## The original documents are located in Box 7, folder "Cyprus Crisis (4)" of the Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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The still classified portions of these RAC documents are eligible for MDR. To file a request follow these steps:

- 1. Obtain the Presidential Libraries Mandatory Review Request Form (NA Form 14020).
- 2. Complete Sections I, II, and III of NA Form 14020.

Gerald R. Ford Library

3. In Section III, for each document requested, simply provide the Executive Standard Document Number (ESDN) in the Document Subject/Title or Correspondents column. The ESDN will be printed on the top and bottom of the document, and written on the declassification authority stamp, and will follow this format:

NLF-NSC\_ILCC-5-2-4-3

A Presidential Library Administered by the National Archives and Records Administration

EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY Ret sensitive — -OFCRUT-Department of State **Operations** Center CYPRUS Task Force 'S (3) Situation Report No. 1 'S-I (RF) Situation in Cyprus as of 0600 (EDT) July 16 /S-K 'S-3 /2 The Coup. At approximately 0800 local time (0200 EDT) on July 15, the Cypriot National Guard, which is com-1 ΠR manded by Greek mainland officers, toppled the governll (LDX) ment of Archbishop Makarios. The Presidential palace OD (LCN) was destroyed and the National Guard gained control of (XQL) AL the Cyprus radio (CEC), the Cyprus Telecommunications GA(LOX) Authority and most strategic points. Sporadic gunfire 1.200 in Nicosia continued throughout the night of July 15. Although there have been reports of gunfire in Turkish J/PRS MODE districts apparently the violence has not significantly involved the Turkish Cypriot community. 10R IUR/GE (2) (1)"Government of National Salvation." In the afternoon of July 15 CBC broadcast a statement by Nikos Sampson, S/S-D(4) a guerrilla leader of the EOKA struggle and strong supporter of Cypriot union with Greece. Sampson declared that he had assumed the Presidency of Cyprus. His statement also supported continuation of the intercommunal talks, promised elections in Cyprus within a

year, and announced that there would be no changes in Cyprict foreign policy, i.e., Cyprus would remain a nonaligned state.

Status of Makarios. Although there have been reports of the Archhishop's death, a British UNFICYP officer reported having seen Makarios and that Makarios had requested a meeting with ranking UNFICYP officials on the morning of the 16th. Reportedly, UN Representatives will attempt to make this contact. On July 15 individual claiming to be Makarios made a radio broadcast stating that he is still the President of Cyprus. On the morning of July 16 a second broadcast, in English, appealed to the superpowers and "all friendly countries" to support the Archbishop.

International Reaction to the Coup.

NATO -- Secretary General Luns has requested restraint on the part of both Greece and Turkey.

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#### SECRET

US -- We have instructed our Embassy in Ankara to approach the highest level of the Turkish Foreign Ministry and our Embassy in Athens to approach Greek strong man Ioannides to reaffirm our policy of support for Cyprus' sovereignty, independence and constitutional arrangements, to express support for a peaceful resolution of the Cyprus problem, and to stress the importance of restraint and patience and to request the two governments' immediate evaluation of the situation in Cyprus.

UN -- Secretary General Waldheim has rejected Cypriot Ambassador Rossides' request for UN intervention on Cyprus and his request that Waldheim convene the Security Council. Rossides seems intent on convening the Council in any case. Apparently Waldheim has sent messages to the Greek and Turkish governments.

UK -- The British government has sent messages to the governments of Greece and Turkey indicating the dangers that the Cyprus situation presents for the eastern Mediterranean and NATO, supporting the independence of Cyprus and requesting the two governments' comments on the situation in Cyprus.

USSR -- Soviet reaction has been cautious. The Soviet Counselor in Nicosia asked the British High Commissioner what the UK reaction would be if Soviet troops were sont to Cyprus. The High Commissioner responded that ha did not favor the suggestion. TASS has accused the Greek government of responsibility for the coup and noted that the USSR was making demarches to Greece, Turkey, the US, the UK and France.

Turkey -- Turkish radio has reported a 10-hour meeting of the Turkish Council of Ministers followed by the Council's decision to request the Turkish President to convene an extraordinary session of Parliament. Reportedly, the Turkish armed forces have been placed in an advanced state of alert. Charge Spain reports US message "could not have been more timely or effective in blunting intense Turkish fear of enosis."

Greace -+ Greace has expressed no public reaction. Reportedly, the Greak armed forces are also on alert.

APPROVED BY ... PLAN JONES

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**EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY** 

DECLASSIFIED w/portions exempted State Dept. Guidelines AUTHORITY RAC NLF- CODEWORD - 3-25-1-0 BY MLO. NARA, DATE 3/9/2011 9/7/2004

Approved For Release 2004/09/07 : NLF-CODEV

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## WARNING

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DIA review(s) completed.

Presidential Library Review of DOS Equities is Required

## -TOP-SECRET

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 16 July 1974

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

#### CYPRUS

Situation Report Number 5 (As of 0700 EDT; updates NIB)

(All times cited are Nicosia time, unless otherwise specified)

## THE POLITICAL SITUATION

(1)

1. Press agencies this morning reported that President Makarios had personally broadcast an appeal for Cypriot and international support over the Paphos radio station. Speaking in English, he charged that the "Greek junta" had instigated a coup d'etat by Greek officers of the Cyprus National Guard and the Greek army detachment on the island and installed a puppet president. Asserting that Greek Cypriots are "struggling valiantly against the usurpers," he stated that both Limassol and Paphos are still held by his forces.

2. Following the Makarios statement, the Paphos station reportedly broadcast an appeal to the people of the world and "all democratic governments" to "help us save democracy in Cyprus."

3. In Nicosia, the Greek-officered National Guard was in full control this morning, and US Embassy cars were permitted to move around the capital to check on Americans. Only sporadic firing was reported during the night, but at 1100 prolonged firing of undetermined origin was reported in the vicinity of the embassy.

4. 25) Radio appeals for blood donations were being broadcast this morning, and US and British officials have expressed concern about food supplies running out if the crisis continues. GREEK REACTION 5. No official Greek statements on the situation have been reported this morning. Ambassador Tasca will see Foreign Ministry officials this afternoon. TURKISH REACTION 6. Turkey's National Security Council concluded an all-night session at 0400 this morning, after which a government spokesman declared that the government "had established its course of action to defend the security of Turkish Cypriots." Premier Ecevit has called for an extraordinary session of parliament and will meet with political party leaders at 1100 today. 25X Premier Ecevit was quoted as observing to the press that there was no doubt that the Cyprus coup was instigated by Athens. 烖枝 Turkish air force units are on advanced alert. The US Embassy has been unable to confirm local press reports that Turkish naval vessels have left southern ports in the direction of Cyprus. 25) -2-Approved For Release 2004/09/07 : NLF-CODEWORD-3-25-1-0

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 16 July 1974

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

### CYPRUS

Situation Report Number 5 (As of 0700 EDT; updates NIB)

(All times cited are Nicosia time, unless otherwise specified)

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## GREEK REACTION

4.

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#### TURKISH REACTION

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Premier Ecevit was quoted as observing to the press that there was no doubt that the Cyprus coup was instigated by Athens.


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## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.

#### INFORMATION

July 17, 1974

### TOP SECRET/CODEWORD (XGDS)

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: Jeanne W. Davis

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Washington Special Actions Group Meeting Held July 16, 1974

Attached are the minutes of the Washington Special Actions Group meeting held July 16, 1974, to discuss Cyprus.

Attachments

cc: Gen. Scowcroft Col. Kennedy Mr. Saunders

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TOP SECRET / CODEWORD (XGDS)



## NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

## WITHDRAWAL ID 034283

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
TITLE WASG Meeting DESCRIPTION Meeting minutes with attached DCI briefing
CREATION DATE 07/16/1974
VOLUME 14 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200169 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE FILES
BOX NUMBER
DATE WITHDRAWN 07/01/2011 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST CCG

#### MEMORANDUM

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INFORMATION July 16, 1974 I pm Wash Time

MEMORANDUM FOR

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FROM:

RICHARD T. KENNEDY

GENERAL SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT:

The Cyprus Situation -- Today's WSAG Meeting

The main new element in the Cyprus situation is that Makarios is alive, thus further complicating the picture of yesterday's coup. A WSAG meeting was held this morning to assess that situation and review our overall strategy.

Information was conflicting on Makarios' intentions. USUN reported that Makarios had touched base with the local UN representative on Cyprus and sought formal UN support for his government; Waldheim would call a UNSC meeting this afternoon to deal with the request. The UK meanwhile indicated that they would respond positively to a request they had from Makarios to evacuate him to some spot outside Cyprus. We are seeking clarification. Late press reports that Makarios has now been flown out of Cyprus. His intentions and the strength of his ability to mount a meaningful opposition to current events are relevant to determing a US response.

There are continued reports of some fighting in pockets on Cyprus, though not seriously affecting the Turk Cypriot community -- a key element to how events might unfold -- as yet. The Turks are taking a strong public line on their treaty rights, with some reports they may seek joint UK-Turk action to "counteract the threat to Cyprus" as guarantor powers. The Greeks have been non-communicative. The Soviets are attacking "outside" interference in Cyprus affairs and we are monitoring Soviet fleet movements in the Mediterranean and keeping our own ships in a holding pattern. Soviet reaction has been assessed as restrained thus far.

There is general agreement that the Cyprus situation is still not clear, and particularly Makarios' fate and any ability he might have to affect the balance of forces on the island away from the coup leaders. Thus, \* ' this morning's meeting focussed on a US holding action while events sort themselves out.

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Specifically, it was agreed that

--We need a much clearer picture of the situation on the ground in Cyprus and the intelligence community has been tasked with developing a better assessment, especially on the strength of the hold the new government/military has and the prospects for opposition by Makarios supporters, taking into account that the Archbishop is alive.

--We need a precise reading of Turkish intentions in the current situation and we need to urge restraint. McComber will be instructed to see Prime Minister Ecevit expeditiously.

--We need a firm reading of Greek intentions and a direct approach to Ioannides for <u>unambiguous</u> assurances on a sovereign Cyprus (the Turks see the newly installed Cypriot president as "hidden enosis.") Tasca will be asked to make a direct approach to Iaonnides and not through his political cabinet.

--Until the situation clarifies, we need a holding operation at any UNSC meeting that is convened. We will hue to our public line of watching the situation and pressing our assumption on the sovereignty and integrity of Cyprus. We will stick to our line that the issue of recognition does not arise, not be positive about who we might recognize and leave that open. We will not recognize the new Sampson government however.

--We will do nothing with our fleet for the moment.

--The main efforts today and overnight will be with Ankara and Athens. Tomorrow we will consider the internal situation on Cyprus and how to deal with our options of support, including Makarios.

Our overall strategy will continue to reflect efforts to avoid any internationalization of the current Cyprus situation. We do not want to provide a context for the legitimization of Soviet intervention.

A WSAG meeting will be held tomorrow morning to review the situation and the US response.

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## NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

## WITHDRAWAL ID 034296


REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
DESCRIPTION Re: Cyprus
CREATION DATE 07/16/1974
VOLUME 3 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200169 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE FILES
BOX NUMBER
DATE WITHDRAWN 07/01/2011 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST CCG

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 16 July 1974

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

## CYPRUS

Situation Report Number 6 (As of 1600 EDT)

(All times cited are Nicosia time, unless otherwise specified.)

## THE POLITICAL SITUATION

1. The British government's announcement today that President Makarios had been assisted to leave Cyprus via the British base area near Limassol appeared to signal at least a military victory for the Greek-backed coup forces. Nicosia has subsequently announced that National Guard troops have entered Paphos, the last major Makarios stronghold.

2., The new cabinet, like the "president" announced yesterday, has a marked rightist, pro-enosis character. Several of the new ministers have been open supporters of EOKA and opponents of Makarios, and have strong ties to the Greek mainland. Ambassador Davies observes that the new government will be strictly dependent on Greek arms and is certain to precipitate a continuing struggle between rightist and leftist forces on the island.

#### TURKISH-BRITISH INTERACTION

3. A Turkish foreign ministry spokesman said that Ankara today asked the UK for talks aimed at reaching agreement on Presidential Library Review of DOS Equities is Required

joint action over Cyprus. Ankara has asked London for a reply within 24 hours. The Turkish spokesman said Ankara was proposing joint action under terms of the Zurich and London Accords of 1959 making Turkey, Greece, and the UK co-guarantors of Cypriot independence. Should London fail to agree to joint action, Turkey said it might "go alone" to counteract what Ankara clearly regards as the Greek-inspired threat to Cyprus' independence.

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
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5. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Ecevit met with President Koruturk Tuesday evening, following another session of the cabinet. Koruturk subsequently announced that parliament has been called into an extraordinary session on July 18. Ecevit met earlier today with opposition political party leaders, apparently briefing them on the results of last night's meet-

#### GREEK COMMENTS

6. Official Greek reaction has been limited to a foreign ministry statement today which said the Greek government would maintain "its principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other countries."

7. Acting Greek Foreign Minister Kypreos delivered the same message in a meeting with Ambassador Tasca today. Kypreos denied that Greek army units stationed on Cyprus were involved in the coup. He admitted that in an earlier discussion with the Soviet ambassador, Moscow's envoy had asserted Greek officers were interfering in the internal affairs of Cyprus. Kypreos also said that the Greek ambassador in Ankara was scheduled to meet the Turkish Foreign Minister today, but he did not have any results from the meeting.



## SOVIET POLITICAL MOVES

The Soviet Ambassador in Ankara at his request met 9. today with the Turkish President to deliver a message from the Kremlin. No statement was issued following the session. The Soviet charge in Athens made a strong demarche to the Greek Foreign Ministry today. He expressed Moscow's serious concern over the situation in Cyprus and stressed that the Soviets hold Athens responsible for the coup. The Soviet diplomat, whose ambassador is on home leave, tried to see President Gizikis. Athens refused, however, and referred him to the Foreign Minister. A Tass statement last night indicated that Soviet demarches would also be made to Britain, France, and the US. Tass today criticized the US for failing to heed warnings of the impending conflict due to "strategic considerations" in the area and for failing to warn Athens about the implementations of its aggressive plans.


10. Tass also repeated Makarios' appeal for assistance. It reported a plea by the Cypriot Communist Party (AKEL) to

rally around Makarios. The AKEL praised the USSR as a great friend of the Cypriot people and stated that Moscow is already actively supporting their cause. Soviet reportage of the AKEL statement is an indication that Moscow sees the party as an important source of resistance to the coup.

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UN

14. The Security Council was scheduled to meet at 1500 EDT today. In an unusual move, the meeting was jointly called for by UN Secretary General Waldheim and by Cypriot UN representative Rossides. Waldheim probably wants to inform the Council of the events which have taken place on Cyprus. He may be seeking formal Security Council approval of his granting Makarios "UN protection." The Secretary may also use the occasion to gain support for some kind of expanded UN or UNFICYP role in restoring stability on the island.




15. The motivations of Rossides in calling for the meeting are more uncertain. He has all along vacillated in requesting Security Council actions and the Soviets may have encouraged him to parallel the Secretary's move by calling for a meeting now. Rossides might call for some kind of a resolution calling for restoration of constitutional government and recognition of Makarios as the legitimate ruler of Cyprus. These minimum objectives may be considerably strengthened if the Soviets decide to take an active part in the debate.

#### NATO

16. A special session of NATO's North Atlantic Council today issued a statement thanking Secretary General Luns for the message he sent yesterday to the Greek and Turkish governments asking them to exercise restraint. The Council also urged the Secretary General to continue monitoring closely Cyprus developments. Greek Acting Foreign Minister Kypreos told the US ambassador in Athens that his government had replied to Luns' request by stressing that events in Cyprus were of an internal nature, that Greek policy remained unchanged and that the parties concerned should exercise restraint.

#### WEST EUROPEAN PRESS REACTIONS

17. Morning newspapers in Germany and France on July 16 stress the international significance of the conflict. <u>Die Welt</u> noted that Makarios had kept a precarious balance between the interests of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots factions, of Greece and Turkey, of the US and the Soviet Union, and of the Arab states and Israel. Although there is a general presumption in the German press that Athens was involved in the coup, this factor is not stressed. In line with their recognition that Cyprus, while unstable internally, has had a stabilizing influence by keeping itself out of superpower disputes and the Middle East conflict, the press assumes that both the US and the USSR have an interest in a peaceful development of the situation.



18. In Paris, the right-wing <u>Aurore</u> writes of Moscow's "Machiavellian game" in seeking to provoke a rift in NATO, while the Communist daily sees US instigation behind the Athens junta's "flagrant foreign intervention." Independent <u>Figaro</u> points out that the Cyprus crisis will show the limits of the detente between the two superpowers.

19. Italian commentaries in the independent press are almost unanimously sympathetic to Makarios and highly critical of Athens. The Socialist and Communist press, on the other hand, wonder about US involvement in the coup.

### WHEREABOUTS OF MAKARIOS

20. Deposed President Makarios has been variously reported enroute to Malta, London and UN Headquarters. Cypriot UN representative Rossides was quoted late today as saying he was "sure Makarios was in London" but was not certain about whether the Archbishop would continue on to New York.

#### ANNEX I

## Military Forces in Cyprus

(Page 3 presents a table of known armed groups in Cyprus.)

The coup forces consist of the 10,000-man Greek Cypriot national guard and some 650-800 Greek officers attached to it. The 950-man Greek mainland legal contingent is apparently not involved. We have no evidence that members of EOKA-B, the proenosis terrorist organization, are involved in the fighting but some may well be taking part and the entire organization would probably assist the guard in the event of a prolonged conflict.

The coup forces apparently control all of the principal towns except for Paphos, where they are still overcoming resistance. They seized the Paphos radio station which had been broadcasting appeals in behalf of Makarios, at about 1230 local time today. Turkish Cypriot sources report that an armored national guard column of about 800 men was heading toward Paphos at about the same time.

The forces loyal to Makarios appear to consist of elements of the police and those members of the tactical reserve unit who did not surrender yesterday. Some of the paramilitary forces of Vassos Lyssaridis, leftist member of the House of Deputies and Makarios' confidant, may also be involved.

Makarios' supporters' in the Paphos area appear to be losing ground and they are not likely to survive that assault of the armored column. Sporadic gunfire continues in Nicosia. One report from a Greek Cypriot source claims there were 4,000 casualties in the Nicosia area but this may be an exaggerated figure. Unless the masses of armed pro-Makarios supporters among the populace rally in his behalf, it is unlikely that the present forces fighting the guard can continue for long. Elements of the pro-Makarios Communist Party (AKEL) would likely join any growing insurgent support for the deposed leader.



The Turkish Cypriot forces are in a state of alert, but so far they have remained out of the fighting and will presumably continue to do so. The coup forces have repeated that their action was strictly an internal Greek Cypriot affair so as not to draw the Turkish Cypriots into the conflict. There was an exchange of fire between Greeks and Turks in a Nicosia suburb at 1730 local time, however. If the Turkish Cypriots should be attacked, they could probably defend themselves until they received assistance from Turkey. If Ankara ordered them into action in support of a Turkish invasion, they could probably help provide a beachhead for a Turkish landing and would probably give a good account of themselves against the divided Greek Cypriots.

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
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## Armed Forces on Cyprus

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Greek (mainland) legal contingents	9 50
Turkish (mainland) legal contingents	650
Turkish Army (mainland) illegal	150-300
Turkish Cypriot regulars	4,000
Turkish Cypriot reserve	6,000
Cypriot (Greek) National Guard	10,000+
Greek (mainland) officers in National Guard	650-800
Makarios' special contingent The Tactical Reserve Unit (TRU) (some have surrendered)	1,000+
EOKA-B guerrillas (estimated)	400
Lyssarides' pro-Makarios guerrillas (estimated)	150-300
UN Forces (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and U.K.)	2,400
Some of the members of the 12,000-man Communist Party might take up arms in behalf of Makarios.	
There are in addition numerous armed but unorganized civilians who might support a pro-Makarios resistance effort.	€ 0 # 0 
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#### ANNEX II

SUBJECT: Moscow and the Cyprus Crisis

Moscow was caught off guard by Monday's fast-moving events on Cyprus, and it clearly is waiting for the dust to settle before establishing a tactical line. That the Soviets may be given to a worst case interpretation of the coup is clear from statements of Soviet diplomats that the USSR will react strongly and from propaganda organs that are labeling the events as NATOinspired. Late on Monday Moscow issued an authoritative Tass statement that stressed the legitimacy of the Makarios government and condemned Greek interference on the island. Over the longer run, Moscow's position will stem from its interest in maintaining an independent, nonaligned Cyprus and its reading of the developing situation there.

The coup poses a threat to Soviet interests and is certain to trigger a strong reaction. Moscow's recent setbacks in the Middle East will intensify the Kremlin's desire to forestall further Western inroads in the area. The growth of Moscow's naval capability in the Mediterranean has made it easier than in earlier Cypriot crises for Moscow to back up its diplomacy with military force. As was the case during the Middle East war, however, Moscow will have to take into account the impact of its actions on relations with the US.

#### Soviet Interests

The Soviets claim that their basic objective in Cyprus is to maintain the island's independence and territorial integrity. Toward this end, the Soviets consistently supported President Makarios against both Greek pressure for enosis and Turkish proposals for federation of the island's two ethnic communities with Athens and Ankara. Underlying this policy is concern that a Cyprus subordinate to either or both of these NATO states would lead to increased Western military use of the island.

A second, closely related Soviet objective is to maintain a neutral, nonaligned government on Cyprus. Moscow wants such a government to limit the Western military presence on the island as well as to provide a receptive audience for Soviet political initiatives. Such a government also promotes the longer-term Soviet interest in removing British bases from Cyprus.

The Soviets also view a neutral, nonaligned government as likely to provide an environment in which the firmly pro-Soviet Cypriot Communist party (AKEL) can flourish. A Cyprus under the de facto control of a staunchly anti-Communist Greek government would be a grave threat to the AKEL. The AKEL, which in the 1970 parliamentary elections won 40 percent of the Greek Cypriot vote, is the best-organized and most disciplined political movement on the island. The Soviets probably nurture hopes that one day the movement might participate in the government and eventually obtain full power. In the meantime, the AKEL has been useful to Moscow in pushing the Makarios government leftward and as a source of intelligence on the island's politics.

A third Soviet interest in Cyprus has been to exploit Greek-Turkish tensions over the island to improve its relations with Ankara. In recent years the Soviets have placed strong emphasis on good relations with Ankara because of Turkey's strategic control of the Bosporus and its location adjacent to the USSR. In addition, Greek-Turkish tension exacerbates US relations with its allies and serves to weaken NATO's southern flank.

#### Soviet Tactics in the Current Situation

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Moscow undoubtedly views the emergence of a Greek-dominated, pro-enosis, right-wing government on Cyprus as threatening its dual objectives of Cypriot independence and nonalignment. The coming to power of Nicos Sampson, a rightist strongarm man, also endangers the AKEL.

The Soviets will undoubtedly make the return to power of Makarios the focal point of their diplomatic activity.

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The Tass statement is consistent with Soviet diplomacy prior to the coup which placed particular emphasis on a common Soviet-US approach to the crisis. The Soviet communication regarding Cyprus made to the US last March, for example, alleged common US and Soviet goals regarding the island and linked them to detente. Subsequently, a stressed \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ that Moscow and Washington seemed to share a common view of the danger in the Cyprus situation. These activities suggest that Moscow will stress to Washington a joint US-USSR responsibility for stability and propose some form of "joint action" to ensure it.

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In addition to its political moves, Moscow may be implementing military contingency plans to reinforce its naval



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squadron in the Mediterranean.

Moscow's tactics obviously will be significantly affected by the survival of Archbishop Makarios. The Soviets will rally to his support as the Tass statement on July 15 indicated. If Makarios has some forces in the field, the Soviets will do what they can to see that they get supplies. The USSR also will order the AKEL to support Makarios. Indeed, the Tass statement indicated that the Soviets were seriously considering supporting an anti-"mutineer" group even if Makarios had been killed, The Soviets might go so far as to support an alternative government if there seems to be no early hope of toppling the "mutineers,"

If the new government survives the next several days, the Soviets will press the guarantors of the London-Zurich agreements to prevent a Cypriot union with Greece. They also may seek to discuss with the US the possibility of joint action -perhaps with UN auspices -- to restore Makarios. To induce a positive US response to such appeals, Moscow will indicate its willingness to intervene unilaterally to reinstall Makarios, and may well back up its warnings with naval deployments and military actions, such as alerts of its airborne forces. Ιf these efforts fail, Moscow will be faced with the choice of accepting a pro-Greek, anti-Communist regime or risking a confrontation with the US by intervening directly on behalf of Makarios. Faced with this dilemma, the Scviets could decide to sustain an insurgent effort on the island to restore the Archbishop.



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
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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

### CYPRUS

Situation Report Number 6 (As of 1600 EDT)

(All times cited are Nicosia time, unless otherwise specified.)

### THE POLITICAL SITUATION

1. The British government's announcement today that President Makarios had been assisted to leave Cyprus via the British base area near Limassol appeared to signal at least a military victory for the Greek-backed coup forces. Nicosia has subsequently announced that National Guard troops have entered Paphos, the last major Makarios stronghold.

2. The new cabinet, like the "president" announced yesterday, has a marked rightist, pro-enosis character. Several of the new ministers have been open supporters of EOKA and opponents of Makarios, and have strong ties to the Greek mainland. Ambassador Davies observes that the new government will be strictly dependent on Greek arms and is certain to precipitate a continuing struggle between rightist and leftist forces on the island.

TURKISH-BRITISH INTERACTION

3. A Turkish foreign ministry spokesman said that Ankara today asked the UK for talks aimed at reaching agreement on Presidential Library Review of DOS Equities is Required

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joint action over Cyprus. Ankara has asked London for a reply within 24 hours. The Turkish spokesman said Ankara was proposing joint action under terms of the Zurich and London Accords of 1959 making Turkey, Greece, and the UK co-guarantors of Cypriot independence. Should London fail to agree to joint action, Turkey said it might "go alone" to counteract what Ankara clearly regards as the Greek-inspired threat to Cyprus' independence.

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
5. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Ecevit met with President Koruturk Tuesday evening, following another session of the cabinet. Koruturk subsequently announced that parliament has been called into an extraordinary session on July 18. Ecevit met earlier today with opposition political party leaders, apparently briefing them on the results of last night's meet-

### GREEK COMMENTS

6. Official Greek reaction has been limited to a foreign ministry statement today which said the Greek government would maintain "its principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other countries."

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
7. Acting Greek Foreign Minister Kypreos delivered the same message in a meeting with Ambassador Tasca today. Kypreos denied that Greek army units stationed on Cyprus were involved in the coup. He admitted that in an earlier discussion with the Soviet ambassador, Moscow's envoy had asserted Greek officers were interfering in the internal affairs of Cyprus. Kypreos also said that the Greek ambassador in Ankara was scheduled to meet the Turkish Foreign Minister today, but he did not have any results from the meeting.



### SOVIET POLITICAL MOVES

The Soviet Ambassador in Ankara at his request met 9. today with the Turkish President to deliver a message from the Kremlin. No statement was issued following the session. The Soviet charge in Athens made a strong demarche to the Greek Foreign Ministry today. He expressed Moscow's serious concern over the situation in Cyprus and stressed that the Soviets hold Athens responsible for the coup. The Soviet diplomat, whose ambassador is on home leave, tried to see President Gizikis. Athens refused, however, and referred him to the Foreign Minister. A Tass statement last night indicated that Soviet demarches would also be made to Britain, France, and the US. Tass today criticized the US for failing to heed warnings of the impending conflict due to "strategic considerations" in the area and for failing to warn Athens about the implementations of its aggressive plans.

10. Tass also repeated Makarios' appeal for assistance. It reported a plea by the Cypriot Communist Party (AKEL) to



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rally around Makarios. The AKEL praised the USSR as a great friend of the Cypriot people and stated that Moscow is already actively supporting their cause. Soviet reportage of the AKEL statement is an indication that Moscow sees the party as an important source of resistance to the coup.

UN

14. The Security Council was scheduled to meet at 1500 EDT today. In an unusual move, the meeting was jointly called for by UN Secretary General Waldheim and by Cypriot UN representative Rossides. Waldheim probably wants to inform the Council of the events which have taken place on Cyprus. He may be seeking formal Security Council approval of his granting Makarios "UN protection." The Secretary may also use the occasion to gain support for some kind of expanded UN or UNFICYP role in restoring stability on the island.



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15. The motivations of Rossides in calling for the meeting are more uncertain. He has all along vacillated in requesting Security Council actions and the Soviets may have encouraged him to parallel the Secretary's move by calling for a meeting now. Rossides might call for some kind of a resolution calling for restoration of constitutional government and recognition of Makarios as the legitimate ruler of Cyprus. These minimum objectives may be considerably strengthened if the Soviets decide to take an active part in the debate.

NATO

16. A special session of NATO's North Atlantic Council today issued a statement thanking Secretary General Luns for the message he sent yesterday to the Greek and Turkish governments asking them to exercise restraint. The Council also urged the Secretary General to continue monitoring closely Cyprus developments. Greek Acting Foreign Minister Kypreos told the US ambassador in Athens that his government had replied to Luns' request by stressing that events in Cyprus were of an internal nature, that Greek policy remained unchanged and that the parties concerned should exercise restraint.

### WEST EUROPEAN PRESS REACTIONS

17. Morning newspapers in Germany and France on July 16 stress the international significance of the conflict. <u>Die Welt</u> noted that Makarios had kept a precarious balance between the interests of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots factions, of Greece and Turkey, of the US and the Soviet Union, and of the Arab states and Israel. Although there is a general presumption in the German press that Athens was involved in the coup, this factor is not stressed. In line with their recognition that Cyprus, while unstable internally, has had a stabilizing influence by keeping itself out of superpower disputes and the Middle East conflict, the press assumes that both the US and the USSR have an interest in a peaceful development of the situation.



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18. In Paris, the right-wing <u>Aurore</u> writes of Moscow's "Machiavellian game" in seeking to provoke a rift in NATO, while the Communist daily sees US instigation behind the Athens junta's "flagrant foreign intervention." Independent <u>Figaro</u> points out that the Cyprus crisis will show the limits of the detente between the two superpowers.

19. Italian commentaries in the independent press are almost unanimously sympathetic to Makarios and highly critical of Athens. The Socialist and Communist press, on the other hand, wonder about US involvement in the coup.

### WHEREABOUTS OF MAKARIOS

20. Deposed President Makarios has been variously reported enroute to Malta, London and UN Headquarters. Cypriot UN representative Rossides was quoted late today as saying he was "sure Makarios was in London" but was not certain about whether the Archbishop would continue on to New York.

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ANNEX I

### Military Forces in Cyprus

(Page 3 presents a table of known armed groups in Cyprus.)


The coup forces consist of the 10,000-man Greek Cypriot national guard and some 650-800 Greek officers attached to it. The 950-man Greek mainland legal contingent is apparently not involved. We have no evidence that members of EOKA-B, the proenosis terrorist organization, are involved in the fighting but some may well be taking part and the entire organization would probably assist the guard in the event of a prolonged conflict.

The coup forces apparently control all of the principal towns except for Paphos, where they are still overcoming resistance. They seized the Paphos radio station which had been broadcasting appeals in behalf of Makarios, at about 1230 local time today. Turkish Cypriot sources report that an armored national guard column of about 800 men was heading toward Paphos at about the same time.

The forces loyal to Makarios appear to consist of elements of the police and those members of the tactical reserve unit who did not surrender yesterday. Some of the paramilitary forces of Vassos Lyssaridis, leftist member of the House of Deputies and Makarios' confidant, may also be involved.

Makarios' supporters' in the Paphos area appear to be losing ground and they are not likely to survive that assault of the armored column. Sporadic gunfire continues in Nicosia. One report from a Greek Cypriot source claims there were 4,000 casualties in the Nicosia area but this may be an exaggerated figure. Unless the masses of armed pro-Makarios supporters among the populace rally in his behalf, it is unlikely that the present forces fighting the guard can continue for long. Elements of the pro-Makarios Communist Party (AKEL) would likely join any growing insurgent support for the deposed leader.

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The Turkish Cypriot forces are in a state of alert, but so far they have remained out of the fighting and will presumably continue to do so. The coup forces have repeated that their action was strictly an internal Greek Cypriot affair so as not to draw the Turkish Cypriots into the conflict. There was an exchange of fire between Greeks and Turks in a Nicosia suburb at 1730 local time, however. If the Turkish Cypriots should be attacked, they could probably defend themselves until they received assistance from Turkey. If Ankara ordered them into action in support of a Turkish invasion, they could probably help provide a beachhead for a Turkish landing and would probably give a good account of themselves against the divided Greek Cypriots.

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
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# Armed Forces on Cyprus

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Greek (mainland) legal contingents	9.50
Turkish (mainland) legal contingents	650
Turkish Army (mainland) illegal	150-300
Turkish Cypriot regulars	4,000
Turkish Cypriot reserve	6,000
Cypriot (Greek) National Guard	10,000+
Greek (mainland) officers in National Guard	650-800
Makarios' special contingent The Tactical Reserve Unit (TRU) (some have surrendered)	1,000+
EOKA-B guerrillas (estimated)	400
Lyssarides' pro-Makarios guerrillas (estimated)	150-300
UN Forces (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and U.K.)	2,400
Some of the members of the 12,000-man Communist Party might take up arms in behalf of Makarios.	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
There are in addition numerous armed but unorganized civilians who might support a pro-Makarios resistance effort.	ક પે દિશા જેવ્યુ ક ટ ટ ટ ટ ટ ટ ટ ટ ટ ટ ટ ટ ટ ટ ટ ટ ટ ટ
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#### ANNEX II

SUBJECT: Moscow and the Cyprus Crisis

Moscow was caught off guard by Monday's fast-moving events on Cyprus, and it clearly is waiting for the dust to settle before establishing a tactical line. That the Soviets may be given to a worst case interpretation of the coup is clear from statements of Soviet diplomats that the USSR will react strongly and from propaganda organs that are labeling the events as NATOinspired. Late on Monday Moscow issued an authoritative Tass statement that stressed the legitimacy of the Makarios government and condemned Greek interference on the island. Over the longer run, Moscow's position will stem from its interest in maintaining an independent, nonaligned Cyprus and its reading of the developing situation there.

The coup poses a threat to Soviet interests and is certain to trigger a strong reaction. Moscow's recent setbacks in the Middle East will intensify the Kremlin's desire to forestall further Western inroads in the area. The growth of Moscow's naval capability in the Mediterranean has made it easier than in earlier Cypriot crises for Moscow to back up its diplomacy with military force. As was the case during the Middle East war, however, Moscow will have to take into account the impact of its actions on relations with the US.

#### Soviet Interests

The Soviets claim that their basic objective in Cyprus is to maintain the island's independence and territorial integrity. Toward this end, the Soviets consistently supported President Makarios against both Greek pressure for enosis and Turkish proposals for federation of the island's two ethnic communities with Athens and Ankara. Underlying this policy is concern that a Cyprus subordinate to either or both of these NATO states would lead to increased Western military use of the island.

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A second, closely related Soviet objective is to maintain a neutral, nonaligned government on Cyprus. Moscow wants such a government to limit the Western military presence on the island as well as to provide a receptive audience for Soviet political initiatives. Such a government also promotes the longer-term Soviet interest in removing British bases from Cyprus.

The Soviets also view a neutral, nonaligned government as likely to provide an environment in which the firmly pro-Soviet Cypriot Communist party (AKEL) can flourish. A Cyprus under the de facto control of a staunchly anti-Communist Greek government would be a grave threat to the AKEL. The AKEL, which in the 1970 parliamentary elections won 40 percent of the Greek Cypriot vote, is the best-organized and most disciplined political movement on the island. The Soviets probably nurture hopes that one day the movement might participate in the government and eventually obtain full power. In the meantime, the AKEL has been useful to Moscow in pushing the Makarios government leftward and as a source of intelligence on the island's politics.

A third Soviet interest in Cyprus has been to exploit Greek-Turkish tensions over the island to improve its relations with Ankara. In recent years the Soviets have placed strong emphasis on good relations with Ankara because of Turkey's strategic control of the Bosporus and its location adjacent to the USSR. In addition, Greek-Turkish tension exacerbates US relations with its allies and serves to weaken NATO's southern flank.

# Soviet Tactics in the Current Situation

Moscow undoubtedly views the emergence of a Greek-dominated, pro-enosis, right-wing government on Cyprus as threatening its dual objectives of Cypriot independence and nonalignment. The coming to power of Nicos Sampson, a rightist strongarm man, also endangers the AKEL.

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
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## NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

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## WITHDRAWAL ID 034298

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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL .		. ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL	• •	. ÇReport
DESCRIPTION		. Re: Cyprus
CREATION DATE		. 07/16/1974
VOLUME		. 4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER COLLECTION TITLE		. 033200169 . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE FILES
BOX NUMBER		
DATE WITHDRAWN		

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#### MEMORANDUM

#### THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP CECRET UNDEA

#### July 16, 1974

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MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: Colonel Kennedy

SUBJECT: Situation in Cyprus

#### Political Situation

1. Embassy Athens reports a statement from General Ioannides that President Makarios is alive at Episkopi, the British base in southern Cyprus. The British Government has reportedly agreed.

2. In Nicosia, the Greek-officered National Guard was in full control this morning, and U.S. Embassy cars were permitted to move around the capital to check on Americans.

3. British observers at Akrotiri reported heavy firing throughout the night in nearby Limassol. They have concluded that the eastern half of the island is controlled by the National Guard but that pro-Makarios forces are holding out in Limassol and Paphos. U.S. and British officials have expressed concern about food supplies running out if the crisis continues.

4. Nicosia radio today announced the installation of the new government under Nicos Sampson.

#### Greek Reaction

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NARA, DATE.

₩ E The Greek Armed Forces has not changed its status -- already in advanced stages of preparedness because of the Aegean Sea tension with Turkey.

#### Turkish Reaction

Premier Ecevit has called for an extraordinary session of parliament and 25x1 will meet with political party leaders today.

late press item indicates that Turkey has asked Britain to use its troops **25X** in Cyprus for joint Turkish-British intervention to counteract the threat to Cyprus' independence.

2. Observations by U.S. defense attache sources have confirmed that Turkish Air Force units are on advanced alert. Turkish gendarmerie units have a mission in operational plans against Cyprus are to be

DISENSIFIE OURS' notice. EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY

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
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# International Reaction

NATO Secretary General Luns has requested restraint by Greece and Turkey. UN Secretary General Waldheim yesterday rejected Cypriot Ambassador Rossides' request for UN intervention on Cyprus. The UN Security Council has called an emergency session this afternoon to consider the crisis.



EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY

# NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 034300

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL	• •	ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL		ÇBriefing Paper
DESCRIPTION		Re: Cyprus
CREATION DATE	• •	07/16/1974
VOLUME	• •	1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID	) .	033200169
COLLECTION TITLE	• •	NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE FILES
BOX NUMBER		7
FOLDER TITLE	• •	Cyprus Crisis (4)
DATE WITHDRAWN		
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST	• •	CCG