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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Han Hsu, Deputy Chief, PRC Liaison Office
in Washington
Shen Jo-yun, Interpreter

Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff,
Department of State
William H. Gleysteen, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member,
National Security Council

DATE, TIME,
AND PLACE: September 4, 1975; 3:00 - 3:15 p.m.
Department of State


SUBJECT: Timing of the Secretary's and President's
Visits to the People's Republic of China

Ambassador Han requested a brief appointment with Mr. Lord on this date. He began the discussion by reviewing in detail the proposals regarding timing of the Secretary's and the President's forthcoming visits to Peking as were conveyed by the Secretary on August 12 and via Mr. Lord by telephone on August 14. Han recalled that the dates proposed for the Presidential trip had been November 29 or 30, or December 1, with perhaps a one or two day delay or advance of the date. He then recalled that the initial proposal for the Secretary's visit had been October 15 or 16, but that later this timing had been changed to October 19 or 20, per Mr. Lord's telephone call. As with the Presidential visit, it was indicated that there might be a one or two day delay or advance of the Secretary's trip. Han also recalled that it had been proposed that the Secretary's visit be announced in mid-September. Ambassador Han said that he now wished to give the PRC's reply to these proposals.

Ambassador Han said that in principle the Chinese side agrees to the plan envisaged by the U.S. side. He said that as to specifics, once the U.S. decides on precise dates the Chinese side will give a specific

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BY 142, NARA DATE 2/9/08



response. He noted that the time periods we had proposed included a range of as much as five to seven days, hence the Chinese side will await an exact proposal.

Mr. Lord said that he would immediately report Ambassador Han's response to the Secretary, and that he appreciated the fact that the Chinese side found these time periods convenient.


Ambassador Han then commented on the timing of the public announcement of the Secretary's visit. He noted that the U.S. side had suggested a public announcement in mid-September. He said that the Chinese side feels that this date would be too early. He noted that it was "usual practice" that the Secretary's trips be announced about ten days before the visit was to begin. He reemphasized that this was according to "usual practice."

Mr. Lord inquired whether the Chinese side had any views on the length of either the Secretary's or the President's trips. He observed that the U.S. side had envisaged about four days for each trip. Ambassador Han replied that he had no instructions on this matter.

Mr. Lord then said that on the Secretary's instruction he would like to convey to Ambassador Han some of the flavor of the Secretary's recent Middle East trip. He said that the Chinese side was aware of the results of the trip, that another interim step between Egypt and Israel had been taken which would lead to the return to Egypt of certain lands occupied by the Israelis. He said we believe this is a positive development which will maintain the momentum toward a just settlement in the region. The U.S. is planning to maintain a role in the Middle East, and noted that the Chinese side has supported the U.S. role in the negotiations.

Mr. Lord said that the U.S. had made it clear to all parties in the region, not just the Israelis and Arabs, but all the Arab states, that this recent agreement was just an interim step. The U.S. will sustain efforts to promote a final settlement that will mean progress on all fronts.

Mr. Lord added that the Soviets were not happy with these developments. He mentioned that the Ambassador might have seen public commentary to this effect from the Russians. In addition, he added, the U.S. side had recently received a rather sharp private message expressing Soviet unhappiness with the new interim agreement.



Mr. Lord commented that this was all he had to say on the Middle East situation, but he did wish to underline that the U.S. would continue its efforts in the region.


Ambassador Han thanked Mr. Lord for conveying the information about the Middle East negotiations. He then initiated a discussion of social invitations that the PRC Liaison Office had extended to Mr. Lord and his family, and to Mr. Gleysteen and other Department officials. There was a brief exchange on dates and guest lists for the dinners.

In conclusion, Ambassador Han indicated that he would be leaving for Peking the day after tomorrow. Mr. Lord inquired how long he would be away. Ambassador Han replied at least one month.

At this point the meeting concluded and Mr. Lord and his associates escorted Ambassador Han and Miss Shen to the elevator.

Comment: In a review discussion of the Chinese response, it was agreed that while the PRC reply on dates for the Secretary's and President's trip superficially appeared to be positive, it did convey the peculiar impression of an effort to keep the timing of the Secretary's visit from becoming public as long as possible. While an interpretation of this impression was entirely speculative at this point in time, it was considered possible that the Chinese leadership might be distracted by growing political tensions, some of which had become visible in PRC media at the beginning of September.

Mr. Lord dictated a briefing memo and comment to the Secretary on the PRC response. The Secretary subsequently replied that he wished to have the Chinese notified that October 19 was the specific U.S. proposal for the date of his arrival in Peking, with November 30 the specific date of the President's arrival. No proposal was made for the length of either visit. Mr. Lord contacted the PRC Liaison Office by telephone to convey these specific dates on September 5.



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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION



PARTICIPANTS: See Attached List

DATE, TIME, AND PLACE: September 8, 1975; 4:15 p.m. - 4:40 p.m.
The Cabinet Room

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with the Delegation of the
China Council for the Promotion of International
Trade

Before the meeting began, as the press was taking photographs, the President exchanged a few words with Mr. Hauge on the financial problems facing New York City.

The President: Let me extend a warm welcome and regards to the delegation from the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade on behalf of myself and the American people.

Mr. Li: Thank you.

The President: I am very pleased to have this opportunity to meet with your delegation. Your visit is very helpful in contributing to the normalization of relations between our two countries. Of course, we want normalization to continue based on the Shanghai Communique of 1972.

I am very pleased to see the growth in trade that has come with better relations between our two countries -- of greater trade from the United States to China, and from China to the United States. Of course, we do recognize that this trade relationship is predicated on respect for sovereignty, equality, and mutual benefit.

I recall with great pleasure the trip that I had to the People's Republic of China in 1972. Congressman Boggs and myself spent ten days in your country. I do hope you will extend to Chairman Mao and to Premier Chou En-lai my very best wishes. I was very glad for the opportunity to have met with the Premier and other leaders during my visit to China.



I understand that following this meeting you and the delegation will tour the White House, and that subsequently you have a tour of the United States of approximately 18 days.

I am grateful to Mr. Hewitt and Mr. Phillips, and others of you for taking the leadership in stimulating the trading relationship between China and the United States.

I believe you will find on your trip a warm welcome from the American people. After your trip through major parts of our country, you will understand the warmth of the American people for the Chinese people.

Mr. Li: Thank you. This is the third day of our arrival in this country. We are most privileged to be received by Your Excellency. On behalf of all members of the delegation of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, I extend you our thanks on behalf of the delegation. You asked me to convey your regards to Chairman Mao and Premier Chou En-lai. I will take these back with me, and also express thanks to you.

When we recall our trading relationship, after the signing of the Shanghai Communique in 1972, trade relations between our two countries have been developing. In actual volume, this trade is sometimes big and sometimes smaller, but this is normal.

We come to your esteemed country with the feeling that we will develop trade further.

I want to also take the opportunity to thank our friends of the National Council for U.S.- China Trade for arranging this wonderful itinerary for us. Already this morning we had an opportunity to exchange views on various matters of mutual interest.

I am sure that our visit will increase mutual understanding and friendship, and also help to develop trade.

The President: I am hoping to visit your country later this year. I look forward to the opportunity to meet with Chairman Mao and the Premier, but also to visiting your country as well.

Mr. Li: I am convinced that the visit of Your Excellency will be successful.

The President: During my trip to China I had a wonderful visit to Liaoning Province, to Shenyang, Anshan, and also to Canton. It was a great visit,

not only for the background it gave me on your country, but also for the warm reception of the people.

Would anyone on the American side like to say something?

Mr. Hewitt: Thank you, Mr. President. Our organization has been in existence for two years now. In November, 1973 a number of us here had the privilege of visiting the People's Republic of China. As you know our group -- the National U.S.- China Trade Council -- is a private trade council, not a governmental organization. We are working with the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade to do just that, to promote trade between our two countries.

We share your view, Mr. President, that the development of trade helps the development of relations between our two countries. On behalf of the Council let me express appreciation for your having taken the time to meet with the delegation from the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, and with us. Our meeting with you, and with Secretary Kissinger, gives us an enormous boost for the efforts we are undertaking.

Although each of us here represent certain companies, banks, or law firms, in a very real sense we represent American industries, financial firms and law firms as a whole. We are not working for the benefit of any particular firm or group.

It is our hope that our talks today and tomorrow will facilitate and help promote trade exchanges and exhibitions between our two countries. This can be accomplished if our two organizations work together.

The President (to Huang Chen): Mr. Ambassador, would you like to add something?

Ambassador Huang: Thank you, Mr. President, for taking the time to meet with the delegation from the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade.

(At this point the meeting adjourned.)



Presidential Meeting with the Delegation of the China Council for the
Promotion of International Trade from the People's Republic of China

Participants

U.S. Government

The President

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State

Brent Scowcroft, Lt. General, USAF, Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs

George Bush, Chief of the United States Liaison Office in Peking

Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council

China Council for the Promotion of International Trade Delegation

Li Chuan, Leader

Tien Kuang-tao, Deputy Leader

Cheng Chi-hsien

Han Piao

Kao Feng

Ho Chi

Liu Shao-shan

Yeh Chung-chi

Han Li-fu

Wang Ken-liang

PRC Liaison Office Officials

Huang Chen, Chief of the PRC Liaison Office in Washington

Tsien Ta-yung, Political Counselor

Shen Jo-yun, Interpreter for the Ambassador

Huang Wen-chun, Interpreter for the Delegation

National Council for U.S.- China Trade Officials

William A. Hewitt, Chairman of the Board

Christopher Phillips, President

George Driscoll, Vice President

Eugene Theroux, former Vice President

Donald C. Burnham

William B. Graham


Gabriel Hauge

Joseph T. Kenneally

Kurt E. Reinsberg

Walter Sterling Surrey

James Bish



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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Senator Robert C. Byrd
 Senator Sam Nunn
 Senator James B. Pearson
 Representative John B. Anderson
 Representative John Slack

The President
 Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
 Brent Scowcroft, Lt. General, USAF, Deputy
 Assistant to the President for National
 Security Affairs
 William Kendall, Deputy Assistant to the
 President for Legislative Affairs
 Robert Wolthuis, Staff Assistant to Mr. Friedersdorf
 George Bush, Chief of the United States Liaison
 Office in Peking
 Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member,
 National Security Council

DATE, TIME,
AND PLACE:

September 8, 1975; 4:45 - 5:10 p.m.
 The Oval Office

SUBJECT:

Congressional Report to the President Following
 a Trip to the People's Republic of China

The meeting began with the President welcoming the delegation into the Oval Office. He remarked that he had just been through a series of meetings in the Cabinet Room, including a just-concluded session with a Chinese trade delegation, hence he was glad to shift to the Oval Office.

The President indicated he would like to hear the delegation's impressions of China. There was some commentary about trip reports. Senator Pearson remarked that he had read most of the reports of the previous Congressional delegations which had visited the PRC before he went to China, including the one written by Representatives Hale Boggs and Mr. Ford when they visited China in 1972. Senator Pearson remarked that the Boggs/Ford report was among the best he had read.

The President: On our trip we went up to Liaoning Province, Manchuria. Hale and I went to their big steel plant at Anshan. That is also a rice

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BY JR, NARA, DATE 7/9/08

growing area. Hale was interested in their agriculture. No official [American] visitors had ever been to that area before our trip. We were up there when [hurricane] Agnes hit here. We read about all the hell it did. It was a great trip.

Representative Anderson: Mr. President, let me say it was an honor to have been named head of this delegation. My colleagues from the House and Senate were a pleasure to work with. I can say that I don't think we did any damage to Sino-American relations, although I don't think we broke much new ground either.

I won't take your time to describe the various communes and factories that we visited, although some of my colleagues might like to mention some of the more interesting things we saw.

My impressions: There is no question in my mind that the Chinese take a dim view of our detente with the Soviet Union. Some of the most trenchant remarks by the Foreign Minister ...

The President: Ch'iao Kuan-hua.


Representative Anderson: He characterized detente as a fraud. This is offset by their obsessive fear of the Soviet Union. They talked about a million men on the 7,200 kilometer border, and Russian efforts to subvert minority groups along the frontier. At the same time, they are interested in cultivating good relations with this country.

They did not press us on Taiwan. The Foreign Minister indicated that we did not have a normal relationship, and there can't be one until ...

(Secretary Kissinger entered the room and greeted the Congressmen.)

Representative Anderson: There can't be a normal relationship because of Taiwan. But he went on to say that our relations are "normal." This seems like a contradiction in terms.

Before we entered the country we had seen various stories of factional strife carried in the Western press. When we had our meeting with their Vice Premier, I asked him whether these stories were true. His answer was that those reports were false. He said he was the Chief of Staff of the Army



and would know if they were true. George (Bush) of course had a different interpretation of the situation ...

The President: They just said everything was sweetness and light?

Representative Anderson: But despite our differences, which are great, they are anxious to continue to have good relations with the United States.

We did ask about their plans for economic development, for investment and trade, and got a long dissertation on the need for self-reliance. They are interested, of course, in acquiring technology from abroad, but trade will come slowly, eventually. There has been no great movement in two-way trade. George tells me it will be down 50% this year. But it was a very useful trip.

The President: Is George behaving himself out there?


Ambassador Bush: You can't do anything else out there but behave! (Laughter)

Representative Anderson: The only discordant note in our discussion with Teng Hsiao-p'ing was when he raised the issue of our cancelling the tour of the Chinese art troupe. He said that because we wouldn't let their people sing a song about liberating Taiwan the United States was not a free society. He asked George about the situation. George said in very diplomatic fashion that he wished the issue could have been resolved by compromise as had been the case of the dispute over the Philadelphia Orchestra. Teng said he fully accepted George's comment. So you can see what a fine job he is doing out there.

Senator Byrd: Mr. President, let me also say it was a privilege to make this trip. We had a very congenial group. We were pleased that Geoge Bush could sit in on our various meetings. Let me also say that Bill Kendall, Oscar Armstrong, the doctor, and Terry Howe did a lot of good work for the delegation.

These people (the Chinese) are determined to be self-reliant, self-contained, self-sufficient. They did not give us a snow job. They were frank, charming, gracious -- and very tough.

I do not think we need to expect to sell them a 100 million automobiles or refrigerators. Technology -- they are interested in some. There will



be some cultural exchanges. There could be, I think, some useful exchanges in the medical area. I think we are on the road toward improved contacts in this area.

As one who opposed the admission of Red China to the United Nations, I must say I went there somewhat antagonistic. I came back impressed. They are a hard working people. They appear to have solved their food problem and appear to give their people a basic level of health care.

But they are paranoid about the Soviet Union. They don't see the U.S. as a threat, or establishing hegemony in their area. Their military posture is defensive, but they emphasize they will support oppressed people around the world. They want us to pay more attention to the Soviets. I foresee a future of mutual interest between ourselves and the Chinese in opposing the nuclear and naval threat of the Soviet Union.

When Mao and Chou En-lai leave the scene, there will not be one person to follow in their footsteps -- there will be millions.

They are not a threat to our way of life. We have much in common: countering the Soviet Union.


Senator Pearson: On the issue of Taiwan, we agreed beforehand not to bring the subject up. They did not -- other than the one reference to the song issue.

Before we left, Secretary Kissinger met with us and made a comment about the need for common security on the Korean Peninsula. He made a very powerful impression on us on this point, and so we raised this with the Chinese. They indicated they will support efforts for the peaceful reunification of Korea and said if there is any resort to military action it would come from the South.

I got the impression that the power of the military has gone down since 1971.

We had a marvelous time. The only problem has been that since we've gotten back my wife has been giving all the interviews and getting all the publicity. (Laughter)

The President: When we were there we never seemed to meet the chairmen of any of their so-called revolutionary committees -- we always met the vice chairmen. We concluded that all the chairmen were military men and they did not want us to meet the military.



Senator Nunn: Mr. President, let me say it was an honor to have made this trip. You have to experience China to really understand it. Robert and John did a great job as leaders of the group.

The Chinese do not like developments in Portugal. They do not recognize the Communist movement there; they see it as controlled by the Soviet Union. They are not in favor of what is going on there.

I asked a number of questions about the border [with the Soviet Union]. I asked to be taken there. While that did not happen, hopefully it will make it easier for some future visitor to do so. In describing the Soviet military threat along the border, they said that first of all it was a threat to Japan, secondly a threat to the United States, and only last a threat to China. They bend over backwards not to appear afraid of the Soviet Union. They would say, "Let them come in and we will absorb them. We will give them territory; let them come in!" This sounded very much like Chiang Kai-shek's strategy for dealing with the Japanese.


I asked them whether they could assist us in the problem of our MIAs in Vietnam. The Vice Premier said he would do all that he could, but then went on to say that they would not interfere with the internal affairs of another nation. I view this statement as having a bit of a positive element in it.

I asked the people from the Institute [hosting the delegation], having heard about all the things going well for China, what might go wrong. The only thing that they would say is that they must be alert regarding education and indoctrination of the young people. They seem to have the same problems as we have here in our country: the young people are forgetting the problems that the country faced before so-called "liberation."

Representative Slack: It was my impression that they [the Chinese] have reached a certain plateau. Now they have to offer their people something more. It is always human nature to want something more.

One observation: It appeared to me that on every opportunity they had they would say they could not thank the United States and Russia enough for having educated them on the value of a policy of self-reliance.

Senator Byrd: Mr. President, let me just add one small footnote. Those people are building tunnels in every city. They would say that if the Russians invade Peking they had better be prepared to fight for 20 or 30 years. Their attitude is that if the Russians start a war, China will let them in and then close the door on them.



On Diego Garcia, their position was that they were against the establishment of any foreign bases, but that they are realistic. They hope that Japan will continue to have good relations with the United States. They said that Japan should have as its number one friend the U.S.

They don't seem to anticipate great, spectacular moves with us. I believe our relations with China will develop slowly. If you visit there and there is no resolution of the Taiwan problem, they indicated that would be okay. Our policy, it seems to me, should be one of making efforts to improve our relations but not to appear in a hurry or eager. Things will develop slowly, but they ought to come.

The President: I recall an interesting six-hour meeting we had with Chou En-lai. We had a late night dinner, and Chou graciously suggested to Lindy and Betty that they could leave if they were tired. This was so that we could have a chance to talk. We went on until 3:00 a.m. talking back and forth through an interpreter. We talked about the favorable prospects for the SALT I agreement. They discounted it. I asked Chou whether the Soviet Union as a result of SALT I would reduce their defense budget. Chou, before my remark had been interpreted, said, "Never, never, never," and to emphasize his point pounded one fist into the other.

Representative Anderson: The interpreter I had never volunteered any information on any subject, but on that subject, the prospect of concluding another SALT agreement, he really pumped me for all that he could get. They are intensely interested in that situation.

Secretary Kissinger: They do not like any agreement that we make with the Soviets. They want an irreconcilable conflict between ourselves and the Russians. Our job is to keep them both off balance. We don't want the Soviets to swallow them, as that would upset the world balance. But basically they want an irreconcilable conflict between the Russians and ourselves, this is their secret dream. They scream about every agreement we try to reach with the Soviets, but then move with us after we do.

The President: I remember a visit to a jeep factory. This was almost a tinker toy operation. They were producing vehicles basically on our own design, with a standard shift. They let me take one out on the road for a mile or so. It seemed to work pretty well, although it was far less sophisticated an operation than we have in Detroit.



Senator Byrd: I will put my money on the long run development of China rather than the Soviet Union.

The President: I was certainly impressed with the degree of individual effort and discipline.

Secretary Kissinger: In 20 years, if they keep developing the way they have, they could be a pretty scary outfit.

The President: Where did you go?

Senator Byrd: Peking, Sian, Kweilin.

Senator Nunn: There seemed to be more soldiers near the border area.

Representative Anderson: George and I went up atop the old Shanghai Mansions building to look out over the Whang Pu River. When we were up there we saw these fellows in white coats and trousers lying on a roof. One of the interpreters seemed embarrassed that we had noticed them. It turns out that they were the waiters in the hotel who are in the militia doing a kind of dry run target practice. If the Russians attack them there will be a lot of Chinese for them to contend with.

The President: What did you fly in?

Representative Anderson: A Trident, one of the British jets that they bought some years ago.

The President: When we were there we flew in an old chugger of an aircraft, I think an early British model. It was nicely appointed, but not very up to date. What kind was it? I think a Viscount.

Well, I really appreciate your coming in to share your impressions of the country.



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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028054

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME Harry Thayer

CREATOR'S TITLE Officer at USLO, Peking

RECEIVER'S NAME Brent Scowcroft

DESCRIPTION re Chou

CREATION DATE 09/17/1975

VOLUME 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200138

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 5

FOLDER TITLE China unnumbered items (18)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/12/2008

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

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FM USLO PEKING

TO -WHITE HOUSE

(25X1)

~~TOP SECRET~~

PEKING 0124 17 SEPTEMBER 1975
FROM: GREAT AMB CROFT
FROM: HARRY THAYER, USLO, PEKING

(25X1)

1. REFERRING TO YOUR 113 PARA 6, ROMANTAN REPORT ON CHOO'S HEALTH

SUGGEST THAT, AT THIS STAGE AT LEAST, CHOO'S HEALTH MAY BE FACTOR IN LEADERSHIP'S DISTRACTION AND DESIRE TO HOLD OFF FINAL DECISION ON VISITS.

(25X1)

2. WARM REGARDS.
HARRY THAYER
BT

(25X1)

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AUTHORITY RAC NLF-K-S-WWUF-5-7-1-7 9/21/05

BY lh NSC/State/Intelligence/NLF, DATE 7/9/09



Presidential Library Review of NSC Equities is Required

***** NSR COMMENT *****

SCORCROFT, OCFAPLIFE, RODMAN

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028055

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇMemorandum

CREATOR'S NAME Habib, Lord, Solomon

RECEIVER'S NAME Secretary Kissinger

DESCRIPTION re fall meetings with the Chinese

CREATION DATE 09/18/1975

VOLUME 10 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200138

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 5

FOLDER TITLE China unnumbered items (18)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/12/2008

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES

BY NR, NARA, DATE 7/9/08

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

September 20, 1975

TO: The Secretary
FROM: S/P - Winston Lord *W*

*HAK: This fills in detail
on the verbal acc.
I've already given
to you*

My Meeting with Ambassador Huang,
Saturday, September 20, 1975, 7:10 - 7:50 pm

Per your instructions I went over to see Ambassador Huang this evening on a personal basis, having asked for the appointment earlier in the day on this basis. Also present were Counselor Tsien, and the two interpreters, Mrs. Shen and Mr. Yang. The Ambassador was extremely cordial from the outset and talked about my having seen Chairman Mao several times, the Chinese Moon Festival today (he gave me moon cakes for my family), my long working hours and my family. After tea and snacks were set before us, I made my presentation informally without notes. It was almost verbatim as follows:

- Secretary Kissinger has asked me to see the Ambassador on a personal basis. I am talking to him as an old friend and colleague in the joint enterprise of our two countries since the early days of 1971.
- The Chinese side may have noticed a malicious article in the London Daily Telegraph of September 15. The article, of course, totally misrepresents the position of the U.S. government, and the Secretary personally.
- There have been other suggestions of possible Chinese reserve toward the Secretary, which we are not sure we should give credence to. This is not important personally, but since our policy is being carried forward by those who initiated it, he wanted to make clear once again his views on our overall policy.
- The Secretary is not a sentimental man but it is fair to say that based on his personal experiences, as well as his view of the world and of history, no policy is more important to him than our relationship with China.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE
GDS



- We are aware, as you must be, that some people are not happy about the new and constructive relationship of our two countries established with the Shanghai Communique. Indeed, your Northern Neighbor for one appears to be taking more active measures to sow distrust and undermine the confidence we have established. Our sources tell us, for example, that this article may reflect Soviet machinations.
- Despite the different strategies our two countries have adopted for dealing with the problem of hegemony, we believe the common problem we share in this regard is as real as ever. We have always acted firmly when required. We have never had any illusions about the possible aims of the Soviets; and you will have noted a heightened critical spirit in our public debate on questions relating to the Soviet Union.
- I know that the Secretary looks forward to briefing the Foreign Minister on the results of Mr. Gromyko's current visit to Washington, and giving your government our current evaluation of Soviet intentions and capabilities.
- In addition, the Ambassador will have noticed the progress we have made in various foreign policy areas in recent months. This includes the new Middle East agreement, about which Moscow is not ecstatic; greatly strengthened relations with Europe and Japan; a more promising situation in Portugal; and progress with the Congress on such issues as aid to Turkey and Jordan.
- Finally, let me reiterate that the Secretary has asked me to relay to you these thoughts in order to underscore the continuity of our policies and the importance we attach to further developing our ties with your country. In this regard we look forward to the series of meetings he and the President will be holding with your leaders this fall.

All the Chinese listened very intently and the interpreters took careful notes. The Ambassador on a couple of occasions checked something with Tsien. For example, the latter confirmed the Ambassador's recollection of the newspaper article when I first mentioned it.



After hearing my presentation, the Ambassador spoke informally for ten to fifteen minutes along the following lines:

- Thank you very much for coming here on a personal basis and giving us this information.
- We have read a brief account of that newspaper article and paid no attention to it. As we have said on many occasions, the Western press is very unreliable and we take no account of it.
- As we have said many times, President Nixon showed great courage in opening up relations with us. Secretary Kissinger, too, has been very helpful in carrying out this policy.
- As our leaders have said, our relationship is set out in the Shanghai-Communique. So far progress in developing our relations has been satisfactory on the whole. The future development of our relations depends on earnestly carrying out the principles of the Shanghai Communique. As the two sides have agreed, the part about hegemony is the key section. Thus, while our two countries have many differences, there are also many common points.
- As you have said, Secretary Kissinger and our Foreign Minister will be meeting soon. And President Ford and the Secretary will be talking with our leaders, including Vice Premier Teng. And they will be discussing these issues.
- With respect to the Middle East, as we have told you on many occasions, it is important that you deal with the Arabs as well as the Israelis. It is true that the Soviets don't like what you are doing.

The Ambassador closed by saying that he was talking to me as an old friend and that this personal conversation was "in the family." He thought that this conversation was helpful. He then asked his colleagues if they had any views to express; perhaps he had neglected a part of my presentation. They didn't have anything to add.



There was then further small talk, including the fact that I was returning to the office to work on your UN speech and that I was taking my son to the Redskins opening game the next day. They plied me with moon cakes, egg rolls and tea -- and stopped me from leaving a couple of times.

Comment: I think this was a useful gesture and foreshadowing of our upcoming series of talks with the Chinese. As you said, they may have felt somewhat neglected recently. There were, of course, no illusions on either side that this was just a personal conversation. Ambassador Huang is on a tight leash, and therefore would not have been reassuring about our policy and you personally unless these were clearly established policy lines. The general pitch, and their reference once again to President Nixon, suggests a continuing wait-and-see attitude on President Ford. The Ambassador singled out the Soviet factor, though he also mentioned the Shanghai principles in general, which normally refer to the Taiwan question as well. While he specifically mentioned Chairman Mao in our opening small talk, the only Chinese leader he mentioned during his presentation (except for the Foreign Minister) was Teng. This certainly underlines Teng's authority once again, but I can't judge whether this might have been a suggestion that Mao and/or Chou might not receive either you or the President.

The atmosphere throughout was extraordinarily friendly.



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LINDIS
 E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CH, US

ACTION MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT: PRC PROTEST OVER TIBETAN ACTIVITIES IN
 THE US (S/S NO. 7518588)

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM EA - PHILIP C. HABIB

1. THE PROBLEM

PRCLO HAS ASKED US TO "BAN" THE OFFICE OF TIBET IN NEW YORK CITY AND TO PREVENT A PLANNED US TOUR BY A TIBETAN SONG AND DANCE TROUPE. THERE ARE NO LEGAL GROUNDS FOR TAKING THESE STEPS. WE PROPOSE TO TELL PRCLO THIS, WHILE NOTING, IF YOU AGREE, THAT WE ARE DISCOURAGING EFFORTS TO HAVE THE DALAI LAMA VISIT THE US. A DECISION IS URGENTLY NEEDED, BECAUSE WE MUST DECIDE ON VISAS FOR THE SONG AND DANCE TROUPE BY SEPTEMBER 25.

2. BACKGROUND/ANALYSIS

PRCLO COUNSELOR HSHIH CHIH-MEI CALLED ON BILL GLEYSTEN AUGUST 8 TO PROTEST THE ACTIVITIES OF THE OFFICE OF TIBET IN NEW YORK CITY. HE ASKED US TO "BAN" THE OFFICE AND

PREVENT IT FROM BRINGING A TIBETAN SONG AND DANCE GROUP TO THE US FOR PERFORMANCES. HSHIH STATED THAT US "CONIVANCE" IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE "TIBETAN REBELS" IN THIS COUNTRY IS CONTRARY TO THE SPIRIT OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. HE ALSO NOTED THAT WE HAD NEVER RESPONDED TO AN EARLIER PRCLO PROTEST CONCERNING THE TIBETAN OFFICE ON

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 STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
 BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/9/08



JULY 30, 1974, (OUR FAILURE TO RESPOND WAS DELIBERATE.)

BILL BLEYSTEN SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO THE MATTER, NOTED THE LIMITATIONS PLACED ON US BY OUR CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL STRUCTURE AND PROMISED A REPLY SHORTLY.

THE TIBETAN OFFICE HAS BEEN REGISTERED WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SINCE 1963 AS THE US REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DALAI LAMA. THE OFFICE IS IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT, AND WE HAVE NO LEGAL BASIS FOR FORCING IT TO CLOSE.

WE ALSO LACK SATISFACTORY GROUNDS UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT FOR DENYING VISAS TO THE TIBETAN SONG AND DANCE TROUPE. THE TROUPE IS COMING UNDER COMMERCIAL SPONSORSHIP FOR A US TOUR RUNNING FROM OCTOBER 6-NOVEMBER 26.

MOREOVER, SOME GROUPS AND MEMBERS OF CONGRESS RETAIN AN INTEREST IN THE TIBETAN PROBLEM, AND PEREMPTORY MOVES ON OUR PART AGAINST EITHER THE TIBETAN OFFICE OR THE DANCE TROUPE COULD RESULT IN LEGAL CHALLENGES TO OUR ACTIONS AND AROUSE ADVERSE PUBLICITY.

IN A RELATED MATTER, NEA HAS RECENTLY BEEN INFORMED OF RENEWED AMERICAN INTEREST IN BRINGING THE DALAI LAMA TO THIS COUNTRY, THIS TIME FOR A RELIGIOUS CONFERENCE IN OCTOBER. YOU HAVE JUST APPROVED OUR RECOMMENDATION THAT WE INFORM CONGRESSMAN BINGHAM, WHO RAISED THE QUESTION IN CONNECTION WITH THIS CONFERENCE, THAT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE DALAI LAMA TO VISIT THE US AT THIS TIME. YOU APPROVED SIMILAR ACTION LAST YEAR IN RESPONSE TO AN UNRELATED INQUIRY.

WHILE WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THE CHINESE PROTEST, WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO TELL THE CHINESE AT THIS TIME OF OUR EFFORTS TO DISCOURAGE A VISIT BY THE DALAI LAMA. HOWEVER, THERE IS SOME RISK INVOLVED, SINCE IF WE TELL THE CHINESE THIS WE MUST BE PREPARED TO RESIST ALL EFFORTS TO GET US TO CHANGE OUR POLICY ON SUCH A VISIT.

SINCE THE DANCE TROUPE'S VISA APPLICATIONS REQUIRE PROMPT ACTION, WE PROPOSE THAT BILL BLEYSTEN CALL IN HSIEN AND MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- YOU WILL RECALL THAT IN OUR DISCUSSION ON AUGUST 8 I MENTIONED THAT WE COULD ONLY ACT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF



OUR CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL STRUCTURE;

-- WE HAVE INVESTIGATED THE SITUATION AND FOUND THAT THE OFFICE OF TIBET IS OPERATING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT, AND THAT THERE IS NO LEGAL WAY FOR US TO FORCE IT TO CEASE ACTIVITIES.

-- THE PRC SIDE SHOULD NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT REGISTRATION WITH THE USG DOES NOT CONSTITUTE APPROVAL, AND THAT OUR LAW REQUIRES ALL POLITICAL PROPAGANDA PUBLISHED BY SUCH ORGANIZATIONS AS THE OFFICE OF TIBET TO CARRY AN EXPLICIT STATEMENT TO THAT EFFECT;

-- SIMILARLY, WE HAVE NO LEGAL BASIS FOR BLOCKING THE TOUR OF THE TIBETAN SONG AND DANCE GROUP, WHICH WE UNDERSTAND IS COMING UNDER COMMERCIAL AUSPICES FOR A SERIES OF CULTURAL PERFORMANCES.

IF YOU AGREE, GLEYSTEN WOULD ADD THAT ALTHOUGH WE ARE UNABLE TO MEET THE CHINESE REQUESTS IN THESE CASES, WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO DISCOURAGE SEVERAL US GROUPS WHICH ARE OR HAVE BEEN INTERESTED IN BRINGING THE DALAI LAMA TO THE US.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS:

THAT YOU AUTHORIZE A REPLY TO THE CHINESE PROTEST ALONG THE ABOVE LINES,

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

THAT YOU ALSO AUTHORIZE US TO TELL THE CHINESE THAT WE ARE DISCOURAGING PRIVATE US EFFORTS TO BRING THE DALAI LAMA TO THE US.

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

CLEARED WITH NEA/INS: MR. KUX; S/P: MR. LORD; AND
P: MR. SISCO,
INGERSOLL
BT



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TELEGRAM

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FROM US DEL Secretary in NY CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:

GDS
OVIP (Kissinger, Henry A.)
PRC Protest over Tibetan Activities in the US (S/S & 7518580)

ACTION:

SECSTATE Washington IMMEDIATE

SECTO 13010

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REF: TOSEC 130029.

FOR HABIB FROM ADAMS

1. Secretary authorizes a reply to the PRC protest along the lines you recommend in paragraph two REFTEL.
2. Secretary also approves informing the PRC that we are discouraging private US efforts to bring Dalai Lama to the U.S.

KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY:

S: A Adams:jm

DRAFTING DATE

9/23/75

TEL. EXT.

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

Alvin Adams

CLEARANCES:

S/S: ENewsom
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
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(Formerly FS 413(H))
January 1975
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SHORT, AS ONE MIGHT EXPECT, OF SUGGESTING THAT CHINA WOULD BE PREPARED TO PLEDGE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN EXCHANGE FOR U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF THE THREE CONDITIONS.

2. RELEVANT SECTION OF THE MEMCON FOLLOWS.

TENG WAS ASKED TO DISCUSS CHINA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES, PARTICULARLY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE UNITED STATES POSITION ON TAIWAN--HOW WAS THIS PROBLEM TO BE RESOLVED AND WHEN? IN REPLY, TENG "DESCRIBED THE QUESTION AS COMPLEX. THE FACT THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES HAD NOT BEEN NORMALIZED WAS ENTIRELY DUE TO THE TAIWAN PROBLEM. THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE PROVIDED IN PRINCIPLE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE TAIWAN QUESTION. RELATIONS COULD NOT BE NORMALIZED WITHOUT, FIRST, THE ABRIGATION OF THE U.S. DEFENSE TREATY WITH TAIWAN; SECOND, THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL U.S. TROOPS--4,000 (SIC) REMAIN AT PRESENT; AND THIRD, THE SEVERING OF AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN. IF THE UNITED STATES MET THOSE THREE CONDITIONS THE ISSUE OF TAIWAN WOULD BE TREATED TOTALLY AS AN INTERNAL AFFAIR. THE MODALITY AND THE TIMING OF TAIWAN'S RETURN TO CHINA WERE ENTIRELY CHINA'S INTERNAL AFFAIR. NO OTHER COUNTRY HAD THE RIGHT TO INTERFERE. CHINA HOPED TO SETTLE THE TAIWAN QUESTION BY PEACEFUL MEANS ON THE BASIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE THREE POINTS. IF IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT THESE THREE POINTS, NON-PEACEFUL MEANS COULD NOT BE RULED OUT. IN ANY EVENT, IT WAS AN INTERNAL AFFAIR. IF THE UNITED STATES ACCEPTED THE THREE POINTS THE TAIWAN QUESTION WOULD BE SETTLED BY THE CHINESE PEOPLE THEMSELVES."

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