

KISSINGER TRIP TO THE
MIDDLE EAST

March 7 - 22, 1975

The President
Trip Book Vol. I



KISSINGER TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST

March 7 - 22, 1975

- Chronology
- March 7, 1975
 - . Checklist for Egypt
- March 8, 1975
 - . HAK/Sadat Memcon, 11:00 a. m.
- March 9, 1975
 - . Report to the President
 - . HAK/Khaddam Memcon, 11:55 a. m. - 12:30 p. m.
 - . HAK/Asad Memcon, 3:15 - 7:30 p. m.
 - . HAK/Khaddam Memcon, 7:30 - 8:00 p. m.
 - . Report to the President
 - . Checklists for Israel
 - . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 10:30 - 11:55 p. m.
- March 10, 1975
 - . Checklist for Israel
 - . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 10:02 a. m. - 1:00 p. m.
 - . Report to the President
- March 11, 1975
 - . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 10:10 - 11:40 p. m.
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- March 12, 1975
 - . Checklist for Israel
 - . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 10:13 a. m. - 12:15 p. m.
 - . Checklists for Egypt
 - . HAK/Sadat Memcon, 6:30 - 9:45 p. m.



-- March 13, 1975

- . HAK/Sadat Memcon, 7:00 - 9:50 p. m.
- . Report to the President

-- March 14, 1975

- . Report to the President
- . Checklists for Israel
- . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 1:10 - 3:45 p. m.
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-- March 15, 1975

- . Checklist for Egypt
- . HAK/Khaddam Memcon, 12:02 - 12:35 p. m.
- . HAK/Khaddam Memcon, 2:00 - 2:35 p. m.
- . HAK/Asad Memcon,
- . HAK/Khaddam Memcon, 6:45 - 7:15 p. m.
- . Report to the President
- . Checklist for Jordan
- . HAK/Hussein Memcon, 8:30 - 8:45 p. m.
- . HAK/Hussein Memcon (dinner), 9:15 - 11:15 p. m.

-- March 16, 1975


- . Report to the President
- . HAK/Hussein Memcon, 10:00 - 11:55 a. m.
- . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 6:07 - 10:07 p. m.
- . Report to the President

-- March 17, 1975

- . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 10:15 - 11:30 a. m.
- . Checklist for Egypt
- . HAK/Sadat Memcon, 6:45 - 9:00 p. m.

-- March 18, 1975

- . Report to the President
- . HAK/Sadat Memcon, 11:45 a. m. - 2:15 p. m.
- . Report to the President
- . Checklist for Israel
- . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 7:10 - 9:45 p. m.



-- March 19, 1975

- . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 8:45 - 10:20 a. m.
- . Report to the President
- . Checklist for Saudi Arabia
- . HAK/Yamani Memcon, 2:25 - 2:55 p. m.
- . HAK/Fahd Memcon, 3:00 - 4:25 p. m.
- . HAK/Faisal Memcon, 4:30 - 5:30 p. m.
- . Report to the President

-- March 20, 1975

- . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 9:50 a. m. - 12:35 p. m.
- . Report to the President
- . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 5:30 - 6:45 p. m.
- . Report to the President
- . Checklist for Egypt
- . HAK/Sadat Memcon, 9:05 - 11:45 p. m.

-- March 21, 1975

- . Report to the President
- . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 1:45 - 4:00 p. m.
- . Checklist for Israel
- . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 10:10 p. m. - 12:10 a. m.

-- March 22, 1975

- . Report to the President
- . Checklist for Israel
- . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 6:35 - 8:15 p. m.
- . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 10:35 p. m. - 12:05 a. m.



CHRONOLOGY OF DECISIVE PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATION

Thursday, March 13

6:50 - 9:50 p. m.

Meeting with Sadat.

-- Sadat agrees (1) all disputes will be resolved by peaceful means; (2) this is not a final step, but a significant step towards peace; (3) non-resort to force for duration of agreement; (4) valid until superseded by another agreement; (5) no linkage to Syria; (6) annual renewal of UNEF; (7) some joint commissions in buffer zone; (8) some selective de facto easing of boycott and other practices.

-- Sadat wants some forward movement of Egyptian line. Gamasy proposes balanced disposition of forces after Egyptian line. moves forward.

Friday, March 14

12:10 p. m.

Arrive Jerusalem.

1:10 - 3:45 p. m.

Meeting with Negotiating Team.

-- HAK reports Sadat's proposals, saying that if he can go back with basic concepts settled, Sadat would probably be flexible on other points.

4:00 p. m.

Dan Pattir backgrounder calls Egyptian proposals, "at first sight, "insufficient and unsatisfactory in many respects."


Saturday, March 15

12:00 Noon

Arrival Damascus

8:05 p. m.

Arrival Amman



Sunday, March 16

Morning

HAK in Amman while Israeli Cabinet meets.

2:00 p. m.

Arrive Tel Aviv

6:00 - 10:00 p. m.

Meeting with Negotiating Team.

-- Cabinet sees "very little" in Sadat's proposals on main points: (1) Non-use of force is only slight variation on disengagement agreement and is conditioned on peace process; (2) On movement towards peace, nothing new; (3) no assurance of duration and no insurance against Soviet veto of UNEF. "Unless he does more on these three key issues, I don't see what can be done." (Rabin)

-- For renunciation of "acts of belligerency," or "acts of war," Israel will give either passes or oil fields, but not both. Gamasy's proposal (balance of forces) could be considered.

-- HAK foresees break-up.

Monday, March 17

10:15 - 11:30 a. m.

Meeting with Negotiating Team.

-- Israel would leave passes and oil fields in exchange for renunciation of acts of belligerency, and might consider Egyptian forces moving into present UN zone. For non-use of force pledge, Israel would pull back to western edge of passes and accept 3-party management of oil fields.

-- Allon offers two strong formulations on renunciation of military, paramilitary, hostile, and warlike actions, and secondly, "permitting, encouraging, assisting or participating" in same.

3:00 p. m.

Depart for Aswan.

7:00 - 8:45 p. m.

Meeting with Sadat.

-- Sadat rejects Allon's formulations on non-use of force as "going beyond non-belligerency."

10:45 p. m. - 12:15 a. m.

Meeting with Fahmy and Gamasy

-- Fahmy says he will recommend new formulations on non-use of force to Sadat tomorrow.



Tuesday, March 18

11:45 a. m. - 2:30 p. m.

Meeting with Sadat.

-- Sadat agrees (1) "Mideast crisis will be solved ... by peaceful means;" (2) assurances to USG in agreement not to resort to force; (3) agreement valid until superseded; (4) Geneva will not interfere with agreement. He is prepared to drop linkage to peace process. Passes should be in UN zone, with each side's forces at each entrance. No further concession on economic warfare.

3:00 p. m.

Depart for Tel Aviv.

7:15 - 9:45 p. m.

Meeting with Negotiating Team.

-- HAK reports that this is maximum Sadat can do. If it is accepted in principle, maybe drafting can be improved.

Wednesday, March 19

8:45 - 10:20 a. m.

Meeting with Negotiating Team.

-- Rabin says it's "more than doubtful" that Cabinet will accept Sadat's position on the passes.


Secretary's Trip to Riyadh.

11:00 a. m. - 2:00 p. m.

Israeli Cabinet Meets.

6:30 p. m. - 1:30 a. m.

Israeli Cabinet Meets.



Thursday, March 20

9:50 - 12:35 p. m.

Meeting with Israeli Negotiating Team.

-- Israelis report results of yesterday's 10 hours of Cabinet meetings: (1) No change in Israel's non-use of force proposal; (2) On duration, still insist on commitment, even indirect, on certain number of years. (3) Line is in middle of the passes; (4) 3-party management for Abu Rudeis; (5) No increase in Egyptian forces now on East bank. Rabin admits he told Cabinet this meant 98% chance of break-up.

-- HAK sees "not the slightest attempt to deal with any of the points made...over many months." He reads talking points approved by President Ford.

1:00 - 3:00 p. m.

Israeli Cabinet Meets

5:30 - 6:45 p. m.

Meeting with Negotiating Team.

-- Cabinet agrees on (1) modification of non-use of force provision (eliminating specific details of non-belligerency), which HAK believes is "doable." (2) No change in lines; (3) Oil fields as civilian enclave; and (4) Egypt must commit itself to renew UNEF at least 3 or 4 times.

-- HAK tells Israelis he sees "no chance of his accepting this line."

6:45 p. m.

Depart for Aswan.

10:00 p. m. - Midnight

Meeting with Sadat.

-- Sadat accepts Israeli formulation on non-use of force, minus phrases about "assistance."

-- Sadat rejects line through middle of passes, proposes that each side be at entrance with UN occupying passes. Re: oil fields, Sadat rejects enclave and proposes demilitarized UN-supervised zone under Egyptian civil administration. He proposes increase in number of Egyptian forces on East bank, from the present 7,000.



Meeting with Sadat (continued)

-- Sadat gives oral assurance, to be conveyed to Israel, that if Syria attacks Israel and this is confirmed by UN, Egypt will not join.

Friday, March 21

10:10 a. m.

Depart Aswan.

1:45 - 4:00 p. m.

Meeting with Negotiating Team.

-- HAK reports Sadat's counter-proposals: Rabin says he would be unwilling to recommend this to the Cabinet: "Because I believe Israel cannot, in present circumstances, in return for what is offered, agree to withdraw from the passes and from the oil fields, and accept Egyptian movement forward of the blue line."

4:30 - 9:30 p. m.

Israeli Cabinet Meets.

-- President's letter to Rabin arrives and is read to Cabinet.

10:10 p. m. - Midnight

Meeting with Negotiating Team.

-- Cabinet decision was basically to reaffirm its previous position. Israelis prefer that no suspension be announced, but that negotiating teams reconvene 6:00 p. m. Saturday.



Saturday, March 22

Morning

Cable to Aswan asking if there are "any aspects of the Egyptian position that they have not revealed," on duration and early warning stations.

Afternoon

Fahmy replies negatively. Break-off will mean "irrevocable and fatal blow to step by step process."

6:35 - 8:15 p. m.

Meeting with Negotiating Team.
-- No change in Israeli position.

10:35 p. m. - 12:05 a. m.

Second Meeting with Negotiating Team.

11:00 p. m.

Announcement of suspension.



March 7

ISRAEL - EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS

CHECK LIST FOR YOUR ASWAN VISIT

MARCH 7

1. Your principal focus during this first stop will be:

- to see if there has been any further refinement or evolution of Egyptian thinking, as reflected in the paper Fahmy gave you on the last trip (Tab A).
- to indicate to Sadat what you think is the minimum required to get an agreement.
- to discuss with Sadat how you envisage this trip evolving, and specifically how you intend to proceed in your initial stops in Damascus and Jerusalem.

2. The issues in the negotiation are:

- the linkage to a Syrian negotiation, covering the following hypothetical spectrum:
 - commitment to a Golan agreement by a specific date;
 - commitment not to implement a Sinai agreement until a Golan agreement is reached;
 - commitment to start Golan negotiations by a specific date, but not holding up conclusion of a Sinai agreement;
 - commitment to an all-out U.S. effort to reach a Golan agreement after a Sinai agreement is achieved.
- there are two key procedural questions:
 - should Golan negotiations be conducted as before or at Geneva,
 - should the Syrian linkage be covered in the Egyptian-Israeli agreement itself, or in a side U.S.-Egyptian understanding.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/2/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

HR 9/23/03



- the duration of the agreement, which has several aspects:
 - how expressed in the agreement - open-ended, or for a specified period;
 - how related to the UNEF mandate question - annual rather than six month renewals;
 - how deal with Israeli desire for a specified period during which there will be no more withdrawal on the Egyptian front.
- the non-belligerency issue:
 - public commitment to observe ceasefire while negotiations continue;
 - private U.S.-Egyptian understanding that Egypt will not resume hostilities so long as Israel does not attack Egypt or Syria.

3. How you will proceed in Damascus and Jerusalem:

- Damascus -- You will make a major effort to persuade Asad that the only practical way to proceed and keep open possibilities for progress on the Golan front is to first negotiate a Sinai agreement. You will also probe to see what is the minimum possible linkage that will keep Asad quiet.
 - A key question here is whether Faisal can be persuaded to support the Sadat approach, or will he throw his weight behind Asad. What are Sadat's views on Faisal's position?
- Jerusalem -- You intend to give the Israelis as your ideas the points contained in Fahmy's paper, minus the following:
 - paragraph 8, delete "during the duration of this agreement" in the assurances that neither side will initiate military or paramilitary operations against the other;
 - delete paragraph 9 on the Syrian linkage; this is something to be handled in a U.S.-Egyptian side understanding.



Attached for your reference are the following documents:

- Tab A: The paper Fahmy gave you in Cairo. We have bracketed the two portions you have said you want to omit in your first presentation to the Israelis.
- Tab B: The list of points which we drafted in Cairo during the last visit. We assume Fahmy is familiar with this.
- Tab C: The three letters we drafted in Cairo during the last trip:
 - Ford-Sadat: U.S. will continue its peace efforts including Syria.
 - Ford-Sadat: Israel has no intention of attacking "its neighbors." (We believe this phrase should be changed to "Syria and Egypt.")
 - Sadat-Ford: Egypt will not attack Israel.


A separate checklist of bilateral issues is in your folder.



SALIENT POINTS RELATED TO A SECOND DISENGAGEMENT
AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

Fahmy
paper
Feb. 75
trip

- 1- The agreement should include total withdrawal of Israeli forces to the east of the passes and from all the oilfields including the town of El Tor. ✓
- 2- The Israeli withdrawal will be implemented in such a manner as to indicate the willingness of the Israelis to demonstrate their desire for peace namely that no roads nor installations or equipment of the oilfields be destroyed or transferred from their present location either to Israel or the remaining occupied part of Sinai.
- 3- The United Nations Zone will be subject of agreement. ✓
- 4- The thinning of forces and their strength will be the subject of mutual agreement. ✓
- 5- The agreement should have as an annex a fixed time-table indicating the various phases of the implementation of the agreement bearing in mind that the full implementation should



be terminated within two months of the signature of the agreement and that Egypt receives all oilfields within two weeks of the signing.

6- Egypt, on its part, is willing to accept a formula by which the mandate of UNEF will be extended annually as long as this agreement is valid and efforts towards a just and peaceful settlement continue.

7- Egypt and Israel are ready to reactivate the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Agreement and they agree that the Mixed Armistice Commission resume its work to consider alleged violations by the parties to the present disengagement agreement.

8- Should Israel give a formal guarantee or assurance in writing to the United States that it will not undertake military or paramilitary operations against Syria and Egypt (during the duration of this agreement,) Egypt on its part is ready to give to the United States Government a similar assurance that it will not initiate military or paramilitary operations against Israel. However, should Israel attack Syria, Egypt will not be bound by this



be terminated within two months of the signature of the agreement and that Egypt receives all oilfields within two weeks of the signing.

6- Egypt, on its part, is willing to accept a formula by which the mandate of UNEF will be extended annually as long as this agreement is valid and efforts towards a just and peaceful settlement continue.

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8- Should Israel give a formal guarantee or assurance in writing to the United States that it will not undertake military or paramilitary operations against Syria and Egypt (during the duration of this agreement,) Egypt on its part is ready to give to the United States Government a similar assurance that it will not initiate military or paramilitary operations against Israel. However, should Israel attack Syria, Egypt will not be bound by this



agreement but will fulfill its obligation towards Syria.

In addition, Egypt if attacked by Israel will exercise its right ^{of} ~~to~~ self-defence under article 51 of the UN Charter.

9- Should Israel give solemn assurances to the United States that it will engage itself in an active process of negotiations with a view to reach a second Disengagement agreement on the Syrian front and if the President of the United States gives his assurances to President Sadat that the United States Government will actively deploy its efforts and weight so that a further disengagement between Syria and Israel takes place before the middle of 1975, President Sadat would be prepared to give to President Ford his assurances that Egypt will not violate the Disengagement Agreement reached between Egypt and Israel as long as the efforts pertaining to further progress towards a just and durable peace are continuing.


10- Moreover, Egypt is prepared to go to Geneva to discuss with the parties concerned the conditions for a final, just and durable peaceful solution provided that the Palestinian representatives be invited to take part in the discussions at the proper time.

of Israeli cargo through the Suez Canal is concerned.



12- Furthermore, and as a demonstration of its continuing efforts towards a peaceful settlement, Egypt would continue the process of the reconstruction of the Suez Canal area and would open the Suez Canal upon the final implementation of the present Disengagement Agreement.

13- Egypt would be prepared to consider lifting restrictions on some American firms - and that on a selective basis - so that they could resume their activities in Egypt. This commitment would be given in the form of an oral understanding between Egypt and the United States Government.



~~SECRET~~

SOME ILLUSTRATIVE POINTS TO BE INCLUDED
IN EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TRANSITION AGREEMENT

1. Egypt and Israel would commit themselves to continue to observe scrupulously the ceasefire on land, sea and air called for by the UN Security Council and refrain from all hostile actions against one another.
2. There would be a statement in the Agreement that it constitutes a further step towards peace and that further negotiations to this end would be undertaken by the two sides.
3. The military forces of Egypt and Israel will be deployed in accordance with the following principles:
 - a. All Egyptian forces will be deployed west of the line designated as Line A on the attached map.
 - b. All Israeli forces will be deployed east of the line designated as Line B on the attached map.
 - c. An integral part of this agreement shall be the stationing of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the area between Line A and Line B on the attached map to assist in the implementation of this agreement.
4. Both sides would agree that the size of the force would be increased and procedures for inspection will be strengthened

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including the attachment of Egyptian and Israeli liaison officers with the UN and the establishment of mixed commissions to assist UNEF in its supervisory role.

5. There would be two areas of limited armament and forces as at present.
6. This agreement would be implemented in stages in accordance with the schedule of implementation as worked out and agreed to by the two sides.
7. There would be an Egyptian undertaking that Israeli cargoes would be permitted through the Suez Canal and that there would be no discrimination as to the nationality of the crews on third party vessels.
8. There would be a provision that the principles of free transit would apply to Israel as part of a peace settlement.
9. There would be a provision that both sides regard the Bab-al-Mandab Straits as an international waterway for ships of all flags and that neither party would interfere with such transit.
10. There would be an undertaking that each side would refrain from hostile propaganda towards the other side.



11. There would be assurances on the part of Egypt that it would take practical measures to ease the boycott, particularly against selected American firms.
12. There would be a provision that the previous disengagement agreement will be fully adhered to except as altered by this agreement.
13. There would be provisions for aerial surveillance of the implementation of procedures in articles 3, 4 and 5.
14. There would also be a provision that both ^{sides} agree to support the continuance of the UNEF, renewable by one-year periods for the duration of this accord. This force cannot be removed except by affirmative action of the Security Council.



Dear Mr. President:

I want to assure you that once a further agreement is achieved between Egypt and Israel, the United States will continue to support and, if desirable and necessary, to engage itself directly in further efforts to achieve the just and durable settlement between Israel and all its Arab neighbors, including Syria, called for in Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford



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Dear Mr. President:

I am informing you that I have received assurances from the Government of Israel that in furtherance of the process of peace, it does not intend to attack its Arab neighbors as long as all concerned abide by the ceasefire resolution adopted by the Security Council. The United States would oppose any such military attack.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford


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Mr. President:

I note with satisfaction your statement that the process leading towards a just and lasting peace in the Middle East will continue and the statement by Israel that it has no intention of attacking its neighbors. In furtherance of the process leading towards peace, Egypt will not attack Israel and will refrain from other hostile acts as long as this agreement is being observed by both sides.

Sincerely,

Anwar Sadat



HK Notes

Foxbat

MIG-20 Electronic

Sandis

March 8



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

President Anwar Sadat
Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy
Minister of War General Gamassy
Dr. Ashraf Marwan, Secretary
of the President for Foreign
Contacts

Secretary Henry A. Kissinger
Under Secretary Joseph J. Sisco
Ambassador Hermann F. Eilts
Assistant Secretary Alfred L.
Atherton, Jr.

SUBJECT:

Disengagement Talks

LOCATION:

Presidential Palace - Aswan

TIME AND DATE:

11:00 AM - Saturday - March 8, 1975

President Sadat: Well, Henry, I welcome you again. You are a dear friend. I hope your visit will be fruitful and decisive.

Secretary Kissinger: I hope it will mark a turning point. As you did the last time, you are taking the lead. I will spare no effort and will not leave.

President Sadat: How is President Ford?

Secretary Kissinger: Fine. He is improving his domestic position by insisting on sticking to his programs. He is

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coming out of the difficult period of the Presidential transition. He looks forward to meeting you if conditions develop to make your visit possible following this trip.

How shall we conduct these talks?

President Sadat: It is up to you.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, the last time you gave me some general ideas. I did not communicate them to the Israelis in order not to have them in the press for two weeks and not to give the Israelis a chance to create public pressures. I spoke in a general way about your ideas with Rabin, but gave him no formulas or points. So in effect the negotiations will start Sunday in Jerusalem.

I would like to review your ideas with you, but this is not the time to make significant alterations. I want to confirm two minor ideas we discussed but we should wait for the Israeli reaction before saying what can be done.

You have been heroic in holding things together. I know this has been a difficult period. We have not lost time, however. We have prepared U.S. opinion and have blunted the attacks against you. We have improved the psychological atmosphere in Israel.

With respect to the other Arab countries, you will always hear wild stories. The only true stories are what you and I agree. We see Egypt as a leader of the Arab world and will do nothing to undermine it. But there is a romantic streak in your Arab brothers; it is hard to tell where realities end and epic poetry begins. I will not go beyond what we agreed.

President Ford is determined to achieve a reasonable agreement if possible; I think it is. Israel will overwhelm us with petty points. If you accept the entire Israeli program, which I am not recommending, they will not accept your acceptance.

We will do nothing to weaken your position. In that spirit, you and I must try to find a solution.



President Sadat: Fine. Shall we discuss this privately?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

(At this point, the President and the Secretary adjourned for a private meeting that lasted from 11:20 AM until about 1:00 PM.)





Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

00352.

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ACTION: DEPARTMENT PASS ^{NSCE} ~~XXXX~~ FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT 7 AND NESSEN

E.O. 11652 N/A

TAGS : OVIP (KISSINGER, H. A.)

SUBJECT : Remarks to Press by Secretary Kissinger and President Sadat following their second Meeting in Aswan, March 8, 1975.

ACTION : SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 060

INFO : AMEMBASSY AMMAN 004

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 009

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 005

AMEMBASSY JIDDA 002

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 005

Amembassy Cairo 018
USINFO WASHDC

Amembassy Jerusalem 004

SECTO 101

UNCLASSIFIED USEL ASWAN 0070

REF : STATE 24911

DRAFTED BY: <i>[Signature]</i> /PRS - AMB ANDERSON	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	APPROVED BY: XXXXXXXXXXXX S/S-SWORRE <i>[Signature]</i>
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REFERENCES: P - MR. SISCO (draft)

~~XXXXXXXX~~

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Classification



Transcript of Secretary Kissinger's and President Sadat's
remarks :

QUOTE As you know the President and I have had extensive talks today partly alone and partly together with our associates, to review all the elements that are involved in ~~making~~ making another step towards peace in the Middle East. I will now go first to Syria and then to Israel and I will discuss there a similar range of issues regarding the elements of another step, ~~and then~~ ^{then} I will return for further discussions with the President on Tuesday or Wednesday..

I am here because the United States believes very strongly that another step towards peace in the Middle East is in the interest of all of the Peoples of the Middle East and of the world and we are dedicated to making a major effort in this direction. I believe, that based on the discussions that I have had, progress is possible.

Question : Have you discussed, Mr. Secretary, any possibility of another disengagement on the Syrian Front?

Answer : Secretary Kissinger: We discussed the whole range of problems involved with peace in the Middle East, and of course that includes all fronts.

Question : Mr Secretary, are you bringing concrete ideas to Israel that you have picked up here from President Sadat?

Answer : Secretary Kissinger: Obviously in discussions with



the Israelis we will be discussing ideas and elements of a possible next step, and I don't think the origin of these ideas and elements is of decisive importance.

Question : Mr. President, do you think enough progress has been made to make you optimistic about a settlement?

Answer : President Sadat: Well, as I said before, I am always optimistic, ~~optimistic~~, but I think we shall be having a very hard round this time.

Question : Did you discuss the Palestinian question, Mr. Kissinger?

Answer : Secretary Kissinger : I said we discussed the whole range of issues in the Middle East.

Question : Mr President, when you said a "hard round" do you think it will take a long time? Do you think it might take three or four weeks?

Answer : President Sadat : Well, I shall be very happy to have Dr Kissinger as long as he can afford to stay with me, but it is not a matter of weeks or so. As I said before, the mission of my friend Dr. Kissinger is very important this time ~~because~~ because we are working on two very important points : The first point is the defusion of the explosive situation, the second point is pushing the process of peace. For that I am saying it is the hardest.

Question : Mr. President, you said recently that you think now, for the first time, peace is possible. Can you please say what

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[changed to make it such at this time? What elements have changed?]

Answer : President Sadat : Well, I did not say this yesterday or a week before. I said it a year before when I met Dr. Kissinger when we fulfilled the first disengagement agreement. My theory is this : For twenty-six years we have never enjoyed any confidence in Israel, and the same thing happened, that Israel never enjoyed any confidence in us. The moment came when Dr. Kissinger appeared on the stage and he enjoyed my full confidence, and I think it must be mentioned also that he should enjoy the full confidence of Israel after all that ~~he has~~ ^{he has} done for Israel, and all that the United States has done. So ~~for~~ ^{for} that I am saying, the first time in twenty-six years peace is possible.

Question : Mr. President, do you think that no form of warfare is useful in the ~~Arab~~ Arab - Israeli conflict?

Answer : President Sadat ; This is quite true from my point of view, and I think the October War has proved that whatever power any party has, it ~~can~~ ^{cannot} impose conditions on the other.

Question : What about other forms of warfare, Mr. President ?

Answer : President Sadat : Well, do you have in mind what you call preventive war ?

Question : Economic Warfare.

Answer : President Sadat : When we discuss peace, we shall be

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[discussing peace in all its dimensions. But let ~~me~~ us first defuse] the explosive situation, then after that we can discuss it.

Question : Mr President, could you say that after your talks today, ~~do~~ you feel things look harder than they did before your talks today?

Answer : President Sadat : Well, my friend, it is true that I feel this time it is harder. It is true.

Question : Is it harder, Mr. President, ~~because~~ because you want to go further this time than you did last time in the range of what you are trying to achieve?

Answer : President Sadat: Well, as I told you, what we want to achieve this time is keeping the momentum of the peace cause and defusing the explosive situation.

Question : Are the prospects better or worse after today's talks?

Answer : President Sadat : I ~~cannot~~ ^{cannot} tell until Dr. Kissinger returns.

Question : Mr President, is the question a written non-war pledge by Egypt a negotiable issue as far as you are concerned?

Answer : President Sadat : We have not discussed this. Not yet. We have not reached it. But do you mean non-belligerency? As I told you, if I am going to agree to non-belligerency while there is one Israeli soldier occupying my land, this would mean an official invitation



[to continue occupying my land, and I am not going to extend this]
invitation.

Question : Mr. Secretary, do you expect the Geneva Conference to meet soon?

Answer : Secretary Kissinger : We have always stated our readiness to go to Geneva, ^{when} and ~~when~~ I met Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva last week, we indicated that we were prepared for a ~~re~~ resumption at an early date.

Question : Have you discussed the visit of President Sadat to the United States?

Answer : Secretary Kissinger : President Sadat knows that he is always welcome and I hope that after we conclude these negotiations we will be able to arrange some firm date. UNQUOTE.

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