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Department of State

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 3 2 7 4 Q

Z O 130014Z AUG 74 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUHQGV/USMISSION GENEVA FLASH 4300
INFO RUONGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA NIACT IMMEDIATE 7953
RUQMGG/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA NIACT IMMEDIATE 6276
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS NIACT IMMEDIATE 7264
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 176389

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, CY, TU, GR
SUBJECT: CYPRUS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARTMAN

1. ON BASIS OF HARTMAN-STABLER CONVERSATION (SUBSEQUENTLY REPORTED IN GENEVA 5199), SECRETARY TELEPHONED ECEVIT TO EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT REPORTS ON STATE OF PLAY IN GENEVA. HE TOLD ECEVIT WE WOULD SUPPORT A MEETING TONIGHT IF THAT WERE POSSIBLE, BUT THAT HE HOPED THAT GUNES WOULD PRESENT THE TURKISH PROPOSAL IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT DID NOT SOUND LIKE AN ULTIMATUM. HE ASSUMED THAT GUNES WOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO GIVE A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF TIME FOR REFLECTION ON THE TURKISH PROPOSAL. ECEVIT INDICATED THAT HE WOULD DO SO, ALTHOUGH HE COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS BEING USED BY THE OTHER PARTIES AS A DELAYING TACTIC.

2. SUBSEQUENTLY, SECRETARY CALLED CALLAGHAN IN GENEVA AND EXPLAINED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO FORMAL US PROPOSAL TO THE TURKS OVER THE WEEKEND. SECRETARY SAID ECEVIT HAD TOLD HIM HE WANTED TO TABLE A TAKE-IT-OR-LEAVE-IT PROPOSAL AT A GENEVA MEETING MONDAY NIGHT, BUT HE HAD PERSUADED ECEVIT TURKS SHOULD WAIT FOR "REASONABLE TIME--24-36 HOURS" TO GET RESPONSE TO THEIR PROPOSAL. CALLAGHAN SAID NAVROS HAD INSTRUCTIONS FROM ATHENS NOT TO HOLD MEETING TONIGHT SO THAT TURKISH PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE TO BE PRESENTED TUESDAY

~~SECRET~~ State Review
NO. 3/3104

BY HA 5/12/11 ~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~
Department of State

TELEGRAM

-2- STATE 176389, 13AUG '74

MORNING. A MAVROS/CLERIDES COUNTERPROPOSAL WOULD BE GIVEN TO THE TURKS TUESDAY EVENING.

3. IN RESPONSE TO SECRETARY'S QUESTION, CALLAGHAN SAID COUNTERPROPOSAL WOULD NECESSARILY BE GENERAL NATURE BECAUSE CLERIDES CANNOT AT THIS TIME ATTEMPT TO RETURN TO CYPRUS WITH SPECIFIC PROPOSAL ON ZONES. THEREFORE, COUNTERPROPOSAL MIGHT ACCEPT GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF GEOGRAPHIC SEPARATION, BUT OMIT DETAILS. CALLAGHAN THOUGHT COUNTERPROPOSAL MIGHT ALLOW FOR 2-3 WEEK PERIOD IN WHICH TO WORK OUT DETAILS. CALLAGHAN ALSO INDICATED HE WAS WILLING TO GO TO ANKARA IF SECRETARY THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO GIVE TURKS HIS ASSESSMENT THAT, WITH TIME, AGREEMENT POSSIBLE AT GENEVA. SECRETARY AGREED TO CONSIDER THIS IDEA.

4. SECRETARY LATER CALLED ECEVIT BACK TO INDICATE THAT A MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE TUESDAY MORNING WITH RESPONSE FROM OTHER SIDE BY LATE TUESDAY NIGHT. SECRETARY TOLD ECEVIT OF CALLAGHAN'S ASSESSMENT THAT CLERIDES UNABLE TO AGREE TO ANYTHING BEYOND GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION WITHOUT PRECISE DELINEATION. ECEVIT RESPONDED THAT A MAJOR PROBLEM FOR TURKS WAS THAT GREEKS (PRESUMABLY NATIONAL GUARD) FORTIFYING AREA AROUND ZONE CURRENTLY OCCUPIED BY TURKS. IF GREEKS WERE WILLING TO WITHDRAW A "REASONABLE DISTANCE" FROM LINES OF AREA NOW OCCUPIED BY THEM, TURKS COULD CONSIDER DELAYING ACTION A FEW DAYS. IN RESPONSE TO SECRETARY'S INQUIRY, ECEVIT DEFINED REASONABLE DISTANCE AS 20 KMS. WITH SUCH A WITHDRAWAL, SAID ECEVIT, TURKISH MILITARY PEOPLE WOULD BE "MORE AT REST". SECRETARY ASKED ECEVIT IF TURKS WOULD AGREE NOT TO MOVE FORWARD IF GREEKS WITHDREW. ECEVIT RESPONDED, "DEFINITELY".

5. SECRETARY THEN INFORMED CALLAGHAN OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH ECEVIT, INCLUDING TURKISH PROPOSAL FOR WITHDRAWAL. CALLAGHAN AGREED THAT WHILE 20 KMS. WAS TOO GREAT A DISTANCE, AT LEAST IT GAVE HIM SOMETHING TO WORK WITH. CALLAGHAN AGREED HE WOULD TRY TO GET THE GREEKS AND



~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~
Department of State

TELEGRAM

-3- STATE 176389, 13 AUG '74

CYPRIOIS TO AGREE TO A WITHDRAWAL OF PERHAPS 10 KMS. ACCOMPANIED BY AN ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF A CANTONAL ARRANGEMENT. CALLAGHAN MIGHT THEN TRAVEL TO ANKARA TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS OF OVERALL SOLUTION WITH THE TURKS.
KISSINGER

EUR:WSTABLER:EMT
8/12/74:21010
S - THE SECRETARY

P - MR. SISCO

|S/S - WHLUERS



~~SECRET~~

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 3 2 7 0 Q

Z 130015Z AUG 74 ZFF6
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS FLASH 7263
 INFO RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA FLASH 4299
 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA NIACT IMMEDIATE 7952
 RUQMQG/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA NIACT IMMEDIATE 6275
 BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 176390

NODIS

State Review
 3/31/04
 BY 42 5/12/11

E.O. 11652: GDS
 TAGS: PFOR, CY, GR, TU
 SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

FROM THE SECRETARY FOR THE AMBASSADOR
 GENEVA FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARTMAN

1. PLEASE DELIVER IMMEDIATELY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
 ME TO PRIME MINISTER KARAMANLIS:

BEGIN QUOTE DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

IT IS, I THINK, MOST IMPORTANT THAT WE REMAIN IN CLOSE
 TOUCH AS THE NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA CONTINUE THEIR WORK. I
 HAVE RECEIVED FULL REPORTS FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARTMAN
 OF THE SITUATION AND, IN PARTICULAR, THE USEFUL TALKS HE
 HAS HAD WITH FOREIGN MINISTER MAVROS.

I AM CONVINCED THAT A SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS QUESTION MUST
 BE FOUND WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS,
 AND I HAVE RECENTLY DIRECTED MY EFFORTS AT DISCOURAGING
 UNILATERAL MOVES OF ANY NATURE WHICH MIGHT COMPROMISE THESE
 NEGOTIATIONS. IT HAS BEEN MY VIEW FROM
 THE BEGINNING THAT IT IS ONLY THROUGH A CONSENSUS OF THE

PARTIES THAT A SETTLEMENT WHICH WE CAN ALL SUPPORT WILL
 EMERGE. IT MUST BE ONE PERCEIVED BY ALL CONCERNED AS PRO-
 TECTING THEIR LEGITIMATE INTERESTS. THERE ARE, OF COURSE,
 NEW REALITIES IN THE CYPRUS SITUATION PRODUCED IN PART BY
 THE PREVIOUS GREEK GOVERNMENT.

~~SECRET~~

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Department of State

-2 - STATE 176390, 13 AUG '74

I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I HAVE SPOKEN TO PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT TO MAKE THE POINT -- WHICH I ALSO MAKE TO YOU -- THAT IT IS IMPORTANT FOR BOTH SIDES TO APPROACH NEGOTIATIONS ON SUCH A KEY ISSUE AS CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN A FLEXIBLE MANNER.

I AM FULLY CONSCIOUS OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH YOUR GOVERNMENT FACES, AND I WANT YOU TO KNOW AGAIN OF MY ADMIRATION FOR THE STATESMANLIKE WAY YOU HAVE APPROACHED THEM. I ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THE MORE RAPIDLY THE CYPRUS QUESTION CAN BE PUT BEHIND US, THE BETTER YOUR GOVERNMENT CAN MOVE FORWARD WITH REGARD TO OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES. WE, FOR OUR PART, ALSO WOULD LIKE TO HAVE AN EARLY SOLUTION AND IT IS TOWARD THIS END THAT WE STAND READY TO BE AS HELPFUL AS WE CAN TO GREECE AND THE OTHER PARTIES AS THEY SEEK A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

GREECE IS A VALUED ALLY OF THE UNITED STATES. IT IS A SOURCE OF GREAT SATISFACTION TO US THAT WE STAND UNITED WITH GREECE IN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IN OUR DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE FREE WORLD. IT IS, THEREFORE, INCUMBENT ON ALL THE ALLIES TO REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS TO RESTORE THE STABILITY OF THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND TO DEPRIVE THE SOVIETS OF ANY PRETEXT TO ENCROACH FURTHER IN THIS AREA. YOU MAY BE SURE, MR. PRIME MINISTER, THAT I HAVE EXXPRESSED THESE SAME SENTIMENTS TO OUR TURKISH ALLIES AND HAVE ENCOURAGED THEM TO MAKE THEIR FULL CONTRIBUTION TOWARD A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. WARM REGARDS, HENRY A. KISSINGER. END QUOTE. KISSINGER

EUR:WSTABLER:EMT
8/12/74:21010
S - THE SECRETARY

P - MR. SISCO

| S/S - WHLUERS





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

Z 130755Z AUG 74
 FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
 TO SECSTATE WAHDC FLASH 4877
 BT
~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 5606

CONTROL: 3 3 2 8 Q

Recd : 13 Aug
 04:34 A.M.

NODIS

DEPT PASS GENEVA FLASH ANKARA AND NICOSIA AS IMMEDIATE
 FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR

GENEVA FOR HARTMAN

E.O. 11652: GDS
 TAGS: PFOR GR TU CY
 SUBJ: MESSAGE FOR KARAMANLIS

State Review
 31364
 5/12/11

REF STATE 176390

1. I DELIVERED YOUR MESSAGE TO KARAMANLIS AT 6:30 THIS MORNING (LOCAL TIME). DURING HOUR AND FORTY-FIVE MINUTE DISCUSSION OF SITUATION KARAMANLIS CLEARLY INDICATED THAT TURKISH POWER TACTICS IN GENEVA AND ON CYPRUS WERE DRIVING GREEKS TO THE WALL. FOR REASONS WE KNEW, KARAMANLIS WAS ANXIOUS TO FIND COMPROMISE SOLUTION TO CYPRUS PROBLEM WHICH WOULD GIVE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY GREATER AUTONOMY. HE COULD NOT RPT NOT HOWEVER ACCEPT TURKISH ULTIMATUM OR ANY SETTLEMENT IMPOSED BY TURKEY WHICH HUMILIATED GREECE. IF TURKS PERSISTED IN TAKE-IT-OR-LEAVE-IT ATTITUDE, GREEK GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO LEAVE IT WITH ALL THIS IMPLIED FOR GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS AND EASTERN FLANK OF NATO. KARAMANLIS SAID THAT HE HAD TRIED TO BE AS FLEXIBLE AS POSSIBLE. GREEK ACTIONS OVER WEEKEND RELATED TO TURKISH ENCLAVES WERE LATEST EXAMPLE. ONLY RESULT OF HIS CONCESSIONS APPEARED TO BE INCREASED TURKISH INTRANSIGENCE. GREECE WAS REACHING POINT OF NO RETURN IN ITS RELATIONS WITH TURKEY. IT WAS CONVICTION OF KARAMANLIS THAT ONLY THING THAT COULD SAVE SITUATION WAS DIRECT AND FORCEFUL AMERICAN PRESSURE ON TURKISH GOVERNMENT TO ADOPT MORE FLEXIBLE AND FAR-SIGHTED POLICY. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES MAVROS COULD REMAIN IN GENEVA, THERE WOULD BE TIME FOR TERMPERS TO COOL, AND SOME SORT OF INTERCOMMUNAL ARRANGEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES MIGHT BE ACHIEVED. IF TURKS PRESSED ON, HOWEVER,

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

-2- ATHENS 5 6 0 6

GREECE WOULD HAVE TO DEFEND ITS HONOR, ITS RIGHTS AND ITS SECURITY, EVEN WHILE RECOGNIZING DESTRUCTIVE EFFECTS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY WOULD HAVE ON OUR COMMON SECURITY AND INTERESTS IN THE AREA.

2. FULL REPORT OF MY CONVERSATION WITH KARAMANLIS FOLLOWS BY FLASH SEPTEL. TASCA



~~SECRET~~

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SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~



Z 130940Z AUG 74
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4878
BT
~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 5608

CONTROL: 3348Q
RECD : AUGUST 13, 1974
6:35 A.M.

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR CY GR TU
SUBJ: MESSAGE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

State Review
NO. 313/04
5/12/11

REF STATE 176390

1. I DELIVERED YOUR MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER CARAMANLIS AT 0615 THIS MORNING. UPON READING THE MESSAGE CAREFULLY HE SAID THAT THE US WAS PERFECTLY AWARE THAT GOG HAD BEEN AS REASONABLE AND FLEXIBLE AS THEY POSSIBLY COULD BE. HE ADDED EMPHATICALLY THAT KEY TO PEACE OR WAR WAS IN ANKARA. CARAMANLIS TOOK POSITION WHICH HE REPEATED MANY TIMES THAT US COULD ACT EFFECTIVELY IF IT WISHED TO MAKE TURKS UNDERSTAND THEY MUST BE REASONABLE. REASONABLE GREEK POSTURE HAD ONLY INDUCED TURKS TO RAISE THE ANTI. HE KNEW TURKS AND TURKISH PSYCHOLOGY. TURKS FEEL THEY HAVE WON AND INSTEAD OF BECOMING MORE REASONABLE, THEY ARE ASKING FOR MORE AND BECOMING MORE INTRANSIGENT. HE REFERRED IN THIS CONTEXT TO ANKARA'S UNILATERAL EXTENSION OF FLIGHT INFORMATION REGION (FIR) AS INDICATION OF TURKISH ATTITUDE AND GRAVE PROBLEM IT CREATED FOR HIM. YESTERDAY MORNING CONTRARY TO ADVICE OF MAVROS AND HIS DELEGATION, HE HAD AUTHORIZED CONCESSIONS ON ENCLAVES, EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS, AND FOOD FOR ISOLATED TURKISH COMMUNITIES. TURKISH RESPONSE WAS ULTIMATUM LAST EVENING THAT GREEKS ACCEPT TURKISH TERMS. GREEKS COULD NEVER ACCEPT ULTIMATUM BY TURKEY. CONTINUATION OF TURKISH PRESSURE WOULD FORCE HIM TO RESIGN WITH RESULTING CHAOS IN GREECE, OR GO TO WAR. THE U.S. WOULD BE PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OUTBREAK OF WAR BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES BECAUSE IT HAD FAILED TO TAKE MEASURES BEYOND WORDS, WHICH CLEARLY HAD NOT IMPRESSED THE TURKS, TO MAKE THE TURKS UNDERSTAND WITH MATERIAL MEASURES THAT IT MEANT WHAT IT SAID WHEN IT WISHED FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF ALL. HE CHIDED THE BRITISH FOR INACTION WHEN THEY HAD THE MATERIAL MEANS ON THE ISLAND TO STOP THE TURKS. CARAMANLIS INDICATED THAT WHAT HE CONTEMPLATED WAS SENDING TROOPS TO CYPRUS, WHICH WAS GREECE'S

~~SECRET~~

Z 130940Z AUG 74



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~



-2- ATHENS 5608

RIGHT UNDER THE LONDON-ZURICH AGREEMENTS, JUST AS THE TURKS HAD DONE. HE EVEN SAID HE EXPECTED THE US TO SUPPLY SIXTH FLEET PROTECTION TO ENABLE GOG TO EXERCISE ITS LEGAL RIGHTS. HE MENTIONED IN ADDITION UN ACTION. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE SAID HE HAS BEEN CRITICIZED BY HIS COLLEAGUES FOR HAVING PUBLICLY REJECTED SOVIET "ASSISTANCE". SOME OF THEM FELT USSR SINCERE IN WISHING TO HELP GOG AND GOC AND THAT SOVIETS COULD FIND IT IN THEIR INTERESTS TO DO SO. CARAMANLIS WOUND UP, AFTER A VERY CONSIDERABLE EFFORT ON MY PART, WITH A PROMISE THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO SEEK A SOLUTION IN GENEVA THROUGH A CONTINUATION OF THE TALKS TODAY, BUT THAT IF TURKS CONTINUED TO BE INTRANSIGENT, OUTLOOK WAS VERY BLEAK INDEED. GREECE WOULD NOT BE JUMILIATED AND IT WOULD FACE WAR WHATEVER THE ODDS. HE SAID IF WAR OCCURRED US WOULD HAVE TO INTERVENE MORE DRASTICALLY. THEREFORE, WHY NOT INTERVENE WITH THE TURKS MORE DRASTICALLY NOW? IN THIS CONNECTION CARAMANLIS REFERRED TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S INTERVENTION IN CYPRUS CRISIS IN 1964 AND SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH HE RECOGNIZED FUROR CREATED IN TURKEY AT THAT TIME, NEVERTHELESS JOHNSON LETTER HAD AVERTED WAR BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY AND PRESERVED EASTERN FLANK OF NATO.

2. CARAMANLIS KEPT ME FOR ONE HOUR AND FORTY-FIVE MINUTES AND WAS CLEARLY DEEPLY TROUBLED AS HE REPEATED HIS POINTS OVER AND OVER AGAIN. I RECEIVED THE IMPRESSION THAT HE HAS REACHED THE LIMITS HIS POLITICAL POSITION PERMITS AND THAT UNLESS GOT TURNS AWAY FROM STRONG POSITION SUCH AS IT TOOK YESTERDAY EVENING, WE ARE FACING A BREAKDOWN IN THE GENEVA TALKS.

3. I FIRMLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY INTERSPERSED DURING HIS EXPOSITION POINTS MADE IN YOUR LETTER. I SAID YOU WERE DOING EVERYTHING HUMANLY POSSIBLE TO RECONCILE ALL OF OUR INTERESTS IN THE AREA. I UNDERLINED THE FACT THAT YOU WERE DEALING WITH TWO VALUED AND IMPORTANT ALLIES AND HAD TO MAINTAIN CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION OPEN TO BOTH. I ADDED I WAS ABSOLUTELY SURE YOU HAD MOST CAREFULLY EXAMINED ALL REPEAT ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM AND WAS SEEKING TO RECONCILE ALL OF OUR COMMON INTERESTS IN THE AREA BEARING IN MIND THE HIGHEST PRIORITIES OF OUR NATO OBJECTIVES. I EXPRESSED VIEW YOU WERE AND HAVE BEEN VERY ACTIVE INDEED IN SEEKING TO PERSUADE OUR NATO ALLY TURKEY OF THE IMPORTANCE OF FLEXIBILITY AND A REASONABLE AND JUST SOLUTION FOR ALL THE PARTIES. FINALLY, I NOTED GOG HAD STRONG POSTURE VIS-A-VIS WORLD PUBLIC OPINION, AND I HOPED THEY WOULD NOT BE ONES TO TARNISH THIS IMAGE BY WALKING OUT OF NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

-3- ATHENS 5608

I STRONGLY URGED CARAMANLIS TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO AVOID A BREAKDOWN IN GENEVA AND TO KEEP HOPE FOR NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT ALIVE.

4. CARAMANLIS WOUND UP THE LONG MEETING BY RESTATING HIS POSITION. THE GOG HAS DONE ITS BEST BOTH PUBLICALLY AND PRIVATELY TO ADOPT A CONCILIATORY POSITION; THE GOT HAS TAKEN THIS GREEK POSTURE AS ONE OF WEAKNESS AND WILL NOW RESPOND ONLY TO DIRECT AND FORCEFUL US PRESSURE TO ASSUME A CORRESPONDINGLY FLEXIBLE POSITION. GOG IS PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO TALK TODAY, NOTWITHSTANDING ITS REJECTION OF TURKISH "ULTIMATUM" LAST NIGHT; IF TURKS CONTINUE PRESENT POSTURE GOG PREPARED TO FACE THE WORST, INCLUDING WAR.

5. I FOUND CARAMANLIS FOR THE FIRST TIME RATHER TIRED LOOKING THIS MORNING, AND I FEAR THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF A CHANGE IN THE TURKISH POSITION, OR HIS PERCEPTION OF TURKISH POSTURE, THAT HE IS PREPARING HIMSELF FOR DRASTIC DECISIONS.

6. PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF THERE ARE ANY OTHER ASPECTS I COULD STRESS. I KNOW CARAMANLIS WOULD BE MORE THAN HAPPY TO REACH A SUCCESSFUL SOLUTION IN GENEVA. BUT I HAVE THE IMPRESSION HE FEELS HE IS NEARING THE END OF THE ROAD UNLESS THERE IS A CONVINCING AND SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE TURKISH POSITION.
TASCA



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DESCRIPTION re Cyprus negotiations

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COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200202

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 8

FOLDER TITLE Cyprus Crisis (36)

DATE WITHDRAWN 09/01/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

#ZZ

RNR 492

CYPRUS--SECOND LEAD TALKS*****

BY SCOTT THORNTON

GENEVA, AUG 13, REUTER -- BRITAIN TODAY PROPOSED THAT THE STALLED CYPRUS PEACE CONFERENCE BE ADJOURNED FOR 36 HOURS, BUT QUICKLY RAN INTO OBJECTIONS FROM TURKEY.

ALTHOUGH THE BRITISH PROPOSAL WAS SUPPORTED BY THE GREEK DELEGATION AT THE TALKS, TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER TURAN GUNES SAID HE OPPOSED THE SUGGESTION.

MR. GUNES TOLD A REUTER REPORTER HE INSISTED THAT THE PRESENT PHASE OF THE TALKS SHOULD REACH AT LEAST A MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ON THE ISLANDS CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURE.

BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY JAMES CALLAGHAN HAD PROPOSED THE ADJOURNMENT AT SEPARATE MEETINGS THIS MORNING WITH MR. GUNES AND GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER GEORGE MAVROS TO ALLOW TIME FOR DELEGATIONS TO CONSULT THEIR GOVERNMENTS ON TURKISH AND GREEK PROPOSALS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE.

MORE 1048

#ZZ

RNR 493

CYPRUS -- SECOND LEAD TALKS 2 GENEVA

THE CONFERENCE REACHED CRISIS POINT LAST NIGHT WHEN TURKEY DEMANDED IT WIND UP THE WORK OF ITS CURRENT SECOND PHASE BY AGREEING IMMEDIATELY TO TURKISH PROPOSALS TO GIVE THE 110,000 TURKISH MINORITY SIX AUTONOMOUS DISTRICTS ON THE ISLAND.

PRESIDENT GLAFKOS CLERIDES, LEADER OF THE ISLANDS GREEK COMMUNITY, AND MR. MAVROS SAID THE PLAN WAS UNACCEPTABLE, AND PROMISED COUNTER-PROPOSALS.

BUT IT WAS ONLY AFTER INTERVENTION BY UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER -- FOLLOWING TRANSATLANTIC TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY JAMES CALLAGHAN -- THAT TURKEY AGREED TO WAIT ANOTHER 24 HOURS FOR THE GREEK REPLY.

MORE 1049



#ZZ

RNR 494

CYPRUS -- SECOND LEAD TALKS 3 GENEVA

WHEN MR. GUNES LEFT GENEVA'S PALAIS DES NATIONS AFTER THIS MORNING'S MEETING WITH MR. CALLAGHAN, REPORTERS ASKED HIM IF HE WOULD BE COMING BACK IN THE AFTERNOON AND HE REPLIED: "I DO NOT THINK SO."

BUT A TURKISH DELEGATION SPOKESMAN SAID LATER THE TURKS STILL WANTED AN AGREEMENT TODAY ON THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS.

"WE HAVE NOT THE PATIENCE TO WAIT 48 HOURS BECAUSE WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT NEW PROPOSALS WILL THEN COME OUT OF LONDON, ATHENS AND NICOSIA," HE SAID.

MORE 1051

#ZZ

RNR 495

CYPRUS--SECOND LEAD TALKS 4 GENEVA

LATER IN THE DAY, AFTER THE BRITISH MADE THEIR PROPOSAL FOR A 36-HOUR DELAY, MR. GUNES TOLD REUTER: "I HAVE TURNED DOWN THE IDEA OF A POSTPONEMENT. THIS CONFERENCE MUST ACHIEVE SOMETHING AND I AM NOT LEAVING GENEVA UNTIL THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED."

THE TURKISH MINISTER SAID HE HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT MR. CALLAGHAN HAD NOW CALLED A PLENARY SESSION OF THE PEACE TALKS FOR 5 PM (1600 GMT) TODAY.

MR. GUNES CONFERRED TODAY WITH TURKISH-CYPRIOT LEADER RAUF DENKTASH, WHO THIS MORNING RECEIVED COUNTER-PROPOSALS FOR THE ISLANDS CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURE FROM PRESIDENT CLERIDES.

AS HE ARRIVED AT...2ND GRAF RNR 451.

REUTER 1056



***** ~~SECRET~~ *****S COPY

FLASH /OP IMMED
ESA786GUA602
DE RUQMGU #6475 2251140
Z O 131137Z AUG 74
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 5610

INFO USMISSION GENEVA FLASH 738
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 3541
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 2414
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2769
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1665
USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE 3233

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 6475

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, CY, TU, GR
SUBJ: CYPRUS: CURRENT TURKISH SCENE
GENEVA FOR HARTMAN

1. AS GENEVA CONFERENCE MOVING TO CRUNCH WHICH ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARTMENT REFERRED TO EARLIER, FOL IS MY ROUNDUP-ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT SITUATION HERE:

A. TURKISH PUBLIC HAS BEEN REMARKABLY TRANQUIL FROM START OF CRISIS TO PRESENT. I HAPPENED TO HAVE BEEN VISITING HERE IN 1964 AND NOTHING LIKE GENERAL EXCITEMENT AND STREE DEMONSTRATIONS THAT OCCURRED IN THAT EARLIER EPISODE HAS DEVELOPED THIS TIME.

B. PRESS HAS BEEN EXTREMIST IN ITS REPORTING OF CRISIS. BUT THIS IS AN EXTREMIST PRESS THAT OVERWRITES EVERYTHING; AND GIVEN THAT PERSPECTIVE, PRESS HAS BEEN LESS EXCITABLE THAN MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED. WHILE GOT IS CURRENTLY PRESSURING GENEVA CONFERENCE, IT IS NOT WHIPPING UP LOCAL PRESS, NOR IS IT IN TURN UNDER PARTICULAR PRESSURE FROM THAT QUARTER.

C. IN RECENT YEARS, US-TURKISH FRIENDSHIP HAS BEEN SOMETHING THAT TURKS GENERALLY SPEAK WELL OF IRIVATELY TO AMERICANS--BUT RARELY DO SO PUBLICLY. IN SAME TIME PERIOD, TURKISH PRESS HAS ALMOST ALWAYS BEEN HOSTILE, AND ALMOST ALL OF TURKEY'S PROBLEMS HAVE IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER BEEN BLAMED ON US. IN RECENT DAYS, HOWEVER, THIS HAS CHANGED NOTABLY. AMERICA, AND SPECIFICALLY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND AMERICAN EMBASSY, HAVE HAD EXCELLENT PRESS. WE ARE



*****WHSR COMMENT*****

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PORTRAYED AS TRUE FRIEND OF TURKEY WHICH IS TRYING TO FIND A WAY TO BE HELPFUL IN A SITUATION WHICH FOR US IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX.

D. TALK HAS DIED DOWN HERE ABOUT POOR PERFORMANCE OF TURKISH MILITARY DURING INITIAL DAYS OF CYPRUS LANDING. WE DO NOT THINK MILITARY DESIRE TO VINDICATE ITSELF, THEREFORE, WILL BE A MAJOR FACTOR IF GOT FINDS ITSELF SERIOUSLY CONTEMPLATING A RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES ON ISLAND.

E. HOWEVER, TURKISH MILITARY FORCES ARE IN POSITION TO RENEW HOSTILITIES IMMEDIATELY, WITH NO FURTHER PREPARATIONS REQUIRED. COMMANDERS AND MEN ARE IN FULL SUPPORT OF TURKEY'S OBJECTIVES IN CYPRUS AND ARE PREPARED TO PROCEED ON COMMAND.

F. SENIOR TURKISH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY AWARE OF DAMAGING AND FAR REACHING INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES IF TURKEY DECIDES TO RECOMMENCE HOSTILITIES ON ISLAND. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ITCH IS SURELY THERE TO ACCOMPLISH BASIC GOALS MILITARILY IF IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT THESE ARE NOT TO BE ACCOMPLISHED AT THE BARGAINING TABLE.

G. TURKS ARE DEEPLY ANGERED, BUT ALSO CONCERNED, BY BRITISH MILITARY MOVES WITH RESPECT TO CYPRUS SITUATION. IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS ULTIMATE EFFECT THIS WILL HAVE ON TURKISH INNER DECISION-MAKING CIRCLES. ON ONE HAND, ADDED INHIBITIONS THAT THESE BRITISH MOVES (JOINED TO STRENGTHENED U. N. PRESENCE) LOGICALLY PLACE ON FURTHER TURKISH MILITARY INITIATIVES ARE UNDERSTOOD. ON OTHER HAND, TURKS CLEARLY REGARD BRITISH MILITARY STEPS AS A CHALLENGE AND AS A THREAT, AND THE USE OF GURKHA "MERCENARIES" IS CONSIDERED HERE PARTICULARLY INSULTING. TO BACK DOWN IN FACE OF THIS TYPE OF MOVE IS CONTRARY TO TURKISH INSTINCTS. THE WORST WAY TO DEAL WITH TURKS IS TO PUBLICLY THREATEN THEM.

H. TURKS ARE WORRIED ABOUT SOVIET REACTION, ARE KEEPING A CAREFUL EYE ON IT, AND ARE DISPATCHING SENIOR DIPLOMAT SOYSAL TO DO WHAT HE CAN TO ALLAY SOVIET FEARS OVER PARTITION. (ARRANGEMENTS FOR SOYSAL'S TRIP, HOWEVER, HAVE NOT BEEN FINALIZED BY SOVIETS). IT IS MY IMPRESSION, NEVERTHELESS, THAT TURKS ARE NOT RPT NOT AT THIS POINT PREOCCUPIED BY SOVIET ROLE, AND MY SUSPICION

IS THAT THEY ARE MORE INTERESTED IN EXPLOITING OUR CONCERN ON HIS SUBJECT THAN WORRYING ABOUT IT ON THEIR OWN.

I. TURKISH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICISLS DESIRE TO

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INFO USMISSION GENEVA FLASH 739
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 3542
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 2415
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2770
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ACCOMPLISH THEIR FURTHER OBJECTIVES WITH RESPECT TO CYPRUS AT THE BARGAINING TABLE ON BASIS OF THEIR CURRENT MILITARY POSITION ON ISLAND AND ADDITIONAL MILITARY STRENGTH MOBILIZED ON NEARBY TURKISH MAINLAND. AS OF MORNING OF AUGUST 13 THEY HAVE NOT REPEAT NOTN GIVEN UP HOPE THAT THESE OBJECTIVES CAN BE REACHED PEACEFULLY. THEY BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WILL SOON KNOW ONE WAY OR THE OTHER.

(J) THE TURKS UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF REACHING A SOLUTION WHICH IS NOT HUMILIATING TO THE OTHER PARTIES. THEY ARE PREPARED TO GO A DISTANCE--BUT A LIMITED DISTANCE--TO AVOID THIS. THEY ARE CLEARLY THINKING, HOWEVER, IN TERMS OF COSMETICS AND PRESENTATION, RATHER THAN SUBSTANCE.

(K) THE TURKS FEEL THAT, IN COMING UP WITH SPECIFIC COUNTER-PROPOSALS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO DIVIDING THE ISLAND IN TWO, THEY HAVE SHOWN FLEXIBILITY THAT HAS NOT REPEAT NOT BEEN FORTHCOMING FROM THE OTHER PARTIES. IF RECIPROCAL FLEXIBILITY IS NOT FORTHCOMING PROMPTLY--AND THEY ARE COUNTING PRIMARILY ON THE US TO BRING THIS FLEXIBILITY ABOUT--THEN THEY ARE CLEARLY PREPARED TO "BREAK UP" THE CONFERENCE.

(L) AS THE BREAK-UP PROCESS STARTS, HOWEVER, IT WILL BE TURKISH HOPE THAT THIS WILL PROMPT "A SHOW OF REALITY" ON THE PART OF OTHERS WHICH WILL, AT THE ELEVENTH HOUR, SAVE THE NEGOTIATIONS.

(M) INTERMIXED WITH THIS PROCESS AND EMERGING OUT OF IT, COULDB WELL BE TURKEY'S "GOING TO THE BRINK" I.E., SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES ON THE ISLAND. WHETHER ITS LEADERS WILL BE WILLING IN THE END TO GO OVER THAT BRINK, IF THEY DO NOT ACHIEVE ACCEPTABLE SATISFACTION IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS, NO ONE NOW CAN



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DEFINITELY SAY, IF THEY SHOULD TAKE THAT STEP, HOWEVER, IT WILL NOT BE DONE WITH THE UNANIMITY THAT HAS CHARACTERIZED ALMOST ALL OF TURKEY'S ACTIONS TO DATE.

(N) IN THE END, THIS WILL BE A DECISION MADE BY ECEVIT, GREATLY INFLUENCED BY SANCAR--AND IF IT IS A VERY CLOSE DECISION, MUCH INFLUENCED, TO, BY PRESIDENT KORUTURK'S VIEWS.

(O) ~~BUT MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEADERS HERE BELIEVE THEY ARE BEING GANGED UP ON BOTH AT GENEVA AND BY WORLD PUBLIC OPINION. THEY BELIEVE THAT THE LONGER THE COMBINED PROCESS OF PRESSURE AND STALLING GOES ON AT GENEVA, THE DIMMER TURKEY'S PROSPECTS BECOME OF ACHIEVING ITS BASIC OBJECTIVES IN CYPRUS.~~

(P) THE PRESSURE ON ECEVIT, THEREFORE, IS "TO GET ON WITH IT" EITHER AT GENEVA OR BACK, ON THE ISLAND. HOWEVER, AS THE TURK MILITARY LEADERS ARE NOT OBLIVIOUS OF THE DRAW-BACKS OF THE LATTER COURSE, THEY WILL NOT LIGHTLY TURN ASIDE ECEVIT'S FINAL JUDGMENTS WITH RESPECT TO THE PRO'S AND CON'S OF A RENEWED MILITARY INITIATIVE. THEY WILL NOT ABDICATE TO HIM, BUT, AGAIN IN A CLOSE DECISION, THEY ARE LIKELY, I BELIEVE,

GIVE THE GREATEST WEIGHT TO HIS OPINIONS, ESPECIFLLY IF THESE OPINIONS ARE GENERALLY SUPPORTED BY PREIDENT KORUTURK.

KORUTURK IS DEEPLY RESPECTED BY THE MILITARY. ECEVIT WAS NOT REPEAT NOT IN THE PAST, BUT NOW VERY DEFINITELY IS.

(Q) ECEVIT IN THIS SITUATION REMAINS UNPREDICTABLE.

A FAULT I HAVE DETECTED IN HIM (AND HERE I AM NOT REPEAT NOT REFERRING LNLY TO THE POPPY DECISION) IS THAT HE IS A STRONG-WILLED MAN, BUT ONE WHO HAS A TENDENCY IN THE END TO PURSUE, IN A STRONG-WILLED WAY, THE PATH OF LEAST RESISANCE. HE TENDS TO DO THIS TO SATISFY IMMEDIATE PRESSURES AT THE RISK OF LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES WHICH HE HOPES CAN BE WORKED OUT, ONE WAY OR THE OTHER, LATER ON.

(R) HOWEVERAN FROM THE DAY THIS CRISIS BEGAN TO THE PRESENT MOMENT I HAVE SEEN THIS HIGHLY INTELLIGENT AND SELF-ASSURED LEADER GO THROUGH AN EXTRAORDINARY, AND ALMOST HOURLY, LEARNING PROCESS. HE HAS ADDICATED TO NO ONE IN THIS CRISIS, BUT HAS OBVIOUSLY LEARNED FROM EACH KEY PHASE AND EACH KEY CONVERSATION. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT HE IS A "FAST LEARNER." WE HAVE ON THE SCENE NOW A FAR MORE MATURE LEADER THAN THE ONE WE BEGAN WITH ON JULY 15.

(S) WHILE ECEVIT DOES NOT PARTICULARLY CARE FOR PUBLIC REFERENCES TO HIS PAST ROLE AS A STUDENT OF THE SECRETARY, HE HAS IN FACT BEEN AN ADEPT STUDENT OF THE SECRETARY'S THROUGHOUT THIS CRISIS. EACH TIME I HAVE DEALT WITH HIM I HAVE FOUND MORE OF THE SECRETARY'S THINKING IMPLANTED IN HIM, AND HIS RESPECT FOR THE SECRETARY (WHICH WAS CONSIDERABLE TO BEGIN WITH) HAS GROWN MARKEDLY AS THE CRISIS HAS PROGRESSED. IN THE END, OF COURSE, IF MILITARY ESCALATION IS BEING SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED HERE, I CANNOT BE CERTAIN WHICH WAY HE WILL JUMP, BUT AMERICAN INFLUENCE--AND SPECIFICALLY THAT OF THE SECRETARY--IS VERY CONSIDERABLE. THIS



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REPRESENTS OUR KEY RESOURCE IF TURKEY SHOULD SERIOUSLY APPROACH SUCH A DECISION.

(T) AS DEPARTMENT IS AWARE, PRESIDENT KORUTURK HOLDS HIMSELF BACK FROM THE GENERAL RUNNING OF THE GOVERNMENT AND INTERVENES ONLY AT THE MOST CRUCIAL MOMENTS, HE HAS LIMITED ACTUAL AUTHORITY, BUT VERY CONSIDERABLE PERSONAL INFLUENCE WITH BOTH THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY LEADERS. PRESIDENT FORD'S MESSAGE TO HIM ON THE CYPRUS SITUATION OPENED A CONTACT, THEREFORE, WHICH WE WILL ALSO WISH TO UTILIZE FURTHER SHOULD A CRITICAL POINT BE REACHED DOWN THE ROAD.

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INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0702
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AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 6149
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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0935

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EXDIS
FROM HARTMAN
EO 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, CY, TU
SUBJ: GENEVA PHASE II - STATUS REPORT

1. AS OF NOON HERE AUGUST 13 CLERIDES HAS SUBMITTED A COUNTER-PROPOSAL TO CALLAGHAN FOR DENKTASH AND THE TURKS. WE DO NOT YET HAVE THE TEXT BUT HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THE CLOSEST IT COMES TO RECOGNITION OF THE GEOGRAPHIC CONCEPT IS A REFERENCE TO POSSIBLE GROUPING OF VILLAGES. WITHOUT HAVING RECEIVED IT OFFICIALLY THE TURKISH SIDE HAS REPORTEDLY REJECTED THIS AS MUCH TOO LITTLE AND TOO LATE.

2. THERE HAS BEEN NO PLENARY MEEGING SO GUNES HAS NOT FORMALLY PRESENTED THE TURKISH PLAN. AFTER PERSUASION FROM CALLAGHAN MAVROS HAS ASKED FOR A TWENTY-FOUR HOUR DELAY SO HE CAN CONSULT THE GREEK CABINET. THE TURKISH POSITION IS STILL OFFICIALLY ONE OF DEMANDING THAT ITS PROPOSAL OF AUGUST 12 BE ACCEPTED OR REJECTED TODAY. THE UK WANTS OUR SUPPORT IN PERSUADING TURKEY TO GRANT MAVROS REQUEST FOR A DELAY. IN AN EFFORT TO BUY TIME, THE UK IS TRYING TO ARRANGE A PLENARY MEETING JUST TO KEEP GUNES IN GENEVA.

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AMEMBASSY NICOSIA FLASH 2892
USMISSION GENEVA FLASH 473
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USUN NEW YORK FLASH 1194

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EXDIS
GENEVA FOR HARTMAN
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFDR, TU, CY, GR
SUBJECT: CYPRUS

1. DEFENSE MINISTER AND ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER AVEROFF
SUMMONED ME URGENTLY TO MFA AT 1300 HOURS LOCAL TIME.
HE SAID THAT ON INSTRUCTIONS OF GOG HE WAS INFORMING
AMBASSADORS OF FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF UNSC OF
FOLLOWING POINTS:

A) SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 353 IS NOT BEING
APPLIED IN CYPRUS AND SITUATION HAS COME TO POINT EQUIVALENT
TO THAT AS IF RESOLUTION DID NOT EXIST OR HAD EVEN
BEEN ISSUED.

B) AS IF THIS IS NOT ENOUGH AFTER LAST TURKISH
PROPOSAL AT GENEVA AND COMPLETE INTRANSIGENCE OF
TURKISH IN MANY AREAS "WE ARE LED TO A CLASH".
(AT THAT POINT I INTERRUPTED TO ASK HIM IF HE WAS
SPEAKING OF ARMED CLASH AND HE REPLIED, "YES").

C) GOG BELIEVES THAT CONDITIONS ARE SUCH THAT
GOVERNMENTS OF IVE PERMANENT MEMBERS IN PARTICULAR
HAVE THE OBLIGATION TO TAKE ALL "NECESSARY INITIATIVES"
TO CHANGE MINDS OF TURKS SO AS TO AVOID CLASH IN
LIGHT OF FACT IT WOULD LEAD TO DISTURBANCE OF PEACE.



2. AVEROFF REQUESTED THAT THIS MESSAGE ALSO INCLUDE

***** *WHSR COMMENT*****

HAK, SCOWCROFT, LL

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HIS PERSONAL OPINION AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND FOREIGN MINISTER THAT "THINGS ARE AS SERIOUS AS THAT". MFA SECRETARY VLACHOS INTERJECTED THAT CLASH WOULD START IN CYPRUS.

3. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION AS TO STATUS AT GENEVA THIS MORNING GREEKS HAD NO INFORMATION LATER THAN NINE A.M. GENEVA TIME WHEN CLERIDES HAD HANDED OVER TO CALLAGHAN HIS PROPOSALS.

4. I MENTIONED MY MEETING THIS MORNING WITH PM CARAMANLIS AND TOLD AVEROFF THAT I HAD TRANSMITTED PM'S POSITION, TOGETHER WITH MY COMMENT THAT GOG HAD REACHED CRITICAL POINT IN TERMS OF ITS OWN POSITION. I ADDED THAT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION IN MIND OF SECRETARY OR OTHERS IN WASHINGTON REGARDING GREEK POSITION. AVEROFF SAID GOG WAS AWARE OF THIS AND UNDERScoreD AGAIN THAT THERE WERE LIMITS FOR GOG SO FAR AS MOMENT TO DECIDE ON WAR WAS CONCERNED. HE HOPED USG FULLY APPRECIATED HOW EXTREMELY SERIOUS SITUATION WAS AND THAT IF CLASH BEGAN IT COULD "LEAD VERY FAR". HE ADDED THAT HE WANTED US ALONE TO KNOW THAT HE THOUGHT AMONG FIVE PERMANENT SC MEMBERS ONLY THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE VERY HAPPY TODAY.

5. I TOOK OCCASION TO EMPHASIZE TO HIM AGAIN THAT WE DID NOT BELIEVE SOLUTION LAY IN SC ACTION BUT MUST BE WORKED OUT BY GRECE, TURKEY AND CYPRUS.

6. BRITISH AMBASSADOR WAS LEAVING WHEN I ARRIVED AND SOVIET AMBASSADOR WAS WAITING TO SEE AVEROFF AS I DEPARTED.

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AT GENEVA THAT "THERE WOULD BE NOTHING LEFT TO DO" IN MEETING IF
TURKISH PROPOSALS NOT ACCEPTED. THESE PROPOSALS REPORTED AS (1)
CYPRUS CONSTITUTION MUST BE RADICALLY CHANGED; (2) TWO AUTONOMOUS EN-
TITIES MUST BE RECOGNIZED AS EXISTING IN CYPRUS AND CYPRUS STATE
MUST BE BASED ON THESE PRINCIPLES: (A) FREE AND INDEPENDENT STATE
COMPOSED OF TWO NATIONS; (?) TWO FEDERATED STATES WILL BE TOTALLY
AUTONOMOUS; (C) TWO STATES WILL CONSTITUTE FEDERAL RULING POWER WITH
EQUAL RIGHTS; (D) TURKISH CYPRIOT STATE WOULD INCLUDE 34 PERCENT OF
ISLAND, MADE UP AT MOST OF FIVE CANTONS, LARGEST OF WHICH WOULD
COVER 17 PERCENT OF ISLAND.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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3. GENEVA SEEMS TO BE STUTTERING TO HALT. BRITISH INITIATIVES ARE FALTERING. I THINK, THEREFORE, THAT YOU SHOULD URGENTLY CONSIDER THE DESIRABILITY OF ASSUMING THE INITIATIVE YOURSELF BY MAKING A QUICK TRIP TO ANKARA, ATHENS AND PERHAPS, NICOSIA. THE TIMING OF SUCH A PERSONAL INTERVENTION ON YOUR PART SO SOON AFTER THE ASSUMPTION TO OFFICE OF PRESIDENT FORD WOULD UNDERSCORE THE URGENCY WITH WHICH WE VIEW THE DETERIORATION OF NATO'S EASTERN FLANK. LETTERS AND TELEPHONE CALLS WILL NO LONGER DO THE TRICK. THIS IS THE TIME FOR A MOVE THAT IS BOLDER AND MORE REASSURING. I EARNESTLY SUGGEST THAT YOU GIVE IT SERIOUS CONSIDERATION.

4. SHOULD YOU DECIDE TO UNDERTAKE A MOVE OF THIS KIND, TWO PURPOSES COULD BE ACHIEVED. IN THE FIRST PLACE, YOU WOULD BE ABLE IN THE MOST AUTHORITATIVE WAY TO DEFINE FOR THE GREEKS AND TURKS THE WIDER STRATEGIC INTERESTS SO GRAVELY THREATENED BY THE CYPRUS DISPUTE. IN THE SECOND PLACE, YOU COULD HELP THE GREEKS AND TURKS FIND COMMON GROUND ON CYPRUS AND IDENTIFY THE NEGOTIABLE ISSUES WHICH ARE AT PRESENT LOST IN THE FOG OF GREEK-TURKISH ANTAGONISM. LOOKING AS OBJECTIVELY AS ONE CAN AT THE SUBSTANCES OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, THE MARGIN FOR NEGOTIATION SEEMS RELATIVELY WIDE--WIDER, I WOULD VENTURE TO SAY, THAN THE MARGIN YOU WORKED WITH IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE. THE COMMENTS OF DENKTASH AND CLERIDES IN GENEVA INDICATE THAT THE TWO CYPRIOT COMMUNITIES DO NOT WANT TO BE GROUND BETWEEN THE TURKISH AND GREEK MILLSTONES. THIS DESIRE OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES FOR A MODUS VIVENDI, COUPLED WITH THE STAKE THAT TURKEY AND GREECE CONTINUE TO HAVE IN AN EFFECTIVE WESTERN ALLIANCE SHOULD PROVIDE THE FOUNDATION FOR A SETTLEMENT WHICH YOU ARE BETTER PLACED THAN ANYONE ELSE TO BRING ABOUT.

TASCA



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RNR 538
CYPRUS-AMERICAN*****

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WASHINGTON, AUG. 13, REUTER - THE UNITED STATES HAS SHARPLY STEPPED UP ITS DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY IN THE DISPUTE OVER CYPRUS IN AN EFFORT TO PREVENT A BREAKDOWN OF THE GENEVA TALKS AND A RESUMPTION OF MILITARY ACTIONS, THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAID TODAY.

SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER HAD FOUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH TURKISH PRIME MINISTER BULENT ECEVIT IN THE 24 HOURS ENDING AT NOON EDT TODAY, STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN ROBERT ANDERSON SAID.

ASKED WHETHER THE UNITED STATES FEARED A RESUMPTION OF FIGHTING BETWEEN GREEKS AND TURKS ON THE ISLAND, MR. ANDERSON SAID: "OUR CONCERN HAS INCREASED IN RECENT DAYS." BUT HE SAID HE WAS NOT AWARE OF THE TURKISH ULTIMATUM GIVING GREECE 24 HOURS TO AGREE TO A FEDERAL SYSTEM UNDER WHICH THE 110,000 TURKS OF CYPRUS WOULD HAVE THEIR OWN AUTONOMOUS DISTRICTS.

MORE 1350

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RNR 539
CYPRUS-AMERICAN 2 WASHINGTON

MR. ANDERSON OUTLINED THE U.S. POSITION ON CYPRUS AS FOLLOWS:

"WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE POSITION OF THE TURKISH COMMUNITY ON CYPRUS REQUIRES CONSIDERABLE IMPROVEMENT AND PROTECTION.

"WE HAVE SUPPORTED A GREATER DEGREE OF AUTONOMY FOR THEM.

"THE PARTIES ARE NEGOTIATING ON ONE OR MORE TURKISH AUTONOMOUS AREAS. THE AVENUES OF DIPLOMACY HAVE NOT BEEN EXHAUSTED. THEREFORE THE UNITED STATES WOULD CONSIDER RESORT TO MILITARY ACTION UNJUSTIFIED.

"WE HAVE MADE THIS CLEAR TO ALL PARTIES."

DR. KISSINGER HAS ALSO WRITTEN A LETTER TO THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER CONSTANTINE KARAMANLIS AND HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY JAMES CALLAGHAN, AT THE GENEVA PEACE TALKS BY TELEPHONE.

MORE 1352

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RNR 540
CYPRUS-AMERICAN 3 WASHINGTON

DESPITE HIS ASSERTION THAT THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS A GREATER DEGREE OF AUTONOMY FOR TURKISH CYPRIOTS, MR. ANDERSON SAID THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT IMPOSING ITS VIEWS ON ANY OF THE PARTIES.

HE REASSERTED THE U.S. VIEW THAT ANY SOLUTION MUST BE REACHED BY THE PARTIES THEMSELVES AND BE SATISFACTORY TO BOTH SIDES.

HE SAID IT WOULD BE WRONG TO INFER FROM THE FOUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN DR. KISSINGER AND DR. ECEVIT THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS INCREASING ITS PRESSURE ON TURKEY.

"SOMETIMES THE CALLS COME TO US, SOMETIMES THE OTHER WAY," HE SAID.

REUTER 1353



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DESCRIPTION re Cyprus

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COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200202

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 8

FOLDER TITLE Cyprus Crisis (36)

DATE WITHDRAWN 09/01/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

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FROM HARTMAN
E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFDR CY
SUBJ: CYPRUS

1. FOLLOWING ARE ORIGINAL UK PROPOSAL AND DENKTASH COUNTER-PROPOSAL:

A. UK PROPOSAL

1. MR. GLAVCOS CLERIDES AND MR. FAUF DENKTASH, HAVING HELD TALKS BETWEEN THEM IN GENEVA FROM 10-AUGUST 1974, AGREED THAT A FUNDAMENTAL REVISION OF THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE CONDITIONS IN WHICH THE GREEK CYPRIOT AND TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITIES CAN LIVE TOGETHER IN THE REPUBLIC IN PEACE, WITH MUTUAL TRUST AND IN FULL CONFIDENCE THAT THE SECURITY OF EACH IS SAFEGUARDED. THEY AGREED THAT THIS REVISION SHOULD RESULT IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SYSTEM BASED ON THE EXISTENCE OF TWO AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATIONS WITHIN SUITABLE BOUNDARIES, UNITED UNDER A CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. THEY ALSO AGREED THAT SUCH CHANGES SHOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A SOVEREIGN, INDEPENDENT AND INTEGRAL REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS.

2. MR. CLERIDES AND MR. DENKTASH FURTHER AGREED:

- A. AT ONCE TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THEM IN NICOSIA IN ORDER TO ELABORATE AS A MATTER OF URGENCY THE CHANGES ENVISAGED IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE; AND
- B. TO INFORM REPRESENTATIVES OF GREECE, TURKEY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AT A FURTHER MEETING TO BE HELD IN----- ON SEPTEMBER 1974, OF THE DETAILS OF THE CHANGES AGREED BETWEEN THEM.

B. DENKTASH PROPOSAL

1. MR. CLAVCOS CLERIDES AND MR. RAUF DENKTASH;

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HAVING MET WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE GENEVA DECLARATION OF THE 30TH JULY 1974 FROM 10-12 AUGUST 1974, AGREED THAT A FUNDAMENTAL REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THE TRAGIC EVENTS OF THE PAST SHOULD NOT REPEAT THEMSELVES AND IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THE MINIMUM CONDITIONS IN WHICH THE GREEK AND THE TURKISH COMMUNITIES CAN PERMANENTLY COEXIST, TOGETHER, IN THE REPUBLIC IN FREEDOM AND PEACE, WITH MUTUAL TRUST AND IN FULL CONFIDENCE SO THAT THE SECURITY OF EACH IS SAFEGUARDED.

2. BEARING ALSO IN MIND THE EXISTENCE IN PRACTICE IN THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS OF TWO AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATIONS, THEY AGREED THAT THIS REVISION SHOULD RESULT IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FEDERAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT BASED ON THE FOLLOWING FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS:--

A. THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS SHALL BE AN INDEPENDENT BI-NATIONAL STATE.

B. THE REPUBLIC SHALL BE COMPOSED OF TWO FEDERATED STATES WITH FULL CONTROL AND AUTONOMY WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES.

C. IN DETERMINING THE COMPETENCE TO BE LEFT TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, THE BI-NATIONAL NATURE OF THE STATE SHALL BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AND THE FEDERAL COMPETENCE SHALL BE EXERCISED ACCORDINGLY.

D. THE AREA OF THE TURKISH-CYPRIOI FEDERATED STATE SHALL COVER 34 PER CENTUM OF THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC FALLING NORTH OF A GENERAL LINE STARTING FROM THE LIMNITIS-LEFKA AREA IN THE WEST AND RUNNING TOWARDS THE EAST, PASSING THROUGH THE TURKISH CONTROLLED PART OF NICOSIA, INCLUDING THE TURKISH PART OF FAMAGUSTA AND ENDING AT THE PORT OF FAMAGUSTA.

3. PENDING AN AGREEMENT ON THE FINAL CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE REPUBLIC, THE TWO AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATIONS SHALL TAKE OVER THE FULL ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS AS DEFINED ABOVE AND SHALL TAKE STEPS TO NORMALIZE AND STABILISE LIFE IN THE REPUBLIC AND REFRAIN FROM ACTS OF VIOLENCE, HARASSMENT AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST EACH OTHER.

4. MR. CLERIDES AND MR. DENKTASH FURTHER AGREED:

A. AT ONCE TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THEM IN NICOSIA WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF GREECE AND TURKEY IN ORDER TO ELABORATE AS A MATTER OF IMMEDIATE URGENCY THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE ENVISAGED ABOVE: AND

B. TO REPORT TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF GREECE, TURKEY AND UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, AT A FURTHER MEETING TO BE HELD IN GENEVA ON 1ST SEPTEMBER 1974, OF THE CONCLUSIONS REACHED.



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2. PIECES OF PAPER WE SUPPLIED UK FOR WHATEVER USE THEY MIGHT MAKE
ARE AS FOLLOWS:

ALTERNATIVE 1

NOTING THE AGREEMENT OF THE GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOT
COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVES TO BEGIN TALKS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
ARRANGEMENTS ON THE BASIS OF GEOGRAPHIC AUTONOMY WITHIN AN
INTEGRAL, SOVEREIGN, INDEPENDENT STATE; AND TAKING ACCOUNT OF
THE EXPERIENCE WITH THE APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE
1960 AGREEMENTS CONCERNING THE RIGHTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE
POWERS OF THE RESPECTIVE COMMUNITIES; THE FOREIGN MINISTERS
OF GREECE, TURKEY, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM ASKED THE
REPRESENTATIVES TO REPORT TO THEM AT A MEETING TO BE HELD IN
GENEVA NO LATER THAN SEPTEMBER-----.

ALTERNATIVE 2

NOTING THE AGREEMENT OF THE GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOT
COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVES TO BEGIN TALKS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
ARRANGEMENTS ON THE BASIS OF A CONCEPT OF FEDERAL, AUTONOMOUS,
ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS GOVERNING A NUMBER OF GEOGRAPHIC AREAS
CONTROLLED BY THE RESPECTIVE COMMUNITIES WITHIN AN INTEGRAL,
SOVEREIGN, INDEPENDENT STATE, AND TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE EXPERIENCE
WITH THE APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE 1960 AGREEMENTS CON-
CERNING THE RIGHTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE RESPECTIVE
COMMUNITIES; THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF GREECE, TURKEY, AND THE
UNITED KINGDOM ASKED THE REPRESENTATIVES TO REPORT TO THEM AT A
MEETING TO BE HELD IN GENEVA NO LATER THAN SEPTEMBER-----.

ALTERNATIVE 3

NOTING THE AGREEMENT OF THE GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOT
COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVES TO BEGIN TALKS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
ARRANGEMENTS ON THE BASIS OF COMPLETELY AUTONOMOUS
AUTHORITIES FOR EACH COMMUNITY WHICH WOULD EXERCISE JURISDICTION
ON ALL MATTERS AND AREAS FOR WHICH THEY ARE RESPONSIBLE EXCEPT
FOR A LIMITED NUMBER OF FUNCTIONS THAT WOULD BE JOINTLY ADMINISTERED
BY A FEDERAL AUTHORITY IN AN INTEGRAL, SOVEREIGN, INDEPENDENT STATE;
AND TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE EXPERIENCE WITH THE APPLICATION OF THE
PROVISIONS OF THE 1960 AGREEMENTS CONCERNING THE RIGHTS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE RESPECTIVE COMMUNITIES; THE FOREIGN
MINISTERS OF GREECE, TURKEY, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM ASKED THE
REPRESENTATIVES TO REPORT TO THEM AT A MEETING TO BE HELD IN
GENEVA NO LATER THAN SEPTEMBER-----.

3. GUNES TEXT AND CLERIDES TEXT WILL BE SENT SEPTTEL, AS SOON AS
OBTAINED FROM UK DEL DALE

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INFO USMISSION GENEVA FLASH

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EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

GENEVA FOR HARTMAN

E.O. 116521 GDS
TAGS: PFOR, TU, CY, GR
SUBJ: CYPRUS

State Review
3/3/04
5/12/11

1. THE PRIMIN, AT SLIGHTLY AFTER 4 P.M. LOCAL TIME, TELEPHONED ME TO SAY THAT AT THE SECRETARY'S REQUEST, HE HAD CONVENED THE TURKISH CABINET AND THAT CABINET SESSION AD JUST ENDED. AS A RESULT, ECEVIT SAID THE GOT HAS DECIDED "AS A LAST ACT OF GOOD WILL AND PATIENCE" TO SEND GUNES TO THE 4 P.M. (6 P.M. LOCAL TIME) AUGUST 13 GENEVA MEETING -- "IF THAT MEETING TAKES PLACE" -- TO MAKE FINAL EFFORT TO GET AGREEMENT FROM OTHERS ON TURKEY'S "BASIC ZONE." THE PRIMIN ADDED THAT IF SUCH AN AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED AT THIS MEETING, THEN TURKEY COULD AFFORD TO WAIT MANY MORE THAN 36 ADDITIONAL HOURS BEFORE GETTING THE RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS UNDERWAY.

2. PRIMIN TOLD ME THAT HE REGRETFULLY CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THERE WAS NO GOOD REASON FOR TURKEY TO AGREE TO AN ADDITIONAL 36-HOUR POSTPONEMENT. HE SAID THAT CONFERENCE HAD ALREADY WASTED SIX DAYS AND THAT AFTER ANOTHER DAY AND ONE-HALF DELAY, THERE WAS STILL NO ASSURANCE THAT "THE RIGHT ANSWER" WOULD BE FORTHCOMING. EVEN IF IT WERE, PRIMIN ADDED, GOT HAD HAD BITTER EXPERIENCES WITH GREEK ASSURANCES BEFORE. HE ALSO ADDED THAT

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 ANKARA 06493 131728Z

OTHER PARTIES SHOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT TURKEY'S BASIC ZONE BECAUSE IF TURKEY HAD NOT HONORED UN RESOLUTION, IT COULD HAVE EASILY TAKEN OVER A MUCH BIGGER ZONE IN ANY EVENT.

3. I PASSED THE ABOVE REPOSENSE TO WHITE HOUSE WHERE THE SECRETARY WAS MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT. THE SECRETARY INSTRUCTED ME THROUGH GENERAL SCOWCROFT TO GO BACK TO THE PRIMIN AND TO AGAIN URGE HIM TO AGREE TO A 36 ADDITIONAL HOUR DELAY. IN RETURN, I WAS AUTHORIZED TO SAY THAT WE WILL WORK WITH THE GREEKS AND THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO GET THEIR BASIC TURKISH ZONE ACCEPTED, AND WE WOULD ASSURE THEM THAT DURING THIS 36 HOUR PERIOD, NO MILITARY ACTION BY THE GREEKS WOULD TAKE PLACE.

4. I SUBSEQUENTLY HAVE SPOKEN TO THE PRIMIN TWICE. (THE SECOND TIME WAS TO MAKE ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN THAT THEY UNDERSTOOD EXACTLY WHAT WE WERE COMMITTING OURSELVES TO WORK FOR THEM IN ADDITIONAL 36 HOURS -- WHICH I WAS ASSURED HE UNDERSTOOD FULLY.) IN THE COURSE OF THESE CONVERSATIONS, THE PRIMIN MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A) HE WOULD TRY TO GET THE EXTRA 36 HOURS, BUT COULD NOT GIVE ME ANY GUARANTEE THAT HE COULD, IN FACT, SUCCEED. HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT TURKEY'S DESIRES RESPECTING THE KEY ZONE OVER THE ADDITIONAL 36 HOURS, BUT HE KNEW HIS "OUTER LIMITS", AND HE SAID HE WAS "AT THEM NOW." BY WAY OF EXPLANATION, HE SAID THAT THE MILITARY HAD BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPATIENT WITH THE SIX DAYS OF STALLING AT GENEVA. HE SAID THAT TURK MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ELEMENTS HAD NOT, REPEAT NOT, BEEN DIVIDED UP UNTIL NOW, AND HE EMPHASIZED THAT HE HAD CONSIDERABLE SYMPATHY FOR THE MILITARY CONCERNS. WHEN I POINTED TO OUR STATEMENT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO GREEK MILITARY ACTION DURING THIS 36 HOUR PERIOD, HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THIS, BUT THAT THE MILITARY WAS STILL VERY CONCERNED ABOUT GIVING THE GREEKS THESE 36 HOURS TO PREPARE FOR MILITARY ACTIVITY (WHOSE MILITARY ACTIVITY THEY WERE PREPARING FOR, HE DID NOT SAY). HE ALSO SAID "I MUST TELL YOU CANDIDLY THAT I AM CONCERNED BY THE PRO-GREEK PRESSURES IN YOUR CONGRESS." I POINTED OUT THAT IN OUR SYSTEM, PRESSURES OF THE LATTER KIND ALWAYS EXISTED AND WERE, OF COURSE, OF CONSEQUENCE. NEVERTHELESS, I COULD GUARANTEE HIM THAT THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY WOULD DO WHAT WAS

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 ANKARA 06493 131728Z

IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF ALL CONCERNED, I WENT ON TO POINT OUT THAT TURKEY'S WORLD PUBLIC RELATIONS IMAGE, ALREADY BADLY DAMAGED, WOULD SURELY NOT BE HELPED IF NOW IT TURNED DOWN ITS NEGOTIATING PARTNER'S 36 HOUR REQUEST -- AND IN THE PROCESS ALSO TURNED DOWN THE US GOVERNMENT WHICH, IT WAS GENERALLY KNOWN, HAD MADE IMPORTANT EFFORTS TO BE HELPFUL THROUGHOUT THIS CRISIS.

5. I STRESSED THAT UP TO NOW TURKEY HAD BEEN SEEKING ITS BASIC ZONE WITHOUT SUPPORT FROM ANYONE. WHILE WE COULD, OF COURSE, MAKE NO GUARANTEES OF SUCCESS, IT SEEMED TO ME MOST UNWISE FOR TURKEY, HAVING WAITED SIX DAYS ALREADY, NOT TO WAIT 36 HOURS MORE TO SEE WHAT THE EFFECT WOULD BE OF OUR ACTIVE HELP ON THIS ISSUE.

6. ECEVIT SAID HE UNDERSTOOD ALL THESE ARGUMENTS. NEVERTHELESS, HE COULD NOT SAY WHAT WOULD BE THE OUTCOME OF HIS CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT ON OUR REQUEST. HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH ME, HE SAID, AS SOON AS THESE ARE DONE. MACOMBER

NOTE: CCG DELIVER TO OFF-LINE FOR PROCESSING.

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 035063

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇReport

DESCRIPTION re Cyprus Situation; 2 copies of the
report

CREATION DATE 08/13/1974

VOLUME 8 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200202

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 8

FOLDER TITLE Cyprus Crisis (36)

DATE WITHDRAWN 09/01/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

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FLASH
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FM USMISSION GENEVA

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FROM HARTMAN
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFDR, CY
SUBJ: CYPRUS

FOLLOWING ARE THE CLERIDES AND THE GUNES TEXTS:

A. CLERIDES

- ① THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER OF CYPRUS SHALL RETAIN ITS BYCOMMUNAL CHARACTER BASED ON THE CO-EXISTENCE OF THE GREEK AND TURKISH COMMUNITIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A SOVEREIGN, INDEPENDENT AND INTEGRAL REPUBLIC.
- ② THIS CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER SHALL, THROUGH AN APPROPRIATE REVISION AND THE ACTIVE CO-OPERATION AND FREE CONSENT OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES, ENSURE AN ENHANCED FEELING OF SECURITY FOR BOTH.
- 3. THE CO-EXISTENCE OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES SHALL BE ACHIEVED IN THE CONTEXT OF INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS REGARDING AN AGREED ALLOCATION OF POWERS AND FUNCTIONS BETWEEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT HAVING COMPETENCE OVER STATE AFFAIRS AND THE RESPECTIVE AUTONOMOUS COMMUNAL ADMINISTRATIONS EXERCISING THEIR POWERS ON ALL OTHER MATTERS WITHIN AREAS TO BE ESTABLISHED AS IN PARAGRAPH (5) HEREIN BELOW PROVIDED.
- 4. THE STRUCTURE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SHALL CONTINUE TO BE BASED ON THE PRESIDENTIAL REGIME.
- 5. THE GREEK AND TURKISH COMMUNAL ADMINISTRATIONS SHALL EXERCISE THEIR POWERS AND FUNCTIONS IN AREAS CONSISTING RESPECTIVELY OF THE PURELY GREEK AND TURKISH VILLAGES AND MUNICIPALITIES. FOR THE PURPOSES OF COMMUNAL ADMINISTRATION SUCH VILLAGES AND MUNICIPALITIES MAY BE GROUPED TOGETHER BY THE RESPECTIVE COMMUNAL AUTHORITIES. FOR THE SAME PURPOSE MIXED VILLAGES SHALL COME UNDER THE COMMUNAL AUTHORITIES OF THE COMMUNITY TO WHICH THE MAJORITY OF THEIR INHABITANTS BELONG.
- 6. LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY OVER THE RESPECTIVE COMMUNAL ADMINISTRATIONS SHALL BE EXERCISED BY THE GREEK AND TURKISH MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CONSTITUTED IN SEPARATE COUNCILS FOR THIS PURPOSE.



***** WHSR COMMENT *****

HAK, SCHROFT, LL

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State Review
3/31/04
5/12/11

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B. GUNES

1. THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS WILL BE A BI-COMMUNAL AND INDEPENDENT STATE.
2. THE REPUBLIC WILL BE COMPOSED OF AN AUTONOMOUS TURKISH CYPRIOT ZONE COMPOSED OF SIX DISTRICTS AND AN AUTONOMOUS GREEK CYPRIOT ZONE COMPOSED OF TWO DISTRICTS:
 - A. AUTONOMOUS GREEK CYPRIOT ZONE
 - I. MAIN GREEK CYPRIOT DISTRICT
 - I., GREEK CYPRIOT DISTRICT OF KARAPAS
 - B. AUTONOMOUS TURKISH CYPRIOT ZONE
 - I. MAIN TURKISH CYPRIOT DISTRICT WHOSE LIMITS WILL BE TRACED FROM WEST TO EAST BY A LINE INCLUDING PANAGRA-MYRTOU-ASANATOS-SKYLLOURA-YEROIAKKOS-TURKISH SECTOR OF NICOSIA-MOKA-ANGASTINA-YENAGRA-MARATHA STYLLOS-FRESH WATER LAKE-TURKISH SECTOR OF FAMAGUSTA; AND IN THE NORTH EAST BY A LINE EXCLUDING GALOONIA, INCLUDING KOMIKEBIR, AYIOS EVSTATHIOS AND EXCLUDING GASTRIA;
 - II. TURKISH DISTRICT OF LEFKA REGION
 - III. TURKISH DISTRICT OF POLIS REGION
 - IV. TURKISH DISTRICT OF PAPHOS REGION
 - V. TURKISH DISTRICT OF LARNACA REGION
 - VI. TURKISH DISTRICT OF KARAPAS REGION

THE AREA OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT AUTONOMOUS ZONE WILL BE EQUIVALENT TO ABOUT 34 0/0 OF THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC. THE AREA AND THE LIMITS OF EACH OF THE DISTRICTS OF THE TURKISH ZONE OTHER THAN THE MAIN DISTRICT WILL BE DETERMINED WITHIN THE TIME LIMIT AND ACCORDING TO THE PROCEDURE WHICH WILL BE SET FORTH IN THE DISPOSITIONS ADDED TO THIS DECLARATION. THE MAIN DISTRICT OF THE AUTONOMOUS TURKISH CYPRIOT ZONE WILL BE EVACUATED BY THE ELEMENTS OF THE GREEK ARMED FORCES AND BY THE GREEK CYPRIOT NATIONAL GUARD AS WELL AS BY GREEK IRREGULARS WITHIN A PERIOD NOT TO EXCEED 48 HOURS FROM THE TIME OF THE SIGNATURE OF THE DECLARATION. ADMINISTRATION, ORDER AND SECURITY OF THE DISTRICT WILL BE IMMEDIATELY TAKEN OVER BY THE TURKISH CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION.

 3. THE ADMINISTRATION OF EACH OF THE AUTONOMOUS ZONES WILL HAVE COMPLETE CONTROL OF ITS ZONE WITHIN ITS GEOGRAPHIC LIMITS.
 4. FREE CIRCULATION BETWEEN THE DISTRICTS OF A SINGLE ZONE WILL BE GUARANTEED BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS.
 5. THERE WILL BE MADE A DETERMINATION OF THE AREAS OF COMPETENCE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC, TAKING FULLY INTO ACCOUNT THE BI-COMMUNAL NATURE OF THE STATE.
 6. WHILE AWAITING THE FUNCTIONING OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL



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State Review
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SYSTEM OF THE REPUBLIC, THE TWO EXISTING DE FACTO GREEK CYPRIOT AND TURKISH CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATIONS WILL JOINTLY TAKE THE ACTION NECESSARY IN ORDER TO NORMALIZE AND STABILIZE LIFE IN THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC AND WILL ABSTAIN FROM ANY ACT OF VIOLENCE, HARASSMENT AND DISCRIMINATION. DALE

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AMEMBASSY LONDON 6152
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4026
AMEMBASSY NOCOSIA 249
AMEMBASSY PARIS 7195
USMISSION NATO 2625

~~SECRET~~ GENEVA 5240

LIMDIS
FROM HARTMAN
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PEOR, CY, UN
SUBJECT: CYPRUS AND UN SECRETARL GENERAL

1. AT REQUEST OF UNDER SECRETARY GUYER I TELEPHONED SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM IN AUSTRIA AT 1900 LOCAL. WALDHEIM SAID HE HAS HEARD VERY DISBURBING REPORTS FROM GUYER AND WANTED ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION. I TOLD HIM THAT I WAS ALSO VERY DISTURBED AND BELIEVED HE WAS CORRECT TO BE WORRIED. THERE ARE ENOUGH SIGNS OF TURKISH TOUGHNESS TO FEAR THAT EVEN UNILATERAL ACTION ON CYPRUS IS A LIVE POSSIBILITY.

2. I REVIEWED FOR HIM THE SITUATION IN GENEVA, I.E. THE UK AND US EFFORTS TO PERSUADE TURKEY TO ACCORD A 36-48 HOUR DELAY SO THAT GREEK AND GREEK-CYPRIOIOT REPRESENTATIVES COULD GO HOME TO TRY AND SELL THE IDEA OF AGREEING TO THE TURKISH DEMAND FOR A MAIN CANTON, PERHAPS NOT SAME SIZE AS THAT WHICH TURKS REQUESTING BUT SUBSTANTIAL ENOUGH TO FORM BASIS FOR A COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT AND KEEP NEGOTIATING PROCESS ALIVE. ECEVIT HAD INSTRUCTED GUNES TO REJECT THIS REQUEST AND MEETING OF ALL FIVE REPS PRESENTLY UNDERWAY AT WHICH THEY WOULD PUT FORWARD THEIR VARIOUS PROPOSALS, EACH SIDE WOULD REJECT THE OTHER'S IDEAS, WITH POSSIBILITY OF LAST-MINUTE APPEAL FROM DENKTASH TO GUNES FOR MORE TIME FOR CLERIDEAS AND MAVROS. DESPITE THIS LAST GAMBIT, IT SEEMS THAT TURKEY IS DETERMINED TO



***** WHSR COMMENT *****

HAK, SCORCROFT, LL

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State Review
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11/21/11

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BREAK OFF TALKS AT 2200 IF GREECE DOES NOT AGREE TO ITS PROPOSALS AND THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT GREECE WILL SAY ANYTHING BUT NO.

3. WALDHEIM SAID THAT IF MEETING BROKE UP WITHOUT AGREEMENT HE PLANS RETURN MORNING OF AUG. 4 TO NEW YORK VIA LONDON WHERE HE WILL MEET WITH CALLAGHAN. HE SAYS THERE WILL HAVE TO BE A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING IF TURKEY MOVES ON ISLAND. CALLED BY HIM IF NECESSARY SINCE THE UNFICYP MANDATE DOES NOT COVER MAJOR HOSTILITIES. HE HAS ALREADY GIVEN ORDERS TO UNFICYP ON PROVISIONAL BASIS TO WITHDRAW UNFICYP TO MAIN BASES IF TURKEY MOVES AS THEY HAD DONE WHEN TURKS FIRST LANDED. HE IS NOT DECIDED ON HOW TO HANDLE THE DEFENSE OF NICOZIA AIRPORT, WHETHER IT SHOULD BE UN OR UK. HE DOES NOT LIKE THE IDEA OF MIXING THE TWO FORCES AND BELIEVES THAT UK HAS AUTHORITY AS A GUARANTOR TO PROTECT THE AIRPORT. HE OBSERVED THAT UK TROOPS WERE PRESENTLY DEFENDING IT AS PART OF UNFICYP. WALDHEIM SAID HE HAD ONLY ABOUT 150 FINNISH TROOPS ACTUALLY IN TURKISH CONTROLLED TERRITORY, WITH SOME 250-300 SWEDES ON EAST SIDE OF DEMARCATION LINE. WEST OF THE DEMARCATION LINE ARE THE BRITISH.

4. WE LEFT IT THAT WE WOULD STAY IN TOUCH TONIGHT. DALE
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SPECIAL REPORT
of the
WATCH COMMITTEE

[redacted]

No. 1250A

13 August 1974
(As of 1930 EDT)


CYPRUS

1. The Watch Committee coordinated telephonically on developments in Cyprus and concluded:

There are convincing signs that the Turks are preparing for renewed military operations on Cyprus. If the Geneva talks collapse, and barring success in any other last minute diplomatic efforts, the chances are better than even that the Turks will reinitiate major military operations on Cyprus in the next few hours. This could in turn precipitate a Greco-Turkish conflict in Thrace or in the Aegean area and cause the fall of the present Greek government or a decision by Karamanlis to start a war against Turkey. [redacted]

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DECLASSIFIED w/portion's exempted NSC/State Guidelines
AUTHORITY RAC NLF-CODEWORD-4-17-3-6 9/21/2005
BY W/O NARA, DATE 3/15/2011



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SCOWCROST, LL

RHWFBIS 135*****

ATHENS STATEMENT NOTES 'UNACCEPTABLE TURKISH PROPOSALS'

L131932 ATHENS INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN GREEK 1900 GMT 13 AUG 74 L

(TEXT) THE FOLLOWING GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCEMENT WAS ISSUED THIS AFTERNOON BY THE PRESS AND INFORMATION GENERAL SECRETARIAT:

AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S INSTRUCTIONS, ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER AVEROFF SUCCESSIVELY SUMMONED AT NOON TODAY THE AMBASSADORS TO GREECE OF BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, THE PRC AND FRANCE IN THEIR CAPACITY AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PERMANENT MEMBER STATES OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL.

THE FOREIGN AMBASSADORS WERE INFORMED OF THE FOLLOWING:

1. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO. 353, WHICH WAS ADOPTED BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE AFOREMENTIONED AMBASSADORS, IS NOT BEING IMPLEMENTED BY TURKEY.

2. FOLLOWING THE UNACCEPTABLE TURKISH PROPOSALS AND TURKEY'S IRRECONCILABLE STAND, THE SITUATION MAY (?BECOME CRITICAL).

3. IF THIS HAPPENS, THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE ABOVE AMBASSADORS WILL SHARE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DISTURBANCE OF PEACE IN THIS SECTION OF THE MEDITERRANEAN. IT IS THE DUTY OF THESE GOVERNMENTS, THEREFORE, TO TAKE THE GIVEN INITIATIVE (ENDHEDHIGMENAS PROTOVOULIAS) TO PREVENT THE ABOVE DANGER.

13 AUG 2002Z HWM/MA*****



DLP
FBIS 134

ANKARA REPORTS GREEK REINFORCEMENTS IN CYPRUS

TAI31852 ANKARA DOMESTIC SERVICE IN TURKISH 1600 GMT 13 AUG 74 TA

(TEXT) IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT THE NATIONAL GUARD IN CYPRUS HAS BEEN REINFORCED WITH NEW OFFICERS FROM GREECE AND THAT GREECE HAS SENT NEW SHIPMENTS OF MODERN WEAPONS AND ARMORED VEHICLES TO CYPRUS.

XANTHOS KLIRIDHIS, WHO IS ACTING PRESIDENT OF THE GREEK CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION, HAS SAID THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOT NATIONAL GUARD CONTINUES TO BE ON THE ALERT. AFP POINTS OUT THAT KLIRIDHIS' ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOT NATIONAL GUARD HAS BEEN PLACED ON THE ALERT CONFIRMS THE FACT THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOT FORCES ON CYPRUS HAVE BEEN REINFORCED BY GREECE. MEANWHILE ATHENS RADIO SAID THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF GREEK CYPRIOT NATIONAL GUARD UNITS FROM TURKISH VILLAGES AND AREAS ON CYPRUS HAS BEEN SUSPENDED. ATHENS RADIO ALSO SAID THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS CONTINUE TO HOLD A LARGE NUMBER OF TURKISH CYPRIOTS, PARTICULARLY FROM THE LIMASSOL AREA, AS HOSTAGES.

THE U.N. PEACE FORCE ON CYPRUS HAS ALSO BEEN PLACED ON FULL ALERT. THE U.N. SPOKESMAN WHO MADE THIS ANNOUNCEMENT ALSO SAID THAT THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GENEVA TALKS MAY PRODUCE AN OUTCOME WHICH MIGHT AFFECT THE SITUATION IN CYPRUS. HE ALSO ADDED THAT IT WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT THE U.N. PEACE FORCE ON CYPRUS HAS BEEN PLACED ON SUCH A HIGH STATE OF ALERT DURING THE PAST 11 YEARS. THE SPOKESMAN NOTED THAT NO SIGNIFICANT CLASH HAS OCCURRED ON CYPRUS TODAY, BUT MAINTAINED THAT THE SITUATION CONTINUES TO BE TENSE IN VARIOUS REGIONS, PARTICULARLY IN LIMASSOL AND NICOSIA.

IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT THE NUMBER OF U.N. PEACE FORCE PERSONNEL HAS NOW REACHED 4,400. IT HAS ALSO BEEN REPORTED THAT THE NUMBER OF BRITISH TROOPS SERVING WITH THE U.N. PEACE FORCE STANDS AT 1,400.

13 AUG 1950Z HWM/IM





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TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 5623
INFO USMISSION GENEVA FLASH

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EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

GENEVA FOR HARTMAN

State Review
3/3/04
BY HR 5/12/11

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, CY, GR, TU
SUBJ: CYPRUS

REF: A. ANKARA 6495 B. STATE 176660

1. SHORTLY AFTER MY CONVERSATION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, REPORTED REF A, I TOOK A HAND-WRITTEN COPY OF THE DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT (REF B) TO HIS RESIDENCE. I FOUND HIM IN A HIGHLY AGITATED STATE, PARTICULARLY INCENSED, AT THE MOMENT I WALKED IN, BY A REPORT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED THAT THE GREEK RADIO STATIONS WERE SAYING IN ALL BUT THEIR TURKISH LANGUAGE BROADCASTS THAT THE EVACUATION OF THE TURKISH ENCLAVES HAD CEASED, WHILE DECLARING IN THEIR TURKISH BROADCASTS THAT THE EVACUATIONS WERE CONTINUING. THIS, OF COURSE, LED HIM TO RESUME THE DENUNCIATION OF THE GREEKS THAT HE HAD COMMENCED IN OUR IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING DISCUSSION. THERE WAS NO WAY UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, HE SAID, THAT HE COULD BE EXPECTED TO PUT ANY TRUST IN THE GREEKS.

2. I SAID THAT I HAD NOT COME TO DISCUSS THE PROS AND CONS OF THE GREEK CHARACTER AND PERFORMANCE, BUT



NODIS



Department of State

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RATHER TO MAKE ONE LAST PLEA TO HIM TO THINK CAREFULLY ABOUT TURKEY'S INTERESTS IN THIS SITUATION. I ASKED HIM TO READ THE DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT AND NOTED THAT, EVEN UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH IT HAD HAD TO BE DRAFTED, THE SECRETARY HAD SEEN TO IT THAT IT INCLUDED A STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR KEY TURKISH OBJECTIVES. I SAID THAT ALL MY MILITARY ADVISERS HAD TOLD ME THAT THERE WAS NO WAY IN 36 HOURS THAT ANYTHING THE GREEKS COULD DO BY WAY OF MILITARY PREPARATIONS COULD MATERIALLY ALTER THE CURRENT AND ENORMOUS TURKISH MILITARY ADVANTAGE ON THE ISLAND. ON THE OTHER HAND, I ARGUED THAT FAILURE TO WAIT 36 HOURS COULD PUT TURKEY UNDER THE WORST KIND OF WORLD PUBLIC OPINION CLOUD.

3. I SAID THAT GIVEN HIS STANDING TODAY WITHIN TURKEY, THE MILITARY AND EVERYONE ELSE WOULD FOLLOW HIS JUDGMENT, AND I JUST COULD NOT BELIEVE HE DID NOT SEE THE GREAT DISADVANTAGES OF TURKEY'S DECLINING THE 36-HOUR REQUEST. IN RESPONSE, HE ASKED ME WHETHER I THOUGHT THERE WAS ANY POSSIBILITY AT ALL THAT PROGRESS MIGHT BE MADE IN THIS EVENING'S GENEVA MEETING. I SAID THAT I DIDN'T KNOW, BUT THAT IN ANY EVENT I WAS NOT ASKING HIM TO RECONSIDER HIS DECISION ON THE BASIS OF ANY POSSIBLE PROGRESS THIS EVENING -- OR FOR THAT MATTER, ON THE BASIS OF ANY IMPLICATION THAT WE COULD GUARANTEE REAL PROGRESS AT THE END OF 36 HOURS. I THOUGHT, HOWEVER, THAT WE CERTAINLY HAD A CHANCE OF MAKING SOME PROGRESS DURING 36 HOURS, BUT I STRESSED AGAIN THE REAL BASIS FOR MY ARGUMENT WAS THAT TURKEY, IF IT FAILED TO AGREE TO THIS 36-HOUR REQUEST, WOULD RECEIVE A VERY COSTLY AND UNNECESSARY BLACK EYE IN WORLD OPINION. AFTER PAUSING FOR A MOMENT, HE SAID, "ALL RIGHT, I WILL ONCE AGAIN RECONVENE THE COUNCIL."
MACOMBER

NOTE BY ANALYST: CCO PASS COPY TO OFF-LINE FOR PROCESSING.

~~SECRET~~



Hsk 22a
SCOWCROFT
McFARLANE

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Henry A. Kissinger
White House

This was done in response to
a request from Under Secretary
Sisco.

W. E. Colby
Director

13 August 1974
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 64 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

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BY lwh NLF DATE 7/9/09



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
13 August 1974

TURKISH MILITARY CAPABILITIES ON CYPRUS

1. The Turks can, with the forces presently available to them on Cyprus, establish within three to six days a line of control across the island to include the "one third" of its territory that they have envisaged as an essentially Turkish area. Fighting would go on behind this line for some time, as pockets of Greek Cypriot resistance were cleared up. The Turks could bring in reinforcements, but these would not be essential for their immediate objectives. We define these objectives as the establishment of a line from Morphou to Famagusta through or more likely around Nicosia and including the Nicosia airport in the Turkish zone.

2. Resistance by UN and/or UK forces would not significantly affect this outcome, except possibly in the immediate environs of Famagusta.

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BY hla NLF DATE 7/4/09



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3. The Soviets would not be able to bring significant forces to bear in the Cyprus arena. Their option would be to develop military/psychological pressures along Turkey's land frontiers, although they might also support Athens by flying in supplies to mainland Greece.


4. The mainland Greeks would not be able to reinforce the island in a way that would affect the outcome. The Karamanlis government would probably survive while the Turkish operation was going on, but if the Turkish move was not reversed through either military or political action by the US or NATO, Karamanlis' chances of staying in power would be very small. Greek withdrawal from NATO would be likely in these circumstances.

5. If the Turks went for broader objectives (i.e. sought to impose military control over Cyprus as a whole or seal off all possible entry points), they could probably do it, against Greek Cypriot opposition, but it would probably take them several weeks, the operation would be bloody, and they would need reinforcements.

6. The rough balance of forces on Cyprus at this time is as follows:

<u>Ground</u>	32,000 Turkish troops
	45,000 Greek Cypriot National Guard and Greek mainland officers

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
4,400 United Nations

Air

Turkish air force (600 operationally assigned aircraft) is available.

Greek air force (400 operationally assigned aircraft) is not available; its fighters are at outer limits of their combat ranges.

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Navy

Turkish navy (100+ combat ships and 60 amphibious craft) is available for operations with air cover.

Greek navy (60+ combat ships and 60-odd amphibious craft) is unable to operate successfully around Cyprus for lack of effective air cover.

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