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~~SECRET~~

September 1, 1975

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT  
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF ISRAEL AND  
THE UNITED STATES

The United States recognizes that the Egypt-Israel Agreement initialed on September 1, 1975, (hereinafter referred to as the Agreement), entailing the withdrawal from vital areas in Sinai, constitutes an act of great significance on Israel's part in the pursuit of final peace. That Agreement has full United States support.

United States-Israeli Assurances


1. The United States Government will make every effort to be fully responsive, within the limits of its resources and Congressional authorization and appropriation, on an on-going and long-term basis to Israel's military equipment and other defense requirements, to its energy requirements and to its economic needs. The needs specified in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 below shall be deemed eligible for inclusion within the annual total to be requested in FY76 and later fiscal years.

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E.O. 12958, 2001, 8/8, State Dept Review  
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES SF 9/19/03  
BY H2, NARA, DATE 11/05/03



2. Israel's long-term military supply needs from the United States shall be the subject of periodic consultations between representatives of the United States and Israeli defense establishments, with agreement reached on specific items to be included in a separate United States-Israeli memorandum. To this end, a joint study by military experts will be undertaken within 3 weeks. In conducting this study, which will include Israel's 1976 needs, the United States will view Israel's requests sympathetically, including its request for advanced and sophisticated weapons.

3. Israel will make its own independent arrangements for oil supply to meet its requirements through normal procedures. In the event Israel is unable to secure its needs in this way, the United States Government, upon notification of this fact by the Government of Israel, will act as follows for five years, at the end of which period either side can terminate this arrangement on one-year's notice.



(a) If the oil Israel needs to meet all its normal requirements for domestic consumption is unavailable for purchase in circumstances where no quantitative restrictions exist on the ability of the United States to procure oil to meet its normal requirements, the United States Government will promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel to meet all of the aforementioned normal requirements of Israel. If Israel is unable to secure the necessary means to transport such oil to Israel, the United States Government will make every effort to help Israel secure the necessary means of transport.

(b) If the oil Israel needs to meet all of its normal requirements for domestic consumption is unavailable for purchase in circumstances where quantitative restrictions through embargo or otherwise also prevent the United States from procuring oil to meet its normal requirements, the United States Government will promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel in accordance with the International Energy Agency conservation




and allocation formula as applied by the United States Government, in order to meet Israel's essential requirements. If Israel is unable to secure the necessary means to transport such oil to Israel, the United States Government will make every effort to help Israel secure the necessary means of transport.

Israeli and United States experts will meet annually or more frequently at the request of either party, to review Israel's continuing oil requirement.

4. In order to help Israel meet its energy needs, and as part of the overall annual figure in paragraph 1 above, the United States agrees:

(a) In determining the overall annual figure which will be requested from Congress, the United States Government will give special attention to Israel's oil import requirements and, for a period as determined by Article 3 above, will take into account in calculating that figure Israel's additional expenditures for the import of oil to replace that which would have ordinarily come from Abu Rodeis and Ras Sudar (4.5 million tons in 1975).



(b) To ask Congress to make available funds, the amount to be determined by mutual agreement, to the Government of Israel necessary for a project for the construction and stocking of the oil reserves to be stored in Israel, bringing storage reserve capacity and reserve stocks now standing at approximately six months, up to one-year's need at the time of the completion of the project. The project will be implemented within four years. The construction, operation and financing and other relevant questions of the project will be the subject of early and detailed talks between the two Governments.

5. The United States Government will not expect Israel to begin to implement the Agreement before Egypt fulfils its undertaking under the January 1974 Disengagement Agreement to permit passage of all Israeli cargoes to and from Israeli ports through the Suez Canal.

6. The United States Government agrees with Israel that the next agreement with Egypt should be a final peace agreement.



7. In case of an Egyptian violation of any of the provisions of the Agreement, the United States Government is prepared to consult with Israel as to the significance of the violation and possible remedial action by the United States Government.

8. The United States Government will vote against any Security Council resolution which in its judgment affects or alters adversely the Agreement.

9. The United States Government will not join in and will seek to prevent efforts by others to bring about consideration of proposals which it and Israel agree are detrimental to the interests of Israel.

10. In view of the long-standing United States commitment to the survival and security of Israel, the United States Government will view with particular gravity threats to Israel's security or sovereignty by a world power. In support of this objective, the United States Government will in the event of such threat consult promptly



with the Government of Israel with respect to what support, diplomatic or otherwise, or assistance it can lend to Israel in accordance with its constitutional practices.

11. The United States Government and the Government of Israel will, at the earliest possible time, and if possible, within two months after the signature of this document, conclude the contingency plan for a military supply operation to Israel in an emergency situation.

12. It is the United States Government's position that Egyptian commitments under the Egypt-Israel Agreement, its implementation, validity and duration are not conditional upon any act or developments between the other Arab states and Israel. The United States Government regards the Agreement as standing on its own.

13. The United States Government shares the Israeli position that under existing political circumstances negotiations with Jordan will be directed toward an overall peace settlement.



14. In accordance with the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas and free and unimpeded passage through and over straits connecting international waters, the United States Government regards the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb and the Strait of Gibraltar as international waterways. It will support Israel's right to free and unimpeded passage through such straits. Similarly, the United States Government recognizes Israel's right to freedom of flights over the Red Sea and such straits and will support diplomatically the exercise of that right.

15. In the event that the United Nations Emergency Force or any other United Nations organ is withdrawn without the prior agreement of both Parties to the Egypt-Israel Agreement and the United States before this Agreement is superseded by another agreement, it is the United States view that the Agreement shall remain binding in all its parts.

16. The United States and Israel agree that signature of the Protocol of the Egypt-Israel



Agreement and its full entry into effect shall not take place before approval by the United States Congress of the United States role in connection with the surveillance and observation functions described in the Agreement and its Annex. The United States has informed the Government of Israel that it has obtained the Government of Egypt agreement to the above.

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
Yigal Allon  
Deputy Prime Minister and  
Minister of Foreign Affairs

For the Government of Israel

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Henry A. Kissinger  
Secretary of State

For the Government of  
the United States





SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE  
GOVERNMENTS OF ISRAEL AND  
THE UNITED STATES

The Geneva Peace Conference

1. The Geneva Peace Conference will be reconvened at a time coordinated between the United States and Israel.

2. The United States will continue to adhere to its present policy with respect to the Palestine Liberation Organization, whereby it will not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization so long as the Palestine Liberation Organization does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The United States Government will consult fully and seek to concert its position and strategy at the Geneva Peace Conference on this issue with the Government of Israel. Similarly, the United States will consult fully and seek to concert its position and strategy with Israel with regard to the participation of any other additional states. It is understood that the participation at a subsequent phase of the Conference of any possible additional state, group or organization will require the agreement of all the initial participants.

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E.O. 11652, SEC. 9.5 *State Dept Review*  
STATE DEPT. SUPERVISOR *SF 9/19/63*  
BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *11/05/03*

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


3. The United States will make every effort to ensure at the Conference that all the substantive negotiations will be on a bilateral basis.

4. The United States will oppose and, if necessary, vote against any initiative in the Security Council to alter adversely the terms of reference of the Geneva Peace Conference or to change Resolutions 242 and 338 in ways which are incompatible with their original purpose.

5. The United States will seek to ensure that the role of the cosponsors will be consistent with what was agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding between the United States Government and the Government of Israel of December 20, 1973.

6. The United States and Israel will concert action to assure that the Conference will be conducted in a manner consonant with the objectives of this document and with the declared purpose of the Conference, namely the advancement of a negotiated peace between



Israel and each one of its neighbors.

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
Yigal Allon  
Deputy Prime Minister and  
Minister of Foreign Affairs

For the Government of Israel

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Henry A. Kissinger  
Secretary of State

For the Government of  
the United States





THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

September 1, 1975

~~SECRET~~

Dear Mr. Minister:

In connection with the Agreement initialled on September 1, 1975 between the Governments of Egypt and Israel, I hereby convey the following to you:

1. The United States Government has received an assurance from Egypt that it will not use lack of progress at the Geneva Conference as a pretext for not fulfilling its obligations under the Agreement.

2. The United States Government will transmit a letter to Israel conveying Egypt's undertaking on annual renewals of UNEF's mandate.

3. The United States Government has received from Egypt an expression of its intention to reduce hostile propaganda in its government controlled media.

4. The United States Government has received an assurance from Egypt of its willingness to ease the boycott of American companies on a selective basis and that it will not discriminate against any American company that wants to do business in Egypt, regardless of whether this company is on the boycott list. The United States will encourage the Government of Egypt to expand the above to include European and other companies.

5. It is the understanding of the United States Government that Egypt intends to avoid active diplomatic efforts to discourage selected other states from resuming diplomatic relations with Israel.


6. The United States Government will seek to ascertain whether Egypt is willing that ships, aircraft, passengers and crews of either Party in distress will be given assistance by the other and will be permitted to continue on their route.

His Excellency  
Yigal Allon,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.5  
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY KJR, NARA, DATE 11/05/03



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7. The United States informs Israel that Egypt has informed us that it will maintain the assurances, written and oral, undertaken at the time of the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement on Disengagement of Forces in January 1974 in addition to the provisions of the Agreement.


8. The United States informs Israel that Egypt will not interfere with the flights of any civilian Israeli aircraft in the airspace above the Straits of Bab el-Mandeb leading into the Red Sea.

9. With respect to the reference to "paramilitary forces" in paragraph 3a of the Annex, the United States understanding of the view of the Government of Egypt is that this phrase includes irregular forces as well.

Respectfully,

Henry A. Kissinger

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 1, 1975

~~SECRET~~

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:


I wish to inform you that the U.S. recognizes that the Israeli-Egyptian Interim Agreement entailing withdrawal from vital areas in the Sinai constitutes an act of great significance on Israel's part in the pursuit of final peace and imposes additional heavy military and economic burdens on Israel.

I want to assure you that the U.S. will make every effort to be fully responsive within the limits of its resources and Congressional authorization and appropriation on an ongoing and long-term basis to Israel's military equipment and other defense requirements as well as to Israel's economic aid needs, all of this based on the requests submitted by Israel, joint studies and previous U.S. Presidential undertakings.

Further to those undertakings, it is my resolve to continue to maintain Israel's defensive strength through the supply of advanced types of equipment, such as the F-16 aircraft. The United States Government agrees to an early meeting to undertake a joint study of high technology and sophisticated items, including the Pershing ground-to-ground missiles with conventional warheads, with the view to giving a positive response. The U.S. Administration will submit annually for approval by the U.S. Congress a request for military and economic assistance in order to help meet Israel's economic and military needs. Realizing as I do the importance

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
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of the Interim Agreement to the Middle Eastern situation as a whole, the U.S. will make every possible effort to assist in the establishment of conditions in which the Agreement will be observed without being subjected to pressures or deadlines.

In the spirit of the special relationship existing between the United States and Israel and in light of the determination of both sides to avoid a situation in which the U.S. and Israel would pursue divergent courses in peace negotiations, the U.S. will take the position that these are negotiations between the parties. As I indicated to you in our conversation on 12 June 1975, the situation in the aftermath of the Israeli-Egyptian interim agreement will be one in which the overall settlement can be pursued in a systematic and deliberate way and does not require the U.S. to put forward an overall proposal of its own in such circumstances. Should the U.S. desire in the future to put forward proposals of its own, it will make every effort to coordinate with Israel its proposals with a view to refraining from putting forth proposals that Israel would consider unsatisfactory.

The U.S. will support the position that an overall settlement with Syria in the framework of a peace agreement must assure Israel's security from attack from the Golan Heights. The U.S. further supports the position that a just and lasting peace, which remains our objective, must be acceptable to both sides. The U.S. has not developed a final position on the borders. Should it do so it will give great weight to Israel's position that any peace agreement with Syria must be predicated on Israel remaining on the Golan Heights. My view in this regard was stated in our conversation of September 13, 1974.

Sincerely,



Gerald R. Ford

His Excellency  
Yitzhak Rabin  
Prime Minister of Israel





September 1, 1975


1. The United States Government has received assurances from Egypt that in the event of a Syrian attack against Israel or in the event of a war of attrition initiated by Syria, Egypt will not participate in hostilities and will refrain from the use of force.

2. Should Syria initiate military or para-military action against Israel or should Syria undertake or tolerate acts that might threaten the ceasefire, the United States Government will support Israel diplomatically. These acts include the infiltration of terrorists across the Israel-Syria ceasefire lines and the stationing of terrorist groups along the frontiers facing Israel.

3. The United States Government takes Egypt's commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force or from military or para-military action contained in the agreement to remain binding in the event Israel undertakes appropriate countermeasures against terrorist operations. Should Egypt take a contrary view, the USG will support diplomatically the above interpretation.

4. Should negotiations between Israel and Syria on an interim agreement develop, the USG will not expect Israel to make proposals that go beyond what Prime Minister Rabin outlined to President Ford in Washington in June 1975.

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E.O. 12958, GPO. 0.5 State Dept Review  
STATE DEPT. COMPLIANCE SF 9/19/03  
BY HR. NARA DATE 11/05/03



*Jgs*  
*S.D.*



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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 1, 1975

~~SECRET~~

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to you to give you some indication as to our intentions with respect to a number of questions on which Secretary Kissinger was asked to ascertain my views.

The United States intends to make a serious effort to help bring about further negotiations between Syria and Israel, in the first instance through diplomatic channels.

In connection with the peace negotiations, I can reaffirm the intention of the United States to promote a solution of the key issues of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 338, taking into account the legitimate interests of all the peoples of the area, including the Palestinian people, and respect for the right to independent existence of all states in the area.

As I indicated to you in my recent letter the US recognizes the situation following Israeli withdrawal from the passes and the oil fields will not be an acceptable permanent solution. You will recall also what I said to you at Salzburg about moving toward a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East and the importance of permitting the realities in the area and internationally to mature to the point where an all-out effort to achieve final peace can be made in circumstances that seem

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
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E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.5

*State Dept Review*  
*SF 9/19/03*

NSC MEMO, 11/24/88, CONT. NO. 11/05/03

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
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most promising for success and in a deliberate and systematic way. The United States will remain active in the peacemaking process. We recognize that a final peace is importantly a matter to be negotiated by the parties. Nevertheless, we would be prepared to put forward ideas of our own when and if it becomes necessary to do so. We have brought these views to the attention of Israeli leaders.

In the event of an Israeli violation of the Agreement, the United States is prepared to consult with Egypt as to the significance of the violation and possible remedial action by the United States.

The United States will provide technical assistance to Egypt for the Egyptian Early Warning Station.

Sincerely,



Gerald R. Ford

His Excellency  
Anwar al-Sadat  
President of the Arab Republic of Egypt

~~SECRET~~



THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

September 3, 1975

Dear Hermann:

I want you to see Ismail Fahmy immediately and withdraw the letter which I gave him on Monday night conveying certain assurances. Enclosed are self-evident substitutes. Here are the points to make to Ismail.

1. He will notice that the principal assurances are now in a Presidential letter. The reason is that with Presidential correspondence we are in a better position to maintain its confidentiality. Presidential correspondence is not normally subject to Congressional scrutiny. Moreover, conveying the assurances to Egypt at the Presidential level is symmetrical to the level of assurances given to the other side.

2. Ismail will notice that there is a separate letter with respect to PL 480. We did not want to include the PL 480 matter within a letter related to the Agreement which would give the impression that we were linking our PL 480 commitment to Egypt to political conditions. This we would not wish to do and moreover it would be contrary to our laws. It would cause the whole arrangement to be cancelled. Hence, a separate letter.

3. You will notice a letter from me to Ismail relaying the Israeli assurance with respect to Syria. We did this because we want to separate

The Honorable  
Hermann Fr. Eilts,  
American Ambassador,  
Cairo,

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.5  
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY HR, MAM, DATE 11/05/03

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
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out our bilateral assurances to Egypt which are in the Presidential letter from our conveyance of an assurance from one government to another, namely from Israel to Egypt.

Please send back the original via the same messenger.


Warm regards,

  
Henry A. Kissinger

Enclosures:

1. Letter from President Ford to President Sadat.
2. Letter to Foreign Minister Fahmy.
3. Letter to Foreign Minister Fahmy.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON


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September 1, 1975

Dear Ismail:

In response to President Sadat's inquiry, I am pleased to inform you that the United States Government intends to supply Egypt with one million tons of grain in the United States fiscal year 1976 if Egypt determines that it can use that amount during this period. The United States will also make a substantial effort to assist Egypt in its economic development.

Warm regards,



Henry A. Kissinger

His Excellency  
Ismail Fahmy,  
Deputy Prime Minister and  
Foreign Minister of the  
Arab Republic of Egypt.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.5  
STATE DEPT. ADMIN. STG.  
BY HR 11/05/03





THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON


September 1, 1975

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Dear Ismail:

This is to inform you that with respect to Syria, we have an Israeli assurance that Israel will not initiate military action against Syria.


Warm regards,

  
Henry A. Kissinger

His Excellency  
Ismail Fahmy,  
Deputy Prime Minister and  
Foreign Minister of the  
Arab Republic of Egypt.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
STATE DEPT. CONTROL  
BY HR, NARA 11/05/03





21

The Parties to the present Protocol,

Having met in the Military Working Group of the Middle East Peace Conference at Geneva under the Chairmanship of Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo, Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East,

Taking into account that the preparation of a detailed Protocol is essential for the implementation of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel in all its parts which constitutes a significant step towards a just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council resolution 338 of 22nd October 1975,

Conscious of the fact that the Agreement enters into force upon the signature of this Protocol,

Having been guided by principles contained in the Annex to the Agreement,

Have Agreed as follows:



Article I

REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

See Maps : 'R' (1/500,000) and 'Q' (1/100,000)

1. Area South of Line E and West of Line M (see Map 'Q')

a. 15th November 1975, 1200 hours

(i) The transfer to UNEF of the Area R1C (marked on Map 'Q').

(ii) The transfer to UNEF of the Ras Sudar area (marked on Map 'Q' as Area R2).

b. 16th November 1975, 1200 hours

(i) The transfer by UNEF to Egypt of the Areas R1C and R1D. In these areas there will be no Egyptian military forces and military infrastructures until:

- in area R1D : 15th December 1975

- in area R1C : 16th January 1976.

(ii) The transfer by UNEF to Egypt of the area of Ras Sudar (Area R2). From 5th October 1975, Egypt may introduce technicians to the Ras Sudar oil installations.


c. 24th - 30th November 1975

(i) UNEF entering to the rest of the area South of Line E and West of Line M. Egypt may introduce technicians to the Abu Rodeis oil installations.

(ii) Israel forces leaving this area at 1200 hours, 30th November 1975.

d. 1st December 1975


At 1200 hours the transfer by UNEF to Egypt of the rest of the area South of Line E and West of Line M.



2. Northern Area (See Map 'Q' - 1/100,000)

Basic Timetable

- a. 12th-13th January 1976 (Sector S-1)
- (i) At 0900, 12th January 1976, UNEF entering area S1D.
  - (ii) At 1400, 13th January 1976, Israel forces leaving area S1D.
- b. 16th January 1976
- At 0900 the transfer by UNEF to Egypt of the Area S1C.
- c. 26th January-2nd February 1976
- (i) At 0900, 26th January 1976, the transfer by UNEF to Egypt of the Area S4D.
  - (ii) At 1200, 2nd February 1976, the transfer by UNEF to Egypt of the Area S3D.
- d. 14th-19th February 1976 (Sectors S-1 and S-4)
- (i) At 0900, 14th February 1976, UNEF entering Area S1B.
  - (ii) At 0900, 15th February 1976, UNEF entering Area S4B.
  - (iii) At 1200, 17th February 1976, Israel forces leaving Area S1B.
  - (iv) At 1200, 18th February 1976, Israel forces leaving Area S4B.
  - (v) At 1200, 19th February 1976, the transfer by UNEF to Egypt of Area S4C.
- e. 16th-20th February 1976 (Sector S-3)
- (i) At 0900, 16th February 1976, UNEF entering Area S3B.
  - (ii) At 1200, 19th February 1976, Israel forces leaving Area S3B.
  - (iii) At 1200, 20th February 1976, the transfer by UNEF to Egypt of Area S3C.



f. 18th-22nd February 1976 (Sector S-2)

- (i) At 0900, 18th February 1976, UNEF entering Area S2B.
- (ii) At 1200, 21st February 1976, Israel forces leaving Area S2B.
- (iii) At 1200, 22nd February 1976, the transfer by UNEF to Egypt of Area S2C.

3. Demarcation of the Lines


a. The demarcation of Line J on the ground will be carried out between 1st October 1975 and 31st October 1975 by UN and Israeli teams.

b. The demarcation of Line M on the ground will be carried out between 25th October 1975 and 21st November 1975 by UN teams. (Line M in Area R-2 will be demarcated by 10th November 1975).

c. Egyptian and Israeli checking of demarcation of Line M on the ground will be carried out after 1st December 1975. The time schedule for checking of Line M will be co-ordinated between Egypt and Israel with UNEF.

d. The redemarcation of Line E on the ground will be carried out between 1st January 1976 and 15th January 1976 by UN. The demarcation of Line E in Area R1C will be carried out between 01 November 1975 and 14th November 1975.

e. Egyptian and UN teams will check Line E according to the basic timetable of the Egyptian deployment in each sector (see paragraph 2).



SOUTHERN AREA (AREA SOUTH OF LINE E AND WEST OF LINE M)

1. General

a. The armed forces or any other armed personnel of either Party or of any other third party other than Egyptian policemen and the UNEF may neither enter, stay nor pass through the area or the airspace above the area.

b. Egyptian civilians and third country civilian oilfield personnel shall have the right to enter, exit, work and live in the area,

c. Entry to and exit from the area by land, sea and air shall be only through UNEF checkpoints,

d. Access to the airspace and the coastal area shall be limited to unarmed Egyptian civilian vessels and unarmed civilian helicopters and transport planes involved in the civilian activities of the area. A limited number of Egyptian civilian helicopters and civilian transport planes may be stationed within the area for emergency cases and for the operation of the oilfields.

2. The Functions of UNEF in the Area

a. UNEF will perform its responsibilities in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions, the provisions of the Agreement, the Annex and Protocol. The Force shall enjoy the freedom of movement and communication and other facilities that are necessary for the performance of its tasks.

b. UNEF will assure that no military or para-military forces of any kind, military fortifications and military installations are in the area. The UNEF shall allow entry to



and exit from the area by land, by air or by sea, through UNEF checkpoints to authorized persons and cargoes only.

c. In order to perform its functions, UNEF -

(i) will establish checkpoints and observation posts (see Map 'C')

(ii) will patrol throughout the area by land, coastal and air patrols.

d. UNEF will carry out verification at the checkpoints through the Egyptian civilian police in the presence and under the supervision of UNEF personnel.

e. UNEF will report its findings to both Parties to the Agreement.

3. Buffer Zones 2A, 2B and UNEF posts in the Hammam Faroun Area

a. The zones designated on the Map attached to the Agreement as Zones 2A and 2B will be Buffer Zones. In these zones UNEF shall be stationed and shall perform the same functions as determined in Buffer Zone 1.

b. The UNEF posts in Hammam Faroun area are as indicated on the Map attached to the Agreement. Egyptian personnel and civilians will not enter UNEF posts in this area.


c. UNEF shall maintain permanent checkpoints on the routes leading into the Buffer Zones and on the Buffer Zone lines.

4. Egyptian Civilian Police

a. Egyptian civilian police shall be allowed in the area, to perform normal police functions among the civilian population.

b. This police unit will be equipped with revolvers, sub-machine guns, rifles and light unarmed vehicles marked with the distinctive marking of civilian police.

c. The police unit will be composed of 700 policemen, 500 of them armed and 200 are Police Administrative personnel.



5. Road Sections for Common Use

a. The sections for common use on the coastal road along the Gulf of Suez are as indicated on the Map attached to the Agreement and will be opened to traffic as detailed in the Statement of the Chairman.

b. The maintenance of the common sections of the road within Buffer Zones 2A and 2B and West of Line M shall be maintained by UNEF. Other sections of the common road East of Line M shall be maintained by Israel.

c. Egypt and Israel will have access to these road sections within Buffer Zones 2A and 2B from all directions, i.e. also from the side roads West and East of these sections as indicated on Map 'C' attached to the Protocol and this in accordance with an established time schedule - to and from their respective areas. Vehicles entering the side roads will be accompanied by UNEF.

d. UNEF will assure, through checkpoints on the road sections for common use (as indicated on Map 'C' attached to the Protocol) and through patrols along these sections, that the traffic on these sections will be conducted in accordance with paragraph (c) above and as detailed in the Statement by the Chairman.

6. Transfer of Oilfields, Installations and Infrastructures

a. Israel undertakes to leave intact all currently existing oilfields, installations and infrastructures.

b. Egypt will be represented in the transfer:

- (i) with respect to the Ras Sudar area by Mobil
- (ii) with respect to the Abu Rodeis area by IEOC.

c. The technicians introduced to the area will have the necessary vehicles for their movements and have the necessary means of communications with Egyptian authorities.



d. The transfer will be carried out by a procès verbal to be signed by Israel and the above-mentioned representative of Egypt and to be witnessed by the Chief Co-ordinator or his representative.

e. The third party technicians will be responsible for whatever oilfield installations and infrastructures they receive.



Article III

THE NORTHERN AREA

1. Buffer Zone 1

a. The zone between the lines designated on the Map attached to the Agreement as Lines E and J will be a Buffer Zone. In this zone the UNEF shall be stationed and continue to perform its functions as under the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of 18th January 1974, and carry out other activities as detailed in the Agreement, Annex and Protocol.

b. UNEF will maintain checkpoints, observation posts and reconnaissance patrols along the lines of the Buffer Zone and within the area, in order to prevent any unauthorized entry into the area of any person. Access will be only through the checkpoints controlled by UNEF.

c. In Buffer Zone 1 there will be established an Early Warning System entrusted to U.S. civilian personnel.

d. UNEF shall have complete freedom of movement within Buffer Zone 1, except that UNEF personnel shall not enter the perimeter of the Surveillance Stations.


2. Limitation of Forces and Armaments

a. The major limitations on Forces and Armaments are as provided for in Article IV B of the Agreement and paragraph 5 of the Annex.

b. UNEF supervision

(i) UNEF will conduct inspections as follows:

(a) In areas between Lines E and F and Lines K and J as regards limitations of forces and armaments.



- (b) In the area between Line E up to ten (10) kilometers West of Line F and in the area between Line J up to ten (10) kilometers East of Line K to assure that anti-aircraft missiles are not placed in the areas.
- (ii) UNEF shall conduct bi-weekly inspections in the areas referred to in b.(i)(a) and b.(i)(b) above in order to ensure the maintenance of the agreed limitations within these areas.
- (iii) UNEF shall inform both Parties of the results of such inspections.
- (iv) UNEF inspection teams shall be accompanied by liaison officers of the respective Parties.
- (v) UNEF shall carry out additional inspections within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of such a request from either Party, and will promptly furnish both Parties with the results of each inspection.

3. Early Warning System


a. The Early Warning System, based on the Agreement, the Annex and the accepted Proposal which constitutes an integral part of the Agreement, will include:

- (i) Two (2) Surveillance Stations operated by each Party respectively.
- (ii) Three (3) U.S. Watch Stations and four (4) unmanned electronic sensor fields.

b. The location of the system and the approach roads are indicated on Map 'A' attached to the Protocol.

c. Surveillance Stations

- (i) General
- (a) Each Party shall maintain a Surveillance Station in Buffer Zone 1, to provide strategic early warning.
- (b) UNEF personnel will not enter the Surveillance Stations of each Party.



(c) Each Party may visit its respective Surveillance Station and may freely supply and replace personnel and equipment situated therein, in accordance with the following procedures:

- UNEF will escort from its checkpoints to the perimeter of the Station and back.
- From that point escort and verification will be as described in paragraph 3.d.(ii).

(d) Each Party will be permitted to introduce into its Station items required for the proper functioning of the Station and personnel.

(ii) The Stations


(a) Each Surveillance Station shall be manned by not more than two hundred and fifty (250) technical and administrative personnel, equipped with small arms (revolvers, rifles, sub-machine guns, light machine guns, hand grenades and ammunition) required for their protection.

(b) Each Party will be permitted to maintain in its respective Surveillance Station, fifteen (15) administrative vehicles, two to three (2-3) mobile engineering equipment for the maintenance of the site and the road and fire-fighting and general maintenance equipment. All vehicles shall be unarmed.

(iii) Access to and exit from the Stations

(a) Access to and exit from the Surveillance Stations shall be as follows (as indicated on Map 'A' attached to the Protocol):

- To E-1 : From West of Line E to the Giddi Route, through the UN Alpha checkpoint, to the junction leading to the Um Hashiba, and thereafter South-Eastwards on the route to E-1.



- To J-1 : From East of Line J to the  
Um Hashiba Route to J-1.

- (b) Each Party will inform UNEF at least one hour in advance of each intended movement to and from the respective Surveillance Station. UNEF will co-ordinate with the appropriate Watch Station.
- (c) As to escort arrangements of personnel to the Surveillance Stations, see paragraph 3.d.(ii).
- (d) Such movement to and from the respective Surveillance Stations shall take place only during daylight.
- (e) Each Party shall be entitled even during the night to evacuate sick and wounded and summon medical experts and medical teams after giving immediate notice to the nearest Watch Station and UNEF.

(iv) Maintenance of Communication Cables and Water Lines

Communication cables and water lines passing through Buffer Zone 1, to the respective Surveillance Stations, shall be inviolable. Both Parties will be permitted to carry out maintenance and repairs along the routes of the communication cable and water lines. Notification of such maintenance team shall be given four (4) hours in advance, through the UN Alpha and Bravo checkpoints respectively, to the nearest Watch Station. UNEF personnel will accompany each team in the same manner as detailed in paragraph 3.d.(ii).

(v) Communication and Co-ordination between UNEF and the Parties

Technical arrangements, including the laying of telephone lines, will be arranged in order to facilitate communication and co-ordination between the UN checkpoints, the Watch Stations and each of the Parties.



d. U.S. Role in Early Warning System

- (i) The U.S. role in the Early Warning System will be as provided for in the U.S. proposal attached to the Agreement.
- (ii) The UNEF will escort Egyptian and Israeli personnel to the perimeter of each Surveillance site where U.S. civilian personnel will verify that access by the Parties is in accordance with the provisions regarding access to the Surveillance sites.
- (iii) If experience suggests changes in locations or procedures, the U.S. shall be able to work out such changes in consultation with the Parties.

e. The Establishment of an Egyptian Surveillance Station at E-1.

- (i) As of 28th December 1975, Egypt may introduce a Working team into the Buffer Zone for the construction of a Surveillance Station at E-1, as detailed in the Statement of the Chairman.
- (ii) The building site at E-1 will be guarded at all times by UNEF whilst construction work is in process.



Article IV

JOINT COMMISSION

1. The Joint Commission, referred to in Article VI of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel signed on the 4th September 1975, shall function in accordance with the following rules:

a. The Commission shall meet under the Chairmanship of the Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East or his representative and shall be composed of representatives of each Party to the Agreement.

b. For the duration of the Agreement, the task of the Commission is to consider any problem arising from the Agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Forces in the execution of its mandate.

c. Ordinary meetings of the Commission shall be held at agreed dates. Invitations for the meetings shall be issued by the Chief Co-ordinator or his representative. In the event that either Party, or the Chief Co-ordinator, requests a special meeting, it will be convened within 24 hours.

d. The Commission shall hold its meetings in the Buffer Zone under the Chairmanship of the Chief Co-ordinator or his representative where liaison officers of the Parties will be available.

e. The Parties to the Agreement shall consider problems before the Commission in order to reach agreement.

f. The Commission may supplement these rules as it deems necessary.

g. It will hold its first meeting not later than one month after the signing of the Protocol.



Article V

FLIGHTS AND AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE

1. Aircraft of either Party will be permitted to fly freely up to the forward line of that Party (Lines E and J respectively).

2. Reconnaissance aircraft of either Party may fly up to the Median Line of Buffer Zone 1 (designated on Map 'D', 1/500,000, US edition, attached to the Protocol) in accordance with the following principles:

- a) Reconnaissance flights will be carried out by planes at a height of not less than 15,000 feet and on a straight course (along the median line of Buffer Zone 1). No manoeuvre should occur in the Buffer Zone that may involve the crossing of lines of the other Party.
- b) Each reconnaissance flight shall not be made by more than two (2) planes.
- c) There shall be seven (7) reconnaissance flights every week for each Party.
- d) For these flights each Party will have at its exclusive disposal periods of 24 hours beginning at 1215 until 1145 the following day. The Parties will alternate in the use of the allocated periods. No flights will be carried out between 1145 and 1215 daily.
- e) Egypt will be the first to exercise the right of carrying out flights on 22nd February 1976, starting from 1215. Israel will carry out its first flight on 23rd February 1976, starting from 1215, etc.
- f) Notice shall be given to a representative of the Chief Co-ordinator not less than six (6) hours before each reconnaissance flight.
- g) For reasons of weather, limitations or other technical reasons, notice of a reconnaissance flight will specify a span of four (4) hours, during which time the reconnaissance flight will take place. (For example: a reconnaissance flight will take place on ..... date, between 1000 and 1400).



Article VI


GENERAL

This Protocol and the Maps attached thereto are an integral part of the Agreement. The Statement of the Chairman is equally binding on the Parties.

The present Protocol shall enter into force upon signature by both Parties.

Done at Geneva on the 22 September, 1975,  
in four original copies.

For the Government of the  
Arab Republic of Egypt

*لواء ان*  


*طه محمد طه*

*٧٥/٩/٢٢*

For the Government of Israel

*2. N. I.*  
*ER*

*.b.7*

WITNESS

*Gen. Lucio Salas*





I. In accordance with an agreement between the Parties, I hereby make the following statement:

II. The Northern Area

1. UNEF will conduct inspections in areas beyond those mentioned in Article III-2.b.(i)(a) and (b) of the Protocol in accordance with the specific request for a specified area of either of the Parties.
2. The Parties undertake to allow UNEF to conduct inspections without any restrictions whatsoever, within all parts of the Areas of Limited Forces and Armaments, the areas of ten (10) kilometers East of Line K and West of Line F and the other relevant above-mentioned areas.
3. With respect to Article III-3.c.(i)(d) of the Protocol, each Party will be allowed to introduce such items as: water, all kinds of oils (petroleum, kerosene, etc.), food, electronic equipment, communications equipment, maintenance tools, medical supplies, postal requisites and any other items required for the proper functioning of the Station and personnel.
4. With reference to Article III-3.c.(iv) of the Protocol, the following was agreed to:

The routine maintenance team will include two (2) vehicles and twelve (12) personnel. In cases where the character of the work requires it, heavy engineering equipment and additional personnel, needed to operate the equipment, will be introduced in co-ordination with UNEF.


Maintenance teams will move from East of Line J to the Giddi Route, through the UN checkpoint, to the junction leading to Um Hashiba, and thereafter North-Westwards on the Route J-1.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, 13527

DATE 11/05/03

BY: [Signature]



5. With Reference to the Establishment of an Egyptian Surveillance Station at E-1, as referred to in Article III-3.e. of the Protocol, the following was agreed upon:

The Egyptian team will consist of/

- 200 unarmed personnel
- 15 administrative vehicles
- 27 heavy engineering equipment (including 12 tippers)
- For the purpose of Guard duty it was agreed by the Parties that the Egyptian personnel could have with them, at the site, 50 rifles, and officers at the site may carry pistols.

Access to and from the Station between 28 December 1975 and 22 February 1976 will be as follows:

- (a) Access will be along the Giddi Road, as detailed in Article III-3.c.(iii)(a) of the Protocol.
- (b) All Egyptian traffic will be checked and escorted by UNEF, an Israeli Liaison Officer will accompany the UNEF.
- (c) Traffic will be by a daily convoy in each direction:
  - to the Early Warning Station between 0630 to 0800
  - from the Early Warning Station between 1600 to 1730,

6. U.S. Role

- (a) United States civilian personnel will establish procedures and establish and maintain their own communications system to other U.S. elements, to the UNEF and to the Parties, as well as operating other equipment necessary to their task.
- (b) They will maintain regular contact with the operational personnel at the site and will be informed in advance of expected entries and exits at the sites.
- (c) Operational personnel will be responsible for maintenance of the site.
- (d) The United States may send a team to survey sites and to consult with the Parties on necessary support facilities as soon as the Protocol is signed.



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(e) By the terms of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel access to the Buffer Zone will be controlled by the United Nations Emergency Force. U.S. personnel will abide by whatever procedures UNEF establishes for assuring that entry into the Zone is in accordance with the Agreement and other documents which are part of the Agreement.

7. With respect of access and exit from the Stations, Article III-3.c.(iii)(c) of the Protocol, the Parties have agreed as follows:

Personnel entering the Buffer Zone in order to reach or leave the respective Surveillance Stations will not be permitted to carry arms.

8. Special provisions on limitations during the Implementation of the Redeployment

It is agreed that there will be no more than two (2) Standard Infantry Battalions and ten (10) tanks in each of the sectors S3-D and S4-D until redeployment of Egyptian Forces in these sectors.

III. The Southern Area (Area South of Line E and West of Line M)

1. Transfer of Oilfields, installations and infrastructures

With reference to Article II-6. of the Protocol, regarding Transfer of Oilfields, Installations and Infrastructures, the following has been agreed upon:

(a) Timetable for the transfer of oilfields

	Introduction of Third Party Technicians as of	Completion of Transfer to Third Party Technicians	Redeployment of Israeli Forces	Transfer of the Area to UNEF	Egyptian Authority into the Area
SIDR	05 October	10 October	15 November	15 Nov.	16 Nov.
ARIS	24 November	30 November	30 November	30 Nov.	10 Dec.



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- (b) The Chief Co-ordinator will be notified twenty-four (24) hours before the introduction of the third party technicians of the time of their entry.

2. Modalities of the Transfer

The following subsidiary stages are required to facilitate the implementation of the transfer of oilfields according to the above-mentioned timetable:

(a) First Stage

The introduction of Third Party Civilian Technicians escorted by UNEF.

- (i) These technicians will receive the oilfields and all existing installations and infrastructures necessary for the continuation of oil production on behalf of Egypt in conformity with a procès verbal signed by both parties and witnessed by the Chief Co-ordinator or his representative.
- (ii) The third party technicians will take over the oilfields and will be responsible for them until the entrance of Egyptian Technicians into the area.


(b) Second Stage

The redeployment of Israeli troops and UNEF.

- (i) During this stage Israel undertakes to protect the personnel and the oilfield area until UNEF complete deployment and control of the area.
- (ii) UNEF ensures the safety of the oilfields area after the Israeli redeployment until the Egyptian technicians and the Egyptian Authority enters the area and takes over the responsibility of the production process.

(c) Third Stage

Egyptian civilian technicians and Egyptian authorities to enter the area and take over the responsibility of production.



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3. UNEF additional function during the oil transfer phase

- (a) UNEF shall ensure the safety of the third party technicians who shall be introduced to the area in conformity with Section III-1.(a).above.
- (b) UNEF shall ensure their freedom of movement to fulfill their task within, to and from the area. This shall include:
  - (i) escorting third party technicians to and from the areas of operation.
  - (ii) the operation of radio communications with Egyptian authorities.

4. Transfer of Abu Rodeis Oilfields

It is understood that there are two possibilities:

- (a) The transfer of the oilfields in producing condition with the introduction of 120-150 third party technicians.
  - (b) The transfer of the oilfields under controlled closed condition with the introduction of 20-40 third party technicians.
5. Israel will be notified through the Chief Co-ordinator not later than 5th October 1975 about which variant of the above-mentioned will be followed.
6. In order to allow the introduction of a tanker at the time Egypt returns to the area, Egypt wishes to reserve its right to delay the entry of third party technicians into Ras Sudar area.
7. With respect to Article II-1.d. of the Protocol, it was agreed by the Parties that Egypt will station in the area South of Line E and West of Line M four (4) unarmed light civilian helicopters and one to two (1-2) civilian transport planes for the operation of the oilfields and for use in emergency cases.

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8. UNEF will patrol along Line M on both sides. As regards the Eastern side, patrolling will be between Line M and the road.
9. Israel undertakes not to exploit the Matarma and Assal oil wells East of Line M.

10. Egyptian Civilian Police

The 200 police administrative personnel referred to in Article II-4. of the Protocol, will be unarmed.

11. Road Sections for Common Use

The Parties have agreed as follows;

The sections for common use will be open to Egyptian, Israeli and UNEF traffic. Use of these sections by the Parties will be according to the following provisions:


(a) Egypt and Israel shall use these sections. Israel will use them also for military transport.

(b) The time schedule shall be as follows:

- For Egyptian use : from 0530 to 0830  
from 1230 to 1500  
from 1830 to 2200
- For Israeli use : from 0900 to 1200  
from 1530 to 1800  
from 2230 to 0500
- UNEF inspections of the road sections prior to the use of road by the Parties will be : from 0500 to 0530  
from 0800 to 0830  
from 1200 to 1230  
from 1500 to 1530  
from 1800 to 1830  
from 2200 to 2230

(c) For emergency cases both Parties shall be able to use these sections of the road during all hours provided that notification is given to UNEF and the other Party and UNEF provides an escort.

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12. The Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces and his Military Aides will visit the Southern Area at any time. Other Egyptian Officers of the highest rank belonging to the Egyptian General Headquarters may also visit the Southern Area after twenty-four (24) hours notification to UNEF. The Military Aides accompanying the Egyptian Minister of War or any other Egyptian Cabinet Minister will be able to visit the Area without prior notification to UNEF.

#### IV. Other Issues

1. Egypt and Israel undertake to provide all assistance to the Chief Co-ordinator in the fulfillment of his task.

2. Reconnaissance flights


Both Parties may fly up to the median line of the Gulf of Suez, in accordance with the following provisions:

- (a) Reconnaissance flights will be carried out by planes at a height of not less than 15,000 feet and on a straight course along the median line of the Gulf of Suez up to Line E.
- (b) Each reconnaissance flight shall be carried out by no more than two (2) planes.
- (c) There shall be no more than one (1) reconnaissance flight every three (3) days.
- (d) Notice shall be given to the Chief Co-ordinator, or his representative, not less than eighteen (18) hours before each expected reconnaissance flight.
- (e) For reasons of weather conditions or other technical reasons, notice of a reconnaissance flight shall specify a span of four (4) hours, during which time the reconnaissance flight will take place.

3. Repatriation of Persons

The Parties agree not to detain military or civilian personnel of the other side. They undertake to repatriate within twelve (12) hours such persons together with their property, including vehicles, vessels,

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informed in the event of any such incident.

4. Communication in Emergency Cases

The Chief Co-ordinator shall ensure and maintain with the Parties instantaneous communication in urgent cases, such as aircraft entering airspace or emergencies endangering human lives.

5. Israel will provide UNEF with all necessary information as to military installations, military fortifications and mine-fields remaining in the areas left by Israel.

6. Return of Missing Bodies

Egypt and Israel undertake to make a new effort to find the missing bodies of Egyptian and Israeli soldiers in order to repatriate them.

V. Proposals

The Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Missions in the Middle East has made the following proposals which were accepted by both Parties:

- (a) With regard to the functions of UNEF in the Southern Area (Article II-2. of the Protocol), each Party and UNEF may request at any time verifications of specific areas or locations. These special verifications will be carried out within twenty-four (24) hours after receipt of the request.
- (b) With regard to access and exit from the surveillance stations, the following was agreed upon:  
"Personnel entering the Buffer Zone in order to reach or leave their respective Surveillance Stations will not be permitted to carry arms".
- (c) With regard to the functioning of the Joint Commission, it was agreed as follows:



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- (i) Meetings will be held at agreed intervals.
- (ii) The Parties will attend all Meetings of the Commission.
- (iii) Until the completion of the Redeployment of Forces, the Joint Commission shall meet in the existing Buffer Zone at UNEF position 512 on the Baluza-Kantara road. After the completion of the redeployment of forces, the Joint Commission shall have its meetings in a UNEF camp in the Buffer Zone to be specified by the Chief Co-ordinator.
- (d) The Chief Co-ordinator, having received information from Egypt, proposes that in view of the special civilian character of the Southern Area, the number of high-ranking Egyptian Officers that will visit the Area will be limited. The purpose of such visits will be non-military.



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This Statement has been read in the presence of the Representatives of Egypt and Israel and both Parties have accepted it. They further consider it as legally binding between them for the duration of the Agreement, which is on an equal footing with it.

Done at Geneva on the 22 September, 1975

*Ensio Siilasvuo*  
Ensio Siilasvuo  
Lt.-General



CHIEF CO-ORDINATOR OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
PEACE-KEEPING MISSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST



~~SECRET~~

Union Calendar No. 266

94TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

**H. J. RES. 683** (S. J. Res. 138)

[Report No. 94-532]

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OCTOBER 2, 1975

Mr. MORGAN (for himself and Mr. BROOMFIELD) introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations

OCTOBER 6, 1975

Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

**JOINT RESOLUTION**

To implement the United States proposal for the early-warning system in Sinai.

Whereas an agreement signed on September 4, 1975, by the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel may, when it enters into force, constitute a significant step toward peace in the Middle East;

Whereas the President of the United States on September 1, 1975, transmitted to the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and to the Government of Israel identical proposals for United States participation in an early-warning system, the text of which has been submitted to the Congress, providing for the assignment of no more than two hundred United States civilian personnel to carry out certain specified noncombat functions and setting forth the terms and conditions thereof;



Whereas that proposal would permit the Government of the United States to withdraw such personnel if it concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary; and

Whereas the implementation of the United States proposal for the early-warning system in Sinai may enhance the prospect of compliance in good faith with the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli agreements and thereby promote the cause of peace: Now, therefore, be it

1       *Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives*  
2       *of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*  
3       That the President is authorized to implement the "United  
4       States Proposal for the Early-Warning System in Sinai":  
5       *Provided, however,* That United States civilian personnel  
6       assigned to Sinai under such proposal shall be removed im-  
7       mediately in the event of an outbreak of hostilities between  
8       Egypt and Israel or if the Congress by concurrent resolution  
9       determines that the safety of such personnel is jeopardized  
10      or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary. (Insert Eckhardt

11      SEC. 2. Any concurrent resolution of the type described  
12      in the first section of this resolution which is introduced in  
13      either House of Congress shall be privileged in the same  
14      manner and to the same extent as a concurrent resolution of  
15      the type described in section 5 (c) of Public Law 93-148  
16      is privileged under section 7 of such law.

1       SEC. 3. The United States civilian personnel participat-  
2       ing in the early warning system in Sinai shall include only  
3       individuals who have volunteered to participate in such  
4       system.

5       SEC. 4. Whenever United States civilian personnel, pur-  
6       suant to this resolution, participate in an early warning  
7       system, the President shall, so long as the participation of  
8       such personnel continues, submit written reports to the Con-  
9       gress periodically, but no less frequently than once every six  
10      months, on (1) the status, scope, and anticipated duration  
11      of their participation, and (2) the feasibility of ~~reducing~~ ending or  
12      reducing as soon as possible their participation by substituting nationals of other countries  
13      or by making technological changes. The appropriate com-  
14      mittees of the Congress shall promptly hold hearings on each  
15      report of the President and report to the Congress any find-  
16      ings, conclusions, and recommendations.

17      SEC. 5. The authority contained in this joint resolution  
18      to implement the "United States Proposal for the Early  
19      Warning System in Sinai" does not signify approval of the  
20      Congress of any other agreement, understanding, or com-  
21      mitment made by the executive branch.

FLOOR ACTION:

House: Adopted Eckhardt amendment to insert on page 2, line 10 the  
following:

Nothing contained in this resolution shall be construed as  
granting any authority to the President with respect to

the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances which authority he would not have had in the absence of this joint resolution. "

Adopted Biaggi amendment to insert the language indicated on page 3, line 11.

The House subsequently passed the Joint Resolution by a vote of 341 to 69.

Senate :

Adopted the Humphery amendments to conform the language of the Senate resolution to the House bill as passed.

Passed the Joint Resolution by a vote of 70 to 18.

Union Calendar No. 266

94TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

**H. J. RES. 683**

[Report No. 94-532]

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## JOINT RESOLUTION

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To implement the United States proposal for the early-warning system in Sinai.

By Mr. MORGAN and BROOMEFIELD

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OCTOBER 2, 1975

Referred to the Committee on International Relations

OCTOBER 6, 1975

Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

7 file  
EX 16-10  
JACO B