

The original documents are located in Box 11, folder “Cyprus Crisis - Sanitized Versions of Situation Reports, 7/74” of the Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

Copyright Notice

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.



Gerald R. Ford Library

1000 Beal Avenue, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-2114
www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov

Withdrawal Sheet for Documents Declassified in Part

This folder contains a document or documents declassified in part under the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) program.

Procedures for Initiating a Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) Request

The still classified portions of these RAC documents are eligible for MDR. To file a request follow these steps:

1. Obtain the Presidential Libraries Mandatory Review Request Form (NA Form 14020).
2. Complete Sections I, II, and III of NA Form 14020.
3. In Section III, for each document requested, simply provide the Executive Standard Document Number (ESDN) in the Document Subject/Title or Correspondents column. The ESDN will be printed on the top and bottom of the document, and written on the declassification authority stamp, and will follow this format:

NLF-NSC_ILCC-5-2-4-3

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Fazio

Attached are sanitized versions of the unsanitized Situations Reports and NID items on Cyprus brought to you earlier today [redacted]

25X1

Paul V. Walsh

Paul V. Walsh
Associate Deputy Director
for Intelligence

Also added are Blind Memos.


11 September 1975
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

DECLASSIFIED, with antismox exempt


AUTHORITY RAC NLF-K-S_WWOF-10-10-1-7 9/21/05

BY h NLF, DATE 7/10/09



29

~~SECRET~~



25X1

OCI No. 1469/74

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
July 16, 1974

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Cyprus Coup: Implications
For The Aegean Dispute


The Cyprus coup came during a lull in the Aegean dispute. Both sides appeared to be awaiting developments from the Law of the Sea Conference which opened in Caracas toward the end of June 1974 before deciding on their next moves to resolve their dispute over sovereignty and ownership of potential minerals in the bed of the Aegean Sea. By the end of June the initial confrontation over the Aegean had reached an impasse. Both parties continued to hold their original positions: the Turks seeking formal negotiations over the disputed area, the Greeks claiming that even to accede to negotiations would derogate from their sovereignty.

Genesis of the Dispute

The Aegean dispute is only a recent manifestation of the centuries of latent hostility reflected in the last 50 years in Greek-Turkish conflict over the treatment of respective minorities and over the status of Cyprus. It reflects the particular mistrust existing between the new thinly-veiled military government in Athens (formed in November 1973) and the precariously balanced civilian coalition in Ankara (formed in January 1974).

The Ioannidis government in Athens from the start has been narrowly nationalistic and parochial in its views. It has been more firm in asserting its rights against Turkey than was the previous Papadopoulos regime and has been more adventurous in dealing with regional issues. Like many Greek officers who have served on Cyprus, Ioannidis has a special interest in the island's fate. He is a determined foe of

MORI/CDF



DECLASSIFIED, with per below script
AUTHORITY 2005/06/07 NLF-K-S_WWOF-10-10-2-6
BY lma NLF DATE 1/21/09

~~SECRET~~

President Makarios and has an exaggerated view of the Communist threat on Cyprus. He regarded Makarios' efforts to remove Greek officers from the National Guard, the major military formation on the island, as a direct challenge. It was this confrontation which triggered the move to oust Makarios.

The formation of the Ecevit coalition government in Turkey in January 1974 also added momentum to the rise of tension in Greek-Turkish relations. While Ecevit has little in his background to suggest particular animosity toward Greeks and has publicly renounced aggressive intent, the weakness of his coalition regime and his inexperience in government leadership may have given more scope to popular nationalist suspicions of Greece. In any event, the coalition government protocol committed him to pursue the exploitation of offshore mineral resources and to accelerate prospecting for basic energy resources. In addition, his initial government policy proclamation endorsing a federated state in Cyprus contradicted earlier assurances that the Turkish were not seeking a "federal" solution and that they accepted the principle of a "unitary" Cyprus. Ecevit's statement, therefore, was read in Greece as provocative.

It was the discovery of oil, however, that triggered the Aegean crisis. Conflicting claims to the seabed are longstanding, but this controversy did not gain serious dimensions until early in 1974 after oil was found in what promised to be substantial quantities off the Greek island of Thassos in the northern Aegean. The seabed here is undisputedly Greek, but the presence of oil suggested that the Aegean might overlie other significant deposits. The Turks have long been frustrated by seeing valuable oil reserves discovered near their borders (in lands formerly part of the Ottoman Empire), while Turkey has had only minor success in finding oil in commercial quantities within its own boundaries. The Turks granted concessions to the Turkish Petroleum Monopoly; and in order to press its claim to the Anatolian shelf, the Ankara government in February 1974 sent Athens a note formally asserting sovereignty over the seabed up to the 100 fathom line, notwithstanding that the area in question lay to the west of numerous Greek islands that line the Aegean coast of Turkey. And the Turks asked for negotiations to delimit the continental shelf.

2

25X1

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

25X1

Greek and Turkish Positions

The Greek Government regarded the Turkish request for talks on this matter as a challenge to Greek sovereignty. Athens maintained that even to agree to negotiate would be tantamount to admitting that Ankara's position had some validity. Hence, the Greek regime delayed answering the Turkish demarche. Greek contingency plans for military action against Turkey were dusted off; some troops were moved to the islands off the Turkish coast, and in general the Athens regime took steps to prepare to defend its claimed rights by force if it should deem necessary. At the same time, informally, the Greeks sought to enlist US backing for their position. And on May 24 Athens finally replied to the Turks in an ambiguous fashion, hinting that it might entertain some sort of preliminary discussions, though not agreeing to formal negotiations. A subsequent note on June 14 reaffirmed the basic Greek position.

Greece has for some time indicated an intention to extend its territorial waters from the present six miles to 12. Since such a move would apply to its many islands, it would effectively transform the Aegean into a Greek lake. Athens is not likely to act before the Law of the Sea Conference in Caracas has considered the question of territorial waters, but a unilateral extension by Greece would be viewed by Ankara as a serious challenge to its claimed rights in the area. And an extension to 12 miles without a blanket grant of right of innocent passage for warships of all nations would embroil Greece with the USSR in particular as well.

The Turks throughout have sought to force Athens to agree to negotiations over the status of the disputed seabed. In April, the Ankara Government publicized its decision to permit oil exploration in the seabed west of the Island of Lesbos. When this announcement failed to induce the Greeks to negotiate the Turks increased the state of readiness of their forces. In June, they sent a Turkish hydrographic vessel into the Aegean for a brief survey of the area in question, accompanied by Turkish naval units, some of which were on route to participate in the bilateral NATO exercise "Good Friendship." This move was calculated to demonstrate Turkish determination to press for Ankara's alleged undersea rights.

[Redacted]

SECRET

25X1



25X1

[REDACTED]

While these Turkish tactics contributed to the increase in tensions, they have not accomplished the aim of securing full-scale negotiations. Ioannidis, although viewing the Turkish actions as provocative, decided to ignore the Turkish hydrographic vessel and has assured the US that he would not consider military response unless and until actual oil drilling began. Athens cites the precedent of having tolerated Soviet surveying operations in international waters over the Greek seabed.

[REDACTED]

The Greeks are relying on what they regard as a strong legal case, improving their military readiness but avoiding action that would provoke the Turks.

This impasse was not broken by high-level diplomatic contacts between Greece and Turkey in mid-June. The respective foreign ministers discussed the problem at the NATO meeting in Ottawa. There the Greeks rejected Turkish proposals to create a special negotiating forum to deal with this issue. Athens was willing to consider the Aegean problem only within the framework of normal diplomatic interchange. Moreover, the Greeks continued to refuse to admit that the Turkish case had any merit. This contact ended with both sides reserving the right to assert their positions by other means.

Presently the parties are awaiting the outcome of legal discussions at the Law of the Sea Conference now underway in Caracas. Athens had from the start wished to have in hand the results of this Conference before considering substantive negotiations with the Turks in hopes that the general principles worked out here would bolster the Greek case. The Turks too hope that they can gain international acceptance of their position that the Aegean Sea is a special case in which a median line for seabed exploitation must be drawn by mutual agreement of the parties at issue.

The present dispute promises to be stubborn. Even if negotiations were to begin, the issues would not yield easily to satisfactory solution. The controversy is likely to be prolonged at least in part because it will be particularly difficult for the Turks to force the pace of mineral exploration. The amount of actual exploratory activity that the Turks can

25X1

[REDACTED]

perform is extremely limited. Oil drilling rigs are in short supply and are already committed to drill elsewhere. Moreover, as long as the area remains in dispute, oil companies will be unwilling to make available the oil rigs necessary for actual drilling. Thus the issue of delimiting the continental shelf boundary and of oil exploration in this disputed area is likely to drag on, carrying with it potential for further damage to the NATO alliance.

The Likelihood of Armed Conflict*

Although these moves and countermoves could touch off an armed conflict, neither Greece nor Turkey has been actively seeking to trigger hostilities with the other. The leadership in both countries is aware of the far-reaching implications of military conflict between NATO members. Both states would like to be less dependent on the US, but still regard their relations with the US as the central facet of NATO membership and of their defense strategy. From past experience in crises over Cyprus they fear dislocation of this relationship if war should break out. What pressures emanate from the respective military establishments to have recourse to arms have not reached proportions so far that would lead the decision-making levels deliberately to initiate armed conflict.

While deliberately initiated war seems unlikely in the near future, some sort of armed clash or incident remains possible. Greek and Turkish naval units in the disputed area could through some miscalculation exchange fire. With present inflamed tempers, other incidents (say over fishing rights) could lead to a localized engagement. Should Athens unilaterally declare a 12 mile territorial limit, the danger of incident would increase. But even in these cases, it seems likely that Athens and Ankara would seek--undoubtedly through US mediation--to prevent larger-scale conflict.

*At annex see the interagency memorandum "The Likelihood of Conflict Between Greece and Turkey" dated 21 June 1974 for a detailed discussion of the balance of forces, the impact on other countries of Greek-Turkish hostilities, and other related matters.

~~SECRET~~

25X1

Should major intercommunal fighting break out on Cyprus or should the regime of Nicos Sampson declare union of Cyprus with Greece, i.e., enosis, the danger of Greek-Turkish hostilities in the Aegean would rise significantly. The Turks would be under strong pressure to intervene on Cyprus. Even though the Ecevit government in Ankara would not want to become thus involved, it is precariously balanced, hence would find it difficult not to be responsive to the national mood. Popular feeling on the Cyprus issue is easily inflamed in both Greece and Turkey, and the Turkish military establishment has in the past been more hawkish than Turkish civilians. Though a Turkish military move in the first instance would be focused on Cyprus, once the Turks entered the fighting, conflict might spread to the Aegean.

Implications for the Aegean Dispute

Besides increasing the likelihood of Greek-Turkish conflict in both Cyprus and the Aegean, the Cyprus coup will in any event affect the course of the Aegean dispute. It is already adding to the general tension and mistrust between Athens and Ankara. The Turks do not accept the claim that Greece was not involved in the effort to overthrow Makarios. Ankara is particularly upset by the appointment of Nicos Sampson as President. Sampson is well known to the Turks as a foe and as an avowed exponent of union with Greece. Thus particularly when they begin to reassess developments in Cyprus, the Turkish leaders are likely to scent an underhanded attempt by Athens to consummate enosis to the detriment of Ankara's rights. This rising suspicion by the Turks against the Ioannidi regime in Athens will undoubtedly make resolution of the Aegean dispute all the more difficult.

6

25X1

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

25X1

31
2b

DECLASSIFIED, with *an* how exempt

AUTHORITY RAC 4/24/07 NLF-K-S WWOFF-10-10-3-5

BY Nh NLF, DATE 1/27/09

OCI-1023-74
18 July 1974

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Prospects for Ioannidis and Possible Successors

1. The effect of the Cyprus coup on the fortunes of Ioannidis remains uncertain. On the one hand, the Greek armed forces generally share Ioannidis' dislike of Makarios, whom they have long regarded as the tool of the leftist forces on Cyprus and whose regime they consider just one step from communist control of the island. And in some quarters of the military, the success of the move to oust Makarios from Cyprus may also increase respect for Ioannidis' efficiency and competence. On the other hand, Ioannidis' failure to include a number of important Greek military leaders in the coup decision-making process, the fact that Makarios escaped death and may return at some future date, and the risks of Greek isolation on the issue have undoubtedly left a bad taste among some elements of the officer corps.

25X1

[Redacted]

2. Ioannidis' future will depend in part on how the situation in Cyprus evolves. Whether or not he has second thoughts about Nicos Sampson as president, Ioannidis is seen as responsible for this appointment. Hence, if the Sampson regime should falter or appear to be losing control, discontent with Ioannidis would rise in the Greek military. Moreover, Ioannidis must also maintain a tight rein over Sampson in order to satisfy the more intensely nationalistic



MORI/CDF

[Redacted]

25X1

~~SECRET~~

25X1

[REDACTED]

6 faction of the Greek armed forces. [REDACTED]

25X6

3. Foreign reaction to the Cyprus coup could also have great impact on Ioannidis' ability to survive. Should Turkish military intervention in Cyprus take place, it would unite the Greek military and a good share of the populace behind the government. But even in this case, Greece's inability to prevent partition of the island might eventually spur discontent with Ioannidis.


4. Another serious problem for Ioannidis is the present intense international isolation of his regime. If this should continue unabated, it might erode the confidence of some officers in the government. Indeed, should world-wide disapproval of his Cyprus policy lead to a break with arms suppliers in the West, particularly the US, Ioannidis' stock with his military supporters might drop precipitously. His position would also be affected by international pressures against Cyprus, such as continuing refusal of major states to recognize the Sampson regime, for this would call into question the success of his Cyprus policy.

Possible Successors

5. There is no obvious successor to Ioannidis, if his fortunes turn sour. It still appears likely that his replacement would have to come from the military, since the armed forces wield the power in Greece. But in a situation where Ioannidis was sufficiently discredited to be brought down, there is an outside chance that some figure from the political world--former Prime Minister Karamanlis is the obvious candidate--might be brought in as a transitional leader to a new regime. This alternative might become more likely in the event that international intervention were mounted to oust Sampson, forcibly negating Ioannidis' policies and discrediting military rule even among the officer corps.

-2-

25X1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

25X1

6. Even in the more likely event of a military successor, however, it is not yet possible to specify which of the several long-existing factions would supply the replacement.

7. One group, which may have been disenchanted by the way the Cyprus coup was conducted is usually described as the moderates. These officers--who probably form the silent majority of the officer corps--have long been opposed to the politicization of the military establishment and would desire that the army return to its traditional role. This element includes both junior and senior officers and is influenced by forces outside the military who are discontented with the regime. The extent of their support among important military elements is uncertain. Should one of this persuasion take power, he might under some circumstances be inclined to permit a limited return to more normal constitutional procedure in Greece.

8. A replacement to Ioannidis might also come, however, from the younger, revolutionary officers who in general share the narrow nationalistic views espoused by the present junta. These elements might be particularly aroused if Ioannidis were to acquiesce to pressures to remove the Greek officers from the Cypriot National Guard or otherwise diminish the Greek influence on the island. While these officers probably favor less Greek dependence on the West, they would probably not greatly alter Greece's overall foreign policy, at least as long as they could continue to acquire arms from Western sources. Because this group, like the preceding one, is amorphous and shifting in composition, it is not possible to determine how much of the armed forces these officers can commit. If they should come to power, however, they would probably seek to salvage as far as possible the policies followed by Ioannidis, including a hard line toward Cyprus and Turkey.

9. Total disaster from the Cyprus operation could also lead to a scramble for power between dissidents from all segments of the military. And in this situation, there could even be a succession of military coups, plunging Greece into

-3-

25X1



~~SECRET~~



25X1

a period of great uncertainty. This outcome could lead to shifts and turns in policies toward Turkey and Cyprus, although the attention of the contesting groups would probably be focused in the first instance on their domestic struggle.



25X1

~~SECRET~~

25X1

20
20

DECLASSIFIED, with portions exempt

AUTHORITY 2DC 5/6/07 NLF-K-S-WWOF-10-10-4-4 OCI-1022-74
18 July 1974BY lab NLF, DATE 1/21/09

MEMORANDUM



SUBJECT: Views of Glafkos Clerides

Inside Cyprus

1. The political credentials of Glafkos Clerides within the Greek Cypriot community are impressive. As president of the House of Deputies, he was the constitutional successor to Makarios. He is co-leader of the center-right Unified Party which has the largest number of seats in the House and is widely considered to be the "establishment" party because of its close ties to the business community. He has also served as negotiator for the Greek Cypriot side in the intercommunal talks since their commencement in 1968.

2. A lawyer educated in Britain, Clerides was a prominent participant in the first enosis campaign of the 1950's against the British. He became a close associate of Makarios and soon assumed the role of "heir apparent." Clerides' relationship with Makarios began showing signs of strain in 1969 following the President's suspicion of Clerides' political ambition. When, in February 1969, Clerides formed the Unified Party in cooperation with former Minister of Interior Polykarpos Georkatzis, Makarios, who disapproved of Clerides' association with Georkatzis, encouraged the formation of other parties in order to counter Clerides' party. This angered Clerides and contributed to the deterioration of relations between him and Makarios.

MORI/CDF



25X1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



25X1

3. Clerides was reelected President of the House in July 1970. Members of his party urged him to run against Makarios in the presidential elections of February 1973 but he demurred.


4. Politically, Clerides sought to appeal to the moderate elements of the center, castigating on occasion both the left and right and questioning the efficacy of government policies. He has favored a more flexible position in the intercommunal talks, condemned both the violence of pro-enosis terrorists and that of government forces, and sought to play a moderating role in the 1972 dispute between Athens and Nicosia as well as in the most recent one which led to Makarios' overthrow. His penchant for moderation and compromise have earned him the distrust of both extreme left and extreme right who consider his motives as opportunistic.

5. Clerides has little support among the pro-enosis elements on the island. He and Sampson have been political rivals since at least 1969. It is unlikely that the present rulers of the island would distinguish much between Makarios and Clerides. They would therefore be likely to resist any effort to impose Clerides, though they might be receptive to the appointment of a more respectable rightist with pro-enosis and anti-communist credentials.

In Athens

6. It is unlikely that Clerides would be acceptable to Ioannides as leader of the Greek Cypriots despite his attempt to play a moderating role in the confrontation between Athens and Makarios over the control of the National Guard and the role of the Greek officers attached to it.

25X1



25X1



25X1

25X1

7. The extent of Ioannidis' commitment to Sampson is not known.

It may well be that Ioannidis considers him expendable and may be willing to bargain with Ankara over his fate. This may account for the choice of such a controversial figure to head the new regime. On the other hand, the Athens regime's insecurity may have led it to choose Sampson because of his presumed malleability rather than his notoriety. In that case Ioannidis would likely resist dumping him, unless he is confronted with the possibility of a Turkish invasion and/or the complete diplomatic isolation of Athens and non-recognition of the Sampson regime.

25X1

In Ankara

8. Of all prominent members of the Greek Cypriot political elite, Ankara and the Turkish Cypriots would probably be most comfortable with Clerides. More than the others, he is a known quantity since he is the only Greek Cypriot representative with whom they have had frequent if irregular contact through the intercommunal talks. Clerides enjoys good personal relations with Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot

-3-

25X1


~~SECRET~~



leader and negotiator. The Turks doubtlessly assume him to be sensitive to Turkish Cypriot concerns. Moreover, he is a moderate and an advocate of the "feasible" policy of independence rather than the "desirable" policy of enosis.



~~SECRET~~



2d

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 035214

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇReport

DESCRIPTION re Cyprus Crisis

CREATION DATE 07/20/1974

VOLUME 6 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200260

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 11

FOLDER TITLE Cyprus Crisis - Sanitized Versions of
Situation Reports

DATE WITHDRAWN 09/09/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR