

**The original documents are located in Box 9, folder “Cyprus Crisis (38)” of the Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.**

### **Copyright Notice**

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.



# *Gerald R. Ford Library*

---

1000 Beal Avenue, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-2114

[www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov](http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov)

## Withdrawal Sheet for Documents Declassified in Part

This folder contains a document or documents declassified in part under the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) program.

### Procedures for Initiating a Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) Request

The still classified portions of these RAC documents are eligible for MDR. To file a request follow these steps:

1. Obtain the Presidential Libraries Mandatory Review Request Form (NA Form 14020).
2. Complete Sections I, II, and III of NA Form 14020.
3. In Section III, for each document requested, simply provide the Executive Standard Document Number (ESDN) in the Document Subject/Title or Correspondents column. The ESDN will be printed on the top and bottom of the document, and written on the declassification authority stamp, and will follow this format:

NLF-NSC\_ILCC-5-2-4-3



~~SECRET~~  
**NO FOREIGN DISSEM**  
DIA SITUATION REPORT

#104

DATE: 15 Aug 74  
TIME: 0115 EDT

SUBJECT: Cyprus Situation as of 0100 EDT

REFERENCE: Indicom Msg w/EUCOM 15005Z AUG 74 (S/NFD)

(S/NFD) TURKISH AIR ACTIVITY: At 0645 hours local (0045 EDT), two RF-84s took off from Incirlik Airbase and 37 F-100s loaded with napalm and 750-lb bombs were seen taxiing for takeoff. This activity indicates that the Turks are most likely resuming their drive on Famagusta Cyprus.

**DECLASSIFIED**

AUTHORITY DIA PAC Review, 9/5/03

BY wh NLF, DATE 5/17/05



Classified by...  
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO  
YEAR INTERVALS

DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER 2002

PREPARED BY:  
LTC Laverty  
Cyprus Task Force  
76801, 'Grey 42

**DISTRIBUTION:**

- Sec Def
- Dep. Sec Def
- Sec Army
- Sec Navy
- Sec Air Force
- Chairman, JCS (4 Cys)
- Asst Sec Def, ISA
- Asst Sec Def, PA
- Dir, Joint Staff
- Dir, J-1
- Dir, J-3 (2 Cys via NMCC Rep)
- Dir, J-4
- Dir, J-5
- Dir, J-6
- Asst Sec Def, IA (Room 3E882)

RELEASED BY:

*Wayne B. Laverty, etc*  
RICHARD A. SZYMOCZYK  
Colonel, USA  
Chief, Western Area Division  
Directorate for Intelligence

- JRC (NMCC Rep)
- CSA
- CNO
- CSAF; CV; CVA (3 Cys)
- CMC
- ACSI (ISD)
- CNO (NOP-009, IP)
- AFIN (Alert Officer, via Tube)
- White House Sit Room (via LDX)
- State (via LDX)
- CIA (NMCC Rep)
- NSA (NMCC Rep)
- DDO NMCC (NMCC Rep)
- DNA (via SSO courier)

Control Number  
5 Jun 74

DIA SPOT REPORT SEQUENCE NO. 74-133

~~SECRET~~  
**NO FOREIGN DISSEM**



15 AUG 74

003990  
WH-LDX

# Department of State

DDocbu  
**TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

CA0714

PAGE 01 STATE 178613

72  
ORIGIN CCU-00

INFO OCT-01 PASS-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY EUR:WSTABLER:GHT  
APPROVED BY S - THE SECRETARY  
S/S - MR. TWOME  
S - MR. EAGLEBURGER

073613

Z 150100Z AUG 74 ZFHA  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS FLASH

~~SECRET~~ STATE 178613

EXDIS HANDLE AS WDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, CYP, TU, GR  
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: MESSAGE FOR PRIME MINISTER  
REF: ATHENS 5694

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

YOU MAY INFORM KARAMANLIS THAT WE AGREE TO HIS PUBLISHING  
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ORAL MESSAGE, BUT NOT THE EXACT TEXT  
(IN THE EVENT THAT YOU LEFT A PIECE OF PAPER WITH HIM). KISS

NOTE -- CCD, TAKE COPY TO OFF-LINE FOR PROCESSING.

5/13/11

~~SECRET~~





Department of State

TELEGR

~~SECRET~~

Z 150150Z AUG 74 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA FLASH 8007  
BT

CONTROL: 4 0 0 4

~~SECRET~~ STATE 178616

NODIS

E.O. 11652:GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, CYP, TU, GR  
SUBJECT: CYPRUS

FOR THE AMBASSADOR - EYES ONLY - FROM THE SECRETARY

1. YOU SHOULD SEE ECEVIT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO GIVE HIM THE FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE. (YOU SHOULD NOT LEAVE ANYTHING IN WRITING WITH HIM):

2. HE SHOULD KNOW THE GREEKS HAVE REQUESTED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE AIR COVER FOR THE TRANSPORT OF A GREEK DIVISION FROM CRETE TO CYPRUS. WE ARE STRONGLY DISCOURAGING THE BRITISH FROM DOING SO. IT WOULD, HOWEVER, GREATLY STRENGTHEN OUR HAND IF ECEVIT COULD ASSURE US THAT TURKISH FORCES WOULD NOT MOVE SOUTH OF THE LINE WHICH ECEVIT DESCRIBED TO US EARLIER THIS WEEK AS THE BASIC ZONE.

3. WE ARE TRYING TO BE HELPFUL TO THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT, BUT WE ARE FAST REACHING THE LIMITS OF WHAT WE CAN CONTINUE TO SUPPORT DOMESTICALLY. WE ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THE TURKISH POSITION, BUT THE CONTINUATION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS PUTS US IN AN INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT POSITION.

4. ECEVIT SHOULD ALSO KNOW THAT MAVROS HAD ASKED TO VISIT US EARLIER THIS MONTH BEFORE THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, BUT I

WAS NOT ABLE TO SEE HIM THEN. I HAVE, THEREFORE, NOW INVITED THE GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER TO COME TO WASHINGTON FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH ME. I WOULD BE PLEASED IF GUNES COULD ALSO VISIT WASHINGTON, ALTHOUGH EVEN MORE PLEASED IF ECEVIT HIMSELF CAME.

*State Review*  
*3/3/04*

*HR* *5/13/11*

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SEC

NODIS  
S  
NODIS  
S  
NODIS  
S



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 035083

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇReport

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Cyprus Situation

CREATION DATE . . . . . 08/15/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200204

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 9

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Cyprus Crisis (38)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/01/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 035084

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇReport

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Cyprus Task Force

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re situation in Cyprus

CREATION DATE . . . . . 08/15/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200204

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 9

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Cyprus Crisis (38)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/01/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR



~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1



25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
August 15, 1974

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

CYPRUS

Situation Report Number 4  
(As of 0700 EDT)

(All times cited are Nicosia time, unless otherwise specified.)

MILITARY SITUATION

1. According to the Turkish Cypriot radio, elements of the Turkish army have broken through into the old walled city of Famagusta. The Turkish community there has been besieged since the invasion in July. There has been no confirmation of this claim, but the leading elements of the Turkish column were within five miles of the city at dawn.

2. The northern Turkish column also resumed its attack toward the coastal city of Trikomo at dawn. At last report Greek National Guard soldiers were pulling back from positions outside Lefkoniko, 10 miles from the coast. The Turks had reached Lefkoniko last evening.

3. Ankara radio reports that the Turkish navy is supporting the advance toward Trikomo by shelling Greek positions on the coast. The Turkish air force also concentrated their air attacks on the eastern coast of the island this morning--leaving the Nicosia area alone.

BY *MLD* NARA, DATE 3/15/2011  
AUTHORITY RAC NLF-CODEWORD-4-19-2-5 5/24/2006  
State Dept. Guidelines

Presidential Library Review of DOS Equities is Required

NSA, DIA reviews completed

25X1



Cont'd

IMPDET

CLASS BY: 010607

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

25X1

4. There have been no further reports of Turkish advances west of Nicosia. Despite occasional reports of heavy firing in this area, no major offensive appears under way there. Reports of paratroop landings and of a drive to capture Morphou remain unconfirmed.

5. The cease-fire remained in effect in Nicosia over the evening but, as usual, scattered and occasionally heavy firing was reported in the city at dawn. The situation around the Nicosia airport appears unchanged with UN forces in control of the airfield but surrounded by Turkish units. The ICRC claims that Ankara has given assurances that its forces will respect two "neutral" zones in Nicosia, one being the Hilton Hotel and the other the Cleopatra Hotel.

6. There have been no further reports of Turkish reinforcements coming to the Island, although a resupply operation would be likely. The arrival of two landing craft at Platanisso on the Karpas peninsula yesterday probably was intended to supply isolated groups of Turkish Cypriots. The Turks are also sending in supplies to Turkish Cypriot enclaves at Kokkina.

#### MAINLAND SITUATION

7. According to the US DAO in Ankara, the atmosphere in the city is much less tense than during the operations on Cyprus in July. There is no blackout and the city appears to be in a normal peace-time condition. Ankara's civil airfield, however, remains closed.

8. The US attache in Athens reports that a Greek soldier from an infantry regiment on Crete notified a friend that his unit was to board ships from Crete presumably bound for Cyprus. This regiment had been transferred from the mainland to Crete on August 13.

#### POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

9. President Clerides returned to Cyprus this morning with his delegation to the Geneva talks, flying in from Athens

-2-

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~

[Redacted]

25X1

via Malta aboard a British airplane. His first step was to call an "expanded representative" conference of leading political, labor, business, and newspaper leaders for 1400 hours to discuss late developments.

SOVIET MILITARY REACTION

10. Soviet military activity remains normal, with only routine training exercises under way. There have been no significant changes in the positions of the Soviet ships in the Mediterranean [Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

LATE ITEM

11. A Reuters correspondent in Nicosia cites informed sources there that Clerides will attempt to get his special conference this morning to agree that the northern part of Cyprus shall be "handed over" to the Turks. There has been no indication from sources in Athens, however, that Clerides discussed this decision with Greek leaders before he left for Cyprus.



[Redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

[Redacted]

25X1

HAK  
Scowcroft

LL

#ZZ

RNR 760

SNAP.....CYPRUS-PEACE

NICOSIA, AUG 15, REUTER -- CYPRUS PRESIDENT GLAVKOS CLERIDES TODAY CALLED AN EMERGENCY CONFERENCE WHICH WAS EXPECTED TO AGREE TO HAND OVER THE NORTHERN PART OF CYPRUS DEMANDED BY THE TURKS, INFORMED SOURCES REPORTED.

REUTER 0644

-----

#ZZ

RNR 761

URGENT.....CYPRUS-PEACE 2 NICOSIA

THE MEETING WAS CALLED FOR 2 P.M. LOCAL TIME (0800 EDT).

THE SOURCES SAID THAT AGREEMENT ON THE HANDOVER WAS EXPECTED TO END THE FIGHTING WHICH HAS BEEN RAGING IN CYPRUS SINCE YESTERDAY.

MORE 0646

-----

#ZZ

RNR 762

CYPRUS-PEACE 3 NICOSIA

THE SOURCES CLOSE TO THE CYPRIOT GOVERNMENT ADDED THAT THE CONFERENCE WOULD INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL SECTORS OF CYPRIOT LIFE, INCLUDING MINISTERS AND UNION LEADERS.

REUTER 0648



*Greeks reportedly are going to expel U.S. troops. HAK, SEOWESS, CC*

UP-009  
(GREECE)

ATHENS (UPI) -- A HIGH GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL SAID TODAY THAT GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER GEORGE MAVROS HAD REJECTED AN INVITATION TO FLY TO WASHINGTON TO CONFER WITH SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER AND THAT GREECE HAS DECIDED TO EXPEL U.S. TROOPS FROM THE COUNTRY.

UPI 08-15 08:42 AED

UP-010  
ADD GREECE, ATHENS (UPI-008)

THE GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL SAID KISSINGER TELEPHONED FROM WASHINGTON TO URGE MAVROS TO CONFER WITH HIM ON THE TURKISH ARMY SWEEP THROUGH WAR-TORN CYPRUS.

"MR. MAVROS CANNOT ACCEPT THE INVITATION IN VIEW OF CONTINUED TURKISH AGGRESSION," THE OFFICIAL SAID. "AMERICAN INTEREST IN GREECE'S PREDICAMENT HAS COME A LITTLE TOO LATE."

UPI 08-15 08:43 AED





Department of State

WIA  
held  
TELEGRAM  
13  
9

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 4095Q  
RECD: AUG 15, 1974  
1116Z

Z 151020Z AUG 74  
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 5647  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 6543

MODIS

FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, GR, TU, CY  
SUBJ: CYPRUS

State Review  
3/3/04  
5/13/11

REF A) STATE 177679; BL STATE 178616

1. I MET WITH PRIMIN 0930 A.M. (LOCAL TIME) AUG 15, TO CONVEY ORAL MESSAGES SET FORTH REFTELS A AND B. DEFMIN ISIK ALSO PRESENT. IN OUR TALK WHICH FOLLOWED, THE PRIMIN MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS:

A. HE CONSIDERED US OFFER TO "ENGAGE ITSELF DIRECTLY" IN NEGOTIATIONS TO BE VERY HELPFUL AND SOMETHING HE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED. HE THOUGHT IT WAS ESSENTIAL HOWEVER, TO FIND A WAY TO EFFECT THIS US INVOLVEMENT WITHOUT "OPENING THE DOOR" TO GREATER SOVIET INVOLVEMENT.

B. THINKING OUT LOUD, HE SAID THE BEST ANSWER WOULD SEEM TO BE TO HAVE THE US COME IN UNDER A NATO UMBRELLA; AND STILL THINKING OUT LOUD, HE WONDERED WHETHER THERE COULDN'T BE A BRIEF HIGH LEVEL MEETING WITH YOU, KARAMANLIS, AND HIM (" I COULD NOT COME, OF COURSE, IF KARAMANLIS DID NOT COME") ON SOME NATO BASE IN ITALY, MALTA OR AT "YOUR NATO BASE IN THE AZORES."

C. CONTINUING TO THINK OUT LOUD, HE SAID "WE COULD DO THIS RIGHT AWAY AND PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR A RESUMED GENEVA MEETING". IN RESPONSE, I SAID I OF COUSE DID NOT KNOW YOUR AVAILABILITY FOR SUCH A MEETING, BUT THE US COULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN SUCH A MEETING IF FIGHTING STILL GOING ON.

D. THE PRIMIN TOOK THIS TO BE THE LEADING QUESTION THAT IT WAS, AND SAID THAT "THE FIGHTING WOULD BE OVER, AND THE TURKS COULD BE BACK AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IN GENEVA ON AUGUST 16."

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

-2-ANKARA 6543, SECTION 1 OF 2, AUG 15

SAID, "DOES THAT MEAN THE FIGHTING WILL BE OVER TODAY?" HE REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT SURE THAT IT WOULD BE OVER TODAY (AUG 15). HE SAID HOWEVER THAT HE FULLY EXPECTED IT TO BE OVER BY TOMORROW EVENING, (AUG 16) AT THE LATEST.

E. I THEN TURNED TO YOUR SECOND MESSAGE AND ASKED IF HE COULD GIVE YOU HIS ASSURANCE THAT TURKISH FORCES WOULD NOT MOVE SOUTH OF THE LINE WHICH HE HAD DESCRIBED TO US EARLIER AS THE SOUTHERN EDGE OF HIS "BASIC ZONE." SO THERE COULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING AS TO THIS PORTION OF OUR CONVERSATION, I BROUGHT WITH ME THE MAP WHICH THE PRIMIN HAD GIVEN ME EARLIER AND ON WHICH HE HAD DRAWN THE TURKISH PROPOSED CANTON LINES.

F. WITH THIS MAP IN FRONT OF US, I ASKED THE PRIMIN IF THE SOUTHERN LINE RUNNING EASTWARD FROM NICOSIA TO SLIGHTLY NORTH OF MUSULITA (MOUSOULITA), THEN SWINGING SOUTH-EASTERLY THROUGH A PORTION OF FAMAGUSTA INTO THE SEA (THIS LINE DESCRIBED IN MORE DETAIL FOR DEPT IN EMBTEL 6415), REPRESENTED THE LIMIT THAT TURKISH TROOPS WOULD BE PRESSING SOUTHWARD ON THE CURRENT OPERATION. THE PRIMIN RESPONDED THAT THIS WILL BE SO "APPROXIMATELY", BUT NOT EXACTLY.

G. HE SAID THAT THE CURRENT OPERATION IS TO GO TO WHAT WOULD HAVE BEEN THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE "BASIC REGION" WHICH WAS DESIGNED BY THE TURKS BEFORE THEY BEGAN THINKING OF A NUMBER OF CANTONS RATHER THAN ONLY ONE. THE "ONLY-ONE-CANTON" CONCEPT HAD A SOUTHERN LINE WHICH APPROXIMATES THE ONE WE WERE FAMILIAR WITH, BUT RUNS SLIGHTLY TO THE SOUTH OF IT.

H. ECEVIT THEN SHOWED ME WHERE THIS SECOND LINE RUNS. IT STARTS FROM THE SAME PLACE IN NICOSIA AND CONTINUES ON A STRAIGHT LINE TO TIMBU (TYMBOU) WHERE THERE IS A SMALL AIRPORT WHICH ECEVIT CLAIMED THE TURKS HAVE ALREADY TAKEN. FROM TIMBU, ECEVIT'S LINE WENT DIRECTLY TO FAMAGUSTA, ENTERING FAMAGUSTA AT THE SAME POINT AS BEFORE.

I. WHEN I EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE ADDED SOUTHERN ENCROACHMENT REPRESENTED BY THIS LINE, THE PRIMIN SAID THAT THE TURKS HAD CONSIDERED, BUT REJECTED, ADVANCING NOT INTO FAMAGUSTA, BUT TO THE LARNACA AREA ALONG THE ROAD THROUGH MARGI (MARGO). HE SAID THAT THIS WOULD NOT RPT NOT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED, AND WOULD HAVE BEEN A MUCH EASIER OPERATION TO ACCOMPLISH. HOWEVER, HE SAID THE BRITISH ARE DOWN THERE "AND IN VIEW OF THE WAY THE BRITISH HAVE BEEN ACTING, WE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR THEM TO BE SURROUNDED BY GREEKS."

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



SECRET

Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

-3-ANKARA 6543, SECTION 1 OF 2, AUG15

J. THE PRIMIN SAID THAT THE TURKEY HAD ONE ADDED MILITARY OPERATION TO COMPLETE. HE ASKED ME TO "PERMIT HIM THE DISCRETION OF NOT REVEALING EXACTLY WHAT THIS WOULD BE". I IMMEDIATELY SPOKE OF THE UNWISDOM OF ANY RPT ANY NEW MILITARY INITIATIVE.

K. AS I WAS DIGESTING HIS LAST REMARK AND AS HE COULD SEE MY EYES FIXING ON THE AREA IN THE SECTOR NORTH OF OMORFO (MORPHOU), HE AGAIN INDICATED THAT DISCRETION PREVENTED HIM FROM PURSUING THIS PORTION OF OUR CONVERSATION, OTHER THAN TO REPEAT THAT THIS NEW OPERATION WOULD NOT REACH FARTHER WOUTH ON THE ISLAND THAN WHAT WE HAD BEEN DISCUSSING.

L. WHEN IT WAS CLEAR THAT MY CONCERN ABOUT THIS NEW OPERATION PERSISTED, THE PRIMIN SAID THAT HE COULD BE SURE WHAT THE TOTAL TERRITORY THE TURKS WOULD SEEK TO CONTROL WOULD NOT BE MORE THAN ONE-THIRD OF THE ISLAND -- AND THAT IF THE ULTIMATE SOLUTION INVOLVED TURKEY'S HAVING MORE THAN ONE CANTON, THEN THE BASIC SINGLE REGION TURKEY WAS NOW SETTING OUT TO CONTROL COULD BE ADJUSTED AND REDUCED.

2. AT THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION, THE PRIMIN RETURNED TO YOUR OFFER OF MORE DIRECT US ENGAGEMENT. HE SAID HE CONSIDERED THIS SO SIGNIFICANT THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO REFLECT ON IT, AND DISCUSS IT WITH GUNES (WHO IS STILL IN GENEVA), BEFORE GIVING ME HIS FINAL REACTION. HE SAID HE HOPED TO BE BACK TO ME IN ONE HOUR.

BT  
06543

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 4099Q  
RECD: AUG 15, 1974  
1132Z

Z 151020Z AUG 74  
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 5648  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 ANKARA 6543

DDIS

3. AS FOREGOING PARAGRAPHS WERE ABOUT TO BE DISPATCHED, I RECEIVED PROMISED TELEPHONE CALL FROM PRIMIN SAING THAT HE HAD CONSULTED WITH GUNES AND WAS NOW CONFIRMING THAT HE WOULD WELCOME OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH YOU. HE CONTINUED TO THINK THE NATO CONTEXT WAS IMPORTANT AND SAID THAT ISIK HAD SUGGESTED THAT BEST LOCUS MIGHT BE BRUSSELS ITSELF, A SUGGESTION WITH WHICH HE AGREED. HE THOUGHT MEETING COULD TAKE PLACE EITHER AS GENEVA TALKS ONCE MORE RESUMED OR PERHAPS A HALF DAY EARLIER. IN ANY EVENT, THE IDEA WOULD BE TO WORK OUT BASIC DIRECTIONS TO GIVE TO THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. PRIMIN SAID THAT AT MEETING WITH YOU AND KARAMANLIS, HE WOULD REFRAIN FROM TABLING THE AEGEAN MATTER AND ANY OTHER GREEK-TURKISH PROBLEMS WHICH THREATENED DIFFICULTY FOR NATO AND FOR THE TWO COUNTRIES IMMEDIATELY CONCERNED. BUT HE WOULD LIKE TO BRING THEM TO YOUR ATTENTION PRIVATELY SO THAT YOU COULD BE "THINKING ABOUT THEM."

4. PRIMIN ALSO TOLD ME THAT HE HAD JUST LEARNED FROM ISIK THAT LUNS WANTED TO COME TO ANKARA. HE SAID HE WAS GOING TO RESPOND TO LUNS THAT IT WOULD BE BEST FOR HIM NOT RPT NOT TO COME AT THIS POINT. THE CONVERSATION ENDED WITH MY AGAIN URGING A PROMPT END TO THE FIGHTING AND ASKING WHETHER THERE IS ANY POSSIBILITY OF IT STOPPING TODAY. PRIMIN SAID IT "MIGHT BE POSSIBLE."

5. A FEW MOMENTS LATER, PRIMIN TELEPHONED ME AGAIN TO SAY THAT THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAD ASKED TO SEE HIM, AND THAT HE WAS GOING TO RECEIVE HIM WITH TWO PURPOSES IN MIND. FIRST, HE WOULD ATTEMPT TO ALLAY SOVIET FEARS REGARDING TURKISH PARTITION INTENTIONS. HE HOPED, HE SAID, THAT HE COULD CONVINCE HIM THAT THIS WAS NOT A TURKISH OBJECTIVE. SECONDLY, HE WANTED TO BE SURE THAT THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR UNDERSTOOD THERE WAS A CYPRUS PROBLEM AS SUCH, AND THAT THERE WAS A SEPARATE NATO PROBLEM WHICH GREW OUT OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, AND THAT THE TWO MUST NOT BE CONFUSED. I SAID THAT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY UNFORTUNATE IF HIS COMMENTS ON THIS SCORE GAVE THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR ANY INKLING OF WHAT HE AND I

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

-2-ANKARA 6543, SECTION 2 OF 2, AUG 15

HAD JUST BEEN DISCUSSING, AND I ADDED THAT I HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING WHETHER A BRUSSELS MEETING WOULD BE PRACTICABLE. THE PRIMIN SAID HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD, AND I NEED HAVE NO CONCERN ON THAT SCORE. HE JUST WANTED TO LAY OUT THE CONCEPT, HE SAID, IN CASE A BRUSSELS-TYPE MEETING SHOULD, IN FACT, MATERIALIZE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

6. HIS FINAL POINT TO ME WAS TO REITERATE THAT WHEN CURRENT TURK OPERATION OVER, TURKEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS TO THE GREEKS. I ASKED IF THESE WOULD INCLUDE TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS. HE SAID YES.

7. IN COURSE OF OUR CONVERSATION, PRIMIN MADE CLEAR HIS VIEW THAT DETAILED, FORMAL AND FINAL CYPRUS SOLUTION MUST EMERGE FROM RESUMED GENEVA CONFERENCE. HE INDICATED THAT GUNES WOULD PROBABLY NOT ACCOMPANY HIM TO A BRUSSELS-TYPE MEETING IF THIS TAKES PLACE, BUT RATHER WOULD BE SENT TO HOLD THE FORT IN GENEVA.

MACOMBER

~~SECRET~~



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 035085

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Amembassy Bonn - Hillenbrand

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Secstate WashDC

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re evacuation planning

CREATION DATE . . . . . 08/15/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200204

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 9

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Cyprus Crisis (38)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/01/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

*Gen. Scowcroft*  
3463X 11a

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS~~

August 16, 1974  
*Added*

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER  
FROM: Jeanne W. Davis *JWD*  
SUBJECT: Minutes of WSAG Meeting, Held  
August 15, 1974

Attached are the minutes of the Washington Special Actions Group meeting held August 15, 1974, to discuss Cyprus.

Attachment

cc: Gen. Scowcroft ✓  
Richard Kennedy  
Denis Clift

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS~~



DECLASSIFIED  
EO 13526 (EXCEPT) GPO 2.3  
NSC 132/2, 132/3, 132/4, 132/5, 132/6, 132/7, 132/8, 132/9, 132/10, 132/11, 132/12, 132/13, 132/14, 132/15, 132/16, 132/17, 132/18, 132/19, 132/20, 132/21, 132/22, 132/23, 132/24, 132/25, 132/26, 132/27, 132/28, 132/29, 132/30, 132/31, 132/32, 132/33, 132/34, 132/35, 132/36, 132/37, 132/38, 132/39, 132/40, 132/41, 132/42, 132/43, 132/44, 132/45, 132/46, 132/47, 132/48, 132/49, 132/50, 132/51, 132/52, 132/53, 132/54, 132/55, 132/56, 132/57, 132/58, 132/59, 132/60, 132/61, 132/62, 132/63, 132/64, 132/65, 132/66, 132/67, 132/68, 132/69, 132/70, 132/71, 132/72, 132/73, 132/74, 132/75, 132/76, 132/77, 132/78, 132/79, 132/80, 132/81, 132/82, 132/83, 132/84, 132/85, 132/86, 132/87, 132/88, 132/89, 132/90, 132/91, 132/92, 132/93, 132/94, 132/95, 132/96, 132/97, 132/98, 132/99, 132/100  
By *HR* 132/100 Date *5/13/11*

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS

WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTIONS GROUP MEETING

August 15, 1974

Time and Place: 11:36 a.m. - 12:00 p.m., White House Situation Room

Subject: Cyprus

Participants:

<u>Chairman:</u>	Henry A. Kissinger	<u>JCS:</u>	Gen. George S. Brown Lt. Gen. John Pauly
<u>State:</u>	Robert S. Ingersoll Joseph Sisco Wells Stabler Robert McCloskey	<u>CIA:</u>	William Colby George Lauder
<u>Defense:</u>	William Clements Robert Ellsworth Gen. Denis McAuliffe	<u>NSC Staff:</u>	Maj. Gen. Brent Scowcroft Richard T. Kennedy A. Denis Clift James G. Barnum

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

--JCS and Defense will determine, by this afternoon, what is involved if it is decided to offload the MAP and FMS equipment to Turkey first; and

--a determination on the forward movement of the F-4s located at Torrejon, Spain and in the U. S. would be made tomorrow.

DECLASSIFIED *FRus Volume*  
E.O. 12958 (Declassify) GDS 2.3  
NSC Memo, 8/22/74, State Dept. Guidance  
1.2.R. NSC 8/23 5/13/11

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS

Secretary Kissinger: Bill....

Mr. Colby: began to brief from the attached text.

Secretary Kissinger: We've called somebody--who was it--about that, and have a direct report from Famagusta that they are not being fired upon. (in reference to an unconfirmed report that Turkish forces were invading the British Sovereign Base Area at Famagusta).

Mr. Colby: We're checking on that now.

Secretary Kissinger: We have a direct report, by telephone that they (the Turks) are not firing on Famagusta. I think we can trust the British enough to know whether they are being fired upon or not.

Mr. Colby: finished his briefing.

Mr. Sisco: When is Papadopoulos due back?

Mr. Stabler: On the 19th (of August).

Secretary Kissinger: We ought to offer him a ten-year position at Harvard!

Mr. Sisco: Yes, with tenure!

Mr. Ingersoll: Bill, do you have anything on reinforcements from Turkey?

Mr. Colby: We have nothing so far. They have the capability to move reinforcements any time they wish, but we have seen no reflections as yet.

Secretary Kissinger: We have received reassurances from Ecevit that the Turks will not move south of that line they have established. I think that their military operation will run its course by tomorrow.

Mr. Colby: Well, one potential problem is the area to the northwest. They may try to take that too.

Mr. Sisco: They said they were going to keep their military operation going until they get what they want.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but they also said that it would end tomorrow.

Mr. Colby: That area to the northwest is not very far. It's only about 40 miles from the controlled area.

Mr. Clements: Joe, (Mr. Sisco) when we first met at this table-- when this Cyprus thing first got started--we talked a lot about that southwest area and what might happen there. As I recall, we were worried about that area and thought they might try to take that also. What is your judgement of what might happen?

Mr. Sisco: That is of some concern.

Mr. Colby: There is quite a concentration of Turks in that southwest area. There could be some further attempts to take it.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think that once this Turkish operation runs its course, they won't go any further. We won't stand for it. We just can't stand for any more Turk operations. They have already stretched us to the limit.

Mr. Colby: The Greek Government could be in for a hard time if the Turks move on those Turkish communities in the southwest.

Secretary Kissinger: Why?

Mr. Colby: The shock affect in Athens. This would be looked on as further aggression--could topple the government.

Mr. Ingersoll: That would fill out the line they said earlier that they wanted.

Mr. Colby: Yes, that's right.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we haven't heard from the Greeks yet. What has happened? Has Embassy Athens broken diplomatic relations with me? We should have heard two hours ago, and we haven't heard anything yet?

Mr. McCloskey: We haven't heard yet.

Secretary Kissinger: Let them know that we want to know when they are sending the reply.

Mr. Ellsworth: Is there any authenticity to that press report that (Greek Foreign Minister) Mavros says that they are going to throw the U. S. military out of Greece?

Secretary Kissinger: We have no official report of that.

Mr. Ellsworth: There was also some press report that Mobile Oil personnel were going to be expelled.

Mr. Sisco: We have nothing on that.

Secretary Kissinger: We were told that that cable from Karamanlis would be here at 8:00 this morning and we don't have it yet?

Mr. Sisco: When we get back, we'll put a call into Athens and find out when it is coming.

Mr. Ellsworth: On the F-4s and the ships....

Secretary Kissinger: On the ships, we were going to wait until tomorrow to tell them whether to go in or not.

Mr. Clements: Yes. We're going to have to await word from you then.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, we should know tomorrow morning. Can they go to Turkey first?

Mr. Ellsworth: Certainly.

Gen. Brown: It would be awkward though, and expensive. The equipment is containerized. It's loaded according to which part is offloaded first.

Mr. Clements: The stuff that is last on, is first off, making it difficult. But, we can do it if you want to.

Secretary Kissinger: If we decided to offload in Turkey first, we'll have to tell them by late tonight.

Gen. Brown: I have the list of equipment here. (reads from the list).

Mr. Ellsworth: Are any small arms included?

Gen. Brown: I don't have anything on small arms. Let's see, there are some recoilless rifles, torpedoes....

Secretary Kissinger: Then it would be possible to unload at Turkey first.

Mr. Clements: Oh, yes, it's possible. It screws up the handling. But in answer to your question, yes it is possible to offload at Turkey first.

Gen. Brown: We can get an estimate from the ships company about what would be involved in offloading at Turkey.

Secretary Kissinger: Good. Can you get it to me by this afternoon?

Gen. Brown: Sure.



Mr. Clements: Henry, I still have this gut feeling that we could still have some trouble in the southwest corner. I think the Greeks might well retaliate against those Turks in the communities down there, and a real fight could develop.

Mr. Colby: I think the chances of a backstage fight are good.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, you know, if this situation leads to double enosis, Makarios will become a Greek politician. There's no joy in that. Okay, thank you.

\*\*\*\*\*

~~TOP SECRET~~

15 August 1974

[Redacted]

25X1

CYPRUS

25X1

I. [Redacted] Clerides

is ready to "hand over" the northern part of Cyprus to the Turks. A special conference of Cypriot leaders was to have convened at 0800 EDT this morning to consider Clerides' proposal.

II. Meanwhile, the Turkish offensive, clearly aimed at securing the northern third of the island is continuing. The Turkish foreign minister has said that this operation should be concluded by late afternoon.

A. At dawn this morning the leading elements of one Turkish armored column were within five miles of Famagusta. The Turks now claim that some of their troops have entered the old walled city, where the Turkish community has been besieged since July.


B. To the north, another Turkish column resumed its advance on Trikono at dawn, amid reports

DECLASSIFIED with portions exempt

AUTHORITY RAC NLF-K-S-WWOF-9-1-3-7 9/21/05

BY [Redacted] NLF DATE 7/9/09

~~TOP SECRET~~




that the Greek National Guard is pulling back.

- C. This northern column is being assisted by gunfire from two Turkish destroyers off Trikonio, and the Turkish Air Force has been bombing and strafing the eastern coast of the island this morning.
- D. The ceasefire in Nicosia held up during the night, but scattered firing resumed this morning. There have been no Turkish air attacks on the city so far today. UN forces still control the airport.
- E. West of Nicosia, ~~there appears to be no report~~ <sup>there are no firm reports of a major</sup> Turkish offensive, ~~but Turkish press releases claim some advances~~ <sup>but Turkish press releases</sup> ~~claim some advances~~ in the area. We have no confirmation of reports that Turkish paratroopers landed in Morphou yesterday.
- F. There are no further specific reports of Greek military preparations on the mainland.
1. Karamanlis is said to have decided, after a meeting with Greek military leaders, not to take any offensive action against Turkey.

- 2 -


~~TOP SECRET~~



2. / The atmosphere in Ankara is said to be much less tense than during the invasion of Cyprus in July. There is no blackout, but the city's civil airfield is closed.

G. Soviet media are still reporting events on Cyprus briefly and factually. Pravda, however, has repeated the familiar line that NATO interference is to blame for the troubles on the island.

1. Soviet military activity remains normal,




25X

(II). The Cyprus fighting is causing an internal political impact in both Turkey and Greece.

A. In Turkey, there is broad support for a firm line on Cyprus. The Ecevit coalition has been under considerable public pressure from the opposition to take a stronger stance toward Cyprus, and to secure at Geneva more than merely a freeze of the cease-fire lines.

- 3 -

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

1. This political consensus reinforced Ecevit's own inclination not to give away anything at the bargaining table which had been, or could be, won on the battlefield.

B. Ecevit also has had to contend with pressure from the military establishment for more decisive action, probably to make up for the slowness with which the initial invasion proceeded.

1. It is hard to tell just how much heat Ecevit has felt from this quarter, but his standing with the military has visibly risen as a result of his performance in the Cyprus crisis thus far.


2. We have no evidence to suggest that Ecevit is not in the final analysis calling the shots in Turkish policy, but there are limits on his room for maneuver.

C. In Greece, Karamanlis' position at the moment is strengthened by several factors.

-- He did not ask for the job; he was requested to take it by a consensus of military and civilian leaders.

-- He cannot be faulted for the reverses Greek Cypriots are now suffering. This setback is attributed to the former junta.

- 4. -

~~TOP SECRET~~

- He can be excused for not taking a tougher military posture against Turkey, because his senior military officers are advising him to avoid broadening the confrontation.
- In Greece's present difficulties, no alternative contender -- military or civilian -- would command anything like Karamanlis' support.

D.


25X1

many of the advantages Karamanlis has now will gradually fade.

1. <sup>He</sup> Karamanlis could get in trouble over the terms of the Cyprus settlement. Even though the disaster was not of his making, he will be associated with its resolution.
2. He is sensitive to this problem, and will insist that the language be such as to minimize Greek humiliation.

V. In Greece, anti-American sentiment has become widespread since the original Turkish invasion, and appears to be growing in direct proportion to Greek and Greek Cypriot setbacks on the battlefield and at the conference table. This feeling is apparently not confined to traditionally anti-American

- 5. -


~~TOP SECRET~~

leftist circles, but is shared by normally pro-American right and center-right politicians and military men.

A. This feeling stems primarily from the Greek belief that the US abandoned Greece in its hour of need and "tilted" toward the Turks. The belief has been nurtured by the Greek press, by American press accounts, and by favorable references to the US role by Turkish leaders.


B. Greece's withdrawal from the military aspects of NATO is the first significant official manifestation of this anti-Americanism, and Greek officials referred it as an "indirect slap" at the allies and "particularly the United States." The decision appears to have been well received by the people and the military.

C. On the non-governmental level, anti-Americanism has been limited to newspaper editorials and one sizeable demonstration involving some 1,000 students.



25X1

- 6 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



25X1

D. Anti-Americanism is also likely to result in leftist gains at the polls, should the Karamanlis government hold elections as promised. The 24 percent vote the left garnered in 1958 -- the highest it has ever received -- was attributed in part to public disenchantment with the West over Cyprus.





M

333A

ADVISORY 8-15

HAK, SCOWCROFT, LL

EDITORS:

THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESUMED MEETING AT 11:28 P.M. EDT TO DISCUSS THE CYPRUS SITUATION. THE NIGHT LD UN WILL BE RE-LED AS DEVELOPMENTS WARRANT.

UPI NEW YORK

UPI 08-15 11:38 PED

UN 8-15

3RD NIGHT LD 261A

WITH CYPRUS

BY R.M. SORGE

UNITED NATIONS (UPI) -- THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL ISSUED ITS FOURTH CYPRUS CEASE-FIRE DEMAND THURSDAY NIGHT AND ADOPTED A STRONGLY WORDED RESOLUTION TO BOLSTER THE STATUS OF THE U.N. PEACE-KEEPING FORCE ON THE EMBATTLED ISLAND AND PROTECT ITS MEMBERS.

THE VOTE ON THE CEASE-FIRE CALL WAS A UNANIMOUS 15-0. ON THE SECOND RESOLUTION THE VOTE WAS 14-0. CHINA DID NOT PARTICIPATE.

THE RESOLUTION ASKS THE FIGHTING PARTIES TO DEMONSTRATE UNEQUIVOCALLY THEIR WILLINGNESS TO FULFIL THEIR COMMITMENTS TOWARDS THE FORCE. THAT DEMAND WAS INCLUDED AT THE REQUEST OF AUSTRIA, WHICH ON WEDNESDAY LOST THREE MEN OF THE U.N. FORCE TO A TURKISH AIR ATTACK WITH NAPALM.

THE RESOLUTION DEMANDS FULL RESPECT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE U.N. FORCE AND COOPERATION WITH IT IN ALL ITS FUNCTIONS, INCLUDING HUMANITARIAN TASKS. IT ALSO ASKS ALL PARTIES TO REFRAIN FROM ACTION WHICH MIGHT ENDANGER THE LIVES AND SAFETY OF ITS MEMBERS.  
MORE

027A

UN 8-16

INSERT 3RD NIGHT LD UN UNITED NATIONS AFTER 10TH PGH XXX PERU.

THE SESSION ADJOURNED AT 1:27 A.M. EDT FRIDAY WITHOUT TAKING ANY FURTHER ACTION OR SETTING A DATE FOR A NEW MEETING.

AMBASSADOR ZENON ROSSIDES OF CYPRUS URGED IN THE DEBATE THAT THE COUNCIL PREVENT WHAT APPEARED TO BE THE IMMINENT PARTITION OF THE ISLAND. "THERE HAS BEEN A PREMEDITATED AND ARMED ATTACK FOR TEARING APART MY COUNTRY," HE STATED.

BRITISH AMBASSADOR IVOR RICHARD APPEALED FOR A RESUMPTION OF PEACE TALKS. "THE ONLY WAY TO SETTLE A DISPUTE IS BY NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE ONLY WAY TO MAKE NEGOTIATIONS IS TO MAKE CONCESSIONS," HE SAID.

SOVIET AMBASSADOR YAKOV A. MALIK, HOWEVER, ACCUSED "CERTAIN NATO CIRCLES" OF BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TURKISH ATTACK ON CYPRUS AND INSISTED THAT ALL FOREIGN FORCES BE WITHDRAWN. RICHARD DISMISSED THE DEMAND AS A "DIATRIBE."

BRITAIN HAS TWO MAJOR BASES ON THE ISLAND.

PICKUP 11TH PGH: THE SESSION

UPI 08-16 02:12 AED

HAK, SCOWCROFT, 40

#ZZ

RNR 829

URGENT..... CYPRUS--LEAD BASE

EPISKOPI, CYPRUS, AUG. 15, REUTER -- TURKISH TROOPS, ADVANCING ON FAMAGUSTA BEHIND TANKS AND ARTILLERY FIRE, BURST INTO THE BRITISH MILITARY BASE AT DHEKELIA TODAY -- AND WERE TOLD TO GET OUT BY DUG-IN GHURKAS.

THE GHURKAS, REPORTEDLY BACKED BY SCORPION LIGHT TANKS, WERE HOLDING THE FRONT LINE DEFENSES OF THE BASE AREA WHICH IS SHELTERING 16,000 CIVILIAN REFUGEES FROM FAMAGUSTA.

A BRITISH SPOKESMAN SAID FIVE TURKISH SHELLS LANDED INSIDE THE BASE BUT CAUSED NO CASUALTIES OR DAMAGE.

THE TURKS, WHO ENTERED THE ZONE APPARENTLY ACCIDENTALLY, LEFT PEACEFULLY ONCE THE GHURKAS TOLD THEM WHERE THEY WERE, A U.N. SPOKESMAN SAID.

THE NEPALESE SOLDIERS WITH THE FLOPPY HATS AND LONG CURVED KNIVES -- KUKRIS -- HAVE A LONG TOUGH TRADITION OF SERVICE AS MERCENARIES WITH THE BRITISH ARMY ACROSS THE WORLD.

THE BRITISH BASE SPOKESMAN X X X PICKING UP FOURTH GRAPH RNR 822.

REUTER 1236



14  
N048

R

GREEK-U.S. BASES

MARVOS DENIES STATEMENT RE PULL OUT

OF U.S. FORCES: MAX, SCORCOP, L

ATHENS, GREECE (AP) -- FOREIGN MINISTER GEORGE MAVROS SAID TODAY THAT U.S. MILITARY BASES IN GREECE ARE PROTECTED BY BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT SUCH AGREEMENTS CAN BE BROKEN.

"HOW IS IT POSSIBLE FOR GREECE TO RENOUNCE BILATERAL AGREEMENTS?" THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID IN RESPONSE TO REPORTS THAT GREECE WAS PLANNING TO THROW OUT THE AMERICAN MILITARY.

"GEORGE MAVROS MOST CATEGORICALLY DENIES HAVING MADE ANY STATEMENT TO ANYONE CONCERNING THE ALLEGED DECISION OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT TO EXPELL THE UNITED STATES FROM GREECE," HE ADDED.

THE GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN, PANAGHIOTIS LAMBRIAS, SAID HE HAD "NO IDEA" OF THE ORIGINS OF THE REPORT TO EXPEL AMERICAN SERVICEMEN. HE ALSO EXPRESSED DOUBTS THAT GREECE COULD CLOSE DOWN U.S. BASES UNDER BILATERAL AGREEMENTS.

08-15-74 11:47EDT

N068

R

ATHENSADD GREEK-U.S. BASES (N48)

IN WASHINGTON, A SPOKESMAN SAID THE PENTAGON HAS RECEIVED NO DIRECT INFORMATION ON THE GREEK GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS.

JERRY W. FRIEDHEIM, THE SPOKESMAN, SAID "I AM NOT AWARE OF ANYTHING" BEYOND A STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT WEDNESDAY THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT YET DETERMINED THE FULL EXTENT OF GREECE'S INTENTIONS.

ASKED WHETHER CONTINGENCY PLANS ARE BEING MADE TO WITHDRAW U.S. MILITARY MEN AND THEIR FAMILIES, FRIEDHEIM SAID, "WE ARE NOT UNDERTAKING ANY KIND OF ACTIVITY PENDING AN ASSESSMENT OF GREEK INTENTIONS."

ACCORDING TO THE PENTAGON'S ACCOUNT, THERE ARE SOME 4,000 U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL AND 6,500 MILITARY DEPENDENTS IN GREECE WHERE THE UNITED STATES MAINTAINS NAVAL AND AIR BASES AS PART OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE.

FRIEDHEIM SAID THE PENTAGON HAS NOT ISSUED ANY INSTRUCTIONS THAT WOULD RESTRICT THE MOVEMENTS OF AMERICAN MILITARY MEN AND THEIR FAMILIES NOW IN GREECE.


FRIEDHEIM REPORTED THAT THE CRUISER LITTLE ROCK, FLAGSHIP OF THE 6TH FLEET, HAS GONE TO SEA FROM AN ITALIAN PORT. HE SAID THIS WAS A DECISION OF VICE ADM. DANIEL MURPHY, THE FLEET COMMANDER.

HE ALSO SAID THE CARRIER FORRESTAL IS EXPECTED TO SAIL FROM NAPLES, BUT WOULD REMAIN IN THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN.

FRIEDHEIM SAID THAT OTHERWISE THE 6TH FLEET IS CONDUCTING NORMAL OPERATIONS, THAT IT IS NOT APPROACHING CYPRUS AND THAT NO ALERTS HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO THE FLEET OR OTHER U.S. MILITARY UNITS.

HE TOLD NEWSMEN THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE OPERATING PATTERN OF THE SOVIET FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

08-15-74 12:58EDT





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 4105Q  
15 AUG 74, 1156E

~~3 151150Z AUG 74 3774~~  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA FLASH 6316  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ STATE 178628

MODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, CY, TU, GR  
SUBJECT: CYPRUS

NO. 11652: GDS  
5/13/11

FROM THE SECRETARY FOR THE AMBASSADOR

1. ASSUMING THAT CLERIDES HAS RETURNED TO NICOSIA, YOU SHOULD DELIVER TO HIM THE FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE FROM ME:
2. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I ADMIRERD THE STATESMANLIKE POSITION WHICH YOU ASSUMED AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. IT SEEMED TO ME THAT GIVEN GREATER FLEXIBILITY ON ALL SIDES, IT MIGHT WELL HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TO AVOID THE RESUMPTION OF THE FIGHTING.
3. I DID WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT WE FOR OUR PART DID OUR UTMOST TO PROLONG THE NEGOTIATING SESSIONS IN GENEVA, FOR WE FELT THAT THERE WERE PROSPECTS FOR THE GRADUAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE OUTLINES OF AN ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT.
4. WE CONSIDER THE RESORT TO MILITARY ACTION TO BE COMPLETELY UNJUSTIFIABLE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND I AM SURE YOU WILL HAVE SEEN OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS TO THAT EFFECT.
5. I EARNESTLY HOPE THAT IN SPITE OF THIS UNJUSTIFIED MILITARY ACTION, YOU WILL CONSIDER WHAT THE POSSIBILITIES MAY BE TO BRING ABOUT A RESUMPTION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.
6. WE ARE FOR OUR PART PREPARED TO ASSUME A MORE DIRECT ROLE IF THE PARTIES CONCERNED BELIEVE THAT WOULD BE HELPFUL. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY VIEWS OR IDEAS YOU MAY HAVE AS TO HOW WE COULD BE MORE DIRECTLY HELPFUL TO THE PARTIES. KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY: EUR:WSTABLER  
APPROVED BY: S-LSEAGLEBURGER  
CLEARANCES: P-MR. SISCO, S/S-JPMOFFAT

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 035086

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . General Goodpaster

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Minister of Defense, Athens

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re NATO

CREATION DATE . . . . . 08/15/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200204

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 9

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Cyprus Crisis (38)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/01/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

16-2

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 035087

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Minister of Defense, Athens

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . General Goodpaster

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re NATO

CREATION DATE . . . . . 08/16/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200204


COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 9

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Cyprus Crisis (38)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/01/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR



25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
August 15, 1974

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

CYPRUS



Situation Report Number 5  
(As of 1200 EDT)

(All times cited are Nicosia time, unless otherwise specified.)

GENERAL MILITARY SITUATION

1. The Turkish offensive in the northeastern portion of Cyprus continues to advance. One Turkish column has reached Boghaz on the east coast and another is within two miles of Famagusta. It is not clear whether the Turkish advance is stalled outside of Famagusta or that they intend to limit their operation there to securing the Turkish quarter. Press reports from Ankara claim a continuing advance on Morphou and Lefka in the west, but this has not been confirmed by other sources. Intense fighting has been reported near Nicosia as Turkish forces attempt to dislodge Greek defenders from their positions north of the airport.

DECLASSIFIED w/portions exempted State Dept. Guidelines  
AUTHORITY RAC NLF-CODEWORD-4-19-3-4 9/7/2004  
BY MLO NARA, DATE 3/15/2011





25X1

25X1

Presidential Library Review of DOS Equities is Required

  
TURKISH INTENTIONS2. Reporting 

 continues to support public Turkish claims that their objectives on Cyprus are limited. Latest reports indicate that the Turks intend to take the port area and Turkish quarter of Famagusta, but have no intention of trying to occupy the Greek sectors of that city or the Greek areas of Nicosia. The Turkish military reportedly expects the present operation on Cyprus to be completed before August 17.

3. The Turks also have no plans to widen the conflict  reports that no move will be made against Greek islands in the Aegean unless Greece launches an attack against Turkey. Even if the Greeks attempt to resupply the Greek Cypriots, the Turks are confident that their navy can interdict the effort and there is no plan to use Turkish planes against potential staging areas on Rhodes or Crete.



25X1

FIGHTING ON CYPRUS

4. Turkish columns continued their advance eastward toward Famagusta along three main axes. The northern column passed through Trikomo to Boghaz and is now moving south toward Famagusta. Boghaz is approximately 15 miles north of Famagusta and straddles the coast road between Famagusta and the Karpas Peninsula. It also is the location of a Greek Cypriot naval base.

5. The central column is within three or four miles of Famagusta but appears to be holding back its advance. The southern column has reached Lysi and has stopped its advance short of the British Sovereign Base at Dhekelia. Turkish Cypriots claim that a vanguard of the Turkish force is within the city, but UN representatives have discounted this report. Turkish air strikes on Famagusta have been reported again today.

-2-

  
~~TOP SECRET~~ 

25X1



6. North of the Nicosia airport, Turkish forces assaulted the camp of the regular Greek army contingent based on Cyprus. The attack was repulsed with support from Greek Cypriot artillery batteries located south of the airport. Turkish tanks reportedly are moving up for a renewed assault on the Greek camp.

7. In Nicosia itself, press reports indicate that the cease-fire agreed to by both sides last night has been shattered this morning.

8. Although the Turkish advance toward Morphou and Lefka appears to have stalled, press reports from Ankara claim that the drive toward Morphou is continuing and called for the surrender of the Greek residents of the city. Turkish air strikes were reported at Lefka and Limnitis on the northwest coast this morning.

#### MAINLAND ACTIVITY

9. There has been no indication of any significant changes in the disposition of Greek or Turkish forces on the mainland.

#### SOVIET REACTIONS

10. There has been no change in the status of Soviet military forces in the USSR in response to the fighting on Cyprus.

#### POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

11. Turkish Foreign Minister Guner told reporters in Geneva that he would return to Ankara today, but that he expected peace talks to resume in Geneva within a few days. Guner said that of the two Turkish proposals for Cyprus, the plan that divides the island into two autonomous areas had a better chance than the one calling for several cantons. The first plan provides for an autonomous Turkish Cypriot area that

-3-

~~TOP SECRET~~



25X1

[REDACTED]

would encompass the Turkish quarter of Famagusta in the east and the Turkish quarter of Nicosia in the center, stretching north to the coast. The western limit would have to be fixed, but the Turkish area should include about 34 percent of the island, according to Gunes, although he admitted that figure is negotiable.

12. The mood in Turkey is considerably more relaxed now than it was following the first Turkish move on Cyprus on July 20. The US Consulate in Istanbul reports that there has been no blackout during this round of hostilities as there was before. In addition, the airports in Istanbul and Ankara that were closed when the fighting was renewed are now reported open again.

13. According to press reports, Greek Foreign Minister Mavros has declined an invitation to meet with Secretary Kissinger at this time. Mavros and Prime Minister Karamanlis decided that the Foreign Minister should not leave Athens in view of the tense situation.

14. One press service has reported that a high-ranking Greek government official claimed that Athens has decided to expel US troops from Greece. He reportedly stated that the government is studying the legal aspects of taking over military facilities in Greece now operated by US forces.

15. The US embassy reports that the situation in Greece is calm. There were two small demonstrations in Athens last night, one of which had an anti-US flavor, but the capital was quiet this morning. Many Greeks are observing a four-day holiday, and have traveled to resorts. Air, sea, train and bus traffic is normal.

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]



25X1

16. The Athens press of August 15 reflected two themes: it offered support for Karamanlis' decision to withdraw from NATO, and assigned responsibility for recent developments in Cyprus to the great powers. One press service reports that the leftist-oriented leader Andreas Papandreu arrived in London today and intends to travel to Athens tomorrow.

17. In Nicosia, no further information is available concerning the meeting of Greek Cypriot leaders with President Clerides in Nicosia. Clerides, who called for the meeting to begin at 0800 (EDT), was expected to probe the reaction to possible territorial concessions to the Turks.

LATE ITEM



Greek Foreign Minister Mavros denied today having made any statements concerning an alleged decision of the Greek Government to expel US forces from Greece, according to a press report. Mavros said that US bases in Greece are protected by bilateral agreements, and expressed doubts that such agreements can be broken.



-5-

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 035088

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇReport

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Cyprus Situation

CREATION DATE . . . . . 08/15/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 5 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200204

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 9

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Cyprus Crisis (38)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/01/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

~~SECRET~~

COPY 100 OF 18 COPIES

POK 11/1/74 19



Department of State

TELEGRAM

Z 151213Z AUG 74  
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 5654  
BT

CONTROL: 4112Q  
RECVD: 15 AUG 74  
8:52AM

~~SECRET~~ ANKARA 6549

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, TU, CY, GR  
SUBJECT: CYPRUS

REF ANKARA 6543

1. BRITISH AMBASSADOR HERE WAS INFORMED BY HIS GOVT THAT I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SEEK CLARIFICATIONS RE POSSIBLE SOUTHERN ORIENTED TURK MILITARY OPERATIONS. HE ALSO INSTRUCTED TO SEEK ASSURANCES FROM PRIMIN ON SUBJECT, BUT HAS BEEN ADVISED BY PRIMIN'S OFFICE THAT PRIMIN WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SEE HIM FOR ANOTHER DAY AND ONE-HALF. UK AMBASSADOR URGED ME, UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, TO GIVE HIM SOME INKLING OF PRIMIN'S POSITION ON THIS POINT. I SAID PRIMIN HAD BEEN REASSURING AND THAT WHILE OPERATIONS NOT OVER, IT MY STRONG IMPRESSION THAT TURK OBJECTIVES DID NOT REACH BEYOND A LINE RUNNING GENERALLY FROM NICOSIA TO FAMAGUSTA. I ADDED IT MIGHT JAP A LITTLE HERE AND THERE, SAYING FOR INSTANCE THAT IT MIGHT REACH OUT TO INCLUDE TIMBU. UK COLLEAGUE INDICATED HIS AWARENESS THAT TURKS ALREADY HAD TIMBU, AND THIS KIND OF DEVIATION ALONG THE LINE CAUSED NO REAL DIFFICULTY. IT WAS MAJOR INITIATIVE SOUTH WITH WHICH HIS GOVT WAS CONCERNED.

2. I SAID THAT WITH FALL OF FAMAGUSTA, I EXPECTED TURKISH INTENTIO MIGHT NOW TURN WESTWARD, BUT THE PURPORT OF THE PRIMIN'S CONVERSATION WITH ME WAS WESTWARD, NOT SOUTHWARD.

3. COMMENT: I FELT THAT IF I REFUSED TO GIVE UK COLLEAGUE ANY INKLING OF HOW THE CONVERSATION HAD GONE WITH ECEVIT, THIS COULD HAVE RESULTED IN AN ALARMIST AND UNHELPFUL REPORT GOING TO LONDON. I LEAVE IT TO DEPT'S JUDGMENT WHETHER ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF THIS PORTION OF MY CONVERSATION WITH ECEVIT SHOULD BE REVEALED UK. I MADE NO REFERENCE, OF COURSE, TO OTHER SUBJECTS COVERED IN MY MEETING WITH ECEVIT TODAY.

*State Review*  
NO. 313104

*HC* 313111

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRET

~~SECRET~~

REF ID: A6549

Department of State

TELEGRAM



-2- ANKARA 6549, 15 AUG 74

4. UK COLLEAGUE INTENDS ADVISE LONDON THAT DAY AND ONE-HALF DELAY IN GRANTING REQUEST FOR ECEVIT MEETING COULD BE RESULT OF: A) TURK ANGER WITH THE BRITISH; B) ECEVIT'S GENUINELY HAVING NO DAYLIGHT ON HIS SCHEDULE; OR C) THAT TURKS DO NOT WANT TO TALK WITH UK AGAIN UNTIL ALL THEIR MILITARY OPERATIONS ARE VIRTUALLY COMPLETE. I LEAN TO "A" AND "C".

5. DEPT MAY WISH CONSIDER REPEATING THIS TELE AND REFTTEL 6543 TO LONDON FOR HARIMAN.

MACOMBER

BT  
#6549



~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET, LL

#ZZ  
RNR 849  
CYPRUS-AMERICAN

WASHINGTON, AUG. 15, REUTER, - PRESIDENT FORD TODAY URGED  
TURKEY TO END ITS MILITARY CAMPAIGN ON CYPRUS AND CALLED FOR  
AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE THERE.

MR. FORD MADE HIS APPEAL IN A BRIEF STATEMENT HE ASKED  
WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY JERALY TERHORST TO READ AT A PRESS  
BRIEFING.

THE PRESIDENT, MAKING HIS FIRST PERSONAL COMMENT ON THE  
CYPRUS CRISIS, BACKED CRITICISM YESTERDAY BY THE STATE  
DEPARTMENT OF TURKEYS DECISION TO RENEW HOSTILITIES AFTER THE  
BREAKDOWN OF THE GENEVA PEACE TALKS.

THE STATEMENT READ BY MR. TERHORST WAS:

"THE PRESIDENT WANTS TO CALL ATTENTION TO THE STATEMENT  
YESTERDAY RELEASED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT THE UNITED  
STATES DISAPPROVES OF THE TURKISH MILITARY ACTION ON CYPRUS,  
AND HE STRONGLY URGES IMMEDIATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE RELATIVE  
UNITED NATIONS CEASEFIRE RESOLUTIONS."

MR. FORD CONFERRED THROUGHOUT THE DAY WITH SECRETARY OF  
STATE HENRY KISSINGER ON THE CYPRUS SITUATION, THE FIRST  
FOREIGN POLICY CRISIS TO FACE HIS NEW ADMINISTRATION.

MORE 1407





S(2) -  
 D  
 P  
 T  
 M  
 C  
 S/AM  
 S/PRS  
 S/S(3)  
 S/S-I(RF)  
 S/S-M  
 S/S-O(4)  
 S/S-S  
 EUR  
 EUR/RPM  
 EUR/SE

~~SECRET/EXDIS/NOFORN~~

## Department of State

## Cyprus Task Force

CYPRUSSituation Report No. 4Situation in Cyprus as of 1500 EDT, August 15

H Military Situation in Cyprus: In a public announcement, the  
 INR Turkish General Staff claimed that all the suburbs of  
 IO Famagusta have been taken, the town center surrounded, and  
 NEA the immediate coast brought under full control. It also  
 PA/HO said the Turkish drive to the West was developing speedily.  
 PM Greek Cypriot and Turkish forces continued to exchange fire  
 USIA in and around Nicosia. The Turks continue to surround the  
 A(LDX) Nicosia airport, but the airport itself continues under UN  
 D(LDX) control. The UN commander has asked us to make a demarche  
 A(LDX) in both Athens and Ankara in support of his efforts to  
 H(LDX) restore a ceasefire and standstill in Nicosia.

UN: The Security Council meeting was postponed again until later this afternoon. The Acting Foreign Minister of Cyprus told Ambassador Davies that the Cyprus UN representative Rossides had not been instructed to support the Soviet idea of a special UN mission to Cyprus and expressed surprise when the Ambassador questioned him about Rossides' action.

Greece: Prime Minister Karamanlis will speak to the nation at 10:00 p.m. (1600 Washington time). Athens remained quiet as a four-day weekend began. The airport was open and operating at nearly normal levels. Two orderly demonstrations involving less than one thousand students took place. Leftist leader Andreas Papandreou was reportedly scheduled to return to Athens today. Ambassador Tasca believes the Greek government decided to withdraw from NATO without realizing the full impact of this decision and that a bilateral relationship securing our base rights may be possible.

Turkey: Following a meeting with Ambassador Macomber, Prime Minister Ecevit claimed that the United States accepted a Cyprus state consisting of two autonomous administrations founded on a geographical basis. On this same subject, the Departmental spokesman referred to previous US statements and said that autonomy for Turkish Cypriot communities could be one means of assuring their protection and well being. The

~~SECRET/EXDIS/NOFORN~~

State Review

3/3/64

By HR 5/13/11

Prime Minister added that Turkey "receives" United States policy "with great satisfaction." Turkish airports have been reopened. The only incident to mar a generally quiet atmosphere was a small demonstration outside the British Consulate General in Istanbul. The Turkish press is voicing strong support for the government.

Cyprus: According to Embassy Nicosia, President Clerides did not receive an endorsement from leaders of all Greek Cypriot sectors when he met with them in emergency session. At the same time, no leader explicitly opposed his position that facts must be faced and negotiations with the Turks resumed. Ambassador Davies speculates that those at the meeting were prepared to let Clerides make the difficult decisions he must now make and take the rap for them. Ambassador Davies also commented that the outlook for Cyprus is not encouraging. He thought a ceasefire not likely to hold and that the Turks would face a considerable guerrilla problem.

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_

*S. Hatten*  
Deputy Director of Operations

SCOWCOX7, LL

22

#ZZ

RNR 853

URGENT\*\*\*\*\*CYPRUS--SECOND NIGHTLEAD GREECE  
 (EMBARGOED FOR AUTOMATIC RELEASE AT 4 P.M. EDT TODAY, AUG. 15)  
 ATHENS, AUG. 15, REUTER -- GREECE WILL NOT SEND TROOPS TO  
 CYPRUS, PREMIER CONSTANTINE KARAMANLIS TOLD HIS PEOPLE IN A  
 NATIONWIDE BROADCAST HERE TONIGHT.

MR. KARAMANLIS SAID THE DISTANCE BETWEEN GREECE AND THE  
 EAST MEDITERRANEAN ISLAND WAS SIMPLY TOO GREAT.

CYPRUS IS 500 MILES FROM THE GREEK MAINLAND BUT ONLY 40  
 MILES FROM TURKEY.

THE PREMIER SAID MILITARY INTERVENTION ON THE ISLAND WOULD  
 ENDANGER THE DEFENSE OF GREECE ITSELF.

#ZZ

RNR 857

CYPRUS--SECOND NIGHTLEAD GREECE 3 ATHENS (EMBARGOED)

MR. KARAMANLIS SAID HIS GOVERNMENT, SWORN IN JULY 24, WAS  
 FROM THE OUTSET A PRISONER OF THESE EVENTS.

"IT HAD NO OTHER CHOICE BUT TO GIVE BATTLE ON THE DIPLOMATIC  
 FRONT," HE SAID. "IT GAVE IT WITH COURAGE AND EFFECT. IT  
 SUCCEEDED IN REVERSING WORLD PUBLIC OPINION IN ITS FAVOR."

HE SAID TURKEY HAD VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE U.N.  
 SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND THE DECISIONS OF THE GENEVA  
 PEACE CONFERENCE.

IN AN APPARENT CRITICISM OF THE UNITED STATES, THE PREMIER  
 SAID, "TURKEY EMBARKED ON THESE MISERABLE ACTS WITH THE  
 TOLERANCE OF THOSE WHO SHOULD AND COULD HAVE HALTED THEM."

#RNR 867

CYPRUS--SECOND NIGHTLEAD GREECE 6 ATHENS (EMBARGOED)

THE PREMIER SAID GREECE WAS NOT EXHAUSTED BY MEASURES  
 TAKEN SO FAR AND SAID THE COUNTRY WOULD SURVIVE "THE DIFFICULT  
 HOURS."

"YOU CAN REST ASSURED THAT BY HEALING THE ERRORS AND  
 WEAKNESSES WE INHERITED FROM THE SINFUL PAST, WE WILL MAKE  
 GREECE ABLE AGAIN TO RECTIFY THE INJUSTICE IT HAS SUFFERED AND,  
 WHAT IS MORE PERMANENT, WE WILL LAY THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A NEW  
 NATIONAL LIFE WHICH WILL GIVE HAPPINESS AND HOPE TO ALL  
 GREEKS," HE CONCLUDED.

EARLIER TODAY, GREECE REPORTEDLY REJECTED AN INVITATION  
 FROM SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER FOR FOREIGN MINISTER  
 GEORGE MAVROS TO COME TO WASHINGTON TO DISCUSS THE CYPRUS  
 CRISIS.

THE REJECTION WAS TAKEN AS A SIGNAL THAT ATHENS FEELS THE  
 UNITED STATES HAS NOT DONE ENOUGH TO CURB TURKEYS TERRITORIAL  
 APPETITE.

MEANWHILE, AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES...7TH GRAF RNR 837.

REUTER 1501



OP IMMED  
ESA399ATA386  
DE RUQMAT #5711 2271540  
O 151535Z AUG 74  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4931

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3453  
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 2906  
USNATO IMMEDIATE 1843

UNCLAS ATHENS 5711

EQ 11652 NA  
TAGS: PFOR, NATO, PINTS, GR, TU, CY  
SUBJ: CARAMANLIS ADDRESS

1. GOG JUST ANNOUNCED PRIME MINISTER CARAMANLIS WILL SPEAK TO GREEK NATION ABOUT PRESENT CRISIS AT 10 PM ATHENS TIME. NATIONAL RADIO/TV WILL CARRY MESSAGE LIVE. WILL REPORT IN DUE COURSE.  
TASCA  
BT



\*\*\*\*\*WHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

SCOWCROFT,LL

PSN:023929 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:227/17:09Z DTG:151535Z AUG 74

WH 24

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: August 15, 1974

SUBJECT: Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS: Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for  
Political Affairs  
Robert M. McCloskey, Ambassador at Large  
Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary, EUR  
William B. Buffum, Assistant Secretary, IO  
Wells Stabler, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR  
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Executive Assistant to  
the Secretary  
Edward P. Djerejian, Special Assistant to Mr. Sisco

TIME AND PLACE: 4:30 p.m., Secretary's Office

KISSINGER: We should do another letter to Karamanlis. I have a call in to Ecevit to stop the military operations. I want a message out tonight and a Presidential message tomorrow to Karamanlis inviting him to a meeting with Ecevit and me somewhere in Europe. We made a mistake in not telling Karamanlis everything we had done to try to stop the Turks. We ought to do a letter to Karamanlis indicating that we realize his concerns; that we thought it most effective to deal with the Turks without publicity. Refer to the White House statement and my message to Mavros and tell him about my call to Ecevit. We must show him that we have done something. Later we can send a Presidential letter which proposes the meeting.

SISCO: I think it needs delay.

KISSINGER: It's coming out about right. They needed a fall guy.

SISCO: Tomorrow evening is about right, if the military operation goes on as we guessed. The matter has been decided on the ground though there are broader considerations in seeing the Secretary of State.

<sup>WJ</sup>  
P:EPDjerejian:bdf  
(Drafting Office and Officer)

NO. 5/13/11  
FRUS  
HR



KISSINGER: The Soviets have proposed a joint initiative with the U.S. which involves a joint guarantee of the outcome of the negotiations and joint intervention in the case of war according to the agreement. I told them that if they interpreted the agreement in this manner, we would have to abrogate it.

We don't have to have a meeting until the end of next week or even the beginning of the following week. Sooner or later the Greeks will have to give up. The best solution would be to have the Turks give up 10 percent of the 30 percent of the territory they have physically occupied.

You (Stabler) should draft a letter to Karamanlis. Make it an account of what we have done before. Include that the situation on Cyprus was lost by the previous Greek Government. Short of military intervention, which our domestic and other factors could not permit, we did what we could. They can count on our good will. Ecevit has assured us they will not move below this southern line. Refer to our public statements. If he gives us an answer by noon, we can decide on a Presidential initiative later on in the day.

BUFFUM: Concerning the situation at the UN, minimal action will be a reaffirmation of the previous resolutions on the ceasefire. The maximum would be the French draft which is being circulated. It formally disapproves of the Turkish action, affirms the ceasefire and the resumption of the negotiations. This text has been opposed by the representatives from the Moslem countries because of the specific reference to Turkey.

KISSINGER: But the Turks can give us trouble in the next Middle East war. We have to be careful not to get too far separated from the Turks. Do the Turks in New York know we are holding back? Do they know we are not leading any crusade?

SISCO: They are abundantly aware of our position.

BUFFUM: There was a Soviet effort to get peace efforts reconvened under the Secretary General.

KISSINGER: How cynical can you get. I told Waldheim that if I can't turn over an island to you and you can't keep it peaceful, what problem can I hand you? (Laughter)

EAGLEBURGER: He doesn't have a sense of humor.

KISSINGER: I told him he had the third largest military force in the non-Communist world. He didn't catch the humor of it.

If we can get agreement for a meeting in Washington, then President Ford can join Ecevit, Karamanlis and myself. At this meeting we can establish guidelines for a reconvened Geneva conference. I am persuaded that Callaghan does not know how to do these things himself. He should have taken a more neutral position and put concrete proposals on the table.

HARTMAN: I told him to have the proposals put forward.

KISSINGER: In all of our Middle East negotiations our proposals were always put forward at the right time to have the parties focus on something. Callaghan should have sent someone around to the capitals--a senior representative. The Greeks went to Geneva with the idea of the British backing them and with the idea that they could depend on the British. To reach a stalemate in 48 hours after the conference is convened is a sign of incompetence. If Callaghan had gotten Clerides to put something forward, then he could have built on this.

HARTMAN: Clerides had a deal with Karamanlis that once Clerides told him what his minimum position was, Karamanlis would support him.

KISSINGER: Why didn't he do it?

BUFFUM: He has no experience. He was dealing in these negotiations like it was a trade union meeting.

KISSINGER: Time and again I called him and he didn't know what he was going to put forward, like the 5 kilometer proposal. He should have seen himself as the agent of the Greeks and had them face the facts of life. Karamanlis is seen as selling out Greek interests against the British. That sort of strategy he never discussed with us. Callaghan was pushing for a meeting on the 8th of August. The Turks wanted the 12th or 14th. If he had any sense, the later the better. He focused on minor ceasefire violations.

HARTMAN: He is the head of the party and had electoral factors in mind. He had only two days before the elections.

KISSINGER: If he had sent a senior British representative to the interested parties who could put forward proposals... I was naive in thinking that when he didn't want a senior officer there, he had a plan for a strategy and a position of his own with some agreement of both the sides. We will not be that quiet any more. Anytime it blows up, we get the blame. He doesn't have the fire power to control this situation. When the Soviets propose joint action, we are running against time because they will be raising this the next time again. Dobrynin told me that he stopped the note on Monday but you can frustrate this thing only so long.

STABLER: I would like to raise the problem of the Lash Espana and Lash Italia. The information DOD gave you at the WSAG this morning on their control over the ship is not correct. The ship is controlled by its owner who wants the ship to pass Piraeus and then go on to Turkey. If the ship goes by, then it will put us in a difficult position with the Greeks.

KISSINGER: What is your solution?

STABLER: If the ship can be sent to Brindisi in Italy and offload the military equipment there, it would help matters.

KISSINGER: I agree.





~~SECRET~~

COPY 17 OF 18 COPIES

25



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WH/000

Z 151640Z AUG 74  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9502  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ NICOSIA 2379

CONTROL: 4181Q  
RECVD: 15 AUG 74  
1:36PM

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR CY TU GR  
SUBJECT: CYPRUS

*State Review*  
NO. 313104  
5/13/11

REF: STATE 178628

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

1. I SAW CLERIDES SHORTLY AFTER 5:00 P.M. ON CONCLUSION OF HIS MEETING WITH POLITICAL ELEMENTS, WHICH I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY.
2. I DELIVERED YOUR ORAL MESSAGE FOR WHICH HE EXPRESSED GREAT APPRECIATION. HE SAID HE KNOWS THE STRENUOUS EFFORTS YOU MADE BOTH DIRECTLY AND IN SUPPORT OF CALLAGHAN TO AVOID FURTHER MILITARY ACTION BY THE TURKS.
3. CLERIDES FELT AT THIS JUNCTURE GREATEST SERVICE U.S. COULD PERFORM WAS TO BRING ABOUT RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS IN SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME.
4. HE WANTS YOU TO KNOW THAT WHILE IN ATHENS LAST NIGHT HE TOLD THE GREEKS HE WANTED NATIONAL GUARD COMMANDER KARAYIANNIS INSTRUCTED TO PULL FORCES OUT OF ALL AREAS BEHIND THE LINES CITED BY GUNES AT GENEVA, USING MILITARY FORCE ONLY IN CASES WHERE IT IS NECESSARY TO PERMIT ORDERLY RETIREMENT. HE HOPES THIS WILL LEAD TO AN END TO TURKISH MILITARY ACTION AND PROMPT RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS.
5. CLERIDES SAYS HE IS WILLING TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS WITH TACIT UNDERSTANDING THE HE RECOGNIZES THE REALITY OF TURKISH MILITARY POWER AND LIKELIHOOD THEY WILL RETAIN CONTROL OF AREA THEY HAVE OCCUPIED. HE CANNOT HOWEVER BE PUT INTO POSITION PUBLICLY OF GOING TO THE TABLE IN ORDER SIGN FAIT ACCOMPLI. NOR CAN HE GO WITH A SHORT FUSE IN TERMS OF A



~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NODIS  
S  
NODIS  
S  
NODIS  
S

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

-2- NICOSIA 2379, 15 AUG 74

DEADLINE FOR AGREEMENT. HE MUST BE SEEN TO BE GOING FOR A GIVE AND TAKE, ALTHOUGH HE REALIZES THAT IN THE END TURKISH TERMS AS OUTLINED IN GENEVA ARE LIKELY TO BE THE BEST HE CAN GET. HE PLEDGES THAT HE WOULD NEGOTIATE FOR SETTLEMENT AND NOT FOR PURPOSE OF DELAYING THE INEVITABLE.

6. HE MENTIONED THAT AT JUST CONCLUDED MEETING LYSSARIDES, THE BISHOPS AND ESEA WERE THE MOST VOCAL IN CALLS FOR NO SURRENDER, NO NEGOTIATION AND FIGHT TO THE DEATH. HE FELT HOWEVER THERE WAS A LARGE SILENT MINORITY WHICH WAS PREPARED TO FACE REALITY. THERE WERE ALMOST 100,000 GREEK CYPRIOT REFUGEES, ECONOMIC DISLOCATION WILL QUICKLY LEAD TO CHAOS AND TURKS MAY NOT BE SATISFIED WITH WHAT THEY NOW HOLD. THERE IS NO QUESTION IN HIS MIND ABOUT THE RIGHTNESS OF SEEKING IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS AND HE HOPES THAT YOU CAN ASSIST IN BRINGING THESE TO PASS.

DAVIES

BT  
#2379



~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NON-SECRET

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 035089

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇReport

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Cyprus Situation

CREATION DATE . . . . . 08/15/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 7 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200204

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 9

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Cyprus Crisis (38)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/01/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

OP IMMED  
E6A5280GA637  
DE RUGHOG #2383 2271745  
O 151734Z AUG 74  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9586

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 4172

~~SECRET~~ NICOSIA 2383

EXDIS  
E.O. 11852: GDS  
TAGS: PINT PFOR CY  
SUBJECT: TURKISH CLAIMS OF U.S. SUPPORT

1. GLAFKOS CLDRIDES TOLD ME FOLLOWING HIS THREE HOURS OF GIVE AND TAKE AT AN EMERGENCY CONFERENCE WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL SECTORS OF THE GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY THAT HE WAS BADDGERED CONTINUALLY BY ASSERTIONS THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD NOW FULLY ENDORSED TURKEY'S CLAIMS.

2. CLERIDES SAID RADIO BAYRAK AND TURKISH INFORMATIONAL MEDIA ARE REPEATING AN ALLEGED STATEMENT BY PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT AFTER MEETING WITH AMB. MACOMBER THAT QUOTE U.S. HAS ACCEPTED THE FACT THAT A CYPRUS STATE FORMED OF TWO GEOGRAPHICALLY BASED AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATIONS WOULD BE THE MOST SATISFACTORY AND LASTING SOLUTION. UNQUOTE.

3. I KNOW WE CANNOT CONTROL STATEMENTS BY THIRD PARTIES BUT URGE THAT WE DO NOT GO PUBLICALLY BEYOND THE POSITION SO WELL OUTLINED BY AMB MACLOSKEY IN HIS AUG 14. BACKGROUNDER. TEMPERS ARE GETTING UGLY HERE. AS I DROVE OFF CLERIDES' TEMPORARY HEADQUARTERS GUN-TOTTING RETAINERS OF ASSEMBLED LEADERSHIP WERE SHOUTING THEIR CONGRATULATIONS ON THE SUCCESS OF AMERICAN PLANNING.

DAVIES  
BT



*State Review*  
*3/3/04*  
*5/13/11*

\*\*\*\*\* WHSR COMMENT \*\*\*\*\*

SCOWCROFT, LL

PSN:024112 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:227/20:13Z DTG:151734Z AUG 74

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 035090

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇReport

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Cyprus Situation

CREATION DATE . . . . . 08/15/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200204

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 9

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Cyprus Crisis (38)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/01/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

W.H. 29

**Memorandum of Conversation**

DATE: August 15, 1974

SUBJECT: Cyprus

**PARTICIPANTS:** Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State  
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for  
Political Affairs  
Robert J. McCloskey, Ambassador at Large  
William B. Buffum, Assistant Secretary, IO  
Wells Stabler, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR  
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Executive Assistant  
to the Secretary  
Edward P. Djerejian, Special Assistant to Mr. Sisco

TIME AND PLACE: 6:30 p.m., Secretary's Office

EAGLEBURGER: Why can't Bob McCloskey make a public statement?

SISCO: Because the achievement of a ceasefire is not going to be seen as a U.S. achievement, especially since they are going to clear out a lot of pockets.

STABLER: Let's tell the Greeks we have done this, if Ecevit indeed keeps his word.

MCCLOSKEY: I am not for our announcing it.

KISSINGER: If we informed Waldheim and Athens.

MCCLOSKEY: Let it come from Ankara overnight.

KISSINGER: What do we do at the United Nations?

STABLER: The Austrians have asked for a delay and insist that the parties be asked to pledge that they cooperate with UNFICYP in accordance with Resolution 353.

SISCO: The question of precedent as it relates to the Middle East is not germane. We can buy it if it comes to that.

P:EPDjerejian.bdf

(Drafting Office and Officer) WJ

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

State Review  
3/3/04  
By: HR 5/13/11

KISSINGER: What is the sense of calling them to tell them they will stop fighting tomorrow? We can say we consider it an undertaking of the GOT and will take all measures that they stick to it.

SISCO: We should write a telegram immediately and tell the Greeks.

KISSINGER: Then let's wake up Karamanlis.

SISCO: You get more credit with the Greeks.

BUFFUM: We should tell Waldheim. On the Austrian proposal, it requires more than the Turks can deliver. It is a new innovation on UN procedures and I don't know if the Arabs and Israelis will like this.

KISSINGER: Shall I call Karamanlis on the phone?

BUFFUM: It would have a bigger impact. What about the British?

EAGLEBURGER: You don't lose anything by calling.

(Kissinger placed a call to Karamanlis.)

KISSINGER: Whom do we notify and when?

SISCO: The British, the UN Secretary General and Clerides.

(The Secretary placed a call to the President.)

KISSINGER: Can we do a message to Clerides? Also, I want to call Sauvagnargues.

SISCO: What about the Russians?

KISSINGER: No.

INGERSOLL: NATO?

KISSINGER: No.

BUFFUM: How well will Karamanlis react if he knows how long the operations will last? You can tell him how reluctantly Ecevit agreed to stop the operations.

KISSINGER: That wouldn't fool him.

SISCO: That's why I don't want to make a public announcement.

KISSINGER: I am convinced of that.

SISCO: You have the responsibility to tell the Greeks this.

KISSINGER: Send Ecevit a message that we informed the Greeks and the Secretary General and that we expect that it will be carried out. Also, get a message to Ambassador Irwin that he can pass to Sauvagnargues. Larry (Eagleburger), you call Callaghan's man.





NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 035091

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇTelegram

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Cyprus

CREATION DATE . . . . . 08/15/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 11 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200204

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 9

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Cyprus Crisis (38)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/01/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

\*\*\*\*\*

~~SECRET~~

\*\*\*\*\*S COPY

OP IMMED  
ESA458ATA427  
DE RUQMAT #5713 2272030  
O 152025Z AUG 74  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4932

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 5713

EXDIS  
E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFDR GR CY  
SUBJ: KARAHANLIS RESPONSE TO KISSINGER MESSAGE

1. FOREIGN MINISTRY SYG AMBASSADOR VLACHOS PHONED AT NOON TODAY TO SAY HE WOULD GIVE ME PM'S RESPONSE AT 1900 LOCAL TIME BUT CALLED LATER IN DAY TO POSTPONE UNTIL NOON AUGUST 16.

2. LOCAL AND FOREIGN NEWS CORRESPONDENTS TELL US MEANTIME THEY HAVE LEARNED FROM "AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES" THAT FM MAVROS HAS DECLINED INVITATION TO VISIT WASHINGTON TO DISCUSS CYPRUS PROBLEM. TASCA  
BT

~~SECRET~~  
NO. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFDR GR CY  
SUBJ: KARAHANLIS RESPONSE TO KISSINGER MESSAGE  
ED. HR NARA. ID# 5713/11



\*\*\*\*\* \*WHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

~~Z~~ SCOWCROFT, LL

PSN:024002 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:227/18:43Z DTG:152025Z AUG 74

\*\*\*\*\*

~~SECRET~~

\*\*\*\*\*S COPY

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 035092

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇCable

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Cyprus

CREATION DATE . . . . . 08/15/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200204

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 9

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Cyprus Crisis (38)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/01/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 4 2 8 9 Q

Z 152359Z AUG 74 ZFFM  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA FLASH 6330  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ STATE 179770

NODIS

E.O. 11652: [unclear]  
TAGS: PFOR [unclear]  
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR AMBASSADOR DAVIES FROM THE SECRETARY

FOR AMBASSADOR DAVIES FROM THE SECRETARY

1. PLEASE INFORM CLERIDES OF THE FOLLOWING ORALLY FROM THE SECRETARY:

2. AS CLERIDES KNOWS, WE HAVE BEEN IN INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH ECEVIT WITH A VIEW TO PRESSING GOT TO STOP ITS MILITARY OPERATION IMMEDIATELY IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. AFTER PERSISTENT INTERVENTIONSON OUR PART, WE HAVE RECEIVED ASSURANCE FROM ECEVIT THAT TURKISH MILITARY OPERATIONS WILL HALT AT 12:00 NOON, WASHINGTON TIME, FRIDAY.

3. YOU SHOULD ALSO INFORM CLERIDES THAT AT THE SAME TIME WE ARE REDOUBLING OUR EFFORTS TO GET A SERIOUS NEGOTIATING PROCESS STARTED, LOOKING TOWARDS A SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS OF GREECE, TURKEY, CYPRUS AND THE CYPRIOI PEOPLE.

4. SECRETARY GREATLY APPRECIATES CLERIDES POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE ON THE QUESTIONS OF NEGOTIATIONS.

KISSINGER

PAJJSISCOIDD  
8/33/74  
S - THE SECRETARY

B/S: MR. GANNON

RECEIVED  
NO. [unclear]  
BY HR 5/13/11

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 035093

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇReport

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Cyprus Situation; 2 copies of report

CREATION DATE . . . . . 08/15/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200204

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 9

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Cyprus Crisis (38)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/01/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 035094

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇReport

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Cyprus Situation

CREATION DATE . . . . . 08/15/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200204

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 9

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Cyprus Crisis (38)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/01/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 035095

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇReport

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Cyprus Situation

CREATION DATE . . . . . 08/15/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200204

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 9

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Cyprus Crisis (38)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/01/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR