

The original documents are located in Box 4, folder “China, unnumbered items - (2), 8/16/74 - 8/31/74” of the Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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FILE

Conv. date: Aug 15, 1974
(evening)

August 16, 1974

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION


At 9:15 p.m., Thursday, August 15, Secretary Kissinger called me at home and asked me to elaborate on the message Mr. Hummel and I had given the Chinese that afternoon. He asked me to call the Chinese immediately and tell them that if they thought a September trip by him was useful for symbolic reasons, he could also probably go back to China for another trip in December or January, i.e., a few weeks later than the original target of mid-November. The Secretary wanted to make clear, in short, that a September trip did not rule out another trip in the near future (i.e., on which we could discuss normalization in greater detail than on the September one.)

In response to the Secretary's question, I said that Mr. Hummel and I had not suggested the possibility of two trips in our talk with the Chinese, since we had not been instructed to do so.

I then immediately called Mr. Chi of the Chinese Liaison Office and said that we wanted to make clear a point that we did not believe had been adequately explained that afternoon. I then said that, if a September trip were arranged, the Secretary might well be able to go to China again a few weeks later than the original target of November, i.e., in December or January. Thus, we were interested in knowing if the Chinese thought a symbolic trip in September would be helpful, but we also wanted them to know that such a trip would not rule out another visit in the December/January timeframe. Mr. Chi responded that this had not been clear in the afternoon conversation, thanked me for the information, and said he would report it immediately.

W

Winston Lord



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 4/30/08

SECRET/NODIS


INFORMATION~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE~~

August 18, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: RICHARD H. SOLOMON *RHS*

SUBJECT: Highlights of Senator Jackson's
Visit to China



While we have avoided pressing Senator Jackson's staff for a readout of the results of his trip to the PRC last month, one of the non-governmental advisers who traveled with the Senator and sat in on his discussions with Chinese officials has given me the following comments which may be of interest to you. As these observations were passed to me in confidence, to protect the source they should not get back to Senator Jackson.

-- Jackson had to repeatedly urge his hosts to hold "serious discussions," particularly a second substantive session with Ch'iao Kuan-hua. The Chinese apparently had hoped to avoid a Jackson meeting with Premier Chou (presumably for health reasons) despite Scoop's pre-trip stress on his desire for a session with Mao and/or Chou. On the next-to-last day, with the Chinese giving the Senator every indication that he would leave Peking without seeing even Chou, Jackson took Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing aside and told him flatly that he had not come all the way to Peking just for sight-seeing, and if he did not at least meet Chou En-lai he would leave China having had a "bad trip." Teng paled a bit at this implied threat, but indicated he would see what he could do. When the Senator finally met Chou, the Premier noted that he had agreed to meet Jackson -- even though he was resting in the hospital -- because Chairman Mao had told him to do so.

-- Jackson found Chou a man "with not much life in him." The hospital where he met the Premier is apparently a clinic of sorts within Chung Nan Hai, the leadership compound where Mao lives. Chou was breathing heavily as he rose to greet the Senator and his wife, and appeared to have a distended abdomen. Jackson asked Chou if he had a heart problem. The Premier nodded in affirmation, and tapped his chest over his heart. As the Jacksons posed for a picture with Chou, they noted "the smell of death" [euremic poisoning] about him.

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE~~DECLASSIFIED *State Review*
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 - 3/1/04NSC MEMO, 11/24/93, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY *HR*, DATA DATE *6/30/08*

The party felt that Ch'iao Kuan-hua was also having medical problems, as he frequently got up from the banquet table or discussion sessions to go to the bathroom. They found Teng Hsiao-p'ing "humorless, blunt, precise, but without a capacity to grasp the political ambiguities in issues." [This fact, which you are aware of from your own session with Teng in New York, holds a substantial problem for your own next trip to Peking. Given the issues you will want to raise -- particularly regarding normalization -- there will be the question, if Chou is not at the negotiating table, of how sympathetically and subtly your views will be passed to the Chairman.]

-- On substantive issues, Jackson and his advisers were impressed by the following points:

- As discussions began, and before the Chinese gave any substantive replies, they expressed their respect for President Nixon and admiration for you. Ch'iao Kuan-hua also observed to Jackson that he had been invited to China at your suggestion.
- While the Soviet Union was a major topic of discussion, the Chinese did not fuel Scoop's view of the Soviets. One of Jackson's advisers, who had met Ch'iao in 1972, was quite struck by the shift in PRC views on the Russian threat -- that the major Soviet menace is now directed against Europe, not China. When this shift in position was called to Ch'iao's attention, the Vice Foreign Minister denied that Chinese views of the Soviet threat had changed. Teng told Jackson that the Soviets were not as fierce as he (Jackson) thought, but that they were devious.
- Jackson criticized the Chinese for undercutting his efforts to maintain a strong NATO by sustaining a U.S. troop presence in Europe through their propaganda calling for an end to foreign bases and the stationing of troops in foreign countries. They replied that this principle was applied to "all" countries (i. e., the Soviets) and that they were able to apply this principle flexibly, according to reality. They noted, as an example, that they viewed Japan as threatened by the Soviets, and therefore did not believe the U.S. military presence should be withdrawn immediately.
- Teng and Ch'iao stressed the need for the U.S. to treat its allies better. They noted our problems with France. They also asked that the U.S. do more for the Pakistanis, "as they are your ally." When Jackson asked what we should do for them, they replied, "You should ask them."



● On bilateral issues, Jackson was surprised that Teng or Ch'iao did not bring up the issue of Taiwan. When the Senator, at his own initiative, asserted that the U.S. had a defense treaty with Taipei which we should continue to honor, the Chinese responded with silence. Other members of the Senator's party, however, in discussions with lower-level officials, were told that there would not be much further progress in trade or cultural exchanges until the Taiwan issue is solved.



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028005

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME Brent Scowcroft

RECEIVER'S NAME Ambassador Bruce

DESCRIPTION updating the Ambassador on activities
in Washington

CREATION DATE 08/18/1974

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200122

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 4

FOLDER TITLE China unnumbered items (2)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/06/2008

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

~~LSE~~
Delivered to HAK
8/19/74

Respected President Ford:

Your letter to Chairman Mao has been received. I would like on behalf of Chairman Mao and in my own name to extend to you our congratulations on your assumption of the office of the President of the United States. We are glad to note your indication that you will continue to adhere to the principles of the Shanghai Communique, and we would like to avail ourselves of this opportunity to reiterate that, as in the past, we shall act according to the spirit and principles of the Shanghai Communique which we jointly released during President Nixon's visit to China.

With best greetings,



Premier Chou En-lai

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: August 19, 1974
10:30 a.m.
Secretary's Office

SUBJECT: Message for President from Premier Chou En-lai

PARTICIPANTS: Secretary of State Kissinger
Ambassador Huang Chen, Chief, PRCLC
Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter
Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., Acting Assistant Secretary, EA
Winston Lord, Director, S/P

COPIES TO:



Secretary Kissinger: It is very nice to see you, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador Huang: I asked to see you today mainly to convey to you a letter from Premier Chou En-lai to President Ford (handing over letter), and also at the same time I am instructed by the Premier to thank you for your good wishes and thoughts for his health and to say he has received your letter.

Secretary Kissinger: May we announce that we have received a communication from the Prime Minister to President Ford?

Ambassador Huang: That is up to you to decide.

Secretary Kissinger: The President is in Chicago today, and tomorrow he will announce the new Vice President. Let me see what would be a good time to announce.

Ambassador Huang: They will announce the new Vice President tomorrow?

Secretary Kissinger: It will be Win Lord.

Memorandum of Conversation: August 19, 1974, 10:30 a.m., Secretary's Office
Subject: Message for President from
Premier Chou En-lai

Winston Lord: I'm not sure I'm old enough to qualify.

Ambassador Huang: They say that two men, Rockefeller and Bush, are being considered.

Secretary Kissinger: Afterward I'll talk to you privately. The President will be pleased to receive the Premier's letter, and I will communicate with him.

Ambassador Huang: That is all I have.

(At this point, Lord and Hummel left the office and Secretary spoke privately with Ambassador Huang and Mr. Chi for about five minutes.)

Attachment: Message from Premier Chou En-lai
to President Ford



~~SECRET/NODIS~~

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With best greetings,



Premier Chou En-lai

8/19/74

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Respected President Ford:

Your letter to Chairman Mao has been received. I would like on behalf of Chairman Mao and in my own name to extend to you our congratulations on your assumption of the office of the President of the United States. We are glad to note your indication that you will continue to adhere to the principles of the Shanghai Communiqué, and we would like to avail ourselves of this opportunity to reiterate that, as in the past, we shall act according to the spirit and principles of the Shanghai Communiqué which we jointly released during President Nixon's visit to China.

With best greetings,



Premier Chou En-lai

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028006

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME David Bruce

CREATOR'S TITLE Ambassador

RECEIVER'S NAME Brent Scowcroft

DESCRIPTION re possible visit by Secretary

CREATION DATE 08/19/1974

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200122

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 4

FOLDER TITLE China unnumbered items (2)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/06/2008

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

Chi Exch



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3846
BT

Control: 5115Q
Recd: August 19, 1974
11:05 PM

~~SECRET~~ STATE 182105

NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA 6/30/08



E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UN, KS, KN
SUBJECT: FURTHER RESPONSE TO PRC ON UNC PROPOSAL

EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR HABIB

1. ADDITIONAL DEPARTMENT AND NSC ANALYSIS OF PRC JULY 31 RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSAL REGARDING THE FUTURE OF THE UNC REAFFIRMS INITIAL INTERPRETATION THAT THE CHINESE ARE INTERESTED IN FURTHER NEGOTIATION ON THIS ISSUE. WHILE THE PRC REPLY REJECTS TWO SECONDARY ELEMENTS OF OUR INITIAL PACKAGE, THE POSITIVE TONE OF THE REPLY AND THE FAILURE TO COMMENT ON CORE ELEMENT OF A FOUR-PARTY ARRANGEMENT FOR CONTINUATION OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT SUGGESTS THE PRC AND NORTH KOREA ARE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON THAT ELEMENT. IN ADDITION, THE EXPRESSION OF HOPE THAT THE UNC QUESTION WILL BE RESOLVED WITHIN THE YEAR FURTHER INDICATES DESIRE FOR ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION.
2. WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD PROCEED WITH A TRUNCATED VERSION OF OUR ORIGINAL PROPOSAL, DROPPING THE IDEA OF A NONAGGRESSION PACT AND PRIVATE PRC/OPRK ACCEPTANCE OF OUR INTERIM TROOP PRESENCE, THUS MAKING THE ESSENCE OF AN AGREEMENT ON TERMINATING THE UNC THE QUADRIPARTITE ARRANGEMENT FOR MAINTAINING THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.
3. WE PROPOSE A REPLY TO THE PRC EMBODYING THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:
 - A. AN EXPRESSION OF REGRET THAT NORTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES ARE UNWILLING TO ENTER INTO A NONAGGRESSION AGREEMENT WITH THE SOUTH, AS IT IS ONLY ON THE BASIS OF A STEP-BY-STEP BUILDING OF CONFIDENCE AND STABILIZATION OF THE SECURITY SITUATION ON THE PENINSULA THAT THE U.S. CAN CONSIDER THE ULTIMATE WITHDRAWAL OF ITS FORCES.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~


-2- State 182105

FYI: YOU SHOULD ASSURE ROK OFFICIALS THAT THE QUESTION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES FROM KOREA IS NOT LINKED IN ANY WAY TO TERMINATION OF THE UNC. END FYI.

8. WE ARE PREPARED TO HOLD FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRC ON FUTURE OF THE UNC BASED ON THE FIRST TWO ELEMENTS OF OUR PROPOSAL OF JUNE 13. THAT IS (1) THE MAINTENANCE OF THE ARMISTICE UNDER AN ARRANGEMENT IN WHICH THE TWO KOREAN SIDES, THE U.S. AND THE PRC WOULD ACCEPT THE U.S. AND ROK MILITARY COMMANDERS AS "SUCCESSORS IN COMMAND" TO CINCUNC UNDER ARTICLE 11 PARAGRAPH 17 OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT; AND (2) ENDORSEMENT OF SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT BY U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL AT THE TIME IT IS NOTIFIED OF TERMINATION OF UNC.

4. WE WOULD SAY THAT IF THIS PROPOSAL IS ACCEPTABLE TO PRC/NORTH KOREAN SIDE, WE ARE PREPARED TO PRESENT A DRAFT AGREEMENT SUBSTITUTING THE U.S. AND ROK MIL COMMANDERS FOR CINCUNC AS SUCCESSORS IN COMMAND AND AFFIRMING THE CONTINUATION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION. IF AND WHEN AGREEMENT ON SUCH A DOCUMENT IS REACHED, THE MODALITIES FOR INFORMING U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OF TERMINATION OF THE U.N. COMMAND, AND GAINING ITS ENDORSEMENT OF SAME, WOULD BE WORKED OUT BY THE U.S. AND PRC REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK IN CONSULTATION WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE FRIENDS.

5. WE WOULD ALSO INDICATE TO THE PRC OUR DISAPPOINTMENT AT INDICATIONS THAT FRIENDS OF NORTH KOREA MAY PRECIPITATE A DEBATE ON THE MATTER OF TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM KOREA IN THE UNGA THIS FALL. WHILE NOTING THAT THIS WILL NOT HELP TO BUILD CONFIDENCE ON KOREAN MATTERS, WE WOULD ASSERT THAT THE U.S., TOGETHER WITH ITS FRIENDS, IS QUITE PREPARED TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY ACTIONS AT THE U.N. TO RESPOND TO THOSE WHO WOULD PRECIPITATE A DEBATE. WE REMAIN WILLING, HOWEVER, TO REFRAIN FROM PRESSING A DEBATE OR RESOLUTION IN THE GA AS LONG AS THIS IS NOT DONE BY ANY OTHER STATE OR GROUP OF STATES. FYI: WE BELIEVE WE ARE IN AN EVEN STRONGER POSITION THIS YEAR THAN LAST TO BUILD A COALITION AGAINST A DEBATE ON KOREA. OUR JUNE 13 PROPOSAL TO THE PRC AND NORTH KOREA CAN BE USED



~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

-3- State 182105


TO MARSHALL SUPPORT FOR A FRIENDLY RESOLUTION; AND THE PRC WILL PROBABLY BE INHIBITED FROM ACTIVELY SUPPORTING NORTH KOREA'S FRIENDS IN ORDER TO AVOID A CONFRONTATION WITH THE U.S. GENERAL RELUCTANCE OF OTHER STATES TO TAKE POSITIONS ON TROOP WITHDRAWAL ISSUES, WHEN COMBINED WITH FACT UNC IS MOST PROPERLY A QUESTION FOR SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION, GIVE US ADDED CONFIDENCE. THUS, YOU SHOULD REASSURE ROK OFFICIALS THAT WE BELIEVE WE ARE IN A STRONG POSITION TO RESPOND TO ANY GA CHALLENGE THIS FALL, AND SHOULD HOLD BACK ON AN IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO THE PRESENT ACTIONS OF NORTH KOREA'S SUPPORTERS IN ORDER TO GIVE THE QUIET PROPOSAL TO PRC MENTIONED IN THIS PARAGRAPH A CHANCE TO TAKE EFFECT. END FYI.

6. REQUEST YOU SEEK MEETING WITH FONMIN KIM AT EARLY DATE AND SEEK ROK AGREEMENT TO THE APPROACH OUTLINED IN PARAS 3 THROUGH 5 ABOVE. KISSINGER

NSC:RHSOLOMAN/EA:DRANARD/SB
05/15/74
S - THE SECRETARY

EA - MR. SNEIDER
IO - MR. BLAKE {DRAFT}
S/S-0:P JOHNSON

L - MR. ALDRICH
S/P - MR. LORD



~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028007

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME David Bruce

CREATOR'S TITLE Ambassador

RECEIVER'S NAME Brent Scowcroft

DESCRIPTION re general comments on various topics

CREATION DATE 08/20/1974

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200122

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 4

FOLDER TITLE China unnumbered items (2)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/06/2008

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028008

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME Brent Scowcroft

RECEIVER'S NAME Ambassador Bruce

DESCRIPTION re Secretary's trip

CREATION DATE 08/28/1974

VOLUME 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200122

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 4

FOLDER TITLE China unnumbered items (2)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/06/2008

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

~~SECRET~~

US Note + Talking
Points on Korea
28 Aug. 1974

2. HERE FOLLOWS TEXT OF USG TALKING POINTS TO PRCLC
AUGUST 28. BEGIN TEXT: TALKING POINTS

-- WE HAVE DISCUSSED YOUR REPLY OF JULY 31 TO OUR
JUNE 13 PROPOSAL REGARDING THE FUTURE OF THE UN COMMAND
IN KOREA WITH RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS OF THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA.

-- WE REGRET THAT THE NORTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES ARE
UNWILLING TO ENTER INTO A NONAGGRESSION AGREEMENT WITH
THE SOUTH, FOR IT IS ONLY ON THE BASIS OF THE STEP-BY-
STEP BUILDING OF CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE TWO KOREAN SIDES,
AND THE STABILIZATION OF THE SECURITY SITUATION ON THE
PENINSULA, THAT THE U.S. CAN CONSIDER THE WITHDRAWAL OF
ITS FORCES.

-- THE U.S. SIDE IS PREPARED, HOWEVER, TO DISCUSS
FURTHER WITH THE CHINESE SIDE AN ALTERNATIVE ARRANGE-
MENT TO THE UN COMMAND BASED ON THE FIRST TWO ELEMENTS OF
OUR PROPOSAL OF JUNE 13. THAT IS: MAINTENANCE OF THE
ARMISTICE AGREEMENT THROUGH ACCEPTANCE BY YOUR GOVERNMENT
AND THE AUTHORITIES OF NORTH KOREA, AS WELL AS THE USG
AND ROKG, OF THE U.S. AND ROK COMMANDERS AS "SUCCESSORS
IN COMMAND" TO CINCUNC, UNDER ARTICLE II PARAGRAPH 17 OF
THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT; AND ENDORSEMENT OF SUCH AN
ARRANGEMENT BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AT THE
TIME IT IS NOTIFIED OF THE TERMINATION OF THE UN COMMAND.

-- IF THIS PROPOSAL IS ACCEPTABLE TO YOUR SIDE, WE ARE
PREPARED TO PRESENT TO YOU FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION A DRAFT
PROPOSAL CONCERNING THE MODALITIES OF EFFECTING THE SUC-
CESSION OF COMMAND AND AFFIRMING THE CONTINUITY OF THE
ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

-- IF THE U.S. AND CHINESE SIDES, IN CONSULTATION WITH
THEIR RESPECTIVE KOREAN ALLIES, REACH AGREEMENT ON THIS

ARRANGEMENT, OUR RESPECTIVE UN REPRESENTATIVES CAN DIS-
CUSS THE MANNER IN WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD BE
NOTIFIED OF THE TERMINATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
AND THEN ENDORSE THE ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENT.

-- UNTIL RECENTLY WE WERE PLEASED THAT BOTH SIDES
APPEARED INTENT ON A SERIOUS APPROACH TO CONSIDERATION
OF THE UN COMMAND QUESTION THROUGH QUIET DIPLOMACY. WE
NOW UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, THAT CERTAIN STATES -- ACTING ON
BEHALF OF NORTH KOREA -- HAVE INSCRIBED AN ITEM ON THE
AGENDA OF THE FALL UNGA SESSION REGARDING THE MATTER OF
TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM KOREA. AS WE INDICATED TO YOU ON
JUNE 13, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT A PUBLIC DEBATE AT THIS
TIME WILL CONTRIBUTE TO BUILDING A MOOD OF CONFIDENCE
WHICH WOULD SUPPORT FURTHER PROGRESS ON KOREAN MATTERS.
INDEED, WE MUST FRANKLY SAY THAT SHOULD NORTH KOREA'S
FRIENDS PRESS A CONFRONTATION IN THE GA THIS FALL, IT
CANNOT BUT SERIOUSLY HAMPER OUR EFFORTS TO WORK OUT A
MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE WAY OF TERMINATING THE UN COMMAND.



DECLASSIFIED *State Review*
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 3/1/04
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY *HRC*, NARA, DATE 6/30/08

~~SECRET~~

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-- WE ARE QUITE PREPARED TO TAKE WHATEVER ACTIONS ARE REQUIRED, IN CONCERT WITH OUR FRIENDS IN THE UN, TO RESPOND TO THOSE WHO WOULD DEBATE THE KOREA ISSUE. WE REMAIN WILLING, HOWEVER, TO REFRAIN FROM PRESSING OUR CASE AT A GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE ON A KOREA RESOLUTION SO LONG AS ANY OTHER STATE OR GROUP OF STATES ACTS LIKEWISE.

-- WE NOTE THAT THE PRC REPLY OF JULY 31 EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT THE QUESTION OF THE UNC CAN BE RESOLVED THIS YEAR. THIS REMAINS OUR INTENTION AND WE WOULD VIEW A PROMPT RESPONSE FROM YOUR SIDE TO THIS PROPOSAL WE ARE NOW MAKING AS CONTRIBUTING TO THIS PROCESS. END TEXT.



3. HERE FOLLOWS TEXT OF USG PAPER HANDED TO PRCLC AUGUST 28. BEGIN TEXT:

THE U.S. SIDE HAS DISCUSSED THE CHINESE SIDE'S REPLY OF JULY 31 TO OUR JUNE 13 PROPOSAL REGARDING THE FUTURE OF THE U.N. COMMAND IN KOREA WITH RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

WE REGRET THAT THE NORTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES ARE UNWILLING TO ENTER INTO A NONAGGRESSION AGREEMENT WITH SOUTH KOREA, FOR IT IS ONLY ON THE BASIS OF THE STEP-BY-STEP BUILDING OF CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE TWO KOREAN SIDES AND THE STABILIZATION OF THE SECURITY SITUATION ON THE PENINSULA, THAT THE U.S. CAN CONSIDER THE WITHDRAWAL OF ITS FORCES.

THE U.S. SIDE IS PREPARED, HOWEVER, TO DISCUSS FURTHER WITH THE CHINESE SIDE AN ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENT TO THE U.N. COMMAND BASED ON THE FIRST TWO ELEMENTS OF OUR PROPOSAL OF JUNE 13. THAT IS: MAINTENANCE OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT THROUGH ACCEPTANCE BY YOUR GOVERNMENT AND THE AUTHORITIES OF NORTH KOREA, AS WELL AS BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, OF THE U.S. AND SOUTH KOREAN COMMANDERS AS "SUCCESSORS IN COMMAND" TO THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, UNDER ARTICLE II, PARAGRAPH 17 OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT; AND ENDORSEMENT OF SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AT THE TIME IT IS NOTIFIED OF THE

COMMAND.

TERMINATION OF THE U.N.


IF THIS PROPOSAL IS ACCEPTABLE TO YOUR SIDE, WE ARE PREPARED TO PRESENT FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION A DRAFT PROPOSAL CONCERNING THE MODALITIES OF EFFECTING THE SUCCESSION OF COMMAND AND AFFIRMING THE CONTINUITY OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES HAVE RECENTLY INSCRIBED AN ITEM ON THE AGENDA OF THE FALL SESSION OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY REGARDING TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM KOREA. IF A DEBATE OCCURS, WE WILL BE PREPARED, IN CONCERT WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, TO RESPOND TO THOSE WHO SPEAK IN FAVOR OF THAT ITEM. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT THE QUESTION OF TERMINATING THE U.N. COMMAND CAN BE SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED ONLY THROUGH QUIET DIPLOMACY, NOT THROUGH A CONTROVERSIAL DEBATE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

WE HAVE NOTED THAT THE CHINESE SIDE'S REPLY OF JULY 31 EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT THE QUESTION OF THE U.N. COMMAND CAN BE RESOLVED THIS YEAR. WE SHARE THAT HOPE, AND AN EARLY AND FAVORABLE REPLY FROM YOUR SIDE WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO PROGRESS TOWARDS THAT GOAL. END
TEXT ~~INFORM~~



~~SECRET~~

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Department of State *Adp-WA*
TELEGRAM
Chi Exm

DECLASSIFIED *State Review*
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.53/1104

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USLO PEKING 3517
BT

STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES CONTROL: 7904Q
BY WR, NARA, DATE 6/30/08 29 AUG 74

~~SECRET~~ STATE 190089



NOD IS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PFOR, ECON, CH, US
SUBJECT: SCOPE OF BRIEFINGS FOR CODEL FULBRIGHT
REF: PEKING 1468

1. WE ARE BRIEFING CODEL ON FRIDAY AND WILL LET YOU KNOW IF THAT SESSION RESULTS IN ANYTHING THAT WILL BE HELPFUL TO YOU IN YOUR BRIEFING OF CODEL. (FYI, SENATOR FULBRIGHT WILL BE OUT OF TOWN AND WILL NOT ATTEND). BROOKS AND SOLOMON CAN ALSO ALERT YOU TO POINTS WHICH ARISE IN DISCUSSIONS EN ROUTE TO PRC.

2. MEANWHILE, WE INTEND TO TRY TO HANDLE POINTS YOU MENTIONED ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

A. CLAIMS/ASSETS. THERE ARE SOME SPECIFIC POINTS WHICH HAVE NOT YET BEEN RESOLVED. (WE HOPE TO AVOID IDENTIFYING THEM). HOWEVER, RECENT CHINESE RESPONSES TO OUR PROPOSALS ALSO SEEM TO SUGGEST THAT THE PRC MAY NOT BE ANXIOUS TO CONCLUDE THE AGREEMENT IN THE NEAR FUTURE. PERHAPS THEY HAVE DECIDED THAT A FORMAL INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT ON CLAIMS/ASSETS WOULD BE POLITICALLY SENSITIVE IN THE PRC AND ALSO INAPPROPRIATE AT THIS STAGE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. IN ANY EVENT, WE ARE UNABLE TO ESTIMATE WITH ANY CONFIDENCE WHEN THE MATTER CAN BE SETTLED.

B. MFN. IN THE PAST, WE HAVE INDICATED TO THE PRC THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS MFN ONCE THE CLAIMS/ASSETS PROBLEM IS OUT OF THE WAY. THE CHINESE SAY THEY WOULD EVENTUALLY LIKE MFN, BUT HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO LET THE MATTER FALL INTO PLACE AT THE PROPER TIME. OUR OWN ESTIMATE IS THAT MFN WOULD IN ITSELF INCREASE PRC EXPORTS TO THE US ONLY ABOUT 15 PERCENT AND

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Department of State

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DISSEMINATION

-2- STATE 190089, 29 AUG 74


THEREFORE WOULD NOT COME CLOSE TO REDRESSING THE TRADE IMBALANCE. ONCE WE START DISCUSSING MFN WITH THE PRC, WE MAY HAVE A PROBLEM OF OBTAINING "COMPARABLE BENEFITS", PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE LARGE TRADE IMBALANCE IN OUR FAVOR.

C. USLO-EMBASSY SWITCH. WE PLAN TO AVOID ANY DETAILED DISCUSSION WITH CODEL OF FULL NORMALIZATION AND POST-NORMALIZATION RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN. IN BRIEFING CODEL, WE DO NOT WANT TO RULE OUT SOMETHING LIKE USLO-EMBASSY SWITCH IN CASE THEY MAKE SOME COMMENT TO PRC OFFICIALS WHICH MIGHT BE MISINTERPRETED. INSTEAD, WE WILL TRY TO HANDLE THIS POINT, IF IT ARISES, ALONG LINES THAT WE DO NOW KNOW WHAT TYPE OF RESIDUAL USG PRESENCE IN TAIWAN WILL BE FEASIBLE, ALTHOUGH PAST EXAMPLES, E.G. JAPANESE, INDICATE PRC PREFERS SOMETHING NOT TOO OPENLY OFFICIAL. KISSING
BT

#0089

EA/PRCM:OVARSTRONG:MFR
8/29/74 EXT 26300
S/S - JPMOFFAT

EA:AWHUMMEL, JR. {DRAFT}



NSC:RHSOLOMON {DRAFT}

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
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INFO RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 8383
RUESNG/USLO PEKING PRIORITY 3516
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 190090

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Review*
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES 31104



BY HR, NARA, DATE 6/30/08

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: UNGA, PFOR, KN, KS, CH
SUBJECT: FURTHER RESPONSE TO PRC ON UNC PROPOSAL
EYES ONLY CHARGE
REF: A. STATE 182105
B. SEOUL 5483
C. SEOUL 5518

1. YOU SHOULD INFORM FOREIGN MINISTER KIM THAT IN MEETING WITH TSIEN TA-YUNG, PRCLO ACTING DEPUTY CHIEF, AND CHI CHAO CHU, INTERPRETER, ON AUGUST 28, HADIB, HUMMEL AND SOLOMON (NSC) CONVEYED SUBSTANCE OUR TRUNCATED PROPOSAL FOR DISSOLVING UNC, AS SPECIFIED IN REFTEL A (PARAS 3-5). TSIEN ALSO HANDED PAPER SUMMARIZING POINTS INVOLVED.

2. TSIEN SAID HE WOULD REPORT OUR PRESENTATION IMMEDIATELY TO AMBASSADOR HUANG AND TO PEKING. HE THEN VOLUNTEERED A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE CHINESE COULD NOT AGREE TO ANYTHING THAT PERPETUATED THE DIVISION OF KOREA, AS PRC HAD INDICATED IN ITS STATEMENT TO US OF JULY 31. WE REPLIED THAT NOTHING IN THE U.S. PROPOSAL HAD THE EFFECT OF PERPETUATING THE DIVISION, OR WOULD OBSTRUCT THE COURSE OF REUNIFICATION, WHICH WAS A MATTER FOR THE KOREAN PARTIES CONCERNED AS THEY THEMSELVES HAD ANNOUNCED AS THEIR POLICY IN JULY 1972.

3. COMMENT: ON BALANCE WE ARE NOT INCLINED TO READ MUCH INTO TSIEN'S STATEMENT, WHICH MAY SIMPLY HAVE BEEN A DESIRE ON HIS PART TO MAKE SOME KIND OF "PRINCIPLED" RESPONSE OPPOSING A TWO-KOREA POLICY TO SATISFY PYONGYANG, WHICH HE COULD REPORT TO PEKING. HIS REMARKS WERE VERY SIMILAR TO HAN HSUS'S REPOSENSE TO OUR INITIAL PRESENTATION OF JUNE 13, AND HE MAY HAVE SIMPLY BEEN PLAYING HAN'S ROLE INASMUCH AS HE IS ACTING DEPUTY OF PRCLO IN HAN'S ABSENCE. KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY: AWHUMMEL:IM

APPROVED BY: EA/K:AWHUMMEL

CLEARANCES: EA/KDLRANARD TO: WBUFFUM S/S: JPMOFFAT NSC: RSOLOMON
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRE

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Control: 8431Q
 Received: August 30, 1974 1017PM

Z 310231Z AUG 74 ZFF4
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO USLO PEKING FLASH 3530
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~~SECRET~~ STATE 192385

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E.O. 11652: GDS
 TAGS:
 SUBJECT:



EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR BRUCE FROM THE SECRETARY

BEGIN QUOTE. MY DEAR DAVID: THE PRESIDENT AND I HAVE HAD SEVERAL LENGTHY DISCUSSIONS ON THE PAST AND FUTURE COURSE OF OUR RELATIONS WITH THE PRC. DURING THOSE TALKS THE PRESIDENT HAS SEVERAL TIMES PRAISED THE SUPERB JOB YOU HAVE DONE FOR THE COUNTRY IN PEKING, AND HAS ASKED ME TO EXPRESS HIS ADMIRATION TO YOU. IN THE COURSE OF OUR DISCUSSIONS I TOLD THE PRESIDENT OF YOUR DESIRE TO LEAVE PEKING, AND OF MY SUCCESS IN PERSUADING YOU TO REMAIN UNTIL FEBRUARY. YOU KNOW HOW PLEASED I AM THAT YOU MADE THIS SACRIFICE; I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THE PRESIDENT IS EQUALLY GRATEFUL.

THE PRESIDENT HAS NOW DECIDED THAT HE SHOULD SPEED UP THE TRANSITION IN ORDER TO HAVE IT COMPLETED BEFORE CONGRESS ADJOURNS THIS FALL. THUS, HE HAS DECIDED TO ANNOUNCE A NUMBER OF AMBASSADORIAL CHANGES SOMETIME DURING THE LATTER PART OF NEXT WEEK. GIVEN YOUR OWN EARLIER INDICATIONS OF A DESIRE TO LEAVE PEKING, THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED WHETHER YOU WOULD BE PREPARED TO AGREE THAT WE INCLUDE THE NOMINATION OF YOUR SUCCESSOR IN THAT SERIES OF ANNOUNCEMENTS. SHOULD YOU AGREE, WE WOULD ANNOUNCE AT THAT TIME

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES

BY HR, NARA, DATE 6/30/08~~SECRET~~



Department of State

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-2- ~~SECRET~~ State 192385 August 30, 1974

THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED TO NAME GEORGE BUSH AS YOUR SUCCESSOR (WE WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO GET AGREEMENT FROM THE PRC, BUT THAT COULD BE HANDLED FROM HERE.)

DAVID, YOU HAVE SERVED WITH THE SELFLESSNESS AND DEDICATION TO DUTY YOU HAVE DEMONSTRATED THROUGHOUT A LIFETIME OF DIPLOMACY AND YOU HAVE DONE IT WITH A STYLE AND GRACE TOO SELDOM FOUND IN TODAY'S PRACTITIONERS OF THE DIPLOMATIC ART. YOU HAVE BEEN A TOWER OF STRENGTH AND WISDOM TO ME PERSONALLY, AND I SHALL ALWAYS BE GRATEFUL FOR THE SACRIFICES YOU HAVE MADE IN YOUR COUNTRY'S BEHALF.

PLEASE LET US KNOW YOUR THINKING ON THIS PROPOSAL. THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED ME TO TELL YOU THAT HE HOPES YOU WILL AGREE TO ACCEPT ANOTHER ASSIGNMENT. NEEDLESS TO SAY, I SHALL BE INSISTENT ON THAT POINT.

NANCY JOINS ME IN WISHING YOU AND VANGIE THE VERY BEST.

WARM REGARDS, HENRY A. KISSINGER. END QUOTE. KISSINGER
BT

#2385

Drafted by: S:Mr. Eagleburger

Approved by: THE SECRETARY (Per Eagleburger)

Clearances: S/S- Mr. Woods.



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