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TELEGRAM

Control: 0090Q
Received: September 2, 1974 346P

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUMJSL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4103
INFO RUESNG/USLO PEKING 3540
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BT
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E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: UNGA, PFOR, KN, KS, CH
SUBJECT: STATEMENT TO PRC ON KOREA AND UNC

EYES ONLY CHARGE

REF: STATE 190090

1. HUMMEL TOOK OPPORTUNITY, WHEN PRCLO CHIEF HUANG CHEN WAS AT ANDREWS AFB TO SEND OFF US CONGRESSIONAL GROUP TO PEKING AUG 31, TO MAKE STATEMENT TO HUANG ON KOREA. HUMMEL SAID WE ARE MUCH CONCERNED THAT SITUATION IN UN IS MOVING SO RAPIDLY THERE IS DANGER THAT QUIET AGREEMENT ON UNC AND KOREAN ITEM MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE UNLESS AGREEMENT IS WORKED OUT VERY SOON. HE SAID WE HOPE FOR PRIVATE US-PRC COOPERATION ALONG LINES THAT WERE SO PRODUCTIVE LAST FALL, BUT THAT INSCRIPTION OF KOREAN ITEM BY FRIENDS OF NORTH KOREA WAS NOT HELPFUL. FRIENDS OF SOUTH KOREA HAD, NATURALLY, BEGUN DISCUSSING COUNTERMEASURES IN UN THAT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR USG TO HOLD OFF. HE URGED VERY PROMPT RESPONSE TO US PROPOSAL OF AUG 28 (REPORTED REFEED) OTHERWISE OPPORTUNITY FOR COOPERATION MIGHT BE MISSED.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 State Review
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES 311/04

BY 112 NAR 6/30/08

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2. HUANG ASKED WHETHER STATEMENT WAS AT DIRECTION OF SECRETARY. HUMMEL SAID HE KNEW THAT CONTENT OF STATEMENT CONFORMED TO SECRETARY'S VIEWS, BUT THAT SECRETARY HAD

NOT DIRECTED THIS PARTICULAR APPROACH TO HUANG. HUANG SAID HE WOULD REPORT IMMEDIATELY TO PEKING.

3. COMMENT: BELIEVE WE ARE NOW IN POSITION OF HAVING GIVEN ENOUGH WARNING TO PRC SO THEY WOULD NOT HAVE GROUNDS FOR COMPLAINT IF OUR SIDE INTRODUCES FRIENDLY ITEM AND RESOLUTION BEFORE WE GET REPLY FROM PRC.

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
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Drafted by: EA- Mr. Hummel

Approved by: EA- Mr. Habib

Clearances: S/S: Mr. Wood



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FM USLO PEKING
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Recd 05, Sept
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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR OREP CH
SUBJECT: TENG HSIAO-P'ING ON CHOU'S HEALTH

1. CODEL FULBRIGHT MET WITH VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-P'ING FOR TWO HOURS FRIDAY MORNING. AN ACCOUNT OF HIS GENERAL REMARKS FOLLOWS BY SEPTEL. IN ADVANCE OF THAT, HOWEVER, BELIEVE DEPARTMENT MIGHT WISH TO KNOW OF TENG'S REMARKS ON PREMIER CHOU, QUOTED IN FULL BELOW.

2. AT THE END OF HIS WELCOMING STATEMENT TO THE DELEGATION, TENG SAID: "IF PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI WERE NOT ILL, I'M SURE HE WOULD HAVE MET WITH YOU." FULBRIGHT EXPRESSED HIS REGRET THAT CHOU WAS NOT IN GOOD HEALTH AND HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT A MEETING WITH HIM WAS UNLIKELY. "YES," CONTINUED TENG, "SENATOR JACKSON MET BRIEFLY WITH PREMIER CHOU IN THE HOSPITAL, BUT HIS ILLNESS IS NOW GRAVER, SO IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO RECEIVE YOU EVEN IN THE HOSPITAL."

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BY HR, NARA, DATE 6/30/08

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TO THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
FM USLO PEKING

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VIA VOYAGER CHANNEL
SECTION 1 OF 2
PEKING 72

SEPTEMBER 6, 1974

TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: RICHARD H. SOLOMON
SUBJ: CONGRESSIONAL VISIT TO THE PRC

1. FOLLOWING ARE SOME INTERPRETIVE COMMENTS ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FULBRIGHT CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION IN PEKING WHICH PARALLEL LAST NIGHT'S REPORTING CABLE VIA STATE CHANNELS ON THE MAJOR THEMES RAISED BY VICE FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA AND VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING IN THE OFFICIAL DISCUSSIONS. (WE WILL BRING BACK COMPLETE MEMCONS OF THESE TALKS.)

2. THE DELEGATION WAS PARTICULARLY APPRECIATIVE OF THE LAST MINUTE WHITE HOUSE INTERVENTION ON THE ISSUE OF A VIP AIRCRAFT, WHICH FRANKLY DID MAKE A DIFFERENCE DURING THE 19 HOUR LONG-HAUL FROM WASHINGTON TO GUAM. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE PRESIDENT DESERVES CREDIT FOR THE SPECIAL TREATMENT, AND HE SHOULD HAVE SOME GOOD WILL TO DRAW UPON AS A RESULT OF HAVING ACCOMMODATED SENATOR HUMPHREY.

3. DESPITE OUR EFFORTS TO PREPARE THE GROUP FOR THE CHIAO KUAN-HUA SESSION IN A WAY THAT WOULD FOCUS DISCUSSION ON INTERNATIONAL RATHER THAN BILATERAL ISSUES, THE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER SEEMED INTENT ON PROBING THE TAIWAN QUESTION. IN A PRE-MEETING SKULL SESSION WE REVIEWED THE SECRETARY'S REMARKS TO THE DELEGATION BEFORE THEIR DEPARTURE FROM WASHINGTON, PARTICULARLY HIS OBSERVATION THAT TAIWAN IS AN ISSUE OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE ON WHICH WE HAVE NOT BEEN PRESSURED, AND CHINESE DISCOMFORT AT WATCHING AMERICANS PRACTISE FOREIGN POLICY SELF-CRITICISM AS HAD BEEN THE CASE DURING THE PREVIOUS CONGRESSIONAL VISIT. THE GROUP SEEMED PRIMED ON A NUMBER OF FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS AS WE WENT INTO WHAT WAS ASSUMED TO BE THE ONLY SESSION WITH THE VICE FOREIGN

***** W H S R C O M M E N T *****

SCOWCROFT, MCFARLANE

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NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
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MINISTER.

4. CHIAO BEGAN THE DISCUSSIONS, HOWEVER, BY STRESSING THE OBSTACLE OF TAINAN, WHICH PREVENTED HIM FROM VISITING WASHINGTON AND LIMITED FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF U.S.-PRC RELATIONS. THE DELEGATION THEN RESPONDED TO HIS REMARK WITH A SERIES OF QUESTIONS WHICH COMPLETELY FOCUSED THE DISCUSSION ON THE FULL DIMENSIONS OF THE TAINAN QUESTION. SENATOR FONG NOTED THAT BOTH CHINESE SIDES AGREE THERE IS ONLY ONE CHINA, AND THE U.S. DOES NOT DISPUTE THIS VIEW. HE THEN INQUIRED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES FOR PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TAIPEI AND PEKING. CHIAO RESPONDED THAT THE PRC VIEWS PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION AS AN IMPOSSIBILITY. REP. ZABLOCKI THEN CHALLENGED THE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER ON THIS VIEW AS BEING IN CONTRADICTION WITH THE PRC'S SUPPORT FOR PEACE. CHIAO WENT INTO A LONG HISTORICAL DISCOURSE ON THE RELATION OF THE TAINAN QUESTION TO THE CHINESE CIVIL WAR, AND PEKING'S PAST REJECTION OF U.S. SUGGESTIONS THAT THE PRC COMMIT ITSELF TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE TAINAN QUESTION AS A BASIS FOR U.S.-PRC ACCOMODATION.

5. SENATOR HUMPHREY MADE A VALIANT TRY TO BUILD ON CHIAO'S COMMENT ABOUT PRC PATIENCE IN RESOLVING THE TAINAN QUESTION, NOTING THE U.S. TREATY COMMITMENT TO THE ISLAND. CHIAO, HOWEVER, TOOK A RATHER HARD LINE IN RESPONSE, SAYING THAT THE AMERICAN TREATY WITH THE ROC IS A REMNANT OF THE DULLES ERA, AND WHILE THIS COMMITMENT IS AN AMERICAN AFFAIR AND WE MUST DECIDE WHAT HAS TO BE DONE WITH THE TREATY, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO BREAK RELATIONS WITH TAIPEI IF THE U.S. WANTS TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH PEKING. TO EMPHASIZE THE PRC VIEW THAT THE U.S. CAN'T HAVE RELATIONS WITH BOTH CHINAS IF IT WANTS FURTHER PROGRESS WITH PEKING, CHIAO QUOTED AN OLD CHINESE PROVERB THAT "YOU CAN'T COOK FISH AND BEAR PANS IN THE SAME POT (AS THEY WON'T BE DONE AT THE SAME TIME)."

6. THE EFFECT OF THIS DISCUSSION, AS WE HAD FEARED, IS TO PUT INTO A SEMI-OFFICIAL RECORD, A PRC POSITION ON NORMALIZATION WHICH--IF ACCEPTED AT FACE VALUE--WILL FURTHER CIRCUMSCRIBE THE SECRETARY IN NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS ISSUE. WHILE I TRUST CHIAO'S VIEWS WILL NOT BE TAKEN AS THE LAST WORD ON PEKING'S POSITION, THE CONGRESSMEN HAVE DONE LITTLE BY THEIR COMMENTS TO PRESERVE ANY BARGAINING LEVERAGE. ONLY ZABLOCKI CHALLENGED CHIAO ON THE "LIBERATION" ISSUE, BUT NOT IN A WAY WHICH WOULD IMPLY GREAT CONGRESSIONAL RESISTANCE TO ABANDONING THE FORMAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ROC. HUMPHREY WAS HELPFUL IN EMPHASIZING THAT THE PRC COULD NOT EXPECT THE U.S. TO ABANDON A TREATY COMMITMENT OVERNIGHT, BUT HE DID NOT FOLLOW THROUGH WITH HIS PRIVATE OBSERVATION THAT FOR US TO UNILATERALLY END OUR TREATY COMMITMENT WITH TAINAN WOULD HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE AMERICAN POSITION ELSEWHERE IN THE



WORLD THAT WILL NOT EVEN BE IN THE PRC'S INTEREST--GIVEN CHIAO'S STRESS ON THE NEED FOR THE U.S. TO MAINTAIN A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN.

7. SENATOR FULBRIGHT HAS BEEN MOST EFFECTIVE IN HIS BANQUET TOASTING, BUT HAS FOUND IT HARD TO RESIST SELF-CRITICISM ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES. HE INDICATED TO CHIAO KUAN-HUA THAT THE U.S. IS NOW TRYING HARD TO RECTIFY THE MISTAKES OF THE KOREAN WAR ERA. HE INQUIRED WHY THE STRENGTH AND MORALE OF NORTH VIETNAM IS SO MUCH HIGHER THAN THAT OF THE SOUTH-- A VIEW DISPUTED BY REP. FRELINGHUYSEN. AND HE STRESSED THE TRAGIC IMPACT OF THE VIETNAM WAR ON THE U.S. ECONOMY. THE SENATOR DID, HOWEVER, TRY TO PUSH TENG HSIAD-PING ON WHY THE PRC LUMPED "U.S. IMPERIALISM" TOGETHER WITH "SOVIET SOCIAL-IMPERIALISM" AS BEING THE CAUSES OF TENSION IN THE WORLD, AND WHY HE DESCRIBED A SOVIET-AMERICAN WAR AS AN INEVITABILITY WHICH WOULD BE TO CHINA'S BENEFIT. TENG BACKED OFF ON THE FORMER ISSUE BY ASSERTING THAT CHINESE MEDIA GAVE PRIMARY STRESS TO THE SOVIET THREAT, AND HE SAID THAT THEIR PREDICTION OF A WAR BETWEEN THE TWO SUPER-POWERS IS SOMETHING THAT APPEARS TO BE BEYOND HUMAN CONTROL AND IS NOT SOMETHING DESIRED BY THE PRC.

8. INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, SENATOR FULBRIGHT APPEARS TO BE RATHER PUT OFF BY THE STRONG CHINESE VIEW--OVERSTATED TO THE DELEGATION BY BOTH CHIAO AND TENG IN A WAY THAT LACKS THE USUAL CHINESE MEASURE OF SUBTLETY-- THAT THE SOVIET THREAT IS DIRECTED PRIMARILY TOWARD THE WEST, THAT THE PRC IS PREPARED AND RELAXED ABOUT SOVIET PRESSURE, AND THAT THE U.S. SHOULD MAINTAIN VIGILANCE AND ITS FOREIGN TROOP PRESENCE. THE SENATOR HAS NOTED THE HIGH LEVEL RECEPTION CURRENTLY BEING ACCORDED THE VISITING PRESIDENT OF TOGO, INCLUDING A MEETING WITH CHAIRMAN MAO AND BANNERS FLYING DOWN THE MAIN THOROUGHFARE THAT RUNS PAST OUR HOTEL. HE CORRECTLY OBSERVES THAT THE CHINESE ARE TRYING TO PRODD US INTO SHOULDERING A CONTINUING DEFENSE BURDEN--INCLUDING MAINTENANCE OF FOREIGN BASES AND TROOP DEPLOYMENTS--WHICH HELPS TO INSURE CHINA'S SECURITY, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME THEY ATTACK THE U.S. AS AN "IMPERIALIST" POWER AND CULTIVATE "THIRD WORLD" COUNTRIES WITH A PLATFORM OF ANTI-IMPERIALISM AND LATENT RACISM. HE HAS NOT VOICED THIS PERCEPTION TO OUR CHINESE HOSTS, HOWEVER, WHICH SEEMS TO SAY SOMETHING ABOUT THE

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VIA VOYAGER CHANNEL
FINAL SECTION OF 2
PEKING 72

ENDURING POTENCY OF THE LOCAL HOSPITALITY AND CUISINE.
9. INDEED, ALMOST ALL HARD QUESTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN PUT TO TENG AND CHIAO BY MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION HAVE DIED A DEATH IN BLAND RESPONSES AND A LACK OF FOLLOW-UP. SENATOR FULBRIGHT ASKED WHETHER THE YOUNGER GENERATION WOULD SUPPORT THE MAO/CHAO POLICY OF NORMALIZATION WITH THE U.S. CHIAO KUAN-HUA GAVE THE EASY ANSWER THAT THIS POLICY IS NOT A MATTER OF EXPEDIENCY AND THERE WILL BE NO CHANGE. REP. FRELINGHOYSEN INQUIRED ABOUT THE DEBATE NOW VISIBLE IN PRC MEDIA WHICH CRITICIZES UNNAMED PERSONS FOR WORSHIPPING FOREIGN CULTURE. DOES THIS MEAN THAT CHINA WILL REEVALUATE ITS POLICY OF TRADING WITH THE WEST? TENG REPLIED THAT WHILE SELF-RELIANCE WILL REMAIN AN IMMUTABLE POLICY OF THE PRC, TRADE WITH THE WEST WILL CONTINUE TO GROW AT A SLOW BUT STEADY PACE. SENATOR FONG ASKED ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR REUNITING CHINESE CITIZENS WITH THEIR RELATIVES IN THE U.S. CHIAO KUAN-HUA DANCED AROUND THE ISSUE BY COMMENTING THAT THIS WAS INDEED A PROBLEM THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED ON AS NORMALIZATION PROCEEDS. REP. ZABLOCKI TRIED TO PROBE TENG HSTAO-PING'S REMARKABLE STATEMENT THAT "CHINA FEELS MORE COMFORTABLE WITH THE U.S. (THAN THE SOVIETS) FOR THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE" BY INQUIRING HOW LONG THAT FUTURE MIGHT BE. TENG REPLIED THAT WE SHALL HAVE TO WAIT AND SEE.



10. FINALLY, I MIGHT JUST NOTE HOW THE AMERICAN MEDIA, WHILE NOT PHYSICALLY REPRESENTED IN THE PEKING PRESS CORPS, IS EVER-PRESENT. AT 3 AM LOCAL TIME A SMALL TEXAS RADIO STATION CALLED REP. JORDAN TO SEE HOW THINGS WERE GOING. BEING A BIT GROGGY AFTER THE RETURN BANQUET SHE NOTED--AMONG OTHER THINGS-- THAT PREMIER CHOU HAD BEEN UNABLE TO MEET THE GROUP BECAUSE OF WORSENING HEALTH. THIS STORY HIT THE WIRES ALONG WITH AN APP REPORT FROM PEKING THAT TWO PRC OFFICIALS

*****HHSR COMMENT*****

SCONCROFT, MCFARLANE

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*****CONFIDENTIAL*****

DATE 09/30/74

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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FM WH42601 (PEKING/BRUCE) WASH74

TO USLD PEKING

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WASH74

FM: SECRETARY KISSINGER, WHITE HOUSE
TO: DAVID BRUCE, EYES ONLY
REF: PEKING 71
SUBJ: JOHN HOLDRIDGE



WASHINGTON 73
VIA VOYAGER CHANNEL

I AGREE WITH YOU COMPLETELY ON THE EXCEPTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND VALUE OF JOHN HOLDRIDGE. YOU ARE CORRECT THAT GEORGE BUSH WILL NEED HIM FOR A TIME, AND YOU ARE ALSO CORRECT THAT THIS CANNOT BE PERMITTED TO RETARD JOHN'S WELL-DESERVED ADVANCEMENT. I ASSURE YOU, I WILL KEEP THIS IN MIND. I HAVE ALSO TAKEN MEASURES TO INSURE THAT THE BUREAUCRACY IS IN STEP.

WARM REGARDS.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 6/30/08

PSN: 001111

TOR: 263/03:16Z

DTG: 200252Z SEP 74

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TELEGRAM

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 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3020
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DECLASSIFIED *State Review*
 E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 3/1104
 STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
 BY HZ, NARA, DATE 6/30/08

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- TAIPEI 5933

BY HZ, NARA, DATE 6/30/08

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CONTROL: 5 3 4 7 Q

E.O. 11652:

RECD: 24 SEPTEMBER 74 -

TAGS PFOR TW CH

SUBJECT: US CHINA POLICY AND THE GROC'S OPTIONS
 REGARDING ITS INTERNATIONAL STATUS

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1. BEGIN SUMMARY: AS US MOVES FURTHER ALONG TRACK OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH PRC, IT BECOMES INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT TO FORECAST KINDS OF ACTIONS WHICH GROC IS LIKELY TO TAKE IF AND WHEN US REACHES POINT OF RECOGNIZING PEKING AND REDUCING ITS RELATIONS IN TAIPEI BELOW THE DIPLOMATIC LEVEL. PREDICTABLY, GROC WILL FEEL COMPELLED TO COPE WITH ITS DAMAGED INTERNATIONAL STATUS. WE BELIEVE AT THAT POINT GROC WILL NEITHER OPEN NEGOTIATIONS WITH PEKING, NOR WILL IT SERIOUSLY PURSUE A SOVIET CONNECTION. INSTEAD, IT WILL HAVE TWO BASIC COURSES OPEN TO IT: (A) WHILE NOT ABANDONING CLAIMS TO BE ONLY LEGITIMATE GOVT OF CHINA, CONTINUE PRAGMATIC EFFORTS TO KEEP ROC AND TAIWAN VIABLY AND INDEFINITELY SEPARATE FROM MAINLAND (I.E. CONTINUE PRESENT POLICIES); OR (B) FORMALIZE TAIWAN'S SEPARATION FROM MAINLAND, A STRATEGY SUSCEPTIBLE OF MANY GRADATIONS RUNNING FROM MINIMAL ASSERTION OF SEPARATE SOVEREIGNTY UP TO OUTRIGHT DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE FROM CHINA.



2. NEGOTIATIONS WITH PEKING (UNLESS TO OBTAIN PRC AGREEMENT TO TAIWAN'S SEPARATION) WOULD BRING EXTREME DOMESTIC CRISIS WITH CIVIL DISRUPTIONS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE. THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT GROUP ON TAIWAN WHICH FAVORS BECOMING PART OF A COMMUNIST MAINLAND. APPROACH TO SOVIETS (WHO IN ANY CASE ARE UNLIKELY TO BOARD SHIP WHICH WOULD APPEAR TO THEM IN IMMINENT DANGER OF SINKING) WOULD OFFEND RIGHT-WING FRIENDS IN US AND JAPAN, WOULD CONFUSE ANTI-COMMUNIST INDICTRINATED POPULATION, AND WOULD BE MOST GRAVE PROVOCATION TO PEKING.

3. MAINTAINING UNCHANGED PRESENT COURSE PROBABLY WOULD BE INSUFFICIENTLY REASSURING TO POPULACE SHAKEN BY LOSS

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
OF LAST VESTIGES OF INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND UNCERTAIN AS TO NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH US, DESPITE POPULARITY OF THIS STRATEGY WITH SOME DIE-HARD KMT ELEMENTS. IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR GOVT TO DEMONSTRATE IT HAS THOUGHT THROUGH WAYS OF MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL ACCESS FOR TRADE AND TRAVEL PURPOSES, AND THAT NON-COMMUNIST CONTROLLED FUTURE IS STILL VIABLE. STANDING PAT, OR STANDING PAT WITH SLIGHT VARIATIONS WOULD NOT PROVIDE SUCH REASSURANCE.

4. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE BELIEVE CCK WILL FEEL PRESSURED TO MAKE STATEMENT FORMALIZING ROC'S SEPARATION FROM MAINLAND, YET THERE WILL BE FACTORS INHIBITING HIM FROM TAKING RADICAL ACTION--THE MOST RADICAL BEING A DECLARATION THAT TAIWAN IS FORMALLY INDEPENDENT OF CHINA. SUCH A RADICAL ACTION, DESPITE UNDOUBTED POPULARITY WITH TAIWANESE MAJORITY ON ISLAND, WOULD OFFEND IMPORTANT CONSTITUENCIES IN MILITARY AND SECURITY APPARATUS AND WOULD UNDERCUT PRESENT RATIONALE FOR MAINLANDER CONTROL. IT THUS WOULD INDUCE UNCERTAINTY AND CONFUSION PRECISELY AT TIME WHEN PUBLIC CALM AND STABILITY WOULD BE MOST NECESSARY. EXTERNALLY, CCK WOULD HAVE TO FEAR ADVERSE US REACTION, GIVEN OUR SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE POSITION, AND WOULD UNDERSTAND INDEPENDENCE DECLARATION WOULD BE GRAVE PROVOCATION TO PEKING AT MOMENT WHEN THERE COULD BE MAXIMUM UNCERTAINTY AS TO US DEFENSE COMMITMENT.

5. CCK THEREFORE IS LIKELY TO REDEFINE ROC STATUS IN MORE MINIMAL WAYS. FROM VARIETY OF SHADINGS AVAILABLE, HE PROBABLY WILL GO ONLY SO FAR DOWN THE ROAD TOWARD TOTAL SEPARATION AS HE THINKS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN FUTURE AND TO ESTABLISH GROUND RULES FOR OTHER NATIONS DEALING WITH TAIWAN, RETAINING OPTIONS TO MOVE FURTHER ALONG IN FUTURE AT TIMES AND IN WAYS WHICH LEAST UPSET CONSTITUENCIES ON ISLAND AND INTERNATIONALLY. ONE POSSIBLE INITIAL FORMULA, FOR EXAMPLE, COULD BE SIMPLE STATEMENT THAT WHATEVER PEKING'S CLAIMS MAY BE AND HOWEVER WIDELY RECOGNIZED INTERNATIONALLY, PRC EXERCISES NEITHER SOVEREIGNTY NOR JURISDICTION OVER TAIWAN AND ROC DOES.

6. EVEN AT POINT OF RECOGNIZING PEKING, US WILL RETAIN ENORMOUS LEVERAGE HERE AND CAN USE IT IN WAYS WHICH

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REINFORCE THOSE FACTORS MAKING FOR CAUTION ON CCK'S PART. SPECIFICALLY, US SHOULD: (A) EASE RADICAL TENDENCIES HERE BY ACCUSTOMING GOVT AND PEOPLE NOT ONLY TO LIKELY INEVITABILITY OF US/PRC DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION BUT ALSO TO IDEA THAT RATHER THAN BEING THE END OF THEIR WORLD, A CONTINUING, ACCEPTABLE FUTURE FOR TAIWAN CAN NEVERTHELESS BE ACHIEVED; (B) ATTEMPT TO PUT ACROSS IDEA THAT SECURITY MUST DEPEND LESS UPON MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY THAN ON POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS IN REGION, AND THESE SHOW REASONABLE PROSPECT OF STABILITY SUFFICIENT TO DETER PEKING FROM USING FORCE TO CHANGE TAIWAN'S STATUS; (C) DISCREETLY BUT POINTEDLY WARN OF R RISKS INHERENT IN ANY GROC ACTION TO UNDERMINE BASIS OF US-PRC RELATIONSHIP, AS WELL AS ADVERSE US REACTION TO UNILATERAL ALTERATION OF TAIWAN'S JURIDICAL STATUS; (D) IN USG ITSELF, HAVING DETERMINED HOW WE WISH HANDLE ISSUES AFTER RECOGNITION OF PEKING! OFFER GROC BEST ASSURANCES WE CAN RE INFORMAL BUT OFFICIAL USG PRESENCE ON ISLAND, MILITARY SECURITY AND ARMS SUPPLY, ECONOMIC AND OTHER ACCESS TO US.

7. THROUGHOUT PROCESS, WE SHOULD REMAIN MINDFUL THAT OUR INTERESTS VIS-A-VIS JAPAN AND REST OF ASIA, AS WELL AS WITH ROC, REQUIRE THAT WE BE SEEN TO ACT WITHOUT HASTE AND ON BASIS OF RESPONSIBLE, CAREFULLY THOUGHT-OUT PLANS. END SUMMARY.

A. GROC OPTIONS

8. AS US MOVES FURTHER ALONG RACK OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH PRC, IT BECOMES INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT TO FORECAST KINDS OF ACTIONS WHICH GROC IS LIKELY TO TAKE IF AND WHEN US REACHES POINT OF RECOGNIZING PRC AND ESTABLISHING FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, AND AT SAME TIME REDUCES ITS RELATIONS WITH ROC BELOW THE DIPLOMATIC LEVEL. WE MUST CAVEAT OUR ANALYSIS BY NOTING THAT THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC VARIABLES ARE MANY AND THAT MUCH WILL DEPEND UPON SPECIFIC SITUATIONS AT THAT POINT IN TIME. NEVERTHELESS, WE CAN IN GENERAL TERMS FORESEE THE COURSES OF ACTION GROC WILL HAVE OPEN TO IT.



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9. PREDICTABLY, GROC WILL FEEL COMPELLED TO COPE WITH ITS DAMAGED INTERNATIONAL STATUS. ASSUMING AS WE DO THAT AT THAT POINT GROC WILL NEITHER OPEN NEGOTIATIONS WITH PRC FOR INCORPORATION INTO A COMMUNIST-RULED STATE, NOR HAVE A TRUE "SOVIET OPTION," GROC WILL HAVE TWO BASIC COURSES OPEN TO IT: (A) WHILE NOT FORMALLY ABANDONING CLAIMS TO BE ONLY LEGITIMATE GOVT OF CHINA, CONTINUE PRAGMATIC EFFORTS TO KEEP ROC AND TAIWAN VIABLY AND INDEFINITELY SEPARATE FROM MAINLAND (I.E., CONTINUE PRESENT POLICIES); OR (B) FORMALIZE TAIWAN'S SEPARATION FROM MAINLAND, A STRATEGY SUSCEPTIBLE OF SEVERAL GRADATIONS RUNNING FROM A MINIMAL ASSERTION OF SEPARATE SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH JURIDICAL FORMULAS SUCH AS "TWO STATES WITHIN ONE NATION" TO AN OUTRIGHT DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE FROM CHINA.

B. NEGOTIATIONS WITH PRC

10. THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT GROUP ON TAIWAN WHICH FAVORS BECOMING PART OF A COMMUNIST MAINLAND. INDEED, CRITICAL FACTOR IN TAIWAN'S DOMESTIC STABILITY IS PUBLIC CONFIDENCE THAT PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO INTENDS KEEP TAIWAN SEPARATE FROM PRC RULE, COUPLED WITH BELIEF (SHARED BY TAIWANESE AS WELL AS MAINLANDERS) THAT HE IS LEADER MOST CAPABLE OF DOING SO. THUS REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE WITH PEKING IS CCK'S FIRMEST POLICY COMMITMENT. ABANDONMENT OF THAT COMMITMENT AND OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS ON ANY BASIS OTHER THAN SEEKING PRC ACQUIESCENCE IN TAIWAN'S CONTINUED SEPARATION WOULD GREATLY DESTABILIZE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION AND THREATEN CCK'S ABILITY TO MAINTAIN CONTROL.

C. SOVIET CONNECTION

11. WE DOUBT CCK HAS TRUE SOVIET OPTION. DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE USSR REACHING APPRAISAL THAT ROC COULD BE SERIOUS CONTENDER FOR POWER ON MAINLAND AT SOME FUTURE TIME, AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE SOVIETS WOULD CONSIDER INCURRING ANY DEGREE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR TAIWAN. SHOULD CCK, IN EXTREMIS, PURSUE SOVIET OPTION, IT IS DOUBTFUL USSR WOULD JUMP ABOARD SHIP WHICH WOULD APPEAR TO THEM IN IMMINENT DANGER OF FOUNDERING.

12. FOR HIS PART, CCK IS UNLIKELY TO SERIOUSLY PURSUE SOVIET CONNECTION, BUT WILL CONTINUE OCCASIONAL COVERT,

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DISOWNABLE CONTACTS. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE ELEMENTS HERE-- IN MILITARY, AMONG INTELLECTUALS, PERHAPS ELSEWHERE--WHO BELIEVE ROC MIGHT BE ABLE TO DEVELOP A SOVIET OPTION, PREMIER MUST BE EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS: WOOLING SOVIETS WOULD BE GRAVEST POSSIBLE PROVOCATION TO PEKING, MOST LIKELY WOULD EVOKE OPPOSITION WITHIN KMT AND CONFUSION IN POPULATION LONG EXPOSED TO MASSIVE ANTI-COMMUNIST INDIC-TRINATION, AND COULD ALIENATE IMPORTANT RIGHT-WING FRIENDS IN JAPAN AND US.

D. MAINTAINING STATUS QUO

13. SOME THIRTY-ODD COUNTRIES NOW RECOGNIZE ROC, A NUMBER BOUND TO DECLINE FURTHER IN DAYS AHEAD. US RECOGNITION OF PRC UNDOUBTEDLY WILL ACCELERATE DE-RECOGNITION PROCESS, PROBABLY LEAVING ONLY SUCH STALWARTS AS PARAGUAY, SOUTH AFRICA OR SOUTH VIETNAM FORMALLY RECOGNIZING ROC AS GOVT OF CHINA. GREAT UNCERTAINTY AS TO FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH US WHICH US RECOGNITION OF PEKING WOULD ENGENDER, PLUS RAPID LOSS OF LAST VESTIGES OF INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF ROC AS MEMBER OF FAMILY OF NATIONS, WILL BE EXTREMELY UNSETTLING TO PUBLIC, INDEED COULD CAUSE SOMETHING OF PANIC REACTION UNLESS GOVT INTERVENES SWIFTLY AND IN WAYS OTHER THAN SIMPLE SECURITY CRACKDOWN.

14. SIMPLY CONTINUING TO ASSERT CLAIMS TO BE ONLY LEGITIMATE GOVT OF CHINA UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT REASSURANCE TO SHAKEN POPULATION. PREMIER MIGHT TRY TO DEAL WITH DOMESTIC SITUATION BY REMAINING ESSENTIALLY WITHIN THE PRESENT POLICY FRAME- WORK, BUT STATING MORE EXPLICITLY WHAT IS ALREADY IN- FERENTIALLY HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION, THAT IS, WHILE NOT FORMALLY ABANDONING PRO FORMA CLAIMS TO BE CHINA'S ONLY LEGITIMATE GOVT, PREMIER COULD ACKNOWLEDGE THAT EFFECTIVE SOVEREIGNTY IS LIMITED TO TAIWAN AND ASSOCIATED ISLAND, NOTING THAT THOSE WHO WISH TO DEAL WITH TAIWAN ECONOMICALLY OR IN OTHER WAYS MUST DO SO ON BASIS OF CONTINUING TO TREAT ROC AS EFFECTIVELY SOVEREIGN WITHIN AT LEAST THAT AREA. OUR JUDGMENT IS THAT TAKING SUCH A POSITION, HOWEVER, STILL WOULD NOT BE SEEN DOMESTICALLY AS DEALING EFFECTIVELY WITH ROC'S SITUATION, NOW WOULD IT BE SUFFICIENT REASSURANCE THAT GOVT HAS THOUGHT THROUGH

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WAYS OF MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL ACCESS FOR TRADE AND TRAVEL PURPOSES, AND THAT A NON-COMMUNIST FUTURE, THEREFORE, IS STILL VIABLE.

E. INDEPENDENCE?

15. IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT FACED WITH THIS SITUATION, CCK WOULD BE STRONGLY TEMPTED TO DECLARE AN INDEPENDENT "REPUBLIC OF TAIWAN", PERHAPS TO SABOTAGE US-PRC NORMALIZATION, PERHAPS TO CAPITALIZE ON CONTINUING SYMPATHY FOR NATIONALIST CHINA AND ON SENTIMENT IN THE US AND ELSEWHERE IN FAVOR OF SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES, AND IN ANY CASE TO SOLIDLY UNITE TAIWANESE MAJORITY BEHIND HIS RULE. CERTAINLY ESTABLISHMENT OF "REPUBLIC OF TAIWAN" IS ULTIMATE IDEAL OF ALMOST ALL POLITICALLY CONSCIOUS TAIWANESE ON THIS ISLAND, YET THERE ARE A GREAT NUMBER OF FACTORS WHICH WILL CONTINUE TO INHIBIT CCK FROM TAKING SO RADICAL AND DRAMATIC A STEP.

16. UNLESS CAREFULLY AND LENGTHILY PREPARED IN ADVANCE, DECLARING TAIWAN FORMALLY INDEPENDENT OF CHINA WOULD IMMEDIATELY UPSET PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF STATE (WITH "NATIONAL" GOVT SUPERIMPOSED ATOP "PROVINCIAL" GOVT) AND WOULD UNDERMINE PRESENT RATIONALE FOR MAINLANDER CONTROL. KMT "OLD GUARD"--MANY OF WHOM WOULD STAND

TO LOSE THEIR SINECURE JOBS--AND DIE-HARD MAINLANDERS WOULD BE BOUND TO OPPOSE. MILITARY LEADERSHIP, STILL HEAVILY INDOCTRINATED WITH MAINLAND RECOVERY MISSION, WOULD FEAR THEY TOO WOULD LOSE THEIR PRESENT FAVORED POSITION IN SOCIETY. SECURITY APPARATUS, WHICH HAS SO LONG AND SO VIGOROUSLY TRACED DOWN ALL TAIWAN INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS WOULD BE DISORIENTED AND MIGHT FEAR REPRISALS.

IN SHORT, DESPITE POPULARITY WITH TAIWANESE, INDEPENDENCE WOULD BRING CONFUSION, WOULD ALIENATE IMPORTANT CONSTITUENCIES ON WHICH CCK DEPENDS, AND WOULD CREATE GREAT UNCERTAINTY AT PRECISELY THE TIME STABILITY AND PUBLIC CALM WOULD BE MOST NECESSARY. EXTERNALLY, CCK WOULD HAVE TO FEAR AN ADVERSE US REACTION, GIVEN OUR SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE POSITION, AND WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT INDEPENDENCE



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DECLARATION WOULD BE GRAVE PROVOCATION TO PEKING AT MOMENT WHEN THERE MIGHT BE MAXIMUM UNCERTAINTY AS TO US DEFENSE COMMITMENT.

F. LESS RADICAL SEPARATION

17. EMBASSY'S JUDGMENT IS THAT ABOVE FACTORS WILL DISSUADE PREMIER FROM DECLARING TAIWAN INDEPENDENT OF CHINA BUT THAT HE PROBABLY WOULD DECIDE ON SOME LESS EXTREME FORMALIZATION OF TAIWAN'S SEPARATION FROM MAINLAND. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF GRADATIONS POSSIBLE, FORMING A KIND OF SPECTRUM BEGINNING WITH FAIRLY SIMPLE AND AMBIGUOUS FORMULATIONS NOTING THAT WHATEVER PEKING'S CLAIMS MAY BE, AND HOWEVER WIDESPREAD INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF THOSE CLAIMS, GOVT IN PEKING EXERCISES NEITHER JURISDICTION NOR SOVEREIGNTY OVER TAIWAN AND GOVT IN TAIPEI DOES. FORMAL, JURIDICALS

YXBLEASED STATEMENTS SUCH AS "ONE CHINA, TWO GOVERNMENTS" OR "TWO STATES IN ONE NATION" FORM PART OF THAT SPECTRUM. TOTAL, FORMALLY DECLARED INDEPENDENCE OF CHINA--WHICH WE HAVE ANALYZED AS UNLIKELY-- IS THE TERMINAL POINT OF THE SPECTRUM.

18. IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT CURRENT THINKING HERE ON THESE QUESTIONS (WHICH, AFTER ALL, IS PROSCRIBED UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS) IS HAZY AND CONFUSED. EVEN SENIOR AND KNOWLEDGEABLE GOVT OFFICIALS WHO, OCCASIONALLY, HAVE INFORMALLY DISCUSSED "THEORETICAL OPTIONS" WITH US TEND TO SLIDE AMONG THESE POSSIBILITIES WITHOUT PRECISION. TAIWANESE INTELLECTUALS TEND TO CALL ALL OF THESE POSSIBILITIES "INDEPENDENCE."

19. BUT CCK, IN HIS TWO YEARS AS PREMIER, HAS SHOWN HIMSELF A VERY CAUTIOUS MAN WHOSE CHARACTERISTIC APPROACH TO INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IS GRADUALIST. WE BELIEVE THAT WHEN IT APPEARS UNMISTAKEABLY CLEAR US INTENDS RECOGNIZE PEKING IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE, PREMIER WILL SEE IT NECESSARY TO REDEFINITE ROC'S STATUS TO EMPHASIZE SEPARATION FROM MAINLAND. IN SO DOING, HE WILL TRY TO REASSURE HIS PEOPLE THAT TAIWAN, AS A SEPARATE ENTITY, HAS VIABLE FUTURE IN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SECURITY



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
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TERMS. HE WILL ACT PRIMARILY TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC CONFIDENCE (AVOIDING CAPITAL FLIGHT AND DOMESTIC INSTABILITY) AND TO ESTABLISH GROUND RULES FOR OTHER NATIONS DEALING WITH TAIWAN. HE WILL GO ONLY SO FAR AS HE THINGS NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THOSE PURPOSES, RETAINING OPTION OF FURTHER, GRADUAL MOVEMENT IN FUTURE, IN WAYS AND AT TIMES WHICH LEAST UPSET CONSTITUENCIES AND BALANCES ON THE ISLAND AND INTERNATIONALLY.

G. US ROLE

20. WE BELIEVE THAT IN CRISIS CAUSED BY US RECOGNITION OF PEKING, CCK ACTUALLY WILL BE MORE RATHER THAN LESS DEPENDENT UPON US. HE WILL BE MOST CONCERNED AS TO HOW NEW DEVELOPMENT WILL AFFECT MULTIPLE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS (LOANS, TRADE, INVESTMENT, ETC.), SUPPLY OF ARMS AND SPARES FOR HIS MILITARY AND, ABOVE ALL, SECURITY GUARANTEES. HIS OWN AND TAIWAN'S FUTURE WILL STILL DEPEND TO EXTRAORDINARY DEGREE ON HIS ABILITY TO MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH US--INDEED THAT ABILITY WILL CONTINUE TO BE A MAJOR CRITERION IN PUBLIC'S JUDGMENT OF HIM AS A LEADER.

21. THESE FACTORS SHOULD BE USED BY US AS LEVERAGE TO STEER GROC AWAY FROM ANY DECLARATION OR OTHER PROVOCATIVE ACTION WE WOULD CONSIDER EMBARRASSING OR ADVERSE TO OUR INTERESTS. WE SHOULD EMPLOY THIS LEVERAGE TO REINFORCE THOSE FACTORS ALREADY MENTIONED WHICH MAKE FOR CAUTION ON CCK'S PART. ASSUMING THAT FULL NORMALIZATION LIES AHEAD, WE SHOULD:



A. IN OUR USE OF THE CONDITIONING PROCESS, EASE RADICAL TENDENCIES BY ACCUSTOMING GOVT AND PEOPLE HERE NOT ONLY TO THE LIKELY INEVITABILITY OF US/PRC RECOGNITION BUT ALSO TO THE IDEA THAT RATHER THAN BEING THE END OF THEIR WORLD, A CONTINUING, ACCEPTABLE FUTURE FOR TAIWAN CAN BE ACHIEVED.

B. SUBTLY BUT PURPOSIVELY ITERATE AND REITERATE POINT THAT TODAY SECURITY MUST DEPEND LESS ON MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY PER SE THAN ON POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS IN REGION, AND THESE SHOW REASONABLE PROSPECT OF STABILITY SUFFICIENT TO DETER PEKING FROM USING FORCE TO CHANGE TAIWAN'S STATUS.

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C. DISCREETLY BUT POINTEDLY WARN VARIOUS ELEMENTS IN SOCIETY--UP TO AND INCLUDING CCK, IF WE CONCLUDE IT IS NECESSARY--OF RISKS INHERENT IN ANY GROG ACTION TO UNDERMINE BASIS OF US-PRC RELATIONSHIP; WARN AS WELL THAT US WOULD REACT ADVERSELY TO UNILATERAL GROG ATTEMPTS TO ALTER TAIWAN'S JURIDICAL STATUS

D. IN US GOVT, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE DETERMINE HOW WE INTEND TO HANDLE ISSUE OF SECURITY ASSURANCE FOR GROG, FOLLOWING RECOGNITION OF PEKING, AND HOW TO ACHIEVE PRC ACQUIESCENCE IN OUR INTENDED ARRANGEMENTS. THEREAFTER, WHEN RECOGNITION IS IMMINENT, OFFER GROG BEST ASSURANCES WE CAN RE INFORMAL BUT OFFICIAL AND EFFECTIVE USG PRESENCE, MILITARY SECURITY AND ARMS SUPPLY, ECONOMIC AND OTHER ACCESS TO US.

H. CONCLUSIONS

22. IF AND WHEN US RECOGNIZES PRC, WE BELIEVE DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS WILL LEAD CCK TO MAKE STATEMENT FORMALIZING AT LEAST SOMEWHAT ROC'S SEPARATION FROM MAINLAND. LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL FACTORS, AS WELL AS HIS OWN CHARACTERISTIC CAUTION, PROBABLY WILL LIMIT THE STATEMENT TO LOWER END OF SPECTRUM, KEEPING IT WELL AWAY FROM ANYTHING SO RADICAL AS A DECLARATION OF TAIWAN'S INDEPENDENCE OF CHINA. US CAN AND HOULD OPERATE IN WAYS WHICH WILL REINFORCE THOSE FACTORS TO MAKE SURE THAT US-PRC NORMALIZATION PROCESS IS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED.

23. EVEN IF FACTORS NOT NOW FORESEEN INTRUDE AND MOVE GROG TO MAKE DECLARATION WHICH IS EMBARRASING TO US-PRC RELATIONS, WE WILL HAVE NUMBER OF APPROPRIATE RESPONSES AVAILABLE. IN ANY CASE, WE SHOULD STILL RTAIN ABILITY TO PROCEED WITH OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH PEKING, ATTENUATING RELATIONS HERE TO DEGREE THAT SEEMS DICTATED BY CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE TIME, UP TO IN THE EXTREME CASE, EXPLICIT DISASSOCIATION FROM AND NONRECOGNITION OF ANY NEW STATUS.



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24. AS WE MOVE UP TO AND BEYOND POINT OF RECOGNITION, WE SHOULD REMAIN MINDFUL THAT OUR INTERESTS VIS-A-VIS JAPAN AND REST OF ASIA, AS WELL AS WITH ROC, REQUIRE THAT WE BE SEEN TO ACT WITHOUT HASTE, AND ON BASIS OF RESPONSIBLE, CAREFULLY THOUGHT-OUT PLANS.

UNGER



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FM THE SITUATION ROOM //WASH 75//

TO USLO PEKING

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
SEPTEMBER 25, 1974

TO: JOHN HOLDRIDGE - PEKING
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

YOU SHOULD INFORM THE CHINESE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THAT THE WHITE HOUSE WILL MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES AT NOON PRESS BRIEFING TOMORROW, SEPTEMBER 26.

THE PRESIDENT TODAY ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTION TO NOMINATE DAVID BRUCE TO SUCCEED DONALD RUMSFELD AS U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION. AMBASSADOR BRUCE IS CURRENTLY SERVING AS THE CHIEF OF THE U.S. LIAISON OFFICE TO THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

IN NOMINATING DAVID BRUCE, THE PRESIDENT IS CALLING ON ONE OF AMERICA'S FINEST DIPLOMATS. AMBASSADOR BRUCE'S WISDOM, HIS BROAD DIPLOMATIC EXPERIENCE AND HIS UNSURPASSED RECORD OF DEDICATED SERVICE TO A CLOSE ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP UNIQUELY QUALIFY HIM FOR THIS IMPORTANT ASSIGNMENT. HIS NOMINATION DEMONSTRATES OUR COMMITMENT TO THE CONTINUATION AND STRENGTHENING OF OUR CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH EUROPE AND OUR DEDICATION TO A STRONG AND VITAL ATLANTIC ALLIANCE.



WARM REGARDS.

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY HR, NARA. DATE 6/30/08

***** W H S R I COMMENT *****

MCPARLANE, RODMAN

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TO THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
FM USLO PEKING

~~SECRET~~ / SENSITIVE / EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

VIA VOYAGER CHANNEL

PEKING 73

SEPTEMBER 26, 1974

TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: JOHN HOLDRIDGE

REFERENCE: WASHINGTON 75

MESSAGE ON BRUCE NATO APPOINTMENT PASSED PRC FOREIGN
MINISTRY 3 P.M. SEPTEMBER 26 PEKING TIME (0700 ZULU SAME
DATED)

REGARDS

BT



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 6/30/08

***** W H S R COMMENT *****

HAK, SCOWCROFT, MCFARLANE, RODMAN

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PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:269/08:51Z DTG:260844Z SEP 74

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