

**The original documents are located in Box 5, folder “China, unnumbered items - (8), 1/6/75 - 1/31/75” of the Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.**

### **Copyright Notice**

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.



# *Gerald R. Ford Library*

---

1000 Beal Avenue, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-2114  
[www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov](http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov)

## Withdrawal Sheet for Documents Declassified in Part

This folder contains a document or documents declassified in part under the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) program.

### Procedures for Initiating a Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) Request

The still classified portions of these RAC documents are eligible for MDR. To file a request follow these steps:

1. Obtain the Presidential Libraries Mandatory Review Request Form (NA Form 14020).
2. Complete Sections I, II, and III of NA Form 14020.
3. In Section III, for each document requested, simply provide the Executive Standard Document Number (ESDN) in the Document Subject/Title or Correspondents column. The ESDN will be printed on the top and bottom of the document, and written on the declassification authority stamp, and will follow this format:

NLF-NSC\_ILCC-5-2-4-3

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Chi Exch File* 4752-X 1A  
DECLASSIFIED *State Review*  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *3/21/04*  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY ACTION *HR*, NARA, DATE *7/11/08*

TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY

January 6, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER *HK*  
SUBJECT: Proposed Reply from You to Republic of  
China Premier Chiang Ching-kuo

You have received a letter from the Premier of the Republic of China, Mr. Chiang Ching-kuo (Tab B). The letter applauds your commitment to the continuity of U.S. foreign policy and to our formal alliances. It cautions that the Communist threat in Asia is still very much alive. Premier Chiang, in effect, asks you to reaffirm the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 and to sustain our active assistance to the ROC in maintaining its defense capability.


I believe a specific reaffirmation of the Mutual Defense Treaty would not now be wise as the overall direction of our China policy is to seek to sustain Taiwan's security by political rather than legalistic means. We have not specifically affirmed the treaty over the last six months, and we will want to move away from it over the long run as the process of normalizing our relations with the People's Republic of China progresses.

Nonetheless, it would be highly appropriate for you to affirm in general terms our commitment to Taiwan's security. This would not violate the spirit of our efforts to normalize relations with the PRC. It would also help to sustain the confidence of the Republic of China, which we need to do. At the same time, by avoiding a specific reference to the 1954 treaty, we would continue the process of moving from a specific commitment to a more general pledge that we will not permit Taiwan to be overwhelmed by military force.

The rest of the letter replies in appropriate terms to other comments in Premier Chiang Ching-kuo's letter to you.

Recommendation:

That you sign the letter to Premier Chiang Ching-kuo at Tab A. The letter has been cleared with Paul Theis.

TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY XGDS

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


1/8/75

Dear Mr. Premier:

Thank you very much for the kind sentiments expressed in your letter of September 20. I particularly appreciate your thoughtful comments on our current relationship.

As you observed, the depth and breadth of our ties is indeed impressive. We have both shown a determination to overcome problems. We can take mutual pride in our present relationship. I would like to express appreciation for the cooperative spirit displayed by your government through the years.

I also wish to mention my continuing admiration for the remarkable achievements of your government and your people. These are due in large part, I am convinced, to the extraordinary leadership of your distinguished father and yourself. During my visit to Taiwan in 1953, I was able to see many of the challenges which have confronted you. I therefore find your subsequent accomplishments all the more impressive. I am particularly gratified by the productive use your government has made of economic assistance provided by my government in earlier years. We continue to cite your achievements as an outstanding example of what a determined people can accomplish if given help when they most need it.




DECLASSIFIED *State Review*  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *3/2/04*  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *7/1/08*

*Dispatched from Ford's ofc 1/8/75*

Upon assuming office, I stressed the continuity of American policies throughout the world. I also reaffirmed our worldwide commitments, including our commitment to the security of the Republic of China. I can assure you that we do not forget our friends. We will continue to value our cordial and constructive relationship.


Our policies throughout the world are designed to construct a framework for peace that will allow mankind's intellectual and physical resources to be devoted increasingly to meeting our common challenges. We realize that this will not be an easy task and that firmness as well as conciliation will be required. I am sure that we can count on your cooperation in achieving this difficult goal desired by both of our peoples.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Gerald R. Ford". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, prominent "F" and "D".

His Excellency  
Chiang Ching-kuo  
Premier of the Republic of China  
Taipei





OFFICE OF THE PREMIER  
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

DECLASSIFIED *State Review*  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *3/2/04*  
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES  
BY *HR*, NAFA DATE *7/1/08*

September 20, 1974


Dear Mr. President:

It gives me much pleasure to recall that during my last visit to Washington as a guest of the United States Government a few years ago, you were kind enough to honor me with your company at a White House dinner. Of course, I always followed with interest and admiration your brilliant career in Congress, especially as the Minority Leader. The selfless and untiring efforts made by you in fulfilling the duties of Vice Presidency under very difficult circumstances further enhanced my respect for your statesmanship. Following your assumption of the office of President, the Government and people of the Republic of China rejoice with all the allies and friends of the United States at your rededication to the noble ideals on which your great nation was founded. Your pledge of openness and candor certainly assures us a fair deal in the furtherance of our future relations.

The United States and other like-minded countries are devoted to the quest for peace and welfare of mankind. In this pilgrimage, we have to encounter many flaws and pitfalls because there are forces pulling the world to other directions. The moral and material strength of the American people has established the United States as the indispensable stabilizing influence of the international community. Together with your other allies and friends in Asia who are immensely engrossed with the safe-guarding of their security and the promotion of their economic development, we in the Republic of China are pleased to hear your declaration of the continuity of America's concern and support with regards to these matters.

The situation in this part of the world is very unstable. Acts of military aggression are unabated in Indochina. The continuation of infiltration and subversion against many Asian countries by outside forces seriously affects the peaceful pursuits of these nations. Your assurance of the United States standing by its commitments in all its formal alliances signifies renewed credibility of America's active partnership which will undoubtedly boost the confidence and vigor of your allies and friends in this area.

As faithful heirs to the age-old Chinese cultural heritage, the Government and people of the Republic of China are unalterably dedicated to the preservation and refinement of our traditional humane way of life. The goal of our national reconstruction is the erection and solidifying of a free, open and progressive society in which all our citizens can enjoy dignity, advancement and harmony, as contrasted to the oppressive system of communist totalitarian regimentation.



Through the spontaneous labor of its own people and with the generous aid of the United States in the '50s and the early '60s, the Republic of China has been able to fulfill its resolution to lay a sound foundation for the development of an economy that is oriented to the welfare of the masses and propelled by reasonable incentive, careful planning and self-emitted devotion. We have orderly and peacefully transformed a rural society into an industrial country, resulting in a high growth rate, expansion of international trade and manifold increase in per capita income. It is our aspiration that in tackling and solving these problem for ourselves, we may set a pattern for other countries similarly situated.

Ever since its inception, the Republic of China has been closely associated with the United States in times of peace and war. During the past two decades, the Mutual Defense Treaty is a major cornerstone of the relationship between both countries. We fully agree with your view that a strong defense is the surest way to peace and weakness invites war. The strengthening of our defense capability is not only a prerequisite for the protection of our own national interests but also serves to sustain a vital bulwark of the free world against any force of aggression which seeks to disturb the peace and stability of the Western Pacific.

In all our endeavors based on self-reliance and mutual assistance, we in the Republic of China are animated with feelings of brotherhood and goodwill towards our compatriots and other peoples throughout the world except those who seek to subjugate and destroy us.


The historical ties between the United States and the Republic of China are permeated with deep and broad significance which transcends our bilateral relations. This friendship is of tremendous importance to us; and to the other allies and friends of the United States in the Asian and Pacific region, it also serves as a good example of the mutuality of benefits. We feel confident that under your eminent Administration and in the years to come, the cordial relationship between our two countries will continue to flourish. We would greatly appreciate any wise counsel you may give us on how to further strengthen our traditional collaboration for the promotion of common interests.

With best wishes for your continuing success and personal well-being,

Yours sincerely,

*Chiang Ching-kuo*

Chiang Ching-kuo  
Premier



His Excellency  
President Gerald R. Ford,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTIONTOP SECRET/EYES ONLY

December 12, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: W. R. SMYER  
RICHARD H. SOLOMON *RS*

SUBJECT: Proposed Reply from the President  
to Republic of China Premier  
Chiang Ching-kuo


Republic of China Premier Chiang Ching-kuo wrote the President a post-inauguration letter on September 20 (which was delivered by Ambassador Shen on October 9) which applauds the President's public statements of intention to maintain the continuity of U.S. foreign policy and to uphold our formal alliances. The Premier also cautions that the Communist threat in Asia is still very much alive, and indirectly seeks a Presidential reaffirmation of the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty as well as American assistance in "the strengthening of our defense capability" -- presumably through increased sales of military equipment. (See the text of the letter at Tab B.)

We and the Department agreed in October that it was appropriate to delay formulating a Presidential reply to Premier Chiang's letter until after your November trip to Peking on the assumption that the results of the visit would enable us to relate the contents of a reply more precisely to the state of our overall China policy.

The major issue in formulating a reply is whether we should, (a) explicitly reaffirm our commitment to the Mutual Defense Treaty, (b) only reiterate in general terms the U.S. defense commitment or make some other form of unspecified commitment to Taiwan's security, or (c) merely assure Chiang Ching-kuo that we will keep the ROC's interests in mind. The more fundamental question involved is whether and how we should, at this point in time and in view of your expectations about the evolution of our relations with both Peking and Taipei, attempt to move along another step or two in the process of conditioning the ROC leadership to the evolution of our China policy.

TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY XGDS

DECLASSIFIED *State Review*  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 3/21/04  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY: *Hr*, NARA, DATE *7/1/08*





To date, we have continued to make rather explicit references to either the Mutual Defense Treaty or to our security commitment to Taiwan in contacts with ROC officials:

-- A year ago, immediately following your November, 1973 trip to Peking, you told Ambassador Shen that the U.S. "defense commitment" was absolutely firm.


-- Last May, Ambassador Unger, on your instructions, explicitly reaffirmed the Mutual Defense Treaty during his first substantive meeting with Chiang Ching-kuo.

-- On December 3, Assistant Secretary Habib, who joined Deputy Secretary Ingersoll in briefing Ambassador Shen on your most recent visit to Peking, said that our "security commitment" to Taiwan "remains valid" in the context of President Ford's general pledge to maintain existing commitments.

State, in a draft reply to Premier Chiang (attached to a draft memorandum from you to the President at Tab II), proposes that the President make no reference to either the Mutual Defense Treaty or to a general U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan, but that he confine himself to reassuring Chiang Ching-kuo of American support in the following vague terms:

"Upon assuming office, I stressed the continuity of American policies throughout the world. I can assure you this means we appreciate your needs and interests, including your concern for Taiwan's security, and that we continue to value our cordial and constructive relations."

We believe this statement goes further than you may wish to go in implying American "distance" from Taiwan's security, given the character of the talks during your recent Peking trip in dealing with the normalization question. The State formulation suggests that we have no concern for Taiwan's security ourselves, but that this is Taiwan's problem. The question we face in replying to Premier Chiang is whether to "push" the ROC leadership this far in circumstances where the exact evolution of our relations with Peking is this much in doubt. The danger, of course, is that we might prematurely lead the ROC to conclude that it has to cope with its security needs on its own, and by means which could force our hand (or that of Peking). Moreover, we think that the ROC is more likely to accept other steps in the normalization process if it does not feel we are moving away from our concern for its safety.



Balancing this view, we do believe it appropriate to continue the process of conditioning Taipei to the likely evolution of our China policy. Thus, we agree with State that the President should not specifically reaffirm the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. It seems more appropriate at this point in time to have him make an indirect affirmation of our commitment to Taiwan's security but not to be as forthcoming as Premier Chiang clearly would like him to be, given the contents of his letter of September 20. This approach will be a clear step forward in the conditioning process but would not be the two or three steps which are embodied in the State draft.

We have prepared two memoranda for the President including replies to Premier Chiang for you to choose from. The first, which we recommend, incorporates a reaffirmation of our general commitment to Taiwan's security (Tab I). The second includes the State position of a very indirect expression of "appreciation" for Taiwan's concerns on security matters (Tab II).

Recommendation:

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I (the affirmation of our security relationship):

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ ✓

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_


or

Option:

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab II (the "appreciation" of Taiwan's security concerns):

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_



1E

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

II

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

Not used

~~TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/1/08

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT:

Proposed Reply from You to Republic of China Premier Chiang Ching-kuo

You have received a letter from the Premier of the Republic of China, Mr. Chiang Ching-kuo (Tab B). That letter applauds your commitment to the continuity of U.S. foreign policy and to our formal alliances. It cautions that the Communist threat in Asia is still very much alive. Premier Chiang, in effect, asks you to reaffirm the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 and to sustain our active assistance to the ROC in maintaining its defense capability.


I believe a specific reaffirmation of the Mutual Defense Treaty would not now be wise as the overall direction of our China policy is to seek to sustain Taiwan's security by political rather than legalistic means. We have not specifically affirmed the treaty over the last six months, and we will want to move away from it over the long run as the process of normalizing our relations with the People's Republic of China progresses.

The attached letter of reply does not reaffirm the 1954 treaty, as the Premier has invited you to do, nor does it affirm any defense commitment in specific terms. Instead, it assures the Premier that we appreciate his needs and interests, including his concerns for Taiwan's security, and that we continue to value our relationship.

This formula will clearly be seen by the Premier as a hedged statement of support on security matters. I believe that such a statement is now advisable as a way of conditioning the ROC leadership to the fact that we are moving away from the present form of our defense commitment to Taiwan. This is one element of our efforts to advance the process of normalizing relations with the People's Republic of China, and is designed to help create a mood which might lead to a political accommodation between Taipei and Peking.

Recommendation:

That you sign the letter to Premier Chiang Ching-kuo at Tab A. The letter has been cleared with Paul Theis.



~~TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY~~ XGDS

14

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


Dear Mr. Premier:

Thank you very much for the kind sentiments expressed in your letter of September 20. I particularly appreciate your thoughtful comments on our current relationship.

As you observed, the depth and breadth of our ties is indeed impressive. We have both shown a determination to overcome problems. We can take mutual pride in our present relationship. I would like to express my appreciation for the cooperative spirit displayed by your government through the years.

I also wish to mention my continuing admiration for the remarkable achievements of your government and your people. These are due in large part, I am convinced, to the extraordinary leadership of your distinguished father and yourself. During my visit to Taiwan in 1953, I was able to see many of the challenges which have confronted you. I therefore find your subsequent accomplishments are all the more impressive. I am particularly gratified by the productive use your government has made of economic assistance provided by my government in earlier years. We continue to cite your achievements as an outstanding example of what a determined people can accomplish if given help when they most need it.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/1/08




Upon assuming office, I stressed the continuity of American policies throughout the world. I can assure you this means we appreciate your needs and interests, including your concern for Taiwan's security, and that we continue to value our cordial and constructive relations.

Our policies throughout the world seek to construct a framework for peace which will allow mankind's intellectual and physical resources to be increasingly devoted to meeting our common challenges. We realize that this will not be an easy task and that firmness as well as conciliation will be required. I am sure that we can count on your cooperation in achieving this difficult goal desired by both of our peoples.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Chiang Ching-kuo  
Premier of the Republic of China  
Taipei



*China Exch*



# Department of State

COPY 1 OF 13 COPIES

# TELEGRAM ACTION

~~SECRET~~

N00945

PAGE 01 PEKING 0055

09  
ORIGIN NGOS-00

INFO OCT-01 1001 R

R 130700Z JAN 75  
FM USLU PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 307

007499

CONTROL: 2095Q  
RECD : JAN 13, 1  
3:06 A.M.

~~SECRET~~ PEKING 0055

DECLASSIFIED *State Rev.*  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *3/2/04*

STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES

BY *ML*, NARA, DATE *7/1/08*

NODIG/EHEHOKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, CH, US, UR, NL, XF  
SUBJECT: COMMENTS BY DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER ON US-PRC  
RELATIONS AND OTHER CURRENT ISSUES



REF: PEKING 0020

1. AFTER READING HARSH WORDS UN BOTH US AND SOVIETS IN CHIAO KUAN-HUA'S TOAST DURING BANQUET FOR VISITING DUTCH FOREIGN MINIST VANDERSTOEL (REFTEL), ON JAN 7 I CONTACTED DUTCH AMBASSADOR VIXSEBOXSE TO ASK DUTCH IMPRESSION OF CHIAO'S REMARKS AND TO SEE IF THEY FELT THERE WERE ANY INDICATIONS OF PROBLEMS IN US-PRC RELATIONSHIP. VIXSEBOXSE REPLIED IMMEDIATELY THAT NONE OF DUTCH G HAD

ATTACHED PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE TO THESE WORDS NOR DID THEY BELIEVE ANY SPECIAL PROBLEMS HAD ARISEN IN US-PRC RELATIONS FROM WHAT THEY HAD HEARD FROM CHINESE SO FAR. HOWEVER, VIXSEBOXSE SAID HE WOULD GET BACK TO ME AGAIN AFTER HE RETURNED TO PEKING FROM ESCORTING VANDERSTOEL TO OTHER PARTS OF CHINA.

2. VIXSEBOXSE CALLED ON ME JANUARY 10 TO FILL ME IN ON WHAT CHINESE HAD SAID ABOUT RELATIONS WITH THE US. HE CONFIRMED WHAT HE HAD ALREADY TOLD ME, NAMELY, THAT NEITHER VANDERSTOEL NOR HEAD OF ASIAN DIVISION IN FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD ATTACHED ANY SPECI IGN-

NIFICANCE TO CHIAO'S BANQUET TOAST. ALL THOUGHT THIS WAS JUST ROUTINE. WHILE IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH THE DUTCH TENG HSIAU-PING AND CHIAO KUAN-HUA (PARTICULARLY THE FURMER) HAD

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~



PAGE 02 PEKING 055

TAKEN A FAIRLY HARD LINE AGAINST THE SUPERPOWERS, IT WAS EVIDENT THAT THE CHINESE CRITICISMS WERE DIRECTED PRIMARILY AGAINST THE USSR.

3. VIXSEBOXSE WENT ON TO SAY THAT AT MEETING WITH CHIAO KUAN-KYUA WHICH OCCURRED AFTERNOON OF JAN. 7, CHIAO HAD IN FACT SPOKE DIRECTLY ON SUBJECT OF US-PRC RELATIONS. ACCORDING TO CHIAO, THERE HAD BEEN SOME REPORTS RECENTLY TO EFFECT THAT THESE RELATIONS HAD DETERIORATED, BUT THIS WAS "SIMPLY NOT TRUE." CHIAO DESCRIBED US-PRC RELATIONS AS "NORMAL" AND GENERALLY GOOD.

4. VIXSEBOXSE NOTED THAT TENG HSIAO-PING HAD MADE IT VERY PLAIN IN TALK WITH VANDERSTOEL THAT THE CHINESE LOOKED UPON THE SOVIETS AS CHINA'S MAIN ENEMY. TENG SPOKE IN FAMILIAR TERMS ON SOVIET FORCE OF ONE MILLION MEN BEING CONCENTRATED ALONG CHINESE BORDERS WITH USSR, ADDING, THOUGH, THAT THESE FORCES WERE NOT SO WELL ARMED AND THAT MANY MORE TROOPS WITH THE MOST MODERN EQUIPMENT WERE CONCENTRATED AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE. HE SPOKE OF NECESSITY FOR WE UNITY AND INCREASE IN MILITARY STRENGTH. REGARDING THE US, TENG SAID THE AMERICANS HAD "TOO MUCH FLESH" (I.E., WERE TOO FAT; A LINE HE HAD TAKEN WITH US UNIVERSITY PRESIDENTS) AND AS A RESULT WERE ON THE DEFENSIVE AGAINST THE "LEANER" SOVIETS. CHIAO, FOR HIS PART, HAD CRITICIZED US FOR ATTEMPTING TO USE ITS MILITARY POWER IN ASIA FOR A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD

AFTER WORLD WAR II TO PREVENT A VACUUM FROM FORMING, BUT CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT US HAD FINALLY "SEEN THE LIGHT."

5. IN RESPONSE TO TENG'S REMARKS ON NEED FOR WE UNITY AND STRENGTH, VANDERSTOEL TOOK SAME POSITION AS THAT OF DANISH PRIME MINISTER HARTLING DURING RECENT TALKS WITH TENG: HIGH PRICE OF OIL ERODED ECONOMIC STRENGTH OF WE NATIONS AND, HENCE, UNDERCUT THEIR MILITARY STRENGTH.

6. FURTHER ON SUBJECT OF OIL PRICES, VIXSEBOXSE COMMENTED THAT CHIAO KUAN-HUA HAD RAISED SUBJECT IN JAN 7. SESSION WITH VANDERSTOEL. CHIAO HAD VIEWED CONSULTATIONS AMONG CONSUMING NATIONS ON OIL PRICES AS CONTRARY TO PRINCIPLE OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN PRODUCERS AND CONSUMERS AND AMOUNTING ALMOST TO CONFRONTATION. VANDERSTOEL HAD DEMURRED, SAYING THAT SINCE CONSUMING NATIONS DID NOT


~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~



PAGE 03 PEKING 0055

REGARD CONSULTATIONS AMONG PRODUCING NATIONS AS CONFRONTATION. THE PRODUCERS SHOULD TREAT CONSULTATIONS AMONG CONSUMERS IN THE SAME LIGHT. CHIAO HAD AGREED THAT EC NATIONS WERE FOLLOWING A PROPER COURSE IN WORKING OUT A COMMON POSITION ON OIL PRICES, BUT SAID THAT IN WHATEVER THEY DID THEY SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO CREATE A DIVERGENCE WITH THE US. WITH RESPECT TO THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION IN GENERAL, VIXSEBOXSE SAID SUBJECT WAS NOT DEALT WITH DIRECTLY EXCEPT IN CONTEXT OF OIL PRICES.

7. VIXSEBOXSE REMARKED BRIEFLY ON VIEWS EXPRESSED BY CHINESE REGARDING SOVIET-INDIAN RELATIONS: SITUATION WAS ONE IN WHICH ONE SUPERPOWER WAS SUPPORTING A LESSER POWER IN THE SUBCONTINENT WHICH HAD AMBITIONS TO BECOME A GREATER ONE.

8. DURING VANDERSTOEL CALL ON PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI, CHOU REFERRED TO SECRETARY KISSINGER'S BUSINESS WEEK INTERVIEW AND SAID JOKINGLY THAT ON QUESTION OF USING FORCE, SECRETARY HAD "OVERSHOT THE MARK." CHIAO KUAN-HUA HAD ALSO COMMENTED ON THIS PARTICULAR ASPECT OF SECRETARY'S INTERVIEW, NOTING THAT HE ASSUMED SECRETARY KISSINGER HIMSELF WISHED HE HAD NOT SAID WHAT HE HAD SAID. NEITHER CHOU NOR CHIAO HAD EXPRESSED ANY FEARS OVER POSSIBLE USE OF FORCE BY US, HOWEVER.

9. APROPOS OF CHOU EN-LAI, HIS APPEARANCE IMPRESSED DUTCH VISITORS AS BEING ABOUT SAME AS USUAL ALTHOUGH HE WAS SOMEWHAT THINNER. CHOU TOLD DUTCH THAT FOR LAST TWO YEARS HE HAD BEEN SUFFERING AILMENT WHICH COULD NOT BE COMPLETELY CURED EVEN THOUGH HIS OUTWARD APPEARANCE WAS NOT BAD. HIS MENTAL VIGOR WAS UNIMPAIRED. CHOU WAS FULLY ON TOP OF ALL SUBJECTS WHICH HIS ASSOCIATES DISCUSSED WITH VANDERSTOEL.

10. IN MAKING FOREGOING INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US, VIXSEBOXSE SAID HE WAS UNDER SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FROM VANDERSTOEL AND HEAD OF ASIAN DEPARTMENT TO KEEP US INFORMED NOT ONLY ON MATTERS INVOLVING US-PRC RELATIONS, BUT ALSO ON MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN EC AS WELL.

11. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO REPEAT TO OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES.

BUSH

~~SECRET~~



**ACTION COPY**

COPY 1 OF 13 COPIES

Department of State

**TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

NOD373



PAGE 01 PEKING 00064 160520Z

CONTROL: 2980Q

RECD: 15 JAN 75

11:36PM

00  
ACTION NOUS-20

INFO OCT-01 /001 W

R 140905Z JAN 75  
FM USLO PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3087

047578

*Chi Bzch*

~~SECRET~~ PEKING 0064

NODIS CHEROKEE.

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFUR CH US IN UR

SUBJECT: PAT MOYNIHAN'S CALL ON PRC FOREIGN MINISTER  
CHIAO KUAN-HUA

1. ON JANUARY 13 I TOOK PAT MOYNIHAN TO CALL ON PRC FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, CHIAO HAVING SET UP THIS APPOINTMENT IN LIEU OF ACCEPTING A LUNCHEON INVITATION WHICH I HAD EXTENDED TO HIM OR ARRANGING A MEETING WITH A LESSOR OFFICIAL IF HE WAS BUSY. JOHN HOLDRIDGE ACCOMPANIED US. IN ADDITION TO CHIAO, ON THE CHINESE SIDE WERE CHAO CHI-HUA AND TWO OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S CORPS OF LADIES, ONE WHO INTERPRETED AND ONE WHO WAS INTRODUCED AS THE INDIA DESK OFFICER. (IT IS UNUSUAL FOR CHIAO TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY SUCH A LOW-LEVEL GROUP, AND WE SUSPECT THAT MORE EXALTED PERSONALITIES SUCH AS CHIAO'S WIFE CHANG HAN-CHIH AND NANCY TANG MAY BE INVOLVED IN PREPARATIONS FOR A NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS.) CHIAO WAS HIS USUAL AFFABLE AND ARTICULATE SELF, AND THE ATMOSPHERICS OF THE MEETING WERE VERY GOOD.

2. A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE MEETING CONSISTED OF PLEASANTRIES-- PAT'S VISIT TO CHINA, THE COURSES PAT WILL TEACH AT HARVARD, HIS IMPRESSIONS OF HARVARD COLLEAGUES SUCH AS JOHN FAIRBANK; HOWEVER, WE GOT DOWN TO BRASS TACKS ON TWO BASIC TOPICS: INDIAN RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND THE US, AND SINO-US RELATIONS.

3. ON THE QUESTION OF INDIA, PAT SAID HE HAD HEARD FROM SECRETARY KISSINGER SINCE THE SECRETARY'S LAST VISIT TO CHINA TO


~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES

BY HR, NARA, DATE 8/11/08



NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 REXING 00064 150820Z

THE EFFECT HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE CHINESE WOULD LIKE CLOSER RELATIONS WITH INDIA. IN FACT, THE SECRETARY HAD SENT A CABLE TO PAT IN NEW DELHI SAYING HE BELIEVED IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IF PAT WERE TO PASS ON THIS THOUGHT TO PRIME MINISTER GHANDI, AND HE HAD DONE SO. CHIAO REMARKED IN RESPONSE THAT SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS HAD BEEN QUITE GOOD IN THE PAST BUT HAD SUFFERED SOME TWISTS AND TURNS; HOWEVER, RELATIONS WOULD CERTAINLY GET BETTER IN THE FUTURE BECAUSE THINGS COULDN'T GO ON THE WAY THEY WERE AT PRESENT.

4. PAT OBSERVED THAT THE SAME THING COULD BE SAID ABOUT US-INDIAN RELATIONS, WHICH ARE NOW MUCH BETTER THAN BEFORE. PAT SAID HE RELIEVED THE INDIANS WERE CONCERNED NOT TO BE JUST IN THE SOVIET CAMP EVEN THOUGH THEY HAD A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIETS, BUT WANTED BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE US. INDEED, THEY HAD ALREADY MADE THIS CLEAR. CHIAO AGREED THAT THE INDIANS DIDN'T WANT TO BE COMPLETELY UNDER SOVIET CONTROL, AND THAT THEY WANTED TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE US. HE THOUGHT SUCH AN IMPROVEMENT WOULD BE HELPFUL. CHIAO RECALLED THAT HE HAD EXPRESSED THE SAME ATTITUDE DURING THE SECRETARY'S LAST VISIT TO CHINA, AND HAD CALLED THE SECRETARY'S EARLIER VISIT TO INDIA A GOOD THING.

5. CHIAO DECLARED THAT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA AFFECTING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WERE NOT SO MUCH CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD INDIA ITSELF, BUT RATHER TOWARD INDIA'S POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. CHINA DID NOT AGREE WITH THESE POLICIES, FOR EXAMPLE, WITH RESPECT TO SIKKIM. NOR DID CHINA AGREE WITH INDIA'S POLICY TOWARD NEPAL.

6. WHEN CHIAO MENTIONED NEXT THAT THE US AND CHINESE ATTITUDES MIGHT DIFFER, PAT OFFERED TO EXPLAIN THE US VIEW ON SIKKIM. HE SAID THAT WHILE WE TOOK NO PLEASURE IN WHAT HAD HAPPENED, IN DECIDING WHAT POSITION WE OURSELVES SHOULD TAKE WE FELT WE HAD TO BE CONTROLLED BY WHAT WE REGARDED AS THE LEGAL SITUATION RESPECTING SIKKIM. THIS WAS THAT SIKKIM HAD BEEN A PART OF BRITISH INDIA AND, HENCE DIDN'T REALLY HAVE A SEPARATE STATUS, ALTHOUGH THE CHINESE MIGHT NOT AGREE WITH US, WE TOOK THIS LEGAL POSITION AS CONTROLLING. HE NOTED THAT WITH RESPECT TO NEPAL, WE KNEW WHEREOF CHIAO SPOKE, AND ADDED THAT THE INDIANS WERE NOW CLEARLY MAKING THINGS DIFFICULT FOR THE NEPALESE.

SECRET





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 PEKING 00064 180020Z

7. CHIAO COMMENTED THAT THE CHINESE HOPED INDIA WOULD TAKE "A RATHER REASONABLE ATTITUDE" TOWARD ITS NEIGHBORS IN THIS CONNECTION. HE REFERRED TO NEWS REPORTS ALLEGING THAT CHINA'S REACTION TO THE SIKKIM EPISODE HAD BEEN A REACTION TO FEARS THAT INDIA'S ANNEXATION OF SIKKIM WOULD HAVE SOME MILITARY EFFECT ON CHINA. CHIAO DENIED THAT CHINA HAD ANYTHING TO FEAR FROM INDIA. SIKKIM WAS A SMALL PLACE, COULD EXERT NO EFFECT ON CHINA, AND THE CHINESE OPPOSED INDIA ON THE SIKKIM ISSUE "AS A MATTER OF JUSTICE."

8. TURNING TO SINO-US RELATIONS, PAT REMARKED THAT HE WOULD BE RETURNING TO THE US AND SEEING THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY KISSINGER, AND, THEREFORE, WOULD LIKE CHIAO'S IMPRESSIONS REGARDING SINO-US RELATIONS. FROM NEWSPAPER REPORTS SUCH AS THOSE APPEARING IN THE HONG KONG PRESS, WE HAD HEARD THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE US WERE NOT AS FLOURISHING AS WE HAD HOPED THEY WOULD BE.

9. CHIAO SAID THAT HE HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED THE SAME QUESTION WITH ME (NO DOUBT REFERRING TO MY CONVERSATION WITH HIM ON DEC 27). REGARDING THE PRESS REPORTS PAT HAD CITED, ESPECIALLY THOSE IN HONG KONG AND SOUTHEAST ASIAN PAPERS, THERE HAD BEEN MANY OF THESE ALLEGING THAT US-PRC RELATIONS WERE DOWN "BUT THESE DON'T CONFORM WITH THE FACTS." DURING THE SECRETARY'S LAST VISIT, CHIAO AND THE SECRETARY HAD SAID IN THEIR SPEECHES THAT RELATIONS WERE DEVELOPING ALONG THE LINES ENVISAGED IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. "GENERALLY SPEAKING," CHIAO SAID, "RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE MOVED FORWARD." THERE WERE CERTAIN CORRESPONDENTS WHO HAD IGNORED WHAT CHIAO AND THE SECRETARY SAID IN THOSE PARTS OF THEIR SPEECHES DEALING WITH US-PRC RELATIONS, AND HAD TRIED TO CREATE TROUBLE. NEVERTHELESS, WHAT BOTH THE SECRETARY AND CHIAO SAID WAS NOT THE LANGUAGE OF DIPLOMACY BUT WAS "IN THE OPEN." "BUT, OF COURSE," HE CONTINUED, "AS MR. BUSH AND MR. HOLDRIDGE KNOW, THE TIME FOR ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS HAS NOT YET COME."

10. THE CONVERSATION THEN SLIPPED OFF INTO PLEASANTRIES FOR AWHILE, IN THE COURSE OF WHICH CHIAO MENTIONED THAT HE WELCOMED PAT'S VISIT TO CHINA, AND HOPED PAT WOULD LOOK AROUND AND SEE MORE OF THE COUNTRY. ONLY BY MAKING COMPARISONS COULD ONE ARRIVE AT OBJECTIVE CONCLUSIONS. IN EFFECT, PAT WOULD BE WELCOME TO COME

~~SECRET~~





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04 PEKING 00064 160020Z


BACK AGAIN. PAT SAID THAT IT WAS KIND OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO SAY SO. WHILE HE HAD ALREADY SEEN MANY THINGS SUCH AS HOUSING DURING HIS VISIT. HE WOULD LIKE TO COME BACK TO SEE SHANGHAI, NANKING AND CANTON. HE THANKED CHIAO FOR THE INVITATION TO RETURN.

11. AS WE WERE GOING OUT THE DOOR, I ASKED PAT WHETHER OR NOT THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN UPSET OVER THE INDIAN NUCLEAR TEST. PAT DECLARED THAT THEY HAD BEEN VERY UPSET; IN FACT, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN NEW DELHI HAD BEEN RECALLED TO MOSCOW JUST AFTER THE TEST AND REPRIMANDED FOR NOT HAVING KNOWN ABOUT IT IN ADVANCE. CHIAO SEEMED INTERESTED IN THIS INFORMATION.

12. SINCE THE SECRETARY IS A FORMER COLLEAGUE OF JOHN FAIRBANK, CHIAO'S COMMENTS ON FAIRBANK MAY BE OF INTEREST. AFTER ELICITING FROM PAT THE FACT THAT HE WAS A MEMBER OF THE GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF HARVARD, CHIAO HIMSELF ASKED PAT WHAT FAIRBANK'S PARTICULAR POSITION WAS. (IN OTHER WORDS, CHIAO RAISED THE SUBJECT HIMSELF.) PAT EMPHASIZED THAT JOHN FAIRBANK IN ACTUAL TERMS CONSTITUTED A WHOLE HARVARD DEPARTMENT ON HIS OWN, EVEN THOUGH HE WAS TECHNICALLY RETIRED. WHEN PAT ASKED CHIAO IF HE COULD TELL FAIRBANK OF CHIAO'S HAVING ASKED ABOUT HIM, CHIAO SAID "SEND HIM MY REGARDS." HE POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT THE TWO OF THEM HAD MANY DIFFERENCES, AND HAD "MANY WORDS" TO SAY TO ONE ANOTHER WHEN THEY MET.

BUSH

~~SECRET~~



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028018

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . George Bush

CREATOR'S TITLE . . . . . Ambassador

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . The Secretary

DESCRIPTION . . . . . a few comments from Peking

CREATION DATE . . . . . 01/15/1975

VOLUME . . . . . 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200128

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 5

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . China unnumbered items (8)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/07/2008

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

268

\*\*\*\*\*~~S E C R E T~~\*\*\*\*\*

DATE 01/21/75

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 00

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

MESSAGE:

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/1/08

IMMEDIATE

DE WTE #0084 0150345

O 150259Z JAN 75

FM WH50039 (PEKING/BUSH) WASH 85

TO USLO PEKING

~~S E C R E T~~ SENSITIVE VIA VOYAGER CHANNELS WH50039

WASH 85

TO: AMEMBASSADOR BUSH  
USLO PEKING

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: SENATOR MANSFIELD'S CALL ON THE PRESIDENT

1. PER YOUR MESSAGE OF JANUARY 10, SENATOR MANSFIELD DID MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT FOR ABOUT AN HOUR AND A HALF ON JANUARY 8, AMONG THE SEVERAL TOPICS COVERED WAS HIS TRIP TO CHINA IN DECEMBER. THE SENATOR TOOK THE OCCASION OF HIS CALL ON THE PRESIDENT TO PRESENT A 30 PAGE REPORT ON THE FINDINGS OF HIS TRIP, WHICH INCLUDED MEMCONS OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH CHINESE LEADERS (SOME OF WHICH YOU REPORTED BY CABLE DURING HIS VISIT).

2. THE OVERALL TONE OF MANSFIELD'S REPORT IS ONE OF HIGH PRAISE FOR THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE CHINESE UNDER CHARIMAN MAO'S LEADERSHIP, AND A FEELING THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT MOVED WITH SUFFICIENT RAPIDITY TO COMPLETE THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH PEKING. SOME OF THE OTHER SPECIFIC IMPRESSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE SENATOR'S REPORT ARE SUMMARIZED BELOW FOR YOUR BACKGROUND USE. IN SUM, THEY INDICATE THAT THE DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY LEADER BELIEVES WE SHOULD MOVE FORWARD WITH THE CHINESE TO COMPLETE THE RAPPROCHEMENT IN OUR RELATIONS AND THAT THIS POLICY SHOULD WIN BROAD SUPPORT IN THE CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC AT LARGE.



\*\*\*\*\*~~S E C R E T~~\*\*\*\*\*

\*\*\*\*\*SECRET\*\*\*\*\*

DATE 01/21/75

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 00

2

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. REGARDING INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS, MANSFIELD DREW THE CONCLUSION FROM HIS MEETING WITH CHOU EN-LAI THAT DAY - TO - DAY ADMINISTRATION HAS PASSED TO TENG HSIAO-P'ING AND CH'IAO KUAN-HUA. REGARDING THE ECONOMIC SITUATION, THE SENATOR FEELS THAT CHINA HAS "SOLVED THE FOOD PROBLEM FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE," AND HAS DEVELOPED AN IMPRESSIVE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL BASE. HE FEELS THAT THEY HAVE SOLVED CHINA'S ENERGY PROBLEM.

4. REGARDING U.S.-PRC RELATIONS, MANSFIELD OBSERVED THAT THE CHINESE CONTINUE TO EXPRESS HIGH ESTEEM FOR PRESIDENT NIXON, BUT EXPRESS DISAPPOINTMENT IN THE PROGRESS IN OUR RELATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. HE SAID THAT IT WAS "EVIDENT IN EVERY DISCUSSION" THAT HE HAD WITH PRC LEADERS THAT THEY ARE DISAPPOINTED IN THE LACK OF FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARD NORMALIZATION. HE OPINED THAT PRC LEADERS ARE PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH THE PRESENT STATE OF OUR RAPPROCHEMENT "MORE OR LESS INDEFINITELY" IF WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO GO FURTHER, BUT THAT THIS IS NOT WHAT THEY EXPECTED THREE YEARS AGO. HE CONCLUDES THAT THE PRESENT ONE-WAY TRAFFIC OF U.S. OFFICIALS TO THE PRC "MAY BEGIN TO BE RESTRAINED" UNLESS THERE ARE CONCRETE STEPS TOWARD NORMALIZATION.

5. REGARDING SPECIFIC BILATEAL DEVELOPMENTS THAT MIGHT OCCURE, MANSFIELD CONCLUDES THAT THE CHINESE DO NOT VIEW THE GRANTING OF MFN AS A PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT STEP, DESPITE THE EIGHT TO ONE TRADE IM-BALANCE IN OUR FAVOR. HE BELIEVES THAT THE PROSPECTS ARE FOR A REDUCTION IN THE VOLUME OF U.S. - PRC TRADE, AND EXPECTS A "SHARP" DECLINE IN THE SALE OF U.S. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS TO THE CHINESE. REGARDING THE CLAIMS ISSUE, HE SAID THAT THE CHINESE SEE THIS AS A "MINOR PROBLEM." HE BELIEVES THAT UNLESS THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO OFFER PEKING A "GENEROUS SETTLEMENT" OF THIS ISSUE IT IS BEST NOT TO PURSUE IT AT THIS TIME.

6. REGARDING THE TAIWAN QUESTION, HE OBSERVED THAT THE CHINESE ARE IRRITATED ABOUT THE OPENING OF THE TWO ROC CONSULATES AND THE APPOINTMENT OF A NEW AMBASSADOR TO TAIPEI LAST YEAR. HE SAID THE CHINESE FIND THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION ON CHINA "MESSY." HE BELIEVES WE MAY BE EMBARRASSING THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP IN PEKING WHO HAVE LITTLE TO SHOW THEIR COLLEAGUES FOR THEIR POLICY TOWARD THE U.S. HE SAID THAT THE CHINESE WANT US TO ADOPT THE "JAPANESE FORMULA." HE BELIEVES THAT PEKING IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT "AN INDEFINITE INTERREGNUM (ON TAIWAN) WHICH WOULD LEAVE THE



\*\*\*\*\*SECRET\*\*\*\*\*

\*\*\*\*\*S E C R E T\*\*\*\*\*

DATE: 01/21/75

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 00

3

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ISLAND'S LOCAL AUTHORITY UNCHALLENGED IN A MILITARY SENSE." UNLESS THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZES PEKING IN FORMAL DIPLOMATIC TERMS, HOWEVER, HE BELIEVES THAT THE U.S. RAPPROCHEMENT WILL REMAIN IN A "HOLDING PATTERN" AND IF IT REMAINS THERE TOO LONG THERE IS "LIKELY TO BE A DECLINE IN WHATEVER VITALITY IT NOW POSSESSES." ON THE OTHER HAND, HE COMMENTS THAT THE JAPANESE, IN RECOGNIZING THE CHINESE, WERE NONETHELESS ABLE TO MAINTAIN "UNIMPAIRED" THEIR COMMERCIAL CONTACTS WITH TAIWAN AND THAT PRIME MINISTER TANAKA RECEIVED HIGH PRAISE FROM PEKING FOR HIS DECISION TO FULLY NORMALIZE RELATIONS. MANSFIELD CONCLUDES THAT THE JAPANESE FORMULA WOULD "WIN VERY SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT" FROM THE CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

7. REGARDING OTHER INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, MANSFIELD CONCLUDES THAT IN CONTRAST WITH HIS VISIT OF 1972, THE CHINESE NOW HAVE A GREATER SENSE OF CONFIDENCE ABOUT THE SOVIET THREAT, AND THAT THEY HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY MODIFIED THEIR ORIENTATION TO JAPAN AND TO THE PRESENCE OF U.S. TROOPS THERE. HE CONCLUDES THAT THE CHINESE WANT THE "CLOSEST POSSIBLE ASSOCIATION" BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND TOKYO. HE PERSONALLY PROPOSES A "CONSOLIDATION OF OUR DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS IN JAPAN."

8. MANSFIELD COMMENTED THAT PEKING IS NOT SYMPATHETIC TO OUR TROOP PRESENCE IN KOREA WHICH, HE CONCLUDES, THE CHINESE ASSOCIATE WITH FAILURE TO SEE NEW DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN SEOUL AND PYONGYANG WHICH WOULD STABILIZE THE PENINSULA. THE SENATOR CONCLUDES THAT WE SHOULD SPEED UP THE WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS FROM KOREA.

9. THE SENATOR OBSERVED THAT THE CHINESE NOW MAKE LITTLE REFERENCE TO THE VIETNAM SITUATION. HE BELIEVES THAT PEKING FEELS IT HAS ATTAINED ITS MAIN OBJECTIVE, THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS. HE DID FIND THEM DISTURBED ABOUT THE CAMBODIAN SITUATION AND BY THE CONTINUING AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR LON NOL. HE SAID THE CHINESE DOUBT OUR ABILITY TO BUILD A COALITION OF LEFT AND RIGHT IN PHNOM PENH. IN CONTRAST THEY STILL SUPPORT SIHANOUK, WHO THEY SAY IS SUPPORTED BY "ALL IN THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT" AND IS A REAL --NOT JUST A SYMBOLIC-- NATIONAL LEADER. MANSFIELD BELIEVES WE SHOULD GET OUT OF CAMBODIA "LOCK, STOCK, AND BARREL" AT AN EARLY DATE.

10. IN SUM, THE SENATE MAJORITY LEADER IS A MAN WHO IS QUITE POSITIVE IN HIS EVALUATION OF CHINA, AND IS ANXIOUS TO SEE

\*\*\*\*\*S E C R E T\*\*\*\*\*





\*\*\*\*\*~~SECRET~~\*\*\*\*\*

DATE: 01/21/75

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 00

4

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE U.S. MOVE FORWARD TO A FULLY NORMALIZED RELATIONSHIP WITH PEKING. HE FEELS THAT THE BALL IS IN OUR COURT ON THE TAIWAN ISSUE, AND BELIEVES THAT -- DESPITE THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH NORMALIZATION WHICH HIS REPORT DOES NOT ADDRESS -- A FAILURE TO COMPLETE NORMALIZATION WILL "PUT US AT ODDS WITH MOST OF THE REST OF THE WORLD (WHICH HAS ALREADY RECOGNIZED PEKING) AND, MOST SERIOUSLY, TENDS TO FREEZE THE POTENTIALITY OF OUR DIPLOMACY FOR CONTRIBUTING TO THE STABILIZATION OF PEACE, PARTICULARLY IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC AND ASIA."

WARM REGARDS.

XGDS:

1164



PSN: 011838

TOR: 015/03:45Z

DTG: 150259Z JAN 75

\*\*\*\*\*~~SECRET~~\*\*\*\*\*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
 INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

S/S

*3 Chitren*  
*File Clavin 6*  
*2 Cambodia*

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

January 16, 1975

To: The Secretary  
 From: EA-Philip C. Habib / S/P - Winston Lord


MEETING WITH HAN HSU - CAMBODIA; INDIA

We met with Han Hsu the evening of January 16. We informed him of our views on the Cambodian matter along the lines of the French message which will be given to the Chinese in the next day or so. Han Hsu seemed to be expecting something from us on this. He read what obviously was a prepared statement of one sentence to the effect that we know their consistent position is that they will not interfere in the internal affairs of Cambodia and they support the just struggle of the Cambodian people. We replied that we understand that this has been their position but what we were doing was merely informing them of our views on this matter in accordance with our usual practice of making them aware of any important actions on our part. Han Hsu said he would convey our views to his Government.

We also told the Chinese that Ambassador Moynihan, in his discussion with their Foreign Minister, might have left the impression that we were actively promoting Sino-Indian relations. This was not correct. Our policy remains as you have explained to Chinese leaders, namely that we have no objection to the improvement of Sino-Indian relations but we believe this is a matter between their two countries. Han Hsu said they had not heard of this conversation yet but would report our comments to Peking.

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
 STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
 BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/1/08

Drafted by: EA:PCHabib/ S/P:WLord  
 1/16/75 Ext. 29596



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028019

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . George Bush

CREATOR'S TITLE . . . . . Ambassador

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Brent Scowcroft

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Senator Mansfield's report to the  
President

CREATION DATE . . . . . 01/17/1975

VOLUME . . . . . 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200128

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 5

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . China unnumbered items (8)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/07/2008

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028020

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇReport

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Secretary Kissinger

DESCRIPTION . . . . . Additional Information Items

CREATION DATE . . . . . 01/17/1975

VOLUME . . . . . 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200128

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 5

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . China unnumbered items (8)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/07/2008

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

SECRET

January 19, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: RICHARD H. SOLOMON *RHS*

SUBJECT: China's National People's Congress  
Formalizes the Continuity of the PRC's  
Recent Policies: But Where is Mao?

Beginning on January 5 Peking convened preparatory meetings for the long-delayed National People's Congress. The Congress was convened secretly between January 13 and 17. Prior to the session the Chinese Communist Party convened a three day Central Committee Plenum which gave formal approval to the list of Congress delegates and its basic documentation, and elevated Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing to membership in the Politburo's Standing Committee and to a Party Vice Chairmanship. In overview, the Plenum and Congress have confirmed Peking's foreign and domestic policies of the past several years. Senior leaders we have been dealing with since 1971 have, without exception, been reaffirmed in high state positions. Civilian control over the military has been strengthened. And the organizational influence of the left wing of the Communist Party has been further attenuated. The one curious note in these proceedings has been the absence of Chairman Mao as a direct participant. His policies, however, are strongly represented in the Congress documents.

This memorandum summarizes the major results of the Congress.

#### Continuity in Key Personnel

The Congress reappointed Chou En-Lai as Premier of the State Council. Indeed, one senses that Chou is resuming a more active political role, having delivered the Political Report to the Congress in person and having left his hospital to participate in the funeral of a long-time associate a few days before the Congress. How much of his old work load Chou will resoulder remains to be seen. My own guess is that he will continue to delegate much of the day-to-day business to Teng Hsiao-p'ing

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED *State Review*  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 3/21/04  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *7/1/08*



and other deputies, and increasingly play the role of a Mao -- arbiter of key political decisions and above the play of administration and bureaucratic politics.


Yeh Chien-ying was formalized as Minister of Defense, thus confirming Teng Hsiao-p'ing's hint to you of such a development during your November trip. The elderly Yeh represents continuity for Mao's national defense policy, although his appointment probably is a reflection of continuing problems with the military, from which the Party was unable to draw a younger candidate. The Congress explicitly named Mao as Commander-in-Chief of China's armed forces.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua was formalized as Foreign Minister. He was not, however, made a Vice Premier (as was his long-term predecessor Chen Yi). This suggests Ch'iao's domestic political base remains rather narrow, or that he is somewhat controversial. Mao, for example, has contemptuously referred to him on several occasions as "Lord Ch'iao"; and Teng Hsiao-p'ing needled him in front of the Fulbright Congressional delegation by referring to himself (Teng) as a "rural bumpkin" and then characterizing Ch'iao as a "foreign bumpkin."

PRC Liaison Office Chief Huang Chen, who was a delegate to the Third National People's Congress in 1964, was -- for unknown reasons -- not a delegate to the present session. Huang left Peking for Washington while the Congress was in session, although he did presumably participate in the Central Committee Plenum which preceded it.

#### Attenuation of the Political "Left"

The list of Ministerial posts confirmed by the Congress indicates that the left wing of the Chinese Communist Party, which we have hypothesized has been on the political defensive during the past three years -- despite their polemicizing in the press, was further attenuated in its organizational influence at the Congress. Mao's wife Chiang Ch'ing, the young Wang Hung-wen -- whose star rose so high at the 10th Party Congress in the summer of 1973, but who has been out of sight in recent months -- and the propagandist Yao Wen-yuan, are noticeable in their absence from posts in the State administration. None of the three were even made members of the permanent presidium of the NPC; and it is difficult to identify newly appointed State officials who are identified with the Party's left wing.



Conversely, there are a number of appointments which clearly go against the influence of the left. The Minister of Education, for example, is a man who was criticized and removed from office during the Cultural Revolution for supporting a "bourgeois" educational line. The Secretary-General of the Congress, in addition, is a man who was under attack from the left in 1974 for having allowed the performance of a play in 1973 which is a veiled ridicule of Chiang Ching.


In policy terms, however, there are several areas where compromises with the left appear to have been made. The Revolutionary Committees of the Cultural Revolution era -- through which the left and military exercised administrative power -- are given permanent status, although they are clearly placed under Party and State control. Similarly, the new State Constitution affirms the legitimacy of mass debates via big character posters, which the left used during the Cultural Revolution to attack Party "revisionists."

#### Implications for the Succession

We have assumed for some time that the 63 year old Shanghai leader Chang Ch'un-ch'iao -- who hosted President Nixon in that city in 1972 -- is a good bet as one of the more likely leaders for a successor to Party and State leadership after Mao and Chou leave the scene. Ch'iao appears to have eclipsed his younger protégé Wang Hung-wen at the Congress by reading the delegates a report on the new State Constitution.\* Chang appears to be situated in both the Party and state systems as a key "organization man," positioned to be able to build a national political following over the long run. At the same time, the overall list of Ministerial appointments indicates that the generation of leaders in their 50s and 60s has yet to take the reins of national leadership. The Congress returned administration of the State apparatus to men in their 70s who were removed from power during the Cultural Revolution. China remains a gerontocracy.

The new State Constitution does not provide for a chief of state. Thus the post which Mao held concurrently with his post as Party Chairman until 1959, has been abolished. This is a victory for Mao in that Lin Piao had tried to gain the post of State Chairman in 1970. Mao objected to there even being such a post at that time as a way of undercutting Lin's efforts to consolidate his power. The fact that the new Constitution is consistent with Mao's view of 1970 can be seen as evidence of Mao's continuing influence, as well as the leading role of the Party over the State bureaucracy.

\* Wang delivered the report on the Party Constitution at the 10th Party Congress in 1973.



### Continuity of Foreign and National Defense Policies

The Congress documents express support for "Chairman Mao's revolutionary line in foreign affairs" and assert that "we (Chinese) should ally ourselves with all the forces that can be allied with." As well, Mao's national defense policy is supported when the key Congress document reaffirms his "principle" of "dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony."

At the same time, the Congress communique calls on China to ally with the Third World and to support the Second World in their struggle against "superpower control, threats, and bullying." The document also asserts that "the contention for world hegemony between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, is becoming more and more intense. The factors for both revolution and war are increasing. The peoples of all countries must get prepared against a world war."


### Economic Policy: How to Control a "Rightist" Line?

The Congress approved an economic policy line which allows for contract labor, private plots, and the continuity of the commune system as it was in the early 1960s. This is the same set of policies which was criticized heavily during the Cultural Revolution, and for which men like Teng Hsiao-p'ing were removed from power. This suggests that PRC leaders remain concerned about their economic base, and will attempt to make a big push in economic production in the coming year.

This "rightist" economic line is very likely the subject of controversy within the leadership. Chang Ch'un-ch'iao's report on the Constitution contains the one overtly threatening political note of the Congress when he warns that "in some [economic] enterprises the form is that of socialist ownership, but the reality is that their leadership is not in the hands of Marxists and the masses of workers. The bourgeoisie will seize hold of many fronts if the proletariat does not occupy them." Chang seems to hint at political pressure on economic managers to counteract the otherwise rightist economic line.

### Where Was Mao?

Mao Tse-tung was conspicuous by his absence from both the Central Committee Plenum and Congress. Ill health does not seem to be the





issue, inasmuch as the Chairman received Maltese leader Dom Mintoff on January 9, and West German leader Strauss on January 16. Both meetings appear to have taken place in South China, where Mao has been for more than seven months.

It is difficult to conclude from the Congress documents that Mao's political influence has diminished. The new State Constitution reaffirms that "Mao Tse-tung thought" is one of the "theoretical bases guiding the thinking of our nation"; and Chang Ch'un-ch'iao's report makes ample reference to the "principles" and policies of "our great leader Chairman Mao." Indeed, except for agricultural policy, the decisions of the Congress -- designating the Chairman as commander of the PRC's armed forces, accepting Mao's personal proposal that the Constitution contain a provision ensuring the freedom of workers to strike, and abiding by Mao's view that there should be no state chairman -- are unquestionably Maoist positions.

We would just note that in past periods of diminished power and conflict over policy Mao has "retreated" to the provinces and has absented himself from formal leadership conclaves. We do not know if Mao's current aloofness represents such a situation. There is tenuous evidence in the arcane polemics on history which have been published in China during the past year that Mao -- or at least his surrogate figure, Emperor Ch'in Shih Huang -- sees the need for national unity, but wants to carry the struggle against political dissenters and military renegades through to the end. It is possible that while Mao accepts the consolidation of the bureaucratic organs of State power, as was accomplished by the National People's Congress, at the same time he wishes to avoid personal identification with this development as he has more disruptive political objectives in mind -- such as purging remaining dissidents from the military. We do not know if this is the case, yet the questions raised by Mao's absence from the Party Plenum and Congress will be worth watching in the months ahead.



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028021

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . John Holdridge

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . George Bush

RECEIVER'S TITLE . . . . . Ambassador

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re comments by Foreign Minister

CREATION DATE . . . . . 01/21/1975

VOLUME . . . . . 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200128

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 5

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . China unnumbered items (8)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/07/2008

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

653

~~\*\*\*\*\*CONFIDENTIAL\*\*\*\*\*~~ COPY

OP IMMED  
DE WTE #0171 0232353  
O 232345Z JAN 75  
FM THE SITUATION ROOM //WASH 86//

TO USLO PEKING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DELIVER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS

VIA VOYAGER CHANNELS WH50052

WASH 86

TO: JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE  
USLO PEKING

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

1. PLEASE DELIVER TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI AT OPENING OF BUSINESS TOMORROW.

2. DEAR MR. PREMIER:

PLEASE ACCEPT MY CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR APPOINTMENT BY THE FOURTH SESSION OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS AS PREMIER OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

I LOOK FORWARD TO MEETING WITH YOU LATER THIS YEAR TO DISCUSS MATTERS OF COMMON CONCERN AND INTEREST. WHILE, AS YOU NOTED IN YOUR REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES REMAIN BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, I REMAIN HOPEFUL THAT THROUGH COMMON EFFORTS WE CAN OVERCOME THESE DIFFERENCES AND ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF NORMALIZING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THUS FULFILL THE JOINT COMMITMENT EXPRESSED IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE OF 1972.

SINCERELY,

GERALD R. FORD

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/1/08



\*\*\*\*\*WHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

MCFARLANE, RODMAN

RECALLED

PSN:021554

PAGE 01

TOR:023/23:53Z

DTG:232345Z JAN 75

~~\*\*\*\*\*CONFIDENTIAL\*\*\*\*\*~~ COPY

\*\*\*\*\*CONFIDENTIAL\*\*\*\*\* COPY

HIS EXCELLENCY  
CHOU EN-LAI  
PREMIER OF THE PEOPLE'S  
REPUBLIC OF CHINA  
PEKING

3. THE SIGNED COPY OF THIS MESSAGE WILL BE DELIVERED TO  
PRCLO HERE.

4. WARM REGARDS.  
0247



PSN:021554 RECALLED  
PAGE 02 OF 02 TOR:023/23:53Z DTG:232345Z JAN 75

\*\*\*\*\*CONFIDENTIAL\*\*\*\*\* COPY

654

\*\*\*\*\*CONFIDENTIAL\*\*\*\*\* COPY

OP IMMED  
DE WTE30 #0065 0240631  
O 240630Z

TO THE WHITE HOUSE  
FM USLO PEKING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VIA VOYAGER CHANNEL  
PEKING 103

JANUARY 24, 1975

TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
FROM: JOHN HOLDRIDGE  
REFERENCE: WASH 86

1. PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS TO PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI DELIVERED TO FOREIGN MINISTRY 11:00 A.M. JAN 24, EARLIEST TIME AT WHICH APPOINTMENT COULD BE ARRANGED.

2. WARM REGARDS  
BT



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/1/08

\*\*\*\*\*WHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

SCOWCROFT, MCFARLANE, RODMAN

RECALLED  
PSN:021908 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:023/07:24Z

\*\*\*\*\*CONFIDENTIAL\*\*\*\*\* COPY

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

URGENT INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

January 27, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: RICHARD H. SOLOMON *RHS*

SUBJECT: Is the Period of Immobilism in Peking Over? Some Comments on the Current State of U.S.-PRC Relations

A number of recent developments suggest that with the conclusion of the National People's Congress (NPC) in Peking earlier this month, the air of immobilism in the PRC's leadership which we have sensed for some time is now dissipating. The Chinese have taken a number of steps in their dealing with us in recent days which suggest an interest in moving ahead in developing a more active and visible relationship. At the same time, the campaign of stimulated press sniping about dissatisfaction in Peking with the state of U.S.-PRC relations seems to have been turned off.

This memorandum highlights the indications of a change in mood in Peking.

Publicizing President Ford's Letter of Congratulations to Premier Chou

The Foreign Ministry called John Holdridge today and asked for permission on an urgent basis to publish the text of President Ford's letter of congratulations to Chou En-lai upon his reappointment as Premier by the NPC. A few hours after this permission was cabled to USLO, the text of the letter was released to the public by NCNA. It may only be accidental that the Chinese asked for this "urgent" permission and released the President's letter on the second anniversary of the signing of the Paris Agreement on Vietnam, but my own sense is that Peking wanted to give some visibility to the fact that its relations with the U.S. have gone beyond the Vietnam stage -- or hope that they have. One can speculate about how they would like this letter to be read in Hanoi, or Moscow, but it does seem clear that Peking wants to give heightened visibility to its relationship with Washington.

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE XGDS 5b(3)

Presidential Library Review of NSC Equities is

DECLASSIFIED w/portions exempted NSC Guidelines  
 AUTHORITY RAC NLF-CODEWORD-3-15-1-1  
 BY *MJD* NARA, DATE 3/2/2011  
 9/8/2004



Publication of the Ford letter may also be intended by Peking as a sign to the U.S. that in the wake of the NPC it is in a position to move ahead more actively in its dealing with us, and may be able to give Sino-American relations greater visibility now that its contentious leadership meetings are over. (In this regard, I might mention that a review of your discussions with Teng Hsiao-p'ing last November gives the clear impression that Teng did not want to get off into any detailed discussion of the normalization issue. Indeed, he seemed almost relieved to be able to go on to other subjects.)

Is Chou En-lai Back in the Action?


Another implication of publication of the Ford letter is that Premier Chou is back in a more visible leadership role. This development, of course, was more directly suggested by Chou's reappointment as Premier, despite his illness, and by his more active pattern of public appearances in the last three weeks. Indeed, I have a sense which is more intuitive than documentable that much of the "sour" quality of our dealings with Peking in 1974 was as much attributable to the predominant role of the dour Teng Hsiao-p'ing in foreign policy matters as to the domestic political campaign. If Chou has indeed reasserted himself more actively in the leadership process in the context of the NPC this may now be evident in a new atmosphere more consistent with the Premier's personal style.

The Press Sniping Appears to Have Ended

Another sign that the "old Chou" approach to dealing with the U.S. may be reasserting itself is the apparent drying up of the stimulated campaign of press sniping which we saw begin at about the time of your November trip to Peking. Since Phil Habib's December 24 demarche to Han Hsu on this subject, there has been sufficiently noticeable a shift in the tone of PRC public and semi-public statements on the U.S. and Sino-American relations that even CIA analysts (who do not know about the Habib-Han conversation) have commented on it (see the analysis at Tab A).

Moving Ahead with Exchanges

Another sign that Peking may be taking steps to pump life into its relations with us is that in the past two weeks PRC trade organizations have informed the National Council for U.S.-China Trade that the long-delayed




~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

3

visit of its counterpart organization, the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, will take place later this year (in August or September), and that they will be sending a delegation of specialists to the U.S. in late February to survey the textile market. This is the first such industry-oriented delegation that Peking has sent to the U.S. (Because of the political sensitivities for us in the textile problem, Bob Hormats and I are working with State, Commerce, and the National Council for U.S.- China Trade to structure the visit of this delegation so that it doesn't set off domestic and international textile producers, and does not alienate the Chinese through a simple recitation of our problems with textile imports.)

In sum, at the moment there seem to be a number of signs that Peking wants to move ahead with the U.S. in a positive direction. The only question about this trend -- if it is sustained -- is whether it will create more of a sense of momentum than suits your sense of timing or that of the President.

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE





~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

25X6

The Washington Connection  
[REDACTED]

Relations with the US have been given a good deal of attention by the Chinese since Secretary Kissinger's trip in late November, but the signals in the public media and in private comments by Chinese officials have been mixed.

Immediately after the visit, the Chinese gave some diplomats the impression of dissatisfaction over the results of talks on Taiwan, although Chinese comments seemed short on specifics.

An apparently well-orchestrated campaign, which went further, emerged in early December. It elaborated the themes that China was displeased over the pace of normalization of Sino-US relations and that normalization was directly linked to specific conditions regarding Taiwan. This line was spread widely to journalists and foreign diplomats by leftists in Hong Kong with ties to Peking, by Chinese diplomats abroad, and by officials in Peking. It was, for instance, passed on to Senator Mansfield during his visit to China in mid-December.

The most authoritative and comprehensive expression of China's position came during a non-attributable background interview granted by Vice Foreign Minister Yu Chan on December 13 to an American journalist accompanying the Mansfield party. The Foreign Ministry closely examined the journalist's story word by word, and Chinese officials stressed the importance of the interview, the first of its kind given to an American newsman by a senior Chinese diplomat.

January 20, 1975

-6-


~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

25X6

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

25X6

Yu Chan told the newsman that Peking was not completely satisfied with the progress of normalization. He indicated that Ambassador Unger's appointment to Taipei and the opening of additional Nationalist Chinese consulates in the US were not in conformity with agreements made during the Nixon visit in 1972 and embodied in the Shanghai communique. Yu described US troop withdrawals from Taiwan as a minor move. He said that, in order to normalize relations, Washington must sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan, abrogate treaties with the Nationalists, and completely withdraw remaining forces from Taiwan. Other officials have made clear that Peking would accept continuing unofficial US-Nationalist commercial ties along the lines of the Japanese model.



25X1

25X6

25X6

January 20, 1975

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]



25X6

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

to underscore the negative aspects of Sino-US relations seemed to fade in late December, and the lines it espoused regarding Taiwan have not been heard since. In mid-January, Foreign Trade Minister Li Chiang downplayed the importance of the huge imbalance in Sino-US trade which favors Washington. He indicated that China did not need an absolute balance and that the PRC planned to continue costly purchases of equipment and technology from the US. Earlier, some Chinese spokesmen had pointed to the trade imbalance as an important irritant in Sino-US relations.

On another plane, Chinese press criticism in December and January of several specific US foreign policies may have added to the impression of some observers that Peking had soured on Washington. In fact, attacks on the US position with regard to Korea, Cambodia, and Third World power in the UN, and on the recently enacted Trade Bill followed well-established Chinese foreign policy lines which have no direct links to Sino-US bilateral relations. Articles on US economic problems that tend to put the US in a negative light have long been a staple of Chinese propaganda and have not increased in frequency or intensity, although they have become more ideological in cast.

Similarly, a more even-handed treatment of the US and USSR in the joint New Year's editorial and recent banquet remarks by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien and Chiao Kuan-hua are almost certainly unrelated to Peking's view of Sino-US relations. [REDACTED] while the Chinese may have treated Washington and Moscow equally in public remarks, in private senior Chinese spoke harshly of the USSR and benignly of the US. Moreover, Peking's public remarks dealt with the likelihood of US-USSR competition resulting

January 20, 1975

-8-

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

25X6

in an outbreak of war--a newly prominent Chinese propaganda theme--which in effect vindicates Peking in its opening toward the West at a time of US-USSR contention. Lastly, a spate of year-end commentary in NCNA contained some of the harshest attacks against Soviet foreign and domestic policy seen in months. The same commentary barely laid a glove on the US. [redacted]

25X6

January 20, 1975

-9-

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]



25X6

MEMORANDUM

549-X 13-2

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

URGENT  
INFORMATION

BO

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

January 27, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: RICHARD H. SOLOMON *RHS*

SUBJECT: Is the Period of Immobilism in Peking Over? Some Comments on the Current State of U.S.- PRC Relations

A number of recent developments suggest that with the conclusion of the National People's Congress (NPC) in Peking earlier this month, the air of immobilism in the PRC's leadership which we have sensed for some time is now dissipating. The Chinese have taken a number of steps in their dealing with us in recent days which suggest an interest in moving ahead in developing a more active and visible relationship. At the same time, the campaign of stimulated press sniping about dissatisfaction in Peking with the state of U.S.- PRC relations seems to have been turned off.

This memorandum highlights the indications of a change in mood in Peking.

Publicizing President Ford's Letter of Congratulations to Premier Chou

The Foreign Ministry called John Holdridge today and asked for permission on an urgent basis to publish the text of President Ford's letter of congratulations to Chou En-lai upon his reappointment as Premier by the NPC. A few hours after this permission was cabled to USLO, the text of the letter was released to the public by NCNA. It may only be accidental that the Chinese asked for this "urgent" permission and released the President's letter on the second anniversary of the signing of the Paris Agreement on Vietnam, but my own sense is that Peking wanted to give some visibility to the fact that its relations with the U.S. have gone beyond the Vietnam stage -- or hope that they have. One can speculate about how they would like this letter to be read in Hanoi, or Moscow, but it does seem clear that Peking wants to give heightened visibility to its relationship with Washington.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ XGDS 5b(3)



DECLASSIFIED w/portions exempted  
Same as  
AUTHORITY RAC NLF-CODEWORD-3-15-1-1  
NSC Directive 9/8/04  
BY *NR* NARA, DATE 3/22/11

Publication of the Ford letter may also be intended by Peking as a sign to the U.S. that in the wake of the NPC it is in a position to move ahead more actively in its dealing with us, and may be able to give Sino-American relations greater visibility now that its contentious leadership meetings are over. (In this regard, I might mention that a review of your discussions with Teng Hsiao-p'ing last November gives the clear impression that Teng did not want to get off into any detailed discussion of the normalization issue. Indeed, he seemed almost relieved to be able to go on to other subjects.)

Is Chou En-lai Back in the Action?

Another implication of publication of the Ford letter is that Premier Chou is back in a more visible leadership role. This development, of course, was more directly suggested by Chou's reappointment as Premier, despite his illness, and by his more active pattern of public appearances in the last three weeks. Indeed, I have a sense which is more intuitive than documentable that much of the "sour" quality of our dealings with Peking in 1974 was as much attributable to the predominant role of the dour Teng Hsiao-p'ing in foreign policy matters as to the domestic political campaign. If Chou has indeed reasserted himself more actively in the leadership process in the context of the NPC this may now be evident in a new atmosphere more consistent with the Premier's personal style.

The Press Sniping Appears to Have Ended

Another sign that the "old Chou" approach to dealing with the U.S. may be reasserting itself is the apparent drying up of the stimulated campaign of press sniping which we saw begin at about the time of your November trip to Peking. Since Phil Habib's December 24 demarche to Han Hsu on this subject, there has been sufficiently noticeable a shift in the tone of PRC public and semi-public statements on the U.S. and Sino-American relations that even CIA analysts (who do not know about the Habib-Han conversation) have commented on it (see the analysis at Tab A).

Moving Ahead with Exchanges

Another sign that Peking may be taking steps to pump life into its relations with us is that in the past two weeks PRC trade organizations have informed the National Council for U.S.-China Trade that the long-delayed



visit of its counterpart organization, the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, will take place later this year (in August or September), and that they will be sending a delegation of specialists to the U.S. in late February to survey the textile market. This is the first such industry-oriented delegation that Peking has sent to the U.S. (Because of the political sensitivities for us in the textile problem, Bob Hormats and I are working with State, Commerce, and the National Council for U.S.-China Trade to structure the visit of this delegation so that it doesn't set off domestic and international textile producers, and does not alienate the Chinese through a simple recitation of our problems with textile imports.)

In sum, at the moment there seem to be a number of signs that Peking wants to move ahead with the U.S. in a positive direction. The only question about this trend -- if it is sustained -- is whether it will create more of a sense of momentum than suits your sense of timing or that of the President.



The Washington Connection  
[REDACTED]

Relations with the US have been given a good deal of attention by the Chinese since Secretary Kissinger's trip in late November, but the signals in the public media and in private comments by Chinese officials have been mixed.

Immediately after the visit, the Chinese gave some diplomats the impression of dissatisfaction over the results of talks on Taiwan, although Chinese comments seemed short on specifics.

An apparently well-orchestrated campaign, which went further, emerged in early December. It elaborated the themes that China was displeased over the pace of normalization of Sino-US relations and that normalization was directly linked to specific conditions regarding Taiwan. This line was spread widely to journalists and foreign diplomats by leftists in Hong Kong with ties to Peking, by Chinese diplomats abroad, and by officials in Peking. It was, for instance, passed on to Senator Mansfield during his visit to China in mid-December.

The most authoritative and comprehensive expression of China's position came during a non-attributable background interview granted by Vice Foreign Minister Yu Chan on December 13 to an American journalist accompanying the Mansfield party. The Foreign Ministry closely examined the journalist's story word by word, and Chinese officials stressed the importance of the interview, the first of its kind given to an American newsman by a senior Chinese diplomat.


January 20, 1975





~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

Yu Chan told the newsman that Peking was not completely satisfied with the progress of normalization. He indicated that Ambassador Unger's appointment to Taipei and the opening of additional Nationalist Chinese consulates in the US were not in conformity with agreements made during the Nixon visit in 1972 and embodied in the Shanghai communique. Yu described US troop withdrawals from Taiwan as a minor move. He said that, in order to normalize relations, Washington must sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan, abrogate treaties with the Nationalists, and completely withdraw remaining forces from Taiwan. Other officials have made clear that Peking would accept continuing unofficial US-Nationalist commercial ties along the lines of the Japanese model.



January 20, 1975

-7-

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]



to underscore the negative aspects of Sino-US relations seemed to fade in late December, and the lines it espoused regarding Taiwan have not been heard since. In mid-January, Foreign Trade Minister Li Chiang downplayed the importance of the huge imbalance in Sino-US trade which favors Washington. He indicated that China did not need an absolute balance and that the PRC planned to continue costly purchases of equipment and technology from the US. Earlier, some Chinese spokesmen had pointed to the trade imbalance as an important irritant in Sino-US relations.

On another plane, Chinese press criticism in December and January of several specific US foreign policies may have added to the impression of some observers that Peking had soured on Washington. In fact, attacks on the US position with regard to Korea, Cambodia, and Third World power in the UN, and on the recently enacted Trade Bill followed well-established Chinese foreign policy lines which have no direct links to Sino-US bilateral relations. Articles on US economic problems that tend to put the US in a negative light have long been a staple of Chinese propaganda and have not increased in frequency or intensity, although they have become more ideological in cast.

Similarly, a more even-handed treatment of the US and USSR in the joint New Year's editorial and recent banquet remarks by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien and Chiao Kuan-hua are almost certainly unrelated to Peking's view of Sino-US relations. [REDACTED] while the Chinese may have treated Washington and Moscow equally in public remarks, in private senior Chinese spoke harshly of the USSR and benignly of the US. Moreover, Peking's public remarks dealt with the likelihood of US-USSR competition resulting

January 20, 1975




~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

in an outbreak of war--a newly prominent Chinese propaganda theme--which in effect vindicates Peking in its opening toward the West at a time of US-USSR contention. Lastly, a spate of year-end commentary in NCNA contained some of the harshest attacks against Soviet foreign and domestic policy seen in months. The same commentary barely laid a glove on the US. [REDACTED]

January 20, 1975

-9-

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]



075

\*\*\*\*\*CONFIDENTIAL\*\*\*\*\* COPY

OP IMMED  
DE WTE #0216 0271012  
O 271015Z JAN 75  
FM THE SITUATION ROOM//WASH 87//

TO USLO PEKING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA VOYAGER CHANNELS WH50077

WASH 87

JANUARY 27, 1975

TO: JOHN HOLDRIDGE  
USLO PEKING

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

YOU MAY ADVISE THE CHINESE THAT WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THE  
PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE BEING PUBLISHED. HOWEVER, THE MESSAGE WILL NOT  
BE PUBLISHED IN THE U.S.

WARM REGARDS.

0092



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/1/08

\*\*\*\*\*HHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

HAK, SCOWCROFT, MCFARLANE, RODMAN

RECALLED

PSN:025218 PAGE:01 OF:01 TOR:027/10:12Z DTG:271015Z JAN 75

\*\*\*\*\*CONFIDENTIAL\*\*\*\*\* COPY

076

\*\*\*\*\*

~~SECRET~~

\*\*\*\*\*S COPY

15

?????????

WTE066

ZZ WTE

DE WTE30 #0066 0270935

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

FM USLO PEKING

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

VIA VOYAGER CHANNEL

TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: JOHN HOLDRIDGE

1. PRC FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS JUST CALLED TO ASK "ON URGENT BASIS" IF PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CHOU EN-LAI MAY BE PUBLISHED.

2. YOUR GUIDANCE REQUESTED SOONEST. IN OUR OPINION, THIS REQUEST INDICATES THEY REGARD MESSAGE IN FAVORABLE LIGHT, AND OUR INCLINATION HERE IS TO AGREE TO PUBLICATION.

3. WARM REGARDS.

BT



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/1/08

\*\*\*\*\* WMSR COMMENT \*\*\*\*\*

HAK, SCOWCROFT, MCFARLANE, RODMAN

RECALLED

PSN:025186

PAGE 01

OF 01

TOR:027/09:47Z

DTG:270930Z JAN 75

\*\*\*\*\*

~~SECRET~~

\*\*\*\*\*S COPY

0

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028023

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇReport

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Secretary Kissinger

DESCRIPTION . . . . . Additional Information Items

CREATION DATE . . . . . 01/30/1975

VOLUME . . . . . 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200128

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 5

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . China unnumbered items (8)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/07/2008

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR



Department of State

Chi B...

TELEGRAM

SECRET

NO0434

PAGE 01 STATE 022571

17

ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 1901 R

DRAFTED BY EA:MGLEYSTEENIGB  
APPROVED BY EA - MR. HABIB  
S/P - MR. LORD  
S/S - WHLUERS

103290

P 310042Z JAN 75 ZFFB  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO USLO PEKING PRIORITY  
INFO AMEMBASSY TAIPEI  
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ STATE 022571

NODIS

E.C. 11652:GDS

TAGS: MOPS, CH, TW

SUBJECT: PRC PROTEST OVER INCURSION BY US AIRCRAFT

1. PRCLO DEPUTY CHIEF HAN HSU CALLED ON HABIB JANUARY 30 TO LODGE PROTEST REGARDING ALLEGED INCURSION INTO PRC AIR SPACE BY US A-6 AIRCRAFT FROM "CORAL SEA" AROUND 10 AM ON JANUARY 28 IN VICINITY OF CHING CHIANG, FUKIEN. HAN EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS SECOND INCURSION, (LAST HAVING TAKEN PLACE DECEMBER 31 OVER HAINAN) AND WAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO THE PRC SINCE THE AIRCRAFT WAS ENGAGED IN


SECRET

DECLASSIFIED *State Dept*

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 3/2/09

STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY: *HR* NARA DATE 7/1/08





# Department of State

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 022571

"COORDINATED MILITARY MANEUVERS WITH THE CHIANG KAI-SHEK CLIQUE." HAN REQUESTED WE ADOPT MEASURES TO PREVENT SIMILAR INCURSIONS IN THE FUTURE.

2. HAN IS PROMISED TO INVESTIGATE FACTS AND PROVIDE PROMPT RESPONSIBLE ANSWER. HE POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT US OBVIOUSLY HAD NO INTENTION OF INTRUDING INTO PRC AIR SPACE AND WAS DETERMINED TO PREVENT SUCH INCIDENTS.

3. HAN'S PROTEST WAS MEASURED AND ATMOSPHERE OF MEETING WAS NOT UNFRIENDLY. FOLLOWING FINAL REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE, WE INTEND TO GET BACK IN TOUCH WITH HAN HSIU TO APOLOGIZE AND TO STATE THAT WE ARE UNDERTAKING FURTHER MEASURES TO ENSURE AGAINST REPETITION.

4. FOR TAIPEI: PLEASE REPORT ALL EXERCISES INVOLVING US FORCES WHICH SCHEDULED IN NEAR FUTURE. KISSINGER

~~SECRET~~





NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028024

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . AMCONSUL Hong Kong

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . [Henry Kissinger]

RECEIVER'S TITLE . . . . . SECSTATE WASHDC

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Foreign Minister

CREATION DATE . . . . . 01/31/1975

VOLUME . . . . . 6 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200128

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 5

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . China unnumbered items (8)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/07/2008

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR