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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 06425 120812Z

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ACTION CCO-00

INFO OCT-01 PASS-00 /001 W

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Z 120720Z AUG 74
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CONTROL: 2 9 87 Q

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~~SECRET~~ ANKARA 6425

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, CY, GR, TU
SUBJ: CYPRUS MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER

FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

GENEVA FOR HARTMAN

REF: STATE 175417

1. I MET WITH ECEVIT EARLY THIS MORNING (AUG 12) TO GIVE HIM THE BASIC POINTS OF YOUR ORAL MESSAGE (REFTEL). THE MEETING, I THINK, WENT VERY WELL.

2. ECEVIT FULLY, REPEAT FULLY, UNDERSTANDS THAT IN YOUR YESTERDAY'S MESSAGE YOU WERE NOT, REPEAT NOT, MAKING A PROPOSAL, BUT RATHER WERE SUGGESTING THAT THERE MIGHT BE OTHER ARRANGEMENTS WHICH COULD BE LOOKED AT BY THE PARTIES TO FIND A COMPROMISE WHICH ALL COULD SUPPORT. FURTHER, HE FULLY UNDERSTANDS, AND I THINK HAS LITTLE DIFFICULTY WITH, YOUR BELIEF IN THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY OF NOT HAVING AN "AMERICAN PROPOSAL" OR AN "AMERICAN-BACKED PROPOSAL" AT GENEVA. HE ALSO UNDERSTANDS, QUITE APART FROM THE PRINCIPLE INVOLVED IN THIS POSITION, THAT IN THE FEW HOURS THAT YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES HAVE HAD TO LOOK AT THE PROPOSAL HE REPORTED TO YOU YESTERDAY, IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO THINK THROUGH ALL OF ITS PLUSES AND MINUSES.



DECLASSIFIED *State Review*
3/31/04

BY HR 5/11/11 ~~SECRET~~



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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 ANKARA 06425 120812Z

3. COMING AT YOUR POINT IN A DIFFERENT WAY, I MADE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT OUR SATISFACTION OVER HIS YESTERDAY'S SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS AND OUR BELIEF THAT A CANTONAL APPROACH HAS MERIT MUST NOT REPEAT NOT BE MISCONSTRUED AS IMPLYING U.S. SUPPORT IN ANY WAY FOR THE TURKISH PROPOSAL WHICH EMERGED.

4. WHEN I SUGGESTED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT NOW WISH TO EXPLORE HIS IDEA INFORMALLY IN GENEVA TO OBTAIN THE REACTION OF OTHER PARTIES, HE FIRST RESPONDED BY WONDERING WHETHER YOU DID NOT THINK IT WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE GREEKS TO ACCEPT ANY PROPOSAL WHICH WAS FIRST ADVANCED BY THE TURKS.

5. I SAID THAT ON THE CONTRARY, I WAS SURE YOUR VIEW WAS THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO GET THE PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED INTO A PROCESS OF INFORMALLY FEELING EACH OTHER OUT TO SEE WHAT KIND OF A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION COULD BE ARRIVED AT -- AND I TOOK THE OCCASION TO AGAIN EMPHASIZE YOUR POINT THAT WHATEVER SOLUTION EMERGES MUST EMERGE AS A RESULT OF CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED. JUST HOW THAT WAS DONE, OF COURSE, WAS OBVIOUSLY A JUDGMENT BEST MADE BY THE GOT.

6. THE PRIME MINISTER RESPONDED THAT HE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED YOUR CANDOR AND ASKED ME TO REPORT TO YOU THAT HE WAS DEEPLY GRATEFUL FOR THE SIMILAR CANDOR WHICH HE FELT HAD CHARACTERIZED US-GOT DEALINGS FROM THE VERY START OF THE CRISIS. HE THEN NOTED THE STRIKING CONTRAST BETWEEN GOT SATISFACTION WITH US-GOT DEALINGS DURING THIS PERIOD AND GOT ACUTE DISSATISFACTION WITH THE UK'S ATTITUDE AND PERFORMANCE. HAVING SAID THIS, HE SAID HE REALLY DID NOT TRUST HIMSELF TO SPEAK ON THE LATTER SUBJECT AND WOULD THEREFORE REFRAIN FROM DOING SO. THIS RESTRAINT DID NOT TAKE FULLY HOLD, HOWEVER, UNTIL HE HAD UNBURDENED HIMSELF ON THE SUBJECT OF THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF UK THREATS, OF THE UK'S ACTING AS IF NOW WAS 60 YEARS AGO AND OF HIS CONTEMPT FOR THE UK'S SEEKING TO MASK ITS THREATENING MOVES BEHIND A UN UMBRELLA. THIS WAS A PORTION OF THE CONVERSATION I DECLINED TO JOIN IN ON, OTHER THAN TO REFER TO (A) YOUR NOTABLY CONTRASTING STYLE (AT WHICH POINT ECCEVITIS HEAD VIGOROUSLY NODDED), AND (B) THAT STYLE APART, I DID FEEL I MUST REMIND THE PRIMIN THAT SOME OF TURKEY'S SABER-RATTLING HAD BEEN TROUBLING TO ALL OF ITS FREINDS.



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PAGE 03 ANKARA 06425 120812Z

7. AFTER THE SUBSTANTIVE PART OF OUR DISCUSSION HAD ENDED AND AFTER WE HAD SAT AND HAD COFFEE FOR A FEW ADDITIONAL MINUTES, THE PRIMIN SAID THAT HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH RIGHT AWAY WITH GUNES IN GENEVA TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITIES OF AN INFORMAL TURKISH INITIATIVE THERE, AND THAT ONCE A GOT DECISION HAD BEEN REACHED IN THIS REGARD, HE WOULD BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH ME.
HACOMBER

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Z 120745Z AUG 74
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 5582
INFO USMISSION GENEVA FLASH

CONTROL: 2 9 8 8 Q

~~SECRET~~ ANKARA 6426

EXDIS HANDLE AS NOOIS

INFO: 11652: GOS
TIGS: PFOR, TU, CY, GR
SUBJ: CYPRUS: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER

FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

GENEVA FOR HARTMAN

REF: ANKARA 6425

1. FOLLOWING UP ON OUR CONVERSATION OF EARLIER THIS MORNING (REFTEL) BRIXIN TELEPHONED ME AT 10:00 A.M. LOCAL TIME (AUGUST 12) TO REPORT ON THE CONVERSATION HE HAD JUST COMPLETED WITH GUNES IN GENEVA.

2. HE SAID THAT GUNES HAD REPORTED THAT THE BRITISH AND THE GREEKS HAVE ALREADY INDICATED THAT THERE IS AN "AMERICAN PLAN." HE SAID HE HAD INSTRUCTED GUNES, HOWEVER, NOT REPEAT NOT TO IMPLY THAT THERE IS ANYTHING OF THIS KIND.

3. HE SAID HE ASKED GUNES AND DENKTASH TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE WITH THE OTHER PARTIES AT GENEVA AND TO SAY THAT WHILE THERE WERE CERTAIN ESSENTIALS WHICH THE TURKS MUST ACHIEVE, THE GOT WILL, AT THE SAME TIME, MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO AVOID HUMILIATION FOR OTHERS, HE ASKED THEM TO SOUND OUT THE OTHER PARTIES AS TO THEIR IDEAS AS TO HOW THIS HUMILIATION COULD BE AVOIDED, AND AT THE SAME TIME TURKISH

State Recd: 12 AUGUST 74
3/3/04

By HR 5/11/11

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 ANKARA 06426 120819Z

MINIMUM OBJECTIVES COULD BE MET. HE INSTRUCTED THEM TO SHOW AFFIRMATIVE INTEREST IF A CANTONIZATION-TYPE OF SOLUTION WAS SUGGESTED. SPECIFICALLY, HE INSTRUCTED THEM TO INDICATE THAT THIS FORM OF SOLUTION COULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO TURKEY. HE ALSO INSTRUCTED GUNES TO EMPHASIZE GOT FLEXIBILITY IN "STAGING" A SOLUTION IN THE MOST PALATABLE MANNER POSSIBLE.

4. PRIMIN SAID THAT GUNES HAD TOLD HIM THAT A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF THIS SOUNDING OUT HAD ALREADY STARTED YESTERDAY, BUT THAT HE, GUNES, WAS NOT REPEAT NOT, OPTIMISTIC AT THIS POINT ABOUT THE RESULTS. ACCORDING TO GUNES, THE GREEKS REALIZE THAT TURKEY'S BASIC REQUIREMENTS ARE UNAVOIDABLE BUT THEY CAN'T "BRING THEMSELVES TO SAY IT." NEVERTHELESS, GUNES WILL RENEW THE EFFORT TODAY.

5. THE PRIMIN TOLD ME HE CONCLUDED FROM GUNES'S REPORT THAT THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS WAS STILL VERY MIREED DOWN, AND HE HOPED THAT THE US WOULD SEEK TO FIND A MEANS TO GET IT MORE USEFULLY UNDERWAY.

6. HE CONCLUDED OUR CONVERSATION BY SAYING THAT HE WAS GLAD TO TELL ME THAT THE BRITISH STANCE WAS "MUCH SOFTER."
MACOMBER

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5586
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 736

INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS 3540
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 2413
AMEMBASSY LONDON 2768
USMISSION NATO 3231
USMISSION USUN 1664
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 8427
AMCONSUL ADANA 3817
AMCONSUL IZMIR 5118

UNCLAS ANKARA 6433

E.O. 11652: NA
TAGS: PFOR, TU, CY, GR
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: MILLIYET REPORTS 4-POINT KISSINGER PLAN
GENEVA FOR HARTMAN

SUMMARY: AUG 12 MILLIYET OUTLINES PROPOSED 4-POINT "KISSINGER"
PLAN. POINTS ARE: (1) 48-HOUR SUSPENSION GENEVA TALKS; (2) GREEK
EVACUATION OF TURKISH VILLAGES AND REGIONS; (3) ACCEPTANCE OF
FEDERAL SYSTEM AND FURTHER WORK ON THIS BY EXPERTS; AND (4) HALT TO
TURKISH MILITARY ADVANCE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF TIMETABLE FOR
GRADUAL FORCE REDUCTION. END SUMMARY.

1. MODERATE, PRO-GOVERNMENT MILLIYET IN AUG 12 EDITION HEADLINES
QUOTING FROM ARTICLE:

2. "IT HAS BEEN LEARNED THAT AMERICAN SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY
KISSINGER PRESENTED SOME NEW PROPOSALS IN THE CYPRUS MATTER AND
SENT THESE TO ANKARA, ATHENS AND LONDON."

3. "ACCORDING TO INFORMATION LEAKED FROM CIRCLES CLOSE TO THE
TURKISH AND ENGLISH DELEGATIONS AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, THE
HIGHLIGHTS OF THESE PROPOSALS ARE:"

- A. "A SUSPENSION OF GENEVA CONFERENCE FOR 48 HOURS."
- B. "GREEK EVACUATION OF TURKISH VILLAGES AND REGIONS."

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

HAK,SCDW,CROFT,LL

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C. "THE PRINCIPLE THAT A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER BASED ON FEDERATION OF THE ISLAND BE ACCEPTED IN THE CONFERENCE IN THE MANNER DEMANDED BY TURKEY; AND EXPERTS SHOULD BEGIN TO WORK ON THIS SUBJECT."

C. "A HALT TO TURKISH MILITARY ADVANCES AND A GRADUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES ACCORDING TO A TIMETABLE."

4. THE ARTICLE NOTES THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO GET OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION OF THIS NEWS THAT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED PARTICULARLY IN BRITISH CIRCLES. TURKISH OFFICIALS WOULD ONLY CONFIRM THAT "KISSINGER HAD MADE CERTAIN PROPOSALS" BUT THEY REFRAINED FROM GIVING DETAILED INFORMATION ON THIS SUBJECT. BRITIS SOURCES, ACCORDING TO MILLIYET SAY KISSINGER'S EFFORTS ARE DIRECTED AS MUCH TO FINDING A SOLUTION TO CYPRUS PROBLEM AS TO SAVING THE CONFERENCE.

MACOMBER

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TELEGRAM

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 TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7712
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CONTROL: 3 0 7 00
 RECD: 12 AUG '74, 1018A

~~SECRET~~ GENEVA 5174

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARTMAN

E.O. 11652: XGDS
 TAGS: PFOR, CV, TU
 SUBJECT: CYPRUS

REF: A. STATOV1670
 B. STATE 175418

1. IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT OF YOUR TWO TELEGRAMS I ASKED FOR A MEETING WITH CALLAGHAN. I WAS ASKED TO COME TO THE PALAIS DES NATIONS WHERE HE WOULD TRY TO SQUEEZE ME IN BETWEEN MEETINGS WITH THE VARIOUS PLAYERS IN THIS BYZANTINE GAME. WHEN HE WAS UNABLE TO BREAK AWAY HE SENT HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY MICHAEL ALEXANDER AND THE SENIOR MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION TO MEET WITH ME.

2. I STARTED BY SAYING THAT I WANTED TO TRY AND REMOVE WHATEVER MISUNDERSTANDINGS REMAINED CONCERNING THE SO-CALLED "AMERICAN PROPOSAL" MADE IN YOUR MESSAGE TO ECEVIT. I RECAPITULATED JOE SISCO'S TALK REPORTED STATE 175407 AND SAID I HEARD CALLAGHAN WAS STILL UNHAPPY OVER THE IDEA OF OUR MENTIONING THE IDEA OF A CANTONAL SOLUTION. ALEXANDER SAID THAT IT WAS NOT SO MUCH THE FACT THAT REFERENCE HAD BEEN MADE TO A CANTONAL SOLUTION THAT HAD UPSET CALLAGHAN AS WAS THE FEAR THAT THE U.S. HAD PUT FORWARD A PROPOSAL WITHOUT INFORMING HIM. THE PROBLEM IS NOT ONE OF SUBSTANCE SO MUCH AS IT IS ONE OF STYLE. I ASSURED HIM THAT WE HAD NOT PUT FORWARD NOR DID WE HAVE ANY INTENTION OF PUTTING FORWARD A PROPOSAL AND WE CERTAINLY WOULD NOT DO SO WITHOUT DISCUSSING IT FIRST WITH CALLAGHAN. THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO ECEVIT HAD BEEN IN SUPPORT OF WHAT CALLAGHAN WAS DOING HERE AND IN RESPONSE TO OUR JOINT CONCERN THAT TURKEY MIGHT TAKE SOME POSSIBLE IMMEDIATE MILITARY ACTION IN CYPRUS.



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TELEGRAM



-2- GENEVA 5174, 12 AUG '74

3. I THEN TOLD ALEXANDER THAT YOU HAD RECEIVED WORD FROM ECEVIT THAT HE IS CONSIDERING MAKING SOME PROPOSALS AT GENEVA, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME TYPE OF CANTONAL APPROACH. THIS WAS IN THE CONTEXT OF YOUR HAVING STRONGLY URGED ECEVIT TO DEMONSTRATE DIPLOMATIC FLEXIBILITY RATHER THAN SEEKING TO IMPOSE A SINGLE OBJECTIVE BY MILITARY FORCE. ALEXANDER SAID THAT DURING THE DISCUSSIONS AND PRIVATE DINNER BETWEEN CALLAGHAN AND THE GREEK AND TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTERS AUGUST 11 THERE HAD BEEN SIGNS OF GREATER TURKISH FLEXIBILITY, ALTHOUGH AS YET NO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS HAD SURFACED.

4. I TOLD ALEXANDER THAT I UNDERSTOOD CALLAGHAN HAD RAISED AGAIN IN HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH SISCO THE QUESTION OF WHAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD DO IN THE EVENT THE TURKS UNDERTAKE MILITARY ACTION IN VIOLATION OF THE CEASEFIRE TO EXTEND THE AREA THEY NOW OCCUPY IN CYPRUS. I HAD BEEN ASKED TO CONVEY TO CALLAGHAN FROM YOU FIVE POINTS. I READ THE FIVE POINTS CONTAINED IN STATE 17540Z VERY SLOWLY TO ALEXANDER WHO TOOK VERBATIM NOTES AND PROMISED TO PASS THEM TO CALLAGHAN. HE ASKED, IN RELATION TO POINT THREE, WHETHER THE UNITED STATES ENVISAGED APPLYING THE SAME TYPE OF PRESSURE IT HAD APPLIED SUCCESSFULLY THREE WEEKS AGO TO BRING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE. I SAID THAT WHILE I HAD NO EXPLICIT GUIDANCE ON THIS POINT, THE IMPLICATIONS OF WHAT WOULD BE INVOLVED FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE ENTIRE ALLIANCE AS WELL AS FOR THE UK AND GREECE WERE SO SERIOUS THAT I IMAGINED WE WOULD INDEED MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT.

5. ALEXANDER THEN SAID HE WISHED TO EXPLAIN THAT THE FRONT PAGES STORIES IN YESTERDAY'S BRITISH PRESS ABOUT ADDITIONAL REINFORCEMENTS FOR CYPRUS WERE COMPLETELY UNFOUNDED. CALLAGHAN HAD PROMISED ME NOT TO TAKE ANY ACTION OR MAKE ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS WITHOUT THE PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH US. HE WAS HOLDING THIS POSITION. THE STORIES IN THE PRESS RESULTED FROM INQUIRIES WHICH CALLAGHAN HAD MADE AS TO THE AVAILABILITY OF VARIOUS MILITARY UNITS PRIOR TO OUR CONVERSATION OF AUGUST 11. NO ORDERS HAD BEEN ISSUED EVEN ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS, MERELY INQUIRIES AND ALL ACTION ON POSSIBLE REINFORCEMENTS HAD BEEN SUSPENDED FOLLOWING OUR TALK. UNFORTUNATELY THE PRESS HAD JUMPED TO THE WRONG CONCLUSION BY PUTTING TOGETHER ACTION THAT HAD BEEN TAKEN THE PREVIOUS DAY TO STOP ANY WITHDRAWALS (INCLUDING

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TELEGRAM

-3- GENEVA 5174, 12 AUG '74


NORMAL ROTATION OF UNITS BACK TO ENGLAND) WITH THE INQUIRIES WHICH CALLAGHAN HAD MADE BUT HAD LATER TURNED OFF.

6. I TOOK THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN ONCE AGAIN THAT WE BELIEVE THAT ECEVIT CAN BE BROUGHT TO DISPLAY GREATER FLEXIBILITY BY A PROPER COMBINATION OF FIRMNESS AND DIPLOMATIC DIALOGUE IN PRIVATE BUT THAT PUBLIC THREATS STIR UP THE POWERFUL TURKISH PRESS, PROVIDE AN OPENING FOR THOSE IN TURKEY WHO WISH IMMEDIATE MILITARY ACTION, AND INCREASE THE PRESSURES ON ECEVIT TO BE TOUGH. ON OUR JUDGEMENT THIS ACTUALLY REDUCES OUR LEVERAGE OVER ECEVIT RATHER THAN INCREASING IT. I ALSO CAUTIONED ALEXANDER THAT IT IS NOT ABOVE THE TURKS TO TAKE WHATEVER THE UNITED STATES MIGHT SAY TO THEM THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS AND USE IT TO INDICATED TO TURKISH PUBLIC OPINION THAT THE UNITED STATES IS PUSHING CERTAIN PROPOSALS OR IDEAS. THIS MIGHT MAKE IT EASIER FOR ECEVIT TO DISPLAY THE NECESSARY FLEXIBILITY, A DESIRABLE END, BUT IT OBVIOUSLY COMPLICATED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND UK.

7. ALEXANDER ASKED THAT I TRY TO OBTAIN THE ACTUAL TEXT OF YOUR MESSAGE TO ECEVIT AS A MEANS OF ALLAYING CALLAGHAN'S SUSPICIONS. THIS IS SOMETHING, I REPLIED, THAT WAS PROBABLY NOT POSSIBLE SINCE YOU, QUITE RIGHTLY, BELIEVED THAT IS ESSENTIAL TO PROTECT THE CONFIDENCE OF TOP-LEVEL DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES.

ALEXANDER REMARKED THAT IT WAS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR CALLAGHAN, IN TERMS OF HIS PARTY AS WELL AS HIS CABINET POSITION, TO HAVE THE PRESS CARRY STORIES OF TURKEY AS REACTING ONLY TO THE UNITED STATES. I ASSURED ALEXANDER THAT AMBASSADOR MACOMBER HAD EXPLAINED TO ECEVIT, ACTING ON YOUR INSTRUCTIONS, THAT THERE WAS NO AMERICAN PROPOSAL AND THAT HE SHOULD NOT REFER TO ANY AMERICAN PROPOSAL.

8. ALEXANDER BROUGHT US UP TO DATE ON CALLAGHAN'S PRESENT TACTICS. HE IS TRYING TO BRING THE GREEKS, TURKS, CLERIDES AND DENKTASH TO AGREE TO A STATEMENT ANNOUNCING THAT CLERIDES AND DENKTASH WOULD BEGIN TO DISCUSS A "FUNDAMENTAL REVISION OF SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS." AND WOULD REPORT BACK TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF GREECE, TURKEY AND THE UK AT A FURTHER TRIPARTITE MEETING TO BE HELD IN ABOUT THREE WEEKS. CALLAGHAN BELIEVED, ON THE BASIS OF HIS TALKS WITH GUNES AND MAVROS LAST NIGHT, THAT THIS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. HE IS MEETING TODAY WITH CLERIDES AND DENKTASH AS WELL AS GUNES AND MAVROS TO TRY AND MOVE THIS IDEA ALONG.



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TELEGRAM

-4- GENEVA 5174, 12 AUG '74

9. ALEXANDER URGED THAT WE KEEP IN CLOSE CONTACT AND THAT EVERYTHING BE DONE TO AVOID FURTHER MISUNDERSTANDINGS SUCH AS THOSE WHICH HAD DEVELOPED OVER THE REPORT OF THE SO-CALLED AMERICAN PLAN AND OVER STORIES IN THE BRITISH PRESS ABOUT A TOUGH UK MILITARY POSITION IN CYPRUS. HE SAID THAT SO FAR AS CALLAGHAN IS CONCERNED IT IS ONLY A "FAMILY MATTER" AND THE LATTER HAS NOT INDICATED TO ANYONE ELSE IN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT THAT THERE IS ANY PROBLEM WHATSOEVER. ALEXANDER SAID HE WAS SURE THAT THE LUNCH YOU ARE HAVING WITH THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR TODAY WOULD DISSIPATE WHATEVER REMAINING CONCERNS CALLAGHAN MIGHT HAVE.

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COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 8

FOLDER TITLE Cyprus Crisis (35)

DATE WITHDRAWN 09/01/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

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FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7727

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 699
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 542
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 6146
AMEMBASSY INCOSIA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE 2619
USMISSION USUN NY IMMEDIATE 931

~~SECRET~~ GENEVA 5192

EXDIS
FROM HARTMAN
E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, CY
SUBJ: CYPRUS PHASE II TALKS--STATUS REPORT

1. AS OF MID-AFTERNOON AUGUST 12 CALLAGHAN IS AWAITING MEETING BETWEEN CLERIDES AND DENKTASH, AT LEAST INITIALLY IN HIS PRESENCE, TO TRY AND AGREE UPON A FORMULA FOR ON GOING NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO MEN. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE PROBLEMS FORESEEN IN PARAGRAPHS 3 AND 5 OF OUR 5151 NOTAL HAVE EMERGED CLEARLY AND ARE HAMPERING EFFORTS TO FIND AN AGREED FORMULA FOR ON-GOING TALKS. CALLAGHAN AND MAVROS VERY MUCH WISH TO HAVE FORMULA INCORPORATED IN STATEMENT BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES WITHOUT ANY REFERENCE TO THE THREE GUARANTORS OTHER THAN A COMMITMENT TO REPORT THE RESULTS OF THE BILATERAL TALKS BACK TO THE THREE WITHIN A FEW WEEKS. THEY'RE BOTH MAINTAINING JURIDICAL POSITION THAT THEY CAN HAVE NO SAY IN A REVISION OF THE CYPRIOT CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. CLERIDES, WE UNDERSTAND, IS ALSO TAKING THE JURIDICAL POSITION THAT THE THREE GUARANTORS HAVE NO SAY IN A REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION. AT THE SAME TIME HE SAYS THAT HE CAN MAKE NO PUBLIC REFERENCE TO FEDERALISM OR ANY OTHER CONCEPT WHICH IMPLIES REGIONAL AUTONOMY IF HE IS TO REMAIN IN OFFICE. WE HAVE HEARD THAT MAVROS IS CHECKING VARIOUS PROPOSED FORMULAE WITH BOTH ATHENS AND MAKARIOS. THE TURKISH POSITION, OF COURSE, REMAINS UNCHANGED: GUNES AND DENKTASH ARE INSISTING UPON THE



***** *WH5R COMMENT*****

HAK, SCONCROFT, LL

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MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF RECOGNITION AND ACCEPTANCE FOR THEIR CONCEPT OF REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND FOR BEGINNING THE CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS FROM SCRATCH BECAUSE THE 1960 CONSTITUTION IS DEAD.

2. THE TALKS EXPECTED BETWEEN THE THREE FOREIGN MINISTERS TO DEAL WITH UNFINISHED PROBLEMS SUCH AS BUFFER ZONES, EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS, DEMARCATION LINE, NICOSIA AIRPORT, TURKISH ENCLAVES HAVE NOT BEGUN. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE REASON FOR THIS IS GUNES' REFUSAL TO DISCUSS ANYTHING UNTIL AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON THE BASIC FRAMEWORK FOR FURTHER CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS.

3. WE'VE ALSO BEEN TOLD BY A SOURCE OF UNCERTAIN RELIABILITY, THAT MAVROS IS THREATENING TO FLY TOMORROW TO NEW YORK TO ASK FOR SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION. HE REPORTEDLY BELIEVES THERE IS NO POINT IN MAKING EFFORT TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH TURKEY, AS THE LATTER'S POSITION IS TOO TOUGH. HE IS SAID TO HAVE ASKED ROSSIDES IN NEW YORK FOR HIS ADVICE. ANOTHER STRAW IN THE WIND IS THE RUMOR THAT PAPENDREOU INTENDS TO RETURN TO ATHENS THIS WEEKEND DESPITE EFFORTS BY "FRIENDS" BUT NOT NECESSARILY POLITICAL SYMPATHIZERS TO CONVINCE HIM TO STAY AWAY AT LEAST ONE YEAR. THERE IS ALSO INCREASING TALK BY THOSE CLOSE TO MAVROS THAT MILITARY IN ATHENS ARE BECOMING RESTIVE AND POSSIBLY THREATENING TO KARAMANLIS.

4. THE PAPER WHICH THE BRITISH HAVE CIRCULATED AS A BASIS FOR THE NEXT STAGE OF TALKS IS ALREADY SAID BY CLERIDES TO HAVE GONE BEYOND HIS POSSIBILITIES BY SPEAKING OF "TWO AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATIONS WITHIN SUITABLE BOUNDARIES." THE LAST WORD IMPLIES TWO ZONES TO CLERIDES AND HE CANNOT ACCEPT IT, ACCORDING TO SOME SOURCES. ON THE OTHER HAND, DENKTASH IS SAID TO BE PREPARING A MUCH TOUGHER PAPER WHICH NAILS DOWN THE TWO ZONES. HE TOLD CALLAGHAN HE COULD NOT COMMENT ON THE UK DRAFT WITHOUT TALKING TO GUNES.

5. WE HAVE JUST BEEN TOLD BY PHONE BY RELIABLE UN SOURCE THAT DENKTASH HAS ARRIVED WITH HIS PAPER (AFTER CONSULTING GUNES) AND THAT THE PAPER SPECIFICALLY CALLS FOR THE TURKISH ZONE TO BE THAT PART OF CYPRUS NORTH OF A LINE FROM FAMAGUSTA THROUGH NICOSIA AND LEFKA TO A POINT ON THE COAST NEAR XERDS. CALLAGHAN IS IN A MEETING WITH CLERIDES AND DENKTASH TRYING TO SEE WHAT HE CAN DO TO NARROW THE WIDE GAP IN THEIR VIEWS.

6. COMMENT: I SEE NO ACTION FOR US AT THIS TIME ASIDE FROM MY TALKING TO MAVROS AND PERHAPS A MESSAGE TO ATHENS DESIGNED TO SHOW THAT WE DO NOT JUST DEAL WITH ANKARA; WISH TO BE SUPPORTIVE AND HELPFUL; SHARE THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT EXTREME POSITIONS, PARTICULARLY AS THESE AFFECT FRAGILE POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS IN ATHENS; AND OUR BELIEF THAT GENEVA OFFERS THE BEST HOPE-NEW YORK OR ANY OTHER PLACE IS A DEAD



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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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W A

CONTROL: 3 2 2 7 Q

Z 122141Z AUG 74 ZFFA
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO USMISSION GENEVA FLASH 4293
 BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 175929

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS
 TAGS: PFOR, TU, CY, GR
 SUBJECT: CYPRUS

State Review
 3/31/04
 BY 152 5/11/11

FROM THE SECRETARY FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARTMAN

1. I HAVE TOLD CALLAGHAN THAT I WOULD ASK YOU TO SHOW HIM FOR HIS PERSONAL INFORMATION ONLY AND NOT FOR RETENTION A COPY OF MY LETTER OF AUGUST 10 TO ECEVIT. (FYI: YOU WILL NOTE SLIGHT DELETIONS FROM THE ORIGINAL TEXT. END FYI.)

2. YOU SHOULD SHOW HIM THE FOLLOWING TEXT:

BEGIN QUOTE DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

I WAS GLAD TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK WITH YOU ON THE TELEPHONE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AND I APPRECIATE YOUR ASSURANCE THAT TURKEY WILL TAKE NO UNILATERAL MILITARY ACTION ON CYPRUS PENDING A FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION IN GENEVA.

AS YOU KNOW, FROM THE VERY START OF THE CYPRUS CRISIS, THE UNITED STATES HAS TRIED IN EVERY WAY TO SHOW SYMPATHY AND HELPFUL UNDERSTANDING FOR THE TURKISH POSITION. WE RECOGNIZED THAT TURKEY HAD LEGITIMATE CONCERNS OVER THE POSITION OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY AND THAT FAILURE TO CORRECT THIS SITUATION OVER THE YEARS DEEPLY DISTURBED TURKISH PUBLIC OPINION. WE HAVE MADE EVERY EFFORT TO KEEP YOU CURRENTLY INFORMED OF OUR THINKING ON THIS PROBLEM, AND YOU KNOW, MR. PRIME MINISTER, MY CONVICTION THAT IT IS OF PARAMOUNT STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE THAT THE SOVIETS BE DEPRIVED OF THE PRETEXT FOR FURTHER INCURSIONS INTO THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

STATE 175929, '12 AUG '74

IT IS IN THIS SAME SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP AND CANDOR THAT I MUST TELL YOU THAT ANY FURTHER UNILATERAL MILITARY ACTION BY TURKEY IN CYPRUS WOULD PRESENT US WITH THE MOST ENORMOUS DIFFICULTIES. SUCH A MILITARY MOVE BY TURKEY IN THE FIRST DEW DAYS OF PRESIDENT FORD'S ADMINISTRATION WOULD SIMPLY NOT BE UNDERSTOOD IN THE UNITED STATES. WHEN THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED THE REPRESENTATIVES OF OUR NATO ALLIES YESTERDAY AS HIS FIRST ACT FOLLOWING HIS ASSUMPTION OF THE PRESIDENCY, YOUR AMBASSADOR URGED THAT WE ENDEAVOR TO KEEP THE CYPRUS QUESTION OUT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. I TOLD HIM THAT WE WERE ENTIRELY AGREEABLE TO THIS. HOWEVER, IF TURKEY SHOULD TAKE UNILATERAL MILITARY MEASURES IN CYPRUS TO ENLARGE THE AREAS WHICH IT NOW HOLDS, THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SUPPORT TURKEY IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

AMBASSADOR MACOMBER HAS REPORTED TO ME FULLY ON YOUR CONVERSATION OF AUGUST 20. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT ALL THE ISSUES ARE CAPABLE OF EARLY SOLUTION, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE PROBLEM OF THE DEFINITION OF THE TURKISH AREA. I UNDERSTAND THAT TURKEY WISHES TO REACH A PROMPT SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND DOES NOT WISH TO HAVE THE TALKS PROLONGED UNNECESSARILY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THIS IS A COMPLEX QUESTION INVOLVING THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS NOT ONLY OF TURKEY, BUT ALSO OF GREECE, WHICH HAS JUST EMERGED FROM A LONG AND DIFFICULT PERIOD, AND OF THE CYPRIOTS THEMSELVES. AS I UNDERSTAND THE PRESENT SITUATION, THE DIFFERENCES WITH REGARD TO THE FUTURE STRUCTURE OF CYPRUS SEEM TO BE BETWEEN THE TURKISH DESIRE TO HAVE A SINGLE AUTONOMOUS ZONE AND THE GREEK CYPRIOT VIEW THAT THERE SHOULD BE A CANTONAL ARRANGEMENT, POSSIBLY INVOLVING MORE THAN ONE CANTON. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE DIFFERENCES HERE MIGHT BE NARROWED AND I WOULD URGE THAT AN ATTEMPT BE MADE TO DO SO. PERHAPS, FOR EXAMPLE, YOUR GOVERNMENT COULD CONSIDER TWO OR THREE WELL-DEFINED TURKISH AREAS RATHER THAN ONE SINGLE GEOGRAPHIC ZONE. AS I HAVE TOLD YOU BEFORE, THE UNITED STATES IS NOT WEDDED TO ANY ONE PARTICULAR FORMULA AND I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE WOULD SUPPORT ANY REASONABLE COMPROMISE WHICH COULD ASSURE PEACE AND STABILITY IN CYPRUS.

I AM SURE THERE ARE MANY OTHER IDEAS WHICH COULD BE CONSIDERED AS TO THE NATURE OF A COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT. I WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE MINISTERS IN GENEVA INSTRUCT A WORKING GROUP OF SENIOR OFFICIALS OF GREECE AND TURKEY AND

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

-3- STATE 175929, 12 AUG '74

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITIES TO GO INTO IMMEDIATE SESSION TO EXPLORE THE DETAILS OF SUCH A SETTLEMENT. THE MINISTERS WOULD INSTRUCT THIS WORKING GROUP TO REPORT BACK TO THEM AT A SPECIFIED TIME WHICH, IN OUR VIEW, NEED NOT BE MORE THAN THREE WEEKS.

WE MUST NOT LET THIS OPPORTUNITY PASS, MR. PRIME MINISTER, TO DEMONSTRATE ONCE AGAIN TO THE WORLD THAT, AS MEMBERS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, WE ARE ALL RESOLVED TO PRESERVE THE PEACE AND TO LIVE IN HARMONY WITH ONE ANOTHER. IT IS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT I APPEAL TO YOU TO MAKE A FURTHER CONTRIBUTION TO THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THIS VITAL AREA OF THE ALLIANCE.

I ASSURE YOU THAT THIS LETTER WILL BE KEPT COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL. WARM REGARDS, HENRY A. KISSINGER. END QUOTE.

KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY: EUR:WSTABLER
APPROVED BY: S-MR. EAGLE BURGER
CLEARANCES: P-MR. SISCO S/S-JPMOFFAT

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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CONTROL: 3 2 3 5 Q
RECD: 12 AUG '74 6:19PM

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FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7735
BT
~~SECRET~~ GENEVA 5200

NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARTMAN

E.O. 11652: SGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJECT: CYPRUS

1. ON THE PRACTICAL SIDE, I BELIEVE SOME WARNING OUGHT TO BE ROGER DAVIES, IF HE NEEDS ONE, TO BATTEN DOWN THE HATCHES QUIETLY AND UNOBSTRUSIVELY. I ALSO ASSUME THAT CONTINGENCY PLANNING IS IN PROGRESS TO GET SOME SHIPS NEARBY IF EVACUATION HELP IS AGAIN NEEDED.
2. THIS OF COURSE WOULD BE IN ADDITION TO ANY ACTION WE ARE TAKING WITH ECEVIT HIMSELF TO DETER HIS MOVING UNILATERALLY.
3. ONE THOUGHT ON THE MOUNTING OF A NATO REACTION IN THE CONTINGENCY OF A TURK MOVE IS TO BE AS SPECIFIC AS POSSIBLE ON THE ACTIONS THAT WOULD FOLLOW. SOME OF THESE INCLUDE STOPPAGES OF AID AND MILITARY SUPPLY, THREATENING TURKISH WORKER REMITTANCES (I'M NOT SURE HOW), ETC. I PREFER THIS TYPE OF PLAN TO PUTTING UN FORCES IN FRONT OF A SUPERIOR TURKISH FORCE. BUT SPECIFICITY WILL BE ESSENTIAL IF MY ASSESSMENT OF TURKISH ATTITUDES IS CORRECT. DALE.

State Review
NO. 142 (42222) 3/31/04
By HR 5/11/11



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FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7736

INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS FLASH 545

~~SECRET~~ GENEVA 5201

EXDIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARTMAN

1. IF THERE IS TO BE A REASONABLE COUNTER-PROPOSAL FROM CLERIDES, I BELIEVE KARAMANLIS WILL HAVE TO SUPPLY THE POLITICAL WILL. AS OF MIDNIGHT HERE CLERIDES WAS STILL STUCK FIRMLY TO HIS JURIDICAL POSITION THAT THE THREE GUARANTORS HAVE NO RPT NO COMPETENCE WHERE CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS ARE CONCERNED. THEREFORE HE HAS TOLD DENKTASH HE WILL PRESENT TO HIM PRIVATELY WHATEVER COUNTER-PROPOSAL HE MAY PRODUCE OVERNIGHT. DENKTASH, REFLECTING BOTH THE TURKISH POSITION AND PARA 5 OF THE TRIPARTITE GENEVA DECLARATION WHICH CALLED FOR THE PRESENCE OF CLERIDES AND DENKTASH, HAS SAID HE WILL NOT EVEN ACCEPT CLERIDES PROPOSAL UNLESS IT IS PRESENTED AT THE FULL MEETING.

2. I HAVE REPORTED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS HOW THE LEGALISTIC POSTURING OF CLERIDES AND MAVROS, BASED IN PART ON UNDERSTANDABLE POLITICAL FEARS, HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE FAILURE OF CYPRUS. I HAVE ALSO REPORTED FROM ATHENS AND FROM HERE THAT KARAMANLIS HAS MUCH MORE POLITICAL COURAGE THAN MAVROS AND THAT HIS FIRM BACKING IS ESSENTIAL IF CLERIDES IS TO MAKE ANY MEANINGFUL FORWARD MOVEMENT IN TALKING TO TURKS AND DENKTASH ABOUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURE OF CYPRUS.

3. IF EVER THERE WAS A TIME FOR STRONG, FORTHCOMING GUIDANCE AND SUPPORT FROM KARAMANLIS FOR CLERIDES IT IS IN HELPING THE LATTER FORMULATE HIS COUNTER-PROPOSAL. ASSUMING THAT NEITHER MAN CAN AT THIS MOMENT AGREE TO DRAW LINES ON A MAP OR ACCEPT A PERCENTAGE FIGURE, THE LEAST THAT ANY OF US CAN POSSIBLY DREAM OF AS SOMETHING WHICH WOULD GET A DIALOGUE STARTED WOULD BE LANGUAGE EXPLICITLY REFERRING TO TWO AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONCEPT OF

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By NA 5/11/11



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GEOGRAPHICAL ADMINISTRATIVE AREAS AND A CANTONAL OR FEDERAL PLAN WITHOUT ACTUALLY SPELLING OUT THE AREAS.

4. THE UK HAS DEVELOPED A NUMBER OF INTERESTING FORMULAS ALONG THESE LINES AND HAS OFFERED THEIR SERVICES TO CLERIDES AND MAVROS. THEIR OFFER HAS BEEN REFUSED.

5. YOU MAY WISH TO GET A MESSAGE TO KARAMANLIS SAYING HOW IMPORTANT YOU BELIEVE IT IS FOR MAVROS AND CLERIDES TO FOLLOW BRITISH ADVICE (THEIR LAWYER HAS SEVERAL FORMULATIONS BUT MAVROS AND CLERIDES WON'T TALK TO HIM) AND BE AS FORTHCOMING AS POSSIBLE IN THEIR COUNTER-PROPOSAL.

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