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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN...

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/EXDIS

MEETING WITH DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN
FORMER US AMBASSADOR TO INDIA

Monday, January 27
11:30 a.m. (30 minutes)
The Oval Office

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *HB*

I. PURPOSE

This will be an opportunity for you to personally thank Ambassador Moynihan for his excellent service as the US Ambassador to India since early 1973 and to receive his personal views on India and the US-Indian relationship.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

A. Background: US relations with India have improved substantially over the last year and one half, from an all-time low following the Indo/Pak war in 1971 to the current reasonably satisfactory level. My discussions in New Delhi in October marked a turning point in this process. Foreign Minister Chavan will come to Washington in March on a visit which will include a meeting of the Joint Commission. Prime Minister Gandhi has also invited you to visit India this year. [You have also been invited to Pakistan.]

The basis for a durable and more mature relationship, however, remains tentative. Given the potential for serious policy differences, we will do well to maintain the current satisfactory plateau. India's nuclear test has made it even more important to maintain a good relationship, in the hope of influencing it to play a responsible nuclear

SECRET/EXDIS

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, PAR. 2.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/73, CLASS. BY: [initials]
BY HR, DATE 5/31/01



role and to cooperate in a multilateral system of nuclear export controls. Our policy has been to acknowledge India as the pre-eminent power on the subcontinent while encouraging it to show restraint toward its neighbors. Our objective is to move the Indians somewhat away from the Soviets while promoting greater regional stability.

Bilaterally, the major current issue in Indian eyes remains our South Asian arms supply policy. In anticipation of your meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto next week (February 5), this policy is being reviewed, weighing the disadvantages of lifting the embargo in terms of US-Indian relations against the advantages of doing so in terms of the US-Pakistani relationship and our interest in keeping Pakistan on its present political course. Ambassador Moynihan strongly believes that a change in the arms policy at this time would not be in the US interest. He is also concerned about plans for improving US facilities on Diego Garcia.

On the economic side, relations have improved, especially since Ambassador Moynihan negotiated a settlement of our massive rupee holdings (signed February 1974). The Indians are interested in large-scale food assistance and in debt rescheduling but have not yet used \$50 million in development lending approved by Congress. We plan for a substantial PL 480 package (perhaps 750,000 tons). India is currently our largest commercial buyer of wheat and has purchased substantial amounts of fertilizer.

B. Participants: Ambassador Moynihan

C. Press Arrangements: The meeting will be announced; White House photo session at the beginning of the meeting.

III. TALKING POINTS

1. I want to express my appreciation and respect for the way in which you have handled our relations with India over the past two years.



2. I would be interested in your assessment of Indian leadership and of what measures might be productive in building a more durable and mature relationship between India and the United States.
3. What are your views on the U.S. arms supply policy in the subcontinent? Our current policy is intolerable to the Paks and represents an anomaly, particularly in view of India's arms industry and access to Soviet weapons. Is there a way, in your judgment, in which we can respond to Pakistan's interest without threatening the Simla process and ruining our relationship with India?
4. I would also be interested on how you would expect India's relations with the Soviet Union and with the PRC to develop.
5. On economic issues, we believe that there is potential for a growing relationship based on private investments. We are willing to help with food aid to the extent possible and believe we will be able to fund as much as 750,000 tons of grain during this fiscal year.
6. We will miss you. I hope that I can call on you for your wise counsel in the months and years ahead.



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

ACTION
January 25, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM:

ROSEMARY NIEHUS *RM*

SUBJECT:

Talking Paper for President's Meeting
with Ambassador Moynihan -- Monday,
January 27

At Tab A is a talking paper for the President's meeting with Ambassador Moynihan on Monday morning. There is space for additional "Participants." If Mr. Rumsfeld has arranged this meeting, he may be planning to sit in.

RECOMMENDATION: That you forward the talking paper at Tab A to the President.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

RECEIVED
67-10000-10145
NOTATIONS, INSTRUCTIONS, AND GUIDELINES
BY *HR* DATE *5/31/01*





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~ (WITH EXDIS ATTACHMENT)

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Call by Ambassador Moynihan

The President has agreed to receive Daniel P. Moynihan, retiring Ambassador to India, on Monday, January 27 at 11:30 a.m. A briefing memorandum for the President is attached.

George S. Springsteen
George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Briefing Memorandum

~~SECRET~~
GDS

HR 5/31/01



~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Meeting with Ambassador Moynihan

I. PURPOSE

You have agreed to see Ambassador Moynihan for 30 minutes Monday, January 27, at 11:30 a.m. Moynihan has just returned from his assignment as Ambassador to India and will be resuming his professorship at Harvard in February.

II. BACKGROUND

Since Moynihan's arrival in Delhi in February 1973, relations with India have improved substantially, moving from a nadir after the 1971 Bangladesh crisis to the current reasonably satisfactory level. Secretary Kissinger's successful visit to Delhi in October marked a turning point in this process. Foreign Minister Chavan will be in Washington March 13-14 for an official visit and a meeting of the new Joint Commission.

The basis for the new mature relationship, however, remains tentative. Given the potential for serious policy differences and Mrs. Gandhi's attitudes, we will do well to maintain the current satisfactory plateau. India's nuclear test has made it even more important to maintain a good relationship with Delhi in the hope of influencing India to play a responsible nuclear role and to cooperate in a multilateral system of export controls. Our present policy, which Moynihan stressed during his tour, is to accept India as the pre-eminent regional power, while asking that it show

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GDS

HR 5/31/01



~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

- 2 -

restraint toward its neighbors. Our goal is to move the Indians somewhat away from the Soviets while promoting greater regional stability in the desperately poor South Asia area.

Bilaterally, the major current issue in Indian eyes remains our South Asian arms policy. We are currently reviewing our arms policy preparatory to the Shutto visit, weighing the cons of lifting the embargo in terms of U. S.-Indian relations against the pros for U. S.-Pakistan relations and for our interests in keeping Pakistan on its present political course. Moynihan strongly believes that a change in the arms policy at this time would not further U. S. interests. He has also questioned the way we have handled the proposed Diego Garcia base. Moynihan feels that the public presentation, on the Hill and to foreign governments, was not managed well, magnifying the issue far beyond its real importance.

On the economic side, relations have improved, especially since Moynihan negotiated a settlement of our massive rupee holdings. (The Rupee Agreement was signed in February 1974.) The Indians are asking for large-scale food assistance and debt rescheduling, but have not yet decided to pick up the \$50 million in development lending approved by Congress. We hope to put together a substantial P. L. 480 Title I package (750,000 tons). India is currently our largest commercial buyer of wheat, having purchased 3.7 million tons this year for cash (about \$650 million) as well as \$150 million worth of U. S. fertilizer.

III. YOUR TALKING POINTS

-- Congratulate Moynihan on the excellent job he has done in Delhi in improving relations to the present reasonable level, without giving rise to unwarranted expectations.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~



~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

- 3 -

-- Discuss with him how we should proceed in order to keep things on the present plateau, avoiding the sharp peaks and valleys of the past. You hope to visit India later in the year to help this process along.

-- We see no fundamental reason why we cannot have reasonably good Indo-American relations although we recognize the limits given Mrs. Gandhi's attitudes.

-- Ask for Moynihan's views on the arms issue. Whatever decision is taken, our overall South Asia policy will remain unchanged: we strongly support India-Pakistan normalization; we will take no action to alter the strategic balance or fuel an arms race.

-- The arms issue presents serious dilemmas whichever way we come out. Continuation of the embargo would better serve bilateral U. S.-Indian relations, but would cause major problems in U. S.-Pakistani relations and could push Pakistan toward adopting regional policies less amenable to our interests. The embargo is also inherently inequitable, since India has access to Soviet arms plus an indigenous arms industry while China is Pakistan's only arms source other than costly commercial procurement in Western Europe.

-- On economic relations, we believe that the main stress should be on trade, investment and contributions U. S. technology can make to Indian development and not bilateral economic assistance. On the food front, we are willing to help insofar as we can on humanitarian grounds and are putting together a sizeable package for FY 1975.

-- Ask Moynihan's views on India's relations with Pakistan (these have been slowly improving), with the USSR (close and friendly) and with China (cool).

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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
January 25, 1975

~~SECRET~~ (WITH EXDIS ATTACHMENT)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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GDS

HR 5/31/01



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GDS

HR 5/31/01



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- 2 -

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~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

- 3 -

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~~SECRET/EXDIS~~



19
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

VIA LDX

January 24, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Presidential Appointment for
Ambassador Daniel Moynihan

To confirm our telephone notification, the President will receive Ambassador Moynihan on Monday, January 27 at 11:30 AM for approximately 30 minutes. Would you please provide a briefing memorandum no later than 12 Noon, January 25.

Please confirm acceptance.


Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary



THE WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

TIME SENT

WHITE HOUSE LDX NR #733

RECEIVED NSC WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

CIA _____ DIA/G _____
STATE X _____ DIA/H _____
NMCC _____ DASA _____
ANMCC _____ NPIC _____
NSA _____

JAN 24 9 30 PM '75
'75 JAN 24 PM 7.56

NUMBER OF PAGES 1

DESCRIPTION/COMMENT:

FROM: J.W. DAVIS

TO: GEORGE SPRINGSTEEN

RECEIVED
BY:

DATE/TIME: 242000 /B'

NSC/S



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		G NBR		INITIAL ACTION O	
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SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

REFERENCE:

CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE

TO: PRES _____
KISSINGER _____
SCOWCROFT _____
DAVIS _____

FROM: KISSINGER, H. _____
COLBY, W _____
SCHLESINGER, J _____
ST EX SEC _____

S/S _____
OTHER _____
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TS _____ CODEWORD _____
SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT:

Request for copy of letter for Lt. Col. Magnifico by India who is returning int'l schedule for 27 Jan 1975

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

ACTION INFO

REC
CY
FOR

ACTION REQUIRED

ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT

STAFF SECRETARY

FAR EAST

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA

EUROPE / CANADA

LATIN AMERICA

UNITED NATIONS

ECONOMIC

SCIENTIFIC

PROGRAM ANALYSIS

NSC PLANNING

CONGRESSIONAL

OCEANS POLICY

INTELLIGENCE

MEMO FOR HAK _____

MEMO FOR PRES _____

REPLY FOR _____

APPROPRIATE ACTION _____

MEMO _____ TO _____

RECOMMENDATIONS _____

JOINT MEMO _____

REFER TO _____ FOR: _____

ANY ACTION NECESSARY? _____

CONCURRENCE _____

DUE DATE: _____

COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

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by - Pres

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE

FROM

TO

S

SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):

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1/25

Rec'd State Dept. for
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Copy 5 to Pres (1-25)

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Scuff x Talker for Pres (1-27)

1/27

Pres P Talker

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C Noted by Pres

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____

NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____

CROSS REF W/ _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: _____ FOLDER: _____

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

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WH _____ EP _____

PA _____ DY _____

January 30, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Decision/Discussion Paper

Attached is one Decision/Discussion item
for the Secretary's use in briefing the
President:

Indian Concerns Over Possible Change in
US Arms Policy.

George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

GDS

HR 5/31/01

WHL:am



26

SECRET/NODIS

INDIAN CONCERNS OVER POSSIBLE CHANGE IN U.S. ARMS POLICY

Background

The Indian Embassy is increasingly concerned that we may lift our embargo on shipments of lethal arms when Bhutto comes here next week. Ambassador Kaul raised the issue with Secretary Schlesinger and alluded to it January 29 at a dinner party he hosted for Ambassador-designate Saxbe where you were present. Kaul was to present a message on the arms question from Chavan to you January 30, but the appointment was put off. The Indians assert that any change in policy would severely set back Indo-American relations and could impair the process of India-Pakistan normalization.

At your request, we have prepared a memorandum on this issue to the President, recommending that we lift the embargo to permit limited cash sales of lethal arms on a case-by-case basis. While recognizing that we will lose something with the Indians, we believe on balance we come out ahead by modifying the policy. Congressional soundings by Ambassador Byroade suggest that problems there should not be insurmountable.

Your Talking Points

--The arms issue is at the top of Bhutto's agenda and we have reviewed our policy with that in mind.

--The present policy is basically unfair to the Pakistanis; they do have access to Chinese and West European arms but India has a pipeline to the Soviet Union as well as a large domestic arms industry. The Pakistanis see our embargo as inconsistent with their CENTO membership and our arms sales to Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East.

--We can expect a strong Indian reaction to any relaxation of the embargo, but in time we think we can get the Indians to see this in the broader perspective of our continuing efforts to build a stronger Indian relationship, our support for the Simla process of Indo-Pak negotiations, and avoiding arms sales that would affect the strategic balance in the area.

--We will be sending more detailed recommendations in the next day or two.

SECRET/NODIS

NEA/INS: BLaingen/DRux
Clearance: NEA:ALaithenJr

Bureau of Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY DR, NARA, DATE 5/31/01



26

Events and Activities

Middle East

- Sadat response re Brezhnev letter
- Staff meeting

Cyprus

- Escnbel accepts meeting, questions venue
- Staff meeting

Wilson Visit

Today's Principal Activities

- Prime Minister Wilson (with the President)
- Davignon



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 3900

June 9, 1975

MEMO FOR NSC/S:

The attached is only an alerting memo indicating that State may send over a recommendation on a Presidential meeting for Indian Ambassador Kaul. No action needs to be taken at this time. Therefore, this can be closed out.

Rosemary Niehuss





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

511390

3900

June 5, 1975

rec 6/6


CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Request for Appointment with the President
by Indian Ambassador Kaul

The Indian Charge has informed us that Ambassador T.N. Kaul, presently in New Delhi on consultations, will return with a personal letter from Prime Minister Gandhi to President Ford and would like an appointment with the President to deliver this message. Kaul is scheduled to return to Washington on/about June 16. Secretary Kissinger has agreed to see Kaul shortly thereafter. We will make a recommendation on the Kaul appointment with the President after the Secretary and Kaul have met.

Ambassador Saxbe delivered a strong protest May 16 to Foreign Minister Chavan over public criticism of the U.S. by senior Indian officials. Since then, the sniping has stopped and there has been a marked improvement in atmospherics. Meanwhile Saxbe has been in the U.S. on personal business. He returns to Washington June 6-11 for consultations.


George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

GDS

HR 5/31/01



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD			LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION
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SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____
KISSINGER _____
SCOWCROFT X
DAVIS _____FROM: KISSINGER, H _____
COLBY, W _____
SCHLESINGER, J _____
ST EX SEC XREFERENCE: 751390
S/S _____
OTHER _____CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE
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LOU NO FORN NODIS
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S CODEWORD
TS SENSITIVE

SUBJECT:

Apppt Request w/ Pres by Indian Ambassador
Kaul

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT.

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION		REC CY FOP	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO	
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT			MEMO FOR HAK ()
STAFF SECRETARY	<u>X</u>		MEMO FOR PRES ()
FAR EAST			REPLY FOR ()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA	<u>X</u>		MEMO TO ()
EUROPE / CANADA			RECOMMENDATIONS ()
LATIN AMERICA			JOINT MEMO ()
UNITED NATIONS			REFER TO FOR: ()
ECONOMIC			ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ()
SCIENTIFIC			CONCURRENCE ()
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			DUE DATE: <u>6/16</u>
NSC PLANNING			COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL			
OCEANS POLICY			
INTELLIGENCE			

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
6/9/75	Niehuss	NSC/S	C	NAN per Niehuss note	

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____	MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:
CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____	
NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____	JUN 17 1975 BY AOC
SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____	
CROSS REF W/ _____	CRT ID: _____
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: <u>X</u>	OPEN _____
FOLDER: _____	CLOSE <u>GAB</u>
	SA SF HP NS WH EP PA DY