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**The documents in this  
folder continue from the  
previous folder.**



~~SECRET~~

(A)

September 1, 1975

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT  
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF ISRAEL AND  
THE UNITED STATES

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The United States recognizes that the Egypt-Israel Agreement initialed on September 1, 1975, (hereinafter referred to as the Agreement), entailing the withdrawal from vital areas in Sinai, constitutes an act of great significance on Israel's part in the pursuit of final peace. That Agreement has full United States support.

United States-Israeli Assurances

1. The United States Government will make every effort to be fully responsive, within the limits of its resources and Congressional authorization and appropriation, on an on-going and long-term basis to Israel's military equipment and other defense requirements, to its energy requirements and to its economic needs. The needs specified in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 below shall be deemed eligible for inclusion within the annual total to be requested in FY76 and later fiscal years.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.5, State Dept Review  
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES SR 9/19/03  
BY LR, MIA, DATE 11/24/03



2. Israel's long-term military supply needs from the United States shall be the subject of periodic consultations between representatives of the United States and Israeli defense establishments, with agreement reached on specific items to be included in a separate United States-Israeli memorandum. To this end, a joint study by military experts will be undertaken within 3 weeks. In conducting this study, which will include Israel's 1976 needs, the United States will view Israel's requests sympathetically, including its request for advanced and sophisticated weapons.

3. Israel will make its own independent arrangements for oil supply to meet its requirements through normal procedures. In the event Israel is unable to secure its needs in this way, the United States Government, upon notification of this fact by the Government of Israel, will act as follows for five years, at the end of which period either side can terminate this arrangement on one-year's notice.



(a) If the oil Israel needs to meet all its normal requirements for domestic consumption is unavailable for purchase in circumstances where no quantitative restrictions exist on the ability of the United States to procure oil to meet its normal requirements, the United States Government will promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel to meet all of the aforementioned normal requirements of Israel. If Israel is unable to secure the necessary means to transport such oil to Israel, the United States Government will make every effort to help Israel secure the necessary means of transport.

(b) If the oil Israel needs to meet all of its normal requirements for domestic consumption is unavailable for purchase in circumstances where quantitative restrictions through embargo or otherwise also prevent the United States from procuring oil to meet its normal requirements, the United States Government will promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel in accordance with the International Energy Agency conservation




and allocation formula as applied by the United States Government, in order to meet Israel's essential requirements. If Israel is unable to secure the necessary means to transport such oil to Israel, the United States Government will make every effort to help Israel secure the necessary means of transport.

Israeli and United States experts will meet annually or more frequently at the request of either party, to review Israel's continuing oil requirement.

4. In order to help Israel meet its energy needs, and as part of the overall annual figure in paragraph 1 above, the United States agrees:


(a) In determining the overall annual figure which will be requested from Congress, the United States Government will give special attention to Israel's oil import requirements and, for a period as determined by Article 3 above, will take into account in calculating that figure Israel's additional expenditures for the import of oil to replace that which would have ordinarily come from Abu Rodeis and Ras Sudar (4.5 million tons in 1975).



(b) To ask Congress to make available funds, the amount to be determined by mutual agreement, to the Government of Israel necessary for a project for the construction and stocking of the oil reserves to be stored in Israel, bringing storage reserve capacity and reserve stocks now standing at approximately six months, up to one-year's need at the time of the completion of the project. The project will be implemented within four years. The construction, operation and financing and other relevant questions of the project will be the subject of early and detailed talks between the two Governments.

5. The United States Government will not expect Israel to begin to implement the Agreement before Egypt fulfils its undertaking under the January 1974 Disengagement Agreement to permit passage of all Israeli cargoes to and from Israeli ports through the Suez Canal.

6. The United States Government agrees with Israel that the next agreement with Egypt should be a final peace agreement.



7. In case of an Egyptian violation of any of the provisions of the Agreement, the United States Government is prepared to consult with Israel as to the significance of the violation and possible remedial action by the United States Government.

8. The United States Government will vote against any Security Council resolution which in its judgment affects or alters adversely the Agreement.

9. The United States Government will not join in and will seek to prevent efforts by others to bring about consideration of proposals which it and Israel agree are detrimental to the interests of Israel.

10. In view of the long-standing United States commitment to the survival and security of Israel, the United States Government will view with particular gravity threats to Israel's security or sovereignty by a world power. In support of this objective, the United States Government will in the event of such threat consult promptly






with the Government of Israel with respect to what support, diplomatic or otherwise, or assistance it can lend to Israel in accordance with its constitutional practices.

11. The United States Government and the Government of Israel will, at the earliest possible time, and if possible, within two months after the signature of this document, conclude the contingency plan for a military supply operation to Israel in an emergency situation.

12. It is the United States Government's position that Egyptian commitments under the Egypt-Israel Agreement, its implementation, validity and duration are not conditional upon any act or developments between the other Arab states and Israel. The United States Government regards the Agreement as standing on its own.

13. The United States Government shares the Israeli position that under existing political circumstances negotiations with Jordan will be directed toward an overall peace settlement.



14. In accordance with the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas and free and unimpeded passage through and over straits connecting international waters, the United States Government regards the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb and the Strait of Gibraltar as international waterways. It will support Israel's right to free and unimpeded passage through such straits. Similarly, the United States Government recognizes Israel's right to freedom of flights over the Red Sea and such straits and will support diplomatically the exercise of that right:

15. In the event that the United Nations Emergency Force or any other United Nations organ is withdrawn without the prior agreement of both Parties to the Egypt-Israel Agreement and the United States before this Agreement is superseded by another agreement, it is the United States view that the Agreement shall remain binding in all its parts.

16. The United States and Israel agree that signature of the Protocol of the Egypt-Israel



Agreement and its full entry into effect shall not take place before approval by the United States Congress of the United States role in connection with the surveillance and observation functions described in the Agreement and its Annex. The United States has informed the Government of Israel that it has obtained the Government of Egypt agreement to the above.

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
Yigal Allon  
Deputy Prime Minister and  
Minister of Foreign Affairs

For the Government of Israel

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Henry A. Kissinger  
Secretary of State

For the Government of  
the United States






MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE  
GOVERNMENTS OF ISRAEL AND  
THE UNITED STATES

The Geneva Peace Conference

1. The Geneva Peace Conference will be reconvened at a time coordinated between the United States and Israel.

2. The United States will continue to adhere to its present policy with respect to the Palestine Liberation Organization, whereby it will not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization so long as the Palestine Liberation Organization does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The United States Government will consult fully and seek to concert its position and strategy at the Geneva Peace Conference on this issue with the Government of Israel. Similarly, the United States will consult fully and seek to concert its position and strategy with Israel with regard to the participation of any other additional states. It is understood that the participation at a subsequent phase of the Conference of any possible additional state, group or organization will require the agreement of all the initial participants.

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E.O. 12958  
STATE DEPT REVIEW  
SF 9/19/63  
11/04/03




3. The United States will make every effort to ensure at the Conference that all the substantive negotiations will be on a bilateral basis.

4. The United States will oppose and, if necessary, vote against any initiative in the Security Council to alter adversely the terms of reference of the Geneva Peace Conference or to change Resolutions 242 and 338 in ways which are incompatible with their original purpose.

5. The United States will seek to ensure that the role of the cosponsors will be consistent with what was agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding between the United States Government and the Government of Israel of December 20, 1973.

6. The United States and Israel will concert action to assure that the Conference will be conducted in a manner consonant with the objectives of this document and with the declared purpose of the Conference, namely the advancement of a negotiated peace between



Israel and each one of its neighbors.

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
Yigal Allon  
Deputy Prime Minister and  
Minister of Foreign Affairs

For the Government of Israel

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Henry A. Kissinger  
Secretary of State

For the Government of  
the United States







DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
**TELEGRAM**

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FROM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652:  
 TAGS:  
 SUBJECT:  
 ACTION:

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 PFOR, IS  
 REMARKS TO PRESS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND FOREIGN  
 MINISTER ALLON AFTER MEETING AT PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE,  
 AUGUST 31, 1975

SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0753 - 0754

INFO: AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE  
 AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE  
 AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE  
 AMEMBA SSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE  
 AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE  
 USDEL ALEXANDRIA IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED ~~JERUSALEM~~ SECTO 10262

DEPT PASS NSC FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND NESSEN

FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON: GOOD MORNING, GENTLEMEN.  
 I AM SORRY YOU DID NOT SLEEP THE WHOLE NIGHT. WE  
 WERE PREPARING FOR THE CABINET SESSION WHICH IS GOING  
 TO TAKE PLACE IN A VERY SHORT WHILE AND THEN WE SHALL  
 SEE WHAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL DECIDE. ANYWAY, THE  
 DECISION, THE GROUND, IS READY FOR SUCH A DECISION.

Q: WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDATION TO THE CABINET?

FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON: I AM NOT PERMITTED TO SAY  
 A FEW HOURS AHEAD OF TIME. THANK YOU.

SEC. KISSINGER: WELL, AS YOU CAN GATHER, THERE  
 WERE A FEW MINOR TECHNICAL PROBLEMS (LAUGHTER) THAT  
 REQUIRED ATTENTION. WE HAVE BEEN MEETING FOR, ~~THE~~ WELL,

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 ca  
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DRAFTED BY: *J. Vogel* J. VOGEL; WB DRAFTING DATE: TEL. EXT.: CON: *J. Vogel* J. VOGEL CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

APPROVED BY: *J. Vogel* S/PRS AMB: ANDERSON

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A FEW HOURS ATTEMPTING TO IRON OUT THE REMAINING TECHNICAL PROBLEMS AND I THINK WE HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY DONE SO. SO NOW THE ISRAELI CABINET IS GOING TO MEET AND WE WILL KNOW LATER DURING THE DAY WHAT THEIR VIEWS ARE.

Q: DO YOU THINK YOU HAVE AN AGREEMENT ALSO?

SEC. KISSINGER: I THINK WE ARE SUBSTANTIALLY THERE.

Q: SPECIAL PROGRESS? (LAUGHTER)

Q: CAN I GET BACK TO THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER, MR. ALLON? CAN YOU TELL US WHETHER IN FACT THERE IS AN AGREEMENT, SIR?

FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON: THE NEGOTIATING TEAM IS GOING TO REPORT TO THE CABINET, PRESENT THE DOCUMENTS AND EXPLAIN WHAT IT IS ALL ABOUT. I THINK WE MADE VERY SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME I AM GOING TO USE A WORD WHICH I HAVE AVOIDED THROUGHOUT THE SHUTTLE: WE HAD A VERY CONSTRUCTIVE SESSION LAST NIGHT (LAUGHTER). SERIOUSLY, THIS IS A DAY WHERE AN IMPORTANT DECISION MAY TAKE PLACE.

Q: MR. ALLON, WILL YOU RECOMMEND TO THE GOVERNMENT THAT THEY ACCEPT THIS DRAFT?

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FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON: OUT OF LOYALTY TO MY COLLEAGUES, I AM NOT GOING TO SAY WHAT I AM GOING TO RECOMMEND. BUT IF WE BRING THE PAPERS AND THE REPORTS BEFORE THE MINISTERS, OF COURSE, WE SHALL TELL THEM WHAT WE THINK ABOUT IT.

Q: MR. ALLON, IF I MAY BE PERMITTED A PERSONAL JUDGMENT, ALL OF YOU SEEM TO BE EXUDING NOTHING BUT GOOD WILL THIS MORNING. YOU ARE ~~RECOMMENDING~~ CERTAINLY NOT GOING TO RECOMMEND THAT IT BE TURNED DOWN, ARE YOU?

FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON: WELL, LET US KEEP YOU WAITING A LITTLE BIT AND FIND OUT LATER -- LATE AFTERNOON.

SEC. KISSINGER: THE KEEPERS ARE GOING TO COME FOR US ANY MOMENT ANYWAY.

Q: WILL THE INITIALING FOR BOTH SIDES TAKE PLACE TODAY?

SEC. KISSINGER: WE WILL MAKE AN EFFORT TO DO THAT. YES. DEPENDING ON HOW LONG THE DELIBERATIONS ARE HERE.

Q: AND THE SIGNING, DR. KISSINGER?

SEC. ~~DR.~~ KISSINGER: THAT WILL BE A FEW DAYS AFTERWARDS, AFTER THE KNESSET HAS MET.

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Q: WHERE WILL  THAT BE, SIR, THE SIGNING?

SEC. KISSINGER: I THINK IT WILL BE IN GENEVA.

Q: WILL IT BE SEPARATELY, OR WILL IT BE TOGETHER?

SEC. KISSINGER: TOGETHER.

Q: ARE YOU JUST TAKING A GIANT LEAP, NOW, DR. KISSINGER? ARE YOU ~~JUST~~ TALKING ABOUT INITIALING?

SEC. KISSINGER: WHAT ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT?

Q: I MEAN BECAUSE IT IS NOW SIX O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING THAT YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT A GIANT LEAP? I GET THE IMPRESSION YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT INITIALING?

SEC. KISSINGER: YOU ARE RIGHT.

Q: THEN IT WILL HAPPEN TODAY ON BOTH SIDES?

SEC. KISSINGER: NO. WE HAVE TO WAIT NOW FOR THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE ISRAELI CABINET.

FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON: MY GUESS IS THAT THE CABINET WILL SIT UNTIL THE LATE HOURS OF THE AFTERNOON. THERE IS A LOT OF MATERIAL TO READ AND I AM SURE THAT EACH ~~OF~~ ONE ~~OF~~ OF THE MINISTERS WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS HIMSELF. --

Q: JUST IN TERMS OF THE TECHNICALITIES, NOW, WHAT DOES THE CABINET HAVE TO DO? GO THROUGH EVERY POINT?

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FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON: WELL, IT DEPENDS ON THE DESIRE OF THE MINISTERS TO GO INTO ~~THE~~ DETAILS MORE OR LESS. SOME ARE MORE INTERESTED, SOME A LITTLE LESS. BUT THEY WILL MEET AT 8:30. WE WILL GIVE THEM A LITTLE TIME TO READ SOME OF THE PAPERS. THEN BY TEN WE SHALL BEGIN OUR DELIBERATIONS. USUALLY, IT WILL TAKE A GOOD SIX TO EIGHT HOURS. AND IF THE CABINET DECIDES TO APPROVE THE AGREEMENT, THEN IT CAN BE ~~BEING~~ INITIALED TODAY, I ~~MEAN~~ MEAN IN THE LATE AFTERNOON OR EARLY ~~EVENING~~ EVENING. AND WHEN THE EGYPTIANS WILL DO THIS IS FOR THE SECRETARY ~~TO~~ TO SAY. I HAVE NOT MET ~~THEM~~ THEM ~~YET~~ YET.

Q: DR. KISSINGER: DR. KISSINGER, WHILE THE ISRAELI CABINET IS MEETING, WILL YOU REMAIN HERE OR WILL YOU GO TO EGYPT?

SEC. KISSINGER: NO, ~~I~~ I WILL BE HERE.

Q: WILL YOU GO TO BED? (LAUGHTER)

SEC. KISSINGER: I AM THINKING OF GOING TO BED NOW. (LAUGHTER)

Q: ARE YOU GETTING A QUICK ROUND OF TENNIS OR SOMETHING TODAY? ~~ARE~~ YOU ARE STILL ~~BURNING~~ BURNING WITH ENTHUSIASM AND VIGOR.

SEC. KISSINGER: WELL, --

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FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON: HE WAS WELL TREATED TONIGHT, YOU SEE. (LAUGHTER)

SEC. KISSINGER: WE HAVE A LOT OF DOCUMENTS TO PREPARE. WE HAVE TO MAKE A LOT OF CONTACTS WITH VARIOUS PEOPLE. SO I WILL BE HERE AND I WILL BE FAIRLY BUSY.

Q: YOU DO NOT REGARD YOUR TASK AS COMPLETED YET?

SEC. KISSINGER: I THINK THE NEGOTIATING TASK IS SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLETED.

Q: WHAT IS REMAINING THEN?

SEC. KISSINGER: WHAT REMAINS? WELL, THERE IS A LOT OF TECHNICAL WORK TO BE DONE -- CONTACTS WITH VARIOUS PEOPLE AND GROUPS.

Q: ARE ALL ~~THESE~~ DETAILS SETTLED -- HOW MANY PEOPLE ARE GOING TO BE THERE AND HOW MANY STATIONS...

SEC. KISSINGER: I WOULD THINK SO.

Q: ARE YOU REFERRING TO CONTACTS WITH CONGRESS AND THE SENATE?

SEC. KISSINGER: IN WASHINGTON AND WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.

Q: HAVE YOU BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE PRESIDENT YET?

SEC. KISSINGER: I WAS IN TOUCH WITH HIM BEFORE I BEGAN THIS MEETING, AND I WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH

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HIM NOW.

Q: ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE AGREEMENT THE  
WAY IT STANDS?

SEC. KISSINGER: YES. I AM.

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REMARKS TO PRESS BY DR. KISSINGER ON RETURN TO THE KING DAVID HOTEL AT 0530 SEPTEMBER 1, 1975 AFTER MEETING AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE.

SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0746

INFO: AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE  
USDEL ALEXANDRIA IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED ~~#####~~ SECTO 10259

DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND NESSEN

Q: GOOD MORNING, MR. SECRETARY, DO YOU HAVE RESULTS ON THE AGREEMENT?

SEC. KISSINGER: AS I TOLD YOU EARLIER, WE HAD A FEW TECHNICAL DETAILS TO WORK OUT.

Q: ARE THEY WORKED OUT NOW, SIR?

SEC. KISSINGER: WE HAD A NUMBER OF ISSUES THAT WE HAD TO EXAMINE. I THINK THAT WE HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY CONCLUDED OUR NEGOTIATIONS. THE ISRAELI CABINET IS NOW GOING TO MEET AND WILL MAKE A DECISION DURING THE COURSE OF THE DAY. AFTERWARDS, WE WILL KNOW WHAT TO DO.

Q: WERE THERE ANY CONTACTS WITH EGYPT DURING THE COURSE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS TODAY?

DRAFTED BY:

*J. Vogel*  
JBVOGEL:wm

DRAFTING DATE

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JBVOGEL *J. Vogel*

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S/PRS Amb. Anderson

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SEC. KISSINGER: WE HAD A PRETTY GOOD IDEA OF THE EGYPTIAN POSITION AND OF COURSE WE HAD PRESENTED THE ISRAELI POSITION IN EGYPT DURING THE DAY. SO IT WAS ~~WE~~ CLEAR WHAT WAS NEEDED TO MOVE THE PARTIES AND ~~WE~~ WE KNEW THE SPAN WITHIN WHICH BOTH SIDES WERE WILLING TO MOVE. WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH DURING THE COURSE OF THE NIGHT WITH EGYPT, HOWEVER.

Q: HAVE THE NEGOTIATORS, THEN, FROM BOTH SIDES AGREED ON A TEXT AT THE MOMENT?

SEC. KISSINGER: MY IMPRESSION IS YES. WE HAVE TO MAKE ONE MORE CHECK.

Q: ARE THERE ANY LOOSE ENDS REMAINING SIR, OR ARE ALL THE FACTS NOW KNOWN? ARE THE LINES KNOWN, THE NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL...

SEC. KISSINGER: NO, THERE IS NO MORE NEGOTIATING TO BE DONE.

Q: ALL HAS BEEN RESOLVED; ALL THE NUMBERS ARE ~~WE~~ KNOWN; ALL THE FIGURES, ALL THE DETAILS ARE ALL FINISHED?

SEC. KISSINGER: YES.

Q: WHERE DOES THAT ~~WE~~ CHECK ~~WE~~ HAVE TO BE MADE -- YOU SAID ONE MORE CHECK HAS TO BE MADE?

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SEC. KISSINGER: WELL, WE HAVE TO COMPARE TEXTS AND SO FORTH TO MAKE SURE.

Q: IS IT STILL YOUR HOPE TO GO TO ALEXANDRIA TONIGHT OR STAY HERE TONIGHT?

SEC. KISSINGER: IT DEPENDS HOW LONG THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE ISRAELI CABINET WILL LAST. IF AT ALL POSSIBLE I WOULD LIKE TO GO TO ALEXANDRIA BEFORE THE END OF THE EVENING.

Q: ARE ALL THE BILATERAL UNDERSTANDINGS NOW COMPLETELY WORKED OUT AS WELL?

SEC. KISSINGER: WE HAVE COMPLETED. YES, IT IS FINISHED.

Q: HUNDRED PER CENT?

SEC. KISSINGER: I WOULD SAY THE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ARE FINISHED.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, WHEN WILL THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND DIPLOMATIC CONCESSIONS TO ISRAEL BE MADE PUBLIC?

SEC. KISSINGER: WELL, WHY DON'T YOU WAIT UNTIL ALL THE DOCUMENTS WILL BE MADE PUBLIC AND THEN YOU CAN JUDGE FOR YOURSELF WHICH FALL INTO WHICH CATEGORY.

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Q: WILL THEY BE ALL MADE AT THE SAME TIME -- THE MILITARY LINES AS WELL AS THE POLITICAL ALL AT ONCE?

SEC. KISSINGER: YES.

Q: AS FAR AS YOU ARE CONCERNED NOW, SIR, THIS IS A SUCCESS --- HAVE YOU DONE WHAT YOU CAME TO DO?

SEC. KISSINGER: WELL, WHY DON'T WE WAIT TILL THE END OF THE DAY.

Q: WILL THE ISRAELI-AMERICAN DOCUMENT BE MADE PUBLIC ALSO?

SEC. KISSINGER: I DO NOT THINK SO.

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ KISSINGER

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Monday, September 1, 1975



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Marilyn Berger, Washington Post  
Bernard Gwertzman, New York Times  
Richard Valeriani, NBC-TV  
Bernard Kalb, CBS  
Ted Koppel, ABC-TV  
Jerrold Schechter, TIME  
John Wallach, Hearst Publications  
Bruce Van Voorst, Newsweek  
John Sprague, USIA  
Oswald Johnston, LA Times  
John McLean, Chicago Tribune  
Lars-Erik Nelson, Reuters  
Dana Adams Schmidt, Christian Science Monitor  
James Anderson, Westinghouse  
Richard Growald, UPI  
James McCartney, St. Louis Post-Dispatch  
Barry Schweid, AP

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and  
Assistant to the President for National Security  
Affairs

Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary for Political Affairs  
Ambassador Robert Anderson, Special Assistant  
to Secretary for Press Relations  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PR*

DATE AND TIME:

Monday - September 1, 1975  
5:00 - 5:40 p.m.


PLACE:

Ambassador Anderson's Suite  
King David Hotel  
Jerusalem

[Ambassador Anderson explained the meeting was on BACKGROUND and embargoed until the signing in the evening.]

Valeriani: Would you like to start with the uncovered section, Mr. Secretary, the Egyptian assurances to the U.S. and so on?

UNCLASSIFIED



Kissinger: The basic commitments are in the document. The rest are technical elaborations.

Wallach: The Israelis are saying that the US in the last three days has weakened its commitments on the bilateral parts -- on the Syrians, on Geneva, and on overall peace talks.

Kissinger: You can't weaken something you've not agreed to. The position is the same -- we're in favor of progress towards peace.

J. Anderson: The commitment on UNEF is not in the document.

Kissinger: It is not in the document. We never said three years. All the commitments are here. The rest is technical elaboration of how renewal will be handled.

Valeriani: What's new in here that was not there in March?

Kissinger: Blockade. And we never had a document in March.

Wallach: What is the most important thing?

Kissinger: It's the first document between the Arabs and Israelis that was not the result of war. It is a balanced document, with military provisions and political provisions, brought in relation to each other. Third, there is a commitment to a peaceful process through non-resort to force. And it is an attempt to encourage a peaceful process that would encourage stability in the area. And a number of provisions, like the Joint Commission, which will encourage a peaceful process.


Schweid: Where are the stations?

Kissinger: [indicates on the map] Umm Khishgiba is here, north of the Giddi Road. The Egyptian station is south of Giddi Road. They are within 10 kilometers of each other, because the best location is on hills.

We have not decided on the precise location of the American stations.

Johnston: All in the Giddi?

Kissinger: There will be at least one manned station in the Mitla. It will be decided soon.



Anderson: What were the hangups?

Kissinger: The major problems were how to define the political commitments. There were some hangups on the southern zone. There were several hangups earlier in the week on the military dispositions.

Wallach: What about the level of the signing?

Kissinger: There is no hangup there.

There will be one more document in 2-3 weeks, when the working groups finish the work -- the Protocol. The Annex will be the guidelines to the working out of the Protocol.

Kalb: What is included in the material not being made public?

Kissinger: Elaborations of what is in the document.

Gwertzman: What about U.S. commitments to Israel?

Kissinger: It will be handled as it has always been handled. They will be submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations and House International Relations Committees.

Berger: You know they will become known here, and possibly in a distorted fashion. Isn't it possible to do it in a more balanced way?


Kissinger: No.

Gwertzman: Who will initial it?

Kissinger: Gur and Kidron. Then their Chief of Staff and Ambassador Osman.

Kalb: What is the precise definition of political commitments? You said Israel gives territory and Egypt gives commitments, What are the Egyptian concessions?

Kissinger: If you look at Article 1, Article 2, and Articles 6 and 7, they represent -- in addition to annual extensions of UNEF -- they represent the largest advance between Israel and any Arab state since the existence of the State of Israel.





Johnston: Boycott and propaganda don't exist in this document. Do they appear anywhere else?

Kissinger: We will make clear what our understanding is of what Egyptian practices will be. They are not bound by what's in the Israeli documents. We will convey it to the Israelis.

Berger: You believe it is so because the Egyptians told you?

Kissinger: The last thing I expected is when you have three documents and you talk about what you don't have.

Gwertzman: Is there any uneasiness about the American presence?

Kissinger: There is no commitment about the American role that won't be submitted to the Congress.

Gwertzman: Confidentially to Congress.

Kissinger: The American proposal.

Valeriani: In both places?

Kissinger: Yes.

Schweid: Will there be 250 Israelis and 250 Egyptians?

Kissinger: There will be 250 Israelis and 250 Egyptians at the two major warning stations. There will also be some Americans. Then there will be three manned American stations. The total of Americans at the two major stations and the three manned stations will not be more than 200. And they will be in shifts.

Berger: How many U.S. civilians will be at the Israeli and Egyptian stations?

Kissinger: Around ten.

Wallach: Is there an understanding on two years?

Kissinger: There is an understanding.

Growald: What were the gaps yesterday?



Kissinger: Yesterday the major issue was something we dropped from the agreement. So we can't tell! On the military annex, there was something about the rights of parties in the Gulf of Suez and a few technical issues.

McLean: This agreement gives them a possibility for peace in the Middle East.

Kissinger: Without an agreement, there would be tension and possible war. A stalemate. What is the worst that can happen with this agreement was certain to have happened without it.

The problem is always balancing political moves against the territorial settlement. That process has to start somewhere. A process of cooperation will be inevitable in the implementation. So a possibility of peace has been created.

Schweid: What if the remaining difficulties are insoluble ?

Kissinger: But for two sides to say they will solve their difficulties by peaceful means is not an insignificant event.

Schweid: Yesterday, you said you'd come up against it.

Kissinger: I said if it failed when we were that close, it would be because of that. Having taken this step, perhaps the parties will gain some confidence, if it works, and take further steps.


Schweid: Can we put that on the record?

Kissinger: You can put that on the record.

I think these are significant steps.

Gwertzman: How important was the American commitment to Israel to get Israel to sign?

Kissinger: It is not significantly different from what accompanied the two previous disengagement agreements, on the economic role and the other. Some of it is inherent in the relationship anyway, so it's just stating it.



Koppel: There are two very major differences between these and those of past agreements. The economic and military aid is so different in scope and the other is the American presence between the two parties.

Kissinger: That's correct. But with respect to the first, if America is going to remain committed to the survival and security of Israel, the bill for that was going to go up anyway, because of the cost of modern weapons and the complexity of the situation. So this ratifies what was going to happen anyway. After the October War, it was \$2.2 billion. It was rising anyway.

The American presence is new. It is of a technical nature. It's not as in the Vietnamese war, when we were in support of one side and trying to achieve our objectives there. It is of a technical nature, and not for objectives of our own.

Anderson: Is there any duration to the financial commitment?

Kissinger: The financial commitment is determined annually. There is no long-term commitment.

Schechter: How much will it be?

Kissinger: The figures I've seen [in the press] are high. It's not yet determined.

Schechter: The President will say something?

Kissinger: Yes.

Kalb: I see that UNEF "shall be extended annually."

Kissinger: It is conceivable that there is an understanding.

Berger: The military limitations will come out.

Kissinger: It's in the annex.

Rodman: It won't be printed, because it's public!

Kissinger: It's open-ended. The understanding was in case of a veto. There have to be alternative arrangements.



Gwertzman: What is it? Another force?

Kissinger: Not necessarily another force.

Valeriani: There is nothing in any other document that limits Article 5?

Kissinger: The commitment to extend annually is open-ended. In addition, there is some understanding about requests that might be made.

Koppel: The same force under another aegis?

Kissinger: The UN has ways to express itself.

Anderson: In Article 2 it says no threat of force. Suppose Radio Cairo.....

Kissinger: Radio Cairo is not a governmental organ.

Anderson: .....and it makes bellicose statements, does that break the agreement?

Kissinger: The fact it's violated doesn't necessarily break the agreement.

VanVoorst: How do you see the Israeli military situation now?

Kissinger: The Israeli military problem is slightly more complex. It doesn't make it significantly worse.

Wallach: Does this vindicate the step-by-step? Will it continue?

Kissinger: I told the State Department doctor to confine me if I try to come out here again.

The issues have become sufficiently complex that they are no longer suited to shuttle diplomacy. If I can be helpful... The step-by-step is the right approach, but it is not necessarily the case that I will be doing it.

VanVoorst: What about Geneva and Syria?

Kissinger: The U.S. favors a negotiation with Syria but we'll reserve our position until it develops.



Valeriani: It is correct to interpret that as a March shuttle? [Laughter]

Koppel: You still feel a "moral obligation" to help the Israelis and Syrians?

Kissinger: We will be helpful if the parties request us.

The first thing, as we did with Israel and Egypt, is exchanges through diplomatic channels. Then we can see if a more active role is possible.

Wallach: Will there be a visit by President Ford to the area?

Kissinger: No.

Berger: What about President Sadat's visit? Is there a date?

Kissinger: There is discussion of a visit by President Sadat to the U.S. in the Fall, but there has been no date set.

I just received word that the Israeli Cabinet approved the agreement unanimously.

[The meeting ended.]





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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**Memorandum of Conversation**

DATE: Tuesday,  
September 2, 1975  
7:15 p.m. - 7:40 p.m.

Place: Residence of  
King Khalid, Taif,  
Saudi Arabia

**SUBJECT:**

**PARTICIPANTS:** King Khalid ibn'Abd al-Aziz Al Saud of Saudi Arabia  
Prince Fahd ibn'Abd al-Aziz Al Saud  
Deputy Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia  
Prince Sultan ibn'Abd al-Aziz Al Saud  
Minister of Defense and Aviation of Saudi Arabia  
Prince Abdallah ibn'Abd al-Aziz Al Saud  
Second Deputy Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia  
Prince Saud ibn Faysal Al Saud, Minister of State  
for Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia  
Ahmad Zaki Yamani, Minister of Petroleum and  
Mineral Wealth of Saudi Arabia  
Royal Counsellor Pharon  
  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and  
Assistant to the President for National Security  
Affairs  
  
Ambassador James E. Akins, U.S. Ambassador  
to Saudi Arabia  
  
Mr. Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for  
Political Affairs  
  
Mr. Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff,  
Department of State  
  
Mr. Robert B. Oakley, <sup>TWO</sup> NSC Staff  
  
Mr. Isa K. Sabbagh, Special Assistant to  
Ambassador Akins

Kissinger: I want to thank Your Majesty for a very  
warm welcome. Your hospitality is always  
so generous.

(Drafting Office and Officer)

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
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XGDS-3

E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.5 State Dept Review  
STATE DEPT. CONTROL DES SF 11/04/03

BY *HR* DATE *11/04/03*



Khalid: I hope you are not too tired. Is it safe to say you are by now used to such a hectic pace? The papers and radio are saying that you have travelled tens of thousands of miles just to get 8 miles for Egypt, but it is more than 8 if you measure it from Alexandria.

Kissinger: It is really about 50 kilometers if you measure from the Suez Canal to the new Israeli line.

Khalid: We thank God that your mission succeeded.

Kissinger: I thank Your Majesty for your very warm reception. It is typical of the Kingdom.

Khalid: We wish you could stay for a rest. The climate in Taif is very invigorating, although it can become unsettled, even with showers, in the afternoon.

Kissinger: As I told His Highness, Prince Fahd, we are grateful that progress has been made but it is only a first step in the progress which must lead to an overall settlement. For the past 48 hours my colleagues and I have had almost no sleep because we were constantly going back and forth from Israel to Egypt to pin down the negotiations. As I said to His Highness, the only smiling faces we have seen have been in Arab countries, not in Israel.

Khalid: We have a bedouin expression that this kind of fatigue shall produce a good result because it comes from a good effort. We all hope this is a step in the right direction and that the next step will have still greater progress.





Kissinger: We shall try to get another agreement on the Syrian front. We will make a significant effort even though the problem is extremely difficult.

Khalid: We hope you do not turn your back on the Syrians, or on the Palestinians, either. If you ignore those who own the territory, there is no possibility of a solution. You must not ignore Jerusalem, either.

Kissinger: I said last night in both Jerusalem and Alexandria that this is only a step and that the U.S. will continue to participate in the process of moving toward peace. President Ford made the same point very strongly in announcing the Agreement. I will ask our Ambassador to send Your Majesty a text of our President's statement.

Khalid: I hope that upon your return to Washington, you will see to the supply of the arms they need for Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and Pakistan. Of course, Prince Sultan wants our needs to be met first, but we must also worry about the others. They have legitimate needs and they are all fighting against Communism.

Kissinger: We agree. They need to be helped. It is in our own national interest. I have had preliminary discussions on this with Sadat.

Khalid: Turkey is very important strategically since it guards the Bosphorus and the entrance to the Mediterranean.

Kissinger: The Congressional decision on Turkish arms was one of the most short-sighted ever taken by a legislative body. We shall request a change in the law when Congress returns and I think we have a good change of getting it through this month.



Khalid: Turkey is really more important to you than to us.

Kissinger: That is true. Jordan is also a problem with Congress and we will try to get a favorable decision on HAWKS for Jordan this month.

Khalid: Pakistan is facing two deadly enemies on its borders -- India and USSR. They need your support.

Kissinger: But the Pakistanis have no money. The problem is not with us. We have removed the embargo.

Khalid: Treat them gently. They are your friends.

Kissinger: I have the impression that someone has been talking to to Your Majesty about this.

Khalid: Let them pay in installments. We and Iran are the only countries in the area who could help but we have set aside money for so many projects. Instead of giving wheat to the Soviets, help your friends.

Kissinger: The Soviets pay in cash and if Yamani does not behave we will make them pay in oil.


Khalid: You have an obligation to help the Pakistanis. They have had floods and disasters. Treat them gently.

Kissinger: I am an admirer of Bhutto.


Khalid: He spoke well of you and said he had received a letter from you just before coming to us.

Kissinger: I told him about the status of the negotiations. I like him very much.

Khalid: He is a good man. He speaks well.



- Kissinger: We worked very closely with him following the 1971 Indo-Pak War, in which we helped the Pakistanis.
- Khalid: The Pakistanis need more help. You must help them.
- Fahd: They are having a problem with Afghanistan. We have talked to both the Paks and the Afghans about this and hope we can bring them all to oppose Communism.
- Khalid: We are doing something of vital importance together. You take care of Turkey and Pakistan. We will take care of Jordan and Egypt.
- Kissinger: We will take another look at Pakistan and work on Turkey. We received a very unfriendly note today from the Soviets on the Agreement.
- Khalid: That is why we do not wish them in the area.
- Kissinger: They want to participate in all activities related to a settlement. We are very grateful to you for having received us. I wish the Kingdom and Your Majesty every success. Despite what the press may say, U.S. policy is to have the closest possible relations with Saudi Arabia.
- Khalid: This is the impression conveyed to us by your Ambassador and it has been the same policy for many years. You must see this the way we do.
- Kissinger: You can count on us.
- Khalid: We don't want Sultan to be annoyed, so don't forget about our arms. We pay cash and we need arms as friends.




Kissinger: We are not used to dealing with countries that can pay cash but I think I brought some good news to Sultan and I think we solved most, if not all, our problems.

Khalid: Under Secretary of Defense Clements and General Brown told us not to worry but it is up to you to get Congress to act.

Kissinger: I think we now have a procedure which will solve problems of this kind.

Khalid: We want you and President Ford to stay on until the whole Middle East problem is solved.

Kissinger: We are committed to a just and lasting peace. President Ford said it yesterday and I said it at press conferences in both Egypt and Israel. We are determined to succeed. I think Ford has a good chance of being elected.





THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: King Hussein I, of Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan  
 Crown Prince Hassan  
 Zaid Rifai, Prime Minister and Minister of  
 Foreign Affairs and Defense  
 General Zaid Ben Shaker, Chief of Staff

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
 and Assistant to the President for  
 National Security Affairs  
 Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State  
 for Political Affairs  
 Thomas R. Pickering, Ambassador to Jordan  
 Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff  
 Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary  
 of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs  
 Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary  
 for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs  
 Robert B. Oakley, NSC Staff  
 Ambassador Robert Anderson, Special Assistant  
 to the Secretary for Press Relations  
 Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PMR*

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, September 3, 1975  
10:15 - 12:08 p.m.

PLACE: Royal Diwan  
Amman, Jordan

[The Secretary and King Hussein conferred privately in the King's Office from 10:15 to 10:25 a.m. and then joined the others in the meeting room. Photographers entered for photographs of the meeting.]

Hussein: I would just like to say how happy we are at the turn of events, and to welcome you to Jordan as a friend.

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DECLASSIFIED *State Dept*  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.5 *Review SF*  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/96, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *11/04/03*



In view of the relationship that we have treasured over many years and the friendship we have had, of which you have been a part, we have had difficulties, but we will discuss them in friendship.

Kissinger: Your Majesty, let me make a few observations -- first, on our relationship, then on the recent agreement, and then we would greatly welcome Your Majesty's views. And in addition, whatever bilateral problems.

First, Your Majesty, there is no ruler in this area for whom we have greater admiration and affection. You have been a friend of the United States when it was not self-evident that it was a popular course. None of us will ever forget the tremendous courage Your Majesty displayed over heavy odds. The commitment of the United States to your kingdom and Your Majesty is not only undiminished -- but it has grown.


This makes all the more painful the events of the last year. We could not move quickly enough to avoid the result of Rabat -- partly because of the change in government in Washington and partly because of the change of government in Israel. And partly also because of the advice of some of your Arab brethren. All of this resulted in the worst mistake we have made -- though it is possible that [a solution] would not have been possible in the time we had before Rabat.

The second decision we regret is the postponement of the Hawks. Our view is the same as yours, so there is little to discuss. Our friends must realize we are in a period of temporary difficulty. Watergate, the collapse of the Presidency of President Nixon, followed by Congressional elections. This is a unique combination of events, which cannot recur. Even if the Democrats win, which isn't likely, the Congress is unrepresentative, and 30 percent of them will not be re-elected, which makes them more irresponsible. Therefore, our friends must be patient and keep in mind the fundamental principles of relationships. We have stood by each other in difficult times.

We will fight for the Hawks this month; and I think we will succeed.

Now let me turn to this agreement. Your Majesty and I have talked about the Middle East for a long time. Your Majesty knows I personally was extremely reluctant to get involved here, and I successfully resisted for four years.

I said in Israel that the next time I ask to go to Israel, I should be institutionalized, because why go 4,000 miles to be in an institution? [Laughter]



After the war in 1973 -- and we had several talks about that on that occasion -- here in Aqaba, and in Washington -- and I explained our strategy. The difficulty had been that there had been too much rhetoric and too little willingness to look at the realities. On the American side there had been politically too little willingness to give the sustained Presidential backing that is needed to move the area.

I told Your Majesty we had to move step-by-step, because if we went to an overall, it would produce the conditions of a stalemate. Not only would radical and outside elements have the greatest influence, but also because in America elements would have a context to produce the same result. Because when you put together all the peace commitments and all the border changes and add in Jerusalem, you have sort of a situation like the Paris negotiations with the North Vietnamese, when it only suits those who want nothing.

Last March, I think here in this room, I asked Your Majesty's advice at a difficult time. You urged me -- correctly -- to continue. Because with an Egyptian negotiation, something is possible; without an Egyptian negotiation, nothing is possible.


I went back from the area after the failure with the intention of going to an overall. I called in all our Ambassadors. I concluded it would lead to an explosion in America and a stalemate in the area which would make things worse. When President Sadat asked us to resume, we decided to make another step to protect the situation until we had restored executive authority in America and could move more rapidly.

We took on the Israeli groups in the United States and made it prevail. This is a political fact of the first magnitude.

For the first time, Israel retreated not in the aftermath of a war, and for the first time with American pressure not in the aftermath of war, as in 1956.

I have noted some of your statements to visitors -- and the statements by your Prime Minister 25 seconds after my arrival. [Laughter] So I know your opinion.

With all due respect. . . . The Prime Minister said we were establishing American protection for Israeli aggression by these warning stations. But





the first one who suggested American stations was President Sadat, to solve the problem of Umm Khisheiba, and to give the Egyptians one. This was a strategic advantage for Egypt.

Second, the front is 300 kilometers long. No more than 20 Americans will be at any one point, along a front 10 kilometers long. And I have never met a military man who thinks an attack through the passes is the most promising way to start a war.

Third, the American presence will force a consideration in America of the basic U.S. -Israeli relationship of a kind they have never seen before. I think it is one of the biggest mistakes Israel has made. You will see a reconsideration of the kind the Arabs have always wanted. This is the beginning of the real reassessment of American-Israeli relations.

Then, you say it will prolong the stalemate. Whether there is a stalemate or not depends on many factors. The mere fact that Israel has been forced to withdraw along a substantial front, when she didn't want to, creates a significant fact. Even if there was a stalemate, the worst that could happen if it fails, would be the same as was already there, and no one had a solution to breaking the stalemate.

We will do nothing for the next month, because we want to get this through the Congress. Then we want something with Syria. We don't want to lead a charge. We don't want to be the leader of the Polish cavalry. The problem is to pick a time when you can do something.

We will invite Prime Minister Rabin to Washington in October and ask him to begin a Syrian negotiation.

Those of us involved in the negotiations are determined to bring the area to peace because we are tired of being tormented every six months by the irreconcilable demands of both sides.

The position of Jordan has improved significantly since Rabat. I believe the day will come when Jordan will be reinstated as the principal negotiator for the West Bank. That is my impression, from my talks in Egypt and in Damascus. When that time comes, we will not make the same mistake we made before.

But it is important not to do things that won't work.



Before our election, only interim steps are possible. After our election, further moves are possible.

A lot depends on the Arabs. If the Arabs begin a massive attack on the United States, we will withdraw. If the Arabs push us more than we can do, it will lead to the same result. We always tell you what we can expect. We always deliver. It took a little longer because of the tragedy of Watergate.

Your Majesty and we can continue in the relationship of friendship.

This agreement can be a turning point. It can lead to further progress as soon as conditions permit in our country.

This is our view. I have put it very frankly. I would like to hear Your Majesty's view.


Hussein: Thank you very much, Sir. I appreciate your spirit of friendship. Once again I say how happy we are that you are visiting us to discuss so many important matters at a very crucial moment in the life of this area.

Our friendship has lasted over many years. Our conviction has always been that the United States could do the most to establish lasting peace in this area, that it was in the interest of the area that you interposed yourself in the area.

We were possibly alone in voicing our opinions -- small Jordan. We resisted pressures in the area; we stood up for what we believed in. We are proud of what is existing between us, over many years in the past, and most of all of the spirit of honesty and frankness of our talks.

I do sympathize with our friends at the very highest levels in Washington regarding the difficulties that exist. We lived in the United States when President Eisenhower was able to take a position against two allies and Israel on the eve of elections, and we have seen the pressures you face in trying to reestablish authority -- in the United States, the most powerful nation in the world -- as far as you are able, to act on principles and in solving problems in the best possible way.

As for you, Sir, we have come to respect you and admire you and all your efforts in the area. The patience and determination you displayed are also recognized.



I do remember our last meeting in this very room, and I do recall our discussion regarding our problem and the possibility of resumption of the step-by-step. We did support Egypt in a further step, since it was the only option. My attitude was and is that you should continue to do all possible.

So if we have any comments or feelings about this, it is not regarding this step but with the contents of it -- which until now we possibly have not been aware.

It is a step which won't be followed by another step for a consideration period of time. The Egyptians have given up the right to use force while the major part of its territory is still occupied. Among other Arabs -- the Syrians, Palestinians -- it seems to us the Egyptians have been involved in their own interest. In 1948 my grandfather urged the other Arabs not to enter Palestine militarily but to support the Palestinians. The Egyptians' policy was to the contrary.

In 1967, the Golan was lost, the West Bank, and all of the Sinai. The feeling is, by the Syrians, particularly in 1973 -- we were out of the picture at the time -- the Syrians lost thousands of their people and came closer to vital points in Israel. They feel that they had contributed to the safe crossing of the Egyptians into the Sinai and across the Canal and helped Egypt.


With the growing military strength of Israel and with no progress toward peace except in a very limited way, it is hoped that whatever is given to Israel for withdrawal in accord with Resolutions 242 and 338 should not be too much, when one front is completely neutralized and the full cost is borne by another.

On the one hand we feel there is a move forward, but on the other hand, there are tremendous difficulties ahead of us. Even if further aid is forthcoming, there will be tremendous problems, but perhaps it will be the salvation of Egypt.

But other Arabs will be speaking loudly and will be heard on this matter.

We are never against a step, but with the hope that one step will lead to another step. One has been taken; we hope others will follow.

I have been to Syria, to Kuneitra in particular, and I can appreciate the sensitivity of the Syrians in that regard. The city is in Syrian hands but under Israeli control, dominated by hills around it. They are a threat not only to the city, but also to Damascus itself.



We hope you achieve some success also on the Syrian side. We consider it vital that something be done. The Syrians will not be satisfied with a small withdrawal in the part; it will have to be uniform over the entire length.

We have tried our best for many, many years, and what has happened has happened. Our objective has always been the recovery of all our territory that was occupied in 1967, and a formula for Jerusalem to give the Arabs some sovereignty over their part of Jerusalem, but to make Jerusalem a city of peace.

This is what we have told the other side and told everyone.

Our despair is caused by many things. First, by the lack of response. Secondly, if it is that difficult to achieve this second step on the Egyptian front, what hope is there really on the West Bank and Golan and for the Palestinians, and thirdly, this semi-divided Arab world.


We were in Syria during the second disengagement agreement and we agreed with our Syrian friends to try to get all the facts and act in the best and most responsible way having these facts available.

As you are dealing with problems, we are also. Very frankly, the United States word in the years that are past was something we could and did accept without exception. Now you are trying to rectify matters so that that situation will prevail again. We hope and pray you are successful -- for the interests of the whole world, not only our interests.

In the area, where action has been taken by a state, we hope President Sadat is as strong as he is. Israel is very likely to receive tremendous economic help, military help.

So if we had not recovered some of our position in the Arab world, and have good relations with Syria and other neighbors, this situation might have had a disastrous effect.

With Syria we have responded to their approach of wanting to cooperate with us. And we have decided from the beginning that this cooperation should be based on logic and reason, not emotion. We felt we should study all possibilities and give our peoples some hope of results. So, it is a large area: economic cooperation, economic development, the education of our people, use of natural resources, water resources, and also, in the face of any threat, some form of coordination so that any difficulty could be handled.



We have not overestimated our possibilities if there is any disruption in the area. We have not overestimated our possibilities in relation to Israel, and the United States. But with respect to the future, we don't feel secure because we have lived with this for many, many years. That is why we welcome your efforts and hope for the future. We are anxious and apprehensive because this is nothing new to us.

We hope there is light at the doorway. In terms of our future position with the Palestinian issue, obviously the Rabat decision is binding until the Arabs feel otherwise at the highest levels. If they do and when they do, it will perhaps be possible to do something -- certainly not on the lines President Sadat has accepted.

Kissinger: What do you mean?

Hussein: Not a limited move. This is a Palestinian question. There must be clear end result. It will be the recovery of all the territory we lost in 1967.

Egypt was such a major party in the whole process. She should be in touch with many of those affected. No one is upset at the United States; but there is some disturbance at them. If we can understand them more clearly . . . . But short of that, to accept almost a state of non-belligerency while most of their territory is still occupied, is too much. On top of this, Israel is likely to receive more arms. What possibility is there?

Over and above our difficulties -- we are utterly surprised, shocked and dismayed by what has happened.

Sisco: You are talking about the Hawks now?

Hussein: Yes. It appears there is a double standard. Turkey did not initiate the problems in Cyprus. But Israel has been occupying Arab territory, contrary to Resolutions 242 and 338. Why is it Turkey should not receive arms and Israel should receive all the most sophisticated type? Perhaps you know.

Jordan has never been able to afford an air defense system. Israeli aircraft fly here all the time; our people and soldiers see them. We can't have half of an air defense system or one-fourth. Finally, after many years, the Saudis agreed to finance it. Then this happens. It does frankly affect the reliability and credibility of the United States. Many in the area are saying this.



I have been writing letters to all the Senators and many Congressmen, putting forth the facts. I don't know if they will help or otherwise. I don't know what will help -- to get the 14 batteries, an improved delivery schedule.

Eventually, after fighting the polarization in this area, our friends do this. It is indeed very, very humiliating to us in this area. So we are waiting, hoping. It shows how very powerful Israel is in the United States. We sympathize with you and feel very, very sorry for our own situation.

There are other questions regarding arms and equipments that are put over. There is a feeling things may have changed in Washington. It seems things have been made more expensive so we can't afford them. [He looks to Ben Shaker.]

If Israel can get such vast amounts and Jordan is denied Hawks, the balance is tipped.

Kissinger: Before we turn to specifics, could I be permitted to make a few observations on your remarks?

Hussein: Yes.

Kissinger: Because, especially to an old friend and admirer; it is more painful because it is so sincere.

I was a historian before I came into government. As a historian I have seen that usually before a collapse a country looks most flourishing. Israel may be at this now. You underestimate the success of our policy because Your Majesty has been the victim -- unjustifiably -- of tendencies in America, but we now have the possibility of moving things, as we never done before.

Rogers came here. I believe now that if he succeeded in 1971, there would have been no war in 1973 -- and there could never have been progress in this area. So Israel made the greatest mistake in rejecting the 1971 interim agreement. It would have split the area.

So I don't think events in Egypt this week have the result of stopping progress. If we wanted to stop progress, we would have gone to Geneva. It would have led to a total stalemate, and Congressional pressure would have led to aid for Israel anyway. A polarization of the area, which Your Majesty has fought all your life, would have inevitably happened.



Our Ambassador here can tell you that when he came back to Washington after the March negotiations, my preference was to go for broke. But as we analyzed it, and if you analyze it, we concluded more soberly that we had to have some success somewhere. The President and I took on the Israeli lobby and won, and they withdrew reluctantly. The Armistice agreements have more high-sounding phrases than this agreement.

The fact is that in our Administration there is more determination to move forward because we can't be tormented like this. When I go around the country on speaking tours, public opinion is more evenhanded, to put it mildly. It will show up in the Congress, especially after the election. The American presence will lead to much more scrutiny.

So the amount of money they get has to be seen in context. The real issue is the delivery schedule, as Your Majesty knows. Our real hold is on delivery schedule; and delivery can't be before the next major phase.

A problem will come if the Arabs polarize the area. In America, people will now start to try to undermine our authority. If on top of it, the Arabs turn against the United States, people will say to hell with it. I know Your Majesty won't.

I am convinced in the next two to three years we will be able to break the back of it. I have never said this before.

On Syria, I don't know where the idea came from that we want only movement in the south. We favor movement along the whole line. The problem is the settlements there; if I said it was easy, you wouldn't believe me. It will be hellishly difficult.

We have actually moved to the point for the first time where we can see how all the pieces fit together. I convinced myself in Israel that if we didn't do this, we would be in exactly the situation you describe.

On the matter of the Hawks, it is a national disgrace. I can say nothing about it. It should never have happened; it could not have happened to a less deserving country and ruler.

With friends, one should bear in patience with the illness until the patient recovers.



Take the case of Turkey. It is inexplicable. I think we will win this battle too next month. All of these victories will help us.

The easiest thing for us is to give up. But compared to 1973, I think objective conditions are being prepared for a breakthrough. It is not completely apparent. This is how you should look at it. The Israeli lobby is weakening in America; not strengthening. When there is an elected President and a new Congress, it will be very different. This is what I wanted to say to Your Majesty, though what you say is right.

Ben Shaker: There are three examples: One is we have agreed on buying two C-130's from the U.S. Air Force. We were shocked when we received a letter giving a \$10 million price -- that was far above anything we were expecting. Ambassador Pickering and the military officers agree it is exorbitant. They are second-hand, from the U.S. inventory, not new.

Hussein: And 707 freighters of the latest type.

Ben Shaker: And secondly, when we had a military conference in Washington in April, there was agreement on artillery and other equipment. Some part would come from U.S. units and sent to us. When we got back here, we got a message that they needed \$4.2 million to rehabilitate this equipment -- which had not been mentioned before.

The third example is: We agreed in our conference on 320 TOW missiles. And 178 TOW launchers, at a price of \$9.6 million. Now, on 7 August we received a letter saying the price is not right. Now, it is \$11.8 million.

Kissinger: They must think you are an oil producing country!

Your Majesty, every time I come here I find out about bureaucratic idiocies. I have no idea at what level this is decided.

[To Sisco] Joe, we must set up some machinery to handle this. [To Hussein] I knew about the 4.2 because somebody put it in my briefing paper. But I hear about these things when I visit countries.

I have no precise answer here. But I will speak to the President. Within two weeks we will set up machinery to get hold of the foreign policy consequences. Maybe it is inevitable that the price goes up. But if it is inevitable, I want to be the one to decide, not some clerk.





On the Hawks, if we had asked for six and next year eight, there would have been no problem. But some idiot put 14, just at the moment when the Greek lobby was against it and Israel was under massive pressure.

It was avoidable, frankly.

Rifai: We could go directly to the companies.

Kissinger: We need some facesaving formula to get Congress off the hook. I will look at this. The trouble is it is being handled by paperpushers. It is handled by majors who want to show their vigilance in protecting the Pentagon budget. You say it shows a change in policy; it shows idiocy.

Ben Shaker: We know this at this level. But it is hard to explain to our people.

Kissinger: I know. The problem is the bright boys who think Jordan is like Kenya. It has got nothing to do with ill will. If it were ill will, we could fix it.

Joe, could you get me a proposal by Monday?

Sisco: I certainly will.

Kissinger: Get Clements over; it is in their interest too.

Ben Shaker: I have the file here. [He hands a file to Atherton.]

Kissinger: I am always told something is under study. But there is always a six-hour period when it will be settled. So why couldn't it be now instead of two months from now? There are always studies.

Rifai: A reassessment!

Kissinger: The reassessment was very successful.

Hussein: The Israelis will get their equipment.

Kissinger: Your Majesty, on Israeli equipment, the fact is, first, that whatever they get, the figure will be less than what is expected. People are



talking about \$2.5 to 3.2 billion. It will be less than 2.5, I can tell you. Part of it is to reimburse for the oil.

You can count on our people to raise the price for Israel too. So it works for you. [Laughter]

Much of the equipment cannot be delivered for three to four years. Before three and four years, we are determined that we cannot go through another Presidential term with our foreign policy manipulated by a foreign country. More and more things are in our hands. So it depends on when we are prepared to pay the domestic price. We will have more and more of the leverage. We are not ready now domestically and I won't pretend to you.

I assume this is limited to our company here.

Hussein: Is there any chance of getting some of the Vietnamese equipment?

Kissinger: I have been raising hell on the way here on the Vietnamese thing. One problem is our military want to get back anything that is of any use into our inventory. [He reads over Bob Oakley's memo.]

It is a great example. What are you interested in? C-130's?

Hussein: C-130's, helicopters.

Ben Shaker: F-5's.

Kissinger: Where does that list stand now, Bob?

Oakley: There are two lots. Most of it -- two-thirds -- was physically carried on the inventory of DOD and they say it belongs to their units and can't be released.

Kissinger: Can we stop it? Has it all been allocated?

Oakley: No.

Hussein: Are the Vietnamese selling it?



Kissinger: I would recommend you not do that. If you get it from them, we won't be able to sell you any. I will give you an answer next week.

Oakley: It has to be looked at in the framework of the whole problem of the Pentagon.

Kissinger: I know. But my problems with the Pentagon won't be made any easier by my not insisting on what I believe has to be done. It only relates to UN-1 helicopters and F-5's. I will have to see about the C-130's.

I recommend we not do this until we move the Hawk thing.

I will let you know by the end of next week what we can make available to you -- if anything. But it is in the F-5E category, and helicopters. And they can't be released until October.

Rifai: The question of budgetary support for this year.

[Kissinger and Pickering confer.]

Congress hasn't approved it yet, and there is no continuing resolution either.

Kissinger: What is the problem on that?

Pickering: Budget support.

Sisco: We will have to wait for that Middle East thing.

Rifai: There is no continuing resolution. The quarterly payment we usually get, we have not received.


Kissinger: The trouble is we haven't put the Middle East package in, to put pressure on Israel.

Rifai: But we have not received the quarterly payment.

Kissinger: What is holding that up?

Pickering: We can't do it before the package is before the Congress.

Kissinger: Who has the authority to release it?



Pickering: You do, once the package is before the Congress.

Kissinger: All right, it will be done by the end of the month. As soon as the protocols are signed.

Can we now promise them what we will release?

Atherton: Yes.

Kissinger: By October 1 we will submit a package, once the protocols are signed. No later than October 15 we will release the first payment.

Is this certain?

Atherton: I think so. I will check with Parker.

Kissinger: The agreement should be signed by the 20th. Within a week, we will submit the package. Within two weeks after that, we will release the payment.

Rifai: Thank you. The second question is wheat. We just don't hear.

Kissinger: I will confirm it by Monday.

If it is the allocation, which I will check, I will confirm it by Monday.

Your Majesty, my assessment is you are emerging in a very critical position, at just the right time.

Hassan: We have had our ups and downs. [Laughter]

Kissinger: You have, but I believe by next year, the necessity of reengaging Jordan will become obvious, which from our point of view will be the best time also.

As far as Jordan is concerned, if we now hold steady on the PLO and don't give them too much encouragement, you will reemerge as the negotiator and we will be in the best position.

Hussein: But they have settlements right on the river.



Kissinger: Without heavy American involvement, no solution is possible.

Rifai: That has always been the case.

Kissinger: But we are in a better position than ever. Don't you think, Joe?

Sisco: I am hopeful.

Rifai: Is there any sense of the Israelis being willing to negotiate with the Palestinians on the West Bank?

Kissinger: They have not given us any indication.

Sisco: Maybe because we were concentrating on this negotiation, we didn't hear.

Rifai: We hear that because the Rabat decision has not been reversed, they are seriously considering establishing a Palestinian entity on the West Bank.

Kissinger: Is that against your interests?

Rifai: No necessarily.

Kissinger: Peres is coming to the United States, and we can talk about it.

Rifai: Frankly, we can make it succeed or make it fail.

Kissinger: Have they gotten in touch with you?


Rifai: Not yet.

Kissinger: Should I encourage them?

Rifai: Not yet, until we hear they are going to do it. We don't want to encourage it.

Hassan: The demographic facts of the Palestinians are having an effect.

Kissinger: President Asad has been very serious. It is important now that he not give vent to his frustrations now.



Rifai: With a new agreement between Jordan and Syria, the sides are obligated to consult before any move is taken. Asad is obligated to consult with His Majesty. We will urge him to be moderate and restrained. You should concentrate on Syria.

Kissinger: I will tell him what I told you. Maybe with less precision.

Hussein: He will be moderate.

Kissinger: We did do what we said we would do, Your Majesty. It took a little longer, but we did do it.

Rifai: I don't think you should take what Arab criticism there is of what Egypt accepted as directed against you or against the principle of the agreement. We accept the need for it; this is different from what Egypt has accepted. It is a totally separate issue. It is an inter-Arab quarrel, a family quarrel, of what Egypt should have accepted. We accept the principle of the agreement.

Kissinger: The more the Arabs make their divisions obvious, the weaker their position will be. Maybe Sadat made a cold-blooded decision that he wouldn't get anything else.


Rifai: Only Iraq and Libya will be saying things. What I told you will not be on the radio. We will not be driving a wedge between the Arabs. If there is a quick move.

Kissinger: Quick! We will start it in the timeframe I have indicated. Quickness is not their strength. Your Majesty has negotiated with them, so you know. But there is one difference. Your Majesty was doing it alone; now there will be American pressure.

It will be an historic meeting in Damascus. I have one and a half hours; it never has been less than six.

Hussein: How was Saudi Arabia?

Kissinger: I had a good talk with Fahd. The talk with His Majesty was briefer. [Laughter] We didn't get into his favorite subject -- falconry. [Laughter] His half brothers were sitting all along the wall. I can't say we had their undivided attention. [Laughter]



Have you heard from Sadat?

Rifai: No.

Kissinger: You are uneasy if you hear the same from both sides!

Rifai: Ashraf Marwan says he wouldn't suggest a date and asked you to.

Kissinger: Nonsense.

Rifai: You have to organize the home inside.

Kissinger: What?

Rifai: We saw your press conference with President Sadat. You looked amused when President Sadat talked about the mandate. He said he would do it for another year so President Ford could organize "the home inside."  
[Laughter]

You see, Israel isn't the only madhouse in the area. [Laughter]

[The meeting ended and the King accompanied the Secretary's party in the walk up the hill to the Guest Palace.]

