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**The documents in this
folder continue from the
previous folder.**



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CHECKLIST

Meetings with Sadat
August 22-23

You still have your comprehensive checklist in your book. This deals with the principal issues you will want to raise during your first stop in Egypt.

I. Procedure

- A. You will probably want to begin by giving Sadat your assessment of your meeting with the Israelis and on the question of what is now possible.
- B. You might then review with him the main concepts of the agreement -- the main issues you reviewed with the Israelis.
- C. Then you might wish to find a way to develop your own sense of the probable Egyptian reaction to the draft Agreement. You could do this either by talking through the existing draft or by getting Sadat's agreement that you should review some formulations with Fahmy.


II. Main Concepts in Agreement

You have agreed with the Israelis that the main issues of the military aspects of a settlement must be resolved as a package. These are the main points you will want to review with Sadat.

- A. The passes, particularly the Israeli line in the Gidi Pass.
- B. Line B.

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C. Um Kushaib. You have already discussed the concept of U.S. management and Israeli manning.

D. Egyptian station. You will want a clearer idea of where they want it and what functions they expect to be performed there.

E. U.S. Observer Sites in the passes. The question is whether Sadat will accept the present concept of two sites plus four outposts.

F. The rest of the line and the coastal zone. These will be dealt with as discussed earlier with Sadat.


III. Documentation.

If some understanding on the concepts can be achieved, you will want to consider how to move forward establishing a documentary basis with the Egyptians. At Tabs, you have the following documents to work from as you choose:

-- Tab A: This is a clean draft of the Agreement. By "clean" we mean that the U.S. version has been typed without the language the Israelis have suggested.

-- Tab B: The letter on UNEF duration. The version provided here is hand annotated to show the suggestions Fahmy suggested in his last talk with Eilts. (There is also the problem of Israel's insistence that the new mandate for UNEF and the subsequent two annual renewals begin only after Israel has completed its withdrawal, etc, i. e., nine months after the signing of the agreement.)

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-- Tab C: Letter on non-use of force. Fahmy questions the need for this. Most of the language is now in the Agreement. (Remember that Eilts was discussing this without having the full text of the draft Agreement.)

IV. Other Issues

A. You said you would raise the question of passage of Israeli cargo through the Canal on a Liberian ship (Leonidas) about August 25.

B. Sadat should be made aware that the need for Congressional approval of the use of U.S. observers could, at least theoretically, have an effect on when the agreement actually comes into effect. (FYI: We must find a means of taking this into account in the U.S. - Egyptian Agreement and U.S. -Israeli MOU, which are presently inconsistent in this respect. Monroe Leigh is working on this.)

C. The Israelis want us to seek additional Egyptian commitments for incorporation in the U.S. -Israeli Memo of Understanding, as follows:

-- A commitment that "the implementation, validity and duration of the Agreement are not conditional upon any act or development between the other Arab states and Israel."

-- A commitment that, in event of Israeli counter-measures against terrorist acts across its borders, Egypt's commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force will remain binding.

-- An understanding that the annual renewals of UNEF will begin after the redeployment of forces under the agreement is completed.

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-- An assurance that Egypt agrees that removal of UNEF, or change in its mandate and modus operandi requires the consent of both parties.

-- Egypt agreement that Abu Rudeis or other Sinai oil may be purchased by Israel through a third-party company and transported directly to Israel at present rate of supply.

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August 22, 1975

~~SECRET~~

AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and
the Government of Israel:

Resolving that the conflict between them and in the
Middle East should not be solved by military force but
only by peaceful means;

Recalling that the Agreement concluded by the parties
January 18, 1974, within the framework of the Geneva peace
conference, constituted a first step towards a just and
durable peace according to the provisions of Security
Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973; and

Desirous of reaching a final and just peace settle-
ment by means of negotiations called for by Security
Council Resolution 338 and as a significant step towards
that end;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Preamble is an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE II

(1) The Parties hereby undertake not to resort to
the threat or use of force against each other and to settle
all disputes between them by negotiations or other peaceful
means.

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(2) The Parties have given a further written assurance to the Government of the United States of America to this effect.

ARTICLE III

(1) The Parties reconfirm their obligation pursuant to the disengagement agreement of January 18, 1974, to scrupulously observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or para-military actions against each other.

(2) The Parties also confirm that the obligations contained in the Annex and, when concluded, the Protocol shall be an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

The Parties agree that the United Nations Emergency Force is essential and shall continue its function and that its mandate shall be extended annually.

ARTICLE V

The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission under the auspices of the United Nations for the duration of this Agreement



in order to consider any problem arising from this Agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the execution of its mandate. The Joint Commission shall function in accordance with procedures established in the Annex.

ARTICLE VI

(1) All cargoes destined for or coming from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal.

(2) The Parties regard the Straits of Bab el-Mandeb leading into the Red Sea as an international waterway for ships of all flags. Neither Party shall interfere with the free and unimpeded transit of any ship or cargo through those Straits or with the flight of aircraft over those Straits.

ARTICLE VII

The details concerning the new demarcation lines, the redeployment of the forces and its timing, the





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✓



S/S-15

Sadat memo on
8/22 7:45-10:15 pm

Amman

O R 222224EU AUG 75 ZFF-6
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN ALEXANDRIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0543.
INFO RUOMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN
RUONBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO
RUJENDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
RUEHLI/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
RUOKRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA
RUGMAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
RUENFO/USINFO WASHDC
BT
UNCLAS SECTO 10045

DEPARTMENT PASS NSCE FOR GENERAL SCOVROFT AND NESSEN

(-E.O. 11652: N/A)
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT SADAT AND SECRETARY KISSINGER PRESS CONFERENCE
AT MAAMURA REST HOUSE, ALEXANDRIA, AUGUST 22, 1975.

Q: ARE YOU GOING TO HAVE AN AGREEMENT THIS WEEK?

PRESIDENT SADAT: I DON'T KNOW, I HAVE JUST RECEIVED THE
SECRETARY, I DON'T KNOW, REALLY.

Q: WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS?

PRESIDENT SADAT: WELL, AS I TOLD YOU I AM ALWAYS OPTIMISTIC,
WHATEVER HAPPENS, I AM ALWAYS OPTIMISTIC.

Q: MR. PRESIDENT, ARE YOU MORE OPTIMISTIC THIS TIME THAN LAST
TIME?

PRESIDENT SADAT: UP TILL THIS MOMENT, I AM OPTIMISTIC LIKE THE
LAST TIME. I DON'T HAVE ANY CONVERSATION WITH MY FRIEND HENRY,
YET.


Q: CAN WE ASK THE SAME QUESTION TO DR. KISSINGER, ARE
YOU HOPEFUL AGAIN?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: YES, I AM HOPEFUL.

Q: AND THE GAP, IS IT STILL NARROWING?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE IS STILL
A GAP, BUT THAT IT IS NARROWING.

Q: IS IT A MATTER OF PROCEEDURE, MR. SECRETARY, OR A MATTER
OF SUBSTANCE IN WHICH THERE IS STILL A GAP?



PF 2

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I THINK BOTH, BUT, AS I SAID, I HAVE THE IMPRESSION SOME PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE.

Q: WILL YOU STAY IN THE AREA UNTIL YOU FINISH THIS AGREEMENT?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: THAT'S MY INTENTION.

Q: HOW LONG DO YOU EXPECT IT WILL TAKE MR. SECRETARY?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WHY DON'T YOU LET ME TALK TO THE PRESIDENT, OR ASK ME AFTER I TALK TO THE PRESIDENT.

Q: MR. SECRETARY PLEASE. WHAT DO YOU SEE MORE ENCOURAGING THIS TIME COMPARED TO LAST TIME? WHAT'S THE NEW FACTOR?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WELL I THINK THAT THIS TIME WE ARE STARTING WITH THE GAP MUCH NARROWER THAN IT TURNED OUT TO BE LAST TIME, AND, THEREFORE, WHILE ONE CAN NEVER BE SURE, I THINK THE CHANCES LOOK TO ME HOPEFUL.


Q: IS IT A TECHNICAL GAP OR A KIND OF CONFIDENCE GAP?


SECRETARY KISSINGER: NO, I THINK THERE ARE A NUMBER OF CONCRETE ISSUES WHICH WE HAVE TO TALK OVER, BUT WE HAVE COME SOME DISTANCE IN THE LAST THREE WEEKS AND WE'LL TRY TO COME THE REMAINDER.

Q: WE CAN SAY THE CHANCES OF PEACE ARE MORE THAN BEFORE?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I'D SAY THE CHANCES OF PEACE ARE MORE THAN THAN THEY WERE SEVERAL WEEKS AGO, BUT THERE IS STILL WORK TO BE DONE.

Q: THANK YOU.
KISSINGER





THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION
August 23, 1975

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

AK 9

Secretary Kissinger asked that the following report of his meeting with President Sadat be passed to you.

"Four hours of discussion on Friday evening with President Sadat, joined by Vice President Murabak, Foreign Minister Fahmy and Defense Minister Gamasy, leads me to the judgment that while Sadat feels the Israelis are being ungenerous, he never the less is ready to settle -- and to settle expeditiously -- on the best deal which proves attainable. He took a realistic approach, discussed the principal issues within the present limits of the negotiations, and distinguished between what he wants and what might prove achievable.

"The atmosphere was warm and cordial, Sadat was relaxed, looked well, and he displayed keen appreciation of the domestic pressures on all parties including Israel.

"His principal focus was getting the Israelis clearly out of the Giddi Pass. He accepted the present Israeli line in the Mitla as one which can plausibly be justified as "out of the pass." In order to get the Israelis out of Giddi, he has agreed not to insist on moving Egyptian forces forward beyond the present UN zone. He also asks that this concession will also get him a bit more territory along the proposed Israeli forward line.

"Sadat has accepted two American early tactical warning posts and the concept of American managed strategic warning stations operated by Israel and Egypt respectively. He wants his strategic warning station in the north rather than in the passes where General Gamasy feels it would be too vulnerable to the Israelis. Sadat expects, and I agreed in principle, that we will provide some sophisticated equipment and technical advice.


"There are two significant problem areas that will require concentrated effort in the next few days in addition to the territorial aspects described above.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

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
"First, is the corridor area in the south of the Sinai which makes possible direct Egyptian access to the oil fields. Fahmy in particular insisted that this area should be Egyptian territory free of military forces rather than a UN zone under Egyptian civil administration. This is a different concept than one previously indicated by the Egyptians, and it will give the Israelis problems. I will know more clearly how best to deal with this new complication after I have explored Israeli thinking in more detail, and once we know the Egyptian thinking in more detail.

"Another area of concern is that the Israelis feel strongly they need to show more political concessions from Egypt in return for giving up tangibles such as the passes and oil fields. We will make a major effort to use what more we can get from the Egyptians on the question of the boycott, political warfare, and reduction of propaganda on Cairo radio, but my impression is that Sadat's sensitivity and vulnerability to attacks from other parts of the Arab world sharply limit his capacity for further significant concessions.

"Finally, Israel pressed me to seek -- and Sadat has agreed -- to let an Israeli cargo through the Suez Canal sometime near the end of next week. This will have a very favorable psychological impact in Israel and an equally unfavorable one in various parts of the Arab world.

"I renewed your invitation to Sadat to visit the U. S. , and it was obvious from his response that he will be very anxious to do this once and if the agreement has been concluded.

"In short, the negotiations have moved somewhat due to Sadat's position, a bit slowly. Tomorrow I will make a short stop in Damascus to keep Asad calm before returning to Jerusalem in the evening to convey Sadat's latest thought. "



Saturday, August 23, 1975



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Muhammad Haydar, Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, Syrian Arab Republic
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Isa Sabbagh, Counselor, American Embassy, Jidda (Interpreter)
 Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PMR*

DATE & TIME: Saturday - August 23, 1975
 1:05 - 1:45 p.m.

PLACE: In Secretary's Car from Airport to Guest House: The Guest House
 Damascus

Kissinger: I'll tell you one thing. I don't know how friendly a reception I'll have here, but it will be friendlier than the one in Jerusalem.
 [Laughter]

Haydar: Here you will have nothing but a friendly reception.

Kissinger: I feel people don't take me seriously unless there is a reception.
 [Laughter]

Haydar: If that really lends importance to your visit, we can arrange one.
 [Laughter]

Kissinger: It is much easier than the opposite.

Haydar: And it is to be considered a positive factor that there are no adverse demonstrations.

Kissinger: Yes.

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E.O. 13526, SEC. 3.5

DECLASSIFICATION AND CONTROL GUIDELINES
HR 10/10/24

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
 SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
 EXEMPTION CATEGORY (5)(1)(3)
 AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON IMP TO DOT

Haydar: Of course we welcome you to Damascus for the umpteenth time -- because I've lost count.

Kissinger: I've spent more time here than any other town. God will surely punish me but I'm genuinely fond of the Syrians.

Haydar: We appreciate these sentiments.

Kissinger: I have a genuine affection for your President. We cannot always do what we want to do but I think we both want to move in a positive direction. He is a man of honor.

Haydar: Of course, we are deeply desirous -- both of us -- of moving toward our proper goal. Irrespective of our sentiments, we believe our joint interests are in moving in the proper direction.

Kissinger: Absolutely -- and we believe progress is necessary.

Haydar: This time the situation around the Egyptian border seems to be better.

Kissinger: Yes, but it is not fully clear.

Haydar: Of course, one has to attach special importance to your coming out in the first place, to reach an agreement.

Kissinger: I think it is now clear from what is happening in Israel that this is not conceived in Israel as a strategy that is helping it.


Haydar: It would appear there is internal cleavage within Israel itself as to whether it is in Israel's interest.

Kissinger: I have to say it is not clear that the Government is taking steps to stop the demonstrations in Israel.

Haydar: It seems to me the Government there is too weak to do that.

Kissinger: That is partly true.

Haydar: We must, realistically speaking, admit that part of that anti-spirit we see in Israel must also exist in other countries, including Egypt.



Kissinger: And including Syria. [Laughter]

Haydar: That is true. Syria in fact might be one exception, in that there is unanimity of opinion among the leadership and people that what is happening is not in the best interest of the Arabs.

Kissinger: Really? [Laughter]

Haydar: Up to a point.

Kissinger: I don't quite agree with you. Because this can represent a turning point in Israel once this opposition is overcome.

Haydar: This has actually been a point of dispute from the beginning between you and us.

Kissinger: I think the record will show we did not originate this. We were asked and could not refuse. We can't insist on doing things in a certain way when others want it another way.

Haydar: True. In any case this is in essence how we look at things. Even if our theoretical analysis of any given step is that it is against the interests of the cause, our hope is that our theoretical analysis will be wrong.

Kissinger: That is a very generous attitude.

[Referring to Sabbagh:] This is the best interpreter in the Middle East.
[To Sabbagh:] Go ahead, interpret it. Where were you on vacation?

Sabbagh: Lapland. Spain.


Kissinger: You will be in Saudi Arabia?

Sabbagh: Yes.

Kissinger: I've never been in Taif. Is it interesting?

Sabbagh: Yes, it is the favorite town of the new king.

Kissinger [To Haydar:] Have you been in Taif?



Haydar: No, Jidda and Medina.

Kissinger: If there is agreement, I may come back through Damascus before I leave. If there is no agreement, there is no reason particularly.

Haydar: It would seem that as a result of that agreement we would get nothing more than your visit.

Kissinger: No, why would I come -- what interest is it to me -- if I didn't want to help?

Haydar: We've no doubt whatsoever about your desire to help.

Kissinger: I think you'll get more than that, more than a visit.

Haydar: I'd like to add, even if we would get nothing more than your visit, it would be enough.

Kissinger: You are very nice. You had King Hussein here yesterday.

Haydar: It was a very successful visit.

Kissinger: He's a nice man.

Haydar: You read the joint communique?

Kissinger: Yes. I don't know what exactly it means in practice.

Haydar: The text, I'd like to assure you, embodies the situation as it stands, overt and any covert policy. It is not quite like the agreements along the Egyptian front, where there are some agreements that are not announced very clearly. Here it is all public.

Kissinger: There are no agreements yet.

Haydar: The newspapers like to mislead.

Kissinger: Especially the Israeli newspapers.

Haydar: Unfortunately, in the absence of any other corrective source, those papers can do a very successful job of misleading world opinion, in fact.



The boisterous reception and demonstrations you faced in Israel could have been produced by the Government to persuade you of the great sacrifice they are making.

Kissinger: I don't think it was produced, but the Government didn't make a great effort to stop them. Also it was designed to undermine me in America, because the Jewish people in America will be very upset by this.

Haydar: If press reports are true, it is our conclusion is that every inch they withdrew cost the United States quite a lot. If we had bought it in money, it wouldn't have cost so much.

Kissinger: It is probably true. But it shows how much we want progress towards peace. Because we don't get anything out of it.

Haydar: That is why we are very sympathetic with the American treasury which has so much going out of it. Because there are less costly ways to get the same results.

Kissinger: Like what?

Haydar: Could you get them to withdraw for less money?

Kissinger: By a personal conversation? [Laughter] Why don't you come with me to Israel? Your picture would be in every newspaper! [Laughter]

Haydar: Through an exchange of a different kind.

[At 1:27 p.m. the motorcade arrived at the Guest House. The other members of the party were introduced. David Kennerly took a picture.]


Kissinger: If I stayed two hours longer, I'd bring more people. [Laughter]

Haydar: We welcome anyone you bring because you are among friends.

Kissinger: Once I came in overnight and found we had brought 45 people to take care of me 15 hours.

Haydar: That was before Damascus was ready for tourists. [Laughter]

Kissinger: Is Khaddam going to torment us in Lima [at the Nonaligned Conference]?



Haydar: No, he went to Lima to torment himself. He would have had quite a taxing burden, because immediately after Dr. Kissinger he would be receiving Col. Hamdi of North Yemen.

Kissinger: Yes. I know. That is why I came today.

Haydar: No, I thought you came today because you knew Khaddam wouldn't be here. [Laughter]

Kissinger: But he won't be here for two weeks!

Haydar: In any event it gives me pleasure to step into his place.

Kissinger: Thank you. Khaddam is going to take a trip through the United States when he comes to the UN. He will become very pro-NATO. [Laughter] He will leave the non-aligned.

Haydar: When he decides that, he, of course, will not be coming back to Damascus. [Laughter] Indeed now, although he is behaving as a Syrian Foreign Minister, his visits within Syrian territory are very infrequent. We will welcome him when he comes back. In the history of Syria, Mr. Khaddam is the one Foreign Minister who has done the most traveling.

Kissinger: I can imagine.

Haydar: This is not due to his desire to travel. It is a direct result of the policy laid down by President Asad, who wants Syria to be seen. Minister Khaddam is suffering from a disease of people who travel by air frequently -- he can't hear.

Kissinger: I can't hear either, especially people who disagree with me. [Laughter]

Haydar: This is, of course, a political ailment. It is something some of us wish we had. Of course President Asad was a pilot.

Kissinger: I know.

Haydar: He could possibly have the same ailment.



Haydar: Khaddam really has it?

Haydar: An earache.

Sisco: It affects his balance.

Kissinger: Like Bunker. We brought him in whenever we wanted to intimidate your President. Whenever we had him in, we made progress. Really.

Haydar: The President was not intimidated. Because we have Ambassadors who are more frightening.

Kissinger: Yes.

Haydar: This building must really feel familiar to you.

Kissinger: Yes. I feel like I'm at home. I've been in Damascus over 30 times.

Haydar: You must feel at home. We want you to.

Kissinger: What is the program?

Amb. Murphy: We have no answer yet.

Haydar: From here you go to Israel?

Kissinger: Yes.

Haydar: Then you go again to Alexandria?


Kissinger: Yes. Probably also to Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

Haydar: Then again to Saudi Arabia?

Kissinger: It depends. Probably after Jordan.

Amb. Murphy: We just closed our second successful year of the Damascus fair. And the Jose Limon Modern Dance Troupe was here.

Lord: It's a very good group.



Kissinger: Was that appreciated in Syria?


Murphy: Very much.

Kissinger: I've never seen anything in Damascus except the road from the airport to this place. I've never seen the Mosque.

Haydar: Why? When you finish all your peaceful missions, you can come on a personal visit.

Kissinger: I'd like to do that.

[The Secretary then took a rest before being called to the Presidential Palace.]





DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

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 CHARGE TO

USDEL SEC IN DAMASCUS XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
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E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:
ACTION:

N/A
OVIP (Kiesinger, Henry A) SY,US
Secretary Kissinger's arrival statement at Damascus Airport,
August 23, 1975
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO

AMB
POL
ADMIN
USIS
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CHRON

US Del ALEXANDRIA IMMEDIATE
Ambassy Amman IMMEDIATE
Ambassy Beirut IMMEDIATE
Ambassy Cairo IMMEDIATE
AmConsul Jerusalem IMMEDIATE
Ambassy Tel Aviv IMMEDIATE
USINFO WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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
State Pass NSCE for General Scovcroft and Hassen

Following is transcript of subject statement: Quote I am here to talk with President Asad and his advisors about the negotiations I am conducting, leading hopefully to progress towards peace in the Middle East. As I have said on many occasions, the United States is dedicated to bringing about an overall settlement, including all of the issues and all of the parties, and we have always recognized that Syria plays an important role in this process. I have always profited from my exchanges with President Asad. I greatly respect him and I look forward very much to my talks.

Thank you. ~~XXXXXX~~ Endquote.

DRAFTED BY: USIS:REall:gn	DRAFTING DATE 8/23/75	TEL. EXT.	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: S/S [Signature]
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CLEARANCES:





THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

Saturday - August 23, 1975

Presidential Palace, Damascus

Tête-à-tête Meeting between President H. Asad
and Secretary of State Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
(following larger meeting)

[Counselor Isa K. Sabbagh interpreted]

DECLASSIFIED *State Review*
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *SF 9/18/03*
EXEMPTED, 11/2/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
HR 10/10/03

1. U. S. -Syrian Relations

The Secretary humorously reiterated his feeling of disappointment at his quiet but amicable reception in Damascus, as contrasted with what he had had, and would have again later in the evening, in Israel.

President Asad (Also humorously) said similar receptions could be arranged, but for the seriousness of the Syrian character and the true traditions of hospitality.

The Secretary said he realized that; from the President on down, the Syrians have been most hospitable and cordial to the Secretary and his group.

President Asad: We always make a distinction between a person and his policy. In the case of Dr. Kissinger, President Asad felt truly sorry at the failure in March '75 of the U. S. peace efforts. But objectively and realistically "we did our bit to make your mission fail!"

The Secretary: You can only do your best! But seriously your timing of doing things seems strange. Just as we were about to reach a positive point with Israel, vis-a-vis the West Bank involving Jordan, you engineer the Rabat Summit stand, making it impossible for Israel to negotiate with the PLO. Now, we have your Syrian-Jordanian declaration of joint commands and councils, etc. Frankly, anybody who could have unison with Jordan and the Palestinians at this juncture is ingenious! But didn't somebody jump the gun by a few months?

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~



CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1,3)
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President Asad: We know how this latest joint communique is going to be interpreted against us. Actually, we have not set up anything jointly yet. We expressed hopes and intentions looking towards the future. I have always told you my views favoring Arab unity. This is no exception. But if you let this development strengthen the hand of those Congressional elements opposed to your carrying out your promise of giving Jordan the 14 rocket battalions, you would be making a grave mistake whose significance would go beyond the borders of Jordan. [Just before the Secretary took his leave, President Asad repeated this thought again -- in fact for the fourth time -- specifically referring to Saudi Arabia, the Gulf and North Africa as countries whose faith in U. S. promises and policies would be greatly reduced and shaken.]


President Asad continued: "Don't you worry, Jordan will get what it needs: from you, from us or from any other source."

The Secretary: We hope Congress will reverse itself. We do want to give Jordan what we promised King Hussein.

President Asad: You would be well advised to do so. The world is already thinking you have a strange system where more than a dozen loci of power seem to exist. The world is beginning to think that nothing should be surprising coming from the U. S. Congress. Why should Congress be anxious about what happens between Syria and Jordan. Why should U.S. - Arab relations be almost entirely based on Israel's wishes, demands or what have you?

The Secretary: I was disappointed that a meeting between President Asad and President Ford did not take place in Europe as we had hoped. Of course we realize that time was short on both sides. But a meeting between the two Presidents would be very useful. For one thing, President Asad would hear the U. S. policy straight from President Ford who is a straightforward man [less complicated than former President Nixon] and a man of his word. "Frankly we cannot tolerate any more a nation of 3 million dictating to U. S. policies which are not necessarily in our best interest." [The Secretary underscored this line more than once.] Secondly, if Presidents Asad and Ford meet, this would be definitely useful to Syria's image in the U. S.

President Asad agreed and hoped a meeting could be arranged in Europe. To meet in the U. S. would be difficult at present, said the Syrian President.



II. The PLO

Secretary Kissinger, responding to President Asad's remark that the US non-recognition of the PLO was a big mistake, said the Syrian President surely appreciated how delicate this point was and how, as in anything else, timing was of the essence. Furthermore, we all know that the Palestinians did not have the untarnished reputation for keeping things quiet, not to mention their "genius" for not agreeing among themselves as to who should represent them.

President Asad emphasized that contacts on a high level should be established with the PLO.

Secretary Kissinger suggested that perhaps George Shultz, former Secretary of the Treasury "who is closely associated with President Ford and me" could visit the area once again and be put in touch with Palestinian elements which the Syrian President might recommend.

President Asad promised to talk to the PLO about this.

[According to news reports, President Asad did receive Yasir Arafat a day or two after Dr. Kissinger's visit to Damascus - IKS]


III. Syria-Israel

Secretary Kissinger emphasized that it is not the U.S. policy to split up the Arabs. "What would we get out of this, save going contrary to the logic of history?"

That's why we hope the Syrian President understands that an Egyptian-Israeli agreement, if it is finalized, would be in the right direction of making the Israelis used to the idea, indeed the necessity of agreements with the Arabs.

The Secretary conceded that an agreement between Israel and Syria would be more difficult than the one on Sinai (the differences between the two being, inter alia, in the terrains, the temperaments of Egypt and Syria!).

President Asad expressed deep doubt that anything would be achieved between Israel and Syria at this rate, and given Israel's continued intransigence and declarations. "What's the use of a few kilometers



in the southern Syrian front? No, if Israel remains in Golan, as her actions and strengthening of settlements seem to indicate, then it is absolutely hopeless even to fool our people with any hopeful prospects. What would any Syrian, or any Arab for that matter, feel when he sees Quneitra as a ghost town? What kind of liberation can we call that when the Israelis are not only looking down on Quneitra but also building more and more things right on the edge of that city! Are we kidding?!"

Secretary Kissinger promised to give the Syrian President's legitimate pre-occupation serious thought in order hopefully to come up with some kind of a suggestion. Continuing, the Secretary explained how precious time was lost because of Watergate and what happened as a result of this "historic accident" i. e., the resignation of former President Nixon. If this had not happened, the element of continuity in our efforts and in using our influence might very well have solved several of the problems we are still facing.

Now President Ford is beginning noticeably to recoup a lot of prestige which the American presidency had lost. He still has a vocal and pro-Israeli Congress to deal with, especially those 40 members who realize that, no matter what happens, they are not going to be re-elected.

With President Ford elected, and Congress having new faces, the tempo could be quickened in pursuing a solution. President Ford, you would notice when you meet him, has positive views on this problem, not unlike what former President Nixon unfolded before you during his visit to Damascus.

President Asad was glad to hear this about President Ford. He added that the Egyptians had described President Ford as honest, courageous, and straightforward.

Asad asked about President Ford's chances in the coming elections.

Secretary Kissinger was almost completely certain of a Ford victory.

Asked about the Democrats, Secretary Kissinger replied the only Democratic candidate he could see was Kennedy. However even Kennedy has similar views regarding this problem (!) said the Secretary.

The Secretary told Asad that Rabin had said that by mid-October 1975 (if the agreement with Egypt is reached), Israel would be willing to send a representative to Washington for quiet talks about the Syrian front.

"While I am not asking you for a reply now," continued the Secretary to Asad, "I'd venture the thought that, in order to maintain the secrecy and low-key aspect of such discussions," President Asad need not send a representative at the outset to Washington. Either the Syrian Ambassador there, or, more discreetly, our Ambassador to Syria, would be summoned once or twice for consultations. Thus we could start or resume the Syrian-Israeli ball rolling, very quietly and pending this the Secretary would keep President Asad informed of any new developments.

The Secretary also gave a tentative "iffy" promise to go back to Damascus: if necessary, if he had any new thoughts on the Golan step, if his schedule did not lag too far behind, etc.

IV. US Aid to Israel

President Asad asked, in seeming consternation, about the reported \$3 billion-plus assistance from the US to Israel!

Secretary Kissinger said the figure was grossly exaggerated. It was much less than that. In any case, added the Secretary, it would not be in the form of a ready check in the whole amount. Rather, the assistance would be proportioned in such a way as to keep us in an effective position of influencing Israel through 1977.

* * * * *

In sum, the Secretary urged President Asad not to upset the apple cart (as he is capable of doing!) -- frankly for Syria's own good. We (USA) need time to tide us over until after the elections. This did not mean that we would in the meantime, do nothing. No, we would be resorting to arranging things quietly and in a preparatory way with Congress and with American public opinion. The Israeli-Egyptian agreement, if and when it comes about, should help the process we have in mind.

The Secretary advised, for instance, against the Arabs, and through them the non-aligned nations, insisting on Israel's ouster from the UN. This would prove counter-productive and would certainly be interpreted as Arab unreasonableness. So, let Khaddam have an opportunity (in Lima, Peru) to exercise his famous composure!

Asad, smilingly, said "We were not urging that Israel be chucked out of the UN, but that she be held to the promises stipulated in her "birth-certificate, i.e., membership in the UN". The Syrian President added: "If Israel does not, she will receive her punishment: if not this year, then the next, or the next."

The Secretary, conceding President Asad's rare gift of machination, suggested that working for peace required a few other considerations to be borne in mind, e.g., clear objectives, the image abroad, timing of steps, increasing friends and supporters and so on.

President Asad said he had always enjoyed exchanging philosophical views with the Secretary. Clearly, he (Asad) appreciates the Secretary's need for more time; but by the same token, the Secretary surely appreciates Syria's unswerving demand for deeper results to show the people that America's intercessional efforts are not just talk or show.

The Secretary said the Syrian President had always been honest, frank and forceful of expression with us. We would do our very best to move expeditiously into the next step on the Syrian front, bearing in mind the President's concerns.





MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Muhammad Haydar, Deputy Prime Minister for
Economic Affairs Syrian Arab Republic
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Isa Sabbagh, Counselor, American Embassy,
Jidda (Interpreter)
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PR*

DATE & TIME: Saturday - August 23, 1975
7:15 - 7:45 p.m.

PLACE: In Secretary's car from Presidential Palace
to Airport -- Damascus

Kissinger: I don't think I've ever had a meeting with President Asad that lasted less than four hours.

Haydar: True.

Kissinger: We had some that lasted 10-12 hours. Remember?

Sabbagh: Yes.

Haydar: As always, there was something of substance that was important.

Kissinger: It is also important to me because I consider Syria an authentic representative of Arab nationalism. And I think you are very serious people.

If this motorcade ever stops suddenly, we're dead. [Laughter]

SECRET/NODIS


SECRET - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

DECLASSIFIED *State Dept Review*

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *SR 9/18/03*

DECLASSIFIED, UNCLASSIFIED, STATE DEPT. CONTROLS

HR 10/10/03



When they don't throw rocks they don't really care. [Laughter] An hour from now I won't be ignored by the people watching. [Laughter]

My wife was in a motorcade the other day. It stopped because a former militiaman was in the road with an AK-47 and they had to get him out of the way.

Haydar: In Israel?

Kissinger: Yes. This happens only in allied countries.

Haydar: They seemed to take a few things for granted.

Kissinger: The Israeli Prime Minister objected only because it was unlawful, not because it was inappropriate. [Laughter]

Haydar: Simply because they didn't obtain a license!

Kissinger: That's right.

Haydar: That is what I meant when I implied the Israeli Government is not totally innocent of encouraging it.

Kissinger: Well, they certainly are not discouraging it.

[To Agent Schwoebel, USSS:] Schwoebel, how fast are we going?

Schwoebel: 65 miles an hour.

Rodman: That's 90, 100 kilometers.

Kissinger: More like 110-113.

Haydar: The roads are conducive to speed.

Kissinger: On one of my visits I'd like to see the Mosque here. My security people say it's too dangerous.

Haydar: Never.

Kissinger: They say you have to go through narrow streets.



Haydar: There is a straight wide street, and a roofed one. Actually, it is the most important commercial center in town.

Kissinger: Maybe the next time.

Haydar: There is no difficulty; nor should there be anything foreboding about it.

Kissinger: Khaddam is now in Lima?

Haydar: Yes.

Kissinger: I'm told that in Taif, the airport is quite a distance from town.

Sabbagh: Yes. But you'll like the weather there. And the frightening mountains.

Kissinger: Frightening?

Sabbagh: Craggy, sharp. Traveling by car it's terrifying.

Kissinger: The best part of the day is still ahead of me. We are having dinner tonight [in Israel] at a Guest House, which has a triple row of barbed wire around it, so I'll be relatively safe.

Haydar: Therefore, the period you spent here should be considered rest and recreation.

Kissinger: Almost.


Haydar: Rest assured we will always be happy to receive you on that basis. Everytime you get tired there, please come over.

As long as you have the determination and tenacity to continue these tremendous efforts towards peace, you know there are boisterous days ahead. [Laughter]

Kissinger: I know. I don't know who will survive this but I won't.

Haydar: We pray to God you'll survive this and be in good health.

Kissinger: My health is good. I should lose some weight but it is hard to do that in the Middle East.



Sabbagh: If you forgive an impertinent question. I've read reports about Jidda and the Ambassador. If he leaves.

Kissinger: He will almost certainly leave. Will it cause difficulty?

Sabbagh: It will cause a furor.

Kissinger: It is nothing to do with policy towards Jidda. It is for personal reasons. Is he liked there?

Sabbagh: Oh yes.

Kissinger: He's extremely able. I will speak to the King about it. If I can conduct a conversation with the King.

Sabbagh: If he lets you.

Kissinger: His predecessor was clear. I really liked his predecessor. How long will it last?

Sabbagh: He will either be very brief and he will lead you on a tour. Or he will talk about falconry.

Kissinger: I've heard that speech.

Sabbagh: Version #1. [Laughter].

Kissinger: Are there others?

Sabbagh: Yes!

Kissinger: Then I'll talk to Fahd. I know him very well.

Sabbagh: It will be more fruitful. You have an open invitation to visit the desert.

Kissinger: Still? Even if I'm out of government?

Sabbagh: They would be tickled pink if you would come out here and advise them.

Kissinger: Just as a private citizen?

Sabbagh: Oh yes. To that a bad example, the former Vice President came out here and was embraced. And Senator Fulbright. Even when we ignored him officially.



Kissinger: Agnew?

Sabbagh: Yes.

[The motorcade arrived at the airport. The Secretary's brief remarks to the press are attached at Tab A.]



O 231731Z AUG 75
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4365
INFO RUEHLA/USDEL ALEXANDRIA IMMEDIATE 13
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 741
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 2282
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 798
RUEHLE/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 543
RUQMAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 842
RUEHFO/USINFO WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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SS-15
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18

STATE PASS NSCE FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND NESSEN

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.) SY, US
SUBJ: SECRETARY KISSINGER'S DEPARTURE STATEMENT AT DAMASCUS AIRPORT. AUGUST 23, 1975.

FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF SUBJECT STATEMENT:

QUOTE. QUESTION: HOW WAS YOUR VISIT DR. KISSINGER?

ANSWER: AS ALWAYS MY TALKS WITH PRESIDENT ASAD WERE CONDUCTED IN A VERY CORDIAL ATMOSPHERE AND I FOUND THEM VERY HELPFUL. WE DISCUSSED THE ROLE OF SYRIA IN NEGOTIATIONS TOWARDS PEACE WITHIN THE PRESENT CONTEXT AS WELL AS IN RELATION TO AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT AND WE DISCUSSED ALSO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WHICH ARE GOOD AND CONTINUE TO IMPROVE. THANK YOU. UNQUOTE.

MURPHY





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CHECKLIST

Meeting With Israelis

Tel Aviv, Saturday, August 23


I. Syria

The Israelis will want to hear your impression of Syria. In this connection, you will want to discuss with Rabin at some point the question of beginning exchanges with the Syrians, perhaps in mid-October.

II. Strategy on Egyptian-Israeli Talks

Your first meeting with the Israelis will presumably concentrate on the issues of the military settlement which you reviewed with them Friday morning. However, you will want to keep in mind as you reveal the Egyptian position on these issues that the Israelis will at some point hit you with the political assurances it wants from Egypt. Since some of those will fall short of Israeli goals, you may want to consider how the Egyptian military concessions can be used in this context; for instance, it would not be illogical to relate Sadat's acceptance of the U. S. presence to his inability to meet all of Israel's political demands. A possible combination of trade-offs might be:

- Sadat's acceptance of Israeli manning in Um Kushaib and the Israeli line in Mitla in return for a satisfactory line in the Giddi Pass. These are top priority issues on both sides. You may even want to raise some uncertainty about the Egyptian position in Mitla.
- Line B and the Israeli forward and main lines north and south of the passes should be settled reciprocally.
- The location of the Egyptian station should be acceptable to the Israelis.
- That leaves the issue of Sadat's acceptance of the U.S. presence. This and the bilateral U. S. guarantee of oil supply, which is a major U. S. commitment, could be used to compensate for what Sadat cannot do on the political side. It is also worth stressing that Sadat considers this concession on non-resort to force and duration as major political concessions.




III. Procedures

- A. In addition to reporting on Sadat's posture, you will want to inform the Israelis that Eilts today is going over the draft agreement with Fahmy.
 - At Tab A. is the draft showing what the Israelis want.
 - At Tab B. is the draft Eilts is talking from.
- B. We need an in-house session with you or Sisco before we meet again with the Israelis on the Memo of Understanding.
- C. We are prepared, when you are ready, to have Leigh and Hoskinson begin talks on a possible Agreement on the U. S. presence.

IV. Main Concepts in Agreement

The following are the main issues in the military aspects of an agreement which you agreed should be dealt with as a package:

- A. The Passes
 - Giddi line must move.
 - Mitla line less of an issue
- B. Um Kushaib. Sadat would consider Israeli manning under U. S. management (provided Giddi line satisfactory).
- C. Egyptian Station. Gamasy wants it in north and will provide exact coordinates.
- D. Line B. Sadat is willing to negotiate in context of settling Israeli forward and main lines.
- E. U. S. Sites in the passes. You may want to open Sadat's position only gradually on this. We have two objectives -- reducing the number and using this against Israel's political demands.



~~SECRET~~/NODIS

V. One New Subject: Suez Coastal Area

A. You will want to lead into this carefully, but it will at some point be necessary to establish rights and responsibilities in the coastal area leading to the oil fields. It may be possible to meet Sadat's concerns by first defining what will happen in the area and leaving to later or finessing entirely the question of how the area is designated.

B. The other side of this issue is raised by the letter Fahmy gave you which makes these points (Tab C):

-- Egypt wants through the U.S. an Israeli assurance that "it will refrain forthwith from taking, authorizing or allowing any actions or measures that could result in changing the geographic character or the demographic composition of the Sinai. It is understood that such undertaking encompasses, inter alia, an injunction against the establishment of any settlements and/or allowing individuals or groups not habitually residing in Sinai prior to June 5, 1967, to reside or settle therein."


-- Egypt wants to be "fully compensated at the proper time for Israeli exploitation of the oil fields during the occupation." This claim could be around \$2 billion.

-- Israeli assurance to turn over the area intact.

C. In this connection, you have asked to be reminded that you want to take up with Rabin the Israeli plans to drill for oil in the Gulf of Suez and Sinai below the new line. We have recommended that you seek an Israeli commitment that there will be no further Israeli exploration in occupied areas.

These issues could be discussed in the technical talks on the Memo-randum of Understanding once you have introduced them at the ministerial level.

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~~SECRET/NODIS~~

VI. Pending Issues

A. Cargoes through the Canal

Depending on when you want to tell the Israelis of Sadat's willingness to allow Israeli cargo through the Canal late next week, you may at least want to tell them you are working on this and they should hold their ship in position.

B. The Israelis have said Sadat should be made aware that the need for Congressional approval of the use of U.S. observers could, at least theoretically, have an effect on when the agreement actually comes into effect. (FYI: We must find a means of taking this into account in the U.S.-Egyptian Agreement and U.S.-Israeli MOU, which are presently inconsistent in this respect. Monroe Leigh is working on this.)

C. The Israelis will expect that Atherton has briefed you on his talks with them Friday on the Memo of Understanding. You do not need to get into this, but if they raise the subject you will want to show awareness that in addition to the issues on your basic checklist still pending from the Washington talks, the Israelis want us to seek additional Egyptian commitments for incorporation in the U.S.-Israeli Memo of Understanding, as follows:


-- A commitment that "the implementation, validity and duration of the Agreement are not conditional upon any act or development between the other Arab states and Israel."

-- A commitment that, in event of Israeli counter-measures against terrorist acts across its borders, Egypt's commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force will remain binding.

-- An understanding that the annual renewals of UNEF will begin after the redeployment of forces under the agreement is completed.

-- An assurance that Egypt agrees that removal of UNEF, or change in its mandate and modus operandi requires the consent of both parties.

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


~~SECRET~~/NODIS

-- Egypt's agreement that Abu Rudeis or other Sinai oil may be purchased by Israel through a third-party company and transported directly to Israel at present rate of supply.

-- In all cases where Egyptian undertakings through us in the Memo of Understanding are expressed as "assurances," the Israelis want them expressed as "commitments" and confirmed or reconfirmed by us with Sadat as necessary.

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AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

(Draft showing Israeli proposed changes made in US-Israeli technical talks August 22, 1975 with statement that this represents view of Israel negotiating team 8/21/75. Israeli changes shown in paranthesis.)

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel:

Resolving that the conflict between them and in the Middle East should not be solved by military force but only by peaceful means;

Recalling that the Agreement concluded by the parties January 18, 1974, within the framework of the Geneva peace conference, constituted a first step towards a just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973; and

Desirous of reaching a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338 and as a significant step towards that end;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I


The Preamble is an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE II

(1) The Parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force against each other and to settle all disputes between them by negotiations or other peaceful means.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.5
STATE DEPT. CONTROL
BY HR NAME DATE 10/10/03



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(2) The Parties have given a further written assurance to the Government of the United States of America to this effect.

ARTICLE III

(1) The Parties reconfirm their obligation pursuant to the disengagement agreement of January 18, 1974, to scrupulously observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or para-military actions against each other. (or blockades against each other directly or indirectly.)

(2) The Parties also confirm that the obligations contained in the Annex and, when concluded, the Protocol shall be an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

The Parties agree that the United Nations Emergency Force is essential and shall continue its function and that its mandate shall be extended annually. (Until this agreement is superseded by another agreement.)

ARTICLE V

The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission (under the auspices of) (in relation to) the United Nations for the duration of this Agreement. in order to consider any problem arising from this Agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the execution of its mandate. The Joint Commission shall function in accordance with procedures established in the Annex.

~~SECRET~~



SECRET

ARTICLE VI

(1) All cargoes destined for or coming from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal.

(2) The Parties regard (the Red Sea, its approaches and straits leading to it) the Straits of Bab el-Mandeb (leading into the Red Sea) as an international waterway for ships of all flags. Neither Party shall interfere with the free and unimpeded transit of any ship or cargo through those Straits or with the flight of aircraft over those Straits (and other areas mentioned above.)

ARTICLE VII

The details concerning the new demarcation lines, the redeployment of the forces and its timing, the limitation on armaments and forces, aerial reconnaissance, the operation of the early warning and surveillance installations, the UN functions and other arrangements will all be in accordance with the provisions of the Annex and map which are an integral part of this Agreement and of the Protocol which is to result from negotiations pursuant to the Annex and which, when concluded, shall become an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE VIII

(1) This Agreement is regarded by the Parties as a significant step toward a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement.

(2) The Parties shall continue the diplomatic efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference.

SECRET



~~SECRET~~

ARTICLE IX

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement between the Parties.

ARTICLE X

This Agreement shall be deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the UN.

(ARTICLE XI)

(FIRST PROPOSAL 8/18)

"The Parties hereby declare that the obligations imposed on them under the present Agreement shall prevail over any other obligation conflicting with this Agreement."

(SECOND PROPOSAL 8/22)

This Agreement shall abrogate as between the contracting parties all obligations under other international agreements insofar as they are inconsistent with the present Agreement.

(THIRD, FALLBACK PROPOSAL 8/22)

This Agreement will not be affected by any other commitments the Parties may have with Third Parties on issues included in this Agreement.

Done at _____ on the _____
1975, in four copies

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel:

Resolving that the conflict between them and in the Middle East should not be solved by military force but only by peaceful means;

Recalling that the Agreement concluded by the parties January 18, 1974, within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, constituted a first step towards a just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973; and

Desirous of reaching a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338 and as a significant step towards that end;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Preamble is an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE II

(1) The Parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force against each other and to settle all disputes between them by negotiations or other peaceful means.

~~SECRET~~

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BY HR DATE 10/10/03



~~SECRET~~

(2) The Parties have given a further written assurance to the Government of the United States of America to this effect.

ARTICLE III

(1) The Parties reconfirm their obligation pursuant to the disengagement agreement of January 18, 1974, to scrupulously observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or para-military actions against each other or blockades against each other directly or indirectly.

(2) The Parties also confirm that the obligations contained in the Annex and, when concluded, the Protocol shall be an integral part of this Agreement.


ARTICLE IV

The Parties agree that the United Nations Emergency Force is essential and shall continue its function and that its mandate shall be extended annually.

ARTICLE V

The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission in relation to the United Nations for the duration of this Agreement, in order to consider any problem arising from this Agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the execution of its mandate. The Joint Commission shall function in accordance with procedures established in the Annex.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

ARTICLE VI

(1) All cargoes destined for or coming from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal.

(2) The Parties regard the Red Sea, its approaches and straits leading to it, and the Straits of Bab el-Mandeb as an international waterway for ships of all flags. Neither Party shall interfere with the free and unimpeded transit of any ship or cargo through those Straits or with the flight of aircraft over those Straits and other areas mentioned above.


ARTICLE VII

The details concerning the new demarcation lines, the redeployment of the forces and its timing, the limitation on armaments and forces, aerial reconnaissance, the operation of the early warning and surveillance installations, the UN functions and other arrangements will all be in accordance with the provisions of the Annex and map which are an integral part of this Agreement and of the Protocol which is to result from negotiations pursuant to the Annex and which, when concluded, shall become an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE VIII

(1) This Agreement is regarded by the Parties as a significant step toward a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

(2) The Parties shall continue the diplomatic efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference.

ARTICLE IX

Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent either Party from exercising the right of self-defense, as recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

ARTICLE X

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement between the Parties.

ARTICLE XI

This Agreement shall be deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the UN.

Done at _____ on the _____
1975, in four copies

For the Government of Israel

For the Government of the
Arab Republic of Egypt

WITNESS

~~SECRET~~



Dear Mr. President,

In connection with the agreement on further disengagement of forces in Sinai, I would like to convey to you the assurance we received from the Israeli government that it will refrain forthwith from taking, authorizing or allowing any actions or measures that could result in changing the geographic character or the demographic composition in Sinai. It is understood that such undertaking encompasses, inter alia, an injunction against the establishment of any settlements and/or allowing individuals or groups not habitually residing in Sinai prior to June 5, 1967, to reside or settle therein.

On the other hand, you may rest assured that Egypt will be fully compensated, at the proper time, for any loss it incurred as a result of the destruction of Egyptian public or private property and/or the exploitation of its natural resources following the occupation of part of its territory and territorial water.



ISRAEL UNDERTAKES:

FIRST:

To rescind immediately, and refrain forthwith from, the following:

- A. Any actions or measures that could result in changing the geographic character and/or the demographic composition in Sinai.
- B. Establishing settlements, authorizing or allowing individuals or groups of those who did not habitually reside in Sinai prior to June 1967, to settle therein.
- C. Destroying, dismantling or inflicting any damage on constructions, installations, roads, buildings or property in Sinai, be it publicly or privately owned.

SECOND:

To honor its obligation to pay full compensation for all unlawful demographic changes, destruction of property and exploitation of natural resources.





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