

Thursday, August 21, 1975

SINAI II DISENGAGEMENT
AGREEMENT

August 21-September 1, 1976 [1976]

<u>Thursday, August 21, 1976</u>	<u>Tab</u>
Malcolm Toon/HAK (memcon) 7:25 - 7:50 p.m.	1
 <u>Friday, August 22, 1976</u>	
Yitzhak Rabin/HAK (memcon) 9:50 - 2:30 p.m.	2
Checklist of meetings with Sadat August 22-23.	3
Q & A Kissinger Press Conference at Maamura Rest House, Alexandria.	4
Report to the President	5
 <u>Saturday, August 23, 1976</u>	
Muhammad Haydar/HAK (memcon) 1:05 - 1:45 p.m. (tête-a-tête)	6
HAK Arrivial statement at Demascus Airport (Telegram)	7
President H. Asad/HAK (memcon) Tete-a-tete meeting.	8
Muhammad Haydar/HAK (memcon) 7:15 - 7:45 p.m.	9
Checklist meeting with Israelis Tel Aviv	10
Yitzhak Rabin/HAK (memcon) 9:00 - 9:50 p.m. (dinner)	11



Sunday, August 24, 1976

Checklist for Israel	12
Yitzhak Rabin/HAK (memcon) 6:15 - 10:30 p.m.	13

Monday, August 25, 1976

Egypt Checklist	14
Report to the President	15
Yitzhak Rabin/HAK (memcon) 10:02 p.m. - 12:06 a.m.	16
Report to the President	17

Tuesday, August 26, 1976

Jerusalem, Checklist	18
Yitzhak Rabin/HAK (memcon) 10:25 a.m. - 4:38 p.m.	19
Checklist, Alexandria	20
Mohammed Anwar al-Sadat/HAK (memcon) 7:04 - 7:45 p.m.	21
Report to the President	22

Wednesday, August 27, 1976

Checklist for Jerusalem	23
Yitzhak Rabin/HAK (memcon) 9:45 - 11:48 p.m.	24
Report to the President	25



Thursday, August 28, 1976

Checklist for Jerusalem	26
Yitzhak Rabin/HAK (memcon) 10:45 a.m. - 4:25 p.m.	27
Checklist, Alexandria	28
Report to the President	29

Friday, August 29, 1976

Checklist for Jerusalem	30
Yitzhak Rabin / HAK (memcon) 11:52 a.m. - 6:40 p.m.	31
Report to the President	32

Saturday, August 30, 1976

Checklist Alexandria	32 A
Yitzhak Rabin/HAK (memcon) 9:00 p.m. - 12:27 a.m.	33

Sunday, August 31, 1976

Yitzhak Rabin/HAK (memcon) 9:13 a.m. - 12:40 p.m.	34
Yitzhak Rabin/HAK (memcon) 9:50 p.m. - 5:30 a.m.	35



Marilyn Berger, Washington Post and Newsies / HAK 5:00 - 5:40 p.m.	36
King Khalid/HAK (memcon) 7:15 - 7:40 p.m.	37
King Hussein I, /HAK (memcon) 10:15 - 12:08 p.m.	38



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SINAI DISENGAGEMENT
AGREEMENT

August 21-September 1, 1976 [1975]

Mr. President

BOOK 1

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~



Khalid Sept 2.
Hussein Sept. 3
Khaddam Sept. 3
Asad "
Khaddam "





Friday, August 22, 1975

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

- Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- Amb. Malcolm Toon, US Amb. to Israel
- Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
- Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
- Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
- Robert B. Oakley, NSC Staff
- Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PRR*

DATE & TIME:

Thursday - August 21, 1975
7:25 - 7:50 p.m.

PLACE:

Secretary's Suite (Rm. 620)
King David Hotel
Jerusalem

SUBJECT:

Israeli Political Situation

Kissinger: [Turns on the babler] What is the situation here now?

Toon: Not good. The public is upset, the press is very nasty. Rabin thinks he can do it.

Kissinger: You think there is doubt he can?



CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp to Det.

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

DECLASSIFIED *State Review*
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *SF* 9/18/03

Toon: If you are prepared to pay the price.

Kissinger: What price ?

Toon: Aid, political commitments you might not be prepared to give.

Kissinger: We offered \$2.1 billion, which gets to the outer limit of what we can do. Look, the President now is vetoing milk for feeding mothers. He has been told that once he gets to \$2 billion, he gets in trouble.

Toon: But the trouble is, there has been a whole troupe of Congressmen coming here saying they can get it, saying they could get \$3.5 billion.

Kissinger: It is not in our interest to give \$3.5 billion.

Toon: One figure mentioned was \$1.9 billion. Rabin said it was not enough. \$2.1 billion might do.

Kissinger: As Joe knows, I have had massive problems with the President. He asked me to offer \$1.9 and settle for \$2.1 billion. But I don't want to play games.

What do they think they are giving up? If it fails, do they want us to cut it down and go for an overall?

Toon: There is opposition.

Kissinger: Any other Administration would follow the same policy, after one year.

Toon: \$1.9 billion is not enough. \$2.1 billion is enough.

Kissinger: Maybe he will settle. We didn't mention \$1.9 billion.

We should keep Mac better informed. There was a series of meetings. Last week we were overworked.

Dinitz wanted to chisel more on the last day. I was inclined to, but luckily the President didn't. Rabin would have asked for more.

By political commitments, he means from the Egyptians?

One thing the President won't do is to give them a veto over our policy. "Consider seriously," yes.

Sisco: Their negotiating team has no latitude. If a technical team gets together, the document will only get worse.

Kissinger: I am not so eager for everyone to be in the room.

Sisco: There should be a brief checklist of points -- in a small group; you and Allon and whoever -- and then turn it over to others. The other way would make it worse. The proposal was for a technical team to get together while the Ministerial team is working.

Kissinger: Whatever we sent back, the wise guys here would prove how tough they are.

Sisco: The wise guys are here.

Toon: I didn't like their idea of waiting to discuss the line until they have the political commitments. The political commitments about Geneva.

Sisco: And second, political commitments about the agreement -- boycott, propaganda.

Kissinger: I won't leave here tomorrow until I have something from them. It was a mistake not to hold out part of the line. Now all the parts of the line to be changed are something they have to give.

Sisco: We need to settle the line and political commitments.

Kissinger: I don't need everyone in Alexandria. I could leave Roy.

What are the issues? We must settle the passes. How far back do you think they will go?

Toon: Some back.

Kissinger: To the Hoskinson position? They said no. It's one kilometer.

Toon: Gur's idea is on the highlands.

Kissinger: How the Egyptians will ever get to that point, I haven't figured out.



Saunders: Here is a checklist. [He hands him the first day's checklist.]

Kissinger: On geography -- the passes, the southern area to the oil, and the Beta Line. Will we get the Beta Line?

It's ridiculous; if every time they withdraw 30 kilometers and the Egyptians advance one kilometer, then when they're at the 1967 borders the Egyptians have moved six kilometers.

Now I think they are under the necessity of breaking quickly or settling quickly.

Why are they turning everybody out tonight [at the Knesset reception]?

It was one of the warmest receptions at the airport I have seen. [Laughter]

Lord: It reminded me of Peking.

Kissinger: [Laughs] On the first visit! Yes.

To receive the Secretary of State of a country that gives them every screwdriver. No other country would have done this.

Lord: Hanoi maybe.

Kissinger: No, Le Duc Tho was very warm. He practically raped me.

We need the passes, the southern line -- whatever maneuvers they will do on the road, and the Beta Line. We need to settle Umm Khisheiba and the stations.

Politically, something on boycott, etc.

Toon: Plus the commitments in a Presidential letter.

Kissinger: They won't get it.

Sisco: They want a veto on our policy and secondly, a commitment that they won't be pushed off the Golan.

Kissinger: How can we do it?

Sisco: Henry's been very firm on that.

Kissinger: We really should make Mac the anchor here.

They asked us for a letter saying we don't ask them to go off the Golan. I took it to Vail. The President said absolutely not. I didn't recommend it. I was overworked. That is the reason for the screwup [the sending of a draft to Rabin by mistake]. Scowcroft took it out of the meeting and said "This can go." I was going to take it up with Dinitz the next day. He meant back to Sisco. Dinitz called me and said the Prime Minister was outraged.

So those are the issues.

Will there be speeches there tonight?

Toon: Probably.

Give me the text [of the arrival statement]. I will use it again. [Laughter]

Saunders: The fact that you gave a prepared text and read it attracted press attention.

Kissinger: Our press -- Barry Schweid -- won't understand it until they get the word. And they don't take it from us ! How will they brief the press?

Toon: Through Dinitz:

Kissinger: That isn't bad. He is for it.

They say Umm Khisheiba will go to Israel. I have never discussed it. We can't get that without the Beta Line. I told them specifically it wasn't agreed.

Lord: It is in the Jerusalem Post today.

Kissinger: Where did they hear that? I never said it. [To Rodman] Did I say it to the Jewish leaders?

Rodman: No, you never got into details.

Kissinger: Great patriots they are. The leaders of the American Jewish Congress, or whatever, were asked by the press "What about the agreement?" They said: "Whatever the Israeli Government thinks." They could have mentioned America once.

Atherton: Actually it was meant as a signal to those who say there should be no agreement.

Kissinger: Actually Rabbi Miller is a nice one.

Rodman: He's not very bright.

[The meeting broke up.]

Atherton: You need a decision on this [the Hawks for Jordan].

Toon: Why?

Sisco: It goes to the heart of our relationship with Hussein, and it was a Presidential commitment. We got it.

Atherton: No thanks to General Brown.

Toon: It means a lot of them here.

Oakley: We promised 22.

Kissinger: We can't go back on a Presidential commitment.

[The meeting ended.]

5

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
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WITHDRAWAL ID 017132

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Memorandum of Conversation

DESCRIPTION Memorandum of Conversation at Prime
Minister's Residence, Jerusalem,
Friday, August 22, 1975, 9:50 a.m -
2:30 p.m.

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DISCUSSIONS

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Disengagement Agreement - Vol. I (1)

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Israel

Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister
Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Shimon Peres, Minister of Defense
Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador to U. S.
Lt. Gen. Mordechai Gur, Chief of Staff
Amos Eran, Director General, Prime
Minister's Office

United States

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary for Political
Affairs
Malcolm Toon, Amb. to Israel
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Asst. Sec. for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Samuel Hoskinson, National Intelligence Office
for the Middle East, CIA (at end)
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PWR*

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With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (c)

MR 04-17, #1, pt New 9/18/03 CIA MR 3/2/04

del NARA Date 7/12/04

DATE & TIME:

Friday - August 22, 1975
9:50 a.m. - 2:30 p.m.

PLACE:

Prime Minister's Residence
Jerusalem

[Photographers were admitted.]

Rabin: First, let me apologize for what happened last night [the demonstration that blocked the Secretary's departure from the Knesset reception].

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.

[The photographers leave and the doors are closed.]

Well, I would suggest that we proceed this morning and start mainly with political items, and then assistance. And then we go to whatever you want.

Kissinger: I have no objection to any order in which you want to discuss this, so long as we cover all the items, including those that I will be asked about in Egypt. So I am prepared to discuss the political things, the question of assistance, but I also want to make clear that there are a number of items that were left to the shuttle under conditions when it wasn't clear to me what the atmosphere of the shuttle would be, so I now regret it will now look as we have extorted from you what we have told you for months was necessary. And we have to come to an understanding about the Passes, because we have achieved Egypt's acquiescence to the line, in which we put ourselves behind your proposal on the basis of assurances that we have received that you were out of the Passes. We didn't realize that being out of the Passes could be defined as 10 meters from the Summit. So that's one issue that has to be settled.

The second one is the Beta line issue. The third are various adjustments which we have indicated might be made. In addition, we have to settle for you the Umm Khisheiba, and the American presence in the Passes. This is what we have to raise but we cannot raise those two without the other three. So I don't care whether we discuss this last this morning, but we cannot go to Egypt without having had some discussion here.

Rabin: First, I would like to ask that the draft of the agreement between Egypt and Israel. Do you have a copy?

Kissinger: Do we have a copy? [He gets out copy of Tab A.] I don't know; we haven't submitted it to the Egyptians.

We think that the part that the United States has put down, in other words without the Israeli additions, will be broadly acceptable to Egypt, but we have never discussed it with Egypt. And considering the process by which we are working and by which we get prior agreement with you, we cannot present all these to Egypt on a take-it or leave-it basis. They must have the right to make amendments which we will then take to you for your comments. So we have never discussed this with Egypt. Egypt has never seen a draft agreement. We simply have to be clear about it. This is our best judgment of what we think is probably acceptable to Egypt and this excludes those items which we didn't agree to in Washington. You know, there are a number of bracketed items.



Allon: Are you referring to the direct documents?

Dinitz: He is referring to the agreement with Egypt and the Secretary refers to those items that we put in brackets where it was our suggestion and subject to the US checking with the Egyptians.

Kissinger: We have not checked anything with Egypt at this point.

Peres: There is one point in the protocol...

Rabin: Agreement.

Peres: In the agreement, which we didn't quite understand. And this is the objection to the blockade against each other directly or indirectly. This is Article 3, item 2. There is a difference between the Israeli language and the American language.

Kissinger: The reason is... [He confers with Sisco.] I asked Joe what the reasoning was here. The reasoning was that we have an agreement with the Egyptians to reconfirm the exact wording of the Disengagement Agreement. This is not the exact wording of the Disengagement Agreement.

Sisco: We informed you of that in March.

Kissinger: We never raised the issue of blockade specifically, but they said they would only reconfirm the exact wording of the Disengagement Agreement. Now, I don't object to raising this point with them.

Sisco: They are apt to respond: look, we agreed in March that we will reconfirm exactly the language of the Disengagement Agreement. This goes beyond the existing language of this Agreement.

Kissinger: Frankly, I think it would be a mistake for us on this shuttle to raise the draft agreement when they didn't agree on the agreement.

Rabin: Yes, but if they will change the draft agreement, it might be there is no reason for going into details.

Kissinger: Well, they cannot change a draft agreement they have never seen. This is point one. They have never seen this agreement.

Peres: The point that we are raising is that you will suggest, maybe, and then we shall have their reaction. But the problem is the initial suggestion on your part, if the Egyptians get the protocol, because there are changes in the agreement by the nature of things.

Kissinger: You are not changing something that doesn't exist. This is between us and you. At no time did we... in none of the previous agreements did we begin drafting the agreement before we had an agreement. It is sort of a wierd procedure to draft an agreement in which you then go to another country that has not yet agreed to this outline and ask them to agree to the document. Look, we have done so many things that are unusual. You know. But this could be construed by them as an attempt to create a situation in which the central issues are never discussed.

I'll tell you. I will propose to them to see whether this sentence can be added. I would not like to read in the Israeli press that there is a joint US-Israel draft agreement. This is something -- we had to start with somebody. We could have started with them. In general we have never made an agreed position with them; not only in general; we have never made an agreed position with them that we then put to you. Since we have to start with somebody, we started with you. But in the past these agreements were proposed when a substantial agreement in principle had already existed. In Syria, we didn't do it until the last day.

Rabin: Then comes the second point, the US presence. The two forms of early warning stations. [Everyone takes his coat off.] What is your position on that?

Kissinger: Let me do it in two parts. I owe it to you to tell you that it is my personal view that asking for the American presence is a great mistake. I have to tell this to you. I have promised you that I would support you and I will support you and I don't know -- the Egyptians have up to now refused it totally. But that's not why I think it is a great mistake -- because the Egyptians refuse it. I think it is a great mistake because in defending the position before the American Congress, we are going to be raising a set of issues about what these Americans will never do, in which that will raise serious problems for you. But if this is your decision, if you ask for it, we will defend it and we will assume that the Egyptians will agree to it, to do it. I have also given a commitment to Simcha that should the Egyptians refuse and should the negotiations break down on that issue, Israel will not be blamed by us for causing the failure of the negotiations. And therefore you should not consider the fact that I have warned you against these stations as a means by which we will go back from that promise.

I repeat the promise which I made to you officially, and which I have confirmed with the President, that if the negotiations break down on the American stations, this factor will not be used in any way against Israel to put the onus of the failure of the negotiations on Israel.

I have said what I have to say about my personal assessment, that in terms of the long-term impact on American public opinion, in terms of the kind of assurance that will have to be given to the Congress, it is probably going to turn out to be counter-productive. If nevertheless you want us to proceed with it, we shall proceed with it within the framework of the explicit promise which I have given to your Ambassador.

So now, what do I think the problems are? So far the Egyptians have totally refused it, on the grounds that they expelled the Russians from Egypt and now they are inviting the Americans back in there, which raises new pressures to get Russians involved in some way and weakens their position in the Arab world.

Nevertheless, we are willing to bring the negotiation down to that point and see what happens. I think there is a chance that Sadat may change his mind.

Rabin: Well, therefore, it might be the first issue to raise then.

Kissinger: I am sure we have reached a point with the Egyptians where it is not going to be possible. We have pushed the existing process with the Egyptians quite far in which we have asked them to make a series of agreements without corresponding Israeli concessions in the last month.

I think what we have to do is settle together the issue of Umm Khisheiba, their warning station, the two warning stations, the Beta line and the exit to the Passes. I think all of these have to be wrapped up together and settled today. I am hopeful that they can be settled today, contrary to what I was told by a number of your Ministers yesterday. I don't have any rabbits in my hat, as I told them. I have nothing. You know everything that I know. My judgment is that they have to be handled together.

Peres: I want to explain the logic and the purpose of the American presence. First of all, we were enriched with one experience that served very well all sides concerned, and this was also an American service rendered to both sides, which while limited in nature added a great deal to the stability in the area. And this is the air reconnaissance. The fact is there was an American presence in the air and in this very nervous confrontation, where armies may move in a matter of hours, the air reconnaissance added a great service to lower a bit this very

high tension that exists. Here we are actually adding to the air reconnaissance a land reconnaissance in the most sensitive part in the Sinai area, which for us is very dear and is practically one of the two major reasons why we face such a heavy opposition now in our country. The passes became a symbol but it is more than a symbol. It is a strategic location of the utmost importance.

Number two, from the Israeli point of view, and I think also from the Egyptian point of view, the mere presence of even a symbolic American group of technicians may serve as an excellent excuse for both parties in considering any sort of an attack. I can imagine a general staff sitting together and considering the situation. The fact that there will be American presence there may serve as a very good reason or one of the reasons why not to start.

Kissinger: Not to Gur! He'll go around them.

Peres: You may be surprised. Anyway, since anything of this nature is a mixed political-military one, so from time to time what you lose on the military side you might gain on the political side. I do believe that if Egypt will be convinced of it, by accepting it it will also convey an air on our part that they really mean business.

The third point is the instability of the United Nations. By nature, description, the legal part and so on, there is always a question mark on the UN presence in the Middle East. You know, Mr. Kissinger, I often think what would have happened if in 1957 after the Israeli retreat from the Sinai Peninsula there would have been an American early warning station.

[A ram's horn blows outside.]

Kissinger: Are those protesters?

Allon: They're practicing for the High Holy Days.

Kissinger: Outside the Prime Minister's house? That's carrying the coalition with the Religious Party too far.

Peres: I am asking myself what would have happened if in 1957 there would have been three American early warning stations, one in Sharm el-Sheikh, the other in the middle of the road leading to Sharm el-Sheikh, and another one close to Eilat. Would even Nasser dare to renew the blockade

or not? My answer is that this probably wouldn't happen and a war would have been saved. Just a symbolic presence of this nature would be sufficient enough to avoid a war.

Now, I am coming again to your point of view. What were we insisting upon? Either non-belligerency, which we couldn't get, or duration, which again, we have it with a question mark, because for the duration we have to have four parties: the Americans, with the good offices, the Egyptians, the Israelis and the United Nations. On that occasion the United Nations again is a very great question so far as we are concerned. And you know exactly, better than myself, what are the problems that Israel may face about the UN. An American additive will reinsure the duration of this agreement.

Now, I know that on the American part, people say, "this is the way things began in Vietnam." I don't see any comparison of any sort whatsoever. At least theoretically, the buffer zone is extraterritorial, and as you have the Sixth Fleet in the Middle East in extraterritorial location, the same goes here. So I know the difference, that this is an extraterritorial part of the make-up for a limited time, not like the sea, which is permanently extraterritorial.

And I am asking myself again, is there any danger for the American technicians there? Believe me that at least I for one don't see any danger of any sort, as I never saw any danger for the UN technicians or soldiers who were there. We may have some difficulties in overcoming it, and we shall have to pay a price, but the advantages are so clear and so important for peace.

By the way, I would call it a sort of peace corps. That's the difference between Vietnam where this wasn't a peace corps. This was a military guarantee. Here America is serving as a trustee accepted by both sides.

You know, the Peruvians left the Golan Heights. They are being replaced by the Iranians. But if you will ask our generals in the north, they will say this creates for us a real problem. The Iranians today are very close to the Arabs. They are Moslems. They are going to control a very delicate situation. We don't feel at ease about it.

Kissinger: Were the Peruvians the only ones?

Peres: And Austrians. But around Kuneitra, which is the most sensitive part of the Golan Heights, it is the Iranians that are going to replace the Peruvians. And it creates for us a problem because the mix-up of Syrians and Iranians as a peace-keeper appears in the judgment of our generals as a very strange combination, to say the least.

Kissinger: I understand. I didn't know about it.

Peres: We wouldn't like to see in the Passes Iranians and we wouldn't want to see Ghanaians, and we are talking about American presence in the Passes which is the most sensitive part.

Now, I really can't see what is the difference between two stations or four stations from your point of view, but I can see what the difference between two and six stations is from our point of view. From our point of view, there is a problem of credibility because we told our people that while the idea of an American square was not accepted, we were given to understand that this was replaced by six stations. But not only that. It is not just a matter of saying and keeping what we have said. It is also a matter that if you have six, one station will be in the entry to the Giddi Road, one in the entry to the Mitla road, then to the end of the road, and then a road connecting the Mitla and Giddi road and that crossroads, which are two, there again will be stations.

If this will happen, I am so sure that this small contribution so far as manpower is concerned will change the whole area for the future, adding seriousness, stability, duration, credibility to everybody concerned, and in a very strange way it may turn events on your part, on their part, on our part. I wouldn't like to see American boys fighting instead of us. We have never asked for it. We didn't change our mind. We don't look upon it as a fighting force or a military presence. But this is a very unique precedence in the American policy and philosophy to contribute in a rather limited way to a change of events. Not only that, I would try to suggest that if Egypt is ready to look upon the American presence as a trusteeship by both sides...

Rabin: Sadat said, "I welcome the American early warning system. I would like them to witness what is done in the area." He said it publicly, in the Hearst interview.

Kissinger: Let's separate it. To take your last point: I will get to the number of stations next. That this would be a useful precedent for the United States contribution to peace-keeping in the area. This may be

true, but I think it is important to keep in mind that this is a difficult stage in American history to set new precedents for foreign involvement. I told your Ambassador, and Lord was with me, when I was in Minneapolis a few weeks ago, I asked a leadership group -- not anti-Israeli -- what they felt about an American presence in the Passes. I didn't ask them to vote. There were about 70 leaders. My impression was that about 55 percent present reluctantly would have said yes on my say so, but those who were opposed were very passionately opposed. And also the difference was a generation gap. The Vietnam generation was violently opposed. The older generation -- there was no one who was for it -- the older generation would go along with it if I said it was needed.

This is just something to keep in mind. If something starts that way, it isn't done with great enthusiasm. We will carry it through the Congress, incidentally, but you can't sell anything in America today by saying it is making a contribution to peace-keeping, or it's making a contribution to other people. You can sell something in America only today by proving what it does for America. If you can't do that, you are in deep trouble, even if you carry it through. So, unfortunately, where four years ago that last argument might have been conclusive in America, and while I understand the force of what you are saying -- and I repeat, I am willing to support it and I will support it. All the Israeli Cabinet and this team has to do is to tell me to do it, and I will do it. But I must tell you -- I find it difficult to say "as a friend" in the light of all the things that are going on -- nevertheless, I am conscience-bound to tell you what I think the implications in America will be. But we will carry it.

Now, the numbers: first, I have to say, I told your Ambassador on behalf of the President that he would agree to six stations. And, therefore, you were in a sense misled by us if I now reduce the number. The Egyptians have agreed to no stations. As the President began to discuss this concept of the six stations with his advisers, with his other advisers, and began to check it around the political spectrum, he began to get uneasy on the concept of six stations; specifically how are you going to sell six stations when it is difficult from a military point of view to explain what any of them are going to do there?

Rabin: Since their purpose is not military, you don't have to go to the military explanation.

Kissinger: But with all due respect, Mr. Prime Minister, the only way we can sell it in America is with the sort of argument that the Defense Minister used, namely if there were early warning stations, it adds an

element of stability, but it must be given some sort of military explanation. The only way we can sell this is by saying Umm Khisheiba and the Egyptian station provide strategic warning and the American stations provide tactical warning. If we cannot do that, we will never sell it. If we say it has a political use, then it will be said Americans are there as hostages, and then you get into the Vietnam argument in the most horrible way.

When we presented your proposal to the National Security Council, to say that there was no enthusiasm for it is putting it mildly, I forced a vote, which in the six years, seven years I am in Washington, I have never done, and I forced it with a formulation that brought about a positive response so that we can say afterwards this was unanimously approved by the National Security Council. But the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Minister, for example, said, "This is total nonsense; why can't we put it in Umm Khisheiba where we are going to be anyway and then put sensors out and let the people in Umm Khisheiba check the sensors? And they can do everything that the warning stations can." So, nevertheless, they will go along with the concept, but they feel that it should all be remote control.

Now, the President has come to the view that if we had two stations, one at the high point, or whatever that road is, then we could justify one as checking the entrance to Umm Khisheiba, as well as giving tactical warning, and the other one as giving exclusively tactical warning. Then we could put sensors at the other points. They could move around and check the sensors, which could be one of the functions of these two points, which in a way gets back more to your square concept.

The additional difficulty is that the distance from this one in the Giddi to the second one is only about, at the outside, three kilometers, and in no case is the distance greater than ten kilometers. Isn't that right? Our impression is that the distance from where we are proposing it -- we didn't measure it...

Peres: Maybe ten miles.

Kissinger: 16 kilometers?

Gur: Less than that.

Kissinger: We have frankly not measured it.

Allon: Closer to the eastern.

Rabin: 5-7 on the Giddi from the eastern.

[General discussion on distance.]

Kissinger: At any rate, we will not be able to carry this -- and we will have to agree precisely on what we are doing -- we will not be able to carry this in America without saying that this is an American technical installation, so we have to put some radars down and we have got to build something in both of these places. We just can't have Americans sitting there. We have got to build some sort of installations that look both ways. Now, we can't do that in six places. And what are these stations going to do? Look at a distance of 10 kilometers? And this is why the President came up -- with an extraordinary lack of enthusiasm anyway -- with the idea of two manned stations and four unmanned stations, and having the two manned stations also service the four unmanned stations.

Allon: There are four unmanned according to this proposal? Plus Umm Khisheiba?

Kissinger: Plus Umm Khisheiba, to which I will come in a minute.

Now, when Sadat said, "let's have the Americans there," this was his proposal to replace the Israelis in Umm Khisheiba by Americans. So since you now believe that this is not possible for you, and without bargaining with you -- we have made our own studies and we are not eager to take over Umm Khisheiba ourselves anymore because now that we realize what is there, it is too heavy a responsibility for Americans to assume. If we made the same judgment that you made in October 1973... That's a judgment that you must make on your own. So we don't have the personnel to man Umm Khisheiba, so it is as I told you, we will support your position, but we don't have their approval yet.

But it is a different thing for Sadat to say Americans replace Israelis where Israelis are now, than for him to accept Americans where Israelis are withdrawing. But you remember we talked to you in June about putting Americans into Umm Khisheiba?

Rabin: In July we agreed.



Kissinger: Well, in July, I told you that I had come independently to the judgment and I told you that I would support your position. I maintain this. I will support your position. I do not yet have Egyptian agreement. But I will not squeeze you to put Americans into Umm Khisheiba.


Allon: But if the explanation, which is quite correct, of the American presence is to improve the early warning system by adding to the strategic and also tactical warning, this is the right definition.

Kissinger: So long as Americans don't think about it. Because to think that we can put something into the Mitla and Giddi that is nearly as good as you have in Umm Khisheiba is really absurd; that we will see anything there that you won't see from Umm Khisheiba. But, never mind, we will make that argument.

Allon: So by having the full number, you are making the system more efficient. In principle, it is the same. I don't think that every American is interested.

Kissinger: I am absolutely positive that we cannot sell six stations to the Egyptians. I am not sure that we can sell two stations to the Egyptians. Of all the points we have, this seems to be the most difficult with the Egyptians. This is from personal conversations with the Egyptians. I am as certain as I can be -- I know that -- that the President will not accept six stations any more, even though he at one point did, once he thought it through. But why will it be more efficient with six American stations?

Peres: May I say? Now we are talking about establishing an American presence, but let's for a minute refer to the reasons how it was born. After the break in March, I think there were points that you understood and points that we understood. We understood that a major point is that we must appear and actually evacuate the Passes. I don't believe that we could have convinced ourselves or our own people about the evacuation of the Passes unless we shall have an arrangement in the Passes which is somewhat stronger and more reassuring than all the UN. So it was born really not to get America involved; the reason, the basic reason, was to meet the American request. I do not believe that we could have suggested the same map otherwise, from a political point of view, and not just from a military point of view, and I am emphasizing the political part. I am not going to the military.



Now, what we actually want is not an addition of early warning, which is important, but that those highly important roads will be controlled better than by just a shaky UN presence. That is our basic point.

Kissinger: You are also controlling it from the heights, which you are keeping.

Peres: Yes and no. Up to a point you are right. More in the north than in the south. And yet, we are not so rich in soldiers to man all the land we have, and that is the bitter lesson we have learned from the Yom Kippur War. Would we be a very rich country, the geographic layout would be sufficient, but, as you know, we can't put unlimited numbers of soldiers all around. And we are after a bitter experience of the Yom Kippur War, and in this highly strategic point we would like to be a little bit better reassured.

Now, to come back to the origin. We have suggested stations here and here [indicating]. Suppose we would put one station here and one here. Because when we suggested here, let's not forget that we thought that the Egyptian early warning station will be at the Passes, as well. Today Egypt is preferring to have the early warning station somewhere along...

Kissinger: They haven't told us yet.

Peres: Anyway, they don't want to be in the Pass.

Kissinger: One trouble of putting them in the Passes is their conviction that they would be able to look better into Egypt than Israel.

Peres: From time to time to have a look at your own country is not a bad idea. [Laughter] Okay, if they are in the passes, we have one set of reasons. If they are alongside the road, we have a different set of reasons, and then I would move the early warning station, the American one, here and one here [indicating], which easily explains, first of all, as the entries to their early warning station, to our early warning station. And if they are somewhat worried about us being in the mountains, we are worried somewhat about having the UN on the road. They have an extra insurance; we have an extra insurance. It really assures both sides that the Passes won't become the beginning of a catastrophe. And let's

put one here [indicating], one here, one here, one here, and one at the exit of the Passes and here at the exit of the Passes. For them it is the entry; what for them is the exit is for us the entry. And this deployment of American presence, by the way, I would call it "peace presence manned by Americans" which is really the idea. Then we feel that the symbolic and strategic value of the passes is ensured in a better and acceptable way for all parties concerned.

Allon: I have a question to ask. You are speaking about sensors. I guess that this is some sort of an instrument which is being controlled from some center. But this is the desert. Are you going to leave these instruments without any guard or any protection?

Kissinger: They are designed that way.

Allon: Every Bedouin can come and damage it, even not as a hostile act; simply because he doesn't know what it is. So it needs some guarding anyhow.

Kissinger: No, no, if you put a guard next to the sensor, you don't need the sensor.

Allon: I am looking for an excuse for the guard!

Kissinger: Have the sensor protect the guard. [Laughter]

Peres: The Bedouins are stealing telephone poles.

Kissinger: No, the way these things are set up, they would have to be serviced from time to time, and the central station would have to have the right to go to the sensors. You know how they work; if they are picked up by a Bedouin or something, the center would immediately send somebody out there to see what went on. In fact, that's part of the system. So one of the results of the sensor is in a way to restore the concept of the square, because if anything happens at any of these places, they will automatically send somebody there, and in addition, periodically somebody has to go there.

Peres: It would be a square without dancing.

Dinitz: It would be a box without a fighter.



Rabin: Well, you know our position. You will see what the Egyptians will say.

Kissinger: Yes, but my problem now is--since we have all had great experience in the last year--if I come back with this from Egypt, will it be another American imposition on an already hard-pressed government? A US-Egyptian collusion?

You know, there is no agreement by Egypt to any of it up to this point, and I have to discuss this. I can ask for the six stations. He's already rejected them. In any case, it has to be done as a package to everything else. I don't think that he will agree to one more thing in the Passes until we have everything else done as a package.

Peres: I don't think we can suggest this map without these stations.

Kissinger: Without any stations?


Peres: Without six stations. Our position is the six stations. The basic idea is, we thought this would be exclusively an American square. Now we have to have an allocation which will be as close as possible to the basic idea.

Kissinger: Well, you know, this map was based on a misconception by us to begin with, and sold to the Egyptians on a misconception.

Allon: Before referring to the map, may I find out another point? You spoke quite rightly about some mobility of people who would render the necessary service to these sensors, travel from the center to the sensor and check them and serve them and so on. By having an additional one or two vehicles, it would be possible--practically speaking, not as a matter of principle; in this case, practice can help--that there will always be an American there or a group, a couple of Americans coming to serve and then another jeep comes and they go back to their tent or barracks or whatever it is at the center.

Kissinger: We haven't worked out any practical operation.

Allon: Maybe this can solve the problem.



Kissinger: Whether something like that is in fact possible, I don't know. [to Saunders:] Have we ever studied it?

Saunders: I would assume that they would go back and forth.

Kissinger: I take it for granted that there would be some movement from the central post to the other four. That I take for granted. That means that at any one point, there is always somebody at the other four points, so that we are always talking about three points. If there is freedom of movement as there could be, I see no reason why we couldn't agree to something like that among ourselves. That, I repeat, has not even been discussed with the Egyptians, so I don't know what their idea is.

Peres: At one point, they have published that they may agree to four stations. An Egyptian senior official told the AP that Egypt may agree to four stations, and on another occasion, as the Prime Minister has mentioned, in an interview which Sadat gave to Hearst, he reaffirmed his positive reaction to the American presence. These are the two reactions we know so far as Egypt is concerned.

Kissinger: Yes, but he might have counted in the four stations Umm Khisheiba and his station.

Peres: Then it's two. He said four American stations. I don't say that Sadat said it. It is a senior official.

Kissinger: You know, when we said Israeli presence in Umm Khisheiba, we are talking about turning Umm Khisheiba technically into an American-managed station with Israeli control.

Sisco: Israeli-operated.

Kissinger: An Israeli-operated, American-managed station. The same for the Egyptians. That is at least the concept on which we have been operating.

Rabin: Well, in this regard, since you say that you don't know exactly what will be the Egyptian reaction, you know our position.

Kissinger: But it is getting to be a real problem to us. What happens if I come back from Egypt with this? What will be then here?

Rabin: Well, I don't know what they will say on other issues here. This is the purpose of the negotiations. You know our position.

Peres: We shall be in an impossible situation, Mr. Secretary, before our own people.

Kissinger: We are getting into an impossible situation before our own people too, because we have been maneuvered into a position where we are extracting from Israel as if we were interested in the outcome of the solution. I want to say that we ought to conduct our discussions with this in mind. I am always asked: are we going to blame Israel? So you can relax. The logic of events will then take over, whatever that is. And each side will pursue whatever it considers best without blaming anybody. It will just do what it thinks is right without putting the blame, without doing it as a punishment, simply on the basis of its actions. We cannot be in the position, and we will not be in the position, where we are abused in Israeli public opinion and thereby in American public opinion as extorting from Israel concessions to our advantage. We cannot allow this. We can go any way. We can go to the overall settlement. We think this is in your interest. We think we are helping you. If that is wrong, let's find it out and go another road. That's fine with us. There is not going to be any acrimony. There aren't any illusions left. So if you can't, you can't, and then let's find it out and let's settle on it and determine it. This has to be perceived in Israel as in Israel's interest. If it isn't perceived that way, we can't help.

Allon: Since you haven't tried yet to convince the Egyptians of neither the idea nor the number

Kissinger: The idea we have given several times.

Allon: So far the response is negative? Why can't you try first to get as much as possible from the Egyptians and let us know what you manage. Believe me, the more you get, the better.

Peres: What will be the American position in presenting stations in the Passes? That's the point you are discussing now.

Kissinger: Well, I am in a difficult position in the fact that the President doesn't want six stations, which I have told your Ambassador on innumerable occasions.

Allon: That's true.

Kissinger: I don't necessarily have to tell that to the Egyptians.

Rabin: Let's assume that they will agree to four stations. What will be the reaction then of the President? Four stations.

Kissinger: That I was had by the Israelis.

Dinitz: The President's reaction?

Kissinger: Yes.

Allon: If the Egyptians and Israelis agree?

Kissinger: It is a domestic problem for us.

Allon: Two additional stations make the whole difference?

Kissinger: The first two stations make a hell of a lot of difference.

Allon: This I understand. But the additional two?


Kissinger: How do you explain what is the rationale for four stations? This is the problem. Two stations you are explaining by saying they look both ways--an extension of the U-2 flights.

Rabin: Warning. It's a military term. I would say, since it is a very, very key piece of terrain, and it is mountainous, etc., you need here a tactical warning station that will cover the area and give warning to any infiltration and movement to this area.

Allon: On both sides.

Rabin: Of course.

Kissinger: Yes, but our generals--who are not exactly distinguished by excessive care when it comes to public statements--will immediately point out that this is crazy.



Sisco: The question that arises: is there no other way? What if it is X, Y and Z?

Kissinger: General Brown came out with 50 ways that we could do it better without being in the Passes. He has now gotten the message.

Peres: We admit it is not simply a military problem. It is basically a political one.

Kissinger: If you say that publicly before the Congress acts on it, then you may turn the Congress around. You ask your own Ambassador not in my presence. He knows the Congress at least as well as we do. It is not an easy matter to put to the Congress. It will pass the Congress. The next question is how much public dispute will arise.

Rabin: What I would propose is: you put our point of view. You would not sum up with the Egyptians anything before you will come to tell us what is their reaction.

Kissinger: We can't do these things piecemeal.

Rabin: I understand, but on this issue. We will discuss every issue.

Kissinger: If we can get this whole complex settled, maybe we can get four stations, I don't know.

Rabin: We will come to each point, but we have to sum up. We understand it is part of the whole plan.

Kissinger: I will put your point.

Rabin: Now, the Umm Khisheiba, it's clear.

Kissinger: Let me make it clear: They thought they were making an enormous concession to us; at least the President thought, as you remember from his talk, that he thought he had achieved a tremendous thing, when he agreed to an American running of Umm Khisheiba. We are now going a step further and saying, in effect, that the Israeli-American management will just be a symbolic one, just enough to put the American flag over there.



But I am certain that beyond that it cannot be pushed. So we are talking about American symbolic management, but, in effect, Israeli operation. We are not going to run it. It will be run by Israelis, but there will be some American presence in there that permits us to say it is technically an American-managed station.

Rabin: With an American flag.

Kissinger: We will not interfere in what you are doing or you don't have to tell us even what you are doing. The same would be true of the Egyptian station.

Allon: Do you have any idea where they want to locate?

Kissinger: They didn't tell us. We gave the requirements that you put forward and they accepted it.

Allon: On the axis. . . .?

Kissinger: The last word I have from Sadat would be that he would leave it up to Gamasy, and I even raised the point which I think Dinitz made to me: what do you get by being 15 kilometers further forward? They said the same can be said about Umm Khisheiba.

Peres: Umm Khisheiba is a place that we have invested close to 300 million pounds and they don't have it. We have it.

Rabin: It is located rightly.

Peres: But the problems about the Americans being near the station is very much that the station wouldn't lose its original meaning, namely that it wouldn't become a military post instead of an early-warning station. One of the problems we have in the thinning out zone is according to our estimation the Egyptians are having double as many soldiers as we agreed.

Gur: We can't demonstrate it.

Rabin: We can't prove it.

Peres: The last report we got is they have there close to 20,000 soldiers. I think that we were precisely true to the agreement. We never had a single soldier more than we have agreed upon.



Allon: Sometimes less.

Peres: Well, we have good reasons for it, but a contra is a contra, and there is one thing about Israel: we kept all the contracts.

Kissinger: I smiled because I don't know whether you saw the cartoon in the Washington Star. When you made that unilateral thinning out. The cartoon showed one of your commanders saying: "They want a withdrawal? All right. Meyer, one step to the rear!" [Laughter]

Peres: Yet it helped. It was a psychological exercise, I agree, but a positive one.

Kissinger: [To Sisco] Does our intelligence show anything like that?

Sisco: We have had these reports from you but we can't verify it.

Peres: We wouldn't like to wake up one morning and find in the early warning station 500 or 600, a whole platoon or brigade of Egyptians, and neither would they.

Kissinger: But if it is under American management, that's impossible. We won't be able to run the radar.

Peres: No, no, we don't want you to.

Kissinger: We are talking about the Egyptian early warning station: we are not talking about yours. I am assuming that the other useful purpose that the Americans will serve at the early warning station is that they won't become military outposts. That's what the Americans can do there.

Rabin: And the basic numbers.

Kissinger: And the basic numbers. We have to agree -- assuming the Egyptians agree to this concept -- I think it is in both side's interest to prevent free movement to and from the station. There should be regular intervals on which it should occur. We should check it.

Rabin: Let's leave it. There is some advantage of free movement so long as it is controlled at the gates.



Peres: That's why we want to have the American stations on both sides of the major crossroads. You know, it will serve not so much as a controlling factor but as a deterrent installation. Really, I mean, the fact that it will be here and here, in my judgment, will create a different atmosphere all over the place.

Kissinger: One problem Sadat has is how he can present this. My enthusiasm for this agreement is very little at this point. I have to tell you quite honestly my personal view. Because one problem is that neither side is going to defend it with any great conviction to his public. And one problem that the Egyptians will have is to make sure that they will not be accused of the same things that some of you are being accused of, namely, having sold out the Arab cause. So this is a very difficult problem for Sadat, how to present it.

Rabin: It seems that he is very good at this.

Peres: We are talking about the management of the buffer zone.

Kissinger: I haven't talked to Sadat since Salzburg. And I didn't talk to him alone there.

Peres: The real problem is the management of the buffer zone, because he has agreed to the UN. We have agreed. All of us. But the UN -- we are in the strange position that they want to throw us out from the UN and Fahmy stands up, in the face of our public opinion, and says that he can one-sidedly recall the UN forces. Mrs. Meir thought she had agreement on the Gaza Strip, and then found out it was removed. So this simply adds stability to the management of the buffer zone, for the duration of the agreement. There is a meeting of the boycott organization in Cairo.

Kissinger: Well, as I said, this will have to be part of the final package: the Beta Line, the exit to the Passes, the Umm Khisheiba and the Egyptian station and the various adjustments we had agreed to consider.

Peres: Can we go now a little bit to the military?

Rabin: We shall come back and cover all the subjects.

Peres: As you say, it is a package deal. We are coming to the American military assistance arrangement for the future. In the letter of the President we have asked that we will be somewhat stronger, in addition

to the F-16, for which we are appreciative. You know, if we would have a chance, have the time, we would go directly to the F-16. We couldn't go in the middle to the F-15, short that we have to cover a time gap.

Kissinger: For my own information, do you consider the F-16 better than the F-18?

Rabin: What is the F-18?

Kissinger: The F-18 is the version that the Air Force rejected.


Gur: You mean 17?

Kissinger: 17, the Northrop one, the two-engine one.

Peres: We prefer the F-16 because it is a little bit cheaper. We can't afford it; it is not just the initial investment.

Kissinger: I have had some Air Force Europeans tell me that they really prefer, if they could have chosen, they would have chosen the 17 or whatever the other is. Because it was our Air Force's plane. But it is up to you. We have no interest in it.

Peres: That we shall be in a position at the conclusion of the agreement to tell explicitly our Cabinet and our Foreign Affairs Committee and Defence Committee in the Parliament that we have your approval for the Pershing. Now, what is the logic of the Pershing? It carries the same logic as the Lance. There are countries that received a sizeable quantity of the Frog and the Scud. The Scud is a long-range missile, actually the same range as the Pershing, and we have hundreds of them surrounding Israel from all parts. They have it in Syria; they have it in Egypt; they have it in Iraq, they probably have it in Libya as well. The main purpose of having it is to equalize the deterrent capacity of the two camps, of the two parties, if you wish. Upon previous negotiations we had, we found out that they carry non-nuclear warhead, conventional warhead. In this case we might reduce a little bit the number of Lance and have instead a little bit of Pershing. I say a little bit. We know our limitations and we cannot afford very much. In the letter which was proposed, the Pershing was put in a somewhat inferior place and in a somewhat undecided language. [See draft Presidential letter at Tab B].




The three items that we would like to have clear before we shall go into more detailed negotiations are the F-16, the Pershings and the sophisticated technology, which we have actually requested and which was basically rejected, either because of the reassessment or because this is new technique.

So, Mr. Secretary, I want you to know our feeling about it. The Russians time and again are introducing new techniques, new technology in the Middle East and this puts us in an impossible situation all the time. Whenever the Russians are angry, they bring in a new generation of weaponry to the Middle East. What they have brought in are the MiG-23; I think the Arabs have already more than hundreds of them. They brought in the Scud in large quantities. There is on the way a new tank which poses for us some problems. There are some new air-to-ground missiles which we don't know exactly their performance. Some new sea-to-sea missiles, which we know about their existence; we don't know yet about their performance.

And about another thing. I am sure we are convinced that our major effort is really to avoid a war. We have to have in addition to the agreement with Egypt a psychological and strategic deterrent and the quantity to maintain this balance. Because, let's face it, even if we shall have agreement with the Egyptians, terror will be continued by the PLO, which we shall have to take into account. We don't know exactly what will happen on the part of Syria, Iraq and Jordan. We are certainly uneasy about the new connections between Hussein and Assad, and how do you say, the rapprochement between Iraq and Syria creates a threatening band around Israel, which would include Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Jordan. They are fortifying all along the frontiers, including Jordan. Jordan gradually is becoming a military force. They are going to have something like 700 tanks. They have already 60 or 70 planes. If they will have the Hawk missiles, it will add very much to their overall military picture.

And we feel that while we will have an agreement which we hope will open the road to peace and settlement, we would like to have also equally to have a deterrent so that our own people will feel more reassured.

The three items which we would like clearly -- I distinguish between our general request and the specific request, if I may -- that we would like to conclude upon your shuttle trip this time, and this is the F-16, which you have agreed; the Pershing, which I have said was in inferior



language and in an inferior place to the F-16 and therefore it creates a doubt; and the sophisticated technology which we until now were rejected, in the face of new technology on the Russian side. That's the first point.

The second point is that the Arabs, having a combination of western technology and Russian technology, more and more we find it difficult to have our really early warning intelligence in Israel. The secrecy of their communications, the sophistication of their electronic stations, actually makes it impossible for us to detect an Arab aggressive intention, even in a matter of hours. We have asked from you, and until now it wasn't settled, for some sophisticated intelligence and communications equipment which are a must for us. And this includes also some ...

Kissinger: What specifically are you talking about?

Peres: You know, it is a list of equipment that our intelligence handed over [REDACTED]

Kissinger: [REDACTED]

Peres: Until now, just a rejection. And this includes some flying radar stations mounted upon naval planes, which we feel would help us.

Kissinger: You mean sea planes?

Rabin: It is a navy plane. A Phantom is a navy plane, too.

Peres: The number is EA6B and E2C. These are airborne warning radar aircraft.

Kissinger: Do they already exist?

Peres: Your Navy has 6 of them.

Kissinger: Are they new?

Peres: They are completely new. The radar stations are better because you can overlook from above. It gives you a wider range of early warning. They are very expensive airplanes. I think four of them should cost something like \$160 million. Our pilots tried them already.



Kissinger: How is that possible if we haven't agreed to it?

Peres: I don't think on the part of the Pentagon there was much objection to it.

Gur: It was on the list before the negotiation. For Matmon-B.

Peres: Before the reassessment. Then we have the Matmon-B and the outstanding list of material that we have asked for, which, as you know, some of it is concluded and we would like to renew the negotiations. I am aware we can't do it here around this table. But we would like to do it at a later date, immediately upon the conclusion of the negotiations in the United States.

Kissinger: We have agreed to that.

Peres: But what we would like is on the three items, if it is possible, and for us it carries weight. It is of great importance. These are the F-16, the Pershing, the sophisticated equipment and the early warning and communication equipment which is necessary for the wider early warning system of our defense.

Rabin: I would like to remind you, when it comes to ground-to-ground missiles, on May 31, 1974, in the letter that was signed by President Nixon, it was written, "With respect to ground-to-ground missiles, I agree that Israel should be equipped with weapons similar to those supplied by the Russians to both the Egyptians and the Syrians. I assure you of my support in this program."

Peres: Then I would like to raise another problem. We have to have this \$150 million that the Prime Minister talked to you about in Salzburg.

Kissinger: Salzburg was Sadat.

Peres: In Bonn. About the building of the new line in the Sinai Peninsula.

Now, I wonder if part of the American military assistance to us, to Israel, can go not just in the way of equipment but in the way of funds of money. I want to explain why. There is a great deal of material that we can produce locally. It may reduce a little bit the list of weapons that we ask for, because we produce, as you know, in our own country at least one plane, one fighter. We are on our way to producing tanks. We produce some missiles. And this would help us tremendously in

developing our own infrastructure of production. It will reduce our requests from the United States, and also we won't be so much tied up with the changes of the American prices which are quite heavy upon us. Just to give one example: for the 600 tanks we have bought we have to pay now an additional \$96 million. Not that we don't have inflation. As a matter of fact, we are much better than you are when it comes to inflation. We wonder whether something like 10 percent or 15 percent of the total American aid which is military assistance can be given to us in the way of free money, instead of in the way of American materiel.

Kissinger: I don't know. I quite honestly don't know. Hal [Saunders], do you know what the mechanics of this is?

Saunders: It would have to be some sort of supporting assistance.

Kissinger: It can't be done out of the Pentagon funds. We'd have to shift something to the economic aid, in some form of free money in economic aid. My guess is it would have to be shifted into supporting assistance.

Saunders: 10-15 percent of the cost of the new line?

Peres: No, of the money allocated to the military, shift 10-15 percent of it to free money.

Rabin: Supporting assistance is not always free money. In our case, we have to purchase goods in the United States for the whole sum.

Sisco: We will look into it.

Kissinger: I see no objection in principle, if there is a technical way of doing it.

Peres: I have checked and what I have learned is that there is no legal objection. It is a policy matter and this will make us a little bit less demanding from you; a little bit more independent.

Rabin: Less demanding in terms of items.

Kissinger: With whom could you have checked that there is no legal objection?

Peres: With our own experts. We have some people who went into American laws. I am not suggesting this as a legal opinion. From our initial checks done by our own people. We have not checked it with any Americans, obviously.

Allon: If there is a political agreement to the idea, then it can be checked legally.

Kissinger: I will have to check it. I have never heard the proposition.

Peres: This is the first time we are putting it. We wouldn't mind a larger portion, but then there may be some objections to it.

Kissinger: For all I know, it may be very easy.

Rabin: I understand that you are ready to check it.

Kissinger: One difficulty in negotiating is that each group we talk to starts a new negotiation. I made a mistake by agreeing in ten seconds on the F-16 with Simcha.

Dinitz: It wasn't exactly 10 seconds.

Kissinger: It was immediately. If I had dragged it out a bit, it would have been considered more significant. But I don't believe in playing games on these things. The problem for us is this: Those items which represent a logical extension of present technology, I don't see why we should hold you up on and use them for blackmail or for concessions. Therefore, if we can sell you F-4 and in principle F-15, to hold up on the F-16 would be simply a form of blackmail which is unworthy of our relationship. So as the Ambassador knows, I agreed to it immediately, without any discussion and without checking with anybody.

Dinitz: Except for the President.

Kissinger: But I told you right away.

Dinitz: That you will warmly support it.

Kissinger: Now, there are two problems for us. One, on the Pershing it is not exactly the same as the Scud. What is our estimate of the range of the Scud? Less than 200 miles.



Allon: The Scud is 400 kilometers.

Kissinger: Our estimate of the range of the Scud is between 160 and 200 miles. That's our estimate. 160 miles is a little short of 300 kilometers. It is in the 300-350 kilometer range and highly inaccurate. We are sure it can hit a country. It may be able to hit a city but it cannot hit any military target. Nevertheless, to hit Israel from where they are they can hit Israel from where they are.

The range of the Pershing is around 600 miles.

Peres: Mr. Secretary, I am afraid. . .

Kissinger: I am afraid I am right on this one. The Pershing I am sure about. I think it is carried formally at about 400 miles but it can in fact go 6-700 miles. That one I do know about. That's not exactly a comparable weapon to the Scud. That is a weapon that is really a new order of magnitude and a better weapon than the Scud.

Allon: It should be better, because it's American!

Kissinger: And it is an extremely visible weapon. On top of the Lance, which isn't even here yet. The Lance is what?

Peres: 70-80 kilometers.

Kissinger: Last year I talked to Dayan. I told him then -- and then the thing was dropped -- that it is easier for us to help with your missile program than to introduce an entirely new magnitude of weapons. But then he dropped the idea. I don't know whether that's still a feasible idea. Especially if there is some free money; you know, if some of the defense money is given free.

On the intelligence items, I don't know about those. They represent to me less of a conceptual problem. But at any rate, I think the request for the Pershing came in when the President was in Vail and when we had no systematic means of considering. It is one thing for him to make the decision on the F-16, which you can justify on the grounds that it is a logical evolution from the F-15, in fact, a cheaper version of the F-15, than the Pershing which is an entirely new order of magnitude. So this is why we want to have a separate discussion about the Pershing or an alternative to the Pershing which we can perhaps agree upon.



On the early warning, I have to tell you honestly, I am going to find out what exactly you are talking about. It presents less of a conceptual problem. It is clearly defensive. It provides you with early warning capacity and unless it presents some technology which is entirely new.... The plane isn't the issue, anyway. The issue is the equipment on it. But it doesn't present the same sort of policy issue as the Pershing does, which we have to put through our machinery in some systematic way before we come to a decision. On the early warning, let me check into it and see. That does not present to me any particular conceptual problem.

Peres: On the technical side, we have asked the previous time and this time again for the FLIR.

Dinitz: Night vision.

Peres: Night infrared, which is a new technique. You know the Russian tanks are equipped with night vision. Our tank corps is without it. And we are very much in need of it.

Kissinger: I never heard of that. Can't some of these items be handled in technical discussions?

Peres: I will tell you what the problem is. It can, no problem about it. There is a technical objection to it that unless there will be a political overruling decision, we don't stand a chance to get it.

Kissinger: Why is that? Because it's new? Is it very secret?

Peres: It is a new technique. It is not secret. Everybody is working on it. The whole world is busy doing it all over. I believe America was first to come out with it. It will somewhat compensate. So unless there will be a political decision, I can see the technological reasons for objections.

Kissinger: Well, we have three categories of proposals you have given. One is an extension of the existing technology, which I have already agreed to in principle. Second is clearly defensive weapons like the early warning, which since I don't know what you are talking about, I first have to do some checking in Washington and I can get you a better answer when I come back or the next time after I come back.



Peres: On that I don't see much problem, by the way. From the indications also of the Pentagon on the early warning.

Kissinger: You clearly have better communications with the Pentagon than I do.

Allon: Naturally.

Rabin: You said three categories.

Kissinger: And the third is the missiles, which is an entirely new order so far as the Middle East, of major strategic capability. And that I think we have to study.

Peres: And the night vision, the FLIR?

Kissinger: I don't know what that is. I put that more in the second category.

Peres: Also the problem of the cash.

Kissinger: If there is a practical way of doing it. There, too, I have to check on how to do it. It's new.

Peres: It's a new point. This is the first time; we have never put it before.

Rabin: Now, we come to the overall assistance, financial assistance. Where do you stand? We sent out a group of people. They sat for days with your people. Simcha knows better about it.

Dinitz: The Secretary knows everything that there is to know on this.

Kissinger: I was told by the President on Saturday, as your Ambassador no doubt reported to you: the President has enormous reluctance to go to \$2 billion and an even greater reluctance to go beyond \$2 billion. He told me to put to you \$1.9 billion and to settle for \$2.1. I decided in the stage in which we were, we should not play games, and I gave you immediately \$2.1 billion, on Saturday. But my instructions were to put to you \$1.9 billion and to settle for \$2.1 if I were absolutely required to go beyond \$2.

Allon: A fall back position.

Kissinger: That's right. He is under the impression from his advisers, from his political advisers, that there again, as we approach and go beyond

\$2 billion, we are going to have a tremendous domestic problem. From his point of view, he has the additional problem that he is cutting back severely on domestic programs. He is vetoing bills right and left that deal with social services for Americans. Two weeks ago he vetoed a bill for lactating mothers. I didn't know what lactating mothers were.

Toon: Milk for breast-feeding mothers.

Kissinger: I don't know how urgent that program is.

Dinitz: It's urgent for the mother!

Kissinger: His conviction has been that the \$2.1 is the limit beyond which he can't go. And, indeed, at your instructions, your Ambassador appealed to me and I put it to the President on Tuesday night to get an increase. On that occasion he refused it. Now, whether during the course of the shuttle -- it will not be a major adjustment; I think it is out of the question -- whether some adjustment is possible during the course of the shuttle, we will have to see. I can tell you flatly, he will not go to \$2.5 billion because he feels that he said to too many people that he will not go to \$2.5 billion.


Allon: You mean he will go to \$2,499 billion?

Kissinger: Well short of \$2.5.

Rabin: I will tell you quite frankly: after the Disengagement Agreement, we then talked about around \$2 billion a year. When President Nixon was here we put the Matmon-B, and the economic aid. I am not saying that we got assurance for it; by no means. But this is what we presented. We lose now as a result of the Abu Rodeis oil field at least \$250 million, and you cannot adjust it?

Kissinger: The way we reached the \$2.1 was through an analysis in which our people thought that \$1.6 billion was a reasonable figure, to which then was added the money for oil, plus the relocation of the defense line. This is why I didn't even present \$1.9, because I couldn't make a rational allocation. But our internal studies have shown that something like \$1.6 was a reasonable figure.

Rabin: Our Finance Minister says that without \$2.5 billion, he will not be able to meet all our needs for defense, civilian needs, oil and reconstruction.



Peres: There was an increase in prices. Since we met with President Nixon and you, the increase of prices of war materials is 23 to 25 percent. A jeep that was in the past \$5,000 is now \$11,000. An armoured personnel carrier, the price increased by \$11 million; on the tank by \$96 million.

Kissinger: They must think your're an oil producer.

Peres: The Redeye, instead of \$3-4,000, is close to \$8,000 or 10,000. But we took the percentage submitted by Secretary Schlesinger before the Congress, which is the average of 23 percent. I think this is the average increase in price. Now, just on a billion and one-half dollars, if you take the increase in price, it is \$350 million, for the same equipment exactly. This is in addition to what the Prime Minister said that one of the problems in the financial part is simply to recover what is lost on the oil, which is very hard on all of us.

Allon: Since we are on the receiving end, it is sometimes not too easy to argue about the amounts of money we are asking our friends to help us with. On the other hand, as you, yourself, Henry, and the President himself, more than once expressed the opinion that you do consider Israel more as an asset rather than a liability, which I fully share. And we all agree that although an agreement will serve first and foremost the two parties concerned to the agreement, namely Egypt and Israel, it helps also, and I am very glad that it does, the United States and maybe Western Europe.

Our economic team which presented our case in Washington came back with the impression that your team -- which really did a very good work and showed great interest in the figures and facts which were drawn before them -- they felt that at least they convinced their counterparts about the necessities.

Kissinger: Who was it?

Toon: Nooter.

Allon: They were not authorized to give answers -- they, the American team -- because this is a political decision.

Kissinger: What is their impression that the American team agreed to?

Dinitz: They didn't agree to anything.

Allon: They were not expected to. That was left to you and to us.

The situation is very difficult. We are still suffering from the results of the Yom Kippur War, also economically, not only politically and morally and so on. We do hope that as a result of the agreement which I hope will be signed, we have to embark on new schemes of development and really raising, not the standard of living -- we are going even to reduce the standard of living, as those who watch our economic policy here know that we are imposing on citizens great hardships and we shall continue in this policy. In addition to what my colleagues said, it must be seen, not just done.

[At the request of Secretary Kissinger, the meeting recessed for a half-hour at 11:40. The Secretary conferred with the U.S. side in the back office as follows:]

Kissinger: We have two problems. One is how to respond to this, which is minor. The second problem is I'm beginning to have serious doubts about this exercise. What do I tell Sadat tonight? They're presenting it to their public as American rape and to use it to create an American obligation in the future. They have no intention of presenting it as an achievement. They've saved all the tough ones for the shuttle. There's been massive deception involved. They told us: "You wanted us out of the passes, now you've got our political needs." They're not remotely out of the Giddi.

Toon: They can't present it as a defeat. They can't politically.

Sisco: They won't present it as an extortion.

Kissinger: We can't pursue the strategy we were pursuing, with an agreement or without an agreement. The only benefit is it shows we can do something.

Sisco: They're exacting an awfully high price. And almost minimally altering their strategic situation.

Kissinger: It's better, because they've got the whole corridor as a hostage.

Sisco: It's not worse. Third, whatever assistance we provide.



What do we get out of it? The continuing American management of the diplomacy and the dominant role of the U.S. Plus whatever time we gain. You've said it to them ad infinitum.

Kissinger: But that was under conditions of some intellectual rapport. Golda was objectively tougher. Once you got Golda and Dayan on the fundamentals, you could talk about where you were going. This group is in the grocery business. They're selling bags of potatoes.

Toon: This is the group you have to work with.

Sisco: They are not sentimental about America.

Kissinger: That doesn't mean anything.

These guys -- they're not saying one thing that shows a grasp of the situation they'll face afterwards.

Lord: They assume we have no alternative.

Kissinger: Things will accelerate in the Arab world after this.

Sisco: We'll be in a war next year.

Kissinger: Maybe in '77. Do you think the Arabs will stand still while Pershings are being sent in there?

I'll send a message to the President to give me the option of breaking off the talks.

Lord: One thing you can't do is give them a veto over our policy and on the Golan Heights.

Sisco: It's not a negotiation among friends.

Kissinger: At some point we will be asked to pay the bill for Western Europe, Japan, and a confrontation with the Soviet Union. We might as well bite the bullet.

Lord: I was here once before, at an earlier stage, and it was much different.

Rodman: We were talking fundamentals.

Sisco: We'll go for an overall.

Saunders: One reason to keep the aid level down is to keep our freedom of decision.

Kissinger: I'll send a message to Scowcroft telling these agencies to stay out of it while there is a negotiation. To let them fly a plane....

Saunders: That was done a long time ago.

Kissinger: I've got to talk to Sadat. If we keep on like this, we'll be here like on the Syrian negotiation.

Saunders: I have a suggestion: Could we ask them, on the stations, if all else is settled....

Toon: They'll accept four. They'll accept two.

Kissinger: There is no doubt they'll accept but they'll do it in a way that they are accepting a U.S. -Egyptian deal.

Sisco: No, they can't get away with that. They've been in the forefront on this. The world knows they're making it conditional on the stations.

Kissinger: You don't understand. To the U.S., two is too many. To their Cabinet, they'll sell it as something we rammed down their throat. Commentary, Ted Draper, will use it as an example of Kissinger perfidy -- agreeing to the stations and making a separate deal with Sadat on two. That is why they carefully left those stations to the end.


Every change in their line, plus the change in the Beta line, will be something I did to them.

They'll blame me in America for even two stations. By the time Rumsfeld has finished his backgrounders, it'll be something I cooked up with the Israelis. The Jewish intellectuals will cut it down.

Rabin won't tell his Cabinet that I've told him for four weeks that two is all he can get.

Toon: No.

Kissinger: Ted Draper....



Toon: You shouldn't read Commentary!

Sisco: No, they'll say it whether you fall flat or whether you get an agreement.

Kissinger: It's not me.

Saunders: No, the country.

Kissinger: I want a memo to the President. There is a limit beyond which the U.S. cannot be pushed by client states.

Sisco: This so far isn't consistent with what Allon said. He said, "Let's get it done."

Kissinger: You don't get the point. I'm not a FSO pointed in the direction of an agreement. I'm conducting the foreign policy of the United States. I'm worried about after the agreement.

Saunders: We all feel we're better off with one.

Kissinger: I have to talk to Sadat. If he thinks he's screwed by it and is weaker....

Sisco: He gets two very important things: they're out of the passes, and the oil.

Kissinger: You don't mind if he gives me his opinion...

If he's convinced it's going in the right direction, then he'll do what he did in '74 -- namely settle all these minor things easily. If he thinks they're trying to nickle and dime him, he'll... The last time, when we presented the ridiculous Rosenne draft, he froze it. That's what broke it. The question will be, will he make the agreement, with an arrière pensée that he'll get them later?

Sisco: It depends on how you present it to him, Henry.

[The full meeting with the Israelis resumed at 12:15 p.m.]

Kissinger: We'll leave at 7:15. Why don't you fill the time with what you want?



Rabin: We have reached this point. Now, we have got the Presidential letter and some understanding between the United States and Israel. There are certain points, but we can do it later on during the process.

Kissinger: We can also discuss a schedule.

Rabin: Yes. Because I believe the shorter the shuttle will be the better.

Kissinger: I agree with you.

Allon: With positive results.

Kissinger: Either way.

Rabin: Either way.

Kissinger: Either way is acceptable to me. At any rate, it should be short and decisive.

Rabin: Exactly. Therefore, we have to go now... When we talk about the lines and the arrangements on the ground, we have discussed the American presence. We have discussed the warning stations. Now comes the question of the lines. I prefer to divide them north of the Passes, the Passes, south of the Passes, the Beta line. And I think when it comes to the south, the access road....

Kissinger: We can do that on the next one.

Rabin: We can do it on the next one.

Kissinger: There it is primarily a cosmetic problem.

Rabin: When it comes to the area north, the Chief of Staff will discuss each sector. We know you have to go to Egypt and you have to go with positions on these issues. I think this is the major point. Let's either agree or disagree and then we will know if there is an agreement. [Gur goes out to get a map.]

Peres: The funny part is that we have compared the Egyptian map, the American map and the Israeli map; all are different. We have discussed it with your expert -- Hoskinson -- that strangely enough the three maps, when it comes to a detailed picture, are different.

Kissinger: We have a table model. We ought to go over that.

[A map is hung from the curtain rod.]

Peres: This is the American map.

Kissinger: What do you mean by the "American map"?

Saunders: You can buy it from the Map Service.

Kissinger: This is a map I've never seen.

[The map is moved to the air conditioner on the back wall.]

Rabin: Just tell us exactly what points you want to discuss.

Kissinger: Let's discuss the passes first.

Rabin: All right.

Kissinger: Let me explain my basic problem with respect to the Passes. As you know, we presented the **Blue Line** to the Egyptians in June and it was rejected. Whenever they talked then about going out of the Passes, they had reason to believe that they were talking about the **Blue Line** plus getting out of the Passes. They had reason to believe it not from you but from the general tenor of the discussion. Then when you went out of the Passes or whatever it was, you presented a change in the line to us, about which I had doubts, but which I promised you I would support with the Egyptians as my judgment that this was the best thing that Israel could do, and I kept my promise. It was presented to me and through me to the President with the arguments on a number of occasions, which I have written down here [indicating Rodman memo, Tab C, in his briefing book] that "Sadat wanted us to be out of the Passes; we are out of the Passes; so he has his political objective." And that's more or less how we presented it to him, with that argument.

Now, we find that in the Mitla Pass -- they haven't raised it; I have no reason to raise it -- my geographer questions whether this can be considered out of the Passes. And in the Giddi Pass there is no conceivable stretch of the imagination by which you can argue that being 20 meters, if the summit is that much, in effect being on the summit can be defined as being out of the Passes.

Now, this will have to be considered as an act of monumental bad faith by Sadat when he knows the actual location-- monumental bad faith by us. And that is the thing that worries me most.

Rabin: The question is: what is the definition "to be out of the Passes", even though it is your definition. When we talked, whenever we talked, we said to you we will be on the eastern slope of the peaks in the area where the roads go to the Passes.

Kissinger: Well, look....

Rabin: But let's not talk in generalities.


Kissinger: What happened was this: you presented a concept to us with two Egyptian companies and a line. The first time I saw this new line was in Gymnich [on July 12], if you remember.

Rabin: The double line.

Kissinger: So when I talked to the Ambassador in the Virgin Islands, in my mind it was the old line plus further movement in the Passes. You weren't obligated to this. Under those conditions, I felt at that time the major problem was that you were on the western slope. I felt if you moved to the eastern slope, plus these two companies, we might be able to manage something. Then you changed the concept completely -- which I supported -- but then the Egyptian companies disappeared, and then the whole thing was sold on the grounds that you were out of the Passes.

Now, I think we can stretch the point of what out of the Passes means and not accept an absolute geographer's definition of what is out of the Passes. And I think that Sadat will be fairly reasonable about it. Though I have no reason -- I haven't heard from him about it. Except when he first saw the map, he said, "well, is it out of the Passes?" Eilts said, "Yes, it is out of the Passes, because these were our instructions." And he accepted that. Then he raised to us that to them when they plotted it didn't look like it. But he said, "If there is any problem, send an American there and let the American tell whether it is in or out of the Passes. I can't make that decision." Which is not an exactly outrageous way of proceeding.

So we sent an American there and he came to the same conclusion that Sadat did. There is no other conclusion that you can come to. Your



own newspapers write that you are two kilometers inside the Passes, which is exactly what our man says too.

Allon: That's not how we did it! The basic idea that the Egyptians could claim that we are out of the Passes and we would claim that we are still somewhere inside. The papers....

Rabin: We will not say publicly that we are in the Passes, when it comes to the roads, but we are in military control in the area.

Kissinger: That you have achieved, and that we are supporting, and we are not even asking you to change the major part. I think myself that if you move on the road, you could keep the heights around the road, and there would be no.... We have not been in negotiation with Sadat on this on the ground because we didn't want to get him to say something that we then create a split here. We'd rather support something. My impression is that at this point Sadat knows very well that he has no significant military option there and that all he wants is to be able to draw a line that he can defend as out of the Passes, even if it then loops around in such a way that you control the surrounding heights. We are not contesting that.

Peres: Do I understand correctly that the problem is concentrated around the Giddi Pass?

Kissinger: They are not raising the Mitla Pass and we sure as hell won't raise the Mitla. I cannot exclude that they will raise the Mitla Pass, too, if they come to the same conclusion as Hoskinson and the geographer did. I can't tell you that. They have not raised it and I promise you we won't raise it. It looks to me, looking at our relief map of the Mitla Pass, that there are a few hundred yards in which the topography doesn't change greatly, in which one can play around. I don't want to argue that. Let's see what they raise.

Peres: The difference is one kilometer, I believe.

Gur: [Gets up to the map] We are talking about the Giddi Pass and the Mitla Pass. First of all, I want to show you that our line in the north is going about six kilometers north of the Giddi Pass and that area is not such a good area for maneuvers. You can only have a road if you build it. No mobile force can really move through these hills. It is even worse in the South. That's the Mitla Pass and that area, Jabel Rasha. This is something that until now nobody built any road, and if we are talking about our possibility to close any Egyptian threat through the straits -- the passes -- it is not so easy, and I will go in a minute into it, to explain why we must sit on the high places.

Yesterday in our small talk, I said to you that it would be a mistake to judge any military operation only by its military value. The question for us is not if the Egyptians would be able to thrust something very fast with big forces, but to realize the fact that if they want they have enough airborne forces to catch all that area in one big operation, to move quite fast, especially from the Beta line, and to give a good backing to such an airborne operation in that area, with a lot of infantry it would be quite difficult for us in such an area to inflict any countermeasure. We will be able to do it in that area after we concentrate a lot of forces, but that will be only after they achieve what they want to achieve. And in the last war we already realized that the main achievement is a political one and not so much to catch another kilometer in the area. So when we are talking about sitting around the Passes, it is not only to keep them, but it mainly to deter.

And if I may go back to the American posts, I think the main difference between the sensors and Americans is that the sensor will be able to give only indications if anybody passes practically on the road, but not any indication about anybody who outflanks it and goes in the area. So from that point of view, of a deterrent, the sensor doesn't play even a small part in comparison to people who will stay there. It goes to the whole concept of what we are afraid of that the Egyptians can do.

Now, about the Passes themselves. This is in the area, and you can see that curve, the flat area [outside the eastern end of the Giddi]. There is no discussion about the opening of that area, and you could see it in the air photo that you had and your people could see it in the area. Now, the distance of the road, of our line, to the Giddi road, is not a few meters from the peaks; it is much more, and he saw it. You can see it on the map. It's some distance.

Kissinger: We have had a scale model built. [To Dinitz] You saw it. We will be glad to show you our scale model.

[Arrangements were made to bring the scale model from the King David Hotel. Saunders goes out.]

Kissinger: The President did not see it. All the President saw were aerial photos which are not very conclusive.

Gur: [Referring to the wall map] On the road in the Giddi Pass, our line crosses the road about 350 meters from the ridge line, and this is on the eastern slopes.

Kissinger: When I said 10 meters, I meant 10 to 20 meters in elevation from the top. In altitude. It is practically at the top. It is 20 meters from the top; that's my impression.

Gur: I think you are wrong, because the difference between the road and the high places there is about 200 yards.

Kissinger: I am saying the drop in elevation is only about 20 meters.

Gur: I am afraid you are wrong. The question with your people was -- I mean, I don't know exactly what they said, but being with them in the area, they said that in different points one can define what is the exit or the entrance to the straits, but when we are talking in military terms, no doubt that here that line is on the eastern slopes and from the point at which the line crosses the road, you see exactly how it opens to the east, and that was exactly the point on which we were standing and on which I drew that line.

In the Mitla Pass, as they realized, it is much easier to define, because in the Mitla Pass all the hills are much lower and you see it quite clearly that we have two military dispositions on the highest point. We went down from these hills about 500 yards and that blue line, I mean, it crosses the road on a certain valley and everybody can see there is no elevation. Those hills are much lower and it opens to the east.

Kissinger: The problem we have is that I have no question whatever that you have a good military reason to have the line where it is. That's not the issue. The issue is that I convinced Sadat to let you have every high point between the two Passes -- which was not a self-evident proposition to him, and it was not easy -- which you know you have. That we have not contested -- not even not contested; we have strongly supported you in everything of the high points between the two Passes, with the proposition that you are out of the Passes, and so that he can make his political claim that he achieved what he said he had achieved even though it makes no military sense. That's my problem. I am not saying that you are being arbitrary in drawing the line as you did. I am saying the way the line is put is incompatible with what I have told Sadat in order to sell everything else on the basis of assurances that I have received. That's my problem.

On the Mitla, I think that we will deal at most with 100 yards or so, if it ever comes up. But I am not raising it since they didn't raise it. They never raised it.



Rabin: I was at the Mitla. There should be no problem whatsoever. The opposite.

Kissinger: [Laughs] I think the danger of Israel's going too far is not one on which I am spending sleepless nights.

[An aerial photo of the Passes is brought in.]

Gur: The brown line is the highest points. The green is....

Kissinger: The green is our version of the line.

Gur: When the Minister said before that there was a difference in the maps, this is something we are not discussing because that can be managed. It is about 100 yards one way or another.

Kissinger: We gave this to you, that we thought even the green line was wrong, was not accurate.

Sisco: We were not suggesting a line. This line, as I was at the meeting with Saunders, was what we interpreted where your line was located.

Gur: About that interpretation is not important. It can be made by technicians.

Kissinger: Either version of where your line is is not consistent with the definition that we gave the Egyptians.

Gur: That's the point; not what is between the technicians.

Kissinger: Our view was, Hoskinson's view....

Gur: He can tell you; we were together in the area. He said -- the geographer, not Hoskinson -- he said that in his view from that point where that ridge goes down to the road, to that point, he said from a geographical point of view, that's the entrance.

Kissinger: And you said you could hold it to the end. [Laughter]

Gur: What I said, I will come back in a minute. We will be able to hold it, don't worry about it. Then we went on, and he said, as much as we went east, he said. "As a matter of fact, it is quite difficult to decide here from a geographical point of view what it is, because you see here the

hills on both sides continue." So it depends on how you define what is the strait. If it is only when the road goes between the two rocks or when you have hills on both sides, so here we stopped and they realized there was no discussion about it.

Sisco: Simcha and I measured it. It's as close as it can be to one kilometer. In a straight line, not even curves.

Gur: I don't want to go into what they were discussing among themselves, the three that were there, but there was one line and another line and another line in which they tried to describe what is the entrance or the exit.

Kissinger: All I know is Hoskinson told me that about a kilometer from that point, as I told you, seems to him to be the right place where -- it wouldn't be a wildly generous definition of the end of the Passes, but it was a plausible definition. His description to us of what a possible point is that we could defend was one kilometer. What his assignment from us was, to go there. We didn't tell him anything of the previous discussion. We just told him, "Define in the most generous way possible for the Israelis what is the end of the Pass," and he said it is a kilometer from....

Dinitz: From the line that we suggested.

Gur: From that line, one kilometer, if I understand what you said, should be something here [pointing].

Kissinger: That's what he said, one kilometer.

Gur: I am trying to translate it on the map.

[Saunders returns.]

Kissinger: Is it coming?

Saunders: Yes. Either Sam or Colonel Forsman will come with it.

Gur: What I showed them and everybody can see it on the map also-- that's why I was asking you yesterday-- from this point you see that ridge on the southern part goes very strongly in a very sharp way down, and from that point you see the break of the rock on the northern side. That's why we put it here. In accordance with what we said, it would be on the eastern slope and on the exit side of the strait.

Kissinger: When you say "eastern slope", it was in a different concept. I mean, "eastern slope" is the end of June. "Eastern end" is the end of July, and these are two different concepts.

Dinitz: One is spring and one is summer.

Allon: Why can't we continue with other lines until the model arrives?

Rabin: We don't need a model for the other sectors. Let's go now to the Beta line.

Kissinger: I have told you our position. The last thing they asked for is 4 kilometers. I have given my personal assessment that we can probably get them to settle for less. I have not gone back to them because I didn't want to go 500 yards at a time; each time they make what they consider a concession, it becomes harder to change the next one. So I have not said any more except to register their four kilometers request. And I have told....

Dinitz: Simcha.

Kissinger: ... Simcha that we could keep it at about a kilometer and a half, not uniform, as something that we can probably defend. Now, I have not discussed it with him ever personally and I have never given him a figure, but I think it can probably be done.

Rabin: I will tell you a story. I met Chancellor Kreisky in Stockholm and he said to me -- he is one of the greatest fans of Sadat -- "Why are you so stubborn? After all, Sadat explained to me that all that he wants is Israeli withdrawal and he will not advance." I said, "Who told it to you?" Then I said to him, "You will be surprised, Israel has agreed that there will be Egyptian advance. The only question is how far." And he was silenced -- for a moment.

Kissinger: Well, let's get Kreisky to sign the agreement. Kreisky will not agree to Israelis in Umm Khisheiba. [laughter]

Rabin: When the Egyptians explain their position, they talk only about Israeli withdrawal. They don't talk about their advance. Tactically it might be right. For us, it is a real problem. To go now beyond the Beta line.

Kissinger: I have even read in the newspaper that you are going to be willing in spots to go beyond.

Peres: That's the Opposition; they accuse us of that. Mr. Secretary, if I may suggest on this Beta line, our problem is not really a half-kilometer. Let's face it. Not in all the places. The problem is a matter of principle. What is the real argument on our part about the Beta line? The people in the Government and Parliament are saying, "Look, we must think about the future. For the future we can see a demilitarized Sinai Peninsula." Whether it is right or wrong -- I am not going into it -- they say, "Okay, we have agreed to the Beta. As it is not too important for us half-a-kilometer, so it is unimportant for Sadat, because the lack of importance is distributed equally between the two parties."

Kissinger: I didn't say half-a-kilometer. I said a kilometer and a half.

Peres: For the sake of my argument; I don't quote you. I mean, I am saying half-a-kilometer just to explain the point. Even if it would be half-a-kilometer. I believe that we shall have to go into the complete lines upon your return, so you will see what is really important and unimportant for us. And I don't feel that right now we have really to make an unnecessary struggle or argument about it.

Kissinger: The only thing one can say about the principle involved, the principle he wants is to say that he got something that had been occupied by Israel. Now, if you adopt this as a principle -- you are going back about 50 kilometers?

Peres: We do it all along the eastern line. Let's not forget it. It is 150 kilometers. This was occupied by Israel.

Kissinger: Assuming now you have gone back 50 kilometers here, 30 to 50, assuming the final line in a peace settlement with Egypt is where you visualize it, say about 20 kilometers from the Egyptian border, give or take 10 kilometers, it means that you have got to go back another 80 to 90 kilometers. If every time you withdraw 40 kilometers, he advances two kilometers...

Rabin. It is not two kilometers. It is two kilometers in addition to the Beta line, from Alpha to Beta.

Kissinger: Even if you say 8 kilometers or 10 kilometers, then the end result of that is going to be that he advances 20 kilometers more by the time you reach the final line. That's not a huge issue of principle.

Peres: We move 150 kilometers down the south.

Kissinger: That's not a military movement at all.

Rabin: It's a military movement on our part.

Kissinger: Not on his part. That's not involved in the global movement of the Egyptian military force.

Allon: Egyptian administration.

Kissinger: What is happening in the south is a tremendous strengthening of your principle because it is a massive -- I mean, it is a massive movement forward of Egyptian civil administration, at least in length, without any advance of Egyptian military force....

Peres: For the same reason....

Kissinger: ... which is exactly the principle you want to establish, and it is one of the great benefits of this agreement to you.

Allon: Am I wrong when I say that in March the Egyptians did agree to satisfy themselves with the present buffer zone?

Rabin: No.

Kissinger: Never. God no, never. In March they wanted much more than four kilometers.

Rabin: They talked about the same distance from both sides of the Passes on both of the Passes.

Kissinger: They said either both are in the Passes or both are equidistant from the Passes. That was their position in March. The important changes are in Israel's favor since March. In fact, if you make the balance sheet of the changes, it will not look negligible.

Rabin: May I say something? One of the problems -- and we are a democratic state and you realize sometimes an over-democratic state -- what is our problem? We are attacked that Sadat gets everything that he wants. It is not negotiations in which both sides compromise. He gets the oil; he gets the Passes. Now you add to it something that even the opposition has not accused us of, that he has to achieve a military advance, not only to the

buffer zone, but as a matter of principle to advance to areas that were held by Israel under the Disengagement Agreement. You have to look at it not as a matter of kilometers but as a matter of principle. And, believe me, this is a real problem for us politically. I can argue here....

Kissinger: But you cannot complain that I have not told you at every meeting.

Rabin: But you cannot complain that we have not told you that it is practically impossible for us.

Kissinger: That I can complain. You have told us it is a difficult problem. You have not said it is impossible.

Rabin: Politically this is going to be one of the biggest issues now.

Kissinger: I don't want to keep adding misunderstanding. I was under the impression that when I reduced it to a small number....

Rabin: Why he had to move?

Kissinger: I said it didn't have to be along the whole front, that this was something that would have finally to be worked out. I mean, what is the sense of keep asking me, writing it down and sending it back, if it is impossible? Why should I give any figure of what I think is manageable?

Rabin: I tell you: this is a real problem.

Kissinger: Look, I am going to see Sadat tonight. I will see what I can do. I have no territorial ambitions in the Sinai.

Gur: If I may add, until now, whenever we were right, they understood it and they accepted it.

Kissinger: I have never known you to admit that you were not right!

Gur: You remember quite well in the other negotiations. This is a principle that has no justification. It is only a political issue, in the political fight.

Rabin: It's a political issue.

Kissinger: Can you name one issue on which you are not right? Because on this definition they will have to accept. If you tell me any point on which you are not right, maybe we can get those settled.

Gur: If I go back to the past, I can give you. Not in this negotiation, because it is still not concluded.

Allon: We went back in Haman Faroun.

Kissinger: I have said publicly that you have made major efforts. I have said it publicly.

Rabin: Please don't repeat it too often! [Laughter]

Peres: The problem is that when somebody asks us in this country, "what are you getting in return?" our eloquence is running out. In plain terms. I know that we have good reasons. I don't deny them. But when it comes to explaining the situation.

Kissinger: Look, if there were any degree of genuine communication between our two governments, which unfortunately there isn't, on the real intellectual level, I could make a case for this agreement that it is overwhelmingly in the Israeli interest, if you look at all the alternatives. If, however, the Israeli Government takes the basic attitude that it is being extorted yard by yard.... In terms of the geopolitical situation, in terms of the historic situation, in terms of the pressure on us, in terms of the evolution that could happen if this thing were done with some conviction, one could make a case. I think your strategic position is not significantly worse and your overall situation, given the fact that you have established the principle of civilian administration from evacuated territories, given the fact that you have a hostage 150 kilometers long, given the fact that you have another hostage in the Canal Zone, given the fact that the way the Egyptians plan mounting an operation -- it is one thing to go with five divisions across the Canal; it is another to launch a complicated airborne division into a Pass area which, according to your Chief of Staff, can be cut off in 72 hours or however long it takes to get your tanks into that area. They now face an almost unmanageable military-political problem, as I see it, as I see the situation. Therefore, in every case, they will have an additional reason not to go into it.

In retrospect -- I didn't see it; you didn't see it -- the line up along the Suez Canal was a sitting duck for them [in 1973]. It was the one military operation they could conduct. The one substantial offensive military

operation Egypt could conduct. This problem which is going to be presented to you by this new line, if they agree on it, is that it's going to give them a political-military problem which will force them either into a totally reckless act which they cannot sustain. If you had been able to knock off what they did in the Suez Canal within three or four days, it would be an unbelievable political victory. It was their ability to hold on for two weeks that makes the political advantage for them; not the fact that they got across the Canal. Getting across the Canal and being totally wiped out in three or four days, which is what I thought would happen, would have been an asset for you rather than a liability. I see no way. I may be wrong, but I do not see with this line how they can go anywhere where they can hold out two weeks or ten days or a week. But I may be wrong. On top of it, the minute they land an airborne outfit into the Passes, you are going to take that whole coastal strip. They have got a major problem now.


So geo-politically I think this agreement is not a liability to Israel. It is an asset, together with the division of the Arab world; that is, the difficulty of coordinating a policy within the Arab world for some period, maybe two years, maybe longer. Together with the fact that the country that is supplying is also the key country conducting the negotiations. All of this is an asset, and, therefore, this negative, grudging, piddling way in which this agreement is being presented and discussed between us isn't worthy of what we are trying to do. On that basis it isn't worth doing. On that basis we are better off in seeing where we go via Geneva or elsewhere. I genuinely believe.... When we went on the step-by-step approach, our conviction was entirely that it would be helpful to Israel -- also to us, but primarily Israel. I still think that the end result of this is something that Israel ought to be proud of, rather than riot about, for God's sake, and I understand your problem.

But when you say, what do you get for it? You get quite a bit for it, if it is properly understood. I mean, these things that I said here can't be put into the newspapers.

Rabin: That's the problem.

Kissinger: But in terms of the overall position, Sadat can be having victory parades, but his strategic position has not improved and his political position has declined, in my view.

Gur: [Gets up to the map] Something that I have to tell you, which I entirely do not accept your concept. And as we are asking for military equipment and requirements, I think I should explain. First of all,



we know about Egyptian plans of attack, so we don't have to guess and go to any discussion of concept. It's a plan. Now, their plan is -- as I said to you yesterday and I repeated it just before - the war for the Egyptians must not be a military war. For them a political gain is the main goal. And if they will be able to achieve 15 kilometers, that's enough. That's enough. Again, they succeeded to move militarily. So for them when we withdraw 30 to 50 kilometers, and there is an open area, no military forces, and they succeed to surprise us, it won't pose any problem for them to approach that main road, and this is very close to the edge of the passes. For us to regain the old territory, that will mean full-scale war, and as we realized in the last war, it is not so easy.

Now, our Minister of Defense told you today that right now they have in the thinned forces area something like 20,000 men, and, believe me, it is a correct figure. And they are allowed to have only 7,000 people.

Kissinger: Yes.


Gur: So if they move forward to the Beta line, and they will build the same fortification line as they have now, and now they have such a fortification area here in which they can put five divisions in six hours. Six hours. That means that when we move back -- and we don't have the same possibility of intelligence as we had before -- and with the seven bridges they have daily on the Canal, and when Sadat claimed that he won't renew the mandate of the UN forces, they had 14 in one day. The next morning we saw 14 bridges. On the 14 bridges they can move.

Kissinger: How will they get ships through the Canal?

Gur: These are bridges that they built in the water. During the day they take them alongside the shore. Once the convoy is out, they put them back. It is a matter of a half-hour or something. It opens like a gate. So daily they have seven. In one night they built another five. And for them it is really nothing because they have them on the Canal. So they cross five divisions in a matter of six hours and we follow their exercises and we count the time with them together. So these are facts, what I tell you.

Kissinger: I know.

Gur: So if they drop their commando units -- and they plan to drop it on our obstacle that we built which goes along that main road -- and to drop paratroopers and commando units all over, they can achieve their political



goal. And to be able to hold that area of the Passes, which is very difficult for counter-attack of massive forces, until a cease-fire or big changes will take place. So I think that your concept that that line is better than the present line....

Kissinger: No, no, it is not better than the present line. I said the overall.... I said you are strategically not significantly worse off. I don't want to argue with the Chief of Staff.

Gur: But it is worse.

Rabin: Mr. Secretary, we have agreed to withdraw to the line. We have agreed that the Egyptians will move forward. Now, the question is how far?

Allon: I will give you one example. I take the Opposition group of Shulamit Aloni, which consists of Doves. They came to me and said, "We are not going to vote with the Government, because you, the Government, are violating the principle of demilitarization." Israel withdrawing -- fine. They would have voted for it. "But why do you permit the Egyptians to cross the old Demarcation Line into the buffer zone, to cross the buffer zone?" I give you this as an example. After all, we have problems too. He always talks of Egyptians' problems. And the vote in the Knesset may be very close, neck and neck.

Peres: It would be fair if we had the manpower to guard it all along. Our problem is the Reservists won't come to the front but after 36 or 72 hours. So even this is a real problem for a country which is poor in manpower.

Allon: And the Security Council is quick to declare a cease-fire.

Saunders: The model is here. [The model is set up on the coffee table in the living room.]

Kissinger: Well, you know, little of what the Chief of Staff said is relevant to moving forward a kilometer or a kilometer and a half. The argument of the move forward is a political argument, not a military argument. None of the things that you described that they can do will be in any respect improved by a move forward of the Egyptians. That's the major thing. But I see the political ...

Rabin: I believe it is a combination. I put it very clearly. For me, it is mainly political. I wouldn't deny that half-a-kilometer in certain places doesn't make a major change. But it is a basic political issue.

Sisco: What does your Opposition say? After all, they [the Egyptians] are in this zone of limitation. They are east of the Canal in terms of this whole principle of demilitarization.

Rabin: It is not demilitarization. It is thinning out. If Sadat would agree that the Beta zone would be Egyptian civilian administration, the whole problem wouldn't have been so complicated. But he wants to advance forces.

Allon: Do you think Sadat may agree to certain changes on the agreed line between us and the buffer zone, our western line of the thing?

Rabin: He would agree in his favor!

Kissinger: A few minor changes in his favor. The proposition has never been put to him that something would be taken back. The proposition has been put to him that during the shuttle some minor rectification might be discussed.

Let's go see the model.

[They go into the living room to view the table model of the passes area. Mr. Hoskinson is there.]

Gur: [examines it] It is not a correct one. [Someone brings an aerial photo. They confer in Hebrew.]

Dinitz: The model does not correspond exactly to the map in the curving of the hills.

Rabin: It's sharper than here.

Gur: If I may point what are the main points to explain our line. I don't know if you see it there. [He indicates the Giddi Pass.] The slope here on the southern part of the Pass goes in a very strong slope down and this point, the highest point, is somewhere here. You see, that line goes underneath the highest point here. You see, from that point that the slope goes down strongly and you see the turn of that cliff here, opens to the north. That's why we chose that point because that answers the two main issues that were raised.

Kissinger: Slope is a different concept.

Gur: Okay. Then close to the exit is the point -- that hill that closes it -- and you see the widening of the entrance. That was the logic of that line. Here in the Mitla you see it is much broader.

Allon: Just to find out, Henry. What you are trying to suggest, if I understood you correctly, you don't mind if we remain on the top. You want us to move on the road itself. What was the point that you said was the exit of the strait?

Hoskinson: I didn't say where the exit was. I did say that when you get down to this point, here, there is a distinct change in the topography of the area, where it breaks away here, bends away to the north and falls away to the south. There is a distinct change here.

Gur: When I said 500 yards, from this point to that line, we are talking only about the road. Along the road is a matter of about 5-700 yards, to the change of topography.

Hoskinson: We walked from here to here, roughly a kilometer.

Gur: This is an entirely different kind of hill already. This is a cliff. It is here in black [aerial photograph]. I pointed to that point, because in the south the cliff goes on, but in the north it turns north. That was the logic of that point.

Kissinger: We are not taking the table model to Egypt.

Gur: We could use it for war games. To defend.

Kissinger: If they are crazy enough to go into the Giddi Pass with Israel sitting here, they deserve what the Israelis will give them.

Gur: We are not allowed to repeat the mistakes to think that if we can counteract fast, it will prevent them. That area is a mountainous one and not an easy area to manage.

Kissinger: Why should I discuss military things with a Chief of Staff? What went wrong in Suez was not if you could have succeeded in your counterattack; it was the failure of your counterattack.

Gur: I am saying the same thing. So it is difficult. So we shouldn't take it for granted.



Kissinger: The reason the counterattack failed was that they got five divisions across with a lot of anti-tank weapons.

Gur: That area with infantry is a very hard terrain to fight. If I may repeat again what General Brown said-- he is a military man-- when he said he doesn't see any difference between sensors and people. Sensors will be placed here, as I said before, and will only be able to see movement on the road. It will not serve as a deterrent for any purpose. While if people stay there, that's entirely different. An anti-airborne operation in the area, people can do something, while sensors won't.

Kissinger: If we could only teach our Chief of Staff to follow political direction as well as you do, we'd be better off.

Allon: You need technical assistance!

Peres: We were lucky on the Hawk missile.

Allon: He's not instructed to think?

Rabin: Can I talk to you alone?

[Kissinger and Rabin conferred privately in the back office from 1:25-1:55 and then returned.]

Rabin: Let me suggest what we should do. In the private talk I said something about the Giddi.


Kissinger: Two kilometers.

Rabin: You know this is not the truth. Whatever Dinitz told you about the northern line, the southern line, the Beta line, and south of the Passes, this is our position. When you talk to Sadat, come back and tell us tomorrow night, I hope, where do we stand. See what happens.

Peres: This is a package deal. The stations, the line....

Kissinger: Neither side can sell it piecemeal. He can't ask for movement in the Passes without giving on the warning stations and vice versa, and it's all got to be put into one package. All right, that's fair enough.

Rabin: Then we will have the memorandum of understanding, the agreement between the two countries, and all the other issues, after we know what are the differences on arrangement on the Passes.



Kissinger: Okay. I think that's the best procedure.

Allon: What about the economic aid? You leave it for next time?

Rabin: We know what we talked. We stick to our position.

Kissinger: What is your position today?

Rabin: I said \$2-1/2 billion.

Peres: In the meantime we found out about the Pershing and Scud. [He gives Secretary Kissinger a paper.] The minimum range is 185 kilometers, as against 110-120 kilometers.

Rabin: We should talk about maximum range.

Kissinger: It can in fact go 740 kilometers.

Gur: It may, but we don't know.

Kissinger: It can. These are the nominal figures for the Pershing.

Peres: The problem is the Arab spread of targets is wider than the Israeli spread of targets. This can, for example, neutralize Iraq.

Kissinger: This thought has occurred to me.

Peres: It adds Iraq to the map.

Kissinger: And southern Egypt.

Peres: There are no targets. It's a waste of missiles.

Rabin: Aswan is out of range.

Kissinger: I have interpreted your request for Pershings to include Iraq in my own thinking.

Peres: Actually, it is a deterrent, more than an arm.

Gur: In the last war they used the Frog, which also is not very accurate, against a military airfield in Ramat David. I am talking about military targets. And the Scud is almost the same. But for targets like airfields, big camps, no doubt they are going to use it.

Kissinger: Our estimate is that the Scud has a CEP of about a mile and a half and is highly inaccurate.

Gur: For an airfield it is enough. If they hit five missiles for an airfield and we have very few, as you know, it is a worthwhile target.

Kissinger: For the Pershing?

Gur: It's a very accurate missile.

Kissinger: Let me understand how we should proceed. I was told by somebody yesterday -- with so many people talking to me last night I lost track -- that I should not arrive in daylight.

Eran: After Shabbat is over.

Kissinger: It's no problem for us. Then, say 8:00. If we go to Syria we'll come from Syria. We haven't heard from Syria?

Sisco: Not as of this morning.

Peres: Every time we start a negotiation we get from you an appreciation of the situation in the Middle East.

Kissinger: And you always assume it's a masterful trick.

Peres: Trick we never say; masterful, yes! [Laughter]

Kissinger: On Saturday, if we come from Syria, it'll be an exhausting day. You said we could meet in Tel Aviv? At the Guest House?

Rabin: Yes. And the Cabinet meeting will be at the regular time. And you agreed to talk to that group of editors.

Kissinger: Yes.

Allon: A good idea.

Kissinger: Would it be a good idea if I tried to explain how the more you withdraw, the more your strategic situation improves?

Rabin: Try to convince them!

Kissinger: We'll discuss later what I say to the editors. But on the plane I'll have to talk to them. It should be in general terms. Most of the specifics have not come from us. I'll just say we reviewed every aspect of the agreement and every aspect of the bilateral, so we can go over it with Egypt.

Allon: I would like to raise another problem which was discussed between you and Simcha on my request, and this is a possible vessel, Israeli vessel, that could pass through the Suez Canal while you are in the area.

Kissinger: I raised it with the Egyptians. He wasn't wild about it when we first presented it to them.

Allon: It is a good vessel for a test. A Liberian vessel, Leonidas, general cargo, nothing strategic, no Israeli crew. It is due to arrive to the northern part of the Gulf of Aqaba or Suez, whatever it is, around the 24th. It can cross the Suez on the 25th, which is a good time. As it is agreed between us that the new agreement will not come into effect before all the clauses of the old ones are being materialized. This is a good opportunity to do it in a good time, which will help Sadat abroad. Maybe a few difficulties abroad; by and large he is going to make it anyhow.

Dinitz: It's easier to make the case that it helps us.

Allon: It will help us a lot and it won't damage him. I think that he must do it once. Always he keeps talking about his desire for peace. He is the angel for peace. We are the stubborn ones. He did nothing until now. He talks nicely and means all things to all men. This is the time.

Kissinger: No question about it. I will raise it with him tonight.

Allon: And convince him. It is very important.

Peres: How do you see the situation right now in the Middle East, vis-a-vis the Russians?

Kissinger: Let's talk about it tomorrow night. I think everything is in flux on both sides and either side could break out.

Rabin: I spoke to people who saw Brezhnev at Helsinki and said that he didn't look well. Kreisky, Palme, everyone said it.



Kissinger: There's no question. We give him a year and a half. That whole generation that lived through the 30's and the War.

Peres: How old is he?

Kissinger: 69.

Peres: Who is next in line?

Kissinger: My judgment is that it is Kirilenko.

Toon: He would just fill the gap.

Rodman: He's the same age.

Kissinger: He's the same age.

Peres: Like Malenkov.

Kissinger: Most of our people think it would raise the influence of the military.

Dinitz: Is that why the President took a harder line in Minneapolis?

Kissinger: There were bureaucratic reasons.


Rabin: To neutralize the impact of Helsinki.

Kissinger: We have a lot of heroes -- until something concrete happens. I don't mean the President.

Rabin: The same thing happens in our country.

Kissinger: We're using detente to get a good starting position for a crisis. They'd do it seriously; we're using it tactically.

[The meeting adjourned at 2:30 p. m.]





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