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APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY
EUR - MR. HARTMAN
S/S - MR. GANNON

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State Review
3/3/04

EXDIS DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS

By: *HR* 4/5/11

SUBJECT: CYPRUS

1. SECRETARY PERSONALLY TELEPHONED PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT AT 3 P.M. LOCAL TIME, JULY 24, AND TOLD HIM THAT WE HAD RECEIVED A REPORT THAT TURKISH AMBASSADOR IN NICOSIA, WHO TENDS TO GET EXCITED, HAD TOLD US THAT TURKISH FORCES WOULD TAKE NICOSIA AIRPORT IN TWO HOURS' TIME.

2. ECEVIT REPEATED HIS CATEGORIC ASSURANCES THAT (A) WHATEVER SITUATION MAY PRESENTLY EXIST AT AIRPORT WOULD REMAIN UNCHANGED; AND (B) TURKISH FORCES WOULD UNDER NO CONDITIONS ATTACK UN FORCE. ECEVIT ADMITTED THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION AS TO WHAT THE SITUATION WAS AT NICOSIA AIRPORT AND THERE WERE TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT: EITHER THE TURKISH FORCE CONTROLLED MOST OF THE AIRPORT WITH THE UN HOLDING ONLY A PART, OR THE AIRPORT IS COMPLETELY UNDER UN

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TELEGRAM

Department of State

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CONTROL.

3. AFTER TALKING WITH ECEVIT, SECRETARY TALKED TO FOREIGN SECRETARY CALLAGHAN WHO SAID UK ALSO HAD REPORTS ABOUT TANKS AND INFANTRY MOVING ON AIRPORT. SECRETARY TOLD CALLAGHAN THAT WE HAD RECEIVED CATEGORIC ASSURANCES FROM ECEVIT THAT TURKS WOULD NOT ATTACK. CALLAGHAN SAID HE HAD ALSO RECEIVED SUCH ASSURANCES, BUT WAS NOT SO REASSURED.

4. MEANTIME, WALDHEIM WAS INFORMED US THAT UN FORCES AT AIRPORT HAVE RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO RESIST ANY ATTEMPT BY TURKISH FORCES TO GAIN CONTROL OF AIRPORT. KISSINGER

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(NATO-CYPRUS)

BRUSSELS (UPI) -- U.S.-EUROPEAN UNITY BROKE DOWN AT THE START OF THE CYPRUS COUP AND ONLY A REVERSAL OF U.S. POLICY PERMITTED ALLIED COOPERATION TO END THE CRISIS, EUROPEAN DIPLOMATS SAID TODAY.

IN A SERIES OF BRIEFINGS AND INTERVIEWS, THE DIPLOMATS GAVE A PICTURE FAR DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE BEING PUBLICLY PROCLAIMED HERE AND IN WASHINGTON -- THAT OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION ALLIES WORKING IN HARMONY TO SOLVE THE CRISIS.

BETWEEN THE COUP ON JULY 15 THE TURKISH INVASION OF CYPRUS ON JULY 20, THE EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF NATO BLAMED THE AFFAIR ON THE MILITARY REGIME IN ATHENS AND PUT PRESSURE ON GREECE TO WITHDRAW ITS OFFICERS FROM CYPRUS, THE DIPLOMATS SAID.

BY CONTRAST, THEY SAID, THE U.S. PRESENTED A MORE EVEN-HANDED PUBLIC POSTURE THAT WAS SEEN HERE AS A "TILT" TOWARD GREECE. WASHINGTON'S VAST INFLUENCE IN THE AREA, THEY SAID, WAS USED TO TRY TO CALM TURKEY RATHER THAN TO PRESSURE GREECE -- A POLICY THAT ENDED WHEN TURKEY, DESPAIRING OF USEFUL AMERICAN HELP, INVADED CYPRUS.

AFTER THAT INVASION, THEY SAID, WASHINGTON'S POLICY CHANGED TO ONE OF ALL-OUT COOPERATION WITH THE ALLIES TO GET A CEASE-FIRE. LED BY SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER AND BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY JAMES CALLAGHAN, THE ALLIES MOVED SMOOTHLY AND SWIFLY TO CONTAIN THE CRISIS.

ON JULY 20, THE NATO COUNCIL MET HERE AND A HIGH OFFICIAL TOLD NEWSMEN THAT MOST OF THE 15 NATO NATIONS SUPPORTED THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE GREEK OFFICERS AND TENDED TO BLAME GREECE FOR THE COUP. HE IMPLIED THE UNITED STATES BACKED THIS ASSESSMENT.

BUT WITHIN HOURS, THE STATE DEPARTMENT DENOUNCED THIS INTERPRETATION. NATO, APPARENTLY EMBARRASSED, HELD NO FURTHER BRIEFINGS UNTIL THE CRISIS ENDED.

ON JULY 21, THE REBEL-HELD NICOSIA RADIO BROADCAST REPORTS THAT THE U.S. HAD DECIDED NOT TO INTERVENE TO RESTORE PRESIDENT MAKARIOS. IT USED THESE REPORTS TO SOLIDIFY ITS OWN POSITION.

THE DIPLOMATS SAID THE CRISIS MISSION OF U.S. UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE JOSEPH SISCO WAS AIMED MOSTLY AT PREVENTING TURKISH ACTION -- NOT AT REVERSING THE CYPRUS COUP. IT WAS ONLY WHEN THIS FAILED THAT THE UNITED STATES SWUNG AROUND TO THE EUROPEAN POSITION, THEY SAID.

IN THE FINAL DAYS OF THE AFFAIR, ALLIED COOPERATION WAS FIRM AND IMPRESSIVE, THEY SAID. THE NATO COUNCIL MET UP TO THREE TIMES DAILY. KISSINGER CALLED FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER JEAN SAUVAGNARGUES, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMON MARKET COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, AS MANY AS FOUR TIMES DAILY.

IF THERE WERE REPORTS HERE -- NOT CONFIRMED BUT WIDELY BELIEVED IN EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES -- THAT THE U.S. WAS HAPPY TO SEE MAKARIOS OUT OF OFFICE, AND THIS COLORED IMMEDIATE U.S. REACTION. ACCORDING TO THESE ASSESSMENTS, IT WAS ONLY WHEN AN ACTUAL GREEK-TURKISH WAR LOOMED THAT THE AMERICAN POSITION CHANGED.

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Department of State

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EXDIR (DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS)
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR GR CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS

FROM THE SECRETARY FOR THE AMBASSADOR

1. I RELIEVE IT WOULD BE MOST USEFUL AT THIS STAGE TO GIVE THE NEW GREEK GOVERNMENT SOME IDEA OF HOW WE ARE APPROACHING THE POLITICAL SITUATION WHICH HAS BEEN CREATED ON CYPRUS AS A RESULT OF THE COUP AND THEN THE MILITARY INTERVENTION. I DO NOT ASK THAT YOU GIVE THE GREEKS TEXTUALLY WHAT FOLLOWS, BUT RATHER THAT YOU USE IT AS YOUR GUIDANCE IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GREEKS.

2. WE THINK IT IMPORTANT THAT EACH PARTY RETAIN FLEXIBILITY AT THIS TIME AND NOT ADHERE TO ANY POSITION PREMATURELY WHICH IT MAY SUBSEQUENTLY FIND IS NOT IN ITS LONG-RANGE INTERESTS. WE HOPE THE GREEKS WILL CAREFULLY CONSIDER THE DAMAGE WHICH HAS BEEN DONE IN THE PAST TEN DAYS, NOT ONLY IN TERMS OF ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS, BUT ALSO IN TERMS OF THE POTENTIAL FOR SOVIET MEDDLING IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. WE HOPE THEY WILL USE THE OPPORTUNITIES, PERHAPS

State Review
3/3/04

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 161369

NOW OPEN TO ALL OF US, TO WORK TOWARD A VIABLE, AND HOPEFULLY DURABLE, SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME RESTORING THE SOMEWHAT BATTERED GREEK-TURKISH ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIP. FOR OUR PART, WE ARE PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE THOUGHTFULLY AND FULLY TO THIS PROCESS.

3. WE HAVE NO READY-MADE SOLUTION TO OFFER AND NO SPECIAL PREFERENCE AS TO THE PERSON WHO SHOULD PRESIDE OVER CYPRUS, PROVIDED THAT THE PERSON EMERGES FROM A CONSENSUS OF GREECE AND TURKEY AND, OF COURSE, THE CYPRIOTS THEMSELVES, AND PROVIDED THE SOVIETS HAVE HAD NO HAND IN THE SELECTION. WE PARTICULARLY WANT TO AVOID ANY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN GREEKS AND TURKS OVER PERSONALITIES.

4. WE ARE OPENMINDED. THIS MEANS PRECISELY THAT WE NEITHER SUPPORT NOR OPPOSE MAKARIOS OR CLERIDES. EITHER ONE MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE, BUT IT WOULD NOT SEEM WISE TO TAKE A CATEGORIC POSITION AT THIS TIME THAT IT MUST BE MAKARIOS OR THAT IT MUST BE CLERIDES. WE SHALL HAVE TO SEE HOW THE POLITICAL FORCES EVOLVE OVER THE PERIOD AHEAD AND THEN AS A CONSENSUS BEGINS TO EMERGE SUPPORT THAT CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT WHICH SEEMS BEST SUITED TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS. WE WILL WANT TO BE SURE THAT THE PERSON WHO EMERGES IS WELL AWARE THAT HIS EMERGENCE IS DUE IN LARGE PART TO OUR SUPPORT AND THAT OF THE GREEKS AND THAT THIS SUPPORT WAS NOT JUST A FREE RIDE.

5. WE WANT TO STAY IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH WITH THE NEW GREEK GOVERNMENT AS THE GENEVA CONFERENCE GETS UNDER WAY. WE HOPE THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WILL FULLY SHARE ITS THOUGHTS WITH US AND WILL TAKE NO PRECIPITATE ACTION WHICH MIGHT BE PREJUDICIAL, NOT ONLY IN THE NARROWER PERSPECTIVE OF THEIR INTERESTS, BUT IN THE LARGER FRAMEWORK OF US-GREEK TIES AND ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS.

6. I RELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE MOST DESIRABLE FOR FOREIGN MINISTER MAVROS AND RUFFIN TO HAVE A FULL DISCUSSION IN GENEVA. KISSINGER

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 035003

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇReport

DESCRIPTION re Cyprus Situation

CREATION DATE 07/25/1974

VOLUME 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200184

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 8

FOLDER TITLE Cyprus Crisis (18)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/30/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

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Department of State

Cyprus Task Force

CYPRUS

Situation Report No. 18

Situation in Cyprus as of 0600 (EDT), July 25

Military Situation in Cyprus: The UNFICYP Operations Center in Nicosia advised our Embassy that there are now 1,000 UN troops guarding the airport and there is no longer a threat of its being occupied by the Turks. In Kyrenia the Turks are reportedly landing reinforcements and heavy equipment. A UN officer estimated that two divisions with tanks and artillery may have landed, but our Embassy doubts there has been sufficient time to off load that large a contingent. Separate reports indicate that twenty landing craft and eight escorts were sighted off Cyprus, but it is not known whether these are the same reinforcements seen by the UN officer.

Turkey: The situation in Ankara appears to be returning to pre-crisis normality. Some of the civil defense precautions have been rescinded, and the military airport is quiet.

UN: SYG Waldheim opened a meeting of the Security Council by relating how the Turkish Ambassador in Cyprus told the UN Commander that Turkish troops would take over the airport. Waldheim then telephoned Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit on three separate occasions to impress on him that any attack would be resisted by UN troops. The Security Council adjourned after the Turkish PermRep gave the SYG a letter stating his country undertook "not to attempt to assume possession of the Nicosia airport by force, the threat of force, or other means of coercion."

Talks: At a press conference in Athens Foreign Minister Mavros told reporters that he would meet with British Foreign Secretary Callaghan in Geneva before the meeting opened. When asked about his attitude toward the talks he said that the difficulties are "indeed vast" if two members of the Atlantic Alliance could not agree on a cease-fire. To a question about the possibility of a federation in Cyprus, he replied that it would not be discussed without the presence of a representative from Cyprus, "an independent country whose independence is

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3/31/04

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By LR 4/5/11

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
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guaranteed internationally." In a reference to Makarios, Navros described him as "the elected President of the Republic of Cyprus."

Greek Seizure of US Munitions for Turkey:

In mid-morning EDT July 24 the Commander of our Military Mission to Turkey asked DOD to look into the matter of a large shipment of US munitions for Turkey which the Greeks may offload from the detained vessel "Lash Espana" at Piraeus. He warned that although the Turkish General Staff was probably not aware of the matter, the vessel is overdue in Istanbul and Greek confiscation of the shipment, together with receipt of 796 metric tons of munitions for Greece which was aboard, would cause a considerable military power shift in the area and probably open Greek-Turkish wounds wider. At 9:17 P.M. EDT the Department asked Embassy Athens for a status report to allow us to decide whether to weigh in with the Greek Embassy here. The Greek FonOff official the Embassy talked to is reported at 2:05 A.M. EDT July 25 as saying GOG would not release the cargo until the cease-fire was effective and perhaps not until the Geneva talks were underway. It might consider releasing the ship today.

APPROVED BY:


Deputy Director of Operations

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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇReport

DESCRIPTION re Cyprus

CREATION DATE 07/25/1974

VOLUME 5 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200184

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 8

FOLDER TITLE Cyprus Crisis (18)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/30/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 035006

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇReport

DESCRIPTION re Cyprus Situation

CREATION DATE 07/25/1974

VOLUME 7 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200184

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 8

FOLDER TITLE Cyprus Crisis (18)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/30/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 035007

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇReport

DESCRIPTION re Cyprus Situation

CREATION DATE 07/25/1974

VOLUME 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200184

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 8

FOLDER TITLE Cyprus Crisis (18)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/30/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9084

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA FLASH 4050

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ NICOSIA 1760

E.O. 11652: GDS
PFOR PINT CY
SUBJECT: TURKISH INVASION

1. GLAFDOS CLERIDES CALLED ME AT 1350 LOCAL TO SAY A MOST SERIOUS NEW DEVELOPMENT HAD JUST BEEN REPORTED TO HIM. TEN TURKISH SHIPS HAD APPEARED OFF KYRENIA AND HAVE JUST NOW BEGUN UNLOADING BOTH TROOPS AND MATERIEL.

2. CLERIDES SAYS THIS SHOWS CLEARLY TURKS HAVE INTENTION OF EXPANDING THEIR AREA OF CONTROL AND NOT MERELY CONNECTING THEIR BRIDGEHEAD THROUGH A CORRIDOR TO NICOSIA. CLERIDES SAYS TURKS ALREADY HAVE ON ISLAND ENOUGH TO SEIZE ALL AREAS AND LANDING ADDITIONAL FORCES MOST OMINOUS DEVELOPMENT.

3. HE URGES THAT DEPT SEEK TO END TURKISH VIOLATIONS.
DAVIES
BT



By LJR 4/5/11

*****~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~*****WHSR COMMENT*****

KENNEDY,LL--SENT TO SC

PSN:003505 RECALLED PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:206/13:05Z DTG:251203Z JUL 74

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INFO CIA
WHITE HOUSE WASH DC
P 250855Z JUL 74
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USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER
INFO SEC DEF WASHDC
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CNO WASHDC
CSA WASHDC
SECSTATE WASHDC
COMNAVINTCOM WASHDC
CINCUSAF RAMSTEIN GER
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON ENG
USREDCOM MACDILL AFB FL
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERGE GER
FICEUR JACKSONVILLE FLA
FOSIF ROTA SPN
COMSIXTFLT
USNMR SHAPE BRUSEELS
USDAO NICOSIA CYPRUS
USDAO ANKARA TUR
DIRNSA FT GEORGE MEADE MD
ZEN/AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI

UNCLAS 0833 JUL 74

SUBJ: BRITISH INTENTIONS CYPRUS CRISIS
IN A TELECON TO DAO TODAY, THE BRITISH DEFENSE ATTACHE
PASSED ON FOR OFFICIAL DISSEMINATION THAT (UNDER SPONSORSHIP UN)
BRITISH AT PRESENT HAVE DISPERSED TWELVE (12) 74 PHANTOMS NOW
SITTING AT AKROTIRI AS WELL AS FOLLOWING: TWO (2) COMPANIES
INFANTRY ("COLD STREAM GUARDS"); ONE (1) REGIMENTAL HQS SQUADRON
(APPROX 200 MEN); SCORPION LIGHT TANKS AND NUMBERS OF APC'S TO
REINFORCE THE PERIMETER GUARD AT NICOSIA ARPT AND VICINITY. THE
BRITISH DATT SAID HIS COUNTRY WILL NOT HESITATE TO IMMEDIATELY
PRESS TROOPS, TANKS AND 74'S INTO BATTLE IF NICOSIA COMES
UNDER ATTACK TODAY BY EITHER TURKS OR GREEKS. HE ADDED THAT

*****WHHR COMMENT*****

KENNEDY.LL--~~SENT~~ SENT SC

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AUTHORITY DTA PAC Review, 9/6/03
BY Wg NLF, DATE 5/17/05

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BRITISH COMMITMENT LONG TIME COMING AND THAT HIS NATION NOW
FEELS COMPELLED TO INTERVENE IF IT SHOULD BECOME NECESSARY.
BT

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PAGE 02

OF 02

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 035008

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇReport

DESCRIPTION re Cyprus

CREATION DATE 07/25/1974

VOLUME 5 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200184

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 8

FOLDER TITLE Cyprus Crisis (18)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/30/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

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FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FAUSH 9091
AMEMBASSY ANKARA FLASH 4051

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 3586

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NICOSIA 1766

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PEOR PINT CYM
SUBJECT: TURKISH REINFORCEMENTS

1. UKHICOM OLVER CALLED AT 1450 TOYZAY THAT THEY HAVE PICKED UP 21 LSTS LYING OFF KYRENIA AND THERE ARE INDICATIONS THEY MOVING TO LAND MEN AND EQUIPMENT.

2. I TOLD HIM CLERIDES HAD JUST CALLED TO EXPRESS CONCERN AT INFORMATION TEN SHIPS UNLOADING. OLVER SAYS 21 RIGHT FIGURE AND HE BEGINNING TO WONDER WHETHER TURKS CONTEMPLATING ACTION TO TAKE NICOSIA. HIS EXPERTS THINK THIS IS MERELY CASE OF TURKISH "OVERKILL" BUT HE NOW BEGINNING TO QUESTION OUR MUTUAL ASSESSMENT OF TURKEY'S LIMITED OBJECTIVES. I TOLD HIM I, TOO, BEGINNING TO WONDER W Y TURKEY WHICH NOW HAD MORE THAN ENOUGH FORCES TO CONSOLIDATE ITS HOLD WOULD BE POURING IN MORE.

3. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANKARA'S BEST GUESS AS TO WHETHER TURKS WILL BE CONTENT WITH EXPANDED ENCLAVE OR WHETHER THEY SEEKING A MAJOR PARTITION OF ISLAND.
DAVIES
BT



EO. 11652: GDS
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*****WHSR COMMENT*****

KENNEDY,LL--SENT TO SC

PSN:003558 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:206/14:19Z DTG:251345Z JUL 7

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4490

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2356
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AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 2800
USMISSION GENEVA 412
USMISSION NATO 1785
USUN NEW YORK 1147
ZEN/AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 992

UNCLAS ATHENS 4986

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PINT, GR

SUBJECT: NEW GOG PRESS SPOKESMAN LAMBRIAS HOLDS FIRST
PRESS CONFERENCE

1. SEVERAL HOURS AFTER TAKING OATH ON JULY 24 AS UNDER
SECRETARY TO PM FOR PRESS AND INFORMATION, PANAYIOTIS
LAMERIAS ASSEMBLED PRESS CORPS TO MAKE SEVERAL ANNOUNCEMENTS.
-- VACANT MINISTERIAL POSTS WOULD BE FILLED JULY 25
AND AFTERWARDS PREMIER KARAMANLIS WILL ADDRESS NATION TO
OUTLINE POLICY OF NEW GOG.
-- REMAINING MINISTERIAL POSTS WILL GO TO YOUNG PERSONALITIES
BELONGING TO FORCES CREATED IN RECENT YEARS.
-- CABINET MEETING JULY 24 AFTER ADMINISTRATION OF OATHS
TOOK UP GREEK POSITION RE GENEVA TRIPARTITE TALKS

2. LAMBRIAS SAID CABINET EXAMINED ISSUE OF IMMEDIATE
RESTORATION OF DEMOCRATIC LEGALITY AND ABOLITION OF ALL
DECREES AND DECISIONS WHICH CONTRADICT THIS LEGALITY.
PURSUANT TO THIS MINISTERS OF JUSTICE, INTERIOR AND
PUBLIC ORDER WERE REQUESTED TO ISSUE DECREES FOR FOLLOWING
MEASURES:
-- ABOLITION OF PRISON OF VIAROS ISLAND AND RELEASE OF ALL
DETAINEES THERE AS WELL AS RELEASE OF ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS
WHEREVER THEY ARE DETAINED
-- ALL POLITICAL CRIMES COMMITTED AFTER AUGUST 1973 ARE

* * * * * W H S R C O M M E N T * * * * *


KENNEDY, LL, CIEP--SENT TO SC.

PSN:003575 RECALLED PAGE 01 TOR:206/14:48Z DTG:251230Z JUL



AMNESTIED. IN AUGUST 1973 GOVERNMENT (OF PAPOPOULOS) GRANTED AMNESTY TO POLITICAL OFFENSES BUT EXEMPTED VARIOUS CRIMES. THE PRESENT AMNESTY EMBRACES ALL POLITICAL CRIMES COMMITTED SINCE ARMY SEIZED POWER IN APRIL 1967.
-- PEOPLE DEPRIVED OF NATIONALITY ON BASIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ACTS ISSUED SINCE 1967 WILL HAVE THEIR NATIONALITY RESTORED.
-- THOSE WHO HAVE HAD THEIR PASSPORTS WITHDRAWN AND HAVE BEEN BANNED FROM TRAVEL ABROAD WILL HAVE FREEDOM OF TRAVEL RESTORED.

3. LAMBRIAS REFERRED TO AMBASSADOR TASCA'S VISIT TO PM KARAMANLIS AFTER CABINET MEETING WHEN AMBASSADOR CONVEYED GOOD WISHES AND PRESENTED PRESIDENT NIXON'S LETTER OF CONGRATULATIONS. LAMBRIAS CONCLUDED PRESS CONFERENCE BY REPLYING TO QUERY ON NEXT ACTIONS BY NOTING THAT GOVERNMENT MEASURES TO RESTORE FULL DEMOCRATIC NORMALITY WERE FIRST STEPS AND CALLED FOR FURTHER ACTION. LAMBRIAS ADDED THAT WITH REGARD TO QUESTION OF KING CONSTANTINE "GOVERNMENT HAD DEALT EXCLUSIVELY WITH MATTERS RELATING TO RESTORATION OF NORMALITY AND THAT NO DETERMINATION OF ALL GUIDELINES HAD TAKEN PLACE."
TASCA
BT



PSN:003575 RECALLED PAGE 02 OF 02 TDR:206/14:48Z DTG:251230Z JL

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*Delivered by Special Courier to Embassy
12:55 pm, Thurs, 7/25/74*

EMBASSY OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
WASHINGTON, D. C.


July 25, 1974

Dear Mr. Kennedy,

Enclosed is the full text of our proposal which I had a chance only briefly to outline to Secretary Kissinger over the phone this morning.

I will appreciate very much your assistance in forwarding this full text to the Secretary.

Sincerely




Yuli M. Vorontsov

Minister

Colonel Richard T. Kennedy

The White House



First. During Soviet-American contacts recently the Soviet side already has a chance to repeatedly express its opinion that one of the important steps on the road to strengthening and further broadening of positive processes going on in the present world would now be prohibition of affecting environment and climate for military and other purposes inconsistent with the interests of ensuring international security and people's wellbeing and health.

Taking possible measures to overcome the dangers of the use of environment modification techniques for military purposes was, of course, the subject of the USSR-US Joint Statement signed on July 3, 1974, in Moscow on the highest level. Both sides expressed themselves in that statement in favour of such most effective measures. Consideration of this problem by the U.N. General Assembly would facilitate working out such measures.

The Soviet side has in mind to submit a proposal to include in the agenda of the forthcoming XXIX session of the U.N. General Assembly as important and urgent the question on "Prohibition of affecting environment and climate in military and other purposes inconsistent with the interests of ensuring international security and people's wellbeing and health".

If the United States are ready to join this initiative then both our countries could submit it jointly. The Soviet Government believes that such a step by the USSR and the US

would become a concrete realization of intentions of our two countries, laid down in their Joint Statement of July 3, 1974.

Second. As to the meeting of United States and Soviet representatives, provided for in the Statement of July 3, for the purpose of discussing the problem of overcoming the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes, we are in agreement with the proposal of the U.S. side to have such meeting in October this year. The Soviet representatives would be glad to receive their American colleagues in Moscow; at the same time they would be ready to go to Washington if that is more convenient to the US side.



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INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 3586

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ NICOSIA 1766

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PEDR PINT CYM
SUBJECT: TURKISH REINFORCEMENTS

1. UKHIDOM OLVER CALLED AT 1450 TRYZAY THAT THEY HAVE PICKED UP 21 LSTS LYING OFF KYRENIA AND THERE ARE INDICATIONS THEY MOVING TO LAND MEN AND EQUIPMENT.

2. I TOLD HIM CLERIDES HAD JUST CALLED TO EXPRESS CONCERN AT INFORMATION TEN SHIPS UNLOADING. OLVER SAYS 21 RIGHT FIGURE AND HE BEGINNING TO WONDER WHETHER TURKS CONTEMPLATING ACTION TO TAKE NICOSIA. HIS EXPERTS THINK THIS IS MERELY CASE OF TURKISH "OVERKILL" BUT HE NOW BEGINNING TO QUESTION OUR MUTUAL ASSESSMENT OF TURKEY'S LIMITED OBJECTIVES. I TOLD HIM I, TOO, BEGINNING TO WONDER W Y TURKEY WHICH NOW HAD MORE THAN ENOUGH FORCES TO CONSOLIDATE ITS HOLD WOULD BE POURING IN MORE.

3. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANKARA'S BEST GUESS AS TO WHETHER TURKS WILL BE CONTENT WITH EXPANDED ENCLAVE OR WHETHER THEY

D
SEEKING M
AJOR PARTITION OF ISLAND.
DAVIES
BT



By HR 4/13/11

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

KENNEDY,LL--SENT TO SC

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 035009

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇReport

DESCRIPTION re Cyprus Situation

CREATION DATE 07/25/1974

VOLUME 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200184

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 8

FOLDER TITLE Cyprus Crisis (18)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/30/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

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INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 507
ANKARA PRIORITY 647
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 6079
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 208
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 788

~~SECRET~~ GENEVA 4777

State Review
3/3/04

By WR

4/13/11

EXDIS
FROM BUFFUM

1. FOLLOWING IS MERELY ADVANCE INDICATION OF PROBABLE SCENARIO LATER TODAY. INFOR BASED ON MY TALKS WITH CALLAGHAN DURING LONDON-GENEVA FLIGHT. HE KINDLY INCLUDED ME IN ALL STRATEGY DISCUSSIONS WITH HIS OWN STAFF THROUGHOUT TRIP. WE WILL HAVE FURTHER TALKS LATER THIS AFTERNOON.

2. PLAN AS OF NOON LOCAL FOLLOWS: (A) CALLAGHAN WILL MEET FIRST WITH TURKISH DEL ABOUT 5 PM AND GREEKS ABOUT 6. LATTER APPARENTLY RESISTING TRIPARTITE MEETING TODAY BUT HE WILL TRY TO GET AT LEAST BRIEF MEETING OF ENTIRE CONFERENCE THIS EVENING. (B) PARTICIPANTS IN CONFERENCE ROOM WOULD BE LIMITED TO UK, GREEKS, TURKS, AND UN REP (GUYER). US WILL NOT BE PRESENT AT FORMAL MEETINGS, BUT CALLAGHAN ASSURED ME WE WILL BE FULLY AND PROMPTLY INFORMED. NO IMMEDIATE CYPRIOT PARTICIPATION ENVISAGED ALTHOUGH UK DOES NOT RULE IT OUT LATER ON. CALLAGHAN OBVIOUSLY AND CORRECTLY PREFERS NOT TO FACE THIS ISSUE UNTIL FORCED TO DO SO. HOWEVER, UK WILL TELL TURKS AND GREEKS THERE IS NO PROBLEM IN THEIR INCLUDING CYPRIOTS AS MEMBERS OF THEIR DELEGATIONS. (C) UK WILL URGE FIRST OBJECTIVE OF CONFERENCE SHOULD BE AGREEMENT ON RESPECT FOR CEASEFIRE AND MILITARY STANDSTILL (THIS IS IN RESPONSE TO THEIR LATEST INFO TURKISH ARMY STILL SPREADING OUT FROM EXISTING POSITIONS TO IMPROVE POSTURE FOR LONG HAUL).

3. UK THEN HOPES TO GET UN-ICYP EVALUATION OF WHERE LOGICAL

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

KENNEDY, LL--SENT TO SC

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DEMARCATIION LINES ARE AND HOW MANY MEN UN WILL NEED TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE BUFFER BETWEEN TURKISH ARMY AND CYPRIOT NATIONAL GUARD. (IT WAS RECOGNIZED MORE DEFINITIVE JUDGMENT ON WHAT CAN BE DONE TO CONTROL AND IMPROVE SECURITY SITUATION THROUGHOUT ISLAND BETWEEN GREEK AND TURK CYPRIOT COMMUNITIES IS VERY DIFFICULT TO ASSESS. UK MILITARY ADVISERS ON PLANE THOUGHT WALDHEIM'S FIGURE OF 5,000 MAN FORCE TOO LOW BUT WILL CHECK WITH THEIR MILITARY COLLEAGUES ON CYPRUS FOR BETTER READING). QUESTION OF CONTROLLING RESUPPLY AND REINFORCEMENT SHOULD ALSO BE REVIEWED WITH PRESUMPTION SUBSTANTIAL UN SUPERVISION WILL BE REQUIRED.

4. BEYOND THAT, CALLAGHAN UNSURE HOW TO TACKLE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES.

I SUGGESTED UNTIL WE KNOW FOR SURE WHAT CYPRIOT LEADERS WE WILL BE DEALING WITH WE SHOULD STAY FLEXIBLE. ALL HIS ADVISERS CONCURRED FULLY BUT CALLAGHAN OBVIOUSLY WOULD LIKE TO GET A NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK ESTABLISHED AT OPENING PHASE OF TALKS FOR ONGOING CONSIDERATION OF POLITICAL FUTURE OF CYPRUS ONCE CEASEFIRE ISSUES SETTLED. CONSENSUS OF UK GROUP WAS THAT HOWEVER THE EFFORT IS APPROACHED, BASIS SHOULD BE THAT 1960 CONSTITUTION IS STILL VALID; PROBLEM IS ONE OF AGREED AND FAITHFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF EXISTING PROVISIONS RATHER THAN WRITING NEW ONE.

5. UNDERSECRETARY WIGGINS (AN OLD PERSONAL FRIEND) POINTED OUT TO CALLAGHAN THAT THIS WHOLE CRISIS CAN BE TRACED BACK ULTIMATELY TO MAKARIOU'S FAILURE TO LIVE UP TO THE CONSTITUTION. CALLAGHAN RETORTED THAT WHILE HE AGREED, HE DID NOT SUPPOSE ANYONE WOULD EXPECT HIM TO SAY THAT PUBLICLY.

6. CALLAGHAN IS SHOOTING FOR CONCLUSION OF DISCUSSION OF CEASEFIRE PHASE BY SATURDAY, HOPEFULLY WITH AGREEMENT ON CONTINUING WORKING-LEVEL MACHINERY WHILE FOREIGN MINISTERS RETIRE TO CAPITALS FOR FURTHER REFLECTION.

7. IF FOREGOING SLIGHTLY DIFFUSE, IT IS BECAUSE UK POLICY LITERALLY BEING MADE ON THE FLY.

8. I WILL SEE CALLAGHAN ALONE AGAIN THIS AFTERNOON BEFORE HE SEES GREEKS AND TURKS, AND WILL SEEK APPOINTMENTS WITH LATTER TWO DELEGATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER CALLAGHAN DOES. ABRAMS
BT

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4847

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0907
AMEMBASSY ATHENS 0858
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 9101
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 0820
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0071

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ USUN 2568

GENEVA FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY BUFFUM
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PDR, UN, CY, GR, TU
SUBJ: TURKISH FEELING ABOUT BRITISH

1. IN CONVERSATION SHORTLY AFTER MID-NIGHT FOLLOWING
ADJOURNMENT SC MEETING, TURKISH PERM REP OLCAY SHOWED
RESENTMENT VERGING ON BITTERNESS OVER BRITISH TACTICS TO
FORCE TURKISH PUBLIC PLEDGE RE NICOSIA AIRPORT. OLCAY
IS MAN OF CALM, LOW-KEY TEMPERAMENT BUT HE SPOKE TO
AMB. SCALI WITH INTENSITY WHILE LATTER WAS ASSISTING
HIM IN HANDLING LARGE GROUP OF PRESS CORRESPONDENTS ON
EMERGING FROM SC MEETING. OLCAY EXPRESSED APPRECIATION
FOR ASSISTANCE WITH PRESS, WHICH ENABLED HIM TO EXPLAIN
TURKISH ACTION IN PROPER PERSPECTIVE.

2. OLCAY SAID BRITISH PRESSURE AND DETERMINATION TO
EMBARRASS TURKS PUBLICLY WOULD BE REGARDED AS
HIMILIATING IN ANKARA AND WOULD LEAVE SCARS WHICH
MIGHT WELL AFFECT TURKISH ATTITUDE TOWARDS BRITISH
IN GENEVA TALKS. SCALI SOUGHT TO TEMPER OLCAY'S
ANGER AND STRESSED TO HIM THE IMPORTANCE OF GENEVA
TALKS AS MEANS OF GETTING RESOLUTION OF CRISIS AND
SETTING COURSE FOR FUTURE RELATIONSHIPS IN EASTERN
MEDITERRANEAN. OLCAY PERSISTED, HOWEVER, IN EXPRESSING
HIS UNHAPPINESS OVER "THESE BRITISH". SCALI CALLED
OLCAY'S ATTENTION TO FACT THAT U.S. WOULD BE REPRESENTED
IN GENEVA BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BUFFUM. HE



*****WHSR COMMENT*****

KENNEDY,LL--SENT TO SC

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EC
By HR State Review 4/13/11 3/31/04

ASSURED OLCAY THAT BUFFUM WOULD ALWAYS BE ACCESSIBLE
TO TURKISH DELEGATION AND WOULD WANT TO BE HELPFUL
IN ANY WAY HE COULD.
BENNETT
BT

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 035011

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇReport

DESCRIPTION re Cyprus

CREATION DATE 07/25/1974

VOLUME 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200184

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 8

FOLDER TITLE Cyprus Crisis (18)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/30/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 035012

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇReport

DESCRIPTION re Cyprus Situation

CREATION DATE 07/25/1974

VOLUME 5 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200184

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 8

FOLDER TITLE Cyprus Crisis (18)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/30/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

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NODIS
TOSEC 002
WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS SAM 86970 FOR MR. EAGLEBURGER
FOR THE SECRETARY
FOLLOWING SENT ACION SECTION FROM NICOSIA JULY 25
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 3 NICOSIA 1765

NODIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR
E.D. 11452: GDS
TAGS: PFOR PINT CY
SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH PRES. CLERIDES
REF: STATE 161356

SUMMARY: GLAFOS CLERIDES BELIEVES PRESENT INTERNAL SITUATION EXTREMELY DANGEROUS AND COUP FROM RIGHT LOOMS. ALTHOUGH HE HAS SUPPORT OF ALL POLITICAL ELEMENTS OTHER THAN LYSSARIDES GROUP, MOST HEAVILY ARMED GROUP AMONG GREEK CYPRIOTS IS FAR RIGHT, THIS GROUP HAS TWICE IN PAST 24 HOURS BEGUN MOVE TO OUST HIM BASED ON BELIEF HE WOULD ACCEPT RETURN OF ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS. CLERIDES ASKS U.S. TO CONVEY HIS ANALYSIS OF INTERNAL DYNAMICS TO KARAMANLIS AND ENLIST HIS SUPPORT BOTH IN MUTING MAKARIOS ISSUE AND IN HOLDING GREEK CYPRIOT RIGHTISTS FROM OVERTURNING APPLE-CART HERE. END SUMMARY.

1. PURSUANT TO YOUR INSTRUCTIONS, I SAW GLAFOS CLERIDES WHO WITH DIMIS DIMITRIOU, RECEIVED ME AT FOREIGN MINISTRY AT 1000 LOCAL THIS MORNING. I EXTENDED HIM OUR BEST WISHES FOR SAFE ISSUE FROM THE PRESENT TURBULENT SITUATION AND ASKED FOR HIS EVALUATION BOTH OF PRESENT INTERNAL POLITICAL SCENE AND POSSIBILITIES FOR EVOLUTION TOWARD NEW STABLE POLITICAL STRUCTURE, HE SPOKE ELOQUENTLY AND AT LENGTH AS FOLLOWS:



2. INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS.
CLERIDES SAID HE WAS CONFIDENT NOW THAT WITH ONE MAJOR

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State Review
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CAVEAT ON SHORT TERM BASIS HE HAD FULL SUPPORT OF ALL POLITICAL ELEMENTS IN CYPRUS OTHER THAN LYSSARIDES GROUP. THIS INCLUDED AKEL, THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY, THE UNITED PARTY, AND, SUBJECT TO CAVEAT OF MAKARIOS NOT COMING BACK, THE EXTREME RIGHT.

3. ON THE LEFT, AKEL LEADERS PAPAIOANNOU AND ZIARTIDES SAW CLERIDES YESTERDAY AND TOLD HIM THEY PREPARED TO EXTEND SUPPORT AS ONLY WAY OUT OF PRESENT CRISIS FOR GREEK CYPRIOTS, THEY AGREED MAKARIOS RETURN COULD ONLY PRECIPITATE CIVIL WAR. THEY HAD OFFERED TO ISSUE STATEMENT IN HIS SUPPORT, BUT HE URGED THEY NOT BE THE FIRST TO MOVE SINCE THIS WOULD MAKE MORE DIFFICULT GETTING CENTER AND RIGHT PUBLIC POSITIONS ESTABLISHED.

4. AKEL LEADERS SAID THEY HAD CONSULTED WITH LYSSARIDES IN A FOREIGN EMBASSY, AND HE WAS ADAMENTLY AND VIOLENTLY OPPOSED TO CLERIDES AS SUCCESSOR AND INSISTED ONLY SOLUTION WAS RETURN OF ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS. ACCORDING TO PAPAIOANNOU, LYSSARIDES DESCRIBED CLERIDES SUCCESSION AS A CIA PLOT WITH THE SAMSON INTERREGNUM AS PART OF THE SCENARIO. U.S. OBJECTIVE WAS TO GET CLERIDES, WHO KNOWN PUPPET OF U.S., IN POSITION IN ORDER TO CONVERT CYPRUS TO NATO BASE. "HARAVGHI" EDITOR HAS SAME LINE. FOR THIS AND OTHER REASONS, CLERIDES TOLD ME HE WAS NOT ALLOWING RESUMPTION OF PUBLICATION OF NEWSPAPERS UNTIL AT LEAST NEXT MONDAY. HE HAD MET WITH ALL EDITORS AND OTHER THAN "HARAVGHI" THESE HAD AGREED THAT PRESS ACTIVITIES NOW NOT IN INTEREST OF STABILITY.

5. PROGRESSIVE PARTY AND UNITED PARTY WERE FULLY IN SUPPORT OF CLERIDES AS CONSTITUTIONAL SUCCESSOR, HE SAID.

6. GREATEST DANGER TO CYPRUS, THE CEASEFIRE AND TO THE AREA, WAS FACT THAT THE RIGHT HAD BEEN ARMED AFTER THE COUP D'ETAT WITH WEAPONS OF THE TACTICAL RESERVE UNIT AND FROM LARGE STORES PREVIOUSLY HIDDEN BY MAKARIOS. EOKA-B, THROUGH RESERVISTS, WAS NOW HEAVILY REPRESENTED IN NATIONAL GUARD AND OUTSIDE NOW HAD THEIR OWN COMMANDO FORCES. THESE GROUPS WERE ADAMENTLY OPPOSED TO MAKARIOS' RETURN AND IN THREATENING HIM YESTERDAY AFTER HIS PRESS CONFERENCE AND THIS MORNING AFTER STATEMENT BY GEORGE MAVROS THAT MAKARIOS WAS LEGAL PRESIDENT, TOLD HIM THEY WOULD RATHER BE UNDER THE TURKS THAN MAKARIOS. RIGHTIST NATIONAL GUARD OFFICERS WHO HELD POSITIONS AFTER COUP STILL IN POSITION WHILE MODERATES OUSTED
BT

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
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WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS SA# 86970 FOR MR. EAGLEBURGER
FOR THE SECRETARY
FOLLOWING SENT ACION SECSTATE FROM NICOSIA JULY 25
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NODIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR
TO SOME EXTENT. THE POLICE WERE TOTALLY DISORGANIZED AND
DEMORALIZED AND ONE OF HIS OBJECTIVES TODAY WAS TO GET
THEM INTO SHAPE TO RESTORE SECURITY WITHIN NICOSIA.

3. RIGHTIST GROUPS MET YESTERDAY AT SEK HEADQUARTERS AND
DECIDED FAILURE OF CLERIDES TO CATEGORICALLY REJECT POSSI-
BILITY MAKARIOS' RETURN REQUIRED HIS OUSTER. HE HAD HIMSELF
GONE TO CONVINCED THEM THAT THIS COULD ONLY LEAD TO CHAOS
WHICH WOULD BE EXPLOITED BY TURKS. THIS MORNING, AFTER BBC
BROADCAST MAVROS STATEMENT, A GROUP OF COMMANDOS HAD MARCHED
INTO FOREIGN MINISTRY AND HAD JUST BEEN DISPERSED BY HIS
ASSURANCES SHORTLY BEFORE MY ARRIVAL. (SOME WITH JUNGLE SUITS,
LONG HAIR AND AUTOMATIC RIFLES, STILL IN EVIDENCE ON LOWER
FLOOR FOREIGN MINISTRY ON MY ARRIVAL BUT NOT ON DEPARTURE
ONE HOUR LATER.) CLERIDES SAID IT EXTREMELY URGENT THAT IN
THIS DELICATE SITUATION ARCHBISHOP BE PERSUADED TO CEASE AND
DESIST FROM STATEMENTS INDICATING SUPPORT FOR HIS RETURN
AND THAT GREEK GOVT NOT TAKE LINE OF MAVROS' STATEMENT. HE
HAD TALKED TO KARAMANLIS YESTERDAY INDICATING PROBLEM
WHICH WOULD ARISE WITH MAKARIOS RETURN AND DIMITRIDOU HAD
TALKED TO MAVROS AFTER HE MADE HIS STATEMENT. KARAMANLIS,
PREOCCUPIED WITH FORMATION HIS GOVT, GAVE SHORT RESPONSE
INDICATING UNDERSTANDING. MAVROS, HOWEVER, MADE INCREDIBLE
STATEMENT THAT HE NOT CONCERNED WITH POSSIBLE CIVIL WAR AMONG
GREEKS ON CYPRUS. CLERIDES FEARED THAT MAVROS AT GENEVA
MIGHT STAKE OUT POSITION IN SUPPORT OF MAKARIOS WHICH COULD
PRECIPITATE RIGHTIST TAKEOVER ON ISLAND. HE HOPED WE



* * * * * W H S R C O M M E N T * * * * *

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COULD BE HELPFUL IN PREVENTING THIS. HE HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM MAKARIOS THROUGH ANOTHER GOVERNMENT WHICH TREATED HIM AS ACTING FOR MAKARIOS AND INSTRUCTED HIM TO DISCHARGE TWO MINISTERS. HE HAD NOT ACKNOWLEDGED THE MESSAGE AND HAD NO INTENTION OF SACKING THE MINISTERS (AGRICULTURE AND LABOR). TO DO SO WOULD END HIS TENURE. QTE AND LIFE UNQTE DIMITRIOU ADDED.

4. CLERIDES SAID EVERYTHING HE HAD DONE SO FAR WITH THE GREEKS WAS OVER AN OPEN TELEPHONE LINE. OBVIOUSLY HE COULD NOT GET INTO SOME DETAILS HE HAD REVIEWED WITH ME. HE HAD CONSIDERED ASKING UK HICOM TO ASSIST IN FLYING HIM FROM DHEKELIA TO ATHENS LAST NIGHT TO TRY TO GET SOME APPRECIATION IN ATHENS OF THE FORCES AT WORK HERE, BUT THE SITUATION IS SO DELICATE NEED FOR HIS ALMOST CONTINUOUS AVAILABILITY TO STAMP OUT FIRES IS OVERRIDING. HE ASKED WHETHER YOU COULD AUTHORIZE AMB TASCA TO SEE KARAMANLIS SOONEST POSSIBLE TO CONVEY TO HIM ABOVE APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION, STRESSING FACT THAT UNLESS THE ISSUE OF MAKARIOS RETURN IS MUTED OR SILENCED, POSSIBILITIES OF A RIGHTIST TAKEOVER AND FURTHER PROBLEMS ON INTERCOMMUNAL FRONT ARE GREAT.

5. I ASSURED HIM I WOULD CONVEY HIS REQUEST TO YOU BY MOST SECURE MEANS I HAD AVAILABLE.

6. HE ASKED THAT FOLLOWING DISCUSSION NOT BE IMPARTED TO THE GREEKS AND BE HELD CLOSELY BY US. NEGOTIATIONS.

THE GREEK STATEMENT THAT CYPRUS SHOULD BE REPRESENTED AT ANY MEETING ON FUTURE STATUS OF ISLAND RAISED THE SERIOUS PROBLEM OF WHO WOULD REPRESENT CYPRUS. WOULD REPRESENTATIVE BE THAT OF MAKARIOS OR PRESENT GOVT? UNTIL INTERNAL SITUATION CLARIFIED THERE SHOULD BE NO CYPRIOT REPRESENTATION AT TALKS AMONG POWERS.

7. CLERIDES SAID WITH RESPECT TO FUTURE STATUS OF COMMUNITIES ON ISLAND, HE WAS A PRAGMATIST. THERE ARE TWO OPTIONS: PARTITION OR FEDERATION. OF THESE, HE SUPPORTED FEDERATION UNDER A SINGLE AGREED GOVT. HE WAS UNDER NO ILLUSIONS; IF TURKEY WISHES, TURKS CAN SEIZE ENTIRE ISLAND WITH WHAT THEY HAVE ON CYPRUS NOW. HE WAS ENCOURAGED BY TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER GUNESH'S STATEMENT THAT PARTITION WAS NOT TURKEY'S OBJECTIVE, AND HE THOUGHT THAT IN PRESENT CHANGED SITUATION PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS THAT COMMUNITIES COULD NOT LIVE TOGETHER IN A SINGLE STATE MUST BE REEXAMINED. IT IS OBVIOUS, HOWEVER, THAT THIS MUST BE WORKED OUT BY THE TWO COMMUNITIES WHOSE INTERESTS ARE MOST DIRECTLY CONCERNED. IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT DENKTASH COULD WORK TOWARD SUCH A SOLUTION, BUT DENKTASH IS NOT AND HAS NOT BEEN CALLING THE SHOTS FOR THE TURKS.



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ANKARA'S OBJECTIVES NOW SEEM OVERRIDING.

8. I NOTED OUR BELIEF TURKISH OBJECTIVES SEEMED LIMITED TO ESTABLISHING AND CONSOLIDATING ENCLAVE BEGINNING WITH WIDE FRONT ON NORTH COAST AND RUNNING TO AS WIDE A BASE AS COULD BE ESTABLISHED IN NICOSIA AREA. CLERIDES SAID THEY HAD
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TO WHITE HOUSE FLASH

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 3 OF 3 STATE 161624

NODIS
TOSEC 002
WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS SA: 86970 FOR MR. EAGLEBURGER
FOR THE SECRETARY
FOLLOWING SENT ACION SECSTATE FROM NICOSIA JULY 25
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 3 OF 3 NICOSIA 1765

NODIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR
TURKISH MAP WHICH INDICATED THEIR GOALS IN CONSOLIDATING
ENCLAVE, BUT ATTEMPT TO SEIZE AIRPORT WAS NOT CONSISTENT
WITH LINES ON MAP. HE THOUGHT TURKS MIGHT NOW BE SEEKING
BARGAINING COUNTERS LOOKING FORWARD TO ULTIMATE NEGOTIATIONS.

9. ROLE OF U.S.

I THANKED CLERIDES FOR HIS VIEWS AND SAID USG CLEARLY
CONCERNED THAT SITUATION ON CYPRUS NOT GET OUT OF HAND NOT
ONLY FOR SAKE OF CYPRUS BUT ALSO FOR OUR MAJOR INTEREST IN
AVOIDING CONFLICT BETWEEN OUR TWO ALLIES. I THOUGHT THAT
GIVEN FLUIDITY OF PRESENT SITUATION IT SEEMED THERE WOULD
BE BENEFIT IN NOT SEEKING HASTILY CONSTRUCTED SOLUTIONS THAT
MIGHT NOT ENDURE. IT WOULD SEEM DESIRABLE THAT VARIOUS
POLITICAL FORCES AT WORK HERE BE IDENTIFIED AND OBJECTIVES
CLARIFIED BEFORE MAJOR MOVES WERE MADE. I ASKED WHETHER
THERE WAS ANYTHING U.S. COULD DO WHICH WOULD BE OF ASSISTANCE
TO HIM BOTH IN CONSOLIDATING CONSTITUTIONAL SITUATION IN-
TERNALLY AND MOVING TOWARD CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS WITH
TURKISH CYPRIOT SIDE.

10. CLERIDES EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION AT OUR PAST EFFORTS
TO BE HELPFUL AND SAID HE AGREED COMPLETELY THAT EVEN HIS
PRESENT POLITICAL SUPPORT WAS EPHEMERAL AND COULD BE DISSIPATED
BY TAKING A POSITION ON THE ARCHBISHOP'S RETURN. HE INTENDED
TO COMPLY FULLY WITH CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, BUT ALL
WITH WHOM HE HAD TALKED ACROSS POLITICAL SPECTRUM AGREED



*****WHSR COMMENT*****

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THAT FLEXIBILITY ON 45-DAY REQUIREMENT FOR ELECTIONS BE WAIVED UNTIL THERE HAD BEEN A REALIGNMENT OF GREEK CYPRIOT POLITICAL FORCES THAT SEEMED STABLE AND THREAT FROM TURKS ABATED. OF GREATEST IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE WOULD BE USG EFFORTS TO SEEK TO PREVENT ISSUE OF MAKARIOS RETURN FROM PRECIPITATING A RIGHTIST COUP HERE. ACTION WITH ATHENS WAS MOST HELPFUL SINGLE THING HE COULD THINK OF. HIS COMMUNICATIONS ARE LIMITED AND HE WOULD APPRECIATE FREQUENT EXCHANGES WITH US SO THAT WE CAN COOPERATE MOST CLOSELY IN TRYING TO EMERGE FROM PRESENT SITUATION WITH ALL OF OUR INTERESTS INTACT. WHEN I APOLOGIZED FOR TAKING HIS TIME IN FACE OF HIS MANY PRESSING PROBLEMS, HE SAID HE PREPARED TO SPEND THE REST OF THE MORNING WITH ME, SINCE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF CYPRUS' INTERNAL PROBLEM WAS OF SUPREME IMPORTANCE AND MIGHT WELL DETERMINE WHETHER HE CAN HOLD THIS FRAGILE SITUATION TOGETHER.

11. HE HAD IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE APPEALED FOR DISREGARD OF RUMORS CONCERNING ATROCITIES ON EITHER SIDE. HE FELT THAT IF U.S. COULD HELP IN ASSURING TURKS THAT THEIR COMPATRIOTS WERE NOT BEING INDISCRIMINATELY SLAUGHTERED BY GREEKS, THIS MIGHT DEFLATE TURK EMOTIONAL HANGUP. HE RECOGNIZED WE IN EMBASSY WERE NOT IN A POSITION TO KNOW WHAT HAD GONE ON OUTSIDE NICOSIA, BUT HE THOUGHT TURKISH REPORTS OF MASSACRES WERE GROSS EXAGGERATIONS. UN HELICOPTER SWEEP NOW UNDER WAY SHOULD CONFIRM HIS BELIEF THAT INCIDENTS WERE SCATTERED AND NOT ORGANIZED.

12. COMMENT: HOPE YOU CAN URGE PRIMIN KARAMANLIS TO HAVE GDC AVOID COMMITTING ITSELF TO MAKARIOS. (CLERIDES DOES NOT HAVE MUCH FAITH IN MAVROS, AND APPROACH TO PRIMIN MAY BE NECESSARY TO GET POINT ACROSS.) ALTHOUGH CLERIDES' REQUEST OBVIOUSLY SELF-SERVING, WE THINK THERE IS INDEED DANGER HE DESCRIBES, OR OF CIVIL WAR IF RIGHT MOVES AGAINST CLERIDES. OUR INTERESTS IN THIS INSTANCE SEEM TO PARALLEL CLERIDES'.

13. SUGGEST THAT ANOTHER POINT TO BE MADE TO KARAMANLIS IS NEED TO MOVE SWIFTLY TO GAIN CONTROL OVER NATIONAL GUARD. WITHOUT NG SUPPORT, WE SUSPECT RIGHTIST GANGS COULD BE HANDLED. IT WOULD BE SAD COMMENTARY IF GREEK OFFICERS SHOULD SUPPORT RIGHTIST PUTSCH IN NICOSIA JUST WHEN ATHENS ITSELF IS MOVING AWAY FROM JUNTA GOVT.

14. AT SAME TIME, I SUGGEST WE ENDEAVOR TO AMELIORATE PRESSURE ON CLERIDES FROM ANOTHER DIRECTION. CLERIDES' CONCERNS OVER CONTINUING TURKISH MILITARY BUILDUP REPORTED SEPTEL. MIGHT BE USEFUL TO REMIND ANKARA THAT IN CLERIDES THEY HAVE BEST HOPE OF ACHIEVING TYPE OF NEGOTIATED SOLUTION WHICH GUNES HAS JUST REITERATED IS GORTURKEY GOAL. WOULD BE SELF-

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DEFEATING FROM THEIR OWN STANDPOINT IF INCOMING TURKISH
CONVOYS SHOULD STIR UP GREEK CYPRIOT REACTIONS TO POINT OF
ENDANGERING GOVERNMENT OF MODERATE SUCH AS CLERIDES.

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 035013

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

DESCRIPTION re Turkey

CREATION DATE 07/25/1974

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200184

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 8

FOLDER TITLE Cyprus Crisis (18)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/30/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

214

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FLASH /ROUTINE
SUP267R
121050 #SA798 MSG BEING SVCD FOR STATE MCN
DE RUQMQU #5948 2061715
Z R 251704Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0000

INFO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA FLASH 2353
AMEMBASSY ATHENS 3476
AMEMBASSY LONDON 2730
USMISSION GENEVA 676

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ANKARA 5948


GENEVA FOR BUFFUM
E.D. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MPPS, CY, TU, GR, PFOR
SUBJ: TURKISH REINFORCEMENTS
REF: NICOSIA 1766 (NOTAL)

State Review
3/31/04
BY HR 4/13/11

1. IN RESPONSE TO REFTTEL'S REQUEST FOR OUR "BEST GUESS" CONCERNING TURKISH FORCES' SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES ON CYPRUS, WE OFFER FOLLOWING VIEWS:

2. TURKS HAVE BEEN ITCHING FOR LONG TIME TO ALTER BALANCE OF AUTHORITY ON THE ISLAND MORE AFFIRMATIVELY IN THEIR FAVOR. THEY WERE NOT PREPARED, HOWEVER, TO TAKE MILITARY INITIATIVE TO DO THIS UNTIL, SURPRISINGLY, IOANNIDES' GOVERNMENT HANDED THEM WHAT THEY CONSIDERED TO BE GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY. GOG-SPONSORED CYPRUS COUP PRESENTED TURKS WITH FAIT ACCOMPLI WHICH ON ONE HAND THREATENED AN EVEN WEAKER TURKISH POSITION ON ISLAND, AND ON OTHER GAVE THEM OPPORTUNITY (JUSTIFIED, THEY BELIEVE, IN WORLD PUBLIC OPINION) TO INTERVENE MILITARILY AND THEREBY SIGNIFICANTLY STRENGTHEN THEIR POSITION ON THE ISLAND. THEY OPTED FOR LATTER AND ARE NOW EXPLOITING SITUATION TO EXTENT THEY THINK TRAFFIC WILL BEAR.

3. WE REMAIN DEEPLY PUZZLED WHY FORMER GREEK GOVERNMENT PRECIPITATED CURRENT SITUATION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE PROXIMITY OBVIOUSLY GAVE TO TURKS GREATER MILITARY -- AND MILITARY RE-SUPPLY AND REINFORCEMENT -- ADVANTAGES. WE THINK THAT, PARTICULARLY IN THE RE-SUPPLY AND REINFORCEMENT



***** WHSR COMMENT *****

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AREA, TURKS ARE CONTINUING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THEIR MORE FAVORABLE GEOGRAPHIC POSITION, AND ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO DO SO AT LEAST UNTIL MODALITIES OF CEASE-FIRE ARE MORE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED.

4. WE BELIEVE CURRENT TURKISH ACTIVITY IS AIMED NOT AT FUNDAMENTALLY ALTERING THE GEOGRAPHIC POSITION THEY NOW HOLD ON ISLAND BUT RATHER AT STRENGTHENING IT, AND AT SAME TIME INCREASING THEIR BARGAINING CHIPS AT GENEVA.

5. HOWEVER, UNTIL FACTS, AND TURKISH MOTIVES, BEHIND LAST NIGHT'S EVENTS CONCERNING NICOSIA AIRPORT BECOME CLEARER, WE NOT IN POSITION TO MAKE DEFINITIVE JUDGMENT.

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 035015

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇReport

DESCRIPTION re Cyprus Situation

CREATION DATE 07/25/1974

VOLUME 5 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200184

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 8

FOLDER TITLE Cyprus Crisis (18)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/30/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR



Department ~~SECRET~~ State

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TELEGRAM

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Control: 7003 - 7004Q
Received: July 24, 1974 611PM

O 242105Z JUL 74
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6892
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 4078

NOOIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, PFOR, CY, TU, GR, NATO
SUBJ: GREECE AND CYPRUS: ROLE OF NATO AND NEW GREEK GOVERNMENT

SUMMARY: LUNS FELT SITUATION HAS BEEN ON RAZOR'S EDGE FOR LAST WEEK, BUT THINKS OUTCOME OF CYPRUS CRISIS THUS FAR IS ABOUT THE BEST NATO COULD HOPE FOR UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES -- WITH CLERIDES; KARAMANLIS; AND TURKS HAVING SENSED SYMPATHY IN NAC FOR THEM. HE FEELS ALLIES, ALLIANCE AND NINE HAVE ACTED SUCCESSFULLY IN SUPPORTING US/UK INITIATIVES ELSEWHERE, HELPING TO AVOID WAR BETWEEN TWO MEMBERS, AVOIDING WITHDRAWAL FROM ALLIANCE OF ONE OR MORE OF THEM, AVOIDING TRANSATLANTIC DIFFICULTIES OVER DIFFERENCE IN VIEWS, REAL OR IMAGINED, TOWARDS GREEKS, AND FINALLY, MAINTAINING AN EFFECTIVELY FUNCTIONING ALLIANCE. FRG PERMREP KRAPP JOINED US AT END OF A PRIVATE MEETING THIS MORNING AND DISCUSSED AN INTERESTING REPORT FROM GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN ATHENS, WHO APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN PRESENT DURING SESSION OF MANEUVERING AMONG GREEKS ON POSITIONS IN NEW CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT. END SUMMARY.

1. ON MORNING OF JULY 24, I SAW LUNS FOR OVER AN HOUR, AT MY REQUEST, TO DISCUSS ASPECTS OF CYPRUS CRISIS. AT THE END WE WERE JOINED BY GERMAN PERMREP KRAPP.
2. LUNS BEGAN BY REPEATING REASSURANCE OF LAST NIGHT (USNATO 4056) THAT HE TOOK ALLEGED CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS SERIOUSLY. HE SAID THAT HE HAD TALKED TO TURKISH CHARGE TULUMEN AS WELL AS GREEK PERMREP CHORAFAS AGAIN DURING EVENING OF JULY 23, AND HAD AGAIN URGED GREATEST RESTRAINT ON BOTH OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS. HE SAID TULUMEN HAD CALLED HIM BACK A HALF HOUR LATER GIVING ASSURANCES THAT TURKEY IS TRYING TO PRESERVE THE CEASEFIRE, BUT STATING

State Review
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By LW 4/13/74

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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~~-2- SECRET~~ Section 1 of 2 USNATO 4078 July 18, 1974

THAT MANY OF VIOLATIONS ALLEGED BY GREEKS HAD OCCURRED BEFORE CEASEFIRE, AND PROVIDED LESS DRAMATIC ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION SINCE CEASEFIRE. LUNS ADDED HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT GREEK PERMREP CHORAFAS HAD NOT PERFORMED WELL DURING CRISIS, THAT HE WAS OVERLY RESPONSIVE TO GREEK ARMY, AND THAT BETTER EXAMPLE WAS SET BY GREEK AMBASSADORS IN ANKARA AND BELGRADE WHO RESIGNED. LUNS BELIEVES VIEWS OF COUNCIL MIGHT HAVE BEEN SWAYED IF TURKISH OCM TULUMEN HAD BEEN IN GREEK SEAT AND CHORAFAS IN TURK'S. LUNS WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF CHORAFAS WERE REPLACED BY A KARAMANLIS MAN.

3. LUNS REPORTED THAT KARAMANLIS HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH HIM LAST WEEK, AND SPOKE FAVORABLY OF HIM, RECALLING CIRCUMSTANCES OF HIS DISPUTE WITH GREEK ROYAL FAMILY THAT LED TO HIS SELF-IMPOSED EXILE. I BRIEFED HIM ON STATUS OF U.S. RELATION WITH CLERIDES, DRAWING ON NICOSIA 1689, AND STATE 160123, NOTING THAT GUIDANCE CABLE WAS CAREFULLY DRAFTED AND NOT SCHEDULED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNTIL 1700 BRUSSELS TIME.

4. AFTER REVIEWING EVENTS OF LAST NIGHT, LUNS FELT THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME DANGER THAT THE NEW GREEK GOVERNMENT MIGHT HAVE BEEN STEPPING INTO A SITUATION WHERE THINGS WERE SO WHIPPED UP THAT IT COULD GET COMMITTED TO SOME ACTION IT DIDN'T WANT TO TAKE.

5. TURNING TO MORE GENERAL DISCUSSION, LUNS SAID HE THOUGHT THAT US HAD COME OUT OF LAST 10 DAYS WELL. HE THINKS THAT U. S. IS SEEN AS TOO CAUTIOUS AT FIRST IN PUTTING U.S. FOOT DOWN WITH THE GREEKS, BUT THAT HIS MEETING IN LONDON WITH JOE SISCO HAD HELPED HIM UNDERSTAND US POSITION AND HELPED SISCO SEE HOW STRONGLY MOST OF OUR ALLIES FELT AGAINST GREECE. HE SAID RUMSFELD'S INTERVENTION DURING THE NIGHT MEETING ON JULY 16 (USNATO 3930), HAD GIVEN ALLIES VALUABLE REASSURANCE OF US EVEN-HANDEDNESS AND THAT A NUMBER OF PERMREPS HAD SAID THIS TO LUNS.

6. LUNS AND I THEN WENT OVER THE VARIOUS MISSIONS THAT NATO HAS DURING A CRISIS AND AGREED THAT IT HAD GENERALLY CARRIED OUT THESE MISSIONS. SEPTEL COVERS SOME OF THE POINTS WE DISCUSSED, AND WHICH HE USED IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE LATER IN THE DAY. HE SAID HE WOULD PROBABLY LEAD OFF PRESS CONFERENCE BY STRESSING NATO'S UNIQUE BUT NOT INDEPENDENT ROLE IN RESOLUTION OF CRISIS, AND NOTING IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTIONS OF US, UK, UN AND THE NINE TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE CEASEFIRE.

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TELEGRAM

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~~-3-SECRET~~ Section 2 of 2 USNATO 4078 July 24, 1974

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NOOIS

7. IN HIS PRESS DEALINGS I SUGGESTED HE CONSIDER CAREFULLY ANY SUGGESTIONS THAT THE U.S. WAS SLOW IN GETTING AROUND TO TAKING STEPS TO STOP THE CRISIS, IN LIGHT OF FACT MANY WHO THINK WE COULD HAVE ACTED EARLIER, TEND TO VASTLY OVERESTIMATE ONE NATION'S INFLUENCE IN SITUATIONS WHERE THERE IS A DESIRE TO AVOID USING MILITARY POWER. SOME SEEM TO ASSUME THE U.S. HAS TOTAL POLITICAL LEVERAGE EVEN WHEN FORCE IS OUT OF THE QUESTION. AS ONE EXAMPLE, I MENTIONED THE DIFFICULTY U.S. HAS BEEN HAVING GETTING OTHER ALLIES TO UNDERSTAND IMPORTANCE OF SPAIN TO SECURITY OF NATO. WE DISCUSSED PRESS ALLEGATIONS THAT U.S. WAS PRO-GREEK AND AGREED THAT SOME LOOK LESS AT SECURITY QUESTIONS AND REFLECT RATHER THE INTENSITY OF THEIR FEELINGS

ABOUT THE GREEK REGIME. I POINTED OUT DEBATE IN USA, OVER U.S. DEALINGS WITH SOVIETS, AS AN ANALOGY. AS IN CASE OF OLD GREEK REGIME, WE ARE TORN BETWEEN DISTASTE FOR SYSTEMS OR REGIMES SO INCONSISTENT WITH OURS AND A NEED TO LIVE IN THE REAL WORLD TO AVOID OTHER, EVEN MORE ORALLY DISTASTEFUL, DEVELOPMENTS. I ADDED THAT I AND ALL AMERICANS COULD NOT BUT AGREE THAT MANY ASPECTS OF GREEK REGIME VIOLATED OUR BELIEFS IN HUMAN FREEDOM.

8. I ADDED FURTHER THAT WHEN A SMALL COUNTRY TAKES A STAND ON AN ISSUE, IT IS VERY DIFFERENT FROM U.S. U.S. MUST MOVE CAREFULLY.

9. LUNS SAID HE SAW MY POINT. HE RECALLED THAT WHEN NORWAY HAD SAID THE DUTCH WERE IMPERALISTS IN INDONESIA, HE HAD SAID (RUDE NOISE), BUT WHEN THE U.S. HAD SAID THE SAME SORT OF THING, THINGS HAPPENED. HE AGREED U.S. POLICY MAKING AND DECISIONS AS TO WHETHER A MATTER SHOULD BE PUBLIC OR KEPT PRIVATE HAD TO BE CAREFULLY HANDLED.

10. LUNS SAID HE AND OTHERS HAD BEEN WORRIED ABOUT U.S. POSITION DURING FIRST FEW DAYS OF CRISIS, BUT AGREED WITH ME THAT SINCE THEN THE ALLIANCE HAD SERVED WELL IN INTEREST OF U.S. AND OTHER

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ALLIES BY SUPPORTING U.S. AND UK INITIATIVES ELSEWHERE; HELPING TO AVOID WAR BETWEEN TWO MEMBERS; AVOIDING WITHDRAWAL OF ONE OR MORE MEMBERS FROM THE ALLIANCE; AVOIDING BREACH BETWEEN U.S. AND EUROPE OVER DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDE, REAL OR IMAGINED, TOWARD GREECE; AND FINALLY MAINTAINING EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF ALLIANCE.

11. AMBASSADOR KRAPP CAME IN AFTER THIS DISCUSSION AND SHOWED LUNS A COPY OF A CABLE FROM THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN ATHENS, PARTS OF WHICH WERE READ ALOUD. I HAD THE IMPRESSION FROM THE REPORT THAT THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN ATHENS APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN PRESENT WITH GREEK LEADERS DURING MEETINGS LAST NIGHT (PRESUMABLY THOSE MENTIONED IN ATHENS 4886) THAT LED TO DECISIONS AS TO RESPONSIBILITIES IN NEWLY FORMED CIVILIAN GREEK GOVERNMENT.

12. THIS PROCESS APPEARS TO HAVE GONE THROUGH MUCH OF THE NIGHT, WITH GHIZIKIS, WITH DIFFERENT PEOPLE PRESENT AT DIFFERENT TIMES, AMONG THOSE PRESENT WERE THOSE SPECIFIED IN ATHENS OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT, PLUS AT TIMES POSSIBLY OTHER DIPLOMATIC PEOPLE IN ATHENS. IOANNIDIS APPARENTLY WAS NOT THERE AND GERMAN AMBASSADOR SEEMED TO HAVE VIEW HE WOULD "FADE AWAY" AND BE PENSIONED EVENTUALLY.

13. FOR NEW GOVERNMENT, IT SEEMED FROM FRG REPORT TO BE AGREED THAT GHIZIKIS WOULD CONTINUE FOR TIME BEING AS PRESIDENT, BUT THERE WAS ALSO A FEELING THAT HE WAS MOVING TO THE OUTER EDGE OF ACTIVITIES. AVEROFF HAD DECLINED JOB OF FONMIN, AND WANTED MAVROS TO TAKE IT, BUT IT WAS ONLY AGREED THAT VLACHOS WOULD TAKE JOB FOR THE INTERIM.

14. FRG OVSERVER SAID BONANOS AND ARMY COMMANDER GALATSANOS SEEMED TO CARRY MORE WEIGHT THAN AF OR NAVY CHIEFS. CANELLOPOULOS AND MAVROS WERE ALSO CENTRAL, MORE SO THAN MARKEZINIS.

15. LUNS SAID THAT THE KING HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH HIM LAST WEEK AND URGED LUNS TO HELP ACHIEVE AND MAINTAIN A CEASE-FIRE. LUNS' IMPRESSION IS THAT THERE IS AT LEAST A POSSIBILITY THAT THE KING COULD COME BACK AT SOME POINT, ALTHOUGH HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH KARAMANLIS, AS A LEGACY OF MID-SIXTIES, IS PROBABLY NOT PERFECT. RUMSFELD

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State Review
3/31/74

4/13/74

112

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TOSEC 4

BEING PASSED TO 86970 FOR EAGLEBURGER FOR THE SECRETARY
FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM DAMASCUS JULY 25.

QUOTE ~~SECRET~~ DAMASCUS 1488

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2 - IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE

TAGS: MARR, SY, IS

SUBJ: SYRIAN ALLEGATIONS OF DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT
VIOLATIONS

REF: STATE 159046

1. LATE MORNING JULY 25 I WAS FINALLY ABLE SEE GENERAL
HIKMA T SHIHABI, CHIEF, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, (HE HAS
BEEN OUT OF TOWN FOR LAST FEW DAYS) TO PASS ON SUBSTANCE
OF PARA 2 REFTEL.

2. CONCERNING ANTI-TANK DITCH AND FENCE MENTIONED PARA 2 (A)
REFTEL, SHIHABI STATED CATEGORICALLY BOTH IN ARABIC AND IN
ENGLISH THAT THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT FORBIDS ANY
MILITARY PRESENCE IN AREA BETWEEN LINES A AND A-1. SHIHABI
CONTINUED THAT BY "PRESENCE" SYRIANS BELIEVE THIS MEANS "NO
ISRAELI SOLDIERS, NO ISRAELI ARMAMENT OF ANY KIND AND NO
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION OF ANY KIND." SHIHABI EMPHASIZED
THAT CONSTRUCTION OF DITCH AND FENCE BETWEEN LINES A AND
A-1 IS CLEARLY FOR MILITARY PURPOSES AND, THEREFORE, IS A
VIOLATION NOT ONLY OF THE LETTER BUT OF THE SPIRIT OF THE
AGREEMENT. SHIHABI CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THE SYRIANS
CONSIDER THIS TO BE A "SERIOUS MATTER."

3. CONCERNING PRESENCE OF MILITARY PERSONNEL BETWEEN LINES
A AND A-1 (SEE PARA 2 (B) REFTEL) SHIHABI AGAIN EMPHASIZED
THAT SYRIAN GOVERNMENT IS FAITHFULLY AND TOTALLY ABIDING
BY ALL OF THE ARTICLES OF THE AGREEMENT BOTH IN LETTER AND
IN SPIRIT. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER'S
SUGGESTION THAT THE SYRIANS GO TO THE UNDOF FOR CLARIFICATION
OF POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS IS CORRECT. THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT,
HOWEVER, BELIEVES THAT THE BEST PROCEDURE AT THIS TIME IS
FOR THE USG TO EMPHASIZE TO THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY SHOULD
DESIST FROM VIOLATING EITHER THE LETTER OF THE SPIRIT OF
THE AGREEMENT RATHER THAN FOR THE SYRIANS TO GO RUNNING TO
THE UNDOF AT EVERY SLIGHTEST PROVOCATION. SHIHABI CONTINUED
THAT IF THE ISRAELS CAN DEMONSTRATE ON THEIR SIDE THAT THEY



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ARE ABIDING BY THE AGREEMENT THIS WILL GO FAR TO ESTABLISH AN ATMOSPHERE OF CONFIDENCE AND THIS WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO DEPENDENCE ON THE UNDOF BY EITHER SIDE.

4. WITH REGARD TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE ROAD ON THE HILLS FACING QUNEITRA (PARA 2 (C) REFTTEL), SHIHABI POINTED OUT THAT THERE ARE ALREADY ROADS IN EXISTENCE ON THE ISRAELI SIDE WHICH OBIVIATE THE NEED FOR CONSTRUCTION OF NEW ROADS. HE QUESTIONED RHETORICALLY WHY THE ISRAELI HAVE TO BUILD ANOTHER ROAD TO "CIRCUMVENT QUNEITRA." ANSWERING HIS OWN QUESTION, SHIHABI WENT ON TO SAY THIS ROAD IS CLEARLY A MILITARY ROAD.

5. COMMENT: SHIHABI WAS RELAXED AND FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT THE MEETING. NONETHLESS IT WAS OBVIOUS TO ME THAT HE CONSIDERS THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE TANK-TRAP AND FENCE ON LINE A TO BE A "SERIOUS MATTER." SCOTES UNQUOTE
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DIA SITUATION REPORT

#60

DATE: 25 July 74
TIME: 2345 EDT

A REVIEWED 26-Jan-2005; SANITIZED FOR RELEASE IN PART

SUBJECT: Cyprus Situation as of 2300 EDT

REFERENCE: See Page 4 [DIA REVIEWED 05-Sep-2003; REVIEW FOR DOS EQUITY REQUIRED]

NLF PROTECT FOR STATE (DOS) EQUITIES

SUMMARY

(C/NFD) GENEVA PEACE TALKS: Negotiations on the Cyprus situation between Greece, Turkey and the UK began at 1550 EDT. Greek Foreign Minister Mavros indicated that his country may ask for withdrawal of the Turkish invasion force before considering removal of Greek officers from the Cypriot National Guard. CYPRUS: US officials at the UN report that the UN does not consider the Turkish landing this morning a ceasefire violation. USDAO Nicosia reported the resumption of travel and economic activity in southern and western portions of Cyprus. Cypriot President Clerides concurs with US Ambassador Davies' proposal for a joint intercommunal relief operation under UN auspices. No further information has been reported concerning the feared confrontation between a Turkish armored force moving eastward from Nicosia toward Kythrea and Greek Cypriots in the same area. SOVIET UNION: No significant Soviet military activity related to Cyprus has been reported since last DIA SITREP (as of 2000 EDT). SEE LATE DEVELOPMENT.

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
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1. (U) Geneva Peace Talks on Cyprus: The first session of talks in Geneva between Greece, Turkey and the UK began at 2050 hours local (1550 EDT). In a brief speech, upon his arrival at Geneva Airport, Greek Foreign Minister Mavros charged that Turkish forces were violating the ceasefire "at this very moment." Mavros was referring to the large Turkish landing this morning at Kyrenia. His harsh statement indicated that, as previously reported, Greece will press at this first session for strict Turkish compliance with the ceasefire rather than dealing with Cypriot political problems. Mavros also indicated that Greece's new government may ask Turkey to withdraw its invasion force before any removal of Greek officers attached to the Cypriot National Guard. In view of Turkey's objectives -- greater guarantees of security for Turkish Cypriots and the maintenance of Turk control over the Nicosia-Kyrenia corridor -- this Greek request could make progress at Geneva extremely difficult. The first reported action taken by the conferees at Geneva so far has been to invite a senior UN official, Under-Secretary General Guyer, to sit in as an observer. In a statement issued at the conclusion of the first session, the three nations made a joint declaration reaffirming their endorsement of the UN ceasefire resolution "and their determination to achieve its aims taking into account the international agreements referred to therein".

2. (U) Cyprus Internal Situation: US officials at the UN in New York report that despite complaints over the Turkish landing at Kyrenia this morning, the UN did not consider this "reinforcement" action as a ceasefire violation and that it was "not a UN concern." UN officials in Cyprus report that during the landing, the Turks disembarked an unspecified number of troops, supplies and equipment including six tanks. USDAO Nicosia believes this to be the remainder of the 39th Infantry Division. US officials regarded the UN attitude on the Turkish landing as questionable particularly in light of earlier Security Council demands for restraint by all combatants.

(U) The US Defense Attache toured Nicosia earlier today and reported many signs of a return to normal. He stated that the entire north and northwest sections of the capital, where intense fighting took place on the night of 23 July, are now deserted. USDAO also reported that Bellapais, some three miles southeast of Kyrenia, was surrounded by Turkish forces but had not been attacked. Greek Cypriot residents have withdrawn into the ruins of an abbey and were requesting UN assistance. Turkish Cypriots in Famagusta's old city are reportedly continuing to resist against Greek Cypriots.

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
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USDAO reports that normal travel and economic activity is possible in the south and in the entire western part of Cyprus. The ports of Larnaca and Limassol are open and are operating normally.

3. (C) Relief Assistance for Cyprus: US Ambassador Davies has discussed possible disaster relief, including medical assistance to civilian casualties, with Cypriot President Clerides and Foreign Minister Dimitriou. Although both officials responded enthusiastically to the concept of a relief effort, they agreed that there is no basis for an estimate on relief requirements. UNFICYP is making a major sweep through accessible areas today and their report should provide some basis for such estimates. President Clerides appears greatly concerned about the fate of Greek Cypriots residing in areas overrun by Turkish forces, and has requested that the US formally urge the Turks to ensure the well-being of all those under their control. In turn, Clerides stated that the Turks could be assured that he was doing everything possible to prevent maltreatment of Turkish Cypriots under his control. Clerides welcomed Ambassador Davies' suggestion for the creation of a joint Greek-Turkish Cypriot coordinating committee to insure island-wide, intercommunal distribution of relief supplies, and recommended that the joint committee function under UN auspices. Implementation of the joint intercommunal relief operation could help bring the two communities together. In a related development, the UNFICYP has sought US assistance in obtaining additional supplies needed to increase patrols around the island, and provide rations for the as yet undetermined but large number of Cypriot refugees.

4. (C/NFD) Cyprus Military Situation: No further information has been reported concerning the feared confrontation between Greek Cypriots and a Turkish armored force allegedly moving eastward from the Nicosia enclave toward Kythrea. The status of the Finnish UN contingent supposedly in the Kythrea area has not been determined.

5. (C) Soviet Ground Force, Air, and Naval Activity: No activity in addition to that reported in previous SITREPs has been observed which can be related to the Cyprus situation.

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Joseph Kraft

Cyprus: The Happy Ending . . .



Odysseus, at his wildest, couldn't have put together a more clever ending than the outcome which now emerges from the Cyprus crisis. But that is not to say that Henry Kissinger was manipulating events all along.

On the contrary, the evidence shows luck and improvisation at work, especially here in Washington. So while celebrating the results, it is also useful to identify the weaknesses which caused the crisis to erupt in the first place.

The most notable development to come out of the Cyprus crisis is the change of regime in Greece. The wild men headed by Brig. Gen. Dimitrios Ioannides who set in motion the attempt to take over Cyprus, have been ousted by senior generals grouped around the commander on the Turkish front, Ioannis Davras.

A civilian regime is being set up under former Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis. Mr. Karamanlis is probably as good a leader as anybody could hope for in Greece. Thus at one stroke the world is rid of a wild man, whose actions threatened stability everywhere, and Greece has a chance to start anew in building a liberal regime in harmony with her European and American allies.

What has happened in Cyprus is only a little less remarkable. Nikos Sampson, the murderous scoundrel

"Mr. Clerides might open the way for a communal settlement followed by replacement of Greek and Turkish forces on Cyprus with a United Nations' contingent."

who acted as proxy for the wild men in Greece to push Archbishop President Makarios from office, has himself been forced from power.

The new Cypriot leader, Glafkos Clerides, has strong support in the Greek community on the island. There is at least a chance that he will replace Archbishop Makarios who is certainly not the most steady of leaders.

Moreover, Mr. Clerides has been the Greek Cypriot most noted for willingness to negotiate with the Turkish minority on the island. Thus he might open the way for a communal settlement followed by replacement of both Greek and Turkish forces on Cyprus with a United Nations contingent.

The one good guy to suffer in the crisis is the Turkish prime minister,

Bulent Ecevit. The invasion force, the Turks sent to Cyprus immediately after Makarios was forced out, did not score a military success.

Though the invasion was launched under pressure of the Turkish armed forces, it is possible that Mr. Ecevit will have to pay the price for the inglorious adventure. But even if he is forced out, the Turkish military are evidently set on maintaining civilian government. So military dictatorship could probably be avoided in Turkey, and the fiasco of the past few days may prompt Mr. Ecevit or some other civilian leader, to try to work out an understanding with the new regime.

The happy ending has already combined with a favorite Washington myth to build the theory that Secretary of

State Kissinger planned the whole thing all along. That is, demonstrably, not the case.

Some 10 days before the anti-Makarios coup in Cyprus, American intelligence officials in Athens were informed by the Ioannides regime that such a move was in the offing. The Americans sensed that Ioannides was testing their reaction and cabled Washington with a request for guidance. Guidance never came—presumably because the President, the Secretary of State and all other high officials were too busy with other matters. So Gen. Ioannides set in motion the Cyprus coup in apparent confidence that he had American backing.

Once the Cyprus crisis was under way, moreover, American officials were slow to bet on the right horses. The President and Secretary Kissinger showed for the Greek military regime the exaggerated concern they usually show for military regimes. Under Secretary Joseph Sisco was at one point reluctant even to go to Athens for the purpose of applying pressure.

The point of all this is that nobody—certainly no American official—can take all the credit. And if anybody tries, the happy ending—which may be too good to be true—will certainly turn sour.

Even and Power

Full-scale war between Turkey and Greece was averted and the 7-year-old military dictatorship in Athens toppled when Washington belatedly abandoned permissiveness and laid down the law to the Greek junta.

There is little doubt Greece would have responded to Turkey's invasion of Cyprus with its own invasion of Turkey were it not for Undersecretary of State Joseph Sisco's backstage pressure in Athens. In most undiplomatic language, Sisco told the Greek generals that the U.S. would abandon them to inevitable destruction if they attacked Turkey. Jolted by this unexpected threat, the military dictatorship backed down and thereby guaranteed its own fall on Tuesday.

But there is no room for American self-congratulation here. The generals held tyrannical power so long because of Washington's coddling. The Cyprus crisis which has shaken the NATO alliance should have been averted by the United States. What's more, this menacing question remains: will bitterness by ordinary Greeks toward Washington for wat-nursing the dictatorship eventually propel their nation out of the Western alliance?

U.S. follies toward Athens date back to the Johnson administration, which embraced the Greek military coup of April 1967. U.S. diplomats in Athens felt the obscure colonels masterminding the coup would have collapsed at a single word from Washington, but that word never came. This policy was perpetuated by the Nixon administration, freezing tyranny in Greece.

Despite a growing coolness toward Athens recently, the U.S. has rigidly refused to pressure the military dictatorship. The current junta, dominated by Brig. Gen. Dimitrios Ioannides, seemed puzzled that Washington demanded so little for friendship and military aid.

Noting American permissiveness coinciding with increased opposition from the Greek people, Ioannides decided on the ancient expedient of faltering regimes: a foreign adventure. Athens' plot to take over Cyprus should have been foreseen and prevented by Washington. Instead, as the junta expected, there was no U.S. interference.



By Joe Heiberger—The Washington Post

In Athens, Under Secretary of State Sisco "recited a tough line."

Moreover, working-level State Department officials who wanted to condemn Athens for the Cyprus plot after it occurred were overruled by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, heeding Pentagon fears of losing Greece as NATO's anchor. Had Kissinger instead aligned himself with the British against the coup, congressional critics

believe, the Turks might have been dissuaded from invading Cyprus—a contention bitterly disputed by administration policymakers.

By the time Sisco left Washington at 11 p.m. July 17 for his try at shuttle diplomacy, the administration was resigned to a Greek-Turkish war which would shatter the West's strategic posi-

tion against Moscow and threaten the NATO alliance. Thankfully, at that belated hour, Sisco talked tough to the Greeks.

When Sisco arrived in Athens Friday morning, July 19, the generals informed him they would respond to Turkish invasion of Cyprus by invading Turkey. Sisco's hardboiled reply: except for the U.S., you have no friends in NATO—or the world. You can expect nothing from the Communist world. In the Third World, you are patriots. And if you attack Turkey, you will lose the U.S. and be totally isolated.

Flying to Ankara that night, Sisco told the Turks that the U.S. would work with Turkey and Great Britain to undo Greek meddling in Cyprus. But the Turks seemed determined to teach Athens a lesson. At 5:45 a.m. Saturday, Sisco was informed of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus to begin 15 minutes later. He left Ankara for Athens at 6:30 a.m.

In Athens, the Greeks reiterated their intention to counterattack against Turkey. Again, Sisco recited his tough line. Stunned that Washington finally meant business, the generals backed down. When Sisco left for Washington last Monday night after negotiating the shaky cease-fire, it was clear the Ioannides regime could not survive.

Luckily, it was replaced not by nationalistic young colonels vowing a redemptive war against Turkey but by a civilian government headed by old conservative Constantine Karamanlis. But the United States has not escaped the consequences of its follies. The harvest from anti-American seed sown in Greece since 1967 by Washington's pro-junta policies has yet to be revealed.

We reported from Athens in June 1969 that the U.S. embrace of the junta—because of military requirements in the Eastern Mediterranean—posed "immense danger to long-range stability" in the region. That prediction was fully realized by the Cyprus crisis. Whether Sisco's belated badgering of the Greeks can forestall the prediction's full consequences will require undeserved but eagerly welcomed good fortune.

