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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028547

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction  
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇMemorandum  
CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Habib, Gleysteen, Lord, Solomon  
RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Secretary Kissinger  
DESCRIPTION . . . . . re your meeting with Huang Chen  
CREATION DATE . . . . . 05/08/1975  
VOLUME . . . . . 5 pages  
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200132  
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES  
BOX NUMBER . . . . . 5  
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . China unnumbered items (12)  
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/08/2008  
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

16

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028036

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇBriefing Paper

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Habib, Gleysteen, Lord, and Solomon

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Secretary Kissinger

DESCRIPTION . . . . . briefing paper and talking points re  
Indochina

CREATION DATE . . . . . 05/08/1975

VOLUME . . . . . 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200132

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 5

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . China unnumbered items (12)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/07/2008

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Korea

Korea Background:

Kim Il-song visited Peking for a week in mid-April, the first time he has been to China since the PRC and DPRK signed a security and friendship treaty in 1961. While we have no hard evidence that Kim came to China seeking support for military action against South Korea, it seems likely that he was reviewing his options in the wake of developments in Indochina.


During the week of Kim's visit, the harshness of the North Korean leader's public comments seemed to wane a bit, while the Chinese held to a position of support for the "independent and peaceful" reunification of Korea. The final communique reiterated this line, while also suggesting PRC support for a high-gear diplomatic effort to support North Korean objectives of gaining a U.N. General Assembly resolution in the fall calling for the dissolution of the U.N. Command and withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. The communique characterized the DPRK as "the sole legal sovereign state of the Korean nation." Chinese unease about Kim's intentions was suggested, however, in the communique phrase about "the Chinese people's high respect for and trust in Comrade Kim Il-song" -- suggesting an effort to salve the North Korean leader's vanity even as they expressed concern that he not violate assurances about not doing something rash.

Since Kim's return to Pyongyang, rumors have circulated in the Peking diplomatic corps that the North Korean leader will also visit Moscow and various Eastern European capitals. These rumors have failed to materialize thus far, however, generating speculation that Kim may have found the Soviets unresponsive to his probing for new options.

The Chinese never responded to our efforts last fall to get diplomatic motion into an effort to terminate the U.N. Command while leaving the armistice intact. PRC leaders have indicated to you their intention to follow Pyongyang's lead on this issue, and we do not anticipate any change in this position in the coming months. Indeed, in view of Kim's high-profile visit to Peking, we assume that the Chinese are now locked into a diplomatic strategy with Pyongyang.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED *State Review*  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *3/21/04*  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY 142, NARA, DATE 7/3/08



Korea Talking Points:

-- Your friend Kim Il-song seems to be getting restless in the wake of developments in Indochina. We appreciate China's support for peaceful efforts to reunify Korea, but we are not so sure that Mr. Kim is interested in peaceful approaches to this question. Is your trust in him well founded? He has sought to present others with faits accompli before.


-- The North Koreans should be under no illusion that if they resort to military provocations they will meet with anything but a harsh response from the United States.

-- We totally reject the statement in your joint communique with Pyongyang that the U.S. has sought to "sabotage the North-South talks." We believe that quiet, step-by-step negotiated efforts to build confidence between the two Koreas is the only way to achieve the "independent and peaceful reunification of Korea." Frankly, we are concerned about the lack of response from the Chinese side to our efforts of last fall to make quiet but constructive efforts to resolve the U.N. Command issue. We remain open to any suggestions your side might have.



-- I must frankly say that high-pressure political tactics in the U.N. on the Korea issue will only make it much more difficult for us to readjust our position in Korea. Such tactics are bound to heighten tension between Seoul and Pyongyang. It looks to us as if the North Koreans are trying to create the same combination of political and military pressures which they saw operating in Indochina. How can they be considered the "sole legitimate government" of Korea?

-- I would only add that if tensions in Korea rise during this fall, or if there is a noisy debate at the U.N. with active Chinese support, it can only complicate our bilateral dealings.



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Soviet Union

Soviet Union Background:

The Chinese will have noted continued Soviet interest in detente despite the trade setback and our own recent foreign policy difficulties. They should also have noticed the sterner tone of remarks by the President and yourself concerning detente in recent statements. They know we consulted with the Russians concerning evacuation and a possible political solution in the waning days of the Vietnam debacle. (We did not go to the Chinese at all after their lack of cooperation on Cambodia.)

Peking may be uneasy about the full upcoming agenda with Moscow, particularly in contrast with our bare slate with Peking (e. g., the Brezhnev summit, SALT II, CSCE, Middle East collaboration, etc.).

Note: Your meeting with Gromyko will be announced on Monday, May 12. You should alert the Chinese in this meeting and explain what will be discussed.

In the past, we have consistently used a heavy anti-Soviet tone in our dealings with the Chinese. While you want to reassure th Ambassador that we will be particularly firm with Moscow during this troubled period, there may be some advantage in leaving the Chinese somewhat uneasy about our Soviet connection.


The Russian negotiator in the Sino-Soviet border talks recently returned home after three fruitless months in Peking. Both sides have been cynical about the stalemate, now in its sixth year.

Soviet Talking Points:

-- The President and I have made it very clear in recent statements that we will not allow Moscow to seek advantages as a result of recent international events.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~


DECLASSIFIED *State Review*  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 3/2/04  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY 142, NARA, DATE 7/3/08



-- As you know, Brezhnev's trip has been delayed until September. We are aiming to complete a SALT II agreement by then, but are encountering the usual Soviet haggling in negotiations.

-- I am meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko during my forthcoming European trip. This will take place in Vienna on May 19-20. (Preview what will take place.)

-- We met informally a couple of weeks ago in London with some of our allies as well as the Soviets on the question of exporting nuclear materials. We will reconvene in June. The purpose is to dampen the prospects for non-proliferation. We have assumed your government would not be interested in such an exercise even though we do not believe proliferation is in your interest (e. g., India, Taiwan, South Korea).





SECRET/SENSITIVE

Europe

12  
DECLASSIFIED *State Review*  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 3/21/04  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 2/3/08

Europe Background:

Our relations with Europe (as well as Japan) have remained in basically good shape, but the Chinese will be worried about the weakening of NATO which has taken place in Portugal and Greece/Turkey. We have announced the NATO summit meeting at the end of this month, which will follow your visit to CENTO, OECD, and the IEA. The President will also visit Italy and Spain. We are on the home stretch of CSCE and are considering tabling new initiatives in MBFR. There have been several West European visitors to Peking lately, Belgian Prime Minister Tindeman and the EEC's Soames being the most recent.


Europe Taling Points:

-- Our relations with Western Europe are probably better than at any time during the past six years. There is closer consultation and collaboration.

-- At the same time there are obviously serious problems along the southern flank of NATO. (Explain our attitude toward Portugal and Spain.) We are working intensively with Congress to try and relaunch military assistance to Turkey.

-- The President's trip to Europe and the NATO summit meeting will reaffirm our solidarity as well as give an opportunity to discuss privately the problems on the southern flank of the alliance.


SECRET/SENSITIVE



-- I believe the Mansfield Resolution on withdrawing troops from Europe is effectively dead, at least for this session of Congress.

-- The dreary CSCE exercise is in its terminal phase. The Soviets are anxious for a summit this summer and are making some marginal concessions. We are under no illusions about the real significance of any documents that might be signed, and will guard against any illusory sense of accomplishment over the results.

-- How are your relations going with the Europeans? What do you sense of the European mood? As you know we favor increased ties between the PRC and our friends in Europe.



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Middle East

Middle East Background:

Since you last saw the Chinese the step-by-step negotiating process has broken down at least temporarily, and we have launched a reassessment of our Middle East policies. Lord alerted the Chinese to the breakdown of the shuttle at the time, but there has been no subsequent discussion of the state of play and future prospects. The Chinese have backed our Middle East efforts from the beginning and would want us to continue our role so as to diminish Soviet influence. Thus they were undoubtedly disappointed at the failure of your last mission and may be somewhat apprehensive of greater Soviet-US cooperation in the negotiating process.

Another interesting recent development is Iran's growing solidarity with the Arab states, including its dumping of the Kurds in order to patch up relations with Iraq. To the extent that this could represent an effort to wean Iraq away from Moscow the Chinese may take some comfort from the development.

In addition, the Soviets have been exploring contacts with Israel and have stated their willingness to guarantee Israel within its 1967 borders.

Finally, Prince Fahd has effectively replaced the deceased King Faisal of Saudi Arabia.


You will want to reassure the Chinese about our determination to continue our central involvement, point out that we remain the only outside power able to talk to both sides, and outline our ongoing strengthening of bilateral ties with various states in the region.

Middle East Talking Points:

-- Explain briefly why the shuttle broke down.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED *State Review*  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *3/2/04*  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY 152, NARA, DATE 7/3/08



-- Outline the rationale for our reassessment, the possible diplomatic options, and the current state of play with the various actors.


-- As the President and I have stressed, we are determined to continue our central role in facilitating a settlement. All the Arab states are urging us to do so, and they continue to reflect suspicions of Soviet intentions.

-- The President's meetings with Sadat and Rabin will help to cap our policy review. Shortly thereafter we will decide on our strategy.


-- We are continuing to strengthen our bilateral ties with the Arab states. This includes efforts to help Egypt's economic situation (e.g., Robinson's trip and working with Iran and Saudi Arabia). Sadat has urged us to send warships through the Suez Canal on the day it reopens. (We are the only country that he wishes to do so.)

-- Iran's improved relations with Iraq should help moderate Soviet influence there. Iraq is playing a rather active diplomatic role now.

-- The new leadership in Saudi Arabia remains pro-American and anti-Soviet.



-- What readings of the Middle East situation do you have from your own contacts with the Arab states, including Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien's recent visit to Teheran?



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028037

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇBriefing Paper

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Habib, Gleysteen, Lord, and Solomon

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Secretary Kissinger

DESCRIPTION . . . . . briefing paper and talking points re  
Subcontinent

CREATION DATE . . . . . 05/08/1975

VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200132

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
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BOX NUMBER . . . . . 5

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DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/07/2008

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028038

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇBriefing Paper

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Habib, Gleysteen, Lord, and Solomon

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Secretary Kissinger

DESCRIPTION . . . . . briefing paper and talking points re  
Bilateral Relations

CREATION DATE . . . . . 05/08/1975

VOLUME . . . . . 7 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200132

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028039

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇMemorandum

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Richard H. Solomon

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Secretary Kissinger

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re last minute items for your meeting  
with Huang Chen

CREATION DATE . . . . . 05/09/1975

VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200132

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

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FOLDER TITLE . . . . . China unnumbered items (12)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/07/2008

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇMemorandum

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Richard H. Solomon

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Secretary Kissinger

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re PRC Diplomat

CREATION DATE . . . . . 05/09/1975

VOLUME . . . . . 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200132

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
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BOX NUMBER . . . . . 5

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . China unnumbered items (12)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/07/2008

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028041

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . SECSTATE

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Ambassador Bush

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re PRC Diplomat

CREATION DATE . . . . . 05/09/1975

VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200132

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 5

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . China unnumbered items (12)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/07/2008

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

N00372

PAGE 01 PEKING 00827 301345Z

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INFO OCT-01 /001 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3667

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~~SECRET~~ PEKING 827

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR CM US  
SUBJECT: PNG OF CHINESE DIPLOMAT IN CANADA

FOR HABIB FROM BUSH

I HAVE HEARD HERE IN PEKING THAT THE CHINESE PRESS ATTACHE WHOM THE CANADIANS ARE THROWING OUT OF CANADA WAS IN SOME WAY INVOLVED WITH FUNNELING MONEY FROM THE USA TO INSURGENT GROUPS IN THE PHILIPPINES.

ALSO THAT A GRAND JURY IN THE USA IS ABOUT TO HAND DOWN SOME CHARGES RELATING TO THIS CASE. WOULD APPRECIATE AS MUCH INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE ON THIS. CANADA IS SPECULATING THAT PRC MAY WELL TAKE ACTION AGAINST SOMEONE IN THEIR EMBASSY HERE WITH AN EQUIVALENT SECOND SECRETARY RANK.

IF THERE IS US GRAND JURY ACTION ARE WE APT TO BE PLACED IN A POSITION OF POSSIBLE RETALIATION VS USLO. PLEASE ADVISE.  
BUSH

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED *State Review*  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *3/2/04*  
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES  
BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *7/3/08*





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Department of State

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NOD497

**TELEGRAM**

24

PAGE 01 PEKING 00888 090911Z

CONTROL: 17290  
RECD: 9 MAY 75  
4:53AM

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 /001 W

075619

R 0908;2Z MAY 75  
FM USLO PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3723

~~SECRET~~ PEKING 860

NGDIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HABIB FROM AMBASSADOR BUSH

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2  
TAGS: PINK PFOR CH CA  
SUBJECT: EXPULSION OF PRC EMBASSY OFFICER

REF: PEKING 827

1. KUO CHING-AN IS NOW BACK IN PEKING. RUMORS CONTINUE TO FLY. ALL RUMORS CONCERN SOME USA LINKAGE. AMB SMALL'S UNIVERSITY ATTENDING DAUGHTER, UNBRIEFED BY SMALL, RAISED THE QUESTION WITH HIM, SAYING THE WORD WAS ALL AROUND THE UNIVERSITY COMING FROM GERMAN SOURCES.

2. SMALL ASKED ABOUT GRAND JURY. I DID TELL HIM WE HAD LITTLE NEWS ON THIS MATTER BUT THAT WE DID NOT EXPECT GRAND JURY ACTION AS OF THIS TIME. I FELT SINCE HE CONFIDED IN ME I COULD NOT COMPLETELY STONEWALL HIM.

3. IS THERE ANY LIKELIHOOD OF ANY GRAND JURY ACTION WHICH OF COURSE WILL ATTRACT PUBLICITY? ARE THERE ANY OTHER INVESTIGATION CONTINUING ON THIS MATTER?

4. WHEN IF EVER I CAN DIVULGE TO SMALL SOME OF THE CONTENTS OF THE SPECIAL REPORT TO ME, PLEASE ADVISE.

5. WE ARE ESPECIALLY DEPENDENT IN PEKING FOR INFORMATION FROM OTHER EMBASSIES. TODAY FOR EXAMPLE, I CALLED SMALL

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED *State Review*  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 3/21/04  
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES  
BY LA, NARA, DATE 7/3/08



1877



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 PEKING 00000 090911Z

REQUESTING FROM HIM BRIEFING INFORMATION RESULTING FROM  
BRIEFING GIVEN BY VIETNAMESE. I RECOGNIZE THIS IS SENSI-  
TIVE, HIGHLY SO, BUT IF ANY OF THAT EXCELLENT REPORT YOU  
SENT ME CAN BE SHARED WITH SMALL IT WOULD HELP A LOT.  
BUSH

~~SECRET~~



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028042

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇTelegram

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re PRC Diplomat

CREATION DATE . . . . . 05/08/1975

VOLUME . . . . . 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200132

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 5

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . China unnumbered items (12)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/07/2008

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

Talking Points on the Current Situation in Laos

The Present Situation

The situation in Laos appears to be deteriorating rapidly. According to a late wire service bulletin, the Vientiane side members of the cabinet have resigned. Based on a conversation with Souvanna Phouma this Thursday, our Charge in Vientiane has concluded that Souvanna no longer considers the non-Communist side to be a factor in the present coalition. On Wednesday, a Communist inspired mob of about 1,500 attacked our Embassy.

On the military side, Pathet Lao forces are continuing to push south on Route 13 which links Luang Prabang with Vientiane. They are now in a good position to interdict the only overland resupply route to General Vang Pao's headquarters at Long Trinh. Although the Communist leadership in Vientiane has signed a joint communique calling for an end to the fighting, Communist headquarters appears in no hurry to issue cease-fire orders to its troops. We assume the North Vietnamese are behind these Pathet Lao moves.

Talking Points


-- I am greatly disturbed by reports coming out of Laos.

-- Military attacks and civil disturbances instigated by the Lao Patriotic Front side seriously threaten the Lao Accords and the stability of the Provisional Government of National Union.

-- We had all hoped that the settlement in Laos would result in a peaceful resolution of differences between the Lao parties.

-- Any attempt to upset this settlement by force will inevitably add to tensions in the area. This is something I am sure we both want to avoid.

-- Moreover, a collapse of the Laos agreement would increase the domestic pressures in the United States challenging the validity of agreements with Communist governments anywhere. It will increase people's doubts about the capacity for restraint of revolutionary societies.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Huang Chen, Chief of the PRC Liaison Office  
in Washington  
Tsien Ta-yung, Political Counselor  
Shen Jo-yun, Interpreter  
Yang Yu-yung, Notetaker

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for  
East Asian and Pacific Affairs  
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff,  
Department of State  
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member,  
National Security Council

DATE, TIME,  
AND PLACE May 9, 1975; 5:35 p.m. - 6:40 p.m.  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Tour d'Horizon with Huang Chen

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Ambassador, I haven't seen you for a long time.

Ambassador Huang: You must be very busy.

Secretary Kissinger: We have had an active period.

I thought it would be useful if we had a review of the international situation, and Indochina.

We've had Prime Minister Lee Kuan-yew here the last two days. Now I know so many Chinese proverbs that you had better be careful.


Would you like to start?

Ambassador Huang: I would like to hear Mr. Secretary's views.

DECLASSIFIED *State Review*  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *3/2/04*

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *7/3/08*





Secretary Kissinger: I know you are a great believer in counter-attack.

Ambassador Huang: Soldiers are used to all kinds of attacks.

Secretary Kissinger: I will make a few observations. I read an editorial in the People's Daily; there was one comment I didn't fully agree with. It said that the United States is in a period of strategic passivity. The chief victim in the editorial was not the U.S., so I am not complaining. There are many points in the assessment with which I agree, especially regarding your northern neighbor, who was the chief target of the attack.


My main point is that we are not in a period of strategic passivity, and we will not remain passive. We now need a brief period of reassessment, but in many respects we are in a psychologically stronger period as we don't have to debate Vietnam every week.

So, my main point is that we have absolutely no intention of remaining passive. There is absolutely no change in our assessment of the dangers of hegemony as they are expressed in the Shanghai Communique. That will be the guideline of our policy.

With regard to specifics: Our relationship -- we maintain fully the principles and objectives of the Shanghai Communique. Occasional statements which may not be fully in accord with these objectives are purely due to inadvertance.

Secondly, with regard to our general approach, we will maintain close relations with Japan, and with some of our friends in Southeast Asia. We believe that we now will see an evolution of the Soviets' Asian Security System, which we do not favor. It is up to other countries to consider their views about hegemonies within their region. On the whole we don't favor it. But we will cooperate in preventing it where there is a reasonable chance of preventing it -- but we won't do other people's work for them.

With respect to Korea, I want to make clear that under no circumstances will we tolerate a military attack on Korea, and a military attack on Korea will involve the certainty of American involvement. We will support peaceful evolution on the Korean Peninsula. We are prepared to discuss measures which would bring about the dissolution of the United Nations Command. And we will work to create conditions for coexistence on the Peninsula. But we are not prepared to accept another attack on the American presence.



In the Middle East, I see two main dangers: one, the danger of Soviet domination; the other is the danger of diplomatic stagnation. The one is related to the other. We will not accept a diplomatic stalemate. You should not be deluded by our public debate at this moment. We are organizing ourselves to have a confrontation with special pressure groups, and will insist on territorial concessions by Israel.

We have not decided whether to adopt a step-by-step approach, or to work towards an interim solution. In any event, we will maneuver so as to make it clear that a solution will have been achieved substantially through American efforts.

We will discuss -- we may discuss some of these issues with the Soviet Union, but always from a position of prior agreement with the Arabs and Israel, so that the Soviets will be in a position to ratify, not to create, terms.

Your government might like to know that on the opening day of the Suez Canal a U.S. ship will be the only warship to traverse the canal -- it probably will be an aircraft carrier.

So, after we have met with President Sadat and Prime Minister Rabin, you can expect significant American initiatives in the Middle East.


With respect to NATO, to Europe: As you know the President is going to NATO in order to strengthen our relations with the allies. There will be no American withdrawals from anywhere -- except Thailand -- during this Administration, but especially from Europe -- except for Taiwan. I am not talking about total withdrawals --

Miss Shen: What did you mean about "total withdrawals?" Did you mean Taiwan?

Secretary Kissinger: No -- we will proceed as we have told you, and we will keep you informed as we proceed. This is just a general discussion.

Ambassador Huang: The sounds of "Taiwan" and "Thailand" are rather similar and are confusing to us.

Secretary Kissinger: That also happens with our public statements.  
(laughter)



In Europe we have two objectives: To strengthen the defense; and to strengthen the left -- as we discussed -- no, to prevent the shift to left-wing parties.

Miss Shen: I got that.

Secretary Kissinger: I will meet with Gromyko in Geneva on the 19th and 20th. The purpose will be three-fold; there will be three major items: the European Security Conference, in which our basic strategy is to remain two steps behind our allies; the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, in which we are trying to get agreement this year; and the Middle East. We will have nothing to tell him [about the Middle East situation] until after we talk to Israel and the Arabs.

There will be no other initiatives discussed [with Gromyko].

Now we expect the Brezhnev summit at the end of September or the first week in October, but the basic outline of our policy [regarding the Soviets] is as I have discussed it many times in China. Our assessment of the Soviet Union has not changed. The major point I want to make to the Ambassador and to your leadership is that we are determined to try to emerge from this period to rally all the forces opposed to hegemony.

So one problem we will have is that -- I have noticed that with respect to India your relations have cooled, as have ours.


With respect to Iran, our relations are close and will become closer.

One problem we have, as I have said before, is that we think that when we pursue parallel objectives, we should avoid peripheral confrontations. The President has asked me to tell your leadership that he is determined to pursue the course that we have discussed in the past.

Your Foreign Minister told a group of foreigners that he thought we could emerge stronger from this period. We believe this also.

So these are the main things. We would like to hear the current views of your leaders on the President's visit to Peking, [your views] as to timing, agenda, and preparations.

Ambassador Huang: Are you through?



Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Ambassador Huang: As for you last point, we will welcome him [the President]. This point was covered in your discussions in Peking with the Vice Premier. As for us, any time will be convenient.

Secretary Kissinger: At some point, we would appreciate some concrete suggestions from you regarding timing, topics to be discussed, and what you expect to emerge [from the visit].

Ambassador Huang: Is there any plan from your side that I can report to Peking?

Secretary Kissinger: As to date, or to substance?

Ambassador Huang: The points you just covered. Have you envisaged anything regarding your President's visit to China?

Secretary Kissinger: Originally we thought about the period mid-November through the first week in December. And our thought in terms of preparation was that we would work out a communique substantially in advance of the visit, to avoid complexities during the visit.

We would be delighted to welcome the Foreign Minister to Washington for that purpose.

Ambassador Huang: As for your plan, I will mention this to Peking. As for the Foreign Minister visiting Washington, it is inconceivable that he can come. We have stated the reasons why several times. Before you left Peking you said that you would visit again for that purpose.

Secretary Kissinger: We can arrange it that way also.

Ambassador Huang: It would be better if you come to Peking.

Secretary Kissinger: What is the view from Peking?

Ambassador Huang: Just now you have covered quite a few issues; we have learned of your views. I would like simply to put things this way: We have been consistent in our principled stand on various international issues. These principled positions are clearly stated in the Shanghai



Communique, and in Dr. Kissinger's many conversations with Chairman Mao.

Just now Mr. Secretary has covered the Indochina question. We think it was a gross mistake for the U.S. to have its feet mired in the quagmire of Indochina. We have urged you to disengage yourself, and not to dilly dally. Now the U.S. has disengaged, and shaken off this burden. It should learn correct lessons from this experiences.

Secretary Kissinger: Everyone should learn lessons from this.

Ambassador Huang: You should learn correct lessons from this.

As for the Korean question, our consistent position, all along we have consistently and resolutely supported the Korean people in their struggle for the independent and peaceful reunification of their country, for termination of the United Nations Command, and for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Korean peninsula.

Secretary Kissinger: We are not asking you to change that position, but military action on the Peninsula would have grave consequences.

Ambassador Huang: And our position is consistent. As far as we know, the South Korean side, the Pak Chung-hee clique, has made provocations against the North, made attacks against them. And Chairman Kim Il-song has repeatedly stated his intention to carry on the struggle for the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea.

Secretary Kissinger: Just so he doesn't define "peaceful" too generously. We will not permit South Korean attacks against the North.

Ambassador Huang: And Chairman Kim Il-song has repeatedly stated his position on the independent and peaceful reunification of his country. We wouldn't necessarily accept your definition of peace. Kim Il-song's proposals were warmly received by all the people in Korea, and the Pak Chung-hee clique has disrupted them. The fact that the South Korean side has repeatedly made provocations and attacks is inseparable from their consideration that they have the support of the U.S. side.

Secretary Kissinger: We will do our utmost to prevent that [any actions by the South against the North]; but when war starts on the Korean Peninsula, it will be clear on which side of the line the troops are, and when that is known, we will take actions accordingly.



But we will take seriously what you have said.

Ambassador Huang [somewhat agitatedly]: I did not intend to come over here to have a conversation on Korea, but as you raised it, I intended to clarify our position.

Secretary Kissinger: I understand. We should understand your position. We are not objecting to your government's position in general; we are not asking you to change it.

Miss Shen: Ambassador Huang just said to me that we are not in a position to discuss these questions on behalf of the Koreans.

Ambassador Huang: Just now you have touched on relations between our two countries . . .

Secretary Kissinger: China and the United States?

Ambassador Huang: Yes. Our leaders have discussed [this issue] clearly during your visits to China, in the Shanghai Communique, and in your talks with Chairman Mao. Our relations can only develop if the principles of the Shanghai Communique are carried out in earnest.


Just now you touched on the European Security Conference, the SALT talks, and your visit with Gromyko. I have nothing to say about these points. But we appreciate the statement of a senior U.S. official not too long ago that [it was] in the spirit of Camp David, the spirit of Glasboro, and detente that the Soviet Union has expanded its power.

Secretary Kissinger: Who said that?

Ambassador Huang: You should know that!

Just now Mr. Secretary mentioned your relations with your allies and with Japan. We think this is very good. We think a powerful Europe and Japan are good. But I would like to ask how you intend to strengthen your relations with Europe and Japan?

Secretary Kissinger: I would like to say something about senior officials: There are only two who make policy, the President and myself. There are many who talk on the fringes. But I happen to agree with this assessment [of the official Ambassador Huang said he was quoting].



Ambassador Huang: You have only two senior officials in your government?

Secretary Kissinger: No, only two who make policy regarding the Soviets.

Now, how will we strengthen these relationships: First, we will sustain our policy of encouraging the Japanese to strengthen their ties with the People's Republic. We will work closely with them in developing common policies on such issues as energy and food, and give them a sense of involvement in our policy making.

With Europe, we will assure them that we will not withdraw any forces during the remainder of this Administration. We will try to settle some arguments still existing between us and our European friends.

Again, for the information of your government, the French President will come to Brussels to have dinner with his colleagues. Afterwards he will meet with the President. This will be the first time a French President has participated in a NATO event.

We also want you to know that after my meeting with Gromyko, I will go to Berlin, Bonn, then Turkey, where we will have a meeting of the CENTO organization -- Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey -- and if the President goes to the European Security Conference, he will also stop in Berlin. This is for your private information. He also plans to stop in Warsaw, Belgrade, and Bucharest on the way back from the European Security Conference.

Ambassador Huang: Just now you are having a meeting with the foreign ministers of the Organization of American States. How are your relations with these countries?

Secretary Kissinger: Actually they are very good. This has been a positive meeting. Recent events -- contrary to what the press is saying -- their relations with us are important, they are improving.

Ambassador Huang: Africa. The other day I attended a reception given by the Ambassador of Senegal. I met your Assistant Secretary, Mr. Davis. He said that that afternoon you had received all the Ambassadors from Africa. How are your relations with these countries?



Secretary Kissinger: We will strengthen our relations; we will become more active. Mr. Davis is now in West Africa. In Angola, we hope that the group backed by the Soviets will not become dominant.

Ambassador Huang: I wouldn't like to take up too much more of your time. You must have much preparing to do.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. My schedule is that I will see Gromyko in Geneva on the 19th and 20th. Then I will be in Berlin on the 21st. I go to Ankara on the 22nd and 23rd. I come home on the 23rd, meet three days with the President, and then go to Europe for two days before the President for a meeting with the Energy Agency and the OECD. Then I will go to Brussels to meet the President.

Ambassador Huang [as he rises to depart]: You are very busy.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Ambassador, I am glad you came over and that we had this exchange of views.

(At this point the conversation concluded and the Ambassador and his party were escorted from the Secretary's office to the elevator.)

