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EXDIS TOSEC 558

FOL PEKING 1871 SENT ACTION SECSTATE OCTOBER 30, REPEATED TO YOU QUOTE

CONFIDENTIAL PEKING 1871

EXDIS



E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR CH
SUBJECT: DISCUSSION WITH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER YU CHAN

1. FOLLOWING OCTOBER 28 SIGNING AT FOREIGN MINISTRY OF AGREEMENT ON CULTURAL RELICS EXHIBITION, I HAD OVER AN HOUR'S DISCUSSION WITH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER YU CHAN ON A NUMBER OF POLICY TOPICS. ALSO PRESENT ON THE CHINESE SIDE WERE WANG YEH-CH'IU, DIRECTOR OF THE STATE ADMINISTRATIVE BUREAU OF MUSEUM AND ARCHAEOLOGICAL FINDS DATA (TO GIVE HIM THE TITLE THE MFA INFORMATION DEPARTMENT USED); TANG WEN-SHENG, IN HER ROLE AS DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE AMERICAN AND OCEANIAN DEPARTMENT; AND INFORMATION DEPARTMENT DEPUTY DIRECTOR YEN HUNG-LIANG.

2. BECAUSE THIS WAS THE FIRST MEETING WHICH ANY OFFICER OF THE LIAISON OFFICE HAS HAD WITH VICE MINISTER YU AND BECAUSE I BELIEVE THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN HIM AND NANCY TANG IS OF SOME INTEREST, I AM REPORTING OUR CONVERSATION RATHER FULLY.

3. I OPENED THE BUSINESS PART OF OUR TALK BY REFERRING TO THE SECRETARY'S VISITS TO THE SOVIET UNION AND INDIA. SINCE VICE MINISTER YU CARRIES A PARTICULAR BRIEF FOR USSR AFFAIRS, I MADE CLEAR TO HIM THAT DESPITE SOME DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL SPECTRUM ON HOW BEST TO ACHIEVE DETENTE, THERE WAS VERY WIDESPREAD SUPPORT FOR THE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Review*
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES *3/11/04*
BY *Hrc*, NARA, DATE *7/1/08*

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4. IN REPLY, VICE MINISTER YU SAID HE WAS SURE THE UNITED STATES HAD NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE NATURE OF ITS OPPONENT, THE SOVIET UNION, AND ADDED THAT THE PRC HAD REASON TO BE VERY SUSPICIOUS OF THEM BECAUSE OF THEIR OWN PAST EXPERIENCE OF THE RUSSIANS. "THE SOVIETS HAVE ONE SPECIAL CHARACTERISTIC", HE SAID, "WHICH IS THAT THEY ALWAYS TRY TO GET SOMETHING FOR NOTHING, PARTICULARLY IN THE QUESTION OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS". IN THIS REGARD, THE SOVIETS HAVE GONE MUCH FARTHER THAN THEY SAID THEY WOULD, WHILE TALKING ALL THE TIME ABOUT DISARMAMENT, HE ADDED.

5. REFERRING TO MY EXPERIENCE WITH AMBASSADOR MALIK AT THE UNITED NATIONS, I REPLIED THAT I KNEW HOW DIFFICULT AND HOW SHARP THE RUSSIANS COULD BE. NEVERTHELESS, WE HAD ALWAYS SOUGHT, GENERALLY SUCCESSFULLY, TO KEEP OPEN THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION TO THE SOVIETS SO THAT WE COULD CONTINUE FRANK DISCUSSIONS DESPITE THE OFTEN DEEP AND SERIOUS DIFFERENCES THAT DIVIDED US. AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE KIND OF COMMUNICATION WHICH WE HAD COME TO REGARD AS NORMAL WITH THE SOVIETS, I DESCRIBED THE GREAT INTEREST WHICH SOVIET OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON HAD SHOWN IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WATERGATE AFFAIR, FREQUENTLY CALLING ON ME AS REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CHAIRMAN AND ALSO ON OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY.

6. AT THIS POINT, NANCY TANG INTERJECTED THE FIRST OF SEVERAL COMMENTS WHICH SHE INTERPRETED INTO ENGLISH HERSELF RATHER THAN ALLOWING THE OTHER INTERPRETER PRESENT TO DO IT. "WE", SHE SAID, "ARE NOT REPEAT NOT INTERESTED IN WATERGATE, WE NEVER WERE, AND WE HAVE SPECIFICALLY TOLD YOU SO."

7. FOLLOWING UP ON THE SUBJECT OF WATERGATE, I SAID THAT AS A PERSONAL ACQUAINTANCE OF FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON, I VERY MUCH APPRECIATED THE COMMENTS WHICH THE CHINESE HAD CONVEYED BOTH OFFICIALLY AND PRIVATELY AT THE TIME OF THE RESIGNATION. THE CHINESE HAD THE FAIRNESS TO RECOGNIZE NIXON'S REAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS. I ADDED THAT I BELIEVE IN TIME NIXON WILL BE ACCORDED FULL CREDIT FOR THE VERY GREAT SUCCESSES OF HIS ADMINISTRATION, PARTICULARLY IN REOPENING CONTACTS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. BEFORE LEAVING THE UNITED STATES, I ADDED, I HAD SPOKEN WITH FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON SEVERAL TIMES, AND HE TOLD ME HOW FORTUNATE I WAS TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY OF COMING TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

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8. AT THIS POINT, I DESCRIBED MY APPROACH TO MY NEW ASSIGNMENT IN MUCH THE SAME TERMS I HAD USED THE WEEK BEFORE WITH THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF PROTOCOL. I SAID THAT WITHOUT WISHING TO GO BEYOND WHAT SEEMED APPROPRIATE, I WANTED TO MEET AS MANY CHINESE OFFICIALS AS POSSIBLE AND TO HOLD FRANK AND CANDID DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM ON ALL SUBJECTS OF MUTUAL INTEREST, SINCE A WIDER EXCHANGE OF VIEWS COULD ONLY LEAD TO BETTER MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND A STRENGTHENING OF OUR RELATIONSHIP.

9. VICE MINISTER YU SAID HE AGREED WITH THIS VIEW AND THOUGHT THAT I WAS OFF TO A GOOD START BY SIGNING AN AGREEMENT WITH THE PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT IN MY VERY FIRST WEEK IN PEKING.

10. AT THIS POINT, NANCY TANG INTERRUPTED A SECOND TIME "THE VIABILITY OF A RELATIONSHIP CANNOT BE CALCULATED IN TERMS OF NUMBERS OF AGREEMENTS SIGNED ONLY", SHE SAID. "THE MERE SIGNING OF AN AGREEMENT DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT A SATISFACTORY RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN FOUNDED. FOR INSTANCE, AN AGREEMENT HAS RECENTLY BEEN SIGNED IN MOSCOW WHICH SAYS THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR WAR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION IS REMOTE. BUT WHAT WE FIND INTERESTING IS THAT THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT ENTIRELY RULE OUT THIS POSSIBILITY".

11. "ON THE SUBJECT OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION", I CONTINUED, "I WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT NOTHING IN OUR APPROACH IS DESIGNED TO COMPLICATE OUR

RELATIONSHIP WITH OR MAKE THINGS DIFFICULT FOR THE PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT NOR IS THERE ANY IMPLIED THREAT OF COLLUSION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIETS AGAINST CHINA. WE ARE CONFIDENT

THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO MEET ANY CHALLENGE TO OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA POSED BY THE SOVIETS IN AN INTELLIGENT AND STRONG WAY AND WILL NOT BE FORCED TO COMPROMISE OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT, WHICH WE CONSIDER TO BE OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE. THE BASIC DIRECTION OF AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS CHINA AND THE DESIRE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR BETTER RELATIONS WITH CHINA REMAINS THE SAME. MEANWHILE, THE CHINESE MAY BE ASSURED THAT US GOVERNMENT WILL NOT BE CAJOLED INTO RELAXING OUR DEGREE OF VIGILANCE OR COMPROMISING OUR PREPAREDNESS AGAINST ANY THREAT. WE HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN HUNGARY AND CZECHOSLAVAKIA. BECAUSE WE DO NOT INDULGE IN RHETORICAL FENCING DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE IGNORE EXISTING DANGERS AND THE FACT THAT WE KEEP A HIGH LEVEL OF AMERICAN FORCES IN EUROPE IS THE PROOF OF THAT."



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12. "MY VIEW IS NOT NECESSARILY THE SAME AS YOURS", REPLIED VICE MINISTER YU. "THE SOVIETS ARE NOT AS HONEST OR AS FRANK AS YOU. (MY CHINESE SPEAKING ADVISERS TELL ME THAT THE WORD WHICH THE VICE MINISTER USED -- LAO SHIH -- MIGHT BETTER BE TRANSLATED AS "NAIVE".) IF THE SOVIETS SEEK DETENTE IT IS SURE TO BE AT OUR EXPENSE AND AT YOURS AS WELL, BREZHNEV IS A SKILLFUL ACTOR AND GOOD AT CHEAP TRICKS LIKE KISSING, EMBRACING, AND WEEPING, BUT WHAT GOES ON INSIDE HIS HEAD IS SOMETHING ELSE. YOU MAY NOT WISH TO TREAT THE SOVIETS AS ENEMIES, BUT THEY CLEARLY VIEW YOU AS THEIRS. THEIR MILITARY FORCES DEPLOYED IN THE FAR EAST ARE AIMED AT YOU AS WELL AS US. THEIR MILITARY MEN CONTINUE TO STRENGTHEN THEIR ARMED FORCES WHILE LEAVING DETENTE TO THE "POLITICIANS" WHOME THEY DESPISE".

13. AT THIS POINT, NANCY TANG INTERJECTED A THIRD REMARK. "IN THE PAST", SHE SAID, "AMERICAN LEADERS HAVE COME TO CHINA AND HAVE STATED THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA HAVE COMMON INTERESTS. THE STRATEGIC MOVES WHICH THE US GOVERNMENT MIGHT MAKE WERE DESIGNED TO GAIN TIME FOR ITS POLICY, THOSE LEADERS ADDED. WE ASSUME THAT THIS IS STILL THE CASE." NONE OF US UNDERSTOOD PRECISELY WHAT MISS TANG WAS GETTING AT. AT THE CONCLUSION OF OUR EXCHANGES ON THE SOVIET UNION, VICE MINISTER YU MADE NOISES AS IF TO TERMINATE THE INTERVIEW, BUT I HAD ONE MORE TOPIC WHICH I WISHED TO MENTION. "IS INDIA IN YOUR AREA OF IMMEDIATE JURISDICTION", I ASKED. "NOT DIRECTLY", REPLIED THE VICE MINISTER, "BUT I AM INDIRECTLY CONCERNED." "THERE IS A LARGE RESERVOIR OF POPULAR SENTIMENT IN THE UNITED STATES IN FAVOR OF THE INDIANS", I SAID, "PARTICULARLY IN INTELLECTUAL CIRCLES. NEVERTHELESS, THERE ARE MANY OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS ON THE POLICY LEVEL BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT. THAT IS WHY OUR SECRETARY OF STATE HAS GONE TO INDIA IN ORDER TO RESUME A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THESE OUTSTANDING DIFFICULTIES. BUT, IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO SUPPOSE THAT WE CAN REACH ANY QUICK OR EASY SOLUTION. DO YOU BELIEVE", I ASKED, "THAT THE SOVIETS CONTINUE THEIR POLICY OF PUSHING INTO INDIA?"

14. "WE DO BELIEVE THAT IS THE RUSSIAN POLICY", ANSWERED THE VICE MINISTER, "AND HAS BEEN EVER SINCE THE DAYS OF THE CZARS. THE RUSSIANS ARE OBSTINATE AND WILL CARRY THROUGH THIS POLICY IF THEY CAN. THE WARMTH WHICH THE INDIANS FEEL FOR THE SOVIETS HAS BEEN ON THE DECLINE RECENTLY, HOWEVER, FOR THE SOVIETS ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO SOLVE INDIA'S FOOD PROBLEMS. IT IS THEREFORE AN OPPORTUNE TIME FOR DR. KISSINGER TO VISIT INDIA, AND WE HOPE WE WILL ACHIEVE SOMETHING. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAS NO OBJECTION AT ALL TO YOUR SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO INDIA BUT WE HOPE YOU WILL REASSURE PAKISTAN OF YOUR INTENTIONS. THE INDIANS ARE A POOR NATION", HE CONCLUDED, "BUT THEY CAN BE VERY ARROGANT".



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5. ON THIS NOTE, OUR CONVERSATION ENDED. I THANKED THE VICE MINISTER FOR HIS TIME AND ATTENTION.

16. COMMENT: VICE MINISTER YU CHAN SEEMED GENERALLY SELF-ASSURED, ESPECIALLY WHILE DISCUSSING THE SOVIET UNION. HIS EYES SHIFTED CONSTANTLY, HOWEVER, IN THE DIRECTION OF HANCY TANG, AS THOUGH TO CHECK WITH HER TO SEE IF HE WAS TAKING THE CORRECT LINE. MISS TANG FOR HER PART DID NOT HESITATE TO ENTER THE CONVERSATION, SOMETIMES TO CORRECT THE INTERPRETER, BUT IN THE THREE INSTANCES DESCRIBED ABOVE WITH THE CLEAR INTENTION OF MAKING A SIGNIFICANT STATEMENT IN HER OWN RIGHT. HER DEMEANOR TOWARD THE VICE MINISTER WAS POLITE AND CORRECT, BUT NOT REALLY DEFERENTIAL. MISS TANG SAW US TO THE DOOR. BUSH UNQUOTE INGER SOLL

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WITHDRAWAL ID 028011

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME Secretary Kissinger

RECEIVER'S NAME Ambassador Bush

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CREATION DATE 11/06/1974

VOLUME 2 pages

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COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
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BOX NUMBER 4

FOLDER TITLE China unnumbered items (6)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/06/2008

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

*****~~SECRET~~*****

DATE 11/13/74

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
 DE WTE30 #0040 3090200
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TO THE WHITE HOUSE
 FM USLO PEKING 78 (BUSH)

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

PEKING 78

NOVEMBER 5, 1974

TO: THE SECRETARY AND SCOWCROFT
 FROM: GEORGE BUSH

1. IN MY FIRST TWO WEEKS HERE I HAVE CALLED ON VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAD-PING, VICE FOREIGN MINISTERS CHIAO KUAN-HUA AND WANG HAI-JUNG, PROTOCOL CHIEF CHU CHUAN-HSIEN, AMERICAN AND OCEANIAN AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR LIN PING, INFORMATION DEPARTMENT DEPUTY DIRECTOR HSIAD-TE, DIPLOMATIC SERVICES BUREAU DIRECTOR HSU HUANG, CONSULAR DEPARTMENT DEPUTY DIRECTOR TIEN PING, FOREIGN TRADE MINISTER LI CHIANG, CPIFA VICE PRESIDENT CHOU CHIU-YEH, CHINESE PEOPLE'S ASSOCIATION FOR FRIENDSHIP WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES VICE PRESIDENT LI EN-CHIU, AND NCNA DIRECTOR CHU MU-CHIH. IN ADDITION, I HAVE HAD A LONGISH TALK WITH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER YU CHAN AT THE SIGNING CEREMONY FOR THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL RELICS EXHIBITION AND BEEN A GUEST OF CHIAO KUAN-HUA AT A WELCOMING BANQUET.

2. ALL THESE MEETINGS HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN STATE DEPARTMENT CHANNELS, THE MORE IMPORTANT ONES AT LENGTH. TO DATE, PROTOCOL HAS SCHEDULED CALLS ON THE CHINESE OFFICIALS WITH WHOM USLO HAS HAD CONTACTS IN THE PAST. HOPEFULLY, PROTOCOL WILL READ ON DOWN THE LIST OF OUR REQUESTS FOR CALLS AND LET US BREAK SOME NEW GROUND WITH OTHER MINISTRIES, COMMISSIONS, AND GROUPS.

3. OF THE LOCAL DIPLOMATS, I HAVE CALLED ON THE FOLLOWING AMBASSADORS OR CHARGES: NEW ZEALAND, FRANCE, AUSTRALIA, GREAT BRITAIN, JAPAN, KUWAIT, ZAMBIA, PAKISTAN, ROMANIA AND EGYPT. I HAVE ENCOUNTERED MOST OF THE REST OF THE CORPS AT SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OR THE ALGERIAN NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION, THE FIRST AT WHICH USLO HAS BEEN REPRESENTED. MOST OF THE AMBASSADORS

*****~~SECRET~~*****

DECLASSIFIED *State Review*
 E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *3/1/04*
 STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
 BY *112*, NARA, DATE *7/1/08*

~~*****SECRET*****~~

DATE 11/13/74

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HAVE EXPRESSED KEEN INTEREST IN DETAILS OF THE SECRETARY'S FORTHCOMING TRIP. THE GHANAIAN, ROMANIAN AND AUSTRALIAN HAVE OFFERED TO CARRY MESSAGES TO SIHANOUK-- ALL OF WHICH WERE POLITELY REJECTED.

4. I INTEND TO CALL ON MOST OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS AND WILL THEN CONCENTRATE ON NATIONS LARGE OR SMALL WHO MAY HELP US WITH GATHERING INFORMATION. SOME DIPLOMATS HERE ARE QUITE DISCOURAGED ABOUT PEKING AND THEIR LIFE HERE -- NO POINT SPENDING TIME WITH THOSE WHO HAVE GIVEN UP.

5. I FELL SOME AFRICANS PLUS PAKISTAN, ROMANIA, POSSIBLY EGYPTIAN WITH SIX YEARS HERE, PLUS EXCELLNT UK, NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN CAN BE MOST HELPFUL.

6. THE DECISION TO ATTEND NATIONAL DAYS HAS BEEN WELL RECEIVED BY OTHER MISSIONS AND BY CH'IAO KUAN-HUA.

7. IT IS MY CONFIDENT OBSERVATION THAT USLO STAFF IS HIGHLY REGARDED HERE BY OTHER EMBASSIES.

8. IN ASSESSING OUR ROLE HERE AFTER TWO WEEKS, THE FOLLOWING POLICY SEEMS IN ORDER.

A. HAVE WIDESPREAD CONTACTS WITH OTHERS IN DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITIES.

B. HAVE AS WIDESPREAD CONTACTS AS POSSIBLE WITH PRC OFFICIALS.

C. BE WILLING TO DISCUSS FREELY WITH PRC VARIOUS WAYS TO IMPLEMENT THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE INCLUDING TRADE, CULTURAL EXCHANGES, JOURNALISTS, BUT LEAVE TAIWAN AND OTHER SENSITIVE SUBJECTS ALONE UNLESS ACTING UNDER INSTRUCTIONS. IMPRESS ON PRC SERIOUS NEED FOR PROGRESS OUT OF SECREATRY'S TRIP.

D. BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USA WITH PRC OFFICIALS (THOUGH THEY DO NOT SHOW ANY INCLINATION SO FAR TO DO SO).

E. DO SOME TRAVELLING IN PRC (BOTH TENG AND CH'IAO HAVE SPECIFICALLY ENCOURAGED TRAVEL).

F. DEAL VERY CAREFULLY WITH PRESS HERE BUT NOT BE UNAPPROACHABLE. THERE ARE DISTURBING CROSSCURRENTS HERE THAT OUR RELATIONS WITH PRC ARE HIGH-CENTERED OR HAVE DETERIORATED. THESE ARE NOT HELPFUL AND CAN BE OFFSET WITHOUT CREATING UNATTAINABLE GOALS. RECENT KINGSBURY SMITH STORY TYPIFIES NEGATIVISM THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO DISPEL.



~~*****SECRET*****~~

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DATE 11/13/74

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 003

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ALL IN ALL THIS IS FASCINATING WORK. I AM IMPRESSED
WITH OUR DEDICATED AND ABLE STAFF AND GLAD TO BE HERE.



PSN: 051217

TOR: 309/02:32Z

DTG: 050015Z NOV 74

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*****S E C R E T*****

DATE 11/13/74

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE WTE30 #0041 3090205
O 050200Z



TO THE WHITE HOUSE
FM USLO PEKING 79 (BUSH)

~~S E C R E T~~/SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

PEKING 79

NOVEMBER 5, 1974

TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: GEORGE BUSH

1. IN COURSE OF ROUTINE COURTESY CALL ON NOVEMBER 4 BY ME ON ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR GAVRILESCU, GAVRILESCU SAID HE WOULD BE IN ROMANIA THE LAST TWO WEEKS IN NOVEMBER AND IMPLIED HE WOULD MISS DR. KISSINGER'S VISIT TO PEKING. I ANSWERED SUCH VISITS WERE ALWAYS UNCERTAIN AND PERHAPS GAVRILESCU KNEW SOMETHING WE DID NOT KNOW. LATER GAVRILESCU RETURNED TO THE SUBJECT SAYING WITH CERTITUDE DR. KISSINGER WOULD BE VISITING JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, VLADIVOSTOK AND THEN CHINA. I REPLIED I HOPED DR. KISSINER WOULD VISIT CHINA SOMETIME AFTER HE VISITED THE SOVIET UNION, BUT THAT WIDESPREAD SPECULATION WAS JUST THAT.

COMMENT: GAVRILESCU SEEMED TO BE ON A FISHING EXPEDITION, LOOKING FOR CONFIRMATION OF INFORMATION HE HAD PICKED UP ON THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO CHINA, A SUBJECT OF INTENSE INTEREST TO THE ROMANIANS HERE -- AND TO ALL MISSIONS.

2. GAVRILESCU SAID HE HAD RECEIVED NO INDICATION OF AN ADVERSE CHINESE REACTION TO THE MEETING IN VLADIVOSTOK.

3. GAVRILESCU SAID HE WOULD BE SEEING SIHANOUK IN TWO DAYS AND WONDERED IF THERE WERE ANYTHING HE COULD DO. I SAID THAT THERE WERE REAL PROBLEMS HERE AND GAVE HIM NO ENCOURAGEMENT.

COMMENT: THE AMBASSADORS OF AUSTRALIA, GHANA, ROMANIA HAVE ALL MENTIONED SIHANOUK TO ME IN CONTEXT OF POSSIBLE DISCUSSIONS. I WONDER IF SIHANOUK IS PUTTING OUT FEELERS. WE TURN ALL THESE OFF IN ACCORD WITH WASH SECTO 271.

PSN: 051219

TOR: 309/02:33Z

DTG: 050200Z OCT 74

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/1/08

*****SECRET*****

DATE 11/13/74

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE WTE30 0042 3090210
O 050205Z

TO THE WHITE HOUSE
FM USLO PEKING 80 (BUSH)

~~SECRET~~ /SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
PEKING 80 NOVEMBER 5, 1974

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: GEORGE BUSH

WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ARRANGING TO HAVE THE FOLLOWING
DELIVERED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT NIXON

I HAD A CORDIAL MEETING WITH TENG HSIAD PING,
VICE PREMIER PRC, NOV. 2. HE SPECIFICALLY ASKED THAT I
CONVEY TO YOU THE SYMPATHY OF THE PRC GOVERNMENT IN
YOUR ILLNESS AND BEST WISHES FOR A SPEEDY RECOVERY.

TO THIS I WOULD LIKE TO ADD BARBARA'S AND MY
WARMEST REGARDS. WITHOUT YOUR FORESIGHT AND COURAGE,
WE WOULD NOT BE IN THIS FASCINATING ASSIGNMENT. A
SPEEDY RECOVERY TO YOU AND OUR LOVE TO MRS. NIXON.

GEORGE BUSH



PSN: 051220

TOR: 309/02:35Z

DTG: 050205Z NOV 74

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/1/08



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ROVE IMMEDIATE 6728
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UNCLAS STATE 242969

TOSEC 710

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: CVIP (KISSINGER, H. A.)
SUBJECT: COMBINED TRAVELING PRESS REPORT, EVENING,
NOVEMBER 4, 1974



FOR AMBASSADOR ANDERSON FROM S/PRS

NO. 30

1. WIRES: AP AND UPI AFTERNOON LEADS EX ROVE. AP LEADS
EXTREMISTS BOMBED OFFICE OF ROVE DAILY AMERICAN A FEW HOURS
BEFORE ARRIVAL HAK. MAJOR FOCUS IS ON SECURITY PRECAUTIONS
AND STATE OF PROTESTS: SCANT MENTION OF WORLD FOOD CON-
FERENCE. UPI LEADS WITH HAK'S OBJECTIVE TO KEYNOTE WORLD
FOOD CONFERENCE ON HOW TO FEED THE WORLD. MAJOR BACKUP
TO STORY IS ON SECURITY SITUATION IN ROVE.

2. ABC, HOWARD SMITH (NO KOPPEL). SECRETARY OF STATE
KISSINGER HAS BEEN TO EIGHT COUNTRIES AND TODAY HE ARRIVED
AT THE NINTH, ITALY. THERE WERE RIVAL DEMONSTRATIONS FOR
AND AGAINST KISSINGER IN ROVE WHERE HE WILL MEET WITH POPE
PAUL AND ITALIAN PRESIDENT LEONE AS WELL AS TO ADDRESS
THE WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE TOMORROW. THEN IT'S ON TO THE
MIDDLE EAST FOR KISSINGER WHERE HE HAS STOPS SCHEDULED IN
FIVE COUNTRIES TO BE FOLLOWED BY A VISIT TO TURKEY THIS
WEEKEND TO DISCUSS THE CYPRUS QUESTION.

COMMENTARY - HOWARD K. SMITH. TOMORROW IS A DAY OF ELEC-
TIONS BUT IT IS ALSO THE OPENING OF THE WORLD FOOD CON-
FERENCE, WHICH MAY BE MORE IMPORTANT. THE GENERAL SHAPE
OF THE ELECTIONS IS IMPORTANT AND SO IS THE FOOD CONFERENCE.
A GOOD MAJORITY OF THE 135 NATIONS WILL SCOLD THE U.S. FOR
BEING FAT AND RICH AND NOT DOING ENOUGH FOR THE POOR.
BUT BEFORE THE BLOWS START FALLING IT SHOULD BE SAID THEY
WILL BE HITTING THE WRONG TARGET. WE CAN DO A FEW MORE
THINGS LIKE STOP FERTILIZING OUR LAWNS AND SENDING THE
FERTILIZER TO THOSE WHO NEED IT FOR CROPS, BUT THE FACT
IS THAT THE U.S. DOES FEEDS IN ADDITION TO OUR OWN PEOPLE

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TELEGRAM

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NEARLY A QUARTER OF THE REST OF THE WORLD. WE ARE NEAR OUR LIMIT. THE SOLUTION UNFORTUNATELY LAYS IN THE POOR COUNTRIES THEMSELVES. THERE IS ENOUGH FERTILE SOIL IN THE WORLD TO FEED THE WORLD. IF IT WERE INTENSIVELY USED, AS IT IS NOT, THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM. THE NEW OIL RICH COUNTRIES COULD USE THE MONEY THEY ARE NOW CROWNING IN TO HELP THE POOR LANDS WITH FUEL FOR INTENSIFIED MECHANIZED CULTIVATION. BUT THE MAIN PROBLEM IS NOT THE QUANTITY OF FOOD, IT IS BAD DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD. IT IS NOT KNOWN VERY WELL THAT LAST YEAR THERE WAS ENOUGH FOOD ALLOCATED TO FEED STARVING AFRICA, BUT LOCAL PROFITEERING AND INEFFICIENCY FAILED TO GET IT TO WHERE IT WAS NEEDED. AND OF COURSE THERE IS THE QUESTION OF POPULATION. THE POOR COUNTRIES ARE ADDING ONE AND A HALF MILLION NEW MOUTHS TO FEED TO THE WORLD EACH WEEK. WE CAN DO VERY LITTLE ABOUT THAT; THEY HAVE TO FIND A WAY TO DO IT. SO THE HARD TRUTH ABOUT THE WORLD FOOD CRISIS IS THE U.S. CAN AT BEST PRODUCE ONE-TENTH OF THE SOLUTION. NINETY PERCENT OF THE SOLUTION DEPENDS ON THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THEMSELVES.

3. NBC - CHANCELLOR. (NO VALERIANI) SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER ARRIVED IN ROME TODAY. HE WILL ADDRESS THE WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE THERE TOMORROW AND THEN HE WILL FLY ON TO THE MIDDLE EAST ON A NEW PEACE MISSION. THAT MISSION WAS COMPLICATED BY THE ARAB DECISION IN RABAT LAST WEEK TO TURN OVER ANY WEST BANK TERRITORY GIVEN UP BY ISRAEL TO THE PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT, THE ARAB GUERRILLAS. CHANCELLOR THEN COVERED THE PROTESTS IN NEW YORK AGAINST THE DECISION TO ALLOW REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PLO ATTEND THE UNITED NATIONS DEBATE ON THE PALESTINE ISSUE. JACKSON WAS FEATURED PROMINENTLY IN THIS COVERAGE.

4. CBS - CRONKITE, (NO KALB). SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER'S ITINERARY TOOK HIM TO ROME TODAY WHERE HIS ARRIVAL WAS GREETED WITH UNUSUALLY HEAVY SECURITY BECAUSE OF THE BOMBING OF THE ROME DAILY AMERICAN NEWSPAPER, THE THIRD ANTI-AMERICAN BOMBING IN AS MANY DAYS. DAMAGE WAS FAIRLY HEAVY, BUT THERE WERE NO INJURIES. KISSINGER IS IN ROME FOR TOMORROW'S ADDRESS TO THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE WHICH IS BEING HELD AT HIS SUGGESTION. REPRESENTATIVES FROM MORE THAN A HUNDRED COUNTRIES WILL WRESTLE WITH THE PROBLEM OF MORE THAN FIVE HUNDRED MILLION PEOPLE WHO FACE STARVATION EVERY DAY. A PANEL OF ECONOMISTS AND FOOD EXPERTS, PREPARING FOR THE CONFERENCE

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification



Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 3 STATE 242969


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SUGGESTED TODAY THAT AMERICANS AND OTHER AFFLUENT PEOPLE EAT LESS OR FACE A CONFRONTATION WITH THE STARVING. ALSO IN ROME, AGRICULTURE SECRETARY EARL BUTZ CALLED ON THE SOVIET UNION AND THE OIL PRODUCING ARAB COUNTRIES TO DO THEIR SHARE IN PROVIDING ADEQUATE FOOD RESERVES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. HE SAID THE U.S. AND CANADA NO LONGER CAN CARRY THE ENTIRE BURDEN. CBS THEN LAUNCHED INTO A SERIES OF REPORTS ON THE WORLD FOOD CRISIS, WITH THE FIRST FROM MURRAY FROMSON IN BANGLADESH.

5. CBS/RADIO - KALB FROM ROME. SECRETARY KISSINGER NOW FEELS HE CAN ISOLATE AN EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI NEGOTIATION OVER FURTHER SINAI WITHDRAWALS WITHOUT ANY REFERENCE TO NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE WEST BANK OF THE JORDAN RIVER.

CONCERNING CYPRUS, IT IS ANNOUNCED TODAY THAT THE SECRETARY WILL VISIT TURKEY ON FRIDAY AND SATURDAY. IT NOW SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE SECRETARY WOULD NOT BE GOING THERE UNLESS HE FELT HE HAD TURKEY'S AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW SOME OF ITS TROOPS FROM CYPRUS. SUCH A WITHDRAWAL AND FINALLY NEGOTIATION WILL GET THE SECRETARY OFF THE HOOK WITH CONGRESS WHICH HAS VOTED TO CUT OFF ALL MILITARY AID TO TURKEY BY DECEMBER 10 UNLESS THERE IS A WITHDRAWAL. THE TWO TOPICS ARE LINKED IN THE SECRETARY'S MIND BECAUSE HE FEELS IF ANOTHER WAR BREAKS OUT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE U.S., HE FEELS, WILL NEED TURKEY. INGERSOLL



UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028012

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME Secretary Kissinger

RECEIVER'S NAME George Bush, USLO Peking, through
General Scowcroft

DESCRIPTION re status in Peking

CREATION DATE 11/06/1974

VOLUME 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200126

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER , 4

FOLDER TITLE China unnumbered items (6)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/06/2008

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

Sanitized per A/E 9/23/03

Ch. Exch 7

SENSITIVE

GE 723

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 11/10/74/1314

SITUATION: HAK TRIP
SUBJECT CATEGORY: HAKTS III

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

① O 060759Z NOV 74 ZYH
FM [REDACTED] 124

TO WHITE HOUSE.

② ~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY 060759Z NOV 74 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

NOVEMBER 6, 1974
TO: GEORGE BUSH
THROUGH: GENERAL SCOVROFT
FROM: SECRETARY MISSINGER
HAKTS 124 IMMEDIATE
REF: TCHAK 160

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR INTERESTING REPORT.
2. IN LIGHT OF YOUR UNIQUE STATUS IMPERING, I BELIEVE YOU SHOULD NOT ASK TO ATTEND ANY DIPLOMATIC FUNCTIONS. INSTEAD, YOU SHOULD ADHERE TO THE PROCEDURE FOLLOWED BY DAVID BRUCE UNTIL I HAVE A CHANCE TO DISCUSS IT WITH YOU.
3. WARM REGARDS.

100

BT

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AUTHORITY ^{KAC} 9/23/03 NLF-K-S-WWOF-4-6-1-9
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***** DHSR COMMENTS *****

SCOVROFT, WCF/PLANE, SEC FILE



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DTG:060759

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NOV 10 1974



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

O 101858Z NOV 74 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USLO PEKING NIACT IMMEDIATE 3958
BT

2830Q
NOV. 10, 1974
2:11 PM

~~SECRET~~ STATE 247811

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GOS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY)
SUBJECT: VISIT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER TO PRC
FOR AMBASSADOR BUSH FROM THE SECRETARY

1. AT 12 NOON, NOVEMBER 11 (1:00 A.M., TUESDAY, PEKING TIME) THE FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT WILL BE ISSUED JOINTLY IN WASHINGTON AND PEKING: BEGIN TEXT IT HAS BEEN AGREED UPON THROUGH CONSULTATIONS THAT THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE AND ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, WILL VISIT THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FROM NOVEMBER 25 TO NOVEMBER 29, 1974. END TEXT

2. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, WE HAVE INSTRUCTED EMBASSIES SEOUL, TAIPEI, SAIGON, LONDON, TOKYO AND US NATO REP TO ADVISE HOST GOVERNMENTS (NATO REPS) 12 HOURS IN ADVANCE (8 HOURS FOR LONDON AND US NATO) OF ANNOUNCEMENT. AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN WILL BE ADVISED IN ADVANCE HERE. KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY: EA:JJHELEBLE
APPROVED BY: EA - MR. HABIB
CLEARANCES: S-MR. EAGLEBURGER
S/S -O:GTWOHIE



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/21/08

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM


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FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2690
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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR CH
SUBJECT: US-PRC RELATIONS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/1/08



REF: A. TAIPEI 6788 B. STATE 247190

1. I AM INCREASINGLY CONCERNED OVER THE GROWING NUMBER OF ARTICLES WHICH ARE APPEARING IN THE PRESS INDICATING THAT U.S.-PRC RELATIONS ARE DETERIORATING, THAT U.S. DIPLOMATS IN PEKING HAVE NO CONTACT WITH CHINESE, THAT U.S.-CHINESE CULTURAL EXCHANGES HAVE DWINDLED TO NIL, ETC. AL JENKINS' VISIT TO TAIWAN (REF A) AND TERNHORST ARTICLE IN CHICAGO TRIBUNE (REF B) ARE ONLY TWO THE MOST RECENT OF SUCH INDICATORS, BUT THEY MAY BE READ BY CHINESE AS OFFICIALLY INSPIRED SIGNALS OF U.S. DISILLUSION WITH OUR RELATIONSHIP.

2. THERE MAY BE SOME WHO WOULD ARGUE WE SHOULD NOT DISABUSE THE CHINESE OF THIS NOTION. WE WOULD CERTAINLY LIKE INCREASED CONTACTS AND GREATER CHINESE FLEXIBILITY AND WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS THEM ON THIS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE FACTS ARE THAT WE HAVE ABOUT AS MUCH ACCESS TO CHINESE OFFICIALS AS ANY OTHER NON-SOCIALIST COUNTRY AND IN SOME CASES MORE. OUR HIGH LEVEL DELEGATIONS HAVE BEEN GIVEN FIRST RATE TREATMENT AND ACCESS, AND OUR CULTURAL EXCHANGES, WITH A FEW EXCEPTIONS HAVE PROCEEDED VERY SMOOTHLY.

3. I CAN SEE NO ADVANTAGE TO US IN LETTING THIS IMPRESSION OF DISILLUSIONMENT GO TOO FAR. THE CHINESE ARE NOT GOING TO CHANGE THEIR SPOTS. THIS IS A CLOSED SOCIETY, AND NO ONE EXPECTS THE KIND OF ACCESS ONE WOULD NORMALLY HAVE, EVEN IN THE SOVIET UNION. I ALSO DOUBT THAT A CHINESE SENSE OF U.S. DISPLEASURE IN THESE AREAS IS LIKELY TO HAVE ANY POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON THEIR ATTITUDES REGARDING THE LARGER ISSUES BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. I SUGGEST, THEREFORE, THAT WE CONSIDER AN ON-THE-RECORD INTERVIEW OR A CLEARLY IDENTIFIABLE BACK-GRINDER IN WHICH WE SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON, AMONG OTHER

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM


~~SECRET~~

-2- PEKING 1946, NOV 11

THINGS, THIS YEAR'S EXCHANGES, GROWTH OF TRADE AND AMOUNT OF OFFICIAL CONTACT. PERHAPS THIS SHOULD BE DONE IN WASHINGTON, BUT WE COULD EFFECTIVELY DO IT HERE.

4. WE MUST FIND THE DELICATE BALANCE POINT BETWEEN
A) HAVING PRC UNDERSTAND ALL IS NOT PERFECT BUT MORE
PROGRESS REQUIRED SO POLICY CONTINUES TO HOLD SUPPORT
IN USA AND B) HAVING PRC REALIZE WE ARE NOT GRIPING
BECAUSE OF CONDITIONS IN PEKING OR BECAUSE OF
UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS THAT ABOUNDED RIGHT
AFTER SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE.

BUSH



~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Huang Chen, Chief of the Liaison Office of the People's Republic of China in Washington
Tsien Ta-yung, Political Counselor
Chi Ch'ao-chu, Interpreter

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning, Department of State
Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council

DATE, TIME, AND PLACE: November 11, 1974, 3:14 - 4:00 p.m.
Department of State

SUBJECT: The Secretary's Briefing of Huang Chen on the Results of His Recent World Trip, in Advance of His Late November Visit to Peking

The Secretary greeted Ambassador Huang, who commented that the Secretary had not taken off much weight despite his recent travels. The Secretary responded that in view of his forthcoming trip to China he was likely to put on several more pounds.

Ambassador Huang: It is good that this time you will bring your children with you. This way they won't rebel against you.

Secretary Kissinger: But they are likely to become Red Pioneers! I wanted to be able to tell them myself that they were going to China, but as soon as stories began appearing in the newspapers that I was going to China, they went out and got shots because they wanted to go. They are absolutely determined to go!

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED *State Review*
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 3/11/04
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/11/08

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE



Ambassador Huang: We will welcome them. You should have them stay longer after you leave.

Secretary Kissinger: I can't have them turned into revolutionaries this early [in their lives]. Your offer is very nice, but they have school to get back to.

I appreciate your willingness to have me stay an extra day to do some sightseeing. The actual place is up to you -- although we suggest Soochow.

Ambassador Huang: I don't think there will be any problems; we can do this according to your wishes. There is the old Chinese saying, "Heaven above, and Hangchou and Soochow below." Senator Jackson found Soochow very nice. His wife's family came from there.

Secretary Kissinger: You can't mention Senator Jackson to be anymore! -- I'm only kidding.

I wanted a brief meeting with you after my world trip. I will go into the issues more deeply in Peking.

Before I do this -- our new Ambassador in Peking has been extraordinarily active since his arrival. I appreciate the courtesy with which he has been treated. But he is not always up on all the nuances of our previous conversations. Until he is, you should take your guidance from what I have said [in past discussions with your senior leaders].


For example, Nancy Tang asked him the question of whether the strategy of gaining time for certain purposes which we have discussed with you has changed, or whether it has become an end in itself. I want your leaders to understand that what I have discussed with Premier Chou regarding our basic strategy is unchanged.

Ambassador Huang: President Ford expressed this to me, as you will remember.

Secretary Kissinger: I only raise this because Nancy Tang asked the question at one of the meetings [in which Ambassador Bush participated].

Ambassador Huang: You know that before Ambassador Bush left Washington we met him several times. He was very eager in his desire to promote good relations between our two countries. We expressed our appreciation to him of his desires. It is understandable that he is not

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE



up to a full understanding of all the nuances [of your policies]. He just started at his job. As we say in the army, even if there are one or two misfires that is no problem. (Laughter)

Secretary Kissinger: Exactly. We will review all this in Peking.

Just let me give you a brief sketch now. I will go into the details in Peking.

Ambassador Huang: We also would like to hear your ideas.

Secretary Kissinger: First, the Soviet Union: My trip basically spent most of its time on two subjects, the strategic arms limitations talks, and second, the project [of the Soviets] that I had mentioned to you before, their proposal of a new treaty with us.

On SALT, they have now made a rather detailed proposal to us. It comes very near our position. For example, in the past they asked us, they said we should count French and British strategic weapons [in the total number to be controlled]. They also asked for a special compensation for [the weapons of] China. We refused both these points. They are beginning to move to our position now, that is, they are accepting lower numbers [of strategic weapons] for themselves.

It is possible there will be agreement in Vladivostok on the general principles of an agreement [on SALT]. I would say the chances are now 50:50. But there is a difference between general principles and a detailed agreement, a great difference -- I mean a SALT agreement.

They also raised the idea of a general agreement about cooperating against third countries. This we refused to discuss in Vladivostok.

These are the major items. For the rest, we reviewed smaller issues. So the only agreement that might come at Vladivostok would be a general agreement on the limitation of strategic weapons -- no other agreement.

With respect to India: Our basic purpose is to move them away from the Soviets, to discourage them [the Russians] so they will reduce their activities in South Asia. I have not changed my judgments about Indian intentions. I believe they seek hegemony on the Subcontinent -- they may even have strengthened intentions. After we left India, Winston Lord said he was in favor of giving nuclear weapons not only to Pakistan but also Bangladesh. (Laughter)



We had good talks in Pakistan. We will try to have some arms sales to Pakistan in the first four months of next year. First, we have invited Bhuto over here. You noticed in our public statement that we expressed support for the territorial integrity of Pakistan, that this is a major objective of the United States. (Ambassador Huang: I noticed.)

As for Afghanistan, we will also try to encourage an independence of spirit there.

In Iran I talked to the Shah according to the spirit of my discussion with Chairman Mao. I encouraged the Shah to visit Peking. His problem is that, as his wife has already been to China, he wants a senior Chinese official to visit him first.

In the Middle East, we will try to get some negotiations going between Israel and the Arabs. Regarding timing, we don't want talks to get going too far in advance of Brezhnev's trip to the Middle East. We would like to start [the talks] before he goes there, and then have them conclude after he has gone. This will discourage excessive adventurism on everyone's part.

Those are the main elements of the trip. I will go into the details in Peking. Regarding [the talks in] Peking, we will be prepared to discuss any subject of mutual interest.

Ambassador Huang: What are your side's ideas?

Secretary Kissinger: We are prepared to further discuss the normalization question, in the spirit of my discussion with the Vice Foreign Minister [in October]. We are prepared to see if we can find some schedule, to follow along the lines of our previous discussions with the Prime Minister and Vice Foreign Minister. But it's up to the Chinese side. If the time is not opportune, we can wait to discuss this issue. We have given you our general considerations -- to the Vice Foreign Minister. We can both try to become more concrete.

We will be prepared to discuss all other subjects in international affairs. I will give the same detailed considerations on various issues as I have on previous trips.

On bilateral relations, we can review where we stand on various negotiations, to see if we can use the occasion of my visit to mark some further progress. Are there any items that the Chinese side particularly has on its mind?

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~



Ambassador Huang: We just wanted our side to know your ideas.

Secretary Kissinger: We are prepared to be flexible.

Ambassador Huang: On the question of normalization, you had a discussion with the Vice Foreign Minister [in October], and also with Vice Premier Teng in the spring. Our side has no difficulty, the question is when you can do it.

Secretary Kissinger: We can be prepared to discuss the concrete steps to do it, but we have to discuss concrete elements which would take into account our problems.

Ambassador Huang: Our attitude on this question is quite clear. Chairman Mao discussed this with you the last time.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. If we discuss the matter of a time schedule, if we try to establish a deadline, that would involve some concrete steps, some decisions -- we are prepared to do that.

We understand the principles very clearly. But the details might require some discussion. If we find this issue too complicated, then we can wait. But we are prepared to discuss a timetable within the term of this Administration.

Ambassador Huang: You mentioned this to Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao.

Secretary Kissinger: Exactly. Exactly as I mentioned to the Vice Minister.

Art, do you have any other topics? (Mr. Hummel: None.)

Will you [Ambassador Huang] be there [in Peking]?

Ambassador Huang: I've already been in Washington seven or eight months now. I am planning to go back. Even before the final date of your visit was set [I was planning to go back].

Secretary Kissinger: Then we will be delighted to see you there.

If I could pay my respects to Prime Minister Chou -- even for a few minutes -- just for sentimental reasons.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~



Ambassador Huang: I think there should be no problem. We are happy to note that the Prime Minister's health has been improving recently. As well, you are old friends now.

Secretary Kissinger: But we didn't know the state of his health.

Ambassador Huang: We saw in our papers that he is receiving foreign visitors again.

Secretary Kissinger: We saw these reports.

When will you go back?

Ambassador Huang: Probably before the end of this week -- but not this evening! (Laughter) I just got back from visiting other parts of your country.

Secretary Kissinger: I know. You took a motor trip.

Ambassador Huang: So I want to rest a few days -- I won't be going tomorrow. (Laughter)

Secretary Kissinger: Can we give you a ride to Japan? (To Mr. Hummel:) Where do we stand on the arrangements for the trip? Will we be going from Tokyo to Peking?

Mr. Hummel: We are waiting for some decisions about the name list as well as the other arrangements.

Secretary Kissinger: Get the route set first. I'll make a decision about the name list later in the week. We have the ability to make enormous complications.

Ambassador Huang: Thank you for briefing us on the Soviets. I think it was a good thing that you visited Romania and Yugoslavia. This was a support to them.

Secretary Kissinger: I wanted to raise that. They are very worried about their neighbors. You know they are very disturbed about an attempt [by the Soviet Union] to split the Party in Montenegro. I spoke to the General Secretary of their Party. They are quite concerned. I invited him to come here.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE



Ambassador Huang: It is quite understandable that they are worried, given the example of Czechoslovakia. Occupying a "fraternal country" in one night!

Secretary Kissinger: We may sell the Yugoslavs some arms next year.

Ambassador Huang: We know that they are making efforts to strengthen their defense and independence.

I noticed from the papers that during your visit in India you reached certain agreements with them -- that you improved relations with them. We think this is a good thing.

Secretary Kissinger: Which agreements? Commissions? (Ambassador Huang: Grains.) On grain, they always brief their press quite enthusiastically. (Laughter)

Ambassador Huang: Our basic view is that it is better, with the Soviets there, to have you there as well. Two are better than one.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. But we have no illusions.

Ambassador Huang: In fact, it is good to make progress step-by-step.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, we made certain progress [on this last trip] -- we created some counterweight. This cannot be too encouraging to your friends to the North. After all the money they have spent, all their effort, we go there and in three days we have generated such emotion.


Ambassador Huang: We are happy to hear that you plan to sell arms to Pakistan.

Secretary Kissinger: This is not an easy question here. First I will have to shoot half of Winston Lord's staff. (Laughter)

Ambassador Huang: I would like to ask the question, after going to five or six Middle East countries what do you see as the prospect for negotiations?

Secretary Kissinger: The American Press has a propensity for defeat -- especially the New York Times and the Washington Post. They can't stand the prospect of success. (Ambassador Huang: That's why I asked!) They took the Libyan view on the Rabat summit -- the radical Arab, pro-Soviet view.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE



I think that we will have a good chance of getting another [period of] movement in the Middle East in January or February. (Ambassador Huang: Do you plan to go again?) We have to change our tactics a bit. We don't want your friends to the North to get too excited; it's not good for Brezhnev's blood pressure! So publicly we will be saying that we will be in touch with everybody, and probably I will not go to the Middle East until the negotiations are near completion. I don't think that Brezhnev wants to go there until things are relatively peaceful, so we will not prepare to go until just before he goes. But that doesn't mean that nothing will be going on -- don't be deceived. We are doing something. I will go at the end. We have made more progress [on the Middle East question] than we announced publicly at the end of my trip.

Ambassador Huang: I appreciate your tactics.

Secretary Kissinger: You shouldn't repeat your tactics too often.

Ambassador Huang: As an army man, I understand that you shouldn't repeat your tactics too often. You might be defeated if you do.

Secretary Kissinger: We will let you know on technical matters -- whether we will go directly to Peking or via Shanghai. Later I will give you a list of my associates.

Ambassador Huang: Talking about a name list, we certainly welcome Mrs. Kissinger and your children to China. They will have a good stay. The children can go to the Great Wall.

Secretary Kissinger: They are all set!

At this point Ambassador Huang and his associates rose to depart. The Secretary escorted Ambassador Huang to the door, and reiterated his pleasure at being able to see him in Peking on his forthcoming trip.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028013

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME George Bush

CREATOR'S TITLE Ambassador

RECEIVER'S NAME General Scowcroft

DESCRIPTION re diplomatic community and press corps

CREATION DATE 11/14/1974

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200126

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 4

FOLDER TITLE China unnumbered items (6)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/06/2008

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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BT
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CONTROL: 4574Q

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E.O. 11652: GDS


TAGS: PDIP, CH

SUBJECT: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE TO CHIAO KUAN-HUA

PLEASE DELIVER BY APPROPRIATE MEANS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
TO FONMIN CHIAO KUAN-HUA FROM THE SECRETARY:

QUOTE. MY DEAR MR. MINISTER,

I AM VERY PLEASED TO HEAR OF YOUR ELEVATION TO THE IMPOR-
TANT POST OF FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, AND OFFER MY WARM PERSONAL CONGRATULATIONS. I LOOK
FORWARD WITH GREAT ANTICIPATION TO SEEING YOU IN PEKING
SOON AND CONTINUING AND INTENSIFYING OUR ALREADY CLOSE
RELATIONSHIP. IT IS ESPECIALLY GRATIFYING TO ME PERSON-
ALLY TO SEE THAT PHILOSOPHERS ARE INCREASINGLY TAKING
OVER DIRECTION OF BOTH YOUR FOREIGN MINISTRY AND MINE.
HENRY A. KISSINGER. UNQUOTE. KISSINGER



NEA/IAI:WBSMITH:DJB
X22686 11/15/74
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NEA-HHSAUNDERS

S/S - MR. WOODS

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/1/08

SECRET

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028014

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME George Bush

CREATOR'S TITLE Ambassador

RECEIVER'S NAME The Secretary

DESCRIPTION re Secretary's visit

CREATION DATE 12/18/1974

VOLUME 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200126

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 4

FOLDER TITLE China unnumbered items (6)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/06/2008

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the United States of America 14

INCOMING AMERICAN EMBASSY TOKYO '74 NOV 19 10 48

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Classification CONTROL

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S/S-10

IMMEDIATE

- MB
- CH
- G/EMIN
- G/CML
- INATT
- OL
- OL/A
- ICI
- LABOR
- IONS
- ISIS
- ADMIN
- AGRIC
- DATA
- EDAO
- REC
- NSF
- DEA
- PERS
- BFF
- NSO
- FBI
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- INS
- MARAD
- CUSTOMS
- FBO
- A/EX
- LEGAT
- SY
- USTC
- USTS
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- Dunay
- CHRON
- POUCH
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- NAHA
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Chi Exch

NODIS
TOSEC 039K

E.O. QOYTWC GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UNGA, CB, CH
SUBJECT: KHMER QUESTION AT UNGA



REFERENCE: SECTO 3, PARAGRAPH 5 KQIPRTZ, FROM AIRCRAFT)

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM LORD

1. PER YOUR INSTRUCTION I HAVE TALKED TO MR. CHI OF THE CHINESE LIAISON OFFICE TODAY SAYING THAT I HAD HEARD FROM YOU AND SUGGESTING A DELAY IN THE CAMBODIAN QUESTION AT THE UN. I SAID THE ISSUE WAS LIKELY TO COME UP DURING YOUR VISIT TO THE PRC. WE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE AWKWARD FOR BOTH SIDES TO HAVE THIS HAPPEN AND TO HAVE A VOTE WHILE YOU WERE THERE. I SAID THAT IF THE CHINESE SIDE SHARED OUR ASSESSMENT WE WOULD APPRECIATE THEIR SUGGESTING IN NEW YORK THAT THERE BE A POSTPONEMENT FOR A WEEK OR SO. WE WOULD BE GLAD TO DO ANYTHING ON OUR SIDE ON THIS MATTER IF THEY THOUGHT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL.

2. MR. CHI SAID HE WOULD REPORT THIS IMMEDIATELY. HE MADE NO COMMENTS AND HE DID NOT ASK ANY QUESTIONS.

3. FYI: WE HAVE NOT REPEAT NOT INSTRUCTED AMBASSADOR SCALI TO DO ANYTHING IN NEW YORK WITH RESPECT TO YOUR INSTRUCTION SINCE WE ASSUME YOU MEANT ONLY TO APPROACH THE PRC AT THIS POINT. WE WILL TAKE NO FURTHER ACTION UNLESS WE HEAR FROM YOU.

4. BILL BUFFUM REPORTS THE FOLLOWING SITUATION FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

IN NEW YORK, THERE IS INTENSIVE MANEUVERING ABOUT WHEN THE KHMER AND KOREA ITEMS WILL BE CONSIDERED. SINCE THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGE TO THE PRO-SIHANOUK FORCES IN HAVING A VOTE ON THE KHMER ITEM BEFORE THE KOREAN ITEM, ON WHICH THE SOUTH KOREAN POSITION WILL PROBABLY PREVAIL, BOUTEFLIKA IS MANEUVERING TO OBTAIN A VOTE ON THE KHMER ITEM PRIOR TO A VOTE ON THE KOREAN ITEM. ON OUR SIDE THE BASIC

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STRATEGY IS TO ENCOURAGE THE ARGENTINE CHAIRMAN OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE TO HOLD FIRM ON HOLDING THE KOREAN DEBATE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO THAT IF BOUTEFLIKA CONTINUES TO INSIST ON TAKING UP THE KHMER ITEM JUST AFTER PALESTINE, HE WILL BE FACED WITH THE SIMULTANEOUS DISCUSSION OF TWO ASIAN ISSUES. PART OF OUR EFFORT HAS BEEN BASED ON CONVINCING THE CHAIRMAN OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE THAT FOREIGN MINISTER KIM'S SCHEDULE IS SUCH THAT A CHANGE IN A DISCUSSION OF THE KOREAN ITEM WILL BE HIGHLY INCONVENIENT TO HIM. BOUTEFLIKA IS DETERMINED, RESOURCEFUL, UNPRINCIPLED AND WELL-PLACED TO SUCCEED IN HIS TACTICS, AND HOWEVER HARD WE MAY WORK THERE IS STILL A STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT THE ACTUAL VOTE ON KHMER MAY COME BEFORE THAT OF KOREA.

INGERSOLL

BT



~~SECRET~~

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*Copy sent to
Edelman*

TO THE WHITE HOUSE
FM USLO PEKING

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY



VIA VOYAGER CHANNEL

PEKING 02

NOVEMBER 20, 1974

TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: GEORGE BUSH
SUBJECT: U.S.-PRC TRADE RELATIONS

1. HEREWITH IS AN ANALYSIS OF U.S.-PRC TRADE RELATIONS PREPARED BY THE USLO COMMERCIAL/ECONOMIC OFFICER AS BEING OF POSSIBLE USE TO THE SECRETARY IN CONNECTION WITH HIS PEKING VISIT. IF YOU AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL, I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR PASSING IT ON TO THE APPROPRIATE PERSONS.

2. OVER THE LAST YEAR, THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF DEVELOPMENTS TO INDICATE THAT NOT ALL IS WELL IN SINO-US TRADE, EVEN THOUGH THIS TRADE OVERALL HAS CONTINUED TO GROW: ---NOTWITHSTANDING THE WARM RECEPTION ACCORDED IN PEKING TO THE DELEGATION FROM THE NATIONAL CONCIL FOR US-CHINA TRADE (NCUSCT) ONE YEAR AGO, THERE HAS BEEN NO FURTHER PROGRESS FROM THE CHINESE ON THE AGREE- MENT FOR A RETURN VISIT TO THE US BY THE CHINA COUNCIL FOR THE PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (CCPIT), OR ON THE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE BETWEEN THE TWO ORGANIZA- TIONS FOR SUBSEQUENT EXCHANGES OF TRADE DELEGATIONS AND EXHIBITIONS.

---PROGRESS ON POTENTIAL SALES OF US PLANTS, EQUIPMENT, AND TECHNOLOGY HAS MOVED FORWARD FAR MORE SLOWLY THAN WAS ANTICIPATED LAST YEAR. FROM LATE 1973 TO THE FALL OF 1974, WHILE CHINA WAS BUYING ABOUT \$800 MILLION WORTH OF WHOLE PLANTS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES, THERE WERE NO SUCH PURCHASES FROM THE US, AND ALMOST A COMPLETE HIATUS IN SUCH NEGOTIATIONS. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN A SHARP DECLINE THIS YEAR IN NEW CONTRACTS FOR PURCHASES OF MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT FROM THE US. WHILE THERE APPEARS TO BE SOME RENEWAL OF ACTIVITY IN RECENT WEEKS, THE CHINESE HAVE NOT FOLLOWED THROUGH, AT LEAST TO THE

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

KENNEDY, MCFARLANE, RODMAN, SENT TO GEN. SCOWCROFT IN TOHAK 36 PER COL. KENNEDY'S INSTRUCTIONS.

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EXTENT EXPECTED, ON THEIR INITIAL INTEREST IN WHAT US FIRMS HAVE TO OFFER. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN NUMEROUS INSTANCES OF CHINESE PREFERENCE TO DEAL WITH FOREIGN AFFILIATES OR SUBSIDIARIES OF AMERICAN FIRMS RATHER THAN WITH THE US FIRMS THEMSELVES.

---THERE HAVE BEEN SERIOUS PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE CHINESE PURCHASE OF US AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES, INCLUDING THE CANCELLATION OF CERTAIN LARGE ORDERS OR THE POSTPONEMENT OF DELIVERIES.

3. THERE HAVE BEEN OTHER INDICATIONS OF DISSATISFACTION AND INFLEXIBILITY FROM THE CHINESE: THEIR RESISTANCE TO COMPLIANCE WITH FDA AND OTHER USG IMPORT REGULATIONS, CONSTANT COMPLAINTS TO BUSINESSMEN ABOUT THEIR LACK OF MFN TREATMENT, THEIR INDIGNANT STANCE ON THE PROBLEM OF US CONTROLS ON EXPORT OF STEEL SCRAP, AND THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO COMPLY WITH PROCEDURES REQUIRED UNDER STRATEGIC EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS.

4. THESE DEVELOPMENTS MAY EACH BE THE RESULT OF INDEPENDENT AND QUITE PLAUSIBLE CONSIDERATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, CCPIT, A VERY BUSY ORGANIZATION, HAS CLAIMED THAT ITS POSTPONEMENT OF A DELEGATION VISIT TO THE US HAS BEEN UNAVOIDABLE RESULT OF A FULL SCHEDULE. THE SLOWNESS OF PLANT, EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY PURCHASES FROM THE US COULD BE PARTIALLY EXPLAINED BY A MID-1974 SLOWDOWN OF SUCH PURCHASE ACTIVITY IN GENERAL, BY THE CHINESE LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH US FIRMS, AND BY THE DESIRE TO MAINTAIN TRADE WITH OLD FRIENDS. SOME PROBLEMS IN AGRICULTURAL PURCHASES FROM THE US SEEM TO STEM FROM SINCERE CONCERN ABOUT THE QUALITY OF US GRAIN, IMPROVED EXPECTATIONS OF THIS YEAR'S HARVEST, AND SHORT-TERM FOREIGN EXCHANGE DIFFICULTIES. THE VERY LARGE IMBALANCE IN TRADE MAY BE ANOTHER REASON WHY THE CHINESE WANT TO HOLD PURCHASES FROM THE US DOWN.

5. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, TWO OTHER THEORIES WHICH MAY PARTIALLY, OR MORE FULLY, EXPLAIN CHINESE BEHAVIOR IN THE PROBLEM AREAS LISTED ABOVE.

6. THE FIRST IS THAT THE CHINESE, DISAPPOINTED AT THE SLOW PACE OF POLITICAL NORMALIZATION AND IRKED BY AMERICAN SELF-SATISFACTION AT THE PHENOMENAL GROWTH OF TRADE, HAVE TRIED TO SHOW THAT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THERE ARE LIMITS TO HOW FAR WE CAN GO IN THE TRADE SPHERE. INDEED, THEY HAVE TAKEN THE LINE WITH SOME VISITORS THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF NORMALIZATION OF POLITICAL RELATIONS, IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE FULL DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE RELATIONS. THE BEST WAY TO SHOW THIS, WITH LITTLE DAMAGE TO CHINA'S SELF-INTEREST, IS IN THE ATMOSPHERICS OF TRADE, E.G., TRADE MISSIONS AND EXHIBITS. HENCE, IN CONVERSATIONS WITH USLO OFFICERS THERE HAVE BEEN CLEAR HINTS THAT CCPIT'S SLOWNESS TO MOVE IN THIS AREA



IS RELATED TO POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. THIS THEORY MIGHT ALSO HELP EXPLAIN THE APPARENT CHINESE RESISTANCE TO LARGE PURCHASES OF US INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY. IT MAY ALSO BE A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THE FIRM LINE THE CHINESE HAVE TAKEN ON MATTERS SUCH AS TCK AND THEIR READINESS TO CUT BACK ON US AGRICULTURAL PURCHASES.

7. THE SECOND THEORY RELATES TO CHINA'S IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO BE A LEADER OF THE THIRD WORLD IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SUPERPOWER DOMINATION. THE CHINESE MAY HAVE FOUND THE FANTASTIC GROWTH OF TRADE WITH THE US, AND ESPECIALLY THE IMBALANCE OF THAT TRADE, TO BE A DIFFICULT PILL TO SWALLOW, A CONTRADICTION TO THEIR TENETS OF SELF-RELIANCE AND OF OPPOSITION TO BOTH THE SUPERPOWERS. THUS THE RESULT MAY HAVE BEEN A GO SLOW ON TRADE MISSIONS AND EXHIBITS WHICH WOULD HAVE HIGH VISIBILITY, A POLICY OF VERY STRICT SELECTIVITY IN EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY PURCHASES (I.E. BUYING FROM THE US ONLY THAT WHICH IS UNIQUE AND UNOBTAINABLE FROM OTHER SOURCES AT COMPETITIVE PRICES), AND A WELCOME OPPORTUNITY TO CUT BACK HIGH VOLUME AND HIGH VALUE AGRICULTURAL PURCHASES. WE CAN SPECULATE THAT WITH A DECLINE IN AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS FROM THE US, WE MAY SEE SOME INCREASE IN PURCHASES OF AMERICAN EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY, WHILE THE OVERALL LEVEL OF IMPORTS FROM THE US IS REDUCED OR KEPT CONSTANT.

8. THERE IS NO SIMPLE OR SINGLE EXPLANATION FOR THE PROBLEMS IN SINO-US TRADE OUTLINED ABOVE. NEVERTHELESS, THE FOREGOING DISCUSSION POINTS OUT TWO SUBJECTS WHICH THE US SIDE MIGHT HAVE IN MIND IN THE TALKS THAT WILL TAKE PLACE DURING THE SECRETARY'S FORTHCOMING VISIT.

9. THE FIRST RELATES TO THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR US FIRMS TO SELL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY TO THE CHINESE. IN CONNECTION WITH ANY PROGRESS IN OUR BILATERAL POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP, AND CERTAINLY IN CONNECTION WITH ANY UNDERSTANDING ABOUT FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS ON MFN STATUS, IT COULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT WE EXPECT US FIRMS TO HAVE AS GOOD OPPORTUNITIES TO COMPETE FOR CHINA'S BUSINESS AS FIRMS IN OTHER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (INCLUDING FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES OF US COMPANIES).

10. SECONDLY, WE SHOULD BE MINDFUL OF THE SYMBOLIC AS WELL AS POTENTIAL TRADE VALUE OF AN AGREEMENT ON FUTURE TRADE MISSIONS AND POSSIBLY EXHIBITIONS. UNLIKE SCHOLARLY AND CULTURAL EXCHANGES, THERE HAS BEEN ALMOST NO FORWARD MOVEMENT IN THIS AREA. AN AGREEMENT DURING THE SECRETARY'S VISIT ON SUCH TRADE EXCHANGES WOULD BE TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF FURTHER PROGRESS IN THE US-CHINA RELATIONSHIP.

11. FOR EXAMPLE, IT COULD BE AGREED THAT THE CCPIT VISIT



DISCUSSED WITH NCUSCT LAST YEAR, WHICH WOULD BE THE FIRST FORMAL PRC TRADE DELEGATION TO THE US, WILL TAKE PLACE IN A SPECIFIC MONTH. ADDITIONALLY, AGREEMENT COULD BE SOUGHT FOR A SPECIFIC NUMBER OF FOLLOWUP DELEGATIONS -- PERHAPS TWO EACH WAY IN 1975 AND MORE IN 1976. WHILE DETAILS ON SUCH FOLLOWUP DELEGATIONS SHOULD BE LEFT TO CCPIT AND THE NCUSCT, SPECIFIC MENTION MIGHT BE MADE OF A PRC DELEGATION TO EXPLORE CHINESE EXPORT OPPORTUNITIES IN THE US.

12. IF IT IS POSSIBLE TO FORESEE THE CLEARING AWAY OF LEGAL OBSTACLES (I.E. ANY STEPS BY THOSE WITH CLAIMS AGAINST THE PRC TO ATTACH CHINESE PROPERTY), AGREEMENT MIGHT ALSO BE SOUGHT ON THE FUTURE RECIPROCAL STAGING OF TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL EXHIBITIONS IN THE US AND CHINA. BECAUSE OF THE LEAD TIME REQUIRED, THE SECOND HALF OF 1975 WOULD APPEAR TO BE THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME FOR SUCH EVENTS.

13. WE DO NOT ENVISION ANY POSSIBLE UNDERSTANDING AT THIS TIME ON THE PROBLEMS INVOLVING US EXPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES. THIS IS A PERIOD OF DECLINING PRC PURCHASES AND REDUCED US AVAILABILITIES FOR EXPORT, AND WE DOUBT THAT THE CHINESE WOULD SHOW ANY FLEXIBILITY ON THEIR COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE QUALITY OF US SHIPMENTS OR BE WILLING TO TALK ABOUT LONG TERM COMMERCIAL ARRANGEMENTS.

BT



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028015

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME George Bush

CREATOR'S TITLE Ambassador

RECEIVER'S NAME The Secretary

DESCRIPTION re Secretary's visit

CREATION DATE 11/21/1974

VOLUME 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200126

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 4

FOLDER TITLE China unnumbered items (6)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/06/2008

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

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TELEGRAM



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TO RUEHAN/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 5715
INFO READWH/THE WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 8260
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NODIS
TOSEC 249

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PRC, CB, UNGA, PFOR

SUBJECT: PRC VIEWS ON CAMBODIA IN THE UNGA

WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS SAM 86970 FOR BREMER
ATTENTION ASSISTANT SECRETARY HABIB AND WINSTON LORD
REFERENCE: TOSEC 39 TOKYO FOR S/S

PRCLO MR. CHI PHONED HUMMEL TODAY, REFERRING TO WINSTON
LORD'S CONVERSATION WITH HIM ON NOVEMBER 18 (ON TIMING
OF KHMER DEBATE IN UNGA) AND READ THE FOLLOWING REPLY:

QUOTE THE CHINESE SIDE CONSIDERS THAT THE DEBATE AND
VOTE ON THE CAMBODIAN QUESTION IN THE UNGA HAS NOTHING
TO DO WITH DR. KISSINGER'S VISIT TO CHINA, AND IT IS INDEED
DIFFICULT FOR THE CHINESE SIDE TO AGREE TO THE VIEWS
OF THE US SIDE ON THIS MATTER UNQUOTE, INGERSOLL
BT

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES

BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/1/08

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FORM 8-2 (12-71)

TOTALLY EMBARGOED FOR
RELEASE AND WIRE TRANSMISSION
UNTIL 11:00 A.M. (EST)

NOVEMBER 29, 1974

Office of the White House Press Secretary

JOINT U. S. -PRC COMMUNIQUE

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, U. S. Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, visited the People's Republic of China from November 25 through November 29, 1974. The U. S. and Chinese sides held frank, wide-ranging and mutually beneficial talks. They reaffirmed their unchanged commitment to the principles of the Shanghai Communique. The two Governments agreed that President Gerald R. Ford would visit the People's Republic of China in 1975.

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