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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 4005  
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 226  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ GENEVA 5130

FROM ASST. SECY. HARTMAN  
E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, CY  
SUBJECT: CYPRUS

1. THE FIRST MEETING OF GENEVA PHASE II BEGAN AT 1830 AUGUST 8 AND LASTED FOR ABOUT TWO HOURS. THE UK DEL TELLS US THAT MAVROS AND GUNES "GOT IT OFF THEIR CHESTS" BUT THEN SETTLED DOWN TO A REASONABLY PRAGMATIC PERFORMANCE.

2. AGREEMENT WAS REACHED TO HAVE A WORKING-LEVEL COMMITTEE MEET ON THE MORNING OF AUGUST 9 TO DISCUSS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SUBPARAS IN THE GENEVA DECLARATION ON RELEASE AND EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS (ICRC WILL BE ON HAND), ON FREEING AND PROTECTION OF TURKISH ENCLAVES (UN WILL BE PRESENT), AND ON DEMARCATING FINALLY THE TURKISH LINE. THE UN REP WILL BE PRESENT AT THE MEETING OF THE WORKING COMMITTEE.

3. OUR UK FRIENDS WERE SPARING IN THE DETAILS THEY PROVIDED BUT CALLAGHAN (PLUS PROBABLY GUIDANCE FROM ATHENS) SEEMS TO HAVE GOTTEN MAVROS OVER HIS BIG HANG-UP OF CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS. MAVROS MADE HIS POINTS AND RESERVED GREESE'S POSITION ON THE JULY 22 AND JULY 30 LINES BUT HE AGREED TO HAVE THE COMMITTEE TRY TO ESTABLISH THE AGREED DEMARCATION LINE (BASED ON MAP DELINEATION FROM NICOSIA) AS OF



\*\*\*\*\*WHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

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AUGUST 9. UK IMPRESSION IS THAT FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE LINE CAN BE WORKED OUT, ALTHOUGH IT MAY TAKE SOME MORE HARD BARGAINING. CALLAGHAN INTRODUCED THE TRADE-OFF CONCEPT BETWEEN DEMARCATING THE LINE, MAINTAINING THE CEASEFIRE AND FREEING TURKISH ENCLAVES. REPORTEDLY THIS WAS QUITE HELPFUL IN GETTING AGREEMENT ON THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE.

4. THE FULL DELEGATIONS WILL MEET AGAIN AT 1800 AUGUST 8 TO SEE WHAT THE COMMITTEE HAS ACCOMPLISHED AND TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF NICOSIA AIRPORT AND, IF THERE IS TIME, TO BEGIN DISCUSSING CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES. THE BUFFER ZONE ISSUE WAS SUGGESTED BY THE UK AS A SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION BUT BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY LET IT DROP. IT MAY BE THAT FINAL RESULT WILL BE TACIT AGREEMENT TO ACCEPT THE PRESENT NO-MAN'S LAND BETWEEN THE OPPOSING FORCES AS THE BUFFER ZONE.

5. DURING THE COURSE OF AUGUST 9 I WILL BE PAYING COURTESY CALLS ON GUNES AND MAVROS AND WALDHEIM. THIS SHOULD ENABLE US TO GET A BETTER FIX ON WHERE AND WHEN SERIOUS PROBLEMS ARE LIKELY TO ARISE. DALE  
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~~SECRET~~ GENEVA 5131

EXDIS  
FROM ASST. SECY. HARTMAN  
E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFDR, CY  
SUBJECT: CYPRUS

1. I HAD SOVIET "OBSERVERS" MININ AND YURI LOGINDV FOR MEETING EARLY EVENING AUGUST 8. THEY STAYED FOR ALMOST TWO HOURS, FISHING TO ASCERTAIN OUR VIEWS AND THE DEGREE OF OUR INVOLVEMENT ON CYPRUS ISSUE. MININ SPROADICALLY PUSHED THEMES THAT SC RES 353 MUST BE IMPLEMENTED IMMEDIATELY, THAT ONLY THE PEOPLE OF CYPRUS SHOULD DECIDE THEIR OWN FATE, THAT FOREIGN TROOPS SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN AND THAT CYPRUS SHOULD REMAIN NON-ALIGNED. HE ALSO CAME VERY NEAR SAYING, ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, THAT FEDERAL SYSTEMS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE FOR CYPRUS, ALTHOUGH HE PUT IT IN TERMS OF "DE FACTO PARTITION." MININ WAS OBVIOUSLY DEFENDING CAUSE OF ARCHBISHOP BUT NEVER MENTIONED HIS NAME. HE HAD GREAT TROUBLE WITH OPPOSITION TO FEDERALISM, ESPECIALLY WHEN ASKED IF HE WISHED EMPOWER SC LOOK INTO INTERNAL POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS ALL MEMBER STATES.

2. IN REPLY, I REPEATED PATIENTLY THE NEED FOR EVERY RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT TO AID IN SEARCH FOR SOLUTION WHICH WOULD NOT ONLY STOP THE PRESENT CONFLICT BUT PRODUCE LONGER TERM

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STABILITY, WHILE SPEECHES AND RESOLUTIONS IN UN SECURITY COUNCIL OR EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY MIGHT MAKE FOR GOOD THEATRE, THEY ONLY MADE SOLUTION MORE DIFFICULT. USG HAS NO FIXED IDEAS ON FORM OF SOLUTION ALTHOUGH WE SUPPORT SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF CYPRUS. FAILURE OF 1960 CONSTITUTION TO GUARANTEE IN FACT TO TURKISH CYPRIOTS WHAT WAS PROMISED ON PAPER, FAILURE SHARED BY UN SC AND GUARANTOR POWERS, CREATED SITUATION WHEREBY OVERTHROW OF MAKARIOS MADE TURKISH MILITARY ACTION INEVITABLE, ALTHOUGH WE HAD TRIED TO STOP IT. IN ORDER BRING ABOUT REDUCTION OR WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS, IT WILL BE NECESSARY BUILD UP CONFIDENCE AND PROVIDE SOLID GUARANTEES THAT TURKISH CYPRIOTS COULD BELIEVE IN. ON GREEK SIDE, THEIR OFFICERS IN NATIONAL GUARD PROVIDE ONLY BARRIER TO VIRTUAL CIVIL WAR AMONG GREEK CYPRIOTS UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. BASED ON PERSONAL OBSERVATION, I TOLD THEM THE FEARS OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY ARE VERY, VERY REAL, AS ARE THE DANGERS TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS FROM THE HEAVILY-ARMED, UNDISCIPLINED CHE-GUEVERA TYPES. THEREFORE, ONE SHOULD ALLOW THE SITUATION TO CALM DOWN BEFORE DEMANDING WITHDRAWAL. PROGRESS ON REMOVING FOREIGN TROOPS IN LINKED TO PROGRESS ON CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS.

3. THE IMAGE WE PROJECTED WAS ONE OF RELAXED CONFIDENCE AND LONG-TERM INTEREST IN REAL SOLUTION. EVEN MORE INTERESTING TO SOVS THAN OUR ROLE OR VIEWS WAS MY EXPECTED DEPARTURE DATE. THEY SEEM TO BE RATHER ANXIOUS TO RETURN TO MOSCOW, FINDING VERY LITTLE TO DO HERE.

4. MININ WAS EMPHATIC ON THE NEED FOR THE CYPRIOTS THEMSELVES TO NEGOTIATE ANY CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. I AGREED, BUT ADDED ONE SHOULD NOT FORGET THE VITAL ROLE OF GUARANTORS AND GUARANTEES. AFTER ALL, THE TURKISH AND GREEK MILITARY ON THE ISLAND WERE THERE WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES, NOT IN SPITE OF THEM.

5. WE DISCUSSED THE NEWS OF THE IMPENDING RESIGNATION OF PRESIDENT NIXON. WHEN THEY ASKED IF THIS WOULD MEAN A CHANGE IN POLICY, IT GAVE ME A GOOD OPENING TO SAY THAT OUR FOREIGN POLICY WOULD MOST DEFINITELY NOT CHANGE BUT WOULD BE MORE EMPHATIC AND DETERMINED AS THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS AND PEOPLE PULLED TOGETHER TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM SOLIDARITY AND SUPPORT FOR A NEW PRESIDENT DURING A PERIOD OF TRANSITION. I EXPLAINED THIS HAD ALWAYS BEEN THE CASE HISTORICALLY. SO FAR AS CYPRUS IS CONCERNED, THEY SHOULD EXPECT NO RPT NO CHANGE IN OUR POLICY. DALE  
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PAGE 02

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TO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5559

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, TU, CR, CY

SUBJECT: REPORTED PROPOSALS FOR UNITED REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS  
 GENEVA FOR HARTMAN

SUMMARY: REPORTED TURKISH PROPOSALS FOR A UNITED REPUBLIC  
 OF CYPRUS FEATURE NORTHERN 30 PERCENT OF ISLAND TO TURKEY, TWO  
 AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATIONS, EACH RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NATIONAL  
 DEFENSE, ECONOMY, FINANCE, EDUCATION, POLICE JUSTICE, AND  
 COMMERCE OF ITS REGION. END SUMMARY.

1. AUG 9 TURKISH NEWS AGENCY REPORT APPEARING IN MODERATE,  
 PRO-GOVERNMENT MILLIYET OUTLINES NATURE OF PROPOSED UNITED  
 REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS WHICH MAY BE ADVOCATED BY TURKISH DELEGA-

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
TION IN GENEVA. DETAILS ARE ATTRIBUTED TO "OFFICIALS."

2. THE PROPOSAL ENVISIONS A UNITED REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS COMPOSED  
 OF AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATIONS OF TURKS AND GREEKS. QUOTING FROM  
 ARTICLE: "THIRTY PERCENT OF THE ISLAND WILL BE LEFT TO THE TURKISH  
 COMMUNITY, THE REST, EXCLUDING THE BRITISH SOVEREIGN BASES, TO BE  
 GIVEN TO THE GREEK COMMUNITY. THE TURKISH SECTOR WILL BE THE  
 OF THE ISLAND, THE BOUNDARIES BEING SET OUT BY A LINE DRAWN FROM  
 LEPKA TO FAMAGUSTA THROUGH THE MIDDLE OF NICOSIA.

3. "GREEKS AND TURKS WILL BE ALLOWED TO LIVE IN EACH OTHER'S PART  
 OF THE ISLAND IF THEY WISH. IF NOT THEY WILL GO TO THE REGION SET  
 FOR THEIR KINSMEN. THOSE WHO DO SO WILL BE ACCORDED THE NECESSARY  
 FACILITIES. RULES WILL BE ESTABLISHED FOR THE TRANSPORTATION  
 THEIR PROPERTY OR THEY WILL BE PAID FOR IT.

4. AFTER THE PRECISE BOUNDARIES OF THE TURKISH AND GREEK CYPRIOT  
 COMMUNITIES OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS ARE DETERMINED,

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THE ADMINISTRATIONS IN THESE REGIONS WILL HAVE FULL AUTONOMY IN POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION, ECONOMY, FINANCE, EDUCATION, DOMESTIC SECURITY AND NATIONAL DEFENSE. TURKS AND GREEKS WILL HAVE THEIR OWN PARLIAMENTS WITHIN THEIR REGIONS AND THE PARLIAMENTS WILL ESTABLISH A GOVERNMENT FOR EACH REGION. HOWEVER, THE TWO COMMUNITIES WILL ALSO BE FREE TO REGULATE THEIR DOMESTIC AFFAIRS BY OTHER METHODS WITHOUT IMPAIRING THE STATUS OF THE ISLAND.

5. THE TURKISH AND GREEK SECTORS WILL SET UP POLICE ORGANIZATIONS TO ENSURE DOMESTIC SECURITY AND WILL BE ABLE TO FORM MILITARY FORCES WITHIN CERTAIN AGREED UPON QUOTAS. MILITARY FORCES WILL BE CHARGED WITH ENSURING THE SECURITY OF THE REGIONS.

6. THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS WILL ALSO HAVE A FEDERAL PARLIAMENT AND A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. THIS PARLIAMENT AND GOVERNMENT WILL REGULATE THE RELATIONS OF THE COMMUNITIES WITH ONE ANOTHER AND (GREEKS AND TURKS) WILL HAVE EQUAL REPRESENTATION. THE GUARANTOR STATES WILL HAVE A SAY IN THE EXTERNAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS.

7. THE TURKISH AND GREEK AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATIONS WILL PAY CERTAIN SUMS FROM THEIR BUDGETS TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO MEET THE EXPENSES IT WILL INCUR. THESE APPROPRIATIONS WILL BE IN

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PAGE 03 ANKARA 06396 091500Z

PROPORTION TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ISLAND BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES.

8. AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATIONS WILL REGULATE EVERY TYPE OF SERVICE WITHIN THEIR OWN REGIONS. THEY WILL BE ABLE TO ACT FREELY IN FINANCE, EDUCATION, DOMESTIC SECURITY, JUSTICE AND COMMERCE. THE GENEVA CONFERENCE WILL INTRODUCE SOME PRINCIPLES ABOUT HAVING MILITARY FORCES ON THE ISLAND, BUT THE MILITARY FORCES WILL NOT BE FEDERAL. EACH AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATION WILL HAVE ITS OWN MILITARY FORCE AND ITS ADMINISTRATION.

9. A SEPARATE STATUS WILL BE ESTABLISHED FOR NICOSIA AIRPORT. THIS STATUS WILL ENABLE THE TWO COMMUNITIES TO BENEFIT FROM THE AIRPORT ON EQUAL TERMS. --- 1

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E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PEOR, GRNK, CSJ, TU  
SUBJECT: CYPRUS  
FOR SISCO FROM MACOMBER  
GENEVA FOR HARTMAN  
REF: STATE 173210

1. WITH RESPECT TO REFTEL, I BELIEVE THERE IS NO REPEAT NOT DOUBT IN TURKEY'S MIND CONCERNING THE EFFECT ON THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OF AN AIR STRIKE AT THIS TIME. I DO NOT BELIEVE SUCH A STRIKE IS CONTEMPLATED IN THE ABSENCE OF WHAT APPEARS TO TURKS AS SERIOUS NEW ADVERSE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN CYPRUS. THE ALERTS I HAVE REPORTED CONTINUE, AND WE CONTINUE TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THEM. OUR BEST JUDGMENT, HOWEVER, IS THAT THEY DO NOT PRESAGE AN UNPROVOKED TURKISH INITIATIVE IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY AHEAD.

2. GIVEN: (1) TURKISH DETERMINATION AND STUBBORNESS, (2) ITS OCCASIONALLY IMPRESSIVE IMPERVIOUSNESS TO INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC RELATIONS, AND THE ADVICE OF ITS FRIENDS, AND (3) TURKEY'S MASSIVE MILITARY DOMINANCE ON CYPRUS AND ON THE ADJACENT TURKISH MAINLAND, -- WE CANNOT ALTOGETHER RULE OUT POSSIBILITY THAT TURKS WILL AGAIN INITIATE MAJOR HOSTILITIES ON THE ISLAND ESPECIALLY IF GENEVA II BEGINS SERIOUSLY TO DETERIORATE.

3. MY BELIEF IS THAT GDT WISHES TO ACHIEVE SOLUTION AT GENEVA, IS REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT A SOLUTION CAN BE REACHED THERE, AND IS PREPARED TO "GIVE" SOMEWHAT MORE IN NEGOTIA-



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TIONS THERE THAN ITS INITIAL POSTURING WILL SUGGEST. BUT THERE ARE LIMITS TO THIS GIVE. IF TURKS GET IDEA THAT WORLD IS GANGING UP ON THEM TO BREACH THESE LIMITS, OUR CONCERN HERE IS THAT COOLER TURKISH HEADS COULD BE OVERRULED AND A NEW TURKISH MILITARY INITIATIVE THREATENED.

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PAGE 02

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# TELEGRAM

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARTMAN

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PFOR, CY  
SUBJ: CYPRUS PHASE II--CALLAGHAN STRATEGY

1. WE HAD A LONG EXCHANGE OF ASSESSMENTS WITH CALLAGHAN AND HIS STAFF THE AFTERNOON OF AUGUST 9. IT LED HIM TO DEVELOP A STRATEGY WHICH HE TENTATIVELY PLANS TO USE FOR CONCLUDING THIS PHASE OF THE GENEVA TALKS AND ESTABLISHING A FRAMEWORK FOR ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS. THE STRATEGY IS DESIGNED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT WHAT UK AND WE HAVE ASCERTAINED TO DATE AS TO THE POSITIONS FOR THE VARIOUS PARTIES, INCLUDING THOSE NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED, SUCH AS MAKARIOS AND THE USSR. CALLAGHAN ALSO STATED FRANKLY THAT IT IS DESIGNED TO MEET HIS MINIMAL POLITICAL NEEDS AT HOME WHERE HE, AS CHAIRMAN OF A LABOR PARTY APPROACHING ELECTIONS, SIMPLY CANNOT AFFORD TO BE SEEN AS COMPLETELY SELLING OUT THE NEW GREEK GOVT.
2. THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THIS STRATEGY ARE SIMPLE AND ARE SET FORTH BELOW.
3. ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL SIDE, CALLAGHAN UNDERSTANDS THE STRENGTH OF TURKEY'S DEMAND FOR A PRIOR COMMITMENT IN PRINCIPLE BY GREECE (AS WELL AS GREEK CYPRIOTS) TO THE CONCEPT OF AN



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PAGE 02 GENEVA 05151 092012Z

AUTONOMOUS TURKISH CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION IN A SEPARATE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA, WITHIN AN INDEPENDENT, SOVEREIGN STATE, WITHOUT A PRIOR COMMITMENT ALONG THESE LINES TURKEY MAY REFUSE TO AGREE TO ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS AND RESORT AGAIN SOON TO MILITARY ACQUISITION OF ADDITIONAL TERRITORY. THE WORDING OF A SUCH A COMMITMENT, WHETHER IT BE VERBAL OR WRITTEN, WILL BE VERY IMPORTANT IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE THE POLITICAL STRAIN IT WILL PLACE ON THE GREEK GOVT. AN CLERIDES, HOWEVER, THE COMMITMENT, IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER, APPEARS A SINE QUA NON. MY ADVICE TO GUNES WAS THAT THE TURKS SHOULD NOT DEMAND EXCESSIVE PRECISION, ABOVE ALL, BUT FOR OBVIOUS REASONS I DID NOT SAY THIS YET TO GUNES, THEY SHOULD NOT INST

AT THIS SESSION ON A REFERENCE TO THE PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL LAND AREA OR ON A MAP OF THEIR ZONE. (I BELIEVE CALLAGHAN UNDERSTANDS THE IMPORTANCE OF TRYING TO AVOID A MAP APPROACH TO THE REGIONS IN THIS PHASE.)

4. TO BALANCE THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT BY GREECE, CALLAGHAN WILL SEEK A COMMITMENT BY TURKEY ON THE PHASED REDUCTION OF TROOPS, TO BEGIN FOLLOWING THE CONCLUSION OF THIS PHASE OF THE GENEVA TALKS AND THE BEGINNING OF WORKING - LEVEL DISCUSSIONS ON CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. (DEPT. AND ANKARA WILL RECALL THAT ECCEVIT TOLD ME ON AUGUST 4 THAT THIS WAS CONCEIVABLE FOR HIM IF THE GREEKS AGREED IN SUFFICIENT DETAIL TO THE PRINCIPLE OF THE TURKISH IDEA ON GEOGRAPHIC AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATION, AND THAT IT COULD BEGIN BEFORE FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.) AMONG THE QUESTIONS ALMOST CERTAIN TO ARISE ARE THOSE OF USE OF WORD "WITHDRAWAL", TIME-TABLE FOR REDUCTION STEPS OR PHASES, NUMBERS TO BE EVACUATED IN EACH STAGE, AND LINKAGE GREEK NUMBERS TO TURKISH NUMBERS.

5. THE ON-GOING TALKS, FOR WHICH THE ABOVE COMMITMENTS ARE PRECONDITIONS, ARE ENVISAGED BY CALLAGHAN AS TAKING PLACE BETWEEN CLERIDES AND DEAKTASH, PREFERABLY WITHOUT GREEK, TURKISH, BRITISH OR UN REPRESENTATIVES EITHER PARTICIPATING OR OBSERVING. HOWEVER, THERE WOULD BE SOME AGREED FORMULA (PROBABLY INCORPORATED INTO A PHASE II GENEVA DECLARATION) WHICH STATES THAT THE TALKS ARE NOT ON PREVIOUS INTER-COMMUNAL BASIS AND THAT THE TWO WILL REPORT RESULTS OF THEIR EFFORTS BACK TO A TRI-PARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING WHICH WOULD BE SET FOR THE FIRST WEEK IN SEPTEMBER. THIS WOULD HELP MEET

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PAGE 03 GENEVA 05151 092012Z

TURKISH CONCERNS THAT THE TALKS NOT DRAG OUT, NOT A REVERSION TO THE OLD INTER-COMMUNAL FORMULA (AND 1960 CONSTITUTION), YET BE ASSOCIATED WITH TRIPARTITE GUARANTORS OF 1960 CONSTITUTION. IT WOULD ALSO HELP MEET THE UK AND GREEK CONCERN THAT THEY NOT BE ASSOCIATED DIRECTLY WITH DRAWING UP A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR AN INDEPENDENT STATE. CALLAGHAN IS RELUCTANT TO HAVE A BRITISH PRESENCE BUT HE ASSUMES THAT THE PARTIES WILL HAVE UNOFFICIAL ADVISERS AND PLENTY OF GUIDANCE FROM GREECE AND TURKEY. WALDHEIM HAS TOLD CALLAGHAN THAT OLD FORMAT FOR TALKS IS DEAD AND HE SEES (AND WANTS) NO ROLE FOR THE UN. A POTENTIAL PROBLEM IN CALLAGHAN'S IDEA OF FRAMEWORK IS CLERIDES' NEED FOR POLITICAL SUPPORT OR "COVER" WHICH MIGHT CAUSE HIM PREFER MORE DIRECT GREEK PARTICIPATION.

## 6. CONCLUSION:

A. I FIND MYSELF MORE AND MORE FORCED INTO THE ROLE OF "PROFESSIONAL OPTIMIST" AMONG THESE GLOOMY JOES. AFTER LISTENING TO CALLAGHAN IN LONDON EXPRESS HIS RIGHTEOUS INDIGNATION ABOUT EVEN SITTING DOWN WITH FELLOWS WHO BREAK THEIR WORD (READ TURKEY), IT GRADUALLY NURSED HIM (WITH NO GREAT OPPOSITION ON HIS PART SINCE HE WAS REALLY LETTING OFF STEAM) TO THE POINT WHERE HE BEGAN TO SEE HIS ROLE AS IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN AND NOT A MORAL ARBITER OF EQUITIES. EACH TIME WE SEE EACH OTHER, HOWEVER, HE HAS NEW BAD NEWS AND HALF THE CONVERSATION IS NUGGING HIM BACK ON THE POSITIVE THINKING ROAD. I CONGRATULATED HIM PROFUSELY ON HIS FIRST DAY'S EFFORTS TO HELP ASSURE THAT HE GOES OUT OF HIS CORNER TONIGHT IN AN UP MOOD. HE WAS IN GOOD MOOD AFTER OUR LONG DISCUSSION BUT HIS FINAL COMMENT TO ME AT SHORT MEETING A PROPOS - ANOTHER TURK MILITARY ACTION, WAS AN OLD DERBYSHIRE MINER'S SAYING MORE CRUDELY PUT: "NEVER LET THEM KICK YOU IN THE TAIL TWICE BY THE SAME BOOT."

B. NEEDLESS TO SAY BOTH GUNES AND MAVROS ARE ALSO PESSIMISTIC SINCE BOTH REALIZE THAT AN AGREEMENT MEANS RECEDING FROM THEIR PRESENT POSITIONS. THEY BOTH SEEM TO HAVE A DETACHED VIEW THAT ASSUMES THINGS WON'T WORK OUT AND IT WILL BE SOMEONE ELSE'S FAULT. GUNES HAS BEEN HAULED BACK BEFORE BY ANKARA FOR BEING TOO "SOFT" AND SEEMS TO HAVE LOST HIS ZEST FOR NEGOTIATIONS

MAYROS SEEMS TO FEAR HE MIGHT BE INSTRUCTED BY CARAMANLIS TO MAKE

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PAGE 04 GENEVA 05151 092012Z

CONCESSIONS WHICH WOULD WEAKEN HIS POLITICAL BASE. WHAT IS LACKING IS THE HUMAN ELEMENT AND I CAN ONLY HOPE THAT CLERIDES AND DENKTASH MAY SUPPLY IT. I AM AFRAID MY OWN APPEARANCE OF OPTIMISM IS ONLY BARELY CREDIBLE.

C. IF CALLAGHAN'S STRATEGY IS TO SUCCEED, IT IS CLEAR HE WILL REQUIRE OUR CONTINUING SUPPORT. AT SOME MOMENT THIS MAY WELL REQUIRE FIRM, HIGH-LEVEL DEMARCHES TO BOTH ECEVIT AND CARAMANLIS. ADDRESSEES SHOULD BE THINKING ABOUT HOW THIS CAN BEST BE DONE. MY GUESS IS THAT CRITICAL MOMENT WILL PROBABLY HIT AUGUST 11. DALE

NOTE: CCO DELIVER TO OFF-LINE FOR PROCESSING.

~~SECRET~~

