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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN...

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH THE INDIAN AMBASSADOR, TRILOKI NATH KAUL

Wednesday, August 21, 1974

12:40 p.m. (5 minutes)

The Oval Office

From: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*I. PURPOSE

To reaffirm the continuity of US foreign policy under your leadership, including our interest in continuing to strengthen our relations with India.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS PLAN

- A. Background: US relations with India have greatly improved during the past 2-1/2 years, after reaching a low point during 1971 when India and the US were in disagreement over the developments that culminated in the December 1971 India-Pakistan war.

Since then, India has been engaged with Pakistan in a series of talks aimed at resolving their differences, and both countries have been gratified by US support for this process. The Indians have also been pleased by the US Government's current efforts to obtain Congressional approval for resumption of a modest US economic aid program (\$75 million for fiscal 1975) in India; direct US Government aid to India was suspended at the time of the 1971 war. Despite India's increasingly serious economic difficulties, there appears to be considerable Congressional opposition to a resumption of such aid, in part because of India's recent test of a nuclear explosive device, which many Congressmen see as a misuse by India of its own scarce resources. In fact, Congress included a requirement in the recently enacted IDA (International Development Association--the World Bank's soft-loan arm) replenishment bill that requires our representative in IDA to vote against IDA loans to India because of its nuclear test.



Finally, India also hopes we will continue our policy of annually rescheduling some of its dollar debt to the US Government. It has asked us to consider increasing the amount (\$29 million) we had originally planned to reschedule this year, and we have agreed to consider this request.

India and the US continue to differ on a number of issues, including our plans to expand our naval facilities on Diego Garcia island in the Indian Ocean; and our reluctance to continue providing services to the key Indian nuclear power-generating reactor at Tarapur, unless India satisfies our request for firm guarantees that material from this reactor will not be used in any nuclear explosion. The US also has long been somewhat concerned over India's very friendly and cooperative political-military relationship with the USSR, although India has emphasized that it remains nonaligned, independent in its actions, and interested in good relations with all countries -- even China, with which India's relations have been very cool since their 1962 war.

Recently, both we and the Indians have made a considerable effort to handle differences in a low-key manner, and to continue the improvement in our relations. Currently, we are discussing with them ways to strengthen our ties in such fields as trade, investment, science and technology, and cultural exchange; we are discussing the establishment of an Indo-US joint commission for these purposes. As you know, I hope to visit India and several neighboring countries in late October.

Ambassador Kaul is a 61-year-old career diplomat who has long been a senior member of India's foreign policy establishment. He called on you during your tenure as Vice President.

B. Participants: Ambassador Kaul and Secretary Kissinger.

C. Press Plan: Meeting to be announced. Picture session.

III. TALKING POINTS

1. Mr. Ambassador, it is a pleasure to see you again.



2. I want to reaffirm to you personally what I have made clear publicly about US foreign policy--that my government intends to carry forward with existing United States policies and commitments.
3. We will continue our efforts on behalf of peace, both globally and in particular regions where it may be threatened. We will continue to support the process of resolving regional differences through negotiation. We are encouraged by the progress India and Pakistan have made toward normalizing their relations, and we hope these efforts will continue.
4. I want to emphasize that I intend to carry forward our policy of seeking continued improvement in US-Indian relations. I see every reason why the world's two largest democracies should enjoy cooperative and constructive relations.
5. (If Ambassador Kaul brings up India's economic needs.) You can be sure we will consider these problems sympathetically and do what we can within the limits of our resources.
6. Please convey my personal respects and best wishes to Prime Minister Gandhi, and my congratulations to your new President, Mr. Ahmed. (Former Agricultural Minister F. A. Ahmed was elected to India's largely ceremonial Presidency August 20.)



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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Biography

CREATION DATE 08/20/1974

VOLUME 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032700002

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH
ASIA

BOX NUMBER 11

FOLDER TITLE India (1)

DATE WITHDRAWN 05/23/2001

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Exempt 9/7/04



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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lc

August 19, 1974

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Briefing Material for the President

Attached is a briefing memorandum with suggested talking points for the call on the President by Indian Ambassador T. N. Kaul which is scheduled for Wednesday, August 21.

Paul Barbrain
for George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Briefing memorandum.

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GDS

HR 5/31/01



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRIEFING PAPER

~~SECRET~~

INDIAN AMBASSADOR

Ambassador Triloki Nath KAUL (pronounced CALL)

Background. U.S. interests in India are:

- The stabilizing role we hope India will play as the predominant power in the thickly populated, but desperately poor South Asia region;
- India's willingness to use its nuclear explosive capability in a responsible manner;
- India's willingness to maintain an independent foreign policy, avoiding an exclusive relationship with the Soviet Union.

Setting.

Domestic. India is experiencing its most severe economic crisis. The current food situation is uncertain. Summer rains have so far been below average. Delhi hopes to scrape through, but may face serious food shortages in some areas.

Mrs. Gandhi, who remains India's unchallenged political leader, has failed to make inroads against the country's galloping inflation and economic stagnation. Despite elation over the recent nuclear test, the mood in India is somber and morale low.

Foreign Policy. India's main foreign policy concern relates to South Asia where Delhi is seeking more stable relationships with neighboring countries; this primarily means achieving less hostile relations with India's long-time enemy, Pakistan. Since the 1972 Simla Agreement between Mrs. Gandhi and Bhutto, there has been continuing, although slow and uneven, progress toward greater regional stability, a process the U.S. has encouraged.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STANDARD SCHEDULES
BY KR DATE 5/31/01

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- 2 -

India's closest ties are with the Soviet Union, reflected in the 1971 Friendship Treaty and continuing Soviet arms deliveries (averaging about \$150 million annually). But India is not a Soviet satellite and has refused to provide the Russians with special base facilities. Sino-Indian relations remain cool.

Indo-American relations have considerably improved since the 1971 Bangladesh crisis. We are now hopefully moving toward more mature and realistic relations based on greater mutual respect and understanding. This process has been facilitated by our military supply policy toward Pakistan, an issue of major importance to the Indians. Our current policy, under which we do not permit shipments of lethal equipment, is seen in Delhi as earnest of our acceptance of the regional power relationship that emerged from the 1971 War and of our desire for friendlier ties with India. The Secretary plans to visit India in late October. The trip should symbolize the improvement in relations, permit policy discussions with Indian leaders, especially on nuclear matters, and the signing of an agreement establishing an Indo-U.S. Joint Commission.

The nuclear test, which India maintains was for purely peaceful purposes, has complicated the task of improving relations. The Administration has avoided public recrimination although we have voiced opposition to the test because of the destabilizing impact of nuclear proliferation. Congress, however, has sharply criticized India and support is strong for restrictions on economic aid. The IDA replenishment bill you signed August 14 instructed the U.S. executive director to vote against all Indian loans. (This has no practical effect as our vote will be overridden. We have assured the Indians we will not canvas against them in IDA.)

There is also Congressional opposition to an administration proposal for \$75 million in development assistance to India in FY 75. We have provided no new economic aid since 1971, but have continued to participate in debt relief exercises. This year we have offered \$29 million, and have under review an Indian request for more. On food, the Indians have not asked for concessional food aid under PL 480, but so far in 1974 have commercially purchased about 1.5 million tons from the U.S.

TALKING POINTS

-- I have committed myself to continuing the effort to improve Indo-American relations. I share Secretary Kissinger's view that relations between the U.S. and India can and should be placed on a friendlier and more realistic basis.

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- 3 -

-- I see no reason why the world's two largest democracies cannot have cooperative and mature relations. Secretary Kissinger's visit this October symbolizes our desire to strengthen this process.

-- We believe India has a vital role as the preeminent regional power in shaping more peaceful and stable relationships in South Asia. The U.S. is encouraged by the progress India and Pakistan have made toward normalization in relations and hopes this effort will continue.

-- Please convey my warm personal good wishes to your Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, and my congratulations to your new President, Mr. Ahmed. (Former Agriculture Minister F. A. Ahmed was elected President August 20. The post has only ceremonial functions.)

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Letter

CREATOR'S NAME Daniel P. Moynihan

RECEIVER'S NAME Lawrence S. Eagleburger

CREATION DATE 09/06/1974

VOLUME 1 page

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COUNTRY FILES FOR MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH
ASIA

BOX NUMBER 11

FOLDER TITLE India (1)

DATE WITHDRAWN 05/23/2001

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~~Spencer~~
Santizal 9/7/04

AMBASSADOR OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NEW DELHI

September 6, 1974

~~TOP SECRET~~

Dear Larry,

Last letter on this subject. The Left
press has the story of the expulsion of our[redacted]
to visit. Which renders my letter of August
nine inoperative.

Best,

PMH,

Daniel P. Moynihan

Mr. Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Executive Assistant
Office of the Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Enclosure:

Copy of letter [redacted]

25X1

Presidential Library Review of DOS Equities is Required

~~TOP SECRET~~with [redacted] exhibit
RAC review 9/7/04; [redacted] review 2/3/02
[redacted] 10/18/07

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Letter

CREATOR'S NAME Daniel P. Moynihan

RECEIVER'S NAME William E. Colby

CREATION DATE 09/06/1974

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032700002

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH
ASIA

BOX NUMBER 11

FOLDER TITLE India (1)

DATE WITHDRAWN 05/23/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012983

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram

CREATOR'S NAME Colby

RECEIVER'S NAME Ambassador Moynihan

CREATION DATE 08/07/1974

VOLUME 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032700002

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COUNTRY FILES FOR MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH
ASIA

BOX NUMBER 11

FOLDER TITLE India (1)

DATE WITHDRAWN 05/23/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

Serialized 9/7/04

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[1] S E C R E T 072355Z AUG 74 []

CITE HEADQUARTERS 1296.

[1] TO: []

[1] EYES ONLY []

[25X1]

[]
AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN FROM COLBY

[1] REF [] EMBTEL 10346

THE ANCIENT AND HONOURABLE SOUTH SIDE OF THE RIVER TRUE
 DISGUISED TURTLE DOVE SINGING AND WIG SOCIETY HAS SUFFERED FROM
 SOME LEAKY PLUMBING LATELY, HAS BEEN MISQUOTED BY SHMERSH,
 AFP AND THE HINDU AND HAS TRIED TO WARN OF ACTUAL RUSSIAN SHIPS
 IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RATHER THAN THREATS ON THE DOGGER BANKS.
 SORRY IT GAVE YOU TROUBLE; YOU SHOULD FEEL IT HERE.

WARM REGARDS. E2 IMPDET.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED, with anticom exempt
 Review 9/2/04; State review 2/3/02
 BY 66 NLF DATE 9/18/07

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4136

~~SECRET/NODIS~~MEETING WITH INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SWARAN SINGHThursday, September 19
5:30 p.m. (30 minutes)
Oval OfficeFROM: Henry A. Kissinger *AK*I. PURPOSE

This is the first Presidential meeting with an Indian minister since the Indo-Pak war of 1971. It is thus a highlight of the trend of the past 18 months towards the improvement of US-Indian relations. Your main objective is to reaffirm our commitment to and interest in the evolution of a durable relationship with India.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS:

- A. Background: US-Indian relations reached a low point during and after the 1971 Indo-Pak war and no high-level Indian official has been received at the Presidential level since Prime Minister Gandhi's visit to Washington in November 1971, just prior to the war. Foreign Minister Singh, a veteran Indian politician, has been a supporter of improved relations with the US and will probably emphasize that interest as well as seek an appreciation of US views on how India fits into our overall foreign policy objectives. He will also be interested in describing India's food needs, its views on the South Asian situation and stress that India's nuclear intentions are peaceful.

Relations between the US and India have steadily improved over the past year and a half. We have moved cautiously to assure that interest

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HR 5/31/01



in better relations was reciprocal and to avoid arousing unrealistic Indian expectations about large-scale aid resumption. Our differences over the proposed expansion of US naval facilities at Diego Garcia have been handled in a restrained manner by the Indians and, while suspicions of US intentions linger, the Indians are beginning to accept that we are not trying to undermine their regional pre-eminence. They want better relations both to influence our South Asia policy and to balance somewhat their relationship with the Soviets. We also see improvement in relations as a means of offsetting Soviet influence in South Asia, though our strategic interests in the area itself are limited. Talks in New Delhi and the formation of a Joint Commission could provide the framework for a carefully expanded cooperative relationship for the longer term.

India's mid-May nuclear test has been a complicating factor. While our official response has been restrained, we are concerned that a number of other countries may follow the Indian example, thus undercutting global non-proliferation efforts. The Indians were stung by foreign criticism of their test and widespread skepticism of their professions of "peaceful" nuclear intentions. They were upset by the passage of the Long Amendment requiring the US to vote against all IDA loans to India but reassured when informed that we would not canvas against India in IDA (our vote alone would not be sufficient to reduce IDA loans). Our strategy will be to seek Indian cooperation in placing controls on its nuclear exports, in slowing the pace of its testing, in confirming the peaceful uses of its nuclear program through some form of safeguards and accountability, in at least postponing development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems and in toning down its criticism of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Progress in these areas is important both for our global non-proliferation policy and for any hope of discouraging Pakistani efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. Nuclear matters will be an important agenda item during my visit. In the interim, we and the Indians have been discussing the supply of US enriched uranium to the Indian Tarapur nuclear power station near Bombay, to confirm that none of our material will be used in nuclear explosives. AEC Chairwoman Ray reached satisfactory agreement this week with her Indian counterpart [Dr. Sethna] on this problem.



On the economic side, our request for \$75 million in development lending for India (suspended since the 1971 war) was widely criticized on the Hill because of the nuclear test. However, with the adoption of the Long Amendment, Congress may now be less inclined to consider other restrictive legislation (although we would expect that critical sentiment would resume if India tests again.)

The Indian food situation is growing worse, against a backdrop of an increasingly gloomy economic picture. The Indians have bought almost 3 million tons of foodgrains, half from the US, but need more (perhaps up to 4 million tons) to avert serious shortages. They have been reluctant to ask our help publicly, having proudly proclaimed food self-sufficiency in 1971, but Ambassador Kaul has made clear privately that India would like food from us as part of our response to the UNGA Emergency Appeal. We have an on-going \$45 million voluntary agency program under Title II of PL 480.

India and Pakistan have made efforts to reduce their bilateral tensions, through slow implementation of the Simla Agreement of 1972 by which the sides agreed to a process of normalization. The Pakistanis had broken off negotiations following India's nuclear explosion but they resumed this month with some agreements last weekend on links in the communications, postal and travel fields. They have also promised further talks, including on the bigger issue of resuming diplomatic ties. We have encouraged this process as a genuinely regional effort important to South Asian stability. The Indians prefer the "bilateralism" it reflects, by contrast to earlier wars when outside powers were intimately involved in settlements.

At the same time, we have continued a policy of restrictive arms sales to India and Pakistan (only cash sales of non-lethal end-items and spares and ammunition for previously supplied US lethal equipment). India welcomes this but Pakistan naturally presses us hard to liberalize our policy. Our arms sales policy to Pakistan is a highly sensitive issue with the Indians. We are studying this issue but prefer to defer any decision on a possible change in policy until after my South Asian trip when we will be better able to weigh our options.

- B. Participants: Foreign Minister Singh, Indian Ambassador T. N. Kaul, Henry A. Kissinger
- C. Press: Short summary statement in Mr. Hushen's daily briefing; press photo session.

III. TALKING POINTS

1. I am pleased to have this opportunity for a first personal meeting between us. I appreciated the warm messages of Prime Minister Gandhi on my assumption of office as President (copies attached; your reply has been sent). As the two largest democracies in the world, our nations have many common objectives and a shared purpose for cooperating towards the building of a more stable world.
2. I want to reaffirm our interest in the continued evolution of a mutually satisfying relationship with India for the longer-term future. We hope that we can forge a durable relationship based on mutual respect and understanding. We appreciate the important role which India has to play in world affairs.
3. I expect that Secretary Kissinger's visit to New Delhi will serve to strengthen the process of improving US-Indian relations on a wide range of issues in which we share a common interest.
4. As I indicated yesterday at the UN, our nation remains very interested in initiatives to improve the world food situation and we will do our part. We will try to be helpful to India within the limits of our resources.
5. The US has viewed with satisfaction the progress made by India and Pakistan, between themselves, towards more normal relations and a more stable South Asian region.
6. We hope that India and the US can work together constructively on nuclear non-proliferation issues which we consider of great importance to global stability.



- 7 [If Singh raises Diego Garcia]: The US interest in improving our facility at Diego Garcia is not in any way directed at South Asia.
8. [If he raises the question of our arms supply policy in South Asia]: We have no current plans to modify our policy but we do keep this issue under continuing review. Our main interest is in the continued strengthening of peace and stability in your region.





64-36
AMBASSADOR OF INDIA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

9th August 1974

Dear Mr. President,

I am directed by my Prime Minister to convey to you the following message on the happy occasion of your assumption of the highest office in the United States of America:

"As you assume the high office of the President of the United States of America, I have great pleasure in sending you my cordial greetings and warm felicitations. We look forward to the further strengthening of the friendly relations between our two countries.

Please accept my best wishes for your personal well being and for the prosperity of the people of the United States of America.

INDIRA GANDHI".

May I add my own heartiest congratulations and respectful wishes for your health and happiness and that of your family, and success in your new office.

With respectful regards,

Sincerely,

(T.N. Kaul)

Hon'ble Gerald R. Ford,
President of the United States of America,
The White House,
WASHINGTON D.C.





PRIME MINISTER

New Delhi,
August 19, 1974.

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter of 10th August 1974 which must have crossed my own message to you. I appreciate your courtesy in sharing your thoughts about the future policies of the United States of America and your commitment to building a strong relationship between our two countries. Indeed, it has been my sincere effort, ever since I became Prime Minister, to improve relations with your great country. But unfortunately our policy and even our motives have so often been misunderstood in the past.

We admire the American heritage. The United States and India are functioning democracies which have a common interest in promoting world peace in which democratic institutions and values can flourish, and men and women will have full opportunity to work for the fulfilment of their aspirations. We look forward to a continuing dialogue between our two Governments on matters of bilateral and international interest. Our two countries can and should work together to promote understanding, cooperation and peace, especially in this part of the world.

As you say, there has indeed been considerable progress in our relations in recent months. We share the wish of the United States Government under your leadership to continue this process. May I assure you, Mr. President, of our earnestness in desiring a more positive and constructive relationship between our two countries.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

Indira Gandhi
(Indira Gandhi)

His Excellency
Mr. Gerald R. Ford,
President of the United States of America,
Washington.



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/NODIS~~ACTION

September 18, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM:

ROBERT OAKLEY *RO*
ROSEMARY NIEHUSE *RN*

SUBJECT:

Talking Paper for President's Meeting
with Swaran Singh

At Tab I is a talking paper for the President's 5:30 p.m. meeting tomorrow with Indian Foreign Minister Singh. The Secretary has not yet signed off on the final memo (copy attached).

State has also forwarded a short briefing paper on India for use by the Secretary in an early morning briefing tomorrow morning. You may wish to transmit this in time for that morning meeting. [Tab II]

RECOMMENDATION: That you forward the package at Tab I to the President.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/93, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY *HR*, WMA, DATE *5/31/01*

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Indian Foreign
Minister Swaran Singh -
September 19, 1974

Background and Objectives

This is the first Presidential level meeting with an Indian Minister in nearly three years. A veteran Indian political leader, Foreign Minister Swaran Singh has supported better Indo-American relations. He comes to Washington at a time when the Indian food situation is growing worse and Delhi needs substantial foodgrain imports to avert serious shortages in the months ahead.

Our Objectives:

-- Underscore your personal interest in placing Indo-American relations on a more satisfactory basis over the longer term;

-- Set the stage for more detailed discussions I will have in Delhi October 27-30;

-- Convey our willingness to assist India in meeting its food problems, while noting our own supply and financial resources are very limited;

-- Indicate our support for continuing Indo-Pakistani efforts toward more normal relations.

Their Objectives:

-- Emphasize India's hope for better Indo-American relations;

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PREPARED BY
E.O. 12812, SEC. 8.3
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
BY KR, DATE 5/31/01



-- Get a sense of how India fits into overall U.S. foreign policy priorities and objectives;

-- Describe India's food situation in the hope we will be forthcoming;

-- Give you India's views on the outlook for greater stability in South Asia, in particular more normal relations with Pakistan;

-- Emphasize that India's nuclear intentions are peaceful.

Principal Issues

1. Indo-American Relations

Relations with India have done a substantial, if unheralded, turnaround during the past 18 months. Our differences over the proposed expansion of US naval facilities at Diego Garcia have been handled in a restrained manner; the Indians have taken care to keep this issue from becoming a matter of bilateral friction. While suspicions of U.S. intentions linger in Delhi, the Indians are beginning to accept that we are not trying to undermine their regional pre-eminence. The Indians want better relations both to influence our South Asia policy and to balance somewhat their dependence on the Soviets. We also see improvement in relations as a means of offsetting Soviet influence in South Asia, although we judge our strategic interests for the littoral of South Asia to be fairly marginal.

Our strategy has been to move cautiously and gradually, to assure that interest in better relations is reciprocal and to avoid arousing unrealistic Indian expectations about large-scale aid resumption. The visit to Delhi and signing of an agreement establishing an Indo-US Joint Commission should signify that we have reached a new and more cooperative phase.

2. Indian Nuclear Test

The May 18 underground nuclear test has been a complicating factor. While our official response has been restrained, we are privately concerned that a number of other countries may in the next few years



follow the Indian example, seriously undercutting global nonproliferation efforts. The Indians have been stung by foreign criticism of their test and the widespread skepticism that has greeted their professions of "peaceful" nuclear intentions. They were upset by the passage of the Long Amendment requiring the US to vote against all IDA loans to India, but reassured when we emphasized that we would not canvas in IDA against India. (The amendment will not reduce IDA loans to India as we have only 25% of the vote.)

The thrust of our strategy will be to seek Indian cooperation in placing controls on its nuclear exports, in slowing the pace of its testing, in at least postponing development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and in toning down its criticism of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Progress in these areas is important both for our global nonproliferation policy and for any hope of discouraging Pakistani efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. Nuclear matters will be an important agenda item during my talks in Delhi. In the meanwhile, we and the Indians have been discussing the supply of U.S. enriched uranium to the Indian Tarapur nuclear power station near Bombay, to confirm that none of our material will be used in nuclear explosives. AEC Chairwoman Ray reached satisfactory agreement this week with her Indian counterpart Homi Sethna on this problem.

3. Economic Assistance and Food Aid

Our request for \$75 million in development lending for new aid to India (we have given none since 1971) was widely criticized on the Hill because of the nuclear test. However, having adopted the Long Amendment (IDA), Congress may be now less inclined to consider other restrictive legislation (although we would expect that critical sentiment would resume if India tests again at an early date).

The Indian food situation is growing worse. Food reserves are low. Inadequate monsoon rains and



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the fertilizer shortage have sharply reduced prospects for the crop to be harvested starting next month. The Indians have bought 2.7 million tons of foodgrains from all sources, including 1.5 million from the U.S., but need substantial additional imports (perhaps 4 million tons) to avert shortages. These would hit hardest at the urban poor, already staggering under a 26% annual rate of inflation. The Indians have been reluctant to ask our help publicly; they are uncertain of our response and embarrassed politically to be seeking renewed U.S. assistance, after having proudly proclaimed food self-sufficiency in 1971. Privately, Ambassador Kaul has made clear India would like food from us as part of our response to the UNGA Emergency Appeal. Probably only with a considerable increase in P.L. 480 levels will we be able to provide food for India, and then perhaps in the 500,000 ton range (\$82 million if all wheat). We have an ongoing \$45 million voluntary agency program under Title II of P.L. 480.

4. South Asia Relations: Arms Supply Policy

Since the 1972 Simla Agreement between Mrs. Gandhi and Bhutto, India and Pakistan have been slowly moving toward more normal relations. After a hiatus in talks caused by the Indian nuclear test, the two governments agreed September 14 to resume communications, postal, and travel links. They have scheduled further discussions to consider resumption of overflights and trade and diplomatic ties.

Our approach has been to encourage this process of normalization, which the Indians call "bilateralism" because it contrasts sharply with peacemaking efforts in South Asia after earlier wars when outside powers were intimately involved. We think this genuinely regional effort at accommodation a key to regional stability in South Asia.

At the same time, we have continued a policy of restrictive arms sales to India and Pakistan (only

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cash sales of non-lethal end-items and spares and ammunition for previously supplied US lethal equipment). India welcomes this, but Pakistan finds it increasingly unpalatable and is strongly urging liberalization. We need to address this issue but prefer to defer any decision on a possible change in policy until after the South Asia trip when we will be better able to weigh our options.

The recent Indian absorption of the tiny, but strategic, protectorate of Sikkim has triggered Nepalese, Pakistani, and especially Chinese criticism. In response to press queries, we have taken a "no comment" line.

Talking Points

- The US desires to evolve a mutually satisfactory relationship with India, which is more mature and less volatile than the pattern of our relations over the past 25 years.
- We expect that the upcoming discussions in India will strengthen the process of improving Indo-American relations.
- The US appreciates the very important role that India can play in the developing world, including the example of a strong and practicing democracy.
- The US is willing to be helpful to India in its current food difficulties, assuming our limited food and financial resources permit.
- The US is deeply satisfied that India and Pakistan continue to make progress toward more normal relations and a more stable South Asia region.

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- 6 -

-- We hope that India and the US can work together constructively on nuclear nonproliferation issues, which we consider a matter of great importance to global stability.

-- (If he raises the Diego Garcia question) The US purpose in a more regular Indian Ocean naval presence is not directed at South Asia.

-- (If he raises the question of our South Asia military supply policy) We have no current plans to modify our policy. We do, however, keep this under a continuing review. Our approach will continue to be determined by its impact on bilateral relations in the area and the outlook for peace.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 18, 1974

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Briefing Paper on Swaran Singh Meeting

Attached are talking points on India for the Secretary's morning briefing for the President before his meeting with Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh. These talking points cover a copy of the Secretary's Memorandum to the President, which is awaiting signature.

The Indian Embassy has confirmed that the Foreign Minister will be at the White House at 5:30 p.m. September 19.


George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Briefing Paper on India
2. Memorandum to the President

~~SECRET/NODIS~~
XGDS-3

DECLASSIFIED
EO 12812, SEC. 1.5
DATE 5/31/01
BY KR



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

39

INDIA

SWARAN SINGH MEETING

Background

- Our relations with India have substantially improved during the past 18 months. They have toned down criticism of U.S. policies, such as the proposed expansion of Diego Garcia. Swaran Singh's meeting with the President and the Secretary's upcoming visit to India underscore the distance traveled since the 1971 crisis toward more mature, if less intimate, relations.
- In South Asia, India and Pakistan have made progress toward reducing bilateral tensions. Since the 1972 Simla Agreement, Bhutto and Mrs. Gandhi have demonstrated great statesmanship in working toward normalization. On September 14 resumption of travel and telecommunications links were announced. Further talks are slated to deal with other issues such as trade, overflights and diplomatic relations. Earlier this year, Pakistan and Bangladesh reached agreement on diplomatic recognition, and the return of all POW's held in India. We have encouraged the process of reconciliation, but basically India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have been sorting out their difficulties on their own.
- India remains close politically to the Soviet Union, its principal military supply source (deliveries are running about \$150 million annually). Swaran Singh visited Moscow in early September, but said nothing on the Soviet Asian Security proposal or on Diego Garcia. The Indians are not Soviet satellites and have refused Soviet feelers for naval base rights.
- Sino-Indian relations remain cool. The stiff Peking reaction to the Indian absorption of the small, but strategic, Himalayan protectorate

SECRET/NODIS

-GDS-

HR 5/31/01



of Sikkim suggests scant prospect for improvement in the short-term. Meanwhile Pakistan continues to receive substantial Chinese arms deliveries.

- Economically, the Indian situation is increasingly gloomy. Over the past two years industry has stagnated. Now a poor monsoon coupled with fertilizer shortages has sharply reduced prospects for the fall harvest. The Indians badly need food help to avert possibly serious food shortages. We believe Mrs. Gandhi has sufficient strength to put down any disorders, but her approach is to deal with difficulties through short-term manipulation rather than a fundamental attack on India's massive problems. Next elections are in 1976, and her opponents remain in disarray despite growing dissatisfaction with her regime.
- The Indian nuclear test has set back global non-proliferation efforts, but has limited strategic effect, except regionally where it badly unsettles the Pakistanis. While the Indians claim they will use nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes only (they currently lack a credible delivery system), our assumption is that they will eventually opt for weapons.
- Over the years, the Indians have been concerned about our military supply to Pakistan. They are satisfied with our present restrained policy (sales only of non-lethal end items and spares and ammunition for previously supplied lethal equipment) although the Pakistanis strongly urge a less restrictive policy.

Our Strategy

- Our overall approach has been to give priority to building a more realistic relationship with India while preserving the good ties we have with Pakistan. This is in line with our limited strategic interests in South Asia and helps offset Indian dependence on the Soviet Union.



- We have moved cautiously and deliberately to be sure the Indians reciprocate our interest. We also want to avoid arousing undue Indian expectations about a possible resumption of US economic aid on any large scale.
- But we want to place sufficient substance and mutual respect in our Indian relationship to permit us to do what our interests may require our doing in Pakistan in the security area.
- Our flexibility with India may be reduced because of substantial Congressional criticism of India. We already have the Long amendment (IDA) and there may be further restrictive legislation, especially if India tests again in the near future. What we can do in the food area is limited and far short of Indian needs.
- We have accepted without recrimination India's emergence as a nuclear power, but need to begin a serious dialogue on nuclear issues in the months ahead. The South Asia trip will provide an opportunity to begin this process.

Our Approach with Swaran Singh

- We wish to stress with the Foreign Minister our strong interest in continuing the improvement of relations, and moving on to a new, steadier phase.
- We want to highlight that we believe India can and does play an important role in world affairs and your meeting with him underscores this point.
- We would like to emphasize our expectation that the upcoming talks in Delhi (October 27-30) will help maintain the momentum of improving relations and that we look forward to serious exchanges with the Indians on a wide range of important issues, including nuclear policy matters.
- On economic matters, we would like to convey the impression we will be helpful to India while dampening their expectations about the prospects for any large-scale US assistance.



~~SECRET~~/NODIS

- 4 -

- On South Asia questions, we can express our deep satisfaction over the continuing progress toward resolution of India-Pakistan problems.
- We look to India as the dominant regional power to act responsibly toward its smaller neighbors, particularly to deal constructively with Pakistan's sense of insecurity.

~~SECRET~~/NODIS



~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Retype

MEETING WITH INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SWARAN SINGH

Thursday, September 19

5:30 p.m. (30 minutes)

Oval Office

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

I. PURPOSE

This is the first Presidential meeting with an Indian minister since the Indo-Pak war of 1971. It is thus a highlight of the trend of the past 18 months towards the improvement of US-Indian relations. Your main objective is to reaffirm our commitment to and interest in the evolution of a durable relationship with India.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS:

- A. Background: US-Indian relations reached a low point during and after the 1971 Indo-Pak war and no high-level Indian official has been received at the Presidential level since Prime Minister Gandhi's visit to Washington in November 1971, just prior to the war. Foreign Minister Singh, a veteran Indian politician, has been a supporter of improved relations with the US and will probably emphasize that interest as well as seek an appreciation of US views on how India fits into our overall foreign policy objectives. He will also be interested in describing India's food needs, its views on the South Asian situation and stress that India's nuclear intentions are peaceful.

Relations between the US and India have steadily improved over the past year and a half. We have moved cautiously to assure that interest

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY KJR, NARA, DATE 5/31/01

On the economic side, our request for \$75 million in development lending for India (suspended since the 1971 war) was widely criticized on the Hill because of the nuclear test. However, with the adoption of the Long Amendment, Congress may now be less inclined to consider other restrictive legislation (although we would expect that critical sentiment would resume if India tests again.)

The Indian food situation is growing worse, against a backdrop of an increasingly gloomy economic picture. The Indians have bought almost 3 million tons of foodgrains, half from the US, but need more (perhaps up to 4 million tons) to avert serious shortages. They have been reluctant to ask our help publicly, having proudly proclaimed food self-sufficiency in 1971, but Ambassador Kaul has made clear privately that India would like food from us as part of our response to the UNGA Emergency Appeal. We have an on-going \$45 million voluntary agency program under Title II of PL 480.

India and Pakistan have made efforts to reduce their bilateral tensions through slow implementation of the Simla Agreement of 1972 by which the sides agreed to a process of normalization. The Pakistanis had broken off negotiations following India's nuclear explosion but they resumed this month with some agreements last weekend on links in the communications, postal and travel fields. They have also promised further talks, including on the bigger issue of resuming diplomatic ties. We have encouraged this process as a genuinely regional effort important to South Asian stability. The Indians prefer the "bilateralism" it reflects, by contrast to earlier wars when outside powers were intimately involved in settlements.

At the same time, we have continued a policy of restrictive arms sales to India and Pakistan (only cash sales of non-lethal end-items and spares and ammunition for previously supplied US lethal equipment). India welcomes this but Pakistan naturally presses us hard to liberalize our policy. Our arms sales policy to Pakistan is a highly sensitive issue with the Indians. We are studying this issue but prefer to defer any decision on a possible change in policy until after my South Asian trip when we will be better able to weigh our options.



- B. Participants: Foreign Minister Singh, Indian Ambassador T. N. Kaul, Henry A. Kissinger
- C. Press: Short summary statement in Mr. Hushen's daily briefing; press photo session.

III. TALKING POINTS

1. I am pleased to have this opportunity for a first personal meeting between us. I appreciated the warm messages of Prime Minister Gandhi on my assumption of office as President (copies attached; your reply has been sent). As the two largest democracies in the world, our nations have many common objectives and a shared purpose for cooperating towards the building of a more stable world.
2. I want to reaffirm our interest in the continued evolution of a mutually satisfying relationship with India for the longer-term future. We hope that we can forge a durable relationship based on mutual respect and understanding. We appreciate the important role which India has to play in world affairs.
3. I expect that Secretary Kissinger's visit to New Delhi will serve to strengthen the process of improving US-Indian relations on a wide range of issues in which we share a common interest.
4. As indicated yesterday at the UN, our nation remains very interested in initiatives to improve the world food situation and we will do our part. We will try to be helpful to India within the limits of our resources.
5. The US has viewed with satisfaction the progress made by India and Pakistan, between themselves, towards more normal relations and a more stable South Asian region.
6. We hope that India and the US can work together constructively on nuclear non-proliferation issues which we consider of great importance to global stability.



- 7 [If Singh raises Diego Garcia]: The US interest in improving our facility at Diego Garcia is not in any way directed at South Asia.
8. [If he raised the question of our arms supply policy in South Asia]: We have no current plans to modify our policy but we do keep this issue under continuing review. Our main interest is in the continued strengthening of peace and stability in your region.



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS

MEETING WITH INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SWARAN SINGH

Thursday, September 19
5:30 p.m. (half hour)
Oval Office

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

I. PURPOSE

This is the first Presidential meeting with an Indian minister since the Indo-Pak war of 1971. It is thus a highlight of the trend of the past 18 months towards the improvement of US-Indian relations. Your main objective is to reaffirm our commitment to and interest in the evolution of a durable relationship with India, ~~for the longer-term. Your meeting will also set the stage for my South Asian trip and talks in India at the end of October.~~

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS:

A. Background: US-Indian relations reached a low point during and after the 1971 Indo-Pak war and no high-level Indian official has been received at the Presidential level since Prime Minister Gandhi's visit to Washington in November 1971, just prior to the war. Foreign Minister Singh, a veteran Indian politician, has been a supporter of improved relations with the US and will probably emphasize that interest as well as seek an appreciation of US views on how India fits into our overall foreign policy objectives. He will also be interested in describing India's food needs, its views on the South Asian situation and stress that India's nuclear intentions are peaceful.

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SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/08, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY HR, NARA, DATE 5/31/01



On the economic side, our request for \$75 million in development lending for India (suspended since the 1971 war) was widely criticized on the Hill because of the nuclear test. However, with the adoption of the Long Amendment, Congress may now be less inclined to consider other restrictive legislation (although we would expect that critical sentiment would resume if India tests again.)

The Indian food situation is growing worse, against a backdrop of an increasingly gloomy economic picture. The Indians have bought almost 3 million tons of foodgrains, half from the US, but need more (perhaps up to 4 million tons) to avert serious shortages. They have been reluctant to ask our help publicly, having proudly proclaimed food self-sufficiency in 1971, but Ambassador Kaul has made clear privately that India would like food from us as part of our response to the UNGA Emergency Appeal. ~~Probably only with a considerable increase in PL 480 will we be able to provide food for India and then perhaps only in the half-million ton range.~~ We have an on-going \$45 million voluntary agency program under Title II of PL 480.

India and Pakistan have made efforts to reduce their bilateral tensions, through slow implementation of the Simla Agreement of 1972 by which the sides agreed to a process of normalization. The Pakistanis had broken off negotiations following India's nuclear explosion but they resumed this month with some agreements last weekend on links in the communications, postal and travel fields. They have also promised further talks, including on the bigger issue of resuming diplomatic ties. We have encouraged this process as a genuinely regional effort important to South Asian stability. The Indians prefer the "bilateralism" it reflects, by contrast to earlier wars when outside powers were intimately involved in settlements.

At the same time, we have continued a policy of restrictive arms sales to India and Pakistan (only cash sales of non-lethal end-items and spares and ammunition for previously supplied US lethal equipment). India welcomes this but Pakistan naturally presses us hard to liberalize our policy. Our arms sales policy to Pakistan is a highly sensitive issue with the Indians. We ~~need to address~~ this issue but prefer to defer any decision on a possible change in policy until after the South Asian trip when we will be better able to weigh our options.

are studying



- B. Participants: Foreign Minister Singh, Indian Ambassador T. N. Kaul, ~~myself and General Scowcroft.~~ *Amey Akin*
- C. Press: ~~There will be a~~ short summary statement in Mr. Hushen's daily briefing; ~~there will be a~~ *run* photo session.

III. TALKING POINTS

1. I ~~appreciate~~ *am pleased to have* this opportunity for a first personal meeting between us. I appreciated the warm messages of Prime Minister Gandhi on my assumption of office as President (copies attached; your reply has been sent). As the two largest democracies in the world, our ~~two~~ nations have many common objectives and a shared purpose for cooperating towards the building of a more stable world.
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3. I expect that Secretary Kissinger's visit to New Delhi will serve to strengthen the process of improving US-Indian relations on a wide range of issues in which we share a common interest.
4. As I indicated yesterday at the UN, our nation remains very interested in initiatives to improve the world food situation and we will do our part. We will try to be helpful to India within the ~~context~~ *limits* of our resources.
5. The US has viewed with satisfaction the progress made by India and Pakistan, ~~among~~ *between* themselves, towards more normal relations and a more stable South Asian region.
6. We hope that India and the US can work together constructively on nuclear non-proliferation issues which we consider of great important to global stability.



SECRET/NODIS -- 5

6. [If Singh raises Diego Garcia]: The US ^{interest in acquiring} ~~purpose in a more~~ regular Indian Ocean naval presence is not directed at South Asia.
7. [If he raised the question of our arms supply policy in South Asia]: We have no current plans to modify our policy but we do keep this issue under continuing review. Our main interest is in the continued strengthening of peace and stability in your region.

*arm facility at Diego Garcia is not
in any way*



SECRET/NODIS

Urgent Staffing 4/36
3)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 14, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: WARREN RUSTAND *WSR*
SUBJECT: Approved Presidential Activity

Please take the necessary steps to implement the following and confirm with Mrs. Nell Yates, ext. 2699. The appropriate briefing paper should be submitted to Dr. David Hoopes.

Event: Foreign Minister Singh of India

Date: Thursday, September 19, 1974 Time: ^{5:30} 5:15 p.m. Duration:

Location: The Oval Office

Participants: Foreign Minister Singh, Secretary Kissinger

Press Coverage: Press Photo

cc: Mr. Hartmann
Mr. Marsh
Dr. Hoopes
Mr. Jones
Mr. O'Donnell
Mr. Hushen
Mr. Wardell
Mrs. Yates
Mrs. Davis



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		LOG NBR		INITIAL ACTION O	
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9	14	9	17	13	7404136		<i>Nichols</i>

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES

KISSINGER

SCOWCROFT

DAVIS

FROM: KISSINGER, H.

COLBY, W

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CODEWORD

SENSITIVE

SUBJECT:

*Talked for Pres party w/ Indian
Admin Supran Singh, Sept 13, 74*

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

ACTION

INFO

REC
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FOR

ACTION REQUIRED

ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT

STAFF SECRETARY

FAR EAST

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA

EUROPE / CANADA

LATIN AMERICA

UNITED NATIONS

ECONOMIC

SCIENTIFIC

PROGRAM ANALYSIS

NSC PLANNING

CONGRESSIONAL

OCEANS POLICY

INTELLIGENCE

MEMO FOR HAK

MEMO FOR PRES

REPLY FOR

APPROPRIATE ACTION

MEMO TO

RECOMMENDATIONS

JOINT MEMO

REFER TO FOR:

ANY ACTION NECESSARY?

CONCURRENCE

DUE DATE:

COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE

FROM

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SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):

CY TO

9/14/74	Nichols	NSC/S	X	PRES TALKERS (09/18) BY-PASS	
9/18		Pres	P	Talker funded to Pres per RCM	
9/20		NSC/S	C	Noted by Pres	

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:

NOTIFY & DATE BY

SPECIAL DISPOSITION:

CROSS REF W/ 7403907

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: FOLDER:

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

SEP 24 1974

CRT ID:

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office Of
THE SECRETARY

November 14, 1974

TO: General Scowcroft

FROM: Al Adams

Larry thought you might
be amused by the attached --
our latest from Moynihan.





AMBASSADOR OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NEW DELHI

November 7, 1974

CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS

Dear Larry:

I am enclosing a copy of a letter I have just written General Brown, as I think someone in the Department should know I have done this.

I really have been surprised by all this. The military lie. Or in any event the Admirals lie. I assume it is the policy of the Department of State that they should do so without being troubled by us. But it is not my policy.

As you will have learned by now, the Secretary's visit went very well. It was a solid diplomatic achievement and a great personal success. But I fear a waste of his time.

Sincerely,

Daniel P. Moynihan

Mr. Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Office of the Secretary
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Enclosure

CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS

EX-100-100000
NOV 1974
EX-100-100000
BY KR DATE 5/31/01



November 6, 1974

CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS

Dear General Brown:

The Joint Chiefs were so exceptionally courteous and helpful on the occasion of my last meeting with you that it may seem churlish to persist from this distance in a matter about which I have perhaps already expressed myself with sufficient emphasis. Which is to say the question of Soviet bases in the Indian Ocean. I hope you will forgive this one last animadversion.

As I was getting into my car at the River Entrance following our meeting, Jim Noyes came running up to say that I must surely not suppose that the President's August 28 statement on this subject was in any way the result of a Pentagon briefing paper. I had never supposed it to be, but Jim was wise to emphasize the point.

It was hence all the more troubling to read of Admiral Holloway's recent news conference. According to the USIS Wireloss File of October 31 in a Defense Department briefing of the previous day: "He noted that President Ford had said the Soviets were using 'three major bases in the Indian Ocean'...."

As I sought to make clear when I spoke of the matter, there are two insurmountable difficulties with any such statement. The first is that there are no such bases. A mistake was made. All the more, then, is the importance of not making it appear to have been a deliberate mistake by repeating it. The second objection derives from elemental strategic considerations. One does not concede to an opponent a strategic advantage which he does not have, but which, having been conceded, he can thereafter claim.

CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS

RECEIVED
BY HR DATE 5/31/01



CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS

-2-

I say no more. The case is so overwhelming that I cannot imagine that any more need be said.

The Secretary had a good visit to New Delhi. The subject of Diego Garcia came up only once in our private talks. The Foreign Minister of India noted India's "unanimous" and total opposition to the base. The Secretary replied that we understood this to be India's view. The exchange did not last three minutes and there was no heat in it whatever. As I said on October 4, it has been our constant object to dissuade the Indians from making this a bilateral issue between us, and we have so far succeeded. On the other hand, next week the same Foreign Secretary will be inaugurating a "40-nation" conference (actually a Communist front) "against setting up of military bases in the Indian Ocean".

Respectfully,

Daniel P. Moynihan

General George S. Brown
Chief of Staff
United States Air Force
Quarters 7
Fort Myer
Arlington, Va. 22211

