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**The documents in this
folder continue from the
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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

WASHINGTON

PARTICIPANTS:

Israel

Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister
Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister
for Foreign Affairs
Shimon Peres, Minister of Defense
Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador to the U.S.
Prof. Barak, Attorney General
Lt. General Mordechai Gur, Chief of Staff
Amos Eran, Director General, Prime
Minister's Office
Avraham Kidron, Director General, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs

United States

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs
Malcolm Toon, Ambassador to Israel
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs
Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PMR*

DATE & TIME: Saturday - August 30, 1975
9:00 p.m. - 12:27 a.m.

PLACE: Prime Minister's Office
Jerusalem

[Photographers were admitted in two waves, and then dismissed.]

Rabin: We have one problem with the schedule.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, SEC. 6.5

State Dept Review

5-9/9/03


NSC MEMO, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

JHR

, REPA, DATE 11/03/03

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5(b)(3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. To Det.



Kissinger: Yes.

Rabin: I understand from Yigal that you have to go back to Egypt.

Kissinger: I can do it in one trip.

Rabin: When do you go?

Kissinger: At 9:30. Or whenever you're ready.

Rabin: We have one problem. We have a Cabinet meeting tomorrow. We can't give them anything completed.

Kissinger: I don't tell you how to run your business, but could you postpone the Cabinet meeting until Monday?

Peres: It will take eight hours. If we start at 8:00, it will not be finished until 4 or 5:00.

Kissinger: I could settle it with Sadat tomorrow. Whether he wants to initial Monday or Tuesday, I don't know. It pushes us less if you have your Cabinet Monday.

Rabin: Do you think you might have to have another meeting tomorrow morning?

Kissinger: If we don't see Sadat before 3:00, he's out of action until 6:30, because he naps in the afternoon. If you and we come to a clear understanding -- you'll see what the issues are very quickly -- we can go in the early afternoon.

Sisco: Sure.


Kissinger: If we sent him a cable saying it's important to meet earlier...

Allon: This reception -- when is it?

Kissinger: I'm delighted to do it Monday morning, but is it realistic?

I'd like to go to Amman.

Allon: And go to Amman and Riyadh?



Kissinger: I can't go to Riyadh.

Allon: It would be interpreted wrongly if you couldn't come.

Kissinger: If I was clearly in Alexandria... I can't gear it to the party.

Rabin: Let's see what are the issues.

Kissinger: One thing, for example, they want is a map. We haven't shown them the Giddi pimple.

And you just have to believe me now, they are at the verge of... they are at the limit, in my judgment. The tone is getting less pleasant. Sadat is always very polite but he is getting more aloof and cooler. Fahmy is getting more and more irritable. And we have now two foreign Ministers, both of whom claim it is the biggest political defeat in their lives; I think he with greater justification.

Allon: I've had bigger!

Kissinger: Let me give you one example: Fahmy says, "What is really happening is that the Israelis are selling our land to the Americans for money so that the Israelis can buy weapons with which to keep all the rest of our land." [Laughter] I thought you'd appreciate it!

Sisco: Top that one!


Kissinger: And Fahmy says this is like a peace treaty. He says, "What can I give in another agreement?"

Rabin: I can show him what he can give!

Kissinger: That I don't doubt. I told him that's a problem he'll never face with the Israelis.

It was not an ideal atmosphere. It's the first time we've been there that it's been all business.

Let me go through what were the areas of problems. In the basic agreement, contrary to what I expected, they did not give up on the Article 51 -- on Article IX. And if that were in or something like it were in, I think we would have Fahmy off our back. I did not try any variations or formulations with him, because I was afraid that if I agreed with him on a



formulation that I would try out here and that were also refused here, we would be worse off than saying you just refused to put it in no matter what I'd say. Nor did I say I'd support it. But if it is possible to formulate something about self-defense that doesn't refer to Article 51, which is your major problem... Fahmy says he needs it to be able to prove it isn't just a peace treaty. The operational significance is not what he is after, because when countries go to war, they go to war.

So this is the one point in the Agreement that they raised. When I refused it, it led to endless discussions, which I don't want to repeat here, where Fahmy wanted to pull back some earlier concessions and said that if there is no Article 51, then other things have to come out of the Agreement. And I told him this was a senseless way to proceed and we couldn't renegotiate that. So here we are with respect to that.

With respect to the Proposal, there are a few minor changes which I would like to give you. [See Tab A]

Rabin: Proposal means Early Warning ?

Kissinger: The Early Warning I think they will accept. We talked as if they would accept and then we actually never showed it to them. In the first paragraph, not just "as part of that Agreement" but "as an integral part of that Agreement." I think that in fact strengthens it. Our legal adviser said that by tying it closely, then it makes all the other parts of the Agreement. But I haven't actually tried that on them, but I think they will accept it. They certainly talked as if they would accept it.

No change until paragraph 2c. They want to add the word "total" before "personnel" -- the "total number of personnel."

In paragraph 6, "The US personnel shall be accorded the same privileges and immunities as are provided for UNEF personnel, supplemented, if necessary by a subsequent exchange of letters." It is a purely technical point. So if we want additional immunities, we have to have an exchange with each side.

Rabin: May I ask the legal advisers, does it put politically any change in their personal status or does it relate them in any way to the role of the UNEF ?

Barak: It is only a question of immunities ?



Sisco: Just immunities. It has no political meaning.

Kissinger: It doesn't have anything to do with their status.

Sisco: The answer to your question is, no.

Kissinger: It gives them the same immunities as UNEF personnel, rather than the same immunities as diplomatic personnel.

Then the only other change they suggest is in paragraph 8; they don't want to say that "the continuation of their role is no longer in the national interest of the US," because they say that makes it look that they are there for the US and not for the parties. They would like it to read, "or that continuation of their role is on longer necessary," or "essential" or something like that. And we think that's an improvement from everybody's point of view -- except ours. "...is no longer essential.."

Peres: We would like to check.

Kissinger: It relates to the function rather than to the national interest of the United States.

Peres: After "necessary" will be a full stop, or what?

Kissinger: Full stop. They don't want to speak of the national interest.

Then we had a long fight about the last sentence [of paragraph 8] because they didn't want it, but they have now accepted it. But that was a bitter struggle.

Now, we come to the Annex [Tab B], and you will be glad to know, General Gur, that our Ambassador says that he has never seen Gamasy so excited.

We have retyped the annex as they want it. We worked from your draft. But let me go through it and explain what they have in mind.

[Military advisers joined the meeting -- General Poran, Colonel Katz, and also Meir Rosenne.]

Rabin: You were quoted as saying there would be no more than 40.

Kissinger: We've got a number of hysterics on the plane. They get fed from all sides. The number 40 has never been mentioned. It couldn't be 40. It



couldn't be as low as 40. The number we will use in Washington in briefing is the number 100, and that's the only number we will ever use. It is suicidal for us to use a number like 40 and then they find 80. My judgment is that it will be between 80 and 100 at all times, 70 to 80. It will never be as low as 40.

Let me go through the changes. I have a typed-up copy of what the Egyptians want and I will give it to you. The trouble is it won't show you what changes were made, so let me read through.

Many of them are minor: "Within five days of the signature representatives of the two Parties..."

Rabin: Instead of "two governments," "two Parties."

Kissinger: Which is what we use in the agreement. And then "in the Military Working Group" rather than "in the Working Group."

Sisco: That's what the official name of the group is.

Peres: Did you try on them "technical working group?"

Sisco: That would have to be changed by a decision of the Geneva Conference.

Kissinger: The technical name is "Military Working Group."

Sisco: Based on a decision of the Geneva Conference.

Kissinger: I didn't know the Geneva Conference took a decision.


Sisco: By consensus it passed a resolution. They established these working groups.

Kissinger: Let me continue. "The Working Groups will..." They want to say "within two weeks" rather than "within three weeks." Let me give all the changes.

In the definition of lines and areas, in order to avoid a debate on what to call this. "Egyptian territory with civil administration and UN presence," they would rather say "the area south from line E and west from Line M" as we are saying in the Agreement. That's paragraph 1.

Dinitz: In addition?

Sisco: Substitute for it. Instead of "Egyptian territory with civil administration and UN presence" -- that's all out -- "south from Line E and west from Line M" is what is the substitute.



Peres: Why was Gamasy so outraged by the annex?

Kissinger: This was his first crack. He wasn't so outraged. There were only two things that caused real trouble -- the other things we'll settle -- the navigation in the Gulf of Suez, the flying in the Gulf of Suez and flying up to the Buffer zone. Those are the things that caused emotional trouble. For the rest, it is my judgment that almost everything can be settled. But here I think we have a misunderstanding.

Let's go through it: Access to the buffer zone.

Rabin: I understand what they want is, in Article 1: "The deployment lines, areas of limited forces and armaments, buffer zone" or "zones?"

Kissinger: "Zones," because we have several now.

Rabin: Instead of "Egyptian territory with civil administration under the UN," "south of Line E and west of Line M?"

[Both sides confer.]

Kissinger: I understand that he did question that word "zones" and then it was decided to leave it aside. He said the "area south from Line E and west from Line M." We'd have to redefine Line M and put in another line between Line M.

Rabin: Have they accepted the concept of a different type of a zone there?


Kissinger: Definitely, that is accepted. The fact that the buffer zone is a different zone from the coastal one. That is accepted.

Dinitz: Within the coastal zone there are two types of zones.

Kissinger: That's right.

Gur: I'm trying to understand why they objected.

Kissinger: They object to the idea that Israel can say "Egyptian territory under some kind of name giving it a different administration," and they don't want it to be given the status of Gaza. That's why they object to it. But they do not object to it being given a different status from the buffer zone.



Can I go back now? There are many changes. "Access to the buffer zone would be controlled by UNEF. Provision will be made for Egyptian civilians to cross through." Where it says "civilians," they want to put in "Egyptian," to "cross through or remain in the buffer zone according to procedures." Where they said, "detailed in the proposal," they want to say "worked out between Egyptian authorities and UNEF." I told them I would present this, but that I could tell them now it would not be accepted and I could not give any chance.

Peres: Why, do they feel that the Israelis can come in the buffer zone without any invitation? I don't get their point. According to that Israel can come into the buffer zone without any invitation.

Rabin: No, it's the opposite. There are two kinds of buffer zones. Israeli personnel will go to the Early Warning Station.

Kissinger: Yes, but that is taken care of by paragraph (d) -- (c) and (d).


Now, they gave us two other variations on (a), which will be less acceptable to you. "Access to the buffer zone will be controlled by UNEF and normal life shall be resumed at the buffer zone according to procedures worked out.." Again they wanted to say "between Egyptian authorities and UNEF," and I told them that wouldn't be accepted. Another way they want -- this is all Gamasy -- is: "civilians who now reside in the buffer zone will be permitted to remain in their homes," or "return to the areas of their former homes."

Rabin: They can fill the area with so-called civilians.

Peres: We have studied this problem. You want to go into it now?

Kissinger: No. The easiest way to solve it would be to just put in "Egyptian civilians" and keep "as detailed in the protocol." "Provision will be made for Egyptian civilians to cross through and remain in the buffer zone according to procedures to be detailed in the protocol." You already had for civilians.

Paragraph (b): After a bloody fight they accepted finally, "reconnaissance aircraft may fly up to the middle line of the buffer zone on an agreed schedule." If you could fly twice a week or five times a week or whatever. It created enormous unhappiness because of their theory that this is Egyptian territory.



Paragraph (c) they accepted.

Paragraph (d) they accepted.

In the "Area of Egyptian Territory Defined in Article IV," they just want to say, "defined in Article IV(a)6 of the Basic Agreement."

Peres: To which are you referring? I'm sorry.

Kissinger: The heading of 3, which in your version is "area of Egyptian territory." They want to say "Area of Egyptian Territory defined in Article IV(a)6 of the Basic Agreement." It just defines where it is.

Dinitz: That reads "Area South of Line E and West of Line M."

Peres: They want just "Egyptian territory" -- they skip out "civil administration."

Kissinger: In paragraph (a), where it says "In this area, the UN Emergency Force will assure that there are no military or paramilitary forces of any kind," they want to take out "irregular," because Gamasy says he doesn't know what that will refer to.

Rabin: What about military fortifications?

Kissinger: That's all right. Irregular.

Peres: The reference is to terrorists.

Gur: Which are not Egyptian.

Rabin: Does the "para-military" cover irregulars? Legal advisers?

Barak: Let's check it.

Kissinger: I don't have the impression that they have any intention of establishing terrorist organizations there. They have never done that. I don't think "irregular" refers to anything.

Rabin: We have to be sure.

Kissinger: He just says he doesn't know what an irregular force is and that could be used to cover anything.



When it says "unarmed Egyptian civilians," Gamasy says -- he made two points here -- one is that this is needlessly wounding to their pride to put this in this way. He accepts the word "Egyptian civilians" but it looks like an unnecessary restriction. And secondly, he said it shouldn't happen what's happened to General Tlas in the Disengagement Zone, that a senior Egyptian officer couldn't visit there. He says, "what happens if I want to visit? Will the UNEF keep me out?" And he says he knows that Sadat wants to visit there. And Sadat told me that. Does it mean that Sadat can't show up there in uniform if that's what he wants to do? This is the point.

Peres: Sadat is obviously a civilian and so, I think, is Gamasy, Minister of Defense.

Kissinger: I don't know whether we can say, "Senior Egyptian officials" or something like that. Gamasy objected on the question of pride.

Gur: Access should be coordinated with UNEF. That can be worked out.

Kissinger: "Civilian police" [in 3(b)] he accepted after a bloody struggle. If you want to know what caused emotions there!

Peres: Why?

Kissinger: Because in their system, areas like this are covered by the Frontier Guard. In the Sudan, for instance. I am giving you his reason. Areas that have no dense populations. The Sudan and Western Desert, which in his mind are analogous to this, are covered by the Frontier Guards. He finally accepted it but he was extraordinarily unhappy with it.

So, to go through, he accepts (b), if you could take out "unarmed" civilians. He has no objection to the word "civilian."

Paragraph (c), he accepted. Paragraph (d), he rejected, the one with "Israeli vessels shall have the right to navigate as presently in the international channel."

Peres: What is his concept about the Gulf of Suez?

Kissinger: And this is one, since I knew it would cause trouble, that I also tried on Sadat. In fact, it was Sadat who finally agreed on the buffer zone thing. And on this [(d)] they were very obdurate. Gamasy said he would



have no objections to UN ships patrolling in there, if you are worried about an Egyptian crossing. He did accept that.

Peres: Israeli vessels with UN presence. The UN doesn't have any vessels.

Kissinger: I can only report their views.

(e), they want to rewrite somewhat. "Access to the airspace and the coastal area shall be limited to unarmed Egyptian civilian vessels." -- that's all right -- "and unarmed light civilian helicopters and transport planes." They say "unarmed civilian helicopters." They said they don't have "light" civilian helicopters. "Access to the airspace and the coastal area shall be limited to unarmed Egyptian civilian vessels and unarmed civilian helicopters and transport planes involved in the civilian activities of the area as agreed by the Working Group." That is the text they would. In other words, they don't want to confine it just to the oil fields.


Sisco: They feel that the "civilian activities" were broader than merely the oil fields, and they thought it was too confining. That's the point they made.

Rabin: 4(f), they are happy with?

Kissinger: 4(f) they accepted, and 4(g) they accept. Which, incidentally, would for the first time make this an agreed item. It was previously a tacit agreement in the American proposal and was not in any document in the Disengagement Agreement.

Now, we go to the limitation of forces. If you want to know what causes generals to weep, this was one. Basically Gamasy takes the position on this that he will not agree to it, but that if Sadat wants to agree to it, that's Sadat's problem. But he talks like a man who thinks that Sadat is going to agree to it, to the numbers, so I have to give it to you with that proviso.

"Eight standard infantry battalions. 75 tanks." When we come to 36 artillery pieces, he wants to use exactly the phraseology of the Disengagement Agreement, which is "36 artillery pieces, which shall be positioned so that they cannot reach the line of the other side." And wants to strike the phrase "including heavy mortars." He wants to use exactly the wording of the Disengagement Agreement.



Gur: That was our greatest problem. They brought in at one time 96 heavy mortars which changed the situation. We didn't think about it until we had that big figure of 96 additional mortars.

Rabin: Let's first hear the rest.

Kissinger: "The total number of personnel" -- he wants to say 15,000, but that's something that has to be settled by Sadat. I would not have a big debate among yourselves on that issue.

Peres: 15,000 instead of 8,000?

Kissinger: I am just giving you what he wants.

(V): "Both Parties agree not to station or locate in the area weapons which can reach the line of the other side." It's the way he would like to express (V). I frankly have difficulty in understanding what the point of this provision is.

Peres: That's missiles. We said we won't station missiles that can reach the thinning-out area of their side.

Kissinger: He is willing to accept. I don't know whether there is a gimmick in the phraseology. But the way he phrases it is: "Both Parties agree not to station or locate in the area weapons which can reach the line of the other side."

Peres: I think what he wants here again is to stick to the language of the previous agreement, basically. And then the word "line" is not clear in this case.

Kissinger: We can define more precisely what the line of the other side is. They took very strong exception to statements by your Chief of Staff that you have guns which can reach the city of Suez.

Rabin: Then it would be contradictory to the Agreement.

Kissinger: I hadn't heard that statement.

Paragraph (VI), about fortifications, they took strong exception to. I don't know whether that is their absolutely final word on the subject. They also said it is nonsense, because who knows how many fortifications are needed for 8,000 men.



Peres: But not for five divisions!

Kissinger: I will tell you I had intellectual trouble with "major limitations in the zone of limited armament." The way you wrote it was that "neither side will station within 30 kilometers of its main defense line any weapon that can reach the front line of the other side." On the other hand, that means, of course, that you can station the Lance and reach their front line. Isn't that right? Otherwise it includes nothing, because no other weapon you have can reach their front line. I am just trying to understand what is meant. What I understood somebody to say here -- Peres I think -- that you are willing to station your forces in such a way that no weapons can reach their front line.

Peres: Yes.

Kissinger: If that's correct, they are willing to accept this. In other words, that both sides agree not to station weapons behind their main line -- Luna or anything else -- that can reach the front line of the other. What they are not willing to do is to have a distinction in which, because of the greater width of that limited forces zone...

Allon: They don't want it in distances.


Kissinger: If you say "30 kilometers behind their zone," since their limited zone is 20 kilometers and yours is 5, they want to say that the other side will not station anything behind their main defense line that can reach the front line of the other. Very simple.

Allon: Because the thinning zone is not the same.

Rabin: There are two problems. There is the problem within the limited armament areas. Second, in addition to that, we are talking now about the area beyond it.

Kissinger: That's right, and they interpret, perhaps incorrectly, this provision to mean that you want to bar all of their weapons from reaching your front line, like the Luna, -- and in fact I think they are right -- while you want to be free to station your weapons in such a way that you can reach their front line. They are willing to accept a definition.

Peres: No matter what the language is, we accept symmetry and mutuality and we don't want to bluff.



Kissinger: They are willing to have it written in any way that behind the main line neither side can reach. There are two prohibitions: one, the limitation within the limited zone, and that I have explained, that nothing can be stationed that can reach the front line. In addition, they are willing to accept that behind the main line...

Rabin: The same principle.

Kissinger: ...neither side will station something that can reach the front line of the other.

Rabin: I understand.

Peres: We shall change the wording on that.

Kissinger: What created the confusion here is the 30-kilometer zone, which created the impression that you could station behind those 30 kilometers something which could reach their front line.

Gur: And they cannot, because of the difference of the width of the area.

Kissinger: They felt they were being penalized there with the long-range weapons.

Gur: I understand.


Rabin: And when it comes to (II) [5(b)(II)]?

Kissinger: When it comes to (II)--you know, I went through this with Gamasy in Aswan [in January 1974] --on SAM's he is maniacal. He wants no restrictions on SAM's. He says if you must have restrictions he is willing to accept four to six kilometers. I personally believe that Sadat will overrule him and accept the 10-kilometers, based on my conversation with Sadat.

I am giving you all his changes. Then let me go through and give you those that I think have high priority.

Paragraph (c) is no problem. But (d) they want to delete because they say they won't agree to any other limitations.

Rabin: "The UN force will conduct inspection..."



Kissinger: Any other limitations that may be agreed to by the working group.

On the Process of Implementation, it is all right, until the next to last sentence, where it says, "The early transfer of Abu Rodeis oil fields to the Egyptians." They want the "first phase will be the transfer of Abu Rodeis oil fields to Egypt within 15 days..." When I told them that you have to find housing for 500 civilians, they said, if 10,000 people came from the Soviet Union tomorrow, they are certain that you'd find housing for them.

Peres: He is right, because immigrants have a priority.

Gur: So the atmosphere was good, with jokes and so on. [Laughter]

Kissinger: The "Implementation shall be completed within five months..."

Now, let me go through in terms of importance, those to which I think importance is attached.

Peres: By the way, we had six months.

Kissinger: Let me just go through. In "Access to the Buffer Zone" in paragraph 2(a), I think we can find a solution to it.

Rabin: You are repeating?

Sisco: And giving you an indication of which are the more important.


Kissinger: In paragraph 3(a), I don't think this is ~~a~~ arriere pensee there. If you can define what you have in mind by irregular forces in some sentence, we can work something out, I am sure.

I have explained to you "unarmed" civilians, what the point there is.

On the navigation, that is a monumental issue.

Peres: Did you have a chance to talk to Sadat about that?

Kissinger: I took two issues from you, the navigation issue and the buffer zone issue. On the buffer zone issue, he overruled Gamasy. On the navigation issue, he did not. He wouldn't go further than having UN patrolling.



Peres: Excuse me, on the navigation, was the same applied to the flying?

Kissinger: Yes, although, of course, if you can fly down the median line of the Buffer Zone, you are going to cover a strip of that Gulf, aren't you?

[Food is served.]

On the specific limitations, Gamasy feels strongly on them but I have the sense that he will be overruled.

Peres: On the numbers, you mean?

Kissinger: Yes. Therefore, I think the major difference is that with respect to the artillery pieces, where he wants to return to the language of the Disengagement Agreement, and whether you are willing to write the paragraph (b), on not stationing forces behind the line, so that it is symmetric.

I have already told you that they feel strongly about that five-month period.

Rabin: That's all the points? Now, what is the timetable, according to them?

Kissinger: I told them we would try to initial it on Monday.

Rabin: No, I am talking about the process of implementation.


Kissinger: Their timetable is five months for the whole thing, 15 days for Abu Rodeis. That is obviously impossible.

Peres: And when do they begin to count? From the signature?

Kissinger: No, from the signing of the protocol.

Rabin: How will the UN Mandate be played?

Kissinger: I had such an unpleasant session with Fahmy today that I didn't want to raise that. He said that I never bring anything that he wants from Israel. I have everybody in the same frame of mind now. [Laughter] He keeps pointing to the document and says: "Show me one Egyptian line in the basic agreement."



Rabin: But they are less than what we wanted. He doesn't want the whole paper.

Kissinger: I think it is the most sweeping paper that's ever been signed between an Arab government and Israel.

Rabin: People will argue that the armistice is better.

Kissinger: Then it is the best since the Armistice, which is, after all, 30 years ago. One in a generation. Plus an American presence.

Rabin: The Chief of Staff of UNTSO then was an American. General Reilly.

Peres: So an American presence was there.

Did you talk with them about the numbers of the police?

Kissinger: No, I think we will leave that to the working group. I think it is a good issue for you and them to quarrel about.

Rabin: Do you have any idea?

Peres: By the way, the working group will be unarmed? [Laughter]

Rabin: Since it's not on Egyptian territory, they couldn't care less.

Kissinger: I think it is better not to start a debate about that. In the working group, they have a high incentive to complete it if they want to get the process started.


Peres: I will tell you: from all the points here, where they may have an arriere pensee, where they may have something on their minds, is this whole arrangement on the southern tip.

Kissinger: Why?

Peres: Because, the unwillingness to define it.

Kissinger: To define what?

Peres: The name of it. After all, the Syrians, who are not less proud than the Egyptians, agreed to "UN area with Syrian administration."



Rabin: Not UN: "area of separation of forces with civil administration."

Peres: Syrian civilian administration.

Rabin: Now the Syrians will come and complain, "Now you did it to us."

Peres: Did Gamasy see the map of the southern part, with the roads and so on?

Kissinger: He wasn't wild about that either, but that was finally accepted. I have to confirm that tomorrow. Fahmy told me, after I talked to Sadat, that Sadat told us the map was accepted. I did not ask specifically. Your map showed the two UN stations and I explained it to them and explained the reasoning for them.

Peres: The two UN stations in the Hamam Faroun?

Kissinger: By the way, is the UN still up on Mount Hermon?

Peres: Yes. In the winter they leave. But they really carry out their job in a good way. It's unpleasant to say it about the UN, but... [Laughter]

Kissinger: Did the Syrians keep to the agreement?

Peres: Very good.

Rabin: The Syrians keep -- the Chief of Staff will correct me -- but for most of the time less than they are entitled to in the two thinning-out areas.

Gur: Yes, which is not the case with the Egyptians.

Peres: When Gamasy raised doubts in my mind was when we showed you missile sites and he called it hospitals. That was a poor excuse.


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Rabin [to Rosenne:] What is the name of the Working Group?

Rosenne: "Egyptian-Israeli Military Working Group."

Rabin: I want to check the process of creating it. On the name, you're right.

Kissinger: If it was at Geneva, I wasn't there.



Sisco: The groups were set up to do the disengagement.

Kissinger: Gur presented the whole disengagement proposal there, so we had to abolish it. [Laughter]

I don't see what arriere pensee there is. They're willing to put "no military installations or fortifications."

Peres: They don't want to name the area.

Another thing that is wrong -- that since we give them back Abu Rodeis, we have to abandon our overflights in an area that we are flying over today and sailing there.

[Rosenne explains to Rabin the documents creating the Military Working Group. There is more eating. Dr. Kissinger explains to Toon and Atherton the Egyptian worry about the Israelis being within Lance-range of the Egyptian line.]


Peres: I want to make clear: We don't play tricks. Our intentions are exactly alike. Obviously when they want to go to a wider thinning zone, they can't have advantages more than the thinning zone allows. I mean, they are gaining territory and they cannot gain strategic advantages because we agree to such a move. That's the point. And then I feel, by the way, that they must be more interested than we are, because traditionally, all the time, there were Arab weapons against Israeli settlements. Today there are Israeli weapons against Egyptian settlements. So they should be careful in the wording. If they reach our positions, they will reach military positions. If we reach their positions, we are reaching towns and cities.

Kissinger: That's why they want your weapons outside the range. Basically, for whatever it's worth -- I wouldn't base your national policy on this -- both Gamasy and Fahmy talked as if this agreement deprives them of any significant military operation. They say this is now going to be for many years.

Peres: There is an explanation when you sell something and when you buy!

Kissinger: You have the wrong impression if you think they are trying to sell us today. This was not the most brilliant meeting we have had with them.

Rabin: What will we do now?



Kissinger: Up to you. We told the Egyptians that if you had any reactions, we would get in touch with them tonight, that is before we get through. This was on the assumption that we'd go there in the morning.

Peres: I want to try to sum up what you have said. I think on Article 51, you can overcome, because this is really a major element. You can overcome. Not to go into new definitions which I am afraid will demand from you another shuttle or two. It is such a tricky article.

Kissinger: I am wondering whether you can find a formulation that doesn't mention 51.

Peres: What is the problem? In their concept, self-defense means the liberation of so-called occupied territories. A definition which will include self-defense, which means they cannot use their right to use force to take back the territories, and I am afraid... We can find a definition, but then you will have to shuttle and shuttle.

Kissinger: I am not going to shuttle and shuttle. I am telling it to you today. What is going on is going on beyond the dignity of the United States. We are not running a grocery store. I'm not saying: "Try this and you'll get a bottle of buttermilk." [Laughter]

I mean it seriously, I am not going to do much more shuttling. Don't say you think I can find a solution, because today I couldn't. Maybe I can find one; maybe they will accept it if everything else is done, and if they are eager for it.


Peres: Because you told us, if we shall get rid of some article, you think you can get rid of 51.

Kissinger: That's what I thought, and I didn't today.

Rabin: The "Military Working Group" -- this is the decision taken in Geneva -- "The Military Working Groups will start discussing forthwith the question of the disengagement of forces. The working groups will report..."

Sisco: The reason that was then written in the plural, Mr. Prime Minister, is that it was so contemplated that when you got into the Syrian-Israeli, or Jordan-Israeli, there would be others.

Rosenne: The Syrians did not create a working group. They came to the Egyptian working group.



Rabin: Mr. Secretary, you are mainly interested now in the Annex, and we have to work it out.

Peres: We can do it in half an hour, I think. We will be back with our comments.

Kissinger: Before your Chief of Staff goes -- they would like him to head the working group for the Israeli side. They would like to send their Chief of Staff for the working group. It is up to you, but they say they want someone there who can take decisions. [Laughter]

Sisco: They said their man last time had to keep coming back.

Kissinger: It was him [Gur]!

Sisco: No, their man. He wants to send his Chief of Staff who will have a certain amount of latitude.

Kissinger: Gur took too many decisions! Anyway, that's their proposal.

Gur: If you think you have to convince me to go for two weeks to Geneva, you are wrong! The problem is, what level. The decisions will be made here anyhow.


[Minister Peres, General Gur, and the officers go out at 10:28 p.m. Secretary Kissinger and Prime Minister Rabin confer alone in the Prime Minister's inner office from 10:30 to 11:07 p.m. From 11:08 to 11:28 p.m., the Prime Minister conferred privately with Peres and Allon. Then Peres comes out and invites Secretary Kissinger to join: The Secretary conferred with the Israelis from 11:28 to 11:49 p.m.]

[The full meeting then resumed, at 11:50 p.m.]

Rabin: Well, 51 we have discussed. For us it is a crucial and vital issue.

Kissinger: I have told Sisco that as I understood what you were saying, you wouldn't make a concession on Article 51, or couldn't change your position on Article 51, and therefore so that Fahmy's feelings won't be hurt that Gamasy gets preferential treatment, you won't change your position on the Annex also. [Laughter]

Peres: This is the best we can offer in the way of...



Kissinger: Good.

Peres: On the American proposal, actually we don't have any remarks, and we accept.

Kissinger: Either "essential," or do you want "necessary?"

Peres: I think in this case "necessary" is better.

Kissinger: All right. Put in "necessary."

Peres: Now on the annex, I shall take your paper and say where we object or where we agree.

No remarks on the Military Working Group, although we feel it would be better to distinguish between the disengagement working group, but we don't feel...

Kissinger: But there is no other working group that can take place. That is the trouble. To invent something, we have to get the agreement of the Russians.

Peres: The problem of the five days or two or three weeks should be synchronized with Congressional approval, which I understand is understood between us. So I mean here it depends very much upon your appreciation of the time. But from our side we can certainly finish it in two weeks, and we are ready to start in five days, provided it won't be on Rosh Hashanah.

Rabin: If it will be signed on Thursday, five days means Monday.


Kissinger: Tuesday.

Rabin: If it is Tuesday, it is fine.

Allon: When will we sign then with the Americans?

Rabin: We cannot sign it before the Congress will approve.

Kissinger: In fact, I think you all have to sign it because we need your signature to submit it to Congress. We don't have your system of government.



Peres: Whenever a date is mentioned, this excludes holiday, either Egyptian or Israeli.

Now in the next part you have, in the definition of areas, inserted "road sections for common use." It is simply a typing error, I am just calling it to your attention.

On page 2, we have to add an "s" to "zone;" it should be "zones," since we have additional buffer zones.

Now here we come to a major problem, which is the understanding of the buffer zone or the separation of forces -- it doesn't matter -- that actually no civilians or military force will enter. We can take either. We would like to start this article by saying "entry to the buffer zone will be forbidden to all forces and civilians."

Rabin: Let's face it, there are two kinds of problems. One that the lines exist and no one can cross, from the military forces. Second, which is much more complicated, is that practically they will open it to their civilian life, which means we will find there a lot of civil activity. If that is a buffer zone, there should be no civilian activity.

Kissinger: What happens to the civilians who are there?

Rabin: We can find a solution to that. But they cannot start civilian activities there, because then it will not be a buffer zone.

Peres: We can discuss this now or leave it to Geneva. We have some proposals as to how to deal with it.


Rabin: Because what does it mean? It won't be a buffer zone.

Kissinger: You have "provisions will be made for civilians" remaining in the buffer zone according to procedures to be detailed in the protocol." That was your position.

Peres: Yes.

Kissinger: When they have asked for a change in their favor, we can't give them a worse formulation than the one they started with. We can't make them go back to anything they consider worse than they had yesterday.

Peres: We won't object to go back to it.



Kissinger: Will you tell us why we can't say "civilians will be..." since we are not talking about any other civilians?

Rabin: True, I don't believe their citizenship has been changed, but to give it open access, they will claim we have agreed that Egyptian civilians will fill the buffer zone.

Peres: This will stop it from being a buffer zone.

Kissinger: I don't know what the basic concept of a buffer zone is.

Sisco: In the Syrian disengagement, they want back in this zone where the people lived, etc.

Peres: That is a different matter, because they have villages there.

Sisco: They have towns in the north and a bunch of fishermen.

Kissinger: They say there are 3,000 civilians.

Peres: Yes, that is true. And with these civilians, we agree there will be special arrangements made. We don't deny it and don't suggest to throw them out. But if it will say "Egyptian civilians," there is an indication that Egypt can send in civilians.

Kissinger: But that is a separate problem, the working it out between them and the UNEF and the working out between you and them.

Sisco: If you stress this principle, namely that "provisions will be made for Egyptian civilians to cross through or remain" and that you will work out these details in the working group so that they will be in the protocol, I think that fully protects you and is very consistent with what you just said.

Peres: I will tell you the problem. The nature of the people there, Joe, is that they are Bedouins. They don't have an established place, so they can take theoretically 10,000 Bedouins and say "We want them to go to the buffer zone." If it would be just the civilians that live there, we wouldn't object, but then we have to agree who they are and where they are. But it's a wandering people. All of a sudden we can discover in the buffer zone a tribe of Bedouins encouraged by the Egyptians to come into the buffer zone and live there.



I want to tell you the Bedouins are very fine fellows and very nice people, but among other things they are rather busy in smuggling and spying, and all of a sudden we shall have a major problem in the buffer zone. So we know about the 3,000 who live in the northern part of the buffer zone alongside the coast, and we are happy to settle it. We don't have any bad intentions, but if we shall leave an open door to such an arrangement, we shall find thousands and thousands of Bedouins wandering into the buffer zone. In the buffer zone there is just the control of the UNEF. Then the Egyptians will come and say we'd like to have an administration there. And we are creating a problem unnecessarily. The whole of the buffer zone, the present one, is empty except for the northern part where you have 3,000 Bedouins. We know about it and we will be willing to find a solution how they will live, under whom and which administration.

Kissinger: The 3,000 Bedouins are now leveling Hill 716, right, Motta?

Gur: They will.

Rabin: The formula here makes it the civil administration of the Egyptians in the buffer zone: "Access to the buffer zone will be controlled by the UNEF and normal life shall be resumed in the buffer zone according to the procedures to be worked out between the Egyptian authorities and UNEF." What does that mean? That they are entitled according to this definition to start every civilian activity in this area. Then it is not a buffer zone.

Allon: And this is bound to be followed by Egyptian civil administration in the buffer zone, sooner or later.

Kissinger: Then what would happen?


Allon: It conflicts with what has been understood by the status of buffer zone until now, except for the northern section which needs a settlement.

Peres: I suggest we stick to the first wording you have suggested. It doesn't exclude the Egyptian civilians; it doesn't exclude anything.

Kissinger: In other words, the paragraph you had.

Peres: Yes.

Kissinger: The only reason they wanted to put in Egyptian civilians is to exclude Israeli civilians.



Peres: You can assure them...

Kissinger: They would settle for "Access to the buffer zone will be controlled by UNEF. Provision will be made for Egyptian civilians to cross through according to provisions to be worked out in the protocol." Then in the protocol you can define which Egyptian civilians can go and which can't.

Sisco: And what you will say is, if this is your position -- all right, there are 3,000 Bedouins. If they raise others you talk it over. It doesn't prejudice your position.

Allon: Can we say "present Egyptian civilians?" What is your formulation?

Kissinger: They want two changes in the first paragraph; that is their minimum position. They want either -- or rather both -- "Egyptian civilians" and "worked out between Egyptian authorities and UNEF." That last I understand you cannot accept.

Sisco: We are not pressing you to.

Kissinger: If you keep "detailed in the protocol," you can give them "Egyptian civilians," because you still have to define which Egyptian civilians can go in. Your definition doesn't exclude Egyptian civilians; it just includes Israeli civilians.

Peres: Because it was very much in reference to the warning stations.

Kissinger: That's a separate issue.

Sisco: Your warning station is taken care of clearly elsewhere. We have no interest in that not being the case.

Peres: No. I am saying where we wrote down "civilians." Otherwise, it wouldn't mention it at all. In our concept of buffer zone there is no room for access to civilians. But we did it, having in mind the warning stations. Otherwise we would start the sentence "Entry of civilians and forces to the buffer zone is prohibited."

Kissinger: You could have put that in anyhow.

Peres: But when we wrote that sentence we had in mind the early warning stations. That was the only reason. Otherwise we wouldn't have phrased it that way.



Allon: Could we say "in the north" where there are civilians? Nobody is going to push them out.

Sisco: You are taken care of in the warning stations.

[The Israelis confer among themselves.]

Peres: Joe, I am ready to try the following sentence:

Kissinger: I hope you realize Joe has no authority to conclude this agreement. [Laughter]

Peres: I have no authority either! "Access to the buffer zones will be controlled by the UNEF. Provision will be made for civilians to cross and for Egyptian civilians to remain in the buffer zone." I distinguish clearly about the Egyptian civilians who live there. We don't have any intentions about other civilians; this is basically in reference to the early warning stations. Could this work out? I'm just asking an unauthorized question. And I want to mention something else...

Rabin: We can't finish tonight.

Sisco: We are just too exhausted.

Kissinger: Why don't we meet tomorrow morning?

Peres: I want to mention another point. The problem is a little bit more complicated since we have an additional two buffer zones, across the road, which even complicate it a bit more. And we wouldn't like to have a wandering of tribes all over the place.


Kissinger: There are tribes down there?

Peres: Oh, yes. If we had five minutes. I would explain it.

Kissinger: What do they live on?

Peres: The people living today in the buffer zone are Bedouins who work in Israel. They buy in Egypt where it is cheap and sell in Israel where it is expensive. They work in Israel, are paid Israeli salaries and then go to Egypt to buy goods.

Kissinger: I need a guy like that to work on this negotiation. [Laughter]



Peres: There is one old Bedouin who speaks a beautiful Hebrew, beautiful English and is a born negotiator. He is quite an impressive guy; he has been on our television, and he even speaks Yiddish. [Laughter]

Kissinger: There is only one problem, when you reflect on this, on this formulation, namely the right of Israelis to go into the buffer zone, which they don't want to admit.

Rabin: We don't ask for it.

Peres: We can even do that. We can say "access to the buffer zone" without saying who "will be done through the UNEF." Then Egyptian citizens have the right to remain, because you have Americans, you have others.

Kissinger: Let me explain how it is bound to look to Egypt. When it is under Israel, Egyptian citizens are there. Now that it returns to Egypt, Egyptian citizens have a right to remain.

Peres: But it is still a buffer zone, not territory returned to Egypt. That is a buffer zone that is clearly without civilians.

Kissinger: It is a military buffer zone. And in the Egyptian mind to sign a document in which Israel grants Egyptian citizens the right to stay where they stayed under the Israelis is a little hard to take. I am just trying to explain to you why, when I come there with your documents, it takes me two hours to calm the Egyptians down on issues of principle.

Peres: We can make it even shorter and better, simply: "Access to the buffer zone will be controlled by UNEF."


Kissinger: Maybe. And "according to the protocol."

Sisco: "The details will be worked out in the protocol."

Kissinger: Are you people going to do more work on this tonight?

Peres: Yes.

Kissinger: When you do please look at the problem I will face tomorrow. Bear in mind that I will have to show Fahmy you will do nothing on the issue of self-defense in any formulation, so they must drop that article. Can you please do something I can bring them so I don't have to go through another



session in which I am constantly accused of being the lawyer for Israel rather than a mediator? If you want anything to be concluded. I genuinely believe they are at their ragged end. Maybe I am wrong.

Secondly, I need a map to take to them -- a map without a pimple.

Peres: Since you always want the background of our way of thinking, there are people, and some of them generals, who say "Look, what is going to happen? In no time the buffer zone will be settled by Bedouins under Egyptian..."

Kissinger: I told Gamasy what would happen.

Gur: You don't have to tell him. He knows about 12 spying stations he has in the buffer zone. By Bedouins.

Rabin: All over the Sinai, not only in the buffer zone.

Kissinger: Look, nobody's arguing that Bedouins should be permitted free entry into the buffer. This article we will solve. That is the least of our problems. If you can solve the navigation issue in the Gulf of Suez and can come up with a formula for that, that's the real problem. The access to the buffer zone we will solve in some way. And I understand that you don't want to give unrestricted access to Bedouins.

Sisco: This we understand.


Kissinger: And therefore the best solution is to leave it to the working group. We are having so much fun negotiating this agreement, why should others not have some fun? [Laughter]

Rodman: Do we have Bedouin agreement to this agreement?

Allon: A newspaperman said you will not give your speech at the UN and the Ambassador will do it.

Kissinger: I talked to the Ambassador and asked him whether he would be willing to give my speech, and when I got here he had already given it to the press.

The only area they have ever mentioned to me as having civilians is that northern stretch. Wouldn't it be possible -- not through me -- couldn't you give this some sort of special status in which there is greater freedom of civilian movement than in the rest of the buffer zone?



Peres: I told you, we suggest that these Egyptian citizens who have the right of access have it to either side they want to go to.

Kissinger: That they won't agree to.

Peres: A sort of open bridge, to continue to make their living.

Kissinger: Can I tell Sadat there is a group of Bedouins that was learning Yiddish? [Laughter] It is a pity to waste their skills.

Allon: Hebrew too.

Kissinger: Hebrew is better.

Peres: You can tell Sadat that he asked to have a Red Crescent branch in El Arish and we agreed. He was supposed to send over doctors and ambulances, which he never did. We took out our doctors and the place is empty and the people are looking for the services they don't have.

Sisco: What about this town in the north, in the buffer?

Peres: It's no town. There are tents and huts.


Rabin: The Sheikh who runs that area is the one who speaks Yiddish and Hebrew. [Laughter] He made a speech in Hebrew on our television.

Kissinger: How much did it cost you? [Laughter]

Peres: He can't read or write.

He catches three kinds of fish -- one kind that Italians like, one that Arab people like, and one that Jewish people like. He has sophisticated knowledge of how to transport it.

Kissinger: If you work any more tonight, could you restrain the impetuosity of your imagination? [Laughter] Take the document that they have already seen, and given the perfectionist that you are, when you see your old document and can see ways of improving it to the disadvantage of the Egyptians, when you send it back to them don't give them a worse formulation than the one they have already rejected. [Laughter] If you follow me. Which is what you did with the buffer zone. You didn't just reject their proposal; you made yours worse.



The agreement is either yes or no. That doesn't worry me in terms of time. On the buffer zone, I will recommend...

Peres: How about the short suggestion "access" -- without referring to any civilians?

Kissinger: That has gotten us through the first page of a five-page document. If you go through that document and see whether you could get your suggestions down to two or three points, as we did with the agreement, then perhaps there is a chance we can come from Egypt tomorrow night.

Rabin: But you must come tomorrow night or otherwise I must postpone the Cabinet meeting.

Kissinger: I will. But I don't think we will have an agreed document. I will tell you that right now. If you are asking for navigation in the Suez Straits - on this one, I don't know why Suez is such a concession, but...

Peres: We will come closer to the Egyptians on some points. There are ten points we can show you, which are the five where we accept the Egyptian side and which are the five on which we would like them to accept our view.

Kissinger: We will know by Monday morning whether we have an agreement or not. I can't shuttle back and forth on these...


Rabin: ...Bedouins.

Kissinger: ...these nit-picks all the time. One of the disadvantages of this procedure is that neither side has the foggiest idea of the problems I encounter on the other side.

Rabin: This is why we proposed direct negotiations.

Kissinger: I am strongly for direct negotiations. It would certainly lead to war. [Laughter]

So look over this document, and see what you want. You want me to get Article 51 out, a six-month extension of UNEF now in the middle of a period -- which makes absolutely no sense whatsoever, how to justify that? -- and get major acceptance of your military protocol. And then



you shouldn't be surprised if the Arabs say -- which they say to me increasingly now -- "What the Israelis really want is a permanent peace in the guise of an interim agreement, while you keep most of the Sinai, and to impose it on us." That is what I hear more and more in the last few days.

Peres: You could have said the same thing about the disengagement agreement.

Kissinger: No. That was done in five days and went very quickly.

Peres: They could have said that was a permanent agreement, but now after a year and a half we have a second step without war, without threat of war. When it was signed I don't know how many people believed that in a matter of a year and a half we shall meet again and continue our withdrawal.

Kissinger: Strangely enough, I did, and I said it to you.

Allon: I remember that very well.

Kissinger: I'd better confirm now that I will let Moynihan give my speech.

[The meeting adjourned at 12:27 a.m. Remarks to the press by the Secretary and Foreign Minister Allon are at Tab C.]



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August 30, 1975


(After Jerusalem meeting)

PROPOSAL

In connection with the Early Warning System referred to in Article IV of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel concluded on this date and as an integral part of that Agreement, (hereafter referred to as the Basic Agreement), the United States proposes the following:


1. The Early Warning System to be established in accordance with Article IV in the area shown on the attached map will be entrusted to the United States. It shall have the following elements:
 - a. There shall be two surveillance stations to provide strategic early warning, one operated by Egyptian and one operated by Israeli personnel. Their locations are shown on the attached map. Each station shall be manned by not more than 250 technical and administrative personnel. They shall perform the functions of visual and electronic surveillance only within their stations.
 - b. In support of these stations, to provide tactical early warning and to verify access to them, three watch stations shall be established

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
by the United States in the Mitla and Giddi Passes as will be shown on the agreed map. These stations shall be operated by U.S. civilian personnel. In support of these stations, there shall be established three unmanned electronic sensor fields at both ends of each Pass and in the general vicinity of each station and the roads leading to and from those stations.

2. The United States civilian personnel shall perform the following duties in connection with the operation and maintenance of these stations.
 - a. At the two surveillance stations described in paragraph 1 a. above, United States personnel will verify the nature of the operations of the stations and all movement into and out of each station and will immediately report any detected divergency from its authroized role of visual and electronic surveillance to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to the UNEF.
 - b. At each watch station described in paragraph 1 b. above, the United States personnel will immediately report to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to UNEF any movement of armed forces, other than




the UNEF, into either Pass and any observed preparations for such movement.

- c. The total number of United States civilian personnel assigned to functions under this Proposal shall not exceed 200. Only civilian personnel shall be assigned to functions under this Proposal.
3. No arms shall be maintained at the stations and other facilities covered by this Proposal, except for small arms required for their protection.
4. The United States personnel serving the Early Warning System shall be allowed to move freely within the area of the System.
5. The United States and its personnel shall be entitled to have such support facilities as are reasonably necessary to perform their functions.
6. The United States personnel shall be accorded appropriate status under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
7. The United States affirms that it will continue to perform the functions described above for the duration of the Basic Agreement.



8. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Proposal, the United States may withdraw its personnel only if it concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary. In the latter case the Parties to the Basic Agreement will be informed in advance in order to give them the opportunity to make alternative arrangements. If both Parties to the Basic Agreement request the United States to conclude its role under this Proposal, the United States will consider such requests conclusive.
9. Technical problems including the location of the watch stations will be worked out through consultation with the United States.

Accepted



B

ANNEX TO EGYPT-ISRAEL AGREEMENT

Within 5 days after the signature of the Egypt-Israel Agreement, representatives of the two Parties shall meet in the Military Working Group of the Middle East Peace Conference at Geneva to begin preparation of a detailed Protocol for the implementation of the Agreement. The Working Group will complete the Protocol within 2 weeks. In order to facilitate preparation of the Protocol and implementation of the Agreement, and to assist in maintaining the scrupulous observance of the ceasefire and other elements of the Agreement, the two Parties have agreed on the following principles, which are an integral part of the Agreement, as guidelines for the Working Group.

1. Definitions of Lines and Areas

The deployment lines, areas of limited forces and armaments, Buffer Zones, the area south from Line E and west from Line M, other designated areas, road sections for common use and other features referred to in Article IV of the Agreement shall be as indicated on the attached map (1:100,000 -U.S. Edition).

2. Buffer Zones

(a) Access to the Buffer Zone will be controlled by the UNEF, according to procedures to be worked out by the Working Group and UNEF.

(b) Aircraft of either Party will be permitted to fly freely up to the forward line of that Party. Reconnaissance aircraft of either Party may fly up to the middle line of the Buffer Zone on an agreed schedule.

(c) In the Buffer Zone, there will be established under Article IV of the Agreement an Early Warning System entrusted to United States civilian personnel as detailed in a separate proposal, which is a part of this Annex.

(d) Authorized personnel shall have access to the Buffer Zone for transit to and from the Early Warning System; the manner in which this is carried out shall be worked out by the Working Group and UNEF.


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


3. Area South of Line E and West of Line M

- (a) In this area, the United Nations Emergency Force will assure that there are no military or para-military, or (irregular forces) of any kind, military fortifications and military installations; it will establish checkpoints and have the freedom of movement necessary to perform this function.
- (b) (Unarmed) Egyptian civilians and third country civilian oil field personnel shall have the right to enter, exit from, work, and live in the above indicated area, except for Buffer Zones 2A, 2B and the UN Posts. Egyptian civilian police shall be allowed in the area to perform normal civil police functions among the civilian population in such numbers and with such weapons and equipment as shall be provided for in the Protocol.
- (c) Entry to and exit from the area, by land, by air or by sea, shall be only through UNEF checkpoints. UNEF shall also establish checkpoints along the road, the dividing line and at other points, with the precise locations and number to be included in the Protocol.
- (d) Access to the airspace and the coastal area shall be limited to unarmed Egyptian civilian vessels and unarmed civilian helicopters and transport planes involved in the civilian activities of the area as agreed by the Working Group.
- (e) Israeli vessels will be permitted to sail and Israeli aircraft to fly along the median line of the Gulf of Suez in an agreed manner.
- (f) Israel undertakes to leave intact all currently existing civilian installations and infrastructures.
- (g) Procedures for use of the common sections of the coastal road along the Gulf of Suez shall be determined by the Working Group and detailed in the Protocol.

4. Aerial Surveillance

There shall be a continuation of aerial reconnaissance missions by the U.S. over the areas covered by the Agreement (the area between lines



F and K), following the same procedures already in practice. The missions will ordinarily be carried out at a frequency of one mission every 7-10 days, with either Party or UNEF empowered to request an earlier mission. The USG will make the mission results available expeditiously to Israel, Egypt and the Chief Coordinator of the UN Peacekeeping Mission in the Middle East.


5. Limitation of Forces and Armaments

(a) Within the Areas of Limited Forces and Armaments (the areas between lines J and K and lines E and F) the major limitations shall be as follows:

- I) Eight (8) standard infantry battalions
- II) Seventy-five (75) tanks
(above 120 mm)
- III) Thirty-six (36) artillery pieces, including heavy mortars, whose range shall not exceed twelve (12) km.
A
- IV) The total number of personnel shall not exceed eight thousand (8,000).
- V) Both Parties agree not to station or locate in the area weapons which can reach the line of the other side.
- VI) Both Parties agree that in the areas between lines J and K, and between line A (of the Disengagement Agreement of January 18, 1974) and line E, they will construct no new fortifications or installations for forces of a size greater than that agreed herein.

(b) The major limitations beyond the Areas of Limited Forces and Armament will be:

- I) Neither side will station nor locate any weapon in areas from which they can reach the other line.




II) The Parties will not place anti-aircraft missiles within an area of ten (10) kilometres east of Line K and west of Line F, respectively.

(c) The UN Force will conduct inspections in order to ensure the maintenance of the agreed limitations within these areas.

6. Process of Implementation

The detailed implementation and timing of the redeployment of forces, turnover of oil fields, and other arrangements called for by the Agreement, Annex and Protocol shall be determined by the Working Group, which will agree on the stages of this process, including the phased movement of Egyptian troops to line E and Israeli troops to line J. The first phase will be the transfer of the Abu Rodeis oil fields and installations to Egypt within days. Implementation shall be completed within months after signature of the Protocol.



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Remarks to Press by Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Allon Following Meeting at Prime Minister's Office, August 30, 1975

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UNCLASSIFIED SECTO 10216

DEPARTMENT PASS NSE FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND NESSEN

Q: How did your talks go today?

Secretary Kissinger: We are in the process of working on mostly the annexes of the Agreement containing a lot of highly technical and complicated material. We are making progress on them. We are conducting useful meetings. We are meeting again tomorrow morning before I go to Egypt.

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Ambassador Anderson

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Q:	How many more trips to Alexandria will you need before you can nail this down?	
Secretary Kissinger:	One or two.	
Q.	Mr. Secretary, you will not be returning to the UN to deliver your speech there?	United Nations
Secretary Kissinger:	I have decided that the speech on which I have been working, which s tries to lay out the major program of the United States towards the developing world ought to be presented at the beginning of the special session. I therefore have asked Ambassador Moynihan to read the speech for me. It will be my speech read by our Ambassador -- a speech that I have been an working on for many months including on this trip. It will attempt to put forward the American position towards the developing world and towards the problems of development in, I hope, a constructive manner. He will read the speech on Monday afternoon at the opening session of the special assembly.	

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Q. Would you say that you were working on the fine points and that all the big issues are all out of the way now?

Secretary Kissinger: The big issues that I found in the area when I came are substantially settled, but an accumulation of fine points can also present a problem. We are in the final phases of a negotiation, and therefore what remains is sometimes the technically most complex, but not necessarily the most significant.

Q: ~~Memorandum~~ Would you just say it is just a matter of time rather than a new hitch or snag?

Secretary Kissinger: Or our nervous stability?

Q. Do you think, sir, that your UN speech will be able to report that a settlement has been reached?

Secretary Kissinger: Whatever happens, the UN speech will not refer to the Middle East negotiations. It was designed for a different purpose. It has been developed as a long term program. If your question is: Is it possible to conclude the negotiations by Monday,

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	it It is possible, but we are not working against any fixed deadline. But you should not draw any conclusions from the fact that I have decided to have the speech read earlier in the session. I just did not want to have to slide it back from day to day in the session that lasts only ten days altogether. So I decided that it would be best to put the speech forward when it was originally scheduled on Monday afternoon on the opening session.	
	Q: Is there a controversy about certain parts of the Agreement that should go in on the public part and in the unpublished part?	
	Secretary Kissinger: That is not the issue right now at all. They are mostly technical problems problems that we are discussing.	
	Foreign Minister Allon: In addition to what Dr. Kissinger told you I would like to inform you that in our weekly Cabinet meeting ^{which} takes place usually on Sunday mornings will be postponed to Monday	

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morning because we have another working session with the Secretary of State and his team tomorrow morning in this office. Since Dr. Kissinger is going to Alexandria later on, I have to ~~cancel~~ cancel the farewell party which I prepared for tomorrow night. I am sure that we will find another date sooner or later to express our gratitude for the very fruitful work that he and his team have been doing ever since the shuttle has begun, not to speak about earlier efforts which are less publicized.

Q: Mr. Allon, what time will ~~be~~ the meeting be tomorrow morning?

Foreign Minister Allon: 8:30.

Q: Mr. Allon, that means that the Agreement will not be initialed before Monday?

Foreign Minister Allon: The Agreement cannot be initialed before the Cabinet approves of the Agreement. After the Cabinet will approve it -- as I hope -- then it can be initialed the same day even by the

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representatives of Israel.

Q: Is the Knesset still about to meet on Tuesday?

Foreign Minister Allon: I am not sure. It just may meet on its usual work, but I think that between the Cabinet meeting and the Knesset special session, the parties will have a chance to meet among themselves in order to clarify their own positions. Only when the Knesset approves this Agreement in principle, will we be able to sign the basic Agreement between us and Egypt. Afterwards comes the negotiations phase of the technical and military negotiations in Geneva itself. Only after the last document has been signed, then the Agreement becomes effective.

Q: Will the time span be a matter of days or weeks before the Agreement is fully solved?

Foreign Minister Allon: Well, it can be a matter of days once the Knesset approves the Agreement.

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Secretary Kissinger's Remarks to the Press at the King David Hotel Following Meeting at Prime Minister's Office, August 30, 1975

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DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND NESSEN

Q: Mr. Secretary, what would you like to tell us?

(Laughter)

Secretary Kissinger: That is an absolutely novel approach. Usually you tell me.

Q: Well, how about trying it the other way?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as an exception let me tell you. We are working now on mostly the annexes

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to the Agreement which contain highly technical subject matter. Therefore, they are extremely again time consuming. I am meeting/agin with the Israeli negotiating /~~negotiating~~ team tomorrow morning. After that I will go to Alexandria, returning in the evening. We hope that we can conclude this phase very shortly.

Q: Is there any ~~making~~ chance of an initialing tomorrow?

Secretary Kissinger: No. There can not be an initialing until there has been an Israeli ~~gap~~ Cabinet meeting. Foreign Minister Allon has just announced that the Israeli Cabinet will not meet until Monday morning.

Q: Mr. Secretary, is Ambassador Moynihan making your speech for you ~~on~~ Tuesday morning?

Secretary Kissinger: Ambassador Moynihan is reading the speech that I have prepared. He is going to read it for me. He is not going to make it for me. We decided that since the special session lasts only ten days, since with the other stops I have to make and the necessity of reporting to the President and

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some Congressional leaders, the earliest I could probably have spoken at the U.N. would have been late Wednesday or early Thursday. On the other hand, we have been working on this program for many weeks, and it represents a major effort in our approach to this issue of development. We wanted to put it before the special session at the earliest opportunity, which is Monday afternoon at the opening session; so Ambassador Moynihan is going to read the speech on which I am still working.

Q: Is that Monday or Tuesday?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States traditionally speaks in the second spot on the opening session. The opening session is Monday afternoon. That I always knew I could not make. But now that Ambassador Moynihan will read the speech, we will do it on Monday afternoon in the spot reserved for the United States.

Q: Mr. Secretary, was this caused by any unexpected delay?

Secretary Kissinger: No, it was not caused by any

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unexpected delay. It was caused by the fact that in analyzing the requirements of the special session and the great desire of the United States Government to put forward an integrated position as a basis for the discussions, it would not be fair to wait into the middle of the session where it then would be more difficult to give full consideration for it. So we decided to take the approach of submitting the speech on the opening day when it could then be studied for the rest of the session.

Q: What is the timetable now? Do you expect an initialing on Monday and the other countries on Tuesday?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it could happen on Monday or Tuesday. It depends on what happens tomorrow; it depends on the Israeli Cabinet; and it depends on whether there is an Agreement.

Q: Nothing has happened to dampen your optimism?

Secretary Kissinger: No, nothing has happened. It

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is inevitable that when you get down to these final phases that the issues that remain are of great technical complexity, and they take time to settle.

Q: How is your morale? How is your patience? You have been on the brink of an Agreement now for about a week. Are you getting a bit anxious or do you still

 Secretary Kissinger: It is an agreement between the Parties. I will do what I can to help them. My morale is excellent.

Q: Is it possible to fail at this point?

Secretary Kissinger: Is it possible to fail? Well, it would be the agreement closest to completion that has failed in recent diplomatic history. I do not expect it.

The Press: Thank you.

KISSINGER

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