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SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH GROMYKO

Wash.D.C., Sept. 18-19, 1975

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

Secretary's Meeting with Gromyko
Wash.D.C., Sept. 18-19, 1975

Strategy

Your meetings with Gromyko come when Moscow has two principal concerns about our relationship: the Soviets are increasingly worried about the US commitment to detente, and possibly skeptical of the benefits they derive from it. Secondly, these apprehensions have been reinforced by what they must view as the beating you are giving them in the Middle East, the unfavorable turn of events in Portugal, the political uproar in the US about grain sales and the hard bargaining which characterizes our SALT exchanges. Gromyko will want assurances he can take back home about his concerns, but there does not seem to be much we can give him concretely beyond offers of regulated grain sales for cash.

The Soviets have reacted particularly sensitively to the ground swell of US questions about detente being a one-way street which began at the time of the Helsinki summit. They certainly don't see it that way, and with some reasons: their long sought CSCE summit turned out to be a very mixed blessing, and they are obviously on the defensive about Western pressures on them to live up to the humanitarian principles of the CSCE Act. You and the President warned the Soviets to keep their hands off Portugal, and by and large they have, but, they may seriously believe we are doing what we warned them not to do. In connection with our warnings on Portugal, one Soviet commentator charged that we are seeking unilateral advantage in the Middle East contrary to our 1972 Summit Agreement on principles governing our bilateral relations and this view is probably widely held in Moscow. It can only be surmised what they think of the President's assertion that he would ask for \$2-3 billion for strategic weapons in the absence of a SAL agreement since they have not publicly or privately referred to it. This fact alone indicates the extent of their sensitivity.

In our bilateral relations, dim prospects for early remedial action on the trade bill leave the Soviets a major disappointment to live with in the

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economic field. Although they undoubtedly appreciate the Administration's efforts to meet their grain purchase requirements despite the domestic difficulties it has caused us, there is probably considerable resentment at the leverage any continuing dependency relationship gives us. The Soviets remain completely negative on the question of Jewish emigration which has levelled off at about 1,000 a month and this seems to have become a matter of national pride and domestic contention on which they will not yield readily.

Despite current frustrations with the detente relationship the Brezhnev regime must consider alternatives to be more unattractive. In addition to the major advantage of avoiding high risks of involvement in international conflicts, the Kremlin leadership needs its economic relationship with the West now more than ever. The intractable China problem has entered a period of heightened tensions illustrated by increased Sino-Soviet rivalry for influence in Asia following the US withdrawal from Vietnam.

Another important element which must be taken into account is Brezhnev's health and position. Based on his meeting with CODEL Albert and other collateral information his appearance and vigor have improved somewhat since Helsinki, but we continue to believe that his stamina and ability to stay on top of things has lessened. Whether or not he is considering the possibility of some sort of elder statesman role after the February 1976 Party Congress, we believe that he is looking to his historical record and that his ability to cite concrete gains at the Congress assumes increasing importance. In view of his close identification with detente policies, a reversal of course such as a failure to produce a SALT agreement would be a better pill to swallow. His ability to produce tricks from the detente bag may be increasingly subject to challenge by his colleagues but he should not be counted out, and he is almost certainly in a better position to do so than any successor would be for some time.

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A central focus of the Gromyko visit will be SALT and in view of the relative tractability of the remaining issues to be resolved it would be an unpleasant surprise if the position he unfolds over the period of his stay does not go some distance towards meeting our concerns. Stalling or back-peddalling at this point might reflect Soviet reconsideration of detente policy which could affect the entire range of our relationship. But further progress and the prospect of a summit toward the end of the year will go far to smooth over other difficulties in our relationship.

The international issue uppermost in Gromyko's mind will be the Middle East. On this issue the Soviets feel, with some justification, that they are not being treated as an equal, and that their interests in the area itself are suffering. Their demonstrative disassociation from the latest Sinai agreement was in part dictated by considerations of superpower ego, but it does not mean they will necessarily try to undermine the agreement. Nor have they categorically denounced it. But unless they are brought into the Middle East action, at the very least in a symbolic way, they can be expected to resort where possible to obstructionist tactics.

It thus seems a good idea to try and work the Soviets into at least a show of participation in the diplomatic play in the Middle East. This might be accomplished by engaging Gromyko in discussion of preparation for reconvoation of the Geneva Conference if only to consider progress achieved and to draw broad outlines for future peace efforts. Moscow's problems with the latest Sinai accord might be assuaged if the forces monitoring the area (including those of the US) reported regularly to UNTSO, where the Soviets participate. We might also try and saddle the Soviets with the responsibility of working out Arab agreement on Palestinian participation in the peace efforts while we undertook to deliver the Israelis on that question. This would get them involved, and on one of the most intractable issues of the Middle East peace process. In any event, Gromyko should be warned that Soviet obstructionism at the upcoming UNGA, or elsewhere, to implementation of the Sinai agreement will not only increase dangers

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in the Middle East but threaten our detente relationship.

Disarmament issues are high on Moscow's post-CSCE foreign policy agenda. Although the Soviets are likely to remain passive at the MBFR talks until we come forward with the Option III proposal, which they know we are considering, you might assure Gromyko that we support the Soviet concept of bolstering political detente with military detente, and look forward to significant progress in this direction at the European force reduction talks in Vienna.

Although prospects for resolution of the trade/MFN impasse are cloudy it would be useful to discuss the effort Secretary Simon is undertaking in the East-West Trade Board as evidence of the Administration's good faith efforts to live up to its MFN commitments. At the same time Gromyko should be again reminded that improvement in the Jewish emigration rate will help the Administration's continuing efforts on this issue. We can also assure him that we see it in our interest to satisfy Soviet requirements for grain, but that the transactions must be regularized by agreement to prevent disruption of the US domestic and international market.

Finally, Gromyko will probably raise with you the mundane question of Embassy construction. The Soviets are vexed that they cannot begin construction of their new Embassy complex here because we are still in the planning stage and not ready to build in Moscow, and they have stated they would raise the question at the highest levels. We could ease their frustrations by allowing them to start on construction of their apartment complex here, but feel we should hold them to a simultaneous Embassy construction schedule so as not to be at their complete mercy when our construction in Moscow encounters the inevitable problems. Yielding to Gromyko on this point could also jeopardize Congressional support for our Moscow project. Talking points on this issue are at Tab 5.

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THE MIDDLE EAST

BACKGROUND

The Soviets continue to oppose the interim agreement both publicly and privately. Although they have said they had no intention of mounting a campaign against the agreement, the import of their public media coverage of it and probably also their behind the scenes activities in fact amount to such a campaign.

The Soviet objections to the agreement include that it is in violation of our understandings with respect to joint efforts dating from the October, 1973 period. They also object to a partial measure which is not a product of the joint efforts of all the interested parties and does not take account of their positions on the issues.

The Soviets also predictably object to the stationing of American civilian technicians in the Sinai and may seek to hamper implementation of at least this aspect of the agreement.

The Soviets have made clear their intentions not to be a party to any actions which would approve decisions prepared without its participation and without the participation of other Arab states. We believe that this means that the Soviets will seek to cause trouble on any UN actions that are needed to implement the agreement, such as the increased costs and size of UNEF and additional duties for it such as control of access to the roads in the coastal strip in the Sinai to be returned to Egyptian civilian control. In a conversation with an NEA officer, the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy here went so far as to suggest that UNEF is no longer needed because Americans will now be stationed in the buffer zone. If the Egyptians and Israelis insist on such a force, they could hire whomever they wanted and pay

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for it themselves. He added that since the interim agreement was reported to be for a duration of three years, the UN should remove UNEF on the understanding that it could be put back in Sinai three years hence. We suspect that this may be the initial Soviet bargaining position at the UN. While we can expect strong words from the Soviets in New York, it is not clear that they will press to the point of actually disrupting the agreement and related arrangements.

In your exchanges with the Soviets you will want to answer their objections and to assure them that we intend that the USSR play an important role in an overall settlement. Gromyko may press you to agree to a time for reconvening the Geneva Conference and you may want to be a bit forthcoming on this, at least to the point of agreeing to begin to discuss the question. Gromyko may also raise the earlier Soviet suggestion of working-level talks concerning the modalities of the Geneva Conference.

Finally, the Soviets are certainly very interested in what additional understandings and commitments beyond the published agreement may have been arrived at. Gromyko will probe tenaciously on the basis of the extensive press reports based on our briefings of the Congress and Israeli leaks.

TALKING POINTS

- The United States is still prepared to work together with the Soviets to promote conditions for a peaceful and just settlement in the Middle East. Our latest efforts have hopefully helped lay the groundwork for such efforts.



- We regard the just concluded interim agreement as a significant step toward a final and just peace and consistent with our mutual objective of reducing the threat of war.
- We fully agree that the interests of all the parties, including the Palestinians, must be fully taken into account in an overall settlement and it is our objective to see that this is done.
- There is no question of the importance of the role of the Soviet Union in advancing toward an overall peace settlement. We believe that it is in the Soviet Union's own interest to support the interim agreement and to help see that it is implemented in a spirit that will keep the momentum toward peace in motion.
- Our efforts to bring about an interim settlement between Egypt and Israel were undertaken at the specific request of those two countries. Our role was thrust upon us and was not imposed on Egypt and Israel.
- The presence of American personnel in the Sinai was agreed to by us because both parties insisted upon it as a source of confidence that the agreement would be maintained. The involvement of US civilian personnel complements UNEF but is completely separate from it and in no way alters the basic character of the UN role.
- The interim agreement is in no sense detrimental to the interests of the Soviet Union nor is it a unilateral advantage for the United States. As we have said repeatedly, we seek no such unilateral advantage in the Middle East.
- We seek your cooperation and are prepared to discuss what should happen next on the Middle

East problem. Though the other parties have not made known to us their decisions on next steps, we are prepared to continue the momentum toward peace in either bilateral or multilateral forums.

- If you believe that the reconvening of the Geneva Conference would be a contribution to the peace-making process, we are prepared to discuss both the timing and the modalities of the Conference.



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CSCE IMPLEMENTATION

ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS

TALKING POINTS

-- We are pleased with the statements by Soviet leaders that the Soviet Union intends to carry out all provisions of the CSCE Final Act. For our part, we intend to do the same and we are studying what steps we must take to comply.

-- Ambassador Stoessel has presented a renewed proposal to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on reciprocal issuance of multiple visas to U. S. and Soviet journalists and has also presented the new U. S. Representation List of divided families. Both of these come within the provisions of the Final Act and we hope there will be positive movement on them. Our Congress and public are following these matters closely as test cases of the value of the CSCE.

-- Ambassador Stoessel will be making further proposals soon in other areas of culture, education, humanitarian affairs, and information covered by the CSCE. We hope we can work together on these issues. Our ability to do so will strengthen the cause of detente.

ANALYSIS/BACKGROUND

Soviet leaders have stated on several occasions that the USSR intends to carry out all the provisions of the CSCE Final Act, although they make the point that some provisions of Baskets II and III are subject to further bilateral negotiations and that considerations of reciprocity will be factored in. Our view is that further negotiations are only required where they are specifically suggested by the language of the Final Act, or are otherwise implicit in the situation.

USA Institute Director Arbatov recently published an article which highlighted Soviet concern over the

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US focus on Basket III implementation. He placed the blame for this "interference in Soviet internal affairs" on "enemies of detente" in the US and elsewhere and argued that the Soviet Union in any case has a better record in humanitarian affairs than the U. S. As examples of US hypocrisy, Arbatov noted US refusal of visas to Soviet trade union leaders and to Soviet delegates to this year's CPUSA convention.

We expect that the Soviets will take some steps to modify their practices in conformity with CSCE decisions, but at the same time foot-dragging will no doubt be defended by attacking us on compliance issues.

Department of State
September, 1975

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BRIEFING PAPER

Soviet Position on Portugal

Issues and Talking Points

TALKING POINTS (if Gromyko raises)

-- Portugal is a member of NATO, and we and our allies cannot remain indifferent to the outcome of the domestic crisis in that country.

-- A large majority of the Portuguese people clearly expressed their preference for democratic development in the elections last April. We believe the wishes of this majority should be respected and that solutions to Portugal's domestic problems should be consistent with their will.

ANALYSIS/BACKGROUND

Apart from an indeterminate amount of financial assistance to the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), and public expressions of sympathy for them, the Soviet posture toward Portugal has been restrained. Whether this is out of concern for Moscow's detente relations with the West, especially the US, or based on a pessimistic evaluation of the PCP's prospects for success, is moot. In any case, Moscow now seems resigned to a secondary role for the PCP on the Portuguese scene. Gromyko may nevertheless attempt to take us to task--if only in reaction to our warnings to Moscow--and repeat Soviet propaganda charges that we are violating Helsinki CSCE principles by interfering in Portuguese developments through threats and exertion of economic pressures.

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NEW EMBASSY PROJECTS

ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS

Talking Points (If raised by Gromyko)

-- We want to push both Embassy projects along as quickly as we can. We will adhere faithfully to the agreements we have reached on exchange of sites and conditions of construction. The principle of reciprocity is fundamental to those agreements and a number of steps including Soviet approval of our final plans must be taken before we agree on a date for construction to begin in both capitals. We will be submitting these plans shortly after the first of the year.

If Gromyko claims there was an "oral understanding" that they could begin construction on their apartments before the Chanceries are started:

-- We have no record of such an understanding. The agreements are quite clear that construction on both projects is to begin on an agreed upon date.

If they specifically suggest a groundbreaking ceremony at the Soviet site during Brezhnev's visit:

-- We believe that groundbreaking should take place after other steps leading up to agreement on a date for beginning construction have been completed and after a date has been agreed upon.

ANALYSIS/BACKGROUND

With funding in hand and free access to American builders, the Soviets have gotten ahead of us in planning for a new Embassy complex and want to start building their apartments at once. With our help they have obtained the approval of the National Capital Planning Commission for their plans. However, we have told the Soviets we cannot exchange sites and permit them to begin construction until we are ready

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to proceed in Moscow. Our final plans will be submitted to them for approval in early 1976 and we expect some very hard bargaining with their planning and construction agencies to follow. The Soviet need for a new Embassy complex is our most promising leverage to obtain the cooperation we must have at that point. To let them go ahead with their project before ours would also jeopardize Congressional support for funding our project in Moscow.

Feelings in Moscow and at the Soviet Embassy in Washington are running very high on this issue, with the Soviets arguing that we are penalizing them unfairly because our planning efforts have not kept pace with theirs. Vorontsov has put us on notice that Gromyko will raise this issue with you, and the Foreign Ministry in Moscow has threatened retaliation and suggested that the delay will result in higher prices for our Moscow project.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

BREZHNEV VISIT TO U.S.

ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS

TALKING POINTS (if Gromyko raises)

-- We are looking forward to Brezhnev's visit and will do all that we can to make it a success. The timing can be decided after we are a little further down the road on SALT.

-- We would like to know what kind of an itinerary you think would be best. The basic alternatives are a very limited one taking in Washington, Camp David and perhaps Williamsburg or a more extensive one including a visit to another part of the country.

-- As to the agenda we believe that signature of a SALT agreement should be the centerpiece and that there is no need to search for a number of other agreements of secondary importance.

-- Progress on the PNE treaty to date leads us to hope that this might also be ready for signature. If the maritime talks now in progress are productive, a renewal of the maritime agreement could also be ready.

-- On chemical warfare, we agree with the Soviet suggestion of a joint statement in the communique; at a minimum we feel such a statement should note intensified consultations pursuant to the 1974 agreement to consider a joint CCD initiative.

-- We believe the progress registered toward international restraints on environmental warfare also could be cited in the communique.

-- As for a civil aviation agreement or protocol, our experts are still talking to yours but we are not convinced that a new agreement based on the Pan American-Aeroflot agreement will serve the overall interests of our aviation industry.

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-- We hope a long-term grain sales agreement would be ready for signature before the summit and believe reference should be made to cooperation in the food grain and resources field in the communique.

-- We remain interested in the idea of national cultural centers in our two countries and would welcome an indication that the Soviet side is prepared to study the idea sympathetically.

(If Gromyko raises the issue of groundbreaking for their new Embassy complex while Brezhnev is here).

-- As you know we wish to maintain the principle of reciprocity and progress in the Moscow and Washington projects and several steps remain to be taken before we can proceed to exchange sites and set an agreed date for starting construction on both sides.

BACKGROUND/ANALYSIS

During a September 2 discussion with Ambassador Stoessel, MFA USA Division Chief Korniyenko listed five agreements he thought could be signed at the Summit:

- SALT
- PNE agreement
- Joint statement on chemical warfare (for communique)
- Maritime Agreement (to replace or extend the current agreement which expires at the end of this year)
- Civil Aviation Agreement or protocol on the basis of the airline agreement between Pan American and Aeroflot

Korniyenko had no instructions on the Brezhnev itinerary but agreed it was time to be thinking about it.

We think there is a good possibility of a PNE treaty being ready, but are not eager on CW or a new Civil Air Agreement. Progress on a new maritime agreement will depend on Soviet willingness to take

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into account our concerns on cargo-sharing and shipping rates. (See separate briefing papers on these issues.)

We see little possibility of winning their agreement to the opening of national cultural centers but believe it is worth keeping the subject alive if only as a bargaining chip.

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GRAINS

BACKGROUND PAPER

As background to the current negotiation of a long-term grain agreement, the following is background information on Soviet grain supplies and purchases:

USG estimates of this year's Soviet grain crop currently range from 170 million tons (CIA) to 175 (USDA). This is approximately 20-25 million tons below last year's crop. Most of the shortfall is in feed grain.

Confirmed and unconfirmed Soviet grain purchases as of August 27 were as follows:

<u>Supplier</u>	<u>Quantity</u> (thousand metric tons)	<u>Estimated Value</u> (\$ million)
Total	16,619	2,432
U.S.	9,800	1,317
Canada	4,121	680
Australia	1,100	186
France	700	100
West Germany	500	85
Other	398	64

On the assumption that their total requirements for this year will be around 210 million tons, they still need to obtain from 20 to 25 million. Their options are:

a) Additional Imports

Both the U.S. and Canada have temporarily suspended sales. Potential purchases from other sources are not likely to amount to much more than 4 million tons.

b) Drawdown of reserves

Current stocks are estimated at around 15 million tons.


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c) Reduction of export commitments

The Soviets have asked East European countries to import more from the West, and have offered to help defray the cost.

d) Increase meat imports

e) Reduce domestic demand

- lower quality of bread
- reduce livestock inventories
- cut feed grain rations per head of livestock



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TRADE AND EMIGRATION

ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS

Talking Points

-- As you know, the President remains committed to revising the 1974 Trade Reform Act to remedy the present restrictions on granting MFN aid credits.

-- I am not in a position at this time to offer any useful assessment on the prospects for passage of new legislation.

-- Obviously, we must find a solution which takes account of the needs of all parties which have become engaged on this issue.

-- Groups which have heretofore supported Jackson-Vanik but are now having second thoughts will watch Soviet actions carefully for indications that switching sides on this issue will help to attain their objectives.

Background

The monthly average for Soviet Jewish emigration is now about 1,000, down from 1,700 last year and 2,500 at the height of the exodus in 1973. The Soviets have taken the line with visiting Congressional groups that the pool of potential Jewish emigrants is drying up and that this alone accounts for the falling figures. We believe the lower level is due to official harassment, intimidation and the creation of an anti-emigration atmosphere in the country and that there is considerable room for a substantive increase in emigration should the Soviets find such a development in their interests.

Although the Humphrey/Scott and Albert delegations convinced some that revision of Jackson-Vanik was the best way of promoting increased emigration, neither Brezhnev nor other top Soviet leaders have displayed

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any interest in taking actions to encourage them. While Arbatov and Dobrynin (in his talk with Jonathan Bingham) have hinted that emigration could rise if the legislation were revised and MFN granted, Ponomarev and others have claimed that there would be no increase at all under such circumstances. If this remains the Soviet attitude it is most unlikely that key figures such as Javits and Ribicoff will be willing to involve themselves in an effort to amend Jackson-Vanik.

At the same time we cannot exclude the possibility that the Soviet leadership would be willing to see emigration rise if a legislative solution they could live with were in sight. The generally worsened economic picture compounded by the need to purchase vast amounts of grain may make EXIM credits a more tempting prospect than was the case last year. Should US-Soviet relations take a turn for the better towards the end of the year with a SALT agreement and a Brezhnev visit in sight, a long-term grain agreement signed and no active Soviet trouble-making in the Middle East or Portugal, the Congress may briefly be receptive to revision and in this context the Soviets may be prepared to help out quietly with emigrants.

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US-SOVIET TRADE

BACKGROUND PAPER

US exports to the Soviet Union expanded in the first six months of 1975, while US imports declined. Future export trends are less promising, because of the lack of Exim financing and the Soviet shortage of foreign exchange due to massive grain purchases.

US exports to the USSR were 65 percent higher for the first six months of 1975 than for the same period in 1974. (Agricultural exports were up by 56 percent.) Imports from the USSR during this period in 1975 were about 30 percent less than for the same period in 1974. The surplus on the U.S. balance of trade with the USSR in the first six months of 1975 was \$387.4 million.

US-USSR Trade, January-June 1975 (\$ millions)

US Exports	\$521.2
US Imports	<u>133.8</u>
	\$655.0

Principal exports were:

Wheat	\$138.1
Corn	\$102.7

Principal imports were:

Fuels, lubricants	\$ 45.5
Platinum metals	\$ 39.9

Prospects

While US exports to the Soviet Union increased during the first six months of 1975 compared with the same period in 1974, a significant portion of these exports consisted of equipment and manufactured goods

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from contracts signed in past years, supported by Export-Import Bank financing. The unavailability of new Export-Import financing for sales to the Soviet Union places US firms at a disadvantage in competition with firms in countries which provide government supported export credits. It is estimated that some billion dollars in potential business with the USSR has been lost to US business due to the absence of such financial support. The present restrictions, if continued, are bound to have a sustained adverse impact on the momentum of US trade with the Soviet Union.

A further limiting factor on the development of US trade with the Soviet Union is the likely curtailment of Soviet projects involving substantial foreign exchange costs, due to heavy grain purchases by the USSR, and consequent stringency in the availability of Soviet foreign exchange. It has been reported that several major energy projects have been postponed for this reason.

The imbalance in Soviet trade with Western Europe has also been sharpened by higher prices on contracts previously signed. The deficit for the first half of this year in Soviet trade with the US, Japan, FRG, Italy and France is estimated at about \$2 billion. These deficits, coupled with the necessity for massive grain imports, are especially awkward for the Soviets at this time. Moreover, while the Soviets could sell gold, they must prefer to avoid contributing to the recent downward fluctuations in the world gold price by adding to the supply. Faced with this quandary, the Soviets are seeking credits from their chief trading partners, including Japan.

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FISHERIES

ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS

TALKING POINTS

-- Strong pressure has developed in Congress for passage of 200-mile legislation and in the absence of a solution to the problem of foreign overfishing off our coasts it is likely that such legislation will pass this year.

-- Such legislation would result in sharp curtailment of Soviet fishing operations and might adversely affect US and Soviet chances of obtaining common objectives in the Law of the Sea Conference.

-- The recent US/USSR Agreement on Pacific fisheries is the type of effort which is required if we are to be able to have any chance of satisfying Congressional concern.

-- Such agreements benefit both countries. We should now work together to set lower ICNAF overall catch quotas for the region off the US Atlantic coast.

ANALYSIS/BACKGROUND

The Soviets are the main culprits of overfishing off the US Atlantic coast. Both supporters and opponents of the legislation agree that 200-mile bills will pass unless there is active Administration opposition at the highest levels. The Administration position calls for a campaign to head off the legislation. That campaign, in part, will be launched upon the claim that the Administration is capable of reducing the problem of foreign overfishing off our coasts through international agreements.

The bilateral US-Soviet agreements which were concluded in 1975 on Pacific and Atlantic fisheries, reducing Soviet catch quotas and extending periods

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during which certain areas are closed to Soviet fishing, may alleviate some of the political pressure. However, serious problems remain, including continued overfishing, Soviet violations of agreements, inaccurate reporting, and slowness in settling American claims for gear losses.

Under a 1973 agreement the International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) was to set an overall quota to restore fish stocks, which had been depleted by a decade of overfishing. Over strong American and Canadian objections, ICNAF has set this quota at a level which will delay full stock recovery for a decade. The US has requested reconsideration of the decision at a special ICNAF meeting in September. It is hoped that the USSR will support the US position for reduced fishing at this meeting.

Department of State
September, 1975

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

MARITIME NEGOTIATIONS

ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS

TALKING POINTS

-- We hope that the maritime negotiations now going on in Moscow will produce agreement on a shipping rate for our bilateral trade, and that these negotiations will lead to a satisfactory maritime agreement between our two countries. It is important to us that the agreement provide the US maritime industry with its fair share of bilateral shipping business, i.e., at least one third.

ANALYSIS/BACKGROUND

US-Soviet maritime negotiations opened in Moscow on September 9. These involve: a) further talks on shipping rates, and b) negotiation of a new maritime agreement.

In rate talks that took place in August, we pressed for a rate of 16 dollars per ton or higher for a four-month period. The Soviets countered with an offer of 15 dollars for four months or 16 dollars for one year, neither of which was acceptable to us.

The key issue in the talks on the maritime agreement is the question of cargo-sharing, i.e., that at least one third of bilateral cargoes should be shipped in US bottoms. Other issues include marine cargo insurance (obtaining a share of bilateral business for US insurers), and the Soviets' desire to set up a chartering company in New York. We would be inclined to agree to the latter, provided we can obtain suitable Soviet concessions in exchange.

Robert Blackwell, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Maritime Affairs, leads the US negotiating team which includes representatives of EUR/SOV and EB. Blackwell's Soviet opposite number is Igor Averin, Chief of Foreign Relations, Ministry of Merchant Marine.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

COMPUTER CASES

BACKGROUND PAPER

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL (ATC) PROJECT

Despite strong USG efforts, the Soviets have made known their intention to contract with the Swedish firm Stansaab, rather than with an American company, for an air traffic control system, the first stage of a very large modernization project.

Stansaab's system uses some US-manufactured components which will require US export licenses. License applications have not yet been submitted, but the Soviets are aware that such licenses will be necessary and are concerned that difficulties might arise.

LICENSING STATUS OF COMPUTER CASES

Export licenses have been issued for two of three large computer systems sold to the Soviets, for use by the Kama truck plant foundry and by Aeroflot. A decision on the larger and more complex third system, which involves IBM computers for the Intourist reservations system is still under consideration. Both IBM and Control Data are trying to market even larger systems in the USSR, but no encouragement has been given that licenses will be forthcoming.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

CIVIL AIR NEGOTIATIONS

ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS

TALKING POINTS

-- We are currently considering discussions on bilateral civil air negotiations but their exact timing will have to be worked out later.

-- We have some problems with the Pan Am-Aeroflot agreement which we will want to discuss at the working level.

ANALYSIS/BACKGROUND

Existing civil air arrangements are heavily weighted in favor of the Soviet Union. Soviet citizens and many other persons travelling from the USSR are effectively barred by official action from purchasing tickets on Pan American. However, Aeroflot competes freely in the American market and sells many tickets to Americans. As a result of this unequal situation Aeroflot is outcarrying Pan American on scheduled flights between the US and the USSR by approximately three to one, although the great majority of the passengers are Americans.

PAA and Aeroflot recently concluded an agreement covering frequencies through 1978. The agreement would allow PAA to introduce B-747 service on its routes to the USSR and would permit Aeroflot to increase its weekly frequencies on service through European points. We are concerned that the proposed agreement might have a diversionary effect on TWA transatlantic traffic. We also fear that the duration of the agreement is too long and would thus undermine our bargaining leverage with the Soviet authorities. The Department has instructed our Embassy to inform the Soviet authorities that the USG is unable to accept this airline agreement in its present form and to solicit Soviet views.

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The Soviets are eager for further expansion of Aeroflot services to the US, and are evidently hopeful that a fall summit meeting would assist them in obtaining US agreement to new traffic points and increased frequencies.

The problem of Soviet violations of the Civil Air Transport Agreement in the form of restrictions on the sale of Pan American tickets in Moscow has subsided following an agreement between the two airlines in 1974. That agreement made it possible for the Department to agree to an expansion of frequencies during the 1975 summer season. Legal action against Aeroflot for the illegal sale of discounted tickets is pending before the Grand Jury of the Eastern District Court of New York. This charge, for which the Soviets profess entire innocence, is based on a 1974 non-discriminatory investigation of all airlines flying the North Atlantic and, if indicted and convicted, Aeroflot would be liable for payment of a \$5000 fine on each of the 14 counts now pending against it. The Soviets have formally requested the Department "to take measures" to halt prosecution of Aeroflot; we have replied to the Soviets that their "evidence" of innocence has been forwarded to the appropriate authorities but that the Department is not in a position to influence the case. The Soviets have hinted at retaliatory acts which may be taken against Pan Am if Aeroflot is found guilty.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

ISSUES/TALKING POINTS PAPER

STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS ON LNG
PROJECTS WITH THE USSR

Talking Points

If this subject is raised:

-- We hope that some of the projects we have been discussing in this area could move forward soon on a non-governmental, commercial basis.

-- We have no objection to private financing of the participation of US companies in the Yakutsk natural gas exploratory project.

-- We are pleased that Gulf Oil company is contemplating participation along with the Japanese in oil and gas exploration off Sakhalin Island.

If the North Star project is specifically raised:

-- We could not at this time predict what will be our decision on government financing for a project of this magnitude or, where government approvals are required, on the eventual terms of an agreement.

-- We have, as you know, a real problem with the Congress on LNG projects with the USSR. I hope it will be possible to work something out.

Background

North Star. The US firms concerned have recently negotiated a draft Letter of Understanding with the Soviets on this project which provides that prior to the negotiation of final contracts, the US companies must assure the Soviets that \$3.8 billion in long-term credits will be made available for the purchase of equipment and materials in the US; the

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USSR will own and operate half of the estimated twenty LNG tankers required for the project; and the USG will support the project and guarantee unrestricted access to all Soviet-flag LNG tankers to the designated port of LNG discharge on the US East Coast.

Because of serious congressional misgivings about US participation in Soviet energy development and pending more definitive movement toward obtaining remedial legislation on the MFN and credits issues we have, with your concurrence, recommended to the US firms that they delay signing the Letter of Understanding. We are also concerned about some of the terms of the Letter. The Soviets, however, have grown increasingly impatient with the slow progress of negotiations on North Star. They told Under Secretary Robinson during his March visit to Moscow that the project was being used by "certain circles" in the US to the detriment of US-USSR relations and hinted that prolonged further delay might lead them to disengage from negotiations with the US firms.

Yakutsk. Last November, US firms, along with Japanese companies and Soviet representatives, signed an agreement to invest a total of \$400 million in natural gas exploration in the Yakutsk area of East Siberia. On July 14, the Soviets initialed an agreement with the Japanese Eximbank earmarking \$100 million for the project, contingent on private US financing of an equal amount. Soviet sources are optimistic that a loan will soon be negotiated with US commercial banks.

Sakhalin. Gulf Oil Company has been negotiating with the Japanese, on its participation with them in the exploration for oil and gas off Sakhalin Island. The Japanese are pressing the Soviets for a reply to their last proposals on the terms of this project. Difficulties have been encountered in working out the exact nature of Gulf's participation in the project.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

NEGOTIATION OF A BILATERAL AIRWORTHINESS AGREEMENT
WITH THE USSR

ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS

TALKING POINTS

If the subject is raised:

-- We are prepared to begin bilateral discussions on the recognition of certificates of airworthiness for specific types of aircraft upon receipt of additional technical information from the Soviet side.

ANALYSIS/BACKGROUND

The Soviets desire an agreement with the US for reciprocal recognition of certificates of airworthiness in order to market Soviet aircraft, the YAK-40 or a derivative thereof, in this country and to enhance their industry's competitiveness in third countries. In August 1974 we agreed to enter into negotiation of an airworthiness agreement involving specific types of aircraft. This offer was conditioned on the understanding that the Soviets undertake definite commitments for substantial purchases of American wide-bodied civil aircraft prior to the conclusion of an agreement. In March 1974 the USSR rejected any specific link between an airworthiness agreement and Soviet purchases of wide-bodied aircraft in the US, but affirmed its intention to purchase two B-747 aircraft and four technological processes from the US. They also proposed that the agreement cover a wide range of Soviet aircraft.

We have informed the Soviets that we are prepared to begin negotiations on a civil airworthiness agreement following receipt of additional information requested of the Soviet side, specifically the appendices to Chapter 8 of the Soviet airworthiness regulations which are needed by the FAA to complete its technical preparations. To date, we have not received the required data.

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We have set no preconditions on the opening of negotiations, but intend adhering to the position that the airworthiness agreement should be limited to specific types of aircraft. Since such an agreement would be a basis for sale of the type of Soviet aircraft involved, we will expect the USSR to undertake commitment for substantial purchases of wide-bodied civil aircraft prior to the conclusion of the agreement.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

US-USSR COOPERATION IN WIDE-BODIED AIRCRAFT

ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS

TALKING POINTS

If aviation matters are raised:

--We hope that the lengthy Soviet discussions with US manufacturers will result in a Soviet decision to purchase wide-bodied aircraft.

--We expect that it will be possible to license some production processes to make a cooperative aviation program attractive to the USSR.

BACKGROUND/ANALYSIS

The Soviets have engaged in extensive discussions with Boeing, Lockheed and McDonnell-Douglas with respect to cooperation in the field of civil aviation. The firms are mainly interested in selling wide-bodied aircraft, while the Soviets have focused on acquiring know-how and equipment for an aircraft production facility in the USSR.

The USG has encouraged US firms to pursue the sale of commercial transport aircraft to the Soviet Union but has advised that it is unlikely that it would approve participation with the USSR in the joint design of a new aircraft or a derivative of an existing aircraft. It has also advised that the extent to which the government is likely to approve manufacturing or assembly operations in the USSR will depend, in considerable measure, on the number and kinds of US-built aircraft purchased by the Soviets. Lockheed and Boeing want to sell the Soviets wide-bodied aircraft and technology for the production of components in the Soviet Union. McDonnell-Douglas is trying to lease or sell DC-10s to the Soviets through Finnair.

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While US firms have pursued wide-bodied aircraft sales under a variety of arrangements for several years with varying degrees of encouragement from the USSR, the Soviets have recently been quite unresponsive to US initiatives. At the same time the Soviets have also decided to move ahead with the production of their own advanced transport aircraft, the IL-86.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

NEW YORK AND KIEV CONSULATES GENERAL

ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS

Talking Points (If raised by the Soviets)

-- We were able to accommodate you by giving you permission to buy a building for your New York Consulate General, although none of the properties shown for our office building or residence in Kiev were adequate for our needs. We hope we will be shown more properties promptly so both sides will be able to proceed with further preparations for opening offices.

Consular Districts

-- We would prefer to follow usual international practice by which each side selects its consular district but in view of your unwillingness to do so, we believe that an eight-state district of Northeast states, excluding Massachusetts, is a reasonable equivalent to the Soviet offer of the Ukrainian Republic, but not Moldavia, for our district.

-- We will be happy to agree to the inclusion of Massachusetts in your district, if you agree to include Moldavia in ours.

Background

The sticking point on consular districts has been a Soviet refusal to include the Moldavian Republic (on the Romanian border, otherwise surrounded by the Ukraine). We told them they could have eight of the ten states they requested (excluding Massachusetts and Ohio). The resulting two districts are roughly equal in proportionate area and population. The Soviets object to the exclusion of Massachusetts, as we object to their refusal to include Moldavia in our district.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

LIMITS ON THE SOVIET CONSULATE GENERAL
STAFF IN SAN FRANCISCO

ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS

Talking Points (if raised by the Soviets)

-- We have reaffirmed our policy of maintaining a reasonable balance between the official Soviet presence in San Francisco and our presence in Leningrad.

-- The total number of Soviet official personnel in the US, not including those attached to the UN, is approximately double ours in the USSR. This imbalance has already occasioned Congressional inquiries and could become a public issue.

Background

In 1972 we informed the Soviets that we would limit the size of the Soviet staff of their Consulate General in San Francisco to 150% of our American staff in Leningrad. We allowed the Soviets the additional 50% to offset the clerical and service personnel we prefer to hire locally in all countries, including the USSR. Our policy of limiting their total staff was designed to maintain a defensible reciprocal position, restrict Soviet intelligence capability, and provide us with leverage in obtaining housing in Leningrad.

Although we have permitted the Soviets to exceed their Leningrad "quota" by assigning two more staffers than our formula would indicate, we have refused visas for additional resident staff. Korniyenko has complained heatedly to Ambassador Stoessel about the ceiling, and with your approval we reaffirmed to the Soviets on May 20 that although we remain flexible on exact numbers we will continue to insist on general adherence to the 1.5-1 ratio. Korniyenko continues to complain, and the MFA has retaliated by restricting TDY travel from Washington to Leningrad.

We will stand by our policy and apply it to future pairs of consulates, though not necessarily with the same ratio.

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