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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Foreign Minister of the
People's Republic of China
Huang Hua, PRC Permanent Representative to
the United Nations
Chang Han-chih, Deputy Director, Asian Affairs
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Lo Hsu, Deputy Director, African Affairs
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Shih Yen-hua, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Interpreter [Notetaker]
Kuo Chia-ting, Second Secretary, PRC United
Nations Mission, Notetaker [Interpreter]

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National
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Patrick Moynihan, U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations
Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff,
Department of State
William H. Gleysteen, Jr., Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member,
National Security Council

DECLASSIFIED *State Review*
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 3/2/04
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/9/08

DATE & TIME:


Sunday, September 28, 1975
8: 10 p.m. - 11: 55 p.m.
Dinner Meeting

PLACE:

Suite of the Secretary of State
35th Floor, Waldorf Towers
New York City

SUBJECT:

The Soviet Union; CSCE; Europe; Japan;
Angola; Indochina; the President's China
Trip; the Global Strategic Situation; Korea



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[Foreign Minister Ch'iao and his party were escorted into the Secretary's suite. After initial greetings, representatives of the press were brought in for a few minutes to photograph the Secretary and Foreign Minister.]

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: It has been almost ten months since we last met.

Secretary Kissinger: Your Ambassador [Huang Hua] has since learned the he has less of an [English] accent than I do.

You have met all of my friends here. Ambassador Moynihan -- he is extremely competent. The other day the Albanian Ambassador attacked the U.S. Moynihan responded by attacking the Soviet Union. Malik did not know what hit him.

Ambassador Moynihan: What I said was that the Albanian Ambassador had missed an opportunity to attack that superpower which styles itself as Socialist.

Secretary Kissinger: I have read the Foreign Minister's speech. This time you fired some real cannons.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Half real; half empty.

Secretary Kissinger: The empty ones were fired at the British.

I told the Soviet Ambassador that we are gaining on them. Of course, he was so wounded by what you said [about the Soviet Union] that he didn't notice [Ch'iao's attacks on the U.S.]. But I told him that in every category we are gaining on him.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: So much about my speech. I would like to listen to your views, as I have not seen you in a while. I would like to listen to your views on the international situation as a whole.

Secretary Kissinger: We have kept you informed through Ambassador Huang Chen.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: We appreciate that. Every time there has been some development you have informed us. But what is your view of the international situation as a whole?



Secretary Kissinger: The basic situation -- with respect to the Soviet Union -- let me begin there. The basic tendencies which we have commented on before are continuing, or somewhat increasing. We believe they are divided evenly between East and West.

According to our perception, the [Soviets] physical strength and the capabilities for pressure are the same in either direction. The danger is about even.

Our assessment is that they [the Soviets] are probably in a period of transition from one leadership to another.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: But what is the tendency?

Secretary Kissinger: Well -- [pause] I think the tendency --


[Mrs. Kissinger enters the room and is introduced to the Foreign Minister and the other Chinese guests. She departs after a few words with the Secretary on her plans for the evening.]

Secretary Kissinger (continuing); What is the tendency of their policy? It is very hard to tell in a succession situation, as those with the highest inclination to grasp power have the highest motivation to mask their intentions. Assuming that Kirilenko -- [the Chinese discuss among themselves to clarify the Soviet leader mentioned by the Secretary].

We would expect them to continue on their present course, but with some less flexibility. But since he [Kirilenko] is likely to be even more dependent on vested bureaucratic interests than Brezhnev, the military element is likely to have a relatively larger influence. This [first] successor group is likely to be succeeded in three or four years by a younger group which will almost certainly try to establish the supremacy of the Party.

This is our assessment. I do not know whether it agrees with yours?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Well, on some points we do not share your views. We differ in that a change in the leadership in the Soviet Union -- if a new leadership comes which is not the same as the old one, we are



sure that its tendency will not change. As for the flexibility of that leadership, I have no information to indicate that Kirilenko will be less flexible than Brezhnev. We know him well, and have no such impression.

Secretary Kissinger: Will he be more flexible?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Such is the case with the Soviet Union that when a man is in power he sings a different tune when he is in power than a man who is not in power. So we do not think that the new man will be much different.

In 1964 when Khrushchev fell from power we knew this man Brezhnev well. When he took office we thought some change in their policy might be possible, as we had had previous contact with Brezhnev. But Brezhnev continued his expansionist policy even more viciously and actively.

Secretary Kissinger: So you think they will continue [on their present course]?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Basically. There is a false impression held by some of our Western friends because Brezhnev talks peace and coexistence. But their military talks strength. These are two tendencies in one situation.

Secretary Kissinger: Are we one of those friends?


Foreign Minister Ch'iao (with a somewhat surprised look on his face): At least I think this idea is widespread in Europe.

Last year I met Chancellor Schmidt [and raised this topic with him]. He thought that Brezhnev was more flexible, and if it was a question of others coming to power it was better to keep Brezhnev.

Secretary Kissinger: You will see Schmidt in November?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Late October.

Secretary Kissinger: My view of the basic tendency of Soviet policy is that there is no basic disagreement within their leadership. But as in this country [the U.S.], ambitious people will express different attitudes. But this is not a reflection of basic differences in philosophy.



Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Of course you have made a very detailed study of this. Since there are [now] economic difficulties in the world, all the Soviet leaders have made the same assessment of the West. They do not speak out [directly], but their scholars have. These scholars expressed differences in tactics, although their major assessments [of the situation in the West] are the same.

This is one subject. We can leave it aside and continue our studies [of Soviet intentions].

Secretary Kissinger: Let me say one thing. Our assessment of Soviet tendencies does not differ from yours, but our strategic problem is different than yours.

Your strategic problem is to call the attention to the dangers of this tendency. Our strategic problem is to be in a position to resist these tendencies when they occur. To do this we have to demonstrate for our domestic situation that no other alternative is available.

Therefore we must use language [descriptive] of our relations [with the USSR] which you do not like. But this is the only way for the United States to pursue a really strong policy. If you observe our actual policies in the Middle East, Portugal, Angola, or other areas, when the Soviet Union tries to expand we resist -- even in the face of domestic or foreign criticism.

There is a prize fight on television every Tuesday night. You cannot stand flat-footed in the middle of the ring waiting for people to hit you. But not everyone who moves is running away.

Shall we have dinner?


[The party moved from the sitting room and seated themselves at the dining table.]

Secretary Kissinger : This is a brief visit for you, Mr. Foreign Minister. Are you going back [to China] next week?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: How is the Prime Minister's health?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: He is still in the hospital, but he is better now.



Secretary Kissinger: I still think of him with respect and affection.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Thank you.

Well, you said just now that in my speech to the U.N. General Assembly I fired some real cannons. I feel that after a period of time you will come to understand [my reasons for firing these cannons].

One other point on which I do not agree with you: the Soviet Union, geographically speaking, is in the middle. But proceeding from the realities of the situation, as I have often told you on many occasions, the focal point of the Soviet Union is in the West, not the East.

Secretary Kissinger: Frankly, I can develop an equally plausible interpretation for either course. I am not saying the focal point is in the East. I am saying that I do not know. But whether the focal point is in the West or the East, if they attack one, then the other will be the next victim. So it does not matter.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Well, this is a point of major importance, which affects how you look at the present situation and events of the future.

Secretary Kissinger: If the focal point is in the West, what should we be doing differently? How should we act [if the Soviets are primarily focussing on the West] as opposed to their focussing on the East? I am openminded --

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Quite differently. Well, let me give you an historical analogy on this. If in 1938 the Western politicians had had a clear idea that the focal point of Germany was in Europe, things might have turned out quite differently.

Secretary Kissinger: But if in 1939 the Soviet Union had understood whether the focal point was in the East or the West, the situation would also have been quite different. But I am openminded.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: To return to philosophy, you are a Kantian agnostic.

Secretary Kissinger: You have this basic advantage over me. You progressed to Hegel.



The Soviet Union believes that they can undermine the will to resist of the West politically --

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Of course they wish to achieve this.

Secretary Kissinger: -- but in the East, they must undermine it militarily. That is my view, but it is based on agnosticism.

Our policy is based on the proposition that a strategic gain on either [the U.S. or China] is a disaster for the other. Therefore we seek to prevent either.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: You are right on this point. But you must have a very clear judgment about what is the focal point, as this has a bearing on many policies.

Secretary Kissinger: But if it is in the West, what should we be doing differently?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao (pauses in reflection): Your --


Secretary Kissinger (Ambassador Huang Hua): You are my advisor this evening!

Chang Han-chih (whispers in Chinese to Ch'iao): Helsinki.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Of course, your moves have both internal and external considerations. We have our differences. We notice your moves in the West and Eastern worlds. But some of your moves are not necessary.

Secretary Kissinger: But we are speaking now as friends. I know you want to strengthen Western Europe. We want to also. I would not consider this criticism.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I would not like to mention highly controversial points, even among ourselves. But I should mention the Helsinki Conference. We do not see why it was necessary for you to take such a step. Why didn't you delay? I do not know why you permit them to take such a form which is of need to the Soviet Union.



We do not exactly know your idea. Perhaps it was that Brezhnev is relatively good among the Soviet leaders and you thought you wanted to stabilize his position among these leaders. This is my own idea [of what the Secretary had in mind].

I will be very candid. There is a contradiction [in your position]: On the one hand you said that the Helsinki agreement has no binding force. On the other hand, [your agreement with the Soviets] took the form of a conference. This is contradictory.

Secretary Kissinger: Our motives had nothing to do with Brezhnev personally.

I once had the intention of writing a book on Bismarck. I find him more interesting than Metternich, with whom I am usually identified. Bismarck was more modern. He once wrote that a sentimental policy knows no reciprocity.

The European Security Conference cannot be analyzed in the context of just this year. You have to understand it in terms of its history. It was around for more than ten years as an idea. We negotiated on it for three years. We used it as a safety valve these past three years for other problems.

My instructions to our delegation were that they should remain one step behind the other European governments. We did not take the lead -- although we did not block the conference either.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: This is what you told me last year. But at that time you had not decided whether to convene it as a summit meeting or a conference of foreign ministers.

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct. The foreign ministers' meeting was preempted as a result of Giscard's meeting with Schmidt in December [during which they agreed to hold the Conference at the summit level].

But I submit that you overestimate the European Security Conference.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: No. That is not the case.

Secretary Kissinger: What is its significance?



Foreign Minister Ch'iao: The American press has almost compared the European Security Conference to another Munich.

Secretary Kissinger: The American press is in a mood of nihilism, complete unreality.

Mr. Foreign Minister, the same people who called the European Security Conference another Munich would organize a real Munich at the first crisis. The most destructive thing we can do is to pay attention to our press in its presently destructive mood.

There is one certain prediction: The only way to pursue a strong foreign policy is to do as we are now doing with the Soviet Union. If we are only rhetorically strong, the Washington Post and New York Times would be saying that we missed an opportunity for progress. Any third secretary in the Soviet Embassy could dangle hints of progress before the press, and we would be spending all of our time explaining why we are unresponsive. Just read our press of the 1960s! I would much rather have the New York Times to my right than on my left.


Foreign Minister Ch'iao: About our assessment of the Helsinki conference, there is one point I would like to clarify: We do not attach much importance to that conference. There has not been even one editorial in our papers, only some commentaries.

Secretary Kissinger: I do not know if I like that. Indifference is a worse punishment than criticism.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: In our recent speeches we made criticism of the Helsinki conference. The Soviet Union has lauded it to the skies. But in terms of the international situation, this will all soon evaporate.

Secretary Kissinger. I agree. It [the conference] had to be brought to a conclusion, as its continuation gave it a greater significance than it deserved. It was not worth a battle over the question of [whether to hold] a summit. If the Soviet Union gained [from the conference], it was internally not internationally.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Whether this conference was convened or not, how long it was held, or the form it took -- a summit meeting or foreign ministers' conference -- these things cannot affect the international situation.



Secretary Kissinger: I do not think the results of the conference affected either. Borders -- there are no unrecognized borders in Europe. They were all recognized before the conference.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: But there are some difficulties in it. Politically, they [the Soviets] can make some propaganda -- not legally -- that the borders are now more settled.

Secretary Kissinger: But the borders of the Balkans were fixed in 1946; the borders between Poland and the Federal Republic were established at Yalta. There are no unrecognized frontiers. What fixes the borders now is the presence of 25,000 Soviet tanks between the Oder and the Elbe. Until that situation changes there will be no [political] changes.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: But at least this conference gives people the idea that the Soviets can station troops in Europe.

Secretary Kissinger: I doubt that we gave the Soviets anything in this agreement. We are trying to weaken Soviet influence [in central Europe] by [Presidential] visits and by our developing military relations with the Yugoslavs. But changes requires a political process in Europe.

At the conference, the attitudes of Yugoslavia and Romania, and less so Poland, were most interesting.

At any rate, I do not exclude the possibility that we make mistakes -- although I seldom will admit it. But our strategy is to weaken the Soviet Union.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I know you have taken some steps toward the Soviet Union -- tactical measures.

Secretary Kissinger: At present no other strategy is possible -- unless you have some other idea?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao (after a pause): Your former Secretary of State Stimson had a policy of "non-recognition."

Secretary Kissinger: We tried that with you for twenty years. It was not one of our most successful policies. (Laughter)



Foreign Minister Ch'iao: But in the end you gained the initiative. You did not recognize the Japanese occupation of northeast China as legal. In this you gained the initiative, so at the end of World War II as you did not recognize the Japanese occupation, the initiative was in American hands.

Secretary Kissinger: But the Soviets haven't --

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Hasn't the United States accorded more or less recognition to what the Soviets are doing in Eastern Europe?

Secretary Kissinger: This is a different situation from northeast China, as technically there are independent governments there [in Eastern Europe]. But our strategy is to weaken the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe; to make it more costly for them to hold on.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: But that is only one example. I agree that it is not an exact analogy.

Secretary Kissinger: We do not believe that the European Security Conference changed that situation in favor of the Soviet Union.


Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Perhaps this is the case with you, but quite many other countries think that the problems in Europe have been settled.

Secretary Kissinger: Which [countries]?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Just read their General Assembly speeches! You will see their groundless optimism, their great expectations about detente.

Secretary Kissinger: My impression -- we have taken your advice about strengthening our relations with Europe. My meetings with my colleagues from Britain, Germany, and France, and others, indicate that they have no illusions.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: You are right. Our European friends also told us the same thing. Our friends in Britain, Germany, France, and Italy said that they would first of all strive for detente, and secondly heighten their vigilance. Some of our friends told us that they would seek to strengthen their defenses.



Secretary Kissinger: I would not necessarily rely on the Italians. The others, more so.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Theoretically speaking, this is a two-sided policy. In actuality, what do they stress? Do they strive for detente, or to prepare for war?

Secretary Kissinger: The basic problem in every European country is the complexity of their domestic situations. Strong Communist Parties directed by the Soviet Union seek to use their influence to pressure the Socialists -- except in Germany.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Therefore, the illusion of detente can only help the revisionist parties gain in influence.

Secretary Kissinger: Unless a series of crises create a situation where what you call the revisionist parties can claim that only they can create peace.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: But now there is such a tendency.

Secretary Kissinger: It existed all the time.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: But the atmosphere of detente has helped them.


Secretary Kissinger: That is a matter of judgment. I believe the previous atmosphere was of more help to them [than the present one]. But I understand the argument [you are making]. I do not believe it is a trivial one.

You remember that I suggested that you invite Senator Jackson to China as he represents a tendency which, if strengthened, would make a really strong policy impossible.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I understand that.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree with your concern about Europe. The European political structure was so affected by two wars that their leadership has lost confidence.

Take the Italian situation. This has nothing to do with detente. There is a complete collapse of will on the part of the leadership of the Christians.



Democrats and a misperception on the part of the Church of the real danger. Italy does not have a foreign policy.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: How do you look at Portugal?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to be scolded by the Chinese representative at the United Nations again, so I will be careful. (Laughter)

One superpower has been active, so we are not far behind. Basically we thought that this was an internal Portugese situation. And because of our internal situation we did very little.

We are now working with our European friends to keep groups supported by Moscow from gaining the upper hand. There has been a tactical improvement -- a great tactical improvement -- in the situation. The problem now is whether our European friends will celebrate a victory or realize that these Moscow-supported groups have to be systematically reduced in influence.


Foreign Minister Ch'iao: This struggle will be a long-term one. No matter what you tell your European friends, we tell our European friends not to overestimate the strength of the Communist Parties. We think we know them better than you do. We once told Western European friends to give a free hand to the so-called Communist Parties. Let them take power and expose themselves in power. They said that they couldn't think of such a thing.

Secretary Kissinger: I do not think you really do either. Do you mean [let them take power] in Portugal, or elsewhere?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Portugal. In that case, the Communist Party of Portugal cannot control the Portugese army.

Secretary Kissinger: We do not overestimate the strength of the Communist Party of Portugal. We have to let things mature to a certain point. First, we did not have the domestic capability; and secondly we had to bring Western Europe to understand what the situation was. Thirdly, we had to make certain that Soares was not Kerenski.

Anyway, the situation in Portugal is at an early stage and can go in either direction.



Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Well, I think that if our European friends, backed by our American friends, take tactful action, the Soviets cannot gain the upper hand.

I do not know if you remember, but you told me that ultimately the Soviet Union will have to use its army to gain influence.

Secretary Kissinger: What I said was that the Soviets cannot expand [their influence] without using military power to make their point. They have not won a political victory yet.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: There is a good example to illustrate your point. If it were not necessary for the Soviets to rely on military force then it would not be necessary for them to put so many troops in Central Europe.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, it is striking that thirty years after they put in troops [in the various Central European countries], the governments have no legitimacy. They have to govern with traditional nationalism.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: In our view, if the Soviet Union takes adventuristic action it will lose Eastern Europe.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree, where do you think they will take action? Western Europe? This is why I have my doubts about their real focal point being Western Europe.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao (after a short pause): Well, the situation is very difficult. There are contradictions in everything.

We have stated our views to you on many occasions. Western Europe is the focal point -- Chairman Mao told you -- if the Soviet Union cannot gain hegemony over Western Europe, it cannot control the world. In our view, and your view, Eastern Europe is a liability of the Soviet Union, but they see it as an asset.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree that the Soviet Union's long-range objective is to turn Western Europe into a kind of Finland. The question is how it will really do that. I am speaking now as a professor, not as Secretary of State. Either they can do it by a direct move against Europe, or they can do it by moves which will demonstrate to Western Europe that they are [an] irresistible [force].



The question is whether they might make some move in the Middle East, or in the Far East [to demonstrate their power to Western Europe]. But I am speaking now as a professor; I am not making any predictions. From where I sit, as Secretary of State, we have to be prepared for any possibility.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Yes, you are right, but you have to have priorities on the basis of the urgency of the problem. I agree that the best way the Soviet Union can do this is to defeat Western European countries one by one, and turn the area into a Finland.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, that is their strategy.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: That is the first part of their strategy, because the Soviets realize that unless they do this they cannot realize the rest of their objectives.


There is an old Chinese expression said more than 2,000 years ago by a military strategist named Sun Tzu -- Mr. Solomon will know this -- that the best way to bring your opponents to their knees is not to use soldiers [but a political stratagem]. The Soviets want to do this, but in our opinion it is difficult to do.

Now the Soviet Union is waiting for an opportune time. Eventually it will see that its strategy will not work, and then it will have to use military means. Of course, now conditions are not right [for a resort to military force].

When I talked about the European Security Conference, I did not mean that it was important. I just meant that some words spoken in some quarters were not beneficial to Europe or to the U.S. This has caused some confusion in Europe.

Secretary Kissinger: Any confusion in European is not a result of the European Security Conference; it is a result of the domestic situation, particularly in Italy, and to some extent in Great Britain. It has to be dealt with at that level.

Foreign minister Ch'iao: Let me add one point. After the European Security Conference, due to exaggerated and groundless propaganda, this has heightened the tendency of certain European friends to be negative [passive], especially these Christian Democratic parties.



Secretary Kissinger: The European Social Democrats are vulnerable to the Communist Parties. In Italy especially; not in Germany.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao Not long ago I talked with Strauss. He said to me -- this is no secret -- the Soviet Union intends to bring up Willy Brandt again.

Secretary Kissinger: Perhaps that is correct.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: As he told me, they had grounds to expect this. I don't know, as I don't know Schmidt very well.

Secretary Kissinger: Brandt wants to bring up Brandt again!

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Schmidt is not in good health.

Secretary Kissinger: Schmidt is a good man, although he is not in good health. He has a thyroid condition, and some other [physical] problems, but he is very strong [as a leader]. Schmidt made a great mistake -- we are old friends; we were introduced in 1955 as we were both considered promising young men -- when I was made Secretary of State he was made Finance Minister. I thought I had finally gotten ahead of him. He now has retaliated and I can never outmatch him because of our Constitution [which prevents a foreign born citizen from being President]. So now I am a revolutionary. (Laughter)

He made a basic mistake. When he was made Chancellor, he did not also have himself made head of his party.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: The Soviet strategy is to foster the Christian Democrats in western Europe and then to encourage the Communist parties to merge with them.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. This is why the Italian Christian Democrats are no barrier [to the expansion of Soviet influence] as they cooperate with the Communist Party. But as long as Schmidt is Chancellor in the Federal Republic, this cannot happen [in Germany].

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Let me tell you a joke I read recently. The German Christian Democratic leader Kohl, visited Moscow at the same time that Strauss was visiting Peking to attend the West German [industrial] exhibition. Our press issued an announcement about Strauss' visit to China, and so the Soviet Union refused to receive Kohl for three days.

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviet Union is very stupid. They should know that it is Strauss' nature to visit all sorts of industrial exhibitions.

When I visited the Soviet Union last year, when I was in the Crimea, Brezhnev complained bitterly about Schmidt and Genscher. I said, "Of course you didn't have to send two spies." They replied, "First, East Germany sent the spies; and secondly, we did not order Brandt to hire them."

Foreign Minister Ch'iao I heard that later Brezhnev apologized to Brandt. I do not know if this is true or not.

Secretary Kissinger: But Brandt did it to himself.

Anything we can do to strengthen Schmidt will be helpful. He is coming to Washington soon.

You mentioned earlier the Soviet speculation about the economic situation in the West. You might like to know that we are planning a meeting soon between the President, Giscard, Schmidt, and the Japanese to coordinate economic policy and deal with this situation.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: May I ask a question? How do you evaluate the Miki government? Because last year in Soochow we [Ch'iao and the Secretary] talked about the situation in Japan. We had not thought such changes [as have occurred since] were possible. We said we would keep you informed. I can tell you that before Miki took power we thought he was a friend of China.


Secretary Kissinger: I know he is a friend of China. He is a thoughtful man, but he heads a weak government. He does not have very great confidence. They are very timid. We do not think [the Miki government] will last more than two years. But I agree that his policy towards China is one of friendliness.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Not completely so.

Secretary Kissinger: Because of the hegemony clause?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Exactly! Do you agree?

Secretary Kissinger: I told their Foreign Minister that you [Ch'iao] were right when you said I had something to do with drafting this [clause in the Shanghai Communique dealing with hegemony].



Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I told them to criticize either me or you.

Secretary Kissinger: They fear that you will apply the hegemony clause to us.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Yesterday I talked with the Japanese Foreign Minister about this situation and made an explanation. I told them on this point that, first, it was discussed and agreed upon by the U.S. and China; secondly, I indicated that the anti-hegemony clause is not aimed at undermining relations between Japan and the United States. He understands this. The main trouble is pressure on them by the Soviet Union.

Secretary Kissinger: You must know that we told him [Miyazawa] that we cannot oppose something that we ourselves signed.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Yes. I also told the Japanese Foreign Minister that China and the United States had reached agreement on this clause, and that also we had reached agreement with some small Southeast Asian countries -- Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia. The Soviet Union did not protest then, only in the case of Japan.

Secretary Kissinger: Do you think they will sign [a peace and friendship treaty with the anti-hegemony clause]?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I don't know. I do not understand their internal problems.

Secretary Kissinger (rising with his glass): Mr. Foreign Minister, friends, it is a pleasure to welcome you to the United States. If I am not mistaken, this is your seventh visit to the U.S. It proves that you cannot let me be ahead in anything, even in the number of visits. (Laughter)

We have noted in general that you have this tendency not to let us get ahead of you. Next year we will be having our 200th anniversary. You sent us your archaeological exhibition to show us that 200 years is but a brief period in Chinese history.

Mr. Foreign Minister, your country and ours have a rather strange relationship. Many things we don't agree upon. Occasionally we make that public. And yet, we talk more frankly to each other, and in more



depth, than with almost any other nation. This is because of certain objective factors, and certain necessities which have brought us together and which we assess in the same way. Among these [areas of agreement] I must include the phrases in the Shanghai Communique concerning hegemony, which we just discussed.

As I said in my speech to the U.N. General Assembly, we attach great importance to our relations with the People's Republic of China. We are prepared to cooperate in those basic perceptions we share.

We value these visits and our conversations; therefore, we welcome you.

So now let me propose a toast: to the health and long life of Chairman Mao and Premier Chou En-lai; to the health of Mr. Foreign Minister, and friends, to the friendship of the Chinese and American peoples. Kan-pei. (All rise and toast.)

(There was some discussion back and forth between the Chinese and American sides to clarify exactly how many times Foreign Minister Ch'iao had been to the United States. It was finally agreed that the number was seven, including two visits he had made to the U.S. in 1950.)


Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I would also like to say a few words.

Respected Mr. Secretary -- or rather, respected Dr. Kissinger. We once reached an agreement that I would call you Mister Doctor, and that you would call me Mr. X. Today you have already breached our agreement. But this is not important, this is just a superficial phenomenon.

What is important is that each time we meet we discuss important questions. We are quite candid. Sometimes we have heated discussions, but this is not important. If we talked only superficially, that would be senseless.

As for relations between our two countries, they are stated clearly in the Shanghai Communique. I believe that our two countries, China and the United States, have a determination to continue on the path charted by the Shanghai Communique.

When I was young, I read a sentence -- I do not know where, perhaps it was by a Marxist -- "The situation is stronger than man. A man may think this way or that way, but the situation is stronger than man."



I believe that in the present changing world, we have many common grounds -- although you belong to the Kantian school, and I belong to the Hegelian school. They lived at the same time, under similar circumstances.

Now I would like to propose a toast: To Mr. President Ford; to our friend Mr. Secretary of State; to our new friend Mr. Moynihan; and to our old friends, Mr. Habib, Mr. Gleysteen, Mr. Solomon, and to Mr. Lord -- who is half Chinese, because he has a Chinese wife. (All rise and toast.)


Secretary Kissinger: May I raise a few relatively brief problems here. Then we can talk about the President's visit, and my visit.

First, Angola, I want to discuss this with you. First, what is the problem of Angola? Geographically the railways connecting Zaire and Zambia with the sea go through Angola. Therefore the future of Angola has considerable impact on countries beyond Angola.

The United States has been next to nothing in Angola for many years. Starting in the early part of this year, the Soviet Union greatly increased its arms deliveries in Angola, indirectly via the Congo Brazzaville and directly or through its friends in Portugal. It sympathizers in the Portugese army allowed soldiers to retire from the army and join the military in Neto. So the Neto forces, which were the weakest several months ago, now are the strongest -- not by revolutionary activity, but by outside influence.

We agree with your view [expressed] in the General Assembly that the three revolutionary movements should combine. But if things are left as they are, Neto will defeat the others and there will be nothing left to combine. If nothing is done, Zaire and Zambia will learn that forces supported by the Soviet Union can prevail, and therefore they will shift toward the Soviet Union. So we are trying -- so starting in August, not before, we began to try to establish a balance between the forces of Roberto, Savimbi, and Neto; to establish a balance, together with Kaunda and Mobutu.

I am surprised that China has said it would do nothing. As long as the Soviet Union is active in Africa, this is important to China. If we are concerned with hegemony, why let the Soviet Union stretch its hands into an area as far as this from the Soviet Union? We do not want anything



for ourselves.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Our viewpoint perhaps is not alike.

We believe that by doing so, the Soviet Union will eventually fail even though it may gain some military advantages for a time.

Of course, what I said to the General Assembly is the policy of the Chinese Government. This policy is principled, and also may have some effect on our African friends.

I have discussed this question with some of our European friends. I told them that China will not object to their adopting measures to prevent the Soviet Union from taking advantage of Neto. It is clear now that the civil war in Angola was provoked by the Soviet Union. As they provoked it, they cannot prevent others from taking actions. Since the Soviet Union provoked the war, it has no moral justification for preventing others from taking action against its actions.

If you have made a detailed study of our speech, you will see we know where the blame lies.

Secretary Kissinger: But forget about the speech. What do we do now?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Some of our friends want to enlist the help of South Africa. This is short-sighted.


Secretary Kissinger: We have received the same proposal. We also refused. We worked with Tanzania and Zambia. This has to be done by the blacks there.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao I suggest we give this further study.

Secretary Kissinger: We have studied the situation. Do you want to exchange ideas on it?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: We have a rather strict position on national liberation movements. Chairman Mao, you remember, told you that regarding the Middle East it was necessary to use dual tactics, to use both hands.

Secretary Kissinger: That is just what we are trying to do.



Foreign Minister Ch'iao: But the case of Angola is different. So far we haven't given up hope that this problem can be solved between the African countries and the three liberation movements. Do you believe this cannot work?

Secretary Kissinger: No, I believe -- I will be precise. Roberto and Savimbi have to be stronger. I get daily reports of Soviet military shipments to Luanda. It is mathematically certain that Neto will prevail unless Roberto and Savimbi are strengthened -- or else when the Portugese leave, Neto will take over. So unless Roberto and Savimbi are strengthened, then there can be no agreement between the three liberation movements and the African governments.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Can you do any work with the Portugese government?

Secretary Kissinger: We are, but it does not help with the arms that the Soviets have already put in.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: How large are the Soviet deliveries?

Secretary Kissinger: Armored cars, they have about 30. That is a lot for Africa. 122 milimeter artillery. In Coxito they used the 122 milimeter artillery to great effect. The troops which had been trained on the Chinese model ran away. They need heavier weapons and training. Particularly Savimbi.

I understand that Chinese arms are held up somewhere. It is important that Roberto and Savimbi control the large part of Angola before independence. Otherwise Neto will declare independence and go to the U.N.

Our people think this is a soluble problem if we act quickly. I repeat, we favor an outcome negotiated between the three liberation movements. But in a few weeks the outcome will be decided.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Good. I have taken note of your views.

Secretary Kissinger: If you want to be more specific, have your Ambassador in Washington get in touch with us. We can give you more precise assessments of the weapons they have and the weapons they need.

This is a clear situation of interference from abroad. We are prepared to help Roberto and Savimbi with weapons. Indeed, we are helping already

to some extent.

Now Habib will have another heart attack. This is against all the principles of his bureau.

Mr. Habib: We are just peace-loving.

(The party rises from the dinner table and returns to the Secretary's sitting room.)

Secretary Kissinger: I will arrive in China on the 19th. I will stay a day in Japan [before coming to China].

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Will you bring your wife?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. I also was thinking of bringing Mr. Lynn, the head of our Office of Management and Budget. I thought it would be useful for him to know something about China.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Well, we will consider this.

So you will arrive on the 19th. In the morning or in the afternoon?

Secretary Kissinger: About 3:00 p.m. in the afternoon.


Foreign Minister Ch'iao: How many days will you stay?

Secretary Kissinger: Maybe until the 23rd.

Before I get to this, let me briefly discuss Southeast Asia.

We, of course, no longer have a principal interest in Southeast Asia. In so far as we have, it is in preventing the hegemonial aspirations of others. In time we will have no reason not to establish relations with Vietnam.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Of course, regarding this question we know your domestic situation. We believe that the U.S. should not mind what happened in the past.



Secretary Kissinger: We don't. The question is that your friends in the Vietnam do not have an excessively low opinion of themselves. Therefore, we want to let reality begin to sink in for a while. Then we can establish relations which will more accurately reflect the real world. This has nothing to do with the past.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Well perhaps. One thing that we told you is that you are too emotional in your actions.

Secretary Kissinger: We are trying to be practical.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Of course, it would not have been necessary for me to discuss this, but the Mayaguez was totally unnecessary. But this is not important.

Secretary Kissinger: This gets me to the real point I wanted to discuss.

We see no reason not to begin discussions with Cambodia. If Prince Sihanouk or other members of the Cambodian delegation want to begin discussions, we are prepared.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I will be very honest with you. Prince Sihanouk and other members of the delegation feel that the U.S. harmed them so much that it is not easy for them to take the initiative.

In the interest of the overall situation, we hope you will have proper relations with Cambodia. Take the initiative with the Cambodians. I give you this advice as a friend and not on behalf of Prince Sihanouk, or the other Cambodian officials. Of course, I cannot reply on their behalf. But it is my estimate that they will give you proper courtesy.

Please go on with Southeast Asia.

Secretary Kissinger: Our only interest is in the independence of the various countries [in the region].

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: This is the same with us.

Secretary Kissinger: That is why we thought that the improvement of your relations with Thailand was a positive thing. We spoke in this sense to the Thai Foreign Minister last spring.



Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Chatchai. He has gone home already.

Secretary Kissinger: But he will come back.

So our policy is to support countries [in Southeast Asia] against foreign aggression.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Of course, bygones are bygones. But we hope you will learn lessons from the past and support the independence of these countries. This will make some real friends for the United States.

(The Foreign Minister rose and indicated he wished to take a break. The Secretary escorted him towards the washroom. After a few minutes the Foreign Minister returned and the conversation resumed.)

Secretary Kissinger: A great deal depends on Cambodia -- on the exuberance of their language in the General Assembly -- whether we can make any overtures to them this session.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Since they have come [to New York], and as the U.S. is a major power in the world, they should be received with a proper reception.

Secretary Kissinger: There are two questions here. First, they will receive a proper reception. But on the [second] issue of initiating discussions, it will be necessary for them to moderate their language.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: This is their affair. The Cambodians -- I think their language is strong, although their actual language is another thing.

Secretary Kissinger: I think there is a relationship between language and reality.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: As I told you just now, I don't want to provoke a dispute -- as there doesn't exist such a thing in our relationship -- but the Mayaguez incident hurt their feelings. It will take them some time to forget.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it is up to them. They can't do much for us. Hostile speeches won't be printed on the front page of the New York Times.

As far as we are concerned, our only interest is in the independence of the countries of Southeast Asia. I wanted you to know this.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I'll very sincerely -- I very sincerely hope you have learned your lessons from Indochina. It is up to you if you have learned your lessons. It is your affair whether you want to consider this [meeting with the Cambodians] or not.

In our view, the general situation in Southeast Asia is good. I don't know how you view the situation?

Secretary Kissinger: I think we are seeing the beginning of a process of evolution. As far as the United States is concerned, we have good relations with all of the countries [of the region] except for Indochina. I would not preclude the possibility of Vietnam having certain hegemonial aspirations with regard to Laos and Cambodia.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: It is possible, as a result of the influence of outside forces. But we doubt that it can succeed.

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to Laos, it is easier to succeed that with Cambodia.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: If such is the case, there has only been a short period of time.


Secretary Kissinger: Our estimate is that there are now 2,000 Soviet technicians in Laos.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: What is the significance of 2,000 even 3,000 Soviet technicians? The main question is if they can achieve popularity there.

Secretary Kissinger: I think the main question is influence from Hanoi.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Perhaps. Anyway, the history of the 30 years after the war in Asia is that an outside country cannot dominate any country for long. The Soviet Union for ten years wanted to dominate China. They sent a large number of experts to us to try to dominate us.

Secretary Kissinger: The question is whether China is stronger than Laos. (Laughter)



Foreign Minister Ch'iao: This is only a matter of degree, not kind.

Secretary Kissinger: This is not our primary problem. I just wanted you to know our attitude.

Shall we talk about the President's visit for a few minutes? We don't need to discuss practical problems. I can do this when I come to Peking next month. The issue is what we are trying to achieve. What in your mind is the purpose of the visit [of the President]?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: We, when you were in China last time, when U.S. Senators or Congressmen visited China, we also discussed that it would be useful to exchange visits, to keep in contact. The visit of your President is a major event. In general we hope there will be some step forward on the basis of the Shanghai Communique.

Secretary Kissinger: It seems to me, as you said in your toast, the Shanghai Communique serves as a useful basis of our relationship, and we remain committed to it. We will carry out its provisions in all aspects.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: That is good.

Secretary Kissinger: That is our policy.


Strategically, in light of our discussions, we [the U.S. and China] have pursued somewhat parallel policies despite profound ideological differences. as we have common concerns.

Therefore, what we should look for -- to us politically, domestically, this is not now a major event, but from a foreign policy point of view there should be some symbolic advance. This should not be a visit of two enemies who are using each other, but rather of two countries who are cooperating on certain questions.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: There is no question about it. We have our common ground, as is stated in the Shanghai Communique.

Secretary Kissinger: But when you said we should have some advance [in our relationship], what did you have in mind?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao (laughs nervously): I was just speaking abstractly. As Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing told many U.S. friends,



it is useful for the two sides to have discussions. We can see if there is a step forward on the basis of the Shanghai Communique. But it doesn't matter if there is none.

Secretary Kissinger: Do you have any idea about what kind of document might be published as a result of the President's trip?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: On this question my mind is a blank.

Secretary Kissinger: Anyway, we will change it [the document] on the last night. You know, I cannot remember anything of the last night of our discussions [during President Nixon's visit to China], of any of the issues discussed.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I admire you. Immediately after our talks you held a press conference, and did so at great ease.

Secretary Kissinger: I remembered the document in great detail -- every version we had drafted.

Let me speak of advances, on the problem of Taiwan, and then other problems.

On Taiwan: We cannot complete the process on this visit. It is domestically impossible on this visit, and I have told you this. But perhaps we can think of some formula that can take us short of [completion of] the process.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: That depends on you. I can do nothing. The famous version of the Shanghai Communique was proposed by you.

Secretary Kissinger: Except for the two sections [where the U.S. and Chinese sides expressed their differing points of view]. That was proposed by you.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: This is not a departure from diplomacy. This is a reflection of realities. The world is such that we have contradictions between us, but we also have common ground. So the Shanghai Communique is a new creation, a reflection of realities.

Secretary Kissinger: But should we have a communique, or just an announcement about the President's visit?



Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I cannot tell you at this moment. As I told you, my mind is a blank.

Secretary Kissinger: That in itself is an historic event.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: We can discuss many problems in Peking.

Secretary Kissinger: My idea is not to take too many chances during the visit of the President. We should work out the outlines of a communique.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I agree.

Secretary Kissinger: Our idea is that in all categories of the Shanghai Communique on which we can come to some agreement, we be prepared to show some progress.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: It would be good if we can achieve that. We understand that you have problems. We have no problems.

Secretary Kissinger: But you understand that we cannot complete the process regarding Taiwan, but we can have some progress [in other areas]?!


Foreign Minister Ch'iao (obviously seeking to reorient the discussion): As friends, as this is not the first time that we have met, how do you view the world situation? Can we have peaceful coexistence; or will war break out?

Secretary Kissinger: As a friend?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I am not the Foreign Minister, and you are not the Secretary of State!

Secretary Kissinger: It is possible for war to break out. As an historian it [the prospects for war] is more likely than not. As Secretary of State, I have to act as if war will not break out, or do my best to prevent it.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I do not think we disagree on this point. In your speech -- in my speech to the General Assembly, my purpose was to raise the problem of the danger of war. Yours was to speak about the materialization of detente. But to speak of the materialization of detente, it may backfire.



Secretary Kissinger: But as a friend, when you speak of the focal point [of Soviet pressure being] in the West, this is part analysis and part tactics.

You are afraid -- no, you are concerned that we will use detente to push the Soviet Union toward the East.

My view -- that -- maybe you are right. If the Soviet Union attacks in the West, we have no psychological problems, and of course we will resist. If the Soviet Union attacks in the East, the same psychological preconditions do not yet exist. And yet -- if we are reasonable, the same strategic necessity exists [for U.S. resistance to a Soviet attack in either the East or the West].

Therefore, for us -- a problem for us is to create enough of a relationship to China to make this [attempt to resist Soviet pressures] psychologically meaningful. This [discussion] is so you understand my thinking. From our point of view this is one purpose of the President's visit.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I do not agree with you on the point that our analysis of the focal point of the Soviet Union in the West is a tactic.

Secretary Kissinger: Partly, partly --

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: -- and that China fears the West will use detente to push the Soviets to the East.

Secretary Kissinger: That does not matter. We have to be prepared in the West [for either eventuality].

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I would like to remind you what Prime Minister Chou En-lai told you --

Secretary Kissinger: No, your position has been consistent.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Of course, when we talk you have your subjective views, and you have thought these out of our subjective views.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, I do not exclude the fact that you may be right. We have to act as if you are right.

Shall we spend five minutes on Korea?



Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Okay -- such a wide range [of topics]!

Secretary Kissinger: I think we have publicly stated our positions [on Korea]. They do not seem to be easily reconciled. But we are prepared to improve our relations with North Korea, but not if the price is isolating South Korea. I hope a way can be found during the U.N. debate not to drive this contradiction to its ultimate limit. Your Ambassador is a procedural genius. (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: This is not a big problem.

I think that after the events in Indochina, you exaggerated the situation in Korea. This problem is a very small one.

Our position is that your troops should withdraw at an early date. But you say this will not do. The overall situation of the world hinges on the situation in Korea?

Secretary Kissinger: You won't agree with me, but I do not think it is in your interests to see another precipitate withdrawal of American power. This would have a significant influence on Japan.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Things are quite complicated there, but this question has to be settled. I would advise you to have direct talks with the Korean side. But you have problems.


Secretary Kissinger: No, at the right time we are prepared to talk with sides that we have not talked to before. (Laughter)

One problem is that if the U.N. Command is abolished, we have to find some way to sustain the Armistice arrangement. Secondly, if we talk to North Korea at some point, it must include South Korea at some point.

Incidentally, your ally [North Korea] did not appreciate my proposal of holding talks with you. So they complained and rejected our proposal.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Never mind. Things in the world are so complicated. But some day there will be a solution.

Secretary Kissinger (with emphasis): But not in an American election year. It will not come in the fourth year!



Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Everyone will be pleased if this question can be resolved this year. But it will not be terrible if it is not settled this year.

Secretary Kissinger: But then we need to have something to talk about next year! (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Ch'iao (in English): If we didn't, Moynihan would be unemployed! (Laughter)

Secretary Kissinger: I can't imagine the titanic struggle when Moynihan and Huang Hua clash at the U.N. I will tell Moynihan not to be the aggressor.

I am advised that some television people are outside. It is not necessary for you to say something to them. We didn't put them there. I think it is ABC.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I will meet them, but I won't talk.

(The Chinese arose to depart. There was some light chatter and exchanges of farewells as the American side escorted the Chinese party down the hall to the elevator.)



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GENERAL

CHIAO KUAN-HUA 26 SEP UN SPEECH

Peking NCNA in English 1616 GMT 26 Sep 75 OW

[Text] United Nations, September 26, 1975 (HSINHUA)--Following is the full text of the speech by Chiao Kuan-hua, chairman of the delegation of the People's Republic of China and minister of foreign affairs, at the plenary meeting of the 30th session of the United Nations General Assembly this morning:

Mr President:

Profound changes have taken place in the international situation since the 29th session of the United Nations General Assembly. A serious capitalist economic crisis plagues most parts of the world. All the basic contradictions in the world are further sharpening. The trend of revolution by the people of the world is actively developing. The Asian, African and Latin American peoples have advanced valiantly and won a series of significant victories in their struggle against colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism. On the other hand, the contention between the two superpowers for world hegemony has become more and more intense. The whole world is in greater turbulence and unrest. Rhetoric about detente cannot cover up the stark reality. The danger of war is visibly growing.



First of all, it should be pointed out that the great victory of the three Indochinese peoples has shaken the world. The Cambodian and Vietnamese peoples have thoroughly defeated U.S. imperialism and its lackeys, thus making an important contribution to the anti-imperialist cause of the people of the world and greatly inspiring all oppressed nations and oppressed people. Their victory is a brilliant example showing that a weak nation can defeat a strong, and a small nation can defeat a big.

The peoples of Asia are strongly against superpower interference and control and against the attempt of any country to seek hegemony in any part of Asia. The Southeast Asian countries want their region to become a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers. This position of theirs has won the recognition and respect of an increasing number of countries. The struggle of the south Asian peoples against expansionism and hegemonism has made new progress. In west Asia, longstanding disputes have been resolved by the countries concerned which excluded foreign influence and conducted consultations on an equal footing, thus creating favourable conditions for friendly cooperation among the countries in the region. The gulf countries are getting united in the common struggle against superpower infiltration and control.

In Africa, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe and the Comoros have achieved independence one after another. This is the result of their persistence in protracted struggles, particularly in protracted armed struggles. The struggle of the people of Zimbabwe, Namibia and Azania against racism and white rule is developing in depth. The situation on the African continent is most encouraging.

The struggle of the Latin American peoples to combat imperialism and hegemonism, safeguard state sovereignty and defend their national natural resources and economic rights and interests has continued to surge forward. They have reinforced in various ways their unity in the struggle.

Furthermore, we are pleased to see that in Oceania, Papua-New Guinea has achieved its national independence recently.



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PRC
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

In order to change the old international economic order and oppose the shifting of economic crises, the Third World countries have, in pursuance of the declaration and programme of action adopted by the UN General Assembly at its 6th special session, advanced many reasonable proposals and waged unremitting struggles at various conferences and achieved marked successes. The unity and struggle of the Third World countries, extending from the political to the economic sphere, have ushered in a new stage in the revolutionary cause of the people of the world against colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism.

The countries of the Second World have also heightened their struggle against superpower and particularly social imperialist control, intervention, subversion and threat of force. The trend among the West European countries to get united against hegemonism has continued to grow. The Second World has increased its dialogue and contacts with the Third World. Such cooperation will doubtless have good prospects for development as long as it is based on mutual respect for sovereignty and equality.

The contention between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, extends to all parts of the world. They are intensifying their strife in Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the Pacific, the Atlantic, Asia, Africa and Latin America. Strategically, Europe is the focus of their contention. Social-imperialism is making a feint to the East while attacking in the West. This was revealed, rather than covered up, by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The two superpowers do reach some agreements from time to time, but these only erect a facade, behind which they are engaged in bigger and fiercer contention.

Take for example the agreement in principle reached at the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting last November on the limitation of strategic offensive arms. This agreement only sets a numerical limit on the arms in question, which exceeds the amount each side possesses at the moment, while qualitatively it sets no limit at all. It is evident, therefore, that such an agreement should more appropriately be called an agreement on strategic arms expansion rather than an agreement on strategic arms limitation. Facts are at hand to prove this. Since the signing of this agreement, the United States and the Soviet Union have both stepped up their development and deployment of new-type strategic arms, each trying hard to overpower the other.

Of late, the Soviet Union has made use of the conclusion of the European Security Conference to turn out much propaganda alleging that detente has progressed to a new stage. This is sheer deceptive talk. We are aware of the eager desire for security on the part of the many small and medium countries which participated in that conference. We are also aware that they have no illusions about its agreements which have no binding force. What security, let alone detente, is there to speak of when Europe remains in the prolonged state of tense armed confrontation? While chanting "peace and security" in the conference hall, the Soviet Union made moves to aggravate tension outside. It not only concentrated massive military forces and carried out unbridled provocations in the seas of northern Europe and the Mediterranean, but also brazenly stretched its tentacles to the Iberian Peninsula. Such deeds of expansion coupled with words of detente are a huge mockery of the European Security Conference. From its inception we considered the European Security Conference a European insecurity conference. Now that this conference has ended, is there greater security in Europe? In our view, no. It has not altered the basic situation in Europe in the least. If one should be so naive as to believe in the Soviet propaganda, that would be dangerous indeed.



The Soviet leadership hankers after a so-called "Asian collective security system." Now that the European Security Conference has been a success, as they say, we Asian countries should learn from its example. What a bright idea: The situation in Asia, however, is different from that in Europe. It was only a short while ago that a superpower was driven out of Indochina. So the purpose of the Soviet Union is not the preservation of Asian security; rather it is to "fill the vacuum" and at the same time divert world attention to Asia to cover up the fact that Europe is the focus of its strategy. As for the principle of the inviolability of existing frontiers that was stressed at the European Security Conference, what implications would it have in Asia? Is it that the Soviet Union wants us to recognize as legal its occupation of the territories of some Asian countries while at the same time allowing it to reserve the right to support one Asian country in violating the existing frontiers of another, as it did in 1971? To put it bluntly, the idea of a so-called "Asian collective security system" peddled by the Soviet leadership is designed to facilitate its contention with the other superpower for hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and serves as a means by which it seeks to divide and control the Asian countries. But the Asian countries, which won their independence after protracted struggles, know well that in order to be masters of their own house they must never "let the tiger in through the back door while repulsing the wolf through the front gate." China's attitude towards this stuff of "Asian collective security system" is clear-cut: First, we are against it; second, we despise it.

As Lenin pointed out time and again, imperialism means war. So long as imperialism and social imperialism exist, war is inevitable. The content of imperialist politics is world domination, and the continuation of this politics is imperialist war. Since both superpowers are after world domination, the contradiction between them is irreconcilable; one either overpowers the other, or is overpowered. The so-called "balance of power," even if it exists, is only a transient and superficial one. It will not do to depend on a "balance of power" or a so-called "balance of terror" for maintaining peace. Khrushchev's brainchild that peaceful coexistence is the only alternative in this nuclear age is a hypocritical lie. If the Soviet Union took this stuff seriously, why should it frantically develop conventional armed forces in addition to energetically developing nuclear arms, and maintain an offensive posture far exceeding its defence needs? With the superpowers contending so fiercely and expanding their armaments so madly, they are bound to go to war against each other some day. This is independent of man's will. The superpowers are the source of a new world war, and the danger of war comes mainly from the wildly ambitious social-imperialism. The frequent meetings between the superpowers and their profuse talk about detente precisely prove that there is no detente, let alone lasting peace, in this world. What characterizes the current world situation is decidedly not an irreversible process of detente but the approaching danger of a new world war.

We hope that the people of all countries will heighten their vigilance and get prepared against the growing danger of a new world war. It is better to be prepared than unprepared. Without preparations one will suffer. The superpowers look strong but are inwardly weak and very isolated. The more evils they do, the more thoroughly they will reveal their true features, and the stronger the resistance of the people of the world will become. At present, the factors for both revolution and war are increasing on a world scale. Whether war gives rise to revolution or revolution prevents war, in either case the international situation will develop in a direction favourable to the people. And the future of the world will be bright.



Mr President:

Numerous questions will be considered at the current session of the General Assembly. The Chinese delegation would like to state our views on some of them.

I. The Question of Opposing Colonialism

The past year was a year in which the African people continued to win important victories in their struggle for national independence and liberation. With the collapse of the Portuguese colonial system and the glorious birth of a number of newly independent states, the African national liberation movement has advanced to a new stage, and the last strongholds of colonialism in southern Africa are assailed from all sides by the multitude of African people and countries persisting in struggle.

But even before old-line colonialism dies out, the two superpowers have already stepped in. The United States has long supported colonial rule in Africa, and southern Africa in particular. The Soviet Union, flaunting the banner of "socialism", has infiltrated into the African national liberation movement to sow discord and stir up trouble in an attempt to bring the movement within its social-imperialist orbit.

All revolutionary people of the world are saddened by the civil war in Angola. Differences within a national liberation movement are something normal. The correct attitude is to encourage unity in their common struggle to combat the enemy and drive out the colonialists. That is why the Organization of African Unity has recognized and supported all the three liberation organizations in Angola engaged in armed struggle and has made tireless efforts to promote unity in the Angolan national liberation movement. But the Soviet leadership which considers itself as the patron of the national liberation movement disregards the agreement reached among the three Angolan organizations on unity against the enemy and has, through its propaganda media, identified one organization as revolutionary and censured another as reactionary in a deliberate attempt to create division. Furthermore, it has sent large quantities of arms, including heavy arms, to one of the Angolan organizations. That was how the civil war was provoked in Angola. The other superpower, on its part, has not lagged behind. The situation in Angola is becoming ever more complicated.

From the very beginning China has given her support to the national liberation movement in Angola. We gave military aid to all three Angolan liberation organizations to help them fight Portuguese colonialism. Being aware of their differences, we have all along urged them to unite against the enemy. After the agreement on independence was reached between the Angolan national liberation movement and Portugal, we stopped giving new military aid to the three Angolan organizations. Such are the facts, and facts are more eloquent than words. The Soviet slanders against China can in no way cover up the truth; instead, they serve to lay bare the true features of the Soviet Union.

The civil war in Angola instigated by the Soviet Union is a bad thing, but a good thing too. It is good precisely because it serves as teaching material by negative example. All revolutionary movements are bound to go through twists and turns. We believe that the broad masses of the Angolan people, after experiencing setbacks and detours, will certainly uphold unity, persist in struggle, frustrate the superpower and particularly social-imperialist schemes and achieve their independence and liberation. Their temporary difficulties and sacrifices will not only greatly enhance their own political awareness, but provide a profound lesson for the liberation movements of the oppressed nations throughout the world.



An excellent situation prevails in Africa. It was because the racists in southern Africa were driven into a corner that Vorster of South Africa proposed "dialogue" between the minority white regime of southern Rhodesia and the Zimbabwe national liberation organizations. This signifies only the weakness of the racists and not at all their strength. Through such tactics they intend to disintegrate the national liberation movement and to preserve the reactionary white rule. The recent conference of heads of state and government of the Organization of African Unity penetratingly stated that "Vorster's detente manoeuvres on Rhodesia are a transparent trick to frustrate majority rule and to disarm the freedom-fighters." The conference stressed the necessity of armed struggle, called on the Zimbabwe people to immediately intensify their armed struggle and expressed the determination to fight by every means possible the white racist regimes until their complete elimination. We warmly support this correct stand. We have always advocated the use of revolutionary dual tactics against the reactionaries' counterrevolutionary dual tactics. Armed struggle is fundamental; the people's armed forces must be strengthened and not weakened, negotiations or no negotiations. Deviations and detours may sometimes occur in the complicated struggle against counterrevolutionary dual tactics. But the people will sum up their experience, overcome difficulties and continue to advance. Through long and tortuous struggles the people of southern Africa will eventually win the complete liberation of the African continent.

II. The Korean Question

The independent and peaceful reunification of Korea is the common aspiration of the entire Korean people. Over the years the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has put forward many reasonable proposals and propositions for the peaceful reunification of the fatherland. Thanks to its initiative, an agreement was reached with the South Korean authorities in 1972 on the three principles for independent and peaceful reunification, which were affirmed by the UN General Assembly in 1973. However, Korea remains divided today, because the Pak Chong-hui clique, supported by the United States, has abandoned these principles and sabotaged the north-south talks.

Under the impact of the great victory of the Indochinese peoples this year, U.S. imperialism became panicky. It endlessly repeated the myth of a so-called "threat of a southward invasion from the north" concocted by the Pak Chong-hui clique, deliberately played up the tension on the Korean Peninsula and even declared that it would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons there. Backed and abetted by the United States, the Pak Chong-hui clique pursued its policy of national division with greater frenzy, issued a succession of "emergency laws", declared a state of war and intensified its suppression of the people in South Korea. It looked as if a Korean war were touch and go. As a matter of fact, that was much ado about nothing. It is now clear that the United States and the Pak Chong-hui clique have acted in this way merely to create a pretext and deceive the people of the world so that U.S. troops may hang on in South Korea and the division of Korea may be perpetuated. If there is a danger of war on the Korean Peninsula, it can only originate from the South Korean authorities that constantly clamour for "reunification by prevailing over communism," and absolutely not from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea which insists on independent and peaceful reunification.

The draft resolution on Korea submitted by the United States, Japan and other countries this year claims a "preparedness" to terminate the United Nations command. But there is no mention at all of the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea. Obviously, its purpose is, under the cover of terminating the UN command, to legalize the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea and create "two Koreas."



The U.S. attempt to thrust the Pak Chong-hui clique into the United Nations is part of this scheme. Clearly, such a draft resolution can by no means lead to a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, no matter how nicely it is worded. It is absolutely unacceptable to us.

We have consistently held that the Korean question should be settled by the Korean people themselves free from any outside interference. The draft resolution on Korea submitted by Algeria, China and other countries proposes that the United Nations command be dissolved and all the foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations be withdrawn, and that the Korean armistice agreement be replaced with a peace agreement signed by the real parties to the armistice agreement. It also puts forward a series of positive measures to remove tension between North and South Korea, prevent armed conflicts and promote the normalization of the situation. This proposal is entirely just and reasonable. It not only meets the eager desire of the entire Korean people but is conducive to the fundamental improvement of the situation of the Korean Peninsula and in northeast Asia.

The United Nations command must be dissolved. From the day of its formation it has been illegal and a tool of U.S. aggression. In fact, it has become a U.S. command long since.

However, the dissolution of the UN command must be coupled with the withdrawal of all the foreign troops from South Korea. For what would be the point of merely changing the name while keeping everything else intact? Continued presence of U.S. troops in South Korea under whatever name contravenes the principles of the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea and will only aggravate the tension of the Korean Peninsula. The question of withdrawal of all the foreign troops from Korea should have been discussed and settled within 3 months after the signing of the Korean armistice agreement. This has been delayed for no less than 22 years because of obstructions placed by successive American administrations. And 17 years have passed since the Chinese People's Volunteers withdrew on their own initiative from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to facilitate a peaceful settlement of the Korean questions. Now there are no foreign troops in North Korea, but U.S. troops still hang on in South Korea. For how much longer does the United States intend to prolong such a state of affairs.

Korea cannot remain forever in a state of armistice. The U.S. representative's idea for the United States and the South Korean authorities to propose to the parties of the armistice the convening of a conference to discuss ways to preserve the agreement has been in existence for 22 years, and how much longer will it be preserved? Moreover, as is known to all, the parties of the Korean armistice agreement have in fact changed a great deal. The Chinese People's Volunteers withdrew from Korea long ago. Most components of the United Nations command have dispersed and evaporated into thin air. So how can such a conference be convened? As for the exploration at such a conference of the possibility of a larger conference to negotiate a more fundamental arrangement, is it not even more impractical? After the armistice in 1953, under the provisions of the armistice agreement a political conference of a higher level should have been held to settle the Korean question. However, owing to sabotage by the United States, even its preliminary talks failed to produce any result. Subsequently in 1954, the Korean and Chinese sides made tremendous efforts in Geneva to urge the convening of a political conference of a higher level in the hope that a peaceful settlement of the Korean question could be realized. At the time, the U.S. representative, stubbornly and arbitrarily clinging to his own course, went so far as to refuse to reopen any discussions on the Korean question in the future. Thus, the United States singlehandedly slammed the door to a political conference on the Korean question.



In the actual circumstances at present, the practical way is for the real parties to the Korean armistice agreement to negotiate and sign a peace agreement to replace the armistice agreement. The facts over the past two decades and prove more that U.S. interference in Korea is the root cause of constant tensions in Korea. Therefore, the key to a peaceful settlement of the Korean question lies in the conclusion of a peace agreement to replace the armistice agreement and in the withdrawal of all U.S. troops.

The United States asserts that as there is no normal international boundary between North and South Korea, the armistice agreement and the demilitarized zone stipulated therein absolutely must not be changed. We cannot accept this view. Korea is only in a state of temporary division. Between North and South Korea there can be no normal international boundary but only a provisional demarcation line. Since both North and South Korea have agreed on the mutual non-use of force and on reunification by peaceful means, why should it be impossible for some necessary measures to be agreed on to settle this problem pending the peaceful reunification? It is groundless to assert that a war will break out in Korea in the absence of the armistice agreement.

The Chinese delegation maintains that the draft resolution on Korea sponsored by Algeria and other countries is one that can solve the problem. We hope that the current session of the General Assembly will seriously consider and adopt this draft resolution.

III. The Middle East Question

Since the October war, the Middle East has reverted to a state of "no war, no peace." This is the result of the fierce and many-sided contention between the two superpowers carried on against the will of the Arab and Palestinian peoples.

During this period, disengagement agreements were signed between Egypt and Israel and between Syria and Israel. Recently, a second disengagement agreement has been signed by Egypt and Israel. Nevertheless, the Middle East question is far from being settled.

It is mainly for the two superpowers that are to be held responsible for this state of affairs. In the 2 years since the October war, one superpower proposed a "comprehensive solution" and the other a "step-by-step solution" of the Middle East question, each trying hard to boost itself and denigrate the others and masquerade as a friend of the Arab and Palestinian peoples. In fact, while the United States has no intention of bringing about a thorough settlement of the Middle East question, the Soviet Union is still less inclined to do so. It may be recalled that when the October war in the Middle East was at its most critical juncture and thereafter, the Soviet Union withheld the shipment of arms already promised to Egypt and even pressed for the repayment of debts. How can one expect such a perfidious country to support in earnest the Arab people in their just struggle for the recovery of the lost territories and the restoration of the Palestinian national rights?

Both superpowers have the need to maintain a state of "no war, no peace" in the Middle East--brief fighting followed by a period of truce, with both war and peace kept under control. Taking advantage of this state of affairs, they contend for spheres of influence, places of strategic importance and oil resources in the Middle East. Taking advantage of the same, they sell munitions in order to reap fabulous profits and alleviate their own economic difficulties. Again taking advantage of this, they test new weapons in preparation for a new war on a larger scale. This is done at the expense of the fundamental interests of the people in the Middle East.



Countless agreements on the Middle East have been reached inside and outside the United Nations in the past 20-odd years. Now, in retrospect, is there any agreement that has been strictly observed by the Israeli aggressors, or that has brought about a basic change in the Middle East situation? None, practically none. In the final analysis, it is not agreements on paper but the struggle of the people that will determine the future of the Middle East. What calls for close attention and vigilance now is that a superpower is taking advantage of the present situation to sow discord and attempt to undermine Arab unity. The Arab and Palestinian peoples must never be taken in.

The Chinese people have consistently supported the Arab and Palestinian peoples in their just struggle against the Israeli aggressors and have all along opposed superpower contention in the Middle East. We believe that the Palestinian and Arab peoples will continue to strengthen their unity, persevere in struggle and carry their fight against aggression and hegemonism through to the end.

IV. The Question of Disarmament

Disarmament is an old question. At a time when there is a growing danger of a new world war, it is fully understandable that the people of all countries, and those of the Third and Second World countries in particular, should feel more concerned about this question. After the European Security Conference, the Soviet leadership has become particularly clamorous for "complementing political detente by military detente," preaching that the most important task now is general and complete disarmament. This is making political profit out of the well-intentioned desire of the people of the world. It is a calculated fraud.

Anyone having respect for realities can see that in Europe there is no political detente at all but a fierce and all-sided contention between the two superpowers. Immediately after the conclusion of the European Security Conference the Soviet Union violated Norway's airspace. Is this not another proof that the so-called detente is just empty talk? To advocate in these circumstances the expanding, developing in depth and spreading of detente can only make people laugh their heads off.

Exploiting the developing countries' keen desire to develop their national economies, the Soviet Union recently has again trumpeted its proposal for a 10 percent reduction of the military budgets of the five permanent members of the Security Council and the use of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries. The Soviet Union deems this proposal its masterstroke, and its representatives have tried to sell it to us here for no one knows how many times. But so far he has failed to inform us just how big the real Soviet military budget is. It would probably take several years to get this clear. And who knows how many more before military budgets can truly be reduced as proposed by the Soviet Union? This magnificent Soviet plan, to use a Chinese saying, is "to draw a pie to satisfy hunger." If the developing countries were to wait for such assistance, wouldn't they be left helpless like "the stranded fish which is promised water to be fetched from a distant sea?"

China's views on disarmament are known to all. We are for disarmament. But it must be genuine and not phoney disarmament. We are against phoney disarmament, and still more against the Soviet attempt to use a disarmament conference as a veil to cover up the truth of its arms expansion and war preparations. The two superpowers are quickening their pace towards a new world war. At this juncture, a disarmament conference in whatever form will only create illusions of peace, serve to deceive and lull the people of the world and bind the hands of the numerous small and medium countries. This is what we are firmly against.



As regards a world disarmament conference, China keeps to her position set forth long ago. Namely, it must have a clear aim and the necessary pre-conditions. The clear aim is the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and absolutely not the so-called limitation of strategic arms. The necessary pre-conditions are: all nuclear countries, and particularly the two nuclear superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, must first of all undertake the unequivocal obligation that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and in any circumstances, and in particular will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones, and that they must withdraw from abroad all their armed forces, including nuclear-missile forces, and dismantle all their military bases, including nuclear bases, on the territories of other countries. But now the superpowers even refuse to undertake the minimum obligation of not using nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear countries. How can it be said that conditions are ripe for holding a world disarmament conference?

Historical experience merits attention. The more the imperialists diffuse a smokescreen of disarmament, the bigger is the danger of war. Before World II, a large-scale international disarmament conference lasting nearly 3 years was held under the sponsorship of the League of Nations after nearly 7 years of preparation, and hundreds of proposals and suggestions were discussed. But the results? Arms expansion instead of disarmament, and war instead of peace. The only effect of that conference was to put many countries off guard and as a result, they were caught unprepared by the outbreak of the Second World War and suffered a great deal.


We hold that the United Nations should not repeat the mistake of the League of Nations.

Nevertheless, as was expected, the Soviet Union tabled at this session of the General Assembly a proposal for the "complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests." This is old ware in new wrappings and another of its tricks for maintaining nuclear monopoly. China's stand on this question is clear to all and we will not repeat it. As regards the Soviet proposal for the prohibition of the manufacture of what it calls new types of weapons even more formidable than nuclear weapons, its aim is none other than to divert people's attention from the immediate issues by talking about remote things. Let it be discussed by those who are prepared to manufacture such weapons. There is no need to bring it up here to scare people.

V. The Question of Development

Since the 6th special session of the General Assembly, the Third World countries have waged effective struggles and put forward a series of reasonable proposals and ideas for transforming the old international economic order based on exploitation. The oil-exporting countries have bravely stood up to superpower intimidation and threats, and kept a firm hold on their oil resources and their right to fix oil prices. Many countries have adopted measures against transnational corporations to regain their sovereign rights in varying degrees. Various associations of raw material-producing countries have been set up one after another. The Third World countries have put forward a number proposals, such as the integrated programme for commodities and the indexation of prices, for the transformation of the present irrational international economic order. The situation of the struggle in the economic field against colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism is excellent.

There are two conflicting positions on the question of development. The position taken by the Third World is for maintaining independence and self-reliance, transforming the old economic order of exploitation of the Third World by a few big powers and establishing a new economic order on the principles of sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit.



The other position, taken by the superpowers, stresses "interdependence" or "international division of labour" between the exploiting and the exploited countries in an attempt to preserve the old economic order. Are the industrially developed countries and the raw material-producing countries interdependent? Yes, they are. This interdependence has been in existence ever since the emergence of a single world market. The point is what kind of interdependence. It may be said that there is an interdependence between the horse and its rider. But, we all know it is the horse that takes the burden and not the rider. As for "international division of labour," it is in essence one and the same as "interdependence." With the emergence of colonialism and imperialism, a new and international division of labour sprang up in the world that converted one part of the globe into a chiefly agricultural field of production serving the other part which was a chiefly industrial field. But to call such cosmopolitan exploitation internationalism is an idea that could only be engendered in the brains of the social-imperialists. Whether or not there is exploitation in the existing international economic relations and whether or not an end should be put to such exploitation--this is a real problem of great importance today.

Towards the demand of the Third World for transforming the old international economic order, two differing attitudes are adopted by different industrially developed countries. One is dialogue, and the other confrontation. Since the use of oil as a weapon by the oil-exporting countries, one superpower has kept hurling abuses and waving the big stick at them and even threatened them with armed intervention in an attempt to coerce them into submission. The other superpower has chimed, saying that oil prices should not be raised unilaterally and asserting threateningly that the aggravation of the oil problem may cause a new flare-up of international tensions. Both take an out-and-out imperialist attitude. We are firmly against this attitude. Facts show that this attitude, far from subduing the oil-exporting countries, only stimulated them to closer unity and hardened their fighting will, we are in favour of dialogue. In the past year and more, many Second World countries have frequently tried dialogue with a number of Third World countries, and some of these attempts have yielded positive results. Ties between the Second World and the Third World have been strengthened. This is a good phenomenon in the international economic life of today.

In the face of the worsening capitalist economic crisis and the shifting of crisis by industrialized countries, the Third World countries have advanced such proposals as the integrated programme for commodities, the indexation of prices and the democratization of the international financial institutions in order to improve their trade terms and develop their national economies. These are entirely justifiable and are minimum demands. But they have met with opposition from a few major industrialized countries. For they constitute a violation of the so-called free market system, which is allegedly sacred and inviolable. Instead, those industrialized countries have put forward a series of concrete proposals allegedly designed to "promote economic development." As a matter of fact, the so-called free market of today has never been free ever since the emergence of monopoly capital. This market is free only for monopoly capital and the industrial powers and not for the developing countries. In the sixties for example, the prices of oil and many other raw materials were kept so low. Was that determined by supply and demand? No, it was determined arbitrarily, or "freely", if you like, by big monopoly capital. To transform the old international economic order, it is imperative to touch this free market system of gaining profits at the expense of others. Otherwise, no matter how many concrete proposals the superpowers may submit or how much money they may promise, these in essence are nothing but a kind of alms and relief which can at best temporarily mitigate a little the difficulties of the developing countries but will not help them shake off exploitation and control. The root cause of their poverty will still be there. The gap between the poor and rich countries will keep widening.



The oil weapon has opened new vistas for the anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist and anti-hegemonic struggle in the economic field. The key to the victories of the oil struggle lies in upholding unity and daring to touch what the industrial powers regard as sacred and inviolable. All raw material-producing countries should get organized and fight in defence of their proper interests. Some people accuse OPEC of being a monopoly organization, a cartel. Why don't they stop and think that cartels, trusts and transnational corporations were inventions of the industrial powers and that to date they still weigh down heavily on the developing countries. Are we to tolerate the injustice of the magistrates being allowed to burn down houses while the common people are forbidden to use fire even to light lamps? All the developing countries should unite more closely. It is true that among the developing countries some are in the greatest need. Other countries should give them more help, and they have already begun to do so. The neediest and other developing countries share common experiences and face common tasks. To call the neediest countries the "fourth world" is groundless or ill-intentioned. There are no saviours in the world. To develop the national economy, a country must persist in independence and self-reliance. Political independence is not won easily, so it is essential to give play to state sovereignty to eliminate gradually but firmly the forces of imperialism and all forces of colonialism and neo-colonialism. The old international economic order was evolved over centuries of colonialist and imperialist plunder and exploitation. It is impossible to thoroughly change it at one stroke. The 7th special session of the General Assembly is a continuation of the struggle of the 6th special session. The struggle against exploitation will be a long one. United as one and persisting in our efforts, we developing countries will surely attain our goal.

Mr President:

Before concluding my speech, I would like to state briefly our opinions on the review of the UN Charter. We are in favour of reviewing the charter and making the necessary amendments. Nothing in the world is immutable. The situation within and outside the United Nations has changed, and it is only natural that the charter should be amended accordingly so as to suit the changed situation. This is common sense. Basing themselves on the purposes and principles of the charter, many countries have put forward views in principle on the revision of certain provisions of the charter, such as expanding the power of the General Assembly, restricting the power of the Security Council, changing the composition of the Security Council, limiting or abolishing the veto right of the states permanent members of the Security Council. We think that these views deserve serious consideration. Since the UN Charter was drawn up by man, why can't it be revised by man? But the superpowers are greatly upset by the changed situation within the United Nations. One superpower describes the democratic voting in the General Assembly as a "tyranny of the majority." The other goes further: at the mere mention of the phrase "review of the UN Charter," it flies into a rage and breaks into abuse, calling people in favour of reviewing the charter "reactionary forces." It mortally fears that it might be deprived of its privilege to abuse the veto power. We would advise this "natural ally of the developing countries" to calm down a bit and not get so exasperated. If you are sure that you have the truth, why are you so afraid of dissenting views? A review of the UN Charter is the general trend and popular demand. We believe that a rational solution acceptable to all can be found so long as the nations, big and small, carry on patient consultations and repeated discussions on the basis of the principle of equality for all. If anyone still resorts to deliberate obstructions, that can only help people see more clearly who are champions of the special privileges of the minority. Therefore, we submit that the work of the review of the charter should be continued.

Thank you, Mr President.



UNITED STATES

PRC TRADE DELEGATION RETURNS FROM U.S.

Peking NCNA in English 1844 GMT 26 Sep 75 OW

[Text] Peking, September 26, 1975 (HSINHUA)--The delegation of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade concluded its visit to the United States. Deputy leader of the delegation Tien Kuang-tao and five others returned to Peking by air today. They were greeted at the airport by Wang Wen-lin, vice-chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, and Lin Ping, director of the American and Oceanian Affairs Department of the Foreign Ministry. On hand also were George Bush, chief of the Liaison Office of the United States of America in China, and Thomas [name as received] J. official of the Liaison Office.

Delegation leader Li Chuan had already left New York for Somalia to preside over the opening ceremony of an economic and trade exhibition of the People's Republic of China.

NORTH ASIA

DERK SPOKESMAN ON KISSINGER'S UN SPEECH

Peking NCNA in English 1522 GMT 26 Sep 75 OW

[Text] Pyongyang, September 26, 1975 (HSINHUA)--The spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea issued a statement yesterday to refute the speech of the U.S. representative to the 30th UN General Assembly, according to KCNA.

The statement says that at the 30th United Nations General Assembly on September 22, U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger spoke about the continued preservation of the armistice agreement in Korea and proposed to the parties concerned of the armistice agreement to convene a conference for discussing "ways" to preserve the armistice agreement.

It says: "This 'proposal' of the United States is a replica of the 'draft resolution' put forward by the U.S. side before the UN General Assembly on the Korean question on June 27 and the contents of a letter sent to the president of the UN Security Council and there is nothing new in it.

"In regard to this question, we made clear the stand of our country through the statement of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea dated August 11 and the memorandum of the Foreign Ministry dated August 17."

The statement says: "An urgent task for converting the armistice into a durable peace in Korea and accelerating the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea is, first of all, to force all the foreign troops to withdraw from South Korea and replace the armistice agreement with a peace agreement.

"The United States, pretending to be interested in the preservation of peace in Korea, is now insisting that the armistice agreement should be preserved as it is. This in itself is an inconsistent piffle."



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FROM SECRETARY KISSINGER

TO SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT

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MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM: SECRETARY KISSINGER

I MET FOR FOUR HOURS THIS EVENING WITH CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA AT A WORKING DINNER. WE COVERED A WIDE RANGE OF SUBJECTS IN WHICH AS USUAL THE PRINCIPAL THEME WAS THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, WITH THE EMPHASIS BEING ON COUNTERING THE SOVIET UNION. THIS TIME, HOWEVER, I DETECTED MORE CONCERN ON THE PART OF THE CHINESE ABOUT MOSCOW'S INITIATIVES, PROBABLY DUE TO BOTH SOVIET OPPORTUNITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE WAKE OF OUR SETBACKS AND IN EUROPE IN LIGHT OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE. CHIAO WAS IN A VERY SOMBER AND PHILOSOPHICAL MOOD; MUCH OF OUR DISCUSSION CENTERED ON THEIR MORE FRONTAL OPPOSITION TO THE SOVIETS GENERALLY VERSUS THE NEED WE HAVE TO PURSUE A MORE COMPLEX POLICY IN VIEW OF THE NEED TO SHORE UP OUR DOMESTIC FRONT IN CASE FIRM ACTION IS REQUIRED AGAINST MOSCOW.

ONCE AGAIN, THE CHINESE EMPASIS WAS CONTINUALLY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AS OPPOSED TO BILATERAL ISSUES BETWEEN US SUCH AS NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS OR THE TAIWAN ISSUE. ON THAT LATTER SUBJECT, I MADE CLEAR THAT WE COULD NOT COMPLETE THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS ON YOUR TRIP, BUT ADDED THAT IN VIEW OF OUR SHARED STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES VIS-A-VIS SOVIET UNION, IT WOULD BE HELPPUL TO SHOW SOME FURTHER PROGRESS IN OUR RELATIONS. CHIAO AGREED, BUT HAD NOTHING SPECIFIC TO SUGGEST. PER THE USUAL CHINESE TACTIC, HE INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD AWAIT OUR SUGGESTIONS, AND THEN HE QUICKLY TURNED THE CONVERSTATION BACK TO THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE AND HIS PRIMARY CONCERN THAT WAR WAS INEVITABLE BECAUSE OF THE SOVIET THRUST.

MUCH OF CHIAO'S CONCERN CENTERED AROUND EUROPE WHICH HE CONTINUED TO CLAIM WAS THE PRIME FOCUS OF THE SOVIET THREAT RATHER THAN ASIA. I EMPHASIZED THAT WHILE

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

SCOWCROFT, MCFARLANE, RODMAN, SDO, SECYLE

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Review*
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *2/9/08*



WE THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS AT LEAST AS GREAT A DANGER TO CHINA AS TO EUROPE, IN EITHER CASE THE ULTIMATE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES EXISTED, AND IT WOULD BE TO OUR INTEREST TO RESIST. HE UNDERLINED THE HARMFUL LULLING ASPECT OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE, PARTICULARLY ITS IMPACT ON THE WEAK EUROPEAN POLITICAL STRUCTURES. I POINTED OUT THE LIMITED ACTUAL IMPACT OF CSCE, WHICH WE FELT HAD TO BE CONCLUDED QUICKLY IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE ITS IMPORTANCE, AND I UNDERLINED OUR VIGOROUS EFFORTS WITH OUR WESTERN ALLIES IN SUCH AREAS AS PORTUGAL AND ECONOMIC COORDINATION. WE AGREED THAT ALTHOUGH THE PORTUGUESE SITUATION WAS TEMPORARILY BETTER, A LONG HARD STRUGGLE WAS


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JUST BEGINNING.

ON ANGOLA, THEY WERE CLEARLY CONCERNED ABOUT SOVIET MANEUVERINGS. CHIAO SAID THAT THE THREE LOCAL FACTIONS AND INTERESTED AFRICAN NEIGHBORS SHOULD RESOLVE THE PROBLEM. I POINTED OUT THAT THE ROBERTO AND SAVIMBI FORCES WOULD HAVE TO BE STRENGTHENED FIRST, OR OTHERWISE THE SOVIET ARMS THAT WERE BEING SUPPLIED TO NETO WOULD MAKE THE ISSUE ACADEMIC. I INDICATED THAT WE WERE TAKING ACTION IN THIS REGARD AND POINTEDLY INVITED THE CHINESE COOPERATION THROUGH THEIR AFRICAN FRIENDS. HE SEEMED INTERESTED.

THE CHINESE ALSO SEEMED CONCERNED ABOUT SOVIET MOVES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA VIA HANOI. IN THIS REGARD I INDICATED OUR WILLINGNESS TO TALK TO THE CAMBODIANS, BUT SAID THAT SIHANOUK SHOULD RESTRAIN HIS RHETORIC WHEN HE COMES TO THE UNITED NATIONS. CHIAO SEEMED RECEPTIVE TO A DIALOGUE BETWEEN US AND THE CAMBODIANS, BUT SUGGESTED THAT THE INITIATIVE WAS UP TO US, IN LIGHT OF THEIR HISTORIC SENSITIVITIES. MOST RECENTLY MAYAGUEZ, HE AGREED WHEN I SUGGESTED THAT HANOI, SUPPORTED BY MOSCOW, COULD HAVE HEGEMONIAL AMBITIONS IN THE REGION. FROM THIS CONVERSATION I DETECTED THAT THE CHINESE MIGHT BE INDICATING ON BEHALF OF THE CAMBODIANS THAT THE LATTER WERE WILLING TO BEGIN DEALING WITH US.

ON KOREA, I EMPHASIZED OUR WILLINGNESS TO FIND A REASONABLE SOLUTION, BUT POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS NOT IN THE CHINESE INTEREST TO SEE ANOTHER PRECIPITOUS REDUCTION OF U.S. FORCES AFTER INDOCHINA. CHIAO SUGGESTED DIRECT U.S.-NORTH KOREAN TALKS. I DID NOT RULE THIS OUT, BUT EMPHASIZED THAT ANY DEALINGS WITH NORTH KOREA COULD NOT BE AT THE PRICE OF ISOLATING SOUTH KOREA. CHIAO DOWNGRADED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM, AND HE IMPLIED THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE TWO KOREAS WAS CONTAINABLE AND WOULD NOT LEAD TO MILITARY ACTION.

CHIAO'S SPEECH TO THE UNITED NATIONS TWO DAYS AGO WAS RELATIVELY ROUGH ON US, SO I DELIBERATELY NEEDLED HIM AT



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
THE OUTSET OF OUR MEETING ON HIS RHETORIC AND KEPT THE MOOD RELATIVELY COOL ON ORDER TO PROBE WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN A FUNDAMENTAL SHIFT IN THE CHINESE POSITION. MY OVERALL IMPRESSION IS THAT THEY ARE MORE WORRIED BOTH ABOUT SOVIET MOVES AND OUR RELATIVE INABILITY TO DEAL WITH THEM. THUS THIS WAS A SOBER CONVERSATION. AT THE SAME TIME THIS TALK MADE CLEAR THAT THEY STILL NEED US, AND THEIR CLEAR EMPHASIS REMAINS ON THE STRATEGIC INTERNATIONAL SITUATION RATHER THAN ON BILATERAL QUESTIONS. I TRIED TO GET ACROSS THE POINT THAT THEY HAD TO COOPERATE IN GIVING MORE MOMENTUM TO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP IF WE ARE TO BE TACIT ALLIES IN COUNTERING SOVIET HEGEMONY. ALTHOUGH SHARING OUR ESSENTIAL PERCEPTION OF THE SOVIET DANGER, IN NO PARTICULAR INSTANCE DID THEY INDICATE A CONCRETE WILLINGNESS TO ACT IN CONCERT TO COUNTER IT, OR A WILLINGNESS

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TO SOFTEN THEIR PUBLIC CRITICISM OF US.

IN SHORT, THEY LOOK TOWARD YOUR VISIT AS BEING IMPORTANT TO SYMBOLIZE OUR ONWARD RELATIONSHIP FOR THEIR OWN STRATEGIC CONCERNS, BUT SEEM TO HAVE LITTLE IDEA ABOUT HOW TO SHOW FORWARD MOVEMENT IN CONCRETE TERMS. I MADE CLEAR THAT MY OCTOBER TRIP TO PEKING SHOULD DEFINE THE CLEAR PARAMETER FOR YOUR VISIT. CHIAO AGREED BUT SUGGESTED ONCE AGAIN THAT CONCRETE IDEAS WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM US. I EXPECT THAT THEY WILL NOT PRESS YOU ON NORMALIZATION ISSUES, BUT WILL SOUND THE THEME OF COUNTERING THE SOVIETS WHILE DISAGREEING WITH OUR TACTICS; THEY WILL PROBABLY GIVE YOU A GENERALLY RESTRAINED AND LOW-KEY WELCOME. IT IS STILL AN OPEN ISSUE WHETHER, FOR STRATEGIC PURPOSES, THEY WILL BE WILLING TO MOVE AHEAD ON AT LEAST SOME BILATERAL ISSUES TO SHOW SIGNS OF VITALITY IN OUR RELATIONSHIP.

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