

The original documents are located in Box 5, folder “China, unnumbered items - (23), 11/1/75 - 11/6/75” of the Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

Copyright Notice

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS

3 Chi Exch



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ NO0613

PAGE 01 PEKING 22000 010130Z

11
ACTION NO05-00

COPY 10 OF 15 COPIES

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

089275

R 010120Z NOV 75
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4669

~~SECRET~~ PEKING 2000

N O D I S

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJ: SECRETARY'S VISIT TO PEKING

1. AMB HARLAND OF NEW ZEALAND IS CONVINCED CHINA IS TRYING TO QTE GO OVER THE HEAD OF US OFFICIALS UNQTE AND TAKE ITS CASE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.
2. AS AN EXAMPLE, HE CITES A CONVERSATION HE HAD WITH TIME CORRESPONDENT TALBOTT ON RECENT SECSTATE VISIT. TALBOTT WAS SUPPOSEDLY TOLD BY MA YU-CHEN THAT OUR POLICY IN EUROPE WAS SIMILAR TO CHAMBERLAIN AT MUNICH.
3. THIS REFERENCE INTERESTED ME BECAUSE OF SIMILAR REFERENCE IN SECSTATE'S TALKS WITH TENG. THERE HAS BEEN NO LEAKING ABOUT THE TALKS, AND INDEED HARLAND NEVER EVEN ASKED ME IF SUCH A REFERENCE HAD BEEN MADE IN TENG TALKS.
4. I WOULD SUGGEST SOMEONE TALK TO TALBOTT OF TIME ON THIS. PERHAPS WE WILL SEE MUCH MORE ON THIS CHAMBERLAIN AT MUNICH THEME.
BUSH



~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED *State Review*
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 3/21/04
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY 1512, NARA, DATE 7/10/08

3 Chi Exm
2

OP IMMED
DE WTE #6171 3050317
O 010159Z NOV 75
FM THE WHITE HOUSE//WASH122//

TO AMBASSADOR BUSH USLO PEKING

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY VIA VOYAGER CHANNELS WH52074

WASH122

TO: AMBASSADOR BUSH
FROM: SECRETARY KISSINGER
REF: PEKING 115

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/10/05

1. YOU ARE TO REQUEST A MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CH'IAO ASAP AND CONVEY TO HIM THE MESSAGE WHICH FOLLOWS:

2. THE U.S. SIDE HAS GIVEN FULL CONSIDERATION TO THE CHINESE SIDE'S RESPONSE OF OCTOBER 31 TO OUR PROPOSAL FOR A JOINT PRESS STATEMENT. THE U.S. SIDE HARBORS NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE DIFFERENCES WHICH REMAIN BETWEEN US. AT THE SAME TIME, WE REITERATE OUR VIEW THAT IF THE U.S. IS TO BE IN A POSITION TO TAKE STRONG ACTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS WHICH ARE OF COMMON CONCERN, OR MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS--WHICH WE HAVE SAID WE INTEND TO DO--ON OUR REMAINING BILATERAL DIFFERENCES, THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT AND ANY DOCUMENT TO BE MADE PUBLIC AT ITS CONCLUSION SHOULD HELP BUILD THE BASIS AMONG THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

3. THE U.S. SIDE HAS FURTHER CONSIDERED THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE PUT FORWARD BY THE CHINESE SIDE ON THE NIGHT OF OCTOBER 22-23. WE CONTINUE TO CONSIDER IT UNACCEPTABLE AS A BASIS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION FROM THE ABOVE PERSPECTIVE AS WELL AS FOR ALL THE REASONS WHICH SECRETARY KISSINGER DISCUSSED WITH THE



***** W H S R C O M M E N T *****

MCFARLANE, RODMAN

PSN:003203 RECALLED PAGE 01 TOR:305/03:17Z DTG:010159Z NOV 75

FOREIGN MINISTER.

4. FOR THESE REASONS, THE U.S. SIDE AGAIN STATES ITS BELIEF THAT IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF NEITHER SIDE TO CONCLUDE THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT WITH A PUBLIC STATEMENT WHICH HIGHLIGHTS OUR DIFFERENCES WITHOUT ALSO INCLUDING SOME BALANCE OF COMMON POINTS AND SHARED OBJECTIVES WHICH WILL INDICATE THE INTENTION OF THE TWO SIDES TO BUILD A DURABLE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.

5. WE CANNOT ACCEPT THE CHINESE VIEW THAT THE U.S. DRAFT PRESS STATEMENT IS A REFURBISHED VERSION OF THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE SUBMITTED BY THE U.S. SIDE ON OCTOBER 20, SINCE WE MADE A MAJOR EFFORT TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF CHINESE VIEWS, INCLUDING ACCEPTANCE VERBATIM OF ALL THE POSITIVE PARAGRAPHS IN THE CHINESE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE HANDED US ON OCTOBER 22. HOWEVER, IF THE CHINESE SIDE WANTS TO ADD SOME PARAGRAPHS, WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER THEM. AS THE U.S. SIDE HAS ALREADY PUT FORWARD ITS IDEAS FOR A JOINT PRESS STATEMENT, WE REQUEST THAT THE CHINESE SIDE NOW PUT FORWARD ITS IDEAS REGARDING SUCH A PRESS STATEMENT, OR SUGGEST THE KINDS OF CHANGES IN THE U.S. DRAFT WHICH WOULD MAKE IT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE DOCUMENT. WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIPT OF SUCH A DRAFT OR SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGES IN THE U.S. DRAFT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AS THIS WILL PERMIT FURTHER EXCHANGES OF VIEW BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S ARRIVAL.

6. THE U.S. SIDE ADDS THAT IT IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT A WHOLLY NON-SUBSTANTIVE PRESS STATEMENT WHICH WOULD BE MERELY DESCRIPTIVE OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT. IT IS OUR CONSIDERED JUDGMENT, HOWEVER, THAT SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD BE INTERPRETED IN MANY QUARTERS AS BEING INDICATIVE OF A MAJOR CRISIS IN OUR RELATIONS. THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTS OF THE SECRETARY'S RECENT VISIT INDICATE THE LIKELIHOOD OF CREATING SUCH AN IMPRESSION. WE HAVE NO REASON TO FEAR THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH SPECULATION, BUT THE CHINESE SIDE SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER THIS WILL SERVE THE OBJECTIVES BOTH SIDES SEEK TO ATTAIN IN THE WORLD AND IN THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS. THEREFORE, THE U.S. SIDE WILL WELCOME SUGGESTIONS FROM THE CHINESE SIDE ON A JOINT PRESS STATEMENT.


7. WITH REGARD TO ANNOUNCING THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT,

RECALLED
PAGE 02

PSN:003203

TOR:305/03:17Z

DTG:010159Z NOV 75



WE PROPOSE THAT A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT BE MADE IN BOTH
CAPTIALS ON TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 4, AT NOON WASHINGTON
TIME. WE WOULD PLAN TO USE THE SAME LANGUAGE PUT FORWARD
BY THE CHINESE SIDE DURING THE SECRETARY'S FINAL
DISCUSSION SESSION WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER EXCEPT
FOR CHANGING THE DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM DECEMBER 6
TO DECEMBER 5.

8. YOU SHOULD FINALLY SAY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER
THAT GIVEN THE BRIEF TIME WHICH REAMINS FOR TECHNICAL
PLANNING FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT, WE OBVIOUSLY WOULD
LIKE TO PROCEED WITH ADVANCE ARRANGEMENTS AS SOON AS
IS CONVENIENT FOR THE CHINESE SIDE. YOU SHOULD ASK
CHIAO HOW SOON THE CHINESE SIDE WOULD BE PREPARED TO
RECEIVE AN ADVANCE PARTY OF APPROXIMATELY 40 PEOPLE,
WHICH WOULD ARRIVE BY GOVERNMENT AIRCRAFT FROM TOKYO.
YOU SHOLD INDICATE THAT FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE WE ARE
PREPARED TO HAVE THE ADVANCE TEAM ARRIVE AS EARLY AS
NOVEMBER 6. IN DISCUSSING THIS POINT YOU SHOULD COUCH
THE TONE OF YOUR REMARKS SO AS NOT TO MAKE THE CHINESE
FEEL WE ARE IMPOSING ON THEM AN UNACCEPTABLY EARLY
ARRIVAL TIME FOR THE ADVANCE PARTY.
0794



HAKK - Re the cable

I suggest you briefly

check with Brent

on the advance team

aspects. He has

been dealing with

the White House

staff.

W



~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

VIA WHITE HOUSE CHANNEL

TO: AMBASSADOR BUSH **FLASH**
FROM: SECRETARY KISSINGER **HK**
REF: PEKING 115

1. You are to request a meeting with Foreign Minister Ch'iao ASAP and convey to him the message which follows:

2. The U.S. side has given full consideration to the Chinese side's response of October 31 to our proposal for a joint press statement. The U.S. side harbors no illusions about the differences which remain between us. At the same time, we reiterate our view that if the U.S. is to be in a position to take strong actions on international problems which are of common concern, or make further progress -- which we have said we intend to do -- on our remaining bilateral differences, The President's visit and any document to be made public at its conclusion should help build the basis among the American people for a constructive relationship with the People's Republic of China.

3. The U.S. side has further considered the draft communique put forward by the Chinese side on the night of October 22-23. We continue to consider it


DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/10/08



unacceptable as a basis for further discussion from the above perspective as well as for all the reasons which Secretary Kissinger discussed with the Foreign Minister.

4. For these reasons, the U.S. side again states its belief that it is in the interest of neither side to conclude the President's visit with a public statement which highlights our differences without also including some balance of common points and shared objectives which will indicate the intention of the two sides to build a durable bilateral relationship.


5. We cannot accept the Chinese view that the U.S. draft press statement is a refurbished version of the draft communique submitted by the U.S. side on October 20, since we made a major effort to take account of Chinese views, including acceptance verbatim of all the positive paragraphs in the Chinese draft communique handed us on October 22. However, if the Chinese side wants to add some paragraphs, we are prepared to consider them. As the U.S. side has already put forward its ideas for a joint press statement, we request that the



- 3 -


Chinese side now put forward its ideas regarding such a press statement, or suggest the kinds of changes in the U.S. draft which would make it a mutually acceptable document. We would appreciate receipt of such a draft or suggestions for changes in the U.S. draft as soon as possible as this will permit further exchanges of view before the President's arrival.

6. The U.S. side adds that it is prepared to accept a wholly non-substantive press statement which would be merely descriptive of the President's visit. It is our considered judgment, however, that such a statement would be interpreted in many quarters as being indicative of a major crisis in our relations. The public accounts of the Secretary's recent visit indicate the likelihood of creating such an impression. We have no reason to fear the consequences of such speculation, but the Chinese side should consider whether this will serve the objectives both sides seek to attain in the world and in the normalization process. Therefore, the U.S. side will welcome suggestions from the Chinese side on a joint press statement.



7. With regard to announcing the President's visit, we propose that a public announcement be made in both capitals on Tuesday, November 4, at noon Washington time. We would plan to use the same language put forward by the Chinese side during the Secretary's final discussion session with the Foreign Minister except for changing the date of departure from December 6 to December 5.

8. You should finally say to the Foreign Minister that given the brief time which remains for technical planning for the President's visit, we obviously would like to proceed with advance arrangements as soon as is convenient for the Chinese side. You should ask Chiao how soon the Chinese side would be prepared to receive an advance party of approximately 40 people, which would arrive by government aircraft from Tokyo. You should indicate that from our perspective we are prepared to have the advance team arrive as early as November ⁶. In discussing this point you should couch the tone of your remarks so as not to make the Chinese feel we are imposing on them an unacceptably early arrival time for the advance party.



OP IMMED

<

CWTE115

OO WTE

DE WTE30 #0115 3040950


O 310810Z OCT 75

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

STATE-DEPT, GUIDELINES

BY 1572, NARA, DATE 7/10/08



~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE/HANDLE VIA VOYAGER CHANNELS

PEKING 115 31 OCTOBER 1975

TO : SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM : GEORGE BUSH

REF : PEKING 113

1. FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO CALLED ME IN MORNING OF OCTOBER 31. HE READ FOLLOWING REPLY TO OUR OCTOBER 27 PRESENTATION:

"THE CHINESE SIDE HAS CAREFULLY STUDIED THE UNITED STATES MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 27 AND ITS PROPOSED DRAFT JOINT PRESS STATEMENT. THE REPLY OF THE CHINESE SIDE IS AS FOLLOWS.

"THE SOCIAL SYSTEMS OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES ARE FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT AND THERE EXIST MAJOR DIFFERENCES OF PRINCIPLE BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. NEVERTHELESS, IN PRESENT TURBULENT WORLD SITUATION OUR TWO SIDES HAVE CERTAIN COMMON POINTS. THESE WELL KNOWN FACTS REFLECT THE PRESENT STATE OF US-CHINESE RELATIONS, HAVE BEEN THE BASIS OF CONTACTS SINCE THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE AND THIS CONTINUES AS THE BASIS AND BACKGROUND OF THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT FORD TO CHINA. IT IS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT WE HAVE ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION STATED OUR STAND WITH RESPECT TO THE VISIT.

"WE WELCOME THE US SIDE'S PROPOSAL FOR A VISIT TO CHINA BY PRESIDENT FORD AND ARE PREPARED TO RECEIVE HIM WITH COURTESY. IT WILL BE ALL RIGHT WHETHER OR NOT OUR MINDS MEET. THE US SIDE SHOULD BE CLEARLY AWARE OF THIS AND NOT HARBOR ANY ILLUSIONS.

"IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRESENT STATE OF SINO-US RELATIONS AND IN THE TRADITION OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, WE SUBMITTED ON OCTOBER 22 A DRAFT JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT TO CHINA. HAD THE US SIDE TAKEN A REALISTIC VIEW OF PRESENT SINO-US RELATIONS, IT SHOULD NOT HAVE FOUND IT DIFFICULT AT LEAST TO TAKE OUR DRAFT AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION.

"ON A NUMBER OF MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ISSUES AND THE TAIWAN ISSUE, IT IS POSSIBLE FOR THE TWO SIDES TO STATE OUR VIEWS SEPARATELY. IT IS UNJUSTIFIABLE TO TONE DOWN OR

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

HAK, SCONCROFT, RODMAN, MCFARLANE

RECALLED
PAGE 01

PBNI002222

TOR1304/10148Z

DTG1310810Z OC

~~SECRET~~



***** 8 COPY

ELIMINATE LANGUAGE ALLEGED BY THE US SIDE TO BE OFFENSIVE. DURING HIS VISIT IN 1972, PRESIDENT NIXON SAID THAT NEITHER OF THE TWO SIDES SHOULD ASK THE OTHER TO CHANGE ITS PRINCIPLED POSITION. WE APPRECIATE SUCH AN APPROACH.

"AS FOR THE DRAFT JOINT PRESS STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY END OF PAGE 1 THE US SIDE ON OCTOBER 27, FRANKLY IT IS NOT A PRESS COMMUNIQUE OF THE NORMAL NATURE. IN FACT, IT IS A REFURBISHED VERSION OF THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE SUBMITTED BY THE US SIDE ON OCTOBER 26. THE NAME HAS BEEN CHANGED BUT NOT THE SUBSTANCE. THE PRESENT DRAFT STILL ATTEMPTS TO COVER UP DIFFERENCES IN PRINCIPLE BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES ON MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ISSUES AND CREATES A FALSE IMPRESSION. THIS WILL SERVE NEITHER OF OUR INTERESTS. THE US SIDE HAS TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT SENTENCES IN THE CHINESE DRAFT WHICH, AS A RESULT, HAVE LOST THEIR ORIGINAL MEANING. FOR INSTANCE, THE WORDING ON THE TAIWAN ISSUE DISMEMBERS CHINA'S PRINCIPLED POSITION. FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, THIS UNITED STATES DRAFT IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE CHINESE SIDE.

"WE WOULD LIKE TO REITERATE THAT IF THERE IS TO BE A JOINT COMMUNIQUE, IT MUST FAITHFULLY REFLECT SINO-US RELATIONS AND THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES. THEREFORE, WE HOPE THAT THE US SIDE WILL RECONSIDER THE CHINESE DRAFT. IF IT HAS ANY AMENDMENTS TO SUGGEST ON SPECIFIC WORDING, WE ARE READY TO LISTEN.

"AS FOR THE PATTERN AND THE ESSENCE, WE MUST BE CONSISTENT. WE LOOK FORWARD TO A COUNTER-PROPOSAL FROM THE US SIDE ON THIS BASIS.

"WITH REGARD TO THE PART IN THE US MESSAGE ABOUT DATES AND PLACE OF PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT AND THE TIME OF HIS ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE FROM PEKING, WE KNOW THE CONSIDERATIONS OF THE US SIDE AND RAISE NO OBJECTIONS.

"THE FOREGOING IS THE REPLY FROM THE CHINESE SIDE AND I HOPE YOU WILL REPORT TO THE US SIDE IMMEDIATELY."

2. I ASSURED CHIAO I WOULD DO SO. I THEN RAISED A QUESTION FOR CLARIFICATION, ASKING IF CHIAO'S REPLY INDICATES THAT NO FORM OF PRESS STATEMENT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE CHINESE SIDE. CHIAO REPLIED: "AS I HAVE MADE VERY CLEAR, THE DRAFT JOINT PRESS STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY THE US SIDE IS NOT A PRESS COMMUNIQUE OF THE NORMAL NATURE. SO I BELIEVE IF YOU WILL MAKE A SERIOUS STUDY OF THE CHINESE SIDE'S REPLY, YOU WILL UNDERSTAND OUR POSITION."

3. DCM THAYER ACCOMPANIED ME. CHIAO WAS FLANKED, AS ON OCTOBER 27, BY NANCY TANG, TING, CHAO AND SHIH.

4. COMMENTS: IN MY OPINION WE ARE NOT GOING TO GET ANY EARLY AGREEMENT TO A SATISFACTORY JOINT COMMUNIQUE OR JOINT PRESS STATEMENT CONTAINING ANY SUBSTANCE. MY OWN JUDGMENT IS THAT AT THIS POINT WE SHOULD ADVISE CHIAO THAT WE ARE AGREEABLE TO NO STATEMENT WHATSOEVER OR TO A VERY SIMPLE

P8N122222

RECALLED
PAGE 02

TOR:384/10:48Z

DTG:310810Z

~~SECRET~~

***** 9 COPY

3 Chi Exch

3

086 ***** ~~SECRET~~ ***** COPY

OP IMMED
OO WTE
DE WTE30 #0117 3050935
O 010855Z NOV 75
FM USLO PEKING

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE/HANDLE VIA VOYAGER CHANNELS

PEKING 117 01 NOVEMBER 1975

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/10/08

TO : SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM : GEORGE BUSH

REF : WASH 122

1. FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO RECEIVED ME AT 3 P.M. TODAY (NOV. 1). I MADE THE ORAL PRESENTATION AS INSTRUCTED, LEAVING HIM A COPY OF THE TEXT OF REFTTEL'S PARAS 2-7. I MADE AN ORAL PRESENTATION OF POINTS IN PARA 8 BUT DID NOT LEAVE A TEXT.

2. IN REGARD TO THE POINTS IN PARAS 2-6, CHIAO OFFERED THIS INITIAL RESPONSE, PROMISING A CONSIDERED RESPONSE LATER:
- YOUR SIDE HAS PROPOSED A DRAFT JOINT PRESS STATEMENT, WHICH WAS OT ACCEPTABLE, AND OUR SIDE HAS PUT FORWARD A DRAFT THAT THE TWO SIDES HAVE NOT AGREED UPON. (AFTER I POINTED OUT THAT THE US SIDE HAD NOW PUT FORWARD NOT ONE BUT TWO DRAFTS, CHIAO CONTINUED). YOU HAVE PROPOSED TWO DRAFTS AND WE HAVE PROPOSED ONE. I AM SURE THAT USLO CHIEF BUSH WOULD CERTAINLY BE AWARE THAT WE CANNOT AGREE TO THE REACTION OF YOUR SIDE TODAY TO OUR PREVIOUS MESSAGE.

- THEREFORE, IT IS DIFFICULT FOR US TO ENVISAGE ANY AMENDMENTS BY US TO THE DRAFT JOINT PRESS STATEMENT THAT YOU SUBMITTED LAST TIME BECAUSE, AS I SAID PREVIOUSLY, IT IS NOT A PRESS STATEMENT OF A NORMAL NATURE.

- AS FOR WHAT WAS MENTIONED RECENTLY ABOUT A DESCRIPTIVE PRESS COMMUNIQUE OF A NORMAL NATURE, YOU MENTIONED THAT YOUR SIDE DID NOT FEAR THE CONSEQUENCES. I MUST FRANKLY SAY THAT OUR SIDE MUST EVEN LESS FEAR THE CONSEQUENCES, BECAUSE WE ARE A PEOPLE WHO RESPECT FACTS, AND THAT IS HOW IT IS.

- THAT IS JUST AN INITIAL IMPRESSION. I WILL HAVE TO STUDY THE MATTER FURTHER.

3. REGARDING THE TIMING OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE VISIT

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

HAK, SCOWCROFT, RODMAN, MCFARLANE



RECALLED
PSN:003441 PAGE 01 TOR:305/10:05Z DTG:010855Z NOV 75

***** ~~SECRET~~ ***** COPY

AND THE ARRIVAL OF THE ADVANCE PARTY, CHIAO CHARACTERIZED THESE BOTH AS "JUST TECHNICAL MATTERS," AND SAID HE DIDN'T THINK THERE WOULD BE ANY PROBLEM. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE ADVANCE PARTY, THE CHINESE WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT WITH THE MANY DEPARTMENTS INVOLVED. HE SAID HE WOULD PROVIDE A REPLY TO ALL ASPECTS OF MY PRESENTATION (COMMUNIQUE, TIMING OF ANNOUNCEMENT AND ARRIVAL OF ADVAN. PARTY) AFTER FURTHER STUDY.


4. THAYER ACCOMPANIED ME. SAME CHINESE WERE WITH CHIAO AS BEFORE EXCEPT NANCY TANG INTERPRETED, IN ABSENCE OF MRS. SHIH, AND SUI CHU-MEI WAS ADDED AS A NOTETAKER.

5. COMMENT: CHIAO SEEMED QUITE TIRED TODAY AND EVEN SEEMED SLIGHTLY TESTY IN EXPLAINING TO NANCY TANG ON TWO OCCASIONS WHAT HE WISHED TO HAVE INTERPRETED TO ME.

WARM REGARDS.

GEORGE BUSH

BT



087

~~SECRET~~

***** COPY

Chi Exch
4

OP IMMED
VCZCCWTE118
OO WTE
DE WTESO #0118 3051030
O 011030Z NOV 75
FM USLO PEKING

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE/HANDLE VIA VOYAGER CHANNELS

PEKING 118 01 NOVEMBER 1975
TO : SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: GEORGE BUSH
SUBJECT: PROTOCOL CHIEF'S QUESTIONS ABOUT ADVANCE PARTY
REF : PEKING 117

1. AT ALGERIAN NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION LESS THAN THREE HOURS AFTER MY SATURDAY AFTERNOON MEETING WITH CHIAO (REPTTEL), PROTOCOL CHIEF CHU CHU'N-HSIEN APPROACHED ME TO ASK FOR DETAILS ABOUT ADVANCE PARTY, INCLUDING WHAT DIFFERENT PRC OFFICES, SUCH AS TV AND NEWSPAPERS, ADVANCE PARTY MEMBERS WOULD WANT TO MEET WITH. HE SAID HE WOULD APPRECIATE HAVING THE INFORMATION "SO THAT WE CAN MAKE PREPARATIONS." I TOLD HIM I WAS NOT INFORMED ON THOSE DETAILS BUT PROMISED THAT I WOULD IMMEDIATELY INQUIRE ON HIS BEHALF.

2. I WOULD APPRECIATE GUIDANCE FOR REPLY TO CHU ASAP.

3. CHU'S QUESTIONS IMPLY THAT CHINESE WILL BE RESPONDING QUICKLY AND POSITIVELY ON TIMING OF ADVANCE PARTY.

4. WARM REGARDS

GEORGE BUSH
BT



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/10/08

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

HAK, SCOWCROFT, MCFARLANE, RODMAN

PSN:003464 RECALLED PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:305/11:36Z DTG:011030Z NOV 75

~~SECRET~~

***** COPY

Chi Exch
5

155 ***** ~~SECRET~~ ***** COPY

OP IMMED
DE WTE #6186 3060208
O 020132Z NOV 75
FM THE WHITE HOUSE//WASH 124//

TO AMBASSADOR BUSH USLO PEKING

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA VOYAGER CHANNELS WH52076

WASH 124

NOVEMBER 1, 1975

TO: AMBASSADOR GEORGE BUSH
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
REFERENCES: PEKING 117,118

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY NR, NARA, DATE 7/10/08

1. AS A FOLLOW-ON TO YOUR REFERENCED CONVERSATIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO AND PROTOCOL CHIEF CHU CHUAN-HSIEN, CONTACT THE LATTER (CHU) ASAP AND CONVEY THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ABOUT THE ADVANCE PARTY AS A BASIS FOR WHAT HOPEFULLY WILL BE AN EXPEDITIOUS DECISION REGARDING AN ARRIVAL TIME. HOWEVER, AS IN WASHINGTON 122, PARAGRAPH 8, YOU SHOULD NOT UNDULY PRESS THE CHINESE.

2. THE ADVANCE PARTY WILL CONSIST OF 38 PERSONS. IT WILL BE HEADED BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE WHITE HOUSE ADVANCE OFFICE, MR. BRYON ("RED") CAVANEY. RICHARD SOLOMON, NSC SENIOR STAFF, WILL ACCOMPANY THE PARTY AS SECRETARY KISSINGER'S CONTACT POINT AND TO ASSIST CAVANEY. THE REMAINDER OF THE PARTY WILL REPRESENT THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

- SCHEDULING/PLANNING/PROTOCOL
- SECURITY
- COMMUNICATIONS
- LOGISTICAL SUPPORT (AIRCRAFT, HOUSING, TRANSPORTATION)
- PRESS
- MEDICAL



***** WHSR COMMENT *****

MCFARLANE, RODMAN

PSN:004000 RECALLED PAGE 01 TOR:306/02:08Z DTG:020132Z NOV 75

***** ~~SECRET~~ ***** COPY


TV TECHNICIANS
MRS. FORD'S OFFICE

OF THE 38 AFOREMENTIONED INDIVIDUALS, 13 ARE NON-GOVERNMENTAL TV TECHNICIANS AND THE REMAINDER ARE EQUALLY DIVIDED AMONG THE VARIOUS CATEGORIES LISTED ABOVE.

3. THE ANTICIPATED PLAN OF OPERATION FOR THE ADVANCE PARTY IS THAT IT WOULD MEET WITH LIAISON OFFICE PERSONNEL IMMEDIATELY UPON ARRIVAL. THIS WOULD INVOLVE A BRIEF SESSION BETWEEN AMBASSADOR BUSH AND SIX LEADERS OF THE ADVANCE PARTY FOR APPROXIMATELY 30 MINUTES TO ONE HOUR. THIS WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY EXPANDED COUNTERPART MEETINGS BETWEEN THE REMAINDER OF THE ADVANCE PARTY AND MEMBERS OF THE LIAISON OFFICE. FOLLOWING THIS, IT IS HOPED THAT AMBASSADOR BUSH WOULD ACCOMPANY APPROXIMATELY 12 MEMBERS OF THE ADVANCE PARTY TO AN INITIAL MEETING WITH CHINESE COUNTERPARTS. THE PURPOSE OF THIS INITIAL MEETING WITH THE CHINESE, AND THE SUBSEQUENT SESSIONS WITH THEM, WILL BE TO DEFINE SCHEDULE ITEMS, ETC. INVOLVED IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND FORMULATION OF THESE ELEMENTS OF A SCENARIO FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT WILL BE SITE SURVEYS, WHEREIN THE MEMBERS OF THE ADVANCE PARTY WOULD HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO VISIT AREAS PROPOSED FOR PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY.

4. OUR BEST ESTIMATE IS THAT APPROXIMATELY 3 DAYS WILL BE NEEDED TO ACCOMPLISH THE TASK OF FORMULATING THE SCHEDULE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT. THE ADVANCE PARTY IS HOPEFUL OF COMPLETING ITS TASK IN THIS TIME PERIOD. HOWEVER, OUR MISSION IS TO DO THE JOB; HENCE, THE GROUP WILL REMAIN LONGER IF NECESSARY.

5. FYI: THE ADVANCE PARTY IS UNDER SOME FAIRLY STRICT TIME CONSTRAINTS, SINCE IT HOPES TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON NO LATER THAN NOVEMBER 14 IN ORDER TO TRAVEL WITH THE PRESIDENT TO PARIS. ADVANCE VISITS TO MANILA AND JAKARTA MUST FOLLOW THE VISIT TO PEKING. THUS IT HOPES TO BE IN PEKING FROM NOVEMBER 6 TO 9. WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT WORD OF APPROVAL FROM THE CHINESE WOULD ENABLE THE ADVANCE PARTY TO DEPART WASHINGTON AT 6:30 A.M. LOCAL TIME ON MONDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1975, AND TRAVEL TO ALASKA AND HAWAII PRIOR TO ARRIVING AT TOKYO AND PEKING. THUS, EARLY NOTIFICATION OF ACCEPTANCE BY THE PRC OF AN ARRIVAL ON NOVEMBER 6, 1975 WOULD BE HELPFUL. YOU SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, TELL ALL THIS TO THE CHINESE. WE WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE A RESPONSE FROM THE



PSN:004060

RECALLED
PAGE 02

TOR:306/02:08Z

DTG:020132Z NOV 75

CHINESE BUT WE DON'T WANT TO LOOK LIKE WE ARE PRESSURING THEM. YOU COULD AT LEAST INQUIRE WHEN WE MIGHT EXPECT NOTIFICATION WHEN YOU GIVE CHU THE INFORMATION IN PARAGRAPHS 2-4.

6. ONE WAY OR THE OTHER (A POSITIVE RESPONSE, A NEGATIVE ONE, OR NOTHING, ETC.), PLEASE NOTIFY US OF THE STATE OF PLAY BY NO LATER THAN 6:00 A.M. WASHINGTON TIME ON MONDAY, NOVEMBER 3. EARLIER WORD, OF COURSE, WILL BE OF GREATER VALUE AS WE WOULD HAVE EVERYONE IN PLACE FOR DEPARTURE ON MONDAY MORNING IN THE HOPES OF BEING ABLE TO LEAVE ON SCHEDULE.

7. ONCE WE ARE NOTIFIED BY THE CHINESE OF AN ACCEPTANCE, A MORE DETAILED MESSAGE WILL FOLLOW GIVING TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ADVANCE PARTY (HOUSING ARRANGEMENTS, TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS, WORK SCHEDULE, ETC.). AT THIS SAME TIME, WE WILL COMMUNICATE TO THE CHINESE THE NAME LIST AND OTHER INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR VISAS. GIVEN OUR PRESENT PLANNING, WE ANTICIPATE PICKING UP VISAS FOR THE PARTY IN TOKYO, EITHER LATE IN THE DAY OF WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 5 (LOCAL TIME) OR PRIOR TO DEPARTURE ON THE MORNING OF THE 6TH. FLIGHT INFORMATION WILL ALSO BE COMMUNICATED AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE.
0789



156

~~SECRET~~

***** COPY

3 Chi Excl
6

OP IMMED

<

OO WTE
DE WTE30 #0119 3060725
O 020325Z NOV 75
FM USLD PEKING

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE/HANDLE VIA VOYAGER CHANNELS

PEKING 119 02 NOVEMBER 1975

TO : SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: GEORGE BUSH

REF : WASHINGTON 124

1. I HAVE AN APPOINTMENT WITH CHU CHUAN HSIEN AT 4:30 P.M. SUNDAY NOVEMBER 2 TO DISCUSS ADVANCE MATTERS.

2. WARM REGARDS.

GEORGE BUSH

BT



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/10/08

*****HHSR COMMENT*****

HAK, SCOWCROFT, MCFARLANE, RODMAN

PSN:004229 RECALLED PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:306/07:55Z DTG:020325Z NOV 75

~~SECRET~~

***** COPY

3 Chi Exch

7

OP IMMED
OO WTE
DE WTE30 #0121 3060920
O 020915Z NOV 75
FM USLO PEKING

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE/HANDLE VIA VOYAGER CHANNELS

PEKING 121 02 NOVEMBER 1975
TO : SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: GEORGE BUSH
REF : WASH 124

I PASSED ON THE INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ADVANCE GROUP AS DIRECTED REPTEL TO MFA PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR CHU CHUAN-HSIEN TODAY (NOV. 2) AT 1630 HOURS. CHU SEEMED TO APPRECIATE RECEIVING INFORMATION HE ASKED FOR SO QUICKLY. HE ASKED ABOUT THE RANK OF PEOPLE COMING BELOW SOLOMON AND THE PRESS GROUP. I TOLD HIM THE GROUP WOULD BE STRICTLY A WORKING PARTY WITHOUT THE NEED FOR SPECIAL PROTOCOL CONSIDERATIONS AND THAT THE PRESS PEOPLE WOULD BE TECHNICIANS AND PERHAPS SOMEONE FROM THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS OFFICE. I ASSURED HIM THERE WOULD BE NO CORRESPONDENTS WITH THE GROUP WRITING PRESS STORIES.

I MADE IT CLEAR TO CHU WITHOUT PRESSING THAT WE WOULD APPRECIATE AN ANSWER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON THE ADVANCE PARTY QUESTION. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD AND WOULD REPORT TO FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA RIGHT AWAY.

WARM REGARDS,
GEORGE BUSH
BT



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY LR, NARA, DATE 7/10/08

*****HHSR COMMENT*****

HAK, SCOWCROFT, MCFARLANE, RODMAN

RECALLED
PSN:004277 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:306/09:26Z DTG:020915Z NOV 75

chi ex 8

279

~~SECRET~~

***** COPY

OP IMMED
DE WTE30 #0125 3070945
O 030940Z NOV 75
FM USLO PEKING

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE/HANDLE VIA VOYAGER CHANNELS

PEKING 125 03 NOVEMBER 1975
FOR : SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM : GEORGE BUSH

1. I MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA AT 1700 HOURS TODAY (NOV. 3) AT MY REQUEST TO FILL HIM IN ON THE US GOVERNMENTAL CHANGES TO BE ANNOUNCED TOMORROW AND TO ASK IF HE HAD A RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSALS. CHIAO SAID THEY HAD READ THE PRESS REPORTS OF THE CHANGE, THANKED ME FOR INFORMING HIM OFFICIALLY, AND SAID HE WOULD INFORM HIS GOVERNMENT OF THE DETAILS. HE THEN SAID HE WAS NOT PREPARED AT THE MOMENT TO RESPOND TO OUR PROPOSALS ON THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT. WHEN I ASKED IF THIS MEANT WE WOULD HAVE TO DELAY THE TIMING OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT, HE REFERRED TO THE TIME DIFFERENTIAL AND SAID WE STILL HAD TIME TO MAKE THE DEADLINE IF WE DISCUSSED IT FURTHER TOMORRO. HE HAD NOTHING ON OUR REQUEST FOR THE ADVANCE TEAM.

2. COMMENT: WE HAD MADE IT CLEAR WHEN WE ASKED FOR THE APPOINTMENT THAT WE HOPED TO DISCUSS THE TRIP PLANS AS WELL AS ANOTHER MATTER (THE USG CHANGES). CHINESE DID NOT MAKE TODAY'S DEADLINE--PERHAPS BECAUSE THEY WERE TRYING TO PUZZLE OUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF OUR CHANGES--BUT CHIAO'S COMMENTS IMPLIED THEY HOPE TO GIVE US A RESPONSE TOMORROW.

3. WARM REGARDS.
GEORGE BUSH
BT



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY NRC, NARA, DATE 7/10/08

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

HAK, SCOWCROFT, MCFARLANE, RODMAN

PSN:005160 RECALLED PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:307/10:11Z DTG:030940Z NOV 75

~~SECRET~~

***** COPY

Chi Exm

9

386

~~SECRET~~

*****S COPY

OP IMMED
VZCZCWTE129
OO WTE
DE WTE30 #0129 3081030
O 041025Z NOV 75
FM USLO PEKING

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY NR, NARA, DATE 7/10/08

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE/HANDLE VIA VOYAGER CHANNELS

PEKING 129 04 NOVEMBER 1975
FOR : SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM : GEORGE BUSH
REF : WASH 122, WASH 124

CHIAO KUAN-HUA CALLED ME IN AT 5:30 THIS EVENING TO GIVE ME PRC REPLY TO OUR MESSAGE OF NOVEMBER 1. CHIAO READ CHINESE POSITION WHICH TOOK HARD LINE ON COMMUNIQUE AND SAID ANNOUNCEMENT COULD BE POSTPONED UNTIL AROUND TWO WEEKS BEFORE THE VISIT. AFTER READING TEXT, CHIAO ADDED THAT "IT WOULD BE INCONVENIENT FOR THE CHINESE SIDE TO RECEIVE OUR ADVANCE PARTY ON NOVEMBER 6 BECAUSE ANOTHER HEAD OF STATE WILL BE VISITING THE PRC AT THAT TIME." HE SUGGESTED THE ADVANCE GROUP'S ARRIVAL BE DELAYED UNTIL NOVEMBER 16. I MADE NO COMMENT ON CHIAO'S PRESENTATION OTHER THAN TO SAY I WOULD REPORT THE PRC POSITION.

TEXT CHIAO'S STATEMENT FOLLOWS:

"THE U.S. MESSAGE OF NOVEMBER 1 DEMONSTRATES AGAIN THAT THE U.S. SIDE SEEMS TO BE OF THE VIEW THAT IT WILL NOT BE IN A POSITION TO TAKE STRONG ACTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS OF COMMON CONCERN, NOR WILL IT BE PREPARED TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE NORMALIZATION OF SINO-U.S. RELATIONS, IF THE CHINESE SIDE DOES NOT SATISFY THE U.S. SIDE ON THE QUESTION OF THE RESULTS OF PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT TO CHINA. THE CHINESE SIDE WOULD LIKE TO STATE THE FOLLOWING IN ALL FRANKNESS: AS IS KNOWN TO ALL, IT IS THE SELF-INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES THAT GUIDES ITS INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS. THE CHINESE SIDE HAS LONG MADE CLEAR THAT IT ENTERTAINS NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. THE BASIS OF CHINA'S POLICY HAS ALWAYS BEEN INDEPENDENCE AND SELF-RELIANCE. CHINA NEITHER FEARS INTIMIDATION NOR SEEKS PROTECTION. AS FOR THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES, THIS IS THE COMMON ASPIRATION OF THE PEOPLE OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES. AND IT IS THE UNITED STATES THAT



*****WHSR COMMENT*****

HAK, SCOWCROFT, MCFARLANE, RODMAN

RECALLED
PSN:006252 PAGE 01 TOR:308/11:46Z DTG:041025Z NOV 75

~~SECRET~~

*****S COPY

OWES A DEBT TO CHINA. IN THE PAST 26 YEARS IN THE ABSENCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, THE CHINESE PEOPLE HAVE LED A LIFE MUCH BETTER THAN IN ANY OTHER PERIOD IN CHINA'S HISTORY. IT CAN BE SAID WITH CERTAINTY THAT FURTHER DELAY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT CAUSE THE SKY TO FALL, AND THE 800 MILLION CHINESE PEOPLE WILL CONTINUE TO ENJOY THEIR HAPPY LIFE.

THE CHINESE SIDE HAS ALWAYS FELT THAT THE ISSUANCE OF A JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF THE NATURE OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, WHICH SHOWS THE WORLD THAT OUR TWO COUNTRIES EACH MAINTAINS ITS PRINCIPLED POSITION WHILE SHARING COMMON POINTS, WOULD BE HELPFUL IN DEALING WITH INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS OF COMMON CONCERN AND MOVING TOWARDS NORMALIZATION. THE IMPACT OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE HAS CLEARLY BORNE THIS OUT. CONVERSELY, AN ATTEMPT TO COVER UP THE TRUTH AND CREATE FALSE IMPRESSIONS CAN ONLY BE HARMFUL AND WILL NOT YIELD THE ANTICIPATED RESULTS. THE INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF ANY COUNTRY AND ITS ABILITY TO TAKE ACTIONS ARE DETERMINED BY THE POLICY IT ACTUALLY CARRIER OUT. FRANKLY, THE CHINESE SIDE DOES NOT CARE ABOUT SPECULATIONS IN OTHER QUARTERS ABOUT SINO-U.S. RELATIONS. IT DOES NOT MATTER TO THE CHINESE SIDE IF NO DOCUMENT IS TO BE ISSUED AT THE CONCLUSION OF PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT TO CHINA, THIS WOULD EVEN NOT BE UNDERSIRABLE.

THE CHINESE SIDE HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE U.S. DRAFT COMMUNIQUE SUBMITTED ON OCTOBER 20 IS UNACCEPTABLE AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION. THAT THE U.S. DRAFT "JOINT PRESS STATEMENT" SUBMITTED ON OCTOBER 27 IS IN ESSENCE A REFURBISHED VERSION OF THAT DRAFT COMMUNIQUE IS IRREFUTABLE. THEREFORE, SUGGESTIONS FOR ADDITIONS OR CHANGES ON THE BASIS OF SUCH A DOCUMENT ARE OUT OF THE QUESTION. WE STILL BELIEVE THAT THE BEST SOLUTION WOULD BE FOR THE TWO SIDES TO FURTHER EXCHANGE VIEWS ALONG THE LINES OF THE CHINESE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE OF OCTOBER 22 AND REACH AN AGREEMENT ON THIS BASIS.

AS FOR THE U.S. PROPOSAL CONCERNING THE TIME OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE DATES OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT, THE CHINESE SIDE FEELS NOVEMBER 4 TO BE TOO EARLY AND THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT CAN WELL BE POSTPONED TILL AROUND TWO WEEKS BEFORE THE VISIT."

WARM REGARDS.

GEORGE BUSH
BT



Chi 5X
10

OP IMMED
DE WTE #6236 3090041
O 050025Z NOV 75
FM THE WHITE HOUSE//WASH 132//

TO USLO PEKING

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA VOYAGER CHANNELS WH52096

WASH 132

TO: AMBASSADOR GEORGE BUSH
USLO PEKING

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

1. PLEASE REQUEST AN APPOINTMENT WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CH'IAO AND CONVEY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE.

2. THE U.S. SIDE HAS RECEIVED AND CONSIDERED THE CHINESE SIDE'S REPLY OF NOVEMBER 4 TO OUR MESSAGE OF NOVEMBER 1. REGARDING THE DOCUMENT TO BE ISSUED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT, THE TWO SIDES HAVE NOW FULLY EXCHANGED VIEWS AND UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER'S POSITION. WE CAN FURTHER EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THIS MATTER BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S ARRIVAL.

3. WITH RESPECT TO THE QUESTION OF THE TIMING OF AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT, THE U.S. SIDE DOES NOT CONSIDER THE PRECISE DATE OF AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF GREAT IMPORTANCE EXCEPT TO MAKE POSSIBLE ORDERLY PLANNING FOR THE VISIT. THE LAST POSSIBLE DATE IN THIS REGARD WOULD BE NOVEMBER 13, SINCE THE PRESIDENT WILL BE LEAVING FOR EUROPE THE NEXT DAY. THIS IS ABOUT TWO WEEKS BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S DEPARTURE FROM WASHINGTON FOR PEKING.

4. ASSUMING THIS DATE IS AGREEABLE TO THE CHINESE

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

MCFARLANE, RODMAN

PSN:000900 RECALLED
PAGE 01

TOR:309/00:41Z

DTG:050025Z NOV 75

~~SECRET~~

***** COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/10/08



SIDE, WE WOULD MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT AT NOON WASHINGTON TIME ON THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 13 AND USE THE FOLLOWING TEXT:

IT HAS BEEN AGREED THAT PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WILL VISIT THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FROM DECEMBER 1 THROUGH DECEMBER 5, 1975.

5. IN ORDER TO PROCEED WITH OUR PLANNING, WE WOULD APPRECIATE HAVING BY SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 8 CONFIRMATION OF AGREEMENT ON THE DATE OF NOVEMBER 13 FOR ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE VISIT.

6. REGARDING THE CHINESE SIDE'S SUGGESTION THAT THE ADVANCE PARTY ARRIVE ON NOVEMBER 16, THE U.S. SIDE WOULD PREFER THAT THE PARTY ARRIVE ON NOVEMBER 19 AND REMAIN IN PEKING UNTIL THE PRESIDENT'S ARRIVAL. IF THIS IS AGREEABLE TO THE CHINESE SIDE, WE WILL PROVIDE DETAILS OF OUR REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ADVANCE PARTY AT A LATER DATE.

7. WARM REGARDS.

0365



PSN:000900

RECALLED
PAGE 02

OF 02

TOR:309/00:41Z

DTG:050025Z NOV 75

Ch. Ex 11

OP IMMED
DE WTE30 #0131 3090645
O 050840Z NOV 75
FM USLD PEKING

TO WHITE HOUSE
PEKING 131 05 NOVEMBER 1975
FOR : SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: GEORGE BUSH
REF : WASH 132

I READ OUR REPLY (SEE REF) TO THE CHINESE NOVEMBER 4 MESSAGE
TO FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO THIS AFTERNOON (NOVEMBER 5).
CHIAO THANKED ME FOR THE REPLY AND INDICATED THE CHINESE
SIDE WOULD STUDY IT.

WARM REGARDS,

GEORGE BUSH
BT



***** W H S R C O M M E N T *****

HAK, SCOWCROFT, MCFARLANE, RODMAN

PSN:007240 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:309/09:22Z DTG:050840Z NOV 75

Chi BX
12

OP IMMED
DE WTE #6258 3091945
O 060036Z NOV 75
FM THE SITUATION ROOM//WASH 133//

TO USLO PEKING

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA VOYAGER CHANNELS WH52099

WASH 133

NOVEMBER 5, 1975

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

TO: GEORGE BUSH

1. MANY THANKS FOR YOUR KIND WORDS. I AM GREATLY
LOOKING FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU AND TO PROFITING
FROM YOUR TREMENDOUS TALENTS.

2. IDEAS ON YOUR CONFIRMATION ARE STILL A BIT
LOOSE AND, IN MY OPINION, WILL DEPEND AT LEAST IN PART
ON HOW THINGS COME ALONG WITH THE CHINESE. I THINK WE
SHOULD NOT DO ANYTHING WHICH WOULD GIVE THEM THE IM-
PRESSION THAT THEY IN ANY WAY WILL BE TAKING SECOND
PLACE TO YOUR NEW RESPONSIBILITIES. THAT COMMENT IS OF
COURSE RELEVANT TO YOUR COMING BACK HERE BETWEEN THE
ANNOUNCEMENT AND THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP.

3. BILL COLBY HAS AGREED TO STAY ON UNTIL YOUR ARE
CONFIRMED. IN ANY EVENT, I SEE NO PROBLEM AT ALL TO
YOUR LEAVING CHINA A WEEK AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S
DEPARTURE, AS YOU SUGGEST.

4. JUST FOR YOUR INFORMATION, WE HAVE PUT OUR AD-
VANCE PEOPLE IN SOMETHING OF A BIND WITH THE DELAY OF
THE TRIP ANNOUNCEMENT. AS YOU KNOW, THEY HOPE TO BE ABLE
TO DO THE ALASKA AND HAWAII STOPS THIS COMING WEEKEND.
I WILL NOT LET THEM DEPART, HOWEVER, UNLESS WE HAVE
CONFIRMATION FROM THE CHINESE THAT AN ANNOUNCEMENT CAN
BE MADE ON THE 13TH. WE SIMPLY CANNOT AFFORD ANY MORE ON
AGAIN-OFF AGAIN STORIES ABOUT THE TRIP. SINCE THEY HOPE

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

MCFARLANE, RODMAN

RECALLED
PAGE 01

PSN:007973

TOR:309/19:45Z

DTG:060036Z NOV 75

~~SECRET~~

*****S COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/10/08



OP IMMED
VZCZCWT132
O WTE
DE WTE30 #0132 3100235
O 060230Z NOV 75
FM USLO PEKING

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE/HANDLE VIA VOYAGER CHANNELS

PEKING 132 06 NOVEMBER
FOR : BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: GEORGE BUSH
REF : WASH 133

1. I CONCUR COMPLETELY WITH YOUR PARAGRAPH 2 OF REFTEL. UNLESS I AM REQUIRED BACK THERE FOR HEARINGS, I AM NOW TOTALLY CONVINCED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO REMAIN HERE, GIVING NO VISIBLE ATTENTION TO MY NEW JOB UNTIL TOTALLY FREE OF MY RESPONSIBILITIES HERE.

2. IT IS HARD TO READ CHINESE REACTION TO THIS NEW APPOINTMENT. IN A SENSE THEY SHOULD LIKE IT, FOR THEY AT LEAST MIGHT FEEL THAT I HAVE BEEN EXPOSED MORE THAN MOST TO THEIR STRONGLY HELD VIEWS ABOUT THE SOVIET THREAT.

3. ON THE OTHER HAND IN A TINY LITTLE INCIDENT TUESDAY A CHINESE GUIDE ESCORTING A BRITISH VISITOR HERE IN PEKING, KNOWING THE VISITOR HAD BEEN TO MY HOUSE, COMMENTED THAT HE WAS "VERY SHOCKED" ABOUT MR. BUSH'S APPOINTMENT, CONCLUDING THAT I HAD BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE AGENCY ALL ALONG AND THAT IT WAS THEREFORE SHOCKING THAT I HAD BEEN AMBASSADOR AT THE UN AND CHIEF IN PEKING." HE ADDED "I WONDER WHAT THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES WILL THINK?" OTHER THAN THIS VERY LOW LEVEL ISOLATED INCIDENT WE HAVE NO INDICATION AS TO HOW CHINESE WILL FEEL. WE DOUBT THIS IS THE LINE THAT PRC WILL BE PROVIDING CADRES BUT I REPORT IT AS THE VERY FIRST CHINESE REACTION TO MY APPOINTMENT OF WHICH WE ARE AWARE.

4. NEVERTHELESS I HAVE NOW CONCLUDED THAT IF I AM CALLED BACK FOR HEARINGS BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT, WHICH I FERVENTLY HOPE WILL NOT HAPPEN, SERIOUS THOUGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO MY NOT RETURNING TO PEKING. THE CHINESE CONCEIVABLY MIGHT FIND THAT EMBARRASSING.

5. I HAD A VERY NICE COOPERATIVE, THOUGHTFUL CABLE FROM



PSN:008148 RECALLED PAGE 01 TOR:310/04:02Z DTG:060230Z NOV 75

***** ~~SECRET~~ ***** COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/10/08

BILL COLBY, WHOM I RESPECT. I WILL MAKE GENERAL PLANS TO LEAVE CHINA AROUND DECEMBER 10TH, RECOGNIZING THAT THIS MAY BE CHANGED BY MANDATE FROM THE SENATE OR OF COURSE A CHANGE OF THINKING ON YOUR END.

6. I AM SORRY ABOUT THE DEALY ON THE CONFIRMATION OF VISIT ANNOUNCEMENT AND OF ADVANCE TEAM PLANS BUT OUR FRIENDS HERE ARE PLAYING IT VERY COOL - ALMOST FROSTY. I WILL BE SENDING THE SECRETARY A CABLE ON OUR VIEWS ON THIS AND WHAT IT CONCEIVABLY COULD MEAN FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT.

7. I DO FEEL THE CHINESE WILL GIVE US AN ANSWER BY SATURDAY, HOPE I'M RIGHT.

8. WARM REGARDS.
GEORGE BUSH

BT



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028061

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME George Bush

CREATOR'S TITLE Ambassador

RECEIVER'S NAME Secretary Kissinger

DESCRIPTION re President's visit

CREATION DATE 11/06/1975

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200144

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 5

FOLDER TITLE China unnumbered items (23)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/13/2008

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR