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NOD918

TELEGRAM
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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 /001 W

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 3512

NODIS CHERUKEE

FOR EAGLEBURGER

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: QVIP (JAVITS)
SUBJ: JAVITS

REF: STATE 058925


1. RAISED JAVITS' DESIRE FOR ACCOMMODATION AT NATIONAL HOTEL WITH BOTH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ZEMSKOV AND KORNIENKO THIS MORNING. I TOLD THEM THAT THIS WAS REPEAT OF SENTIMENTAL JOURNEY AND THAT SENATOR WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE SOVIET COOPERATION IN MEETING THIS REQUEST.

2. KORNIENKO WAS NON-COMMITTAL IN REPLY AND SAID THAT MATTER WOULD BE REFERRED AGAIN TO SUPREME SOVIET.

3. I'M NOT VERY HOPEFUL ON THIS ONE, BUT IN ANY CASE I FEEL WE'VE GONE ABOUT AS FAR AS WE CAN GO TO HELP THE SENATOR.
STOESSEL

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DEPT PASS SECRETARYE.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP KISSINGER, HENRY A.
SUBJECT: VIENNA MEETING

REF: SECTO 361

I APPRECIATE OPPORTUNITY PARTICIPATE IN VIENNA TALKS.
I AM HAVING WORKING LUNCH WITH KORNIYENKO MARCH 20 AND
WILL SUBMIT RECOMMENDATIONS THEREAFTER ON ITEMS FOR
DISCUSSION AND ANY POINTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST HE MAY RAISE.
STUESSEL

S/S NOTE: THIS TEL HAS NOT BEEN RELAYED BY OC/T TO SECRETARY~~SECRET~~

66 8/1/01



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☐ With concurrence _____ (not)(obtained)
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NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-4
TAGS: PFOR, UR, FI
SUBJ: BREZHNEV'S HEALTH

1. I CALLED YESTERDAY ON FINNISH AMBASSADOR HALLAMA, WHO SAT IN WITH KEKKONEN DURING HIS RECENT MOSCOW CONVERSATIONS WITH SOVIET LEADERSHIP. HALLAMA SAID HE HAD FOUND BREZHNEV "A CHANGED MAN"; EXTREMELY PALE AND CLEARLY UNDER SOME STRAIN. HALLAMA NOTED HE HAS SEEN BREZHNEV FAIRLY FREQUENTLY OVER PAST YEARS AND STRESSED THAT ON THIS OCCASION HE HAD NOTED MARKED DECLINE IN HIS VIGOR.

2. ACCORDING TO HALLAMA, BREZHNEV DID NOT ACCOMPANY KEKKONEN AND PODGORNYY TO HUNTING PARTY AT ZAVIDOVO, SAYING HE WAS "STILL NOT WELL ENOUGH".


3. HALLAMA SAID FINNS HAD HEARD FROM SOVIET SOURCE THAT BREZHNEV HAD UNDERGONE OPERATION ON UPPER LEFT JAW, AND THAT FOUR WEST GERMAN DOCTORS HAD CAME TO MOSCOW TO PERFORM OPERATION.
STOESSEL

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5.

STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, *Stalinski 8/4/00*

BY 649, NARA, DATE 2/1/01



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NOOIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UR, US

SUBJ: WORKING LUNCH FOR KORNIYENKO

REF: A. MOSCOW 3567 B. STATE 62675

1. LUNCH WITH GROUP FROM MFA USA DIVISION HEADED BY DIVISION CHIEF KORNIYENKO TOOK PLACE MARCH 26 AT SPASO HOUSE. KORNIYENKO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY KOMPLEKTOV, MIKHAILOV, SOKOLOV, AND CHETVERIKOV. MATLOCK, BREMENT, MELENCAMP AND JOYCE WERE PRESENT ON OUR SIDE.

2. TRADE ACT. KORNIYENKO HAD VERY LITTLE TO RAISE OF A SUBSTANTIVE NATURE. HE DID NOTE, HOWEVER -- RATHER CEREMONIOUSLY -- WHEN WE WERE DISCUSSING THE UPCOMING VISIT OF TREASURY SECRETARY SIMON THAT IF U.S. HAD PROPERLY READ AND APPRECIATED BREZHNEV'S SPEECH OCT. 15 ON U.S.-SOVIET TRADE RELATIONS WHEN SIMON WAS LAST IN MOSCOW, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO "SURPRISE OR CONFUSION" ON THE PART OF SOME PEOPLE ABOUT THE SUBSEQUENT SOVIET REFUSAL TO ACCEDE TO THE CONDITIONS OF THE TRADE ACT. KOMPLEKTOV ADDED THAT GROMYKO'S LETTER OF OCT. 26 ALSO MADE THIS CLEAR AND SAID THAT THE BREZHNEV SPEECH AND THE GROMYKO LETTER TAKEN TOGETHER SHOULD HAVE LEFT NO DOUBT IN ANYONE'S MIND IN THIS REGARD.

3. SUMMIT. KORNIYENKO INDICATED THAT HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS AS YET ON TIMING OF THE U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE SUMMIT WOULD TAKE PLACE THIS YEAR, AND HIS REMARKS ON CSCW IMPLIED THAT THE SOVIETS EXPECT THAT IT WILL BE HELD

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AFTER THE CSCE SUMMIT. WHILE NOT RULING OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF CONCLUDING NEW AGREEMENTS, HE SAID THAT HE FELT WE SHOULD PERHAPS DEVOTE OUR MAJOR EFFORTS AT THE BILATERAL SUMMIT ON PERFECTING ALREADY ON-GOING AGREEMENTS AND FOLLOWING THROUGH ON CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS, RATHER THAN TURNING TO NEW TOPICS. IN THIS REGARD, HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED AGREEMENTS ON PNE'S AND CHEMICAL WARFARE AS BEING TIED TO EARLIER SUMMIT DISCUSSIONS. ON THE LATTER SUBJECT, HE SAID THAT SOME INDICATION OF PROGRESS IN OUR BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WOULD SUFFICE, AND THAT A FULL-FLEDGED AGREEMENT WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY. HE SPOKE IN GENERAL TERMS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF CONCLUDING AGREEMENTS IN THE SCIENTIFIC-TECHNOLOGICAL FIELD AS WELL, BUT MADE NO SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS.

4. CSCE. KORNIYENKO NOT SURPRISINGLY ENDORSED THE BREZHNEV SUGGESTION THAT THE CSCE SUMMIT BE HELD ON JUNE 30. HE CONTENTED THAT IF WE CAN AGREE ON THIS TARGET DATE IT WOULD SPEED SUBSTANTIVE WORK AT THE CONFERENCE. I SAID THAT WE WERE INTERESTED IN A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION ALSO, BUT THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO SEE WHAT PROGRESS IS MADE IN FURTHER WORK BEFORE WE CAN COMMIT OURSELVES TO A DATE FOR THE CONCLUDING SUMMIT.

5. OTHER TOPICS WE DISCUSSED ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. APOLLO-SOYUZ -- I POINTED OUT THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS IN THE US WHICH COULD RESULT FROM SOVIET REFUSAL TO ALLOW LIVE PRESS COVERAGE. I SAID I HAD ALREADY RAISED THIS MATTER WITH KELOYSH AND KUZNETSOV. KORNIYENKO WAS NON-COMMITTAL ON THE QUESTION, AND SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO THE MATTER. HE DID SAY THAT HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY WE COULD NOT BE SATISFIED WITH LIVE TV COVERAGE, AND REMARKED THAT WE SEEMED TO BE ATTEMPTING TO IMPOSE "AMERICAN PRACTICE" ON THEM.

B. BICENTENNIAL -- I TOLD HIM THAT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH WARNER'S OFFICE ON POSSIBLE SOVIET COOPERATION WITH OUR BICENTENNIAL CELEBRATION. KORNIYENKO CLAIMED NOT TO BE AWARE OF THIS, AND SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO IT. HE SAID THAT IN ANY CASE, HE WOULD BE GLAD TO LOOK OVER ANY SUGGESTIONS HE MIGHT HAVE, AND THAT HIS OFFICE WOULD SERVE AS THE COORDINATING POINT FOR SUCH SUGGESTIONS. CULTURAL COUNSELOR WILL BE

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FOLLOWING UP ON THIS.


C. NATIONAL CULTURAL CENTERS -- I EXPLAINED OUR PROPOSAL ON SUCH CENTERS, AND KORNIYENKO REPLIED THAT IT "COULD BE CONSIDERED". HE SAID THAT IT RAISED MANY OF THE SAME QUESTIONS BEING DISCUSSED NOW IN CSCE, BUT HE WOULD NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION.

D. TRAVEL CONTROLS -- IN RESPONSE TO MY REQUEST FOR OUR SUGGESTIONS FROM HIM AS HOW WE COULD MOVE FORWARD TO LIBERALIZE TRAVEL CONTROLS, KORNIYENKO REPLIED THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME, IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE TRADE ACT, THE "PSYCHOLOGICAL ATMOSPHERE" MIGHT NOT BE RIGHT FOR SUCH A MOVE. I REMARKED THAT PERHAPS UNDER THOSE CONDITIONS WE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO MOVE FORWARD ON SUCH ISSUES, BUT HE DISAGREED.

E. KIEV. I MENTIONED MYSHKOV'S REQUEST IN WASHINGTON FOR APPROVAL IN PRINCIPLE OF PROPERTY FOR THE SOVIET CONGEN IN NEW YORK AND ASKED WHEN WE MIGHT EXPECT TO BE OFFERED PROPERTIES IN KIEV. KORNIYENKO SAID THE KIEV AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN WORKING ON THE MATTER AND THAT HE HAD INSTRUCTED HIS PEOPLE THAT MORNING TO CHECK ON THEIR PROGRESS. HE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT PROPERTIES WOULD BE OFFERED SHORTLY, AND SAID IT WOULD ALSO BE DESIRABLE TO SETTLE THE QUESTION OF THE CONSULAR DISTRICTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I AGREED, BUT REMARKED THAT WE ASSUME THAT THE CONSULAR DISTRICT QUESTION NEED NOT BE SETTLED BEFORE WE ARE OFFERED PROPERTIES. KORNIYENKO STATED THAT THEY DID NOT YET NOT CONSIDER IT NECESSARY TO SETTLE THE CONSULAR DISTRICTS BEFORE PROPERTIES WERE OFFERED FOR OUR CONSIDERATION.

REGARDING CONSULAR DISTRICTS, HE ASSURED ME THAT TRAVEL BY KIEV CONSULAR OFFICIALS TO STAVROPOL AND OTHER CITIES OUTSIDE THE DISTRICT WOULD BE NO PROBLEM. I STRESSED THAT EXCLUSION OF MOLDAVIA FROM THE DISTRICT WOULD BE ARTIFICIAL, BUT HE RESPONDED WITH THE STANDARD ARGUMENT THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR CONSULAR OFFICIALS IN ONE REPUBLIC CAPITAL TO DEAL WITH THOSE IN ANOTHER. (HE SEEMED, INCIDENTALLY, TO BE CONFUSED ABOUT THE STATUS OF ACCREDITATION OF EE CONSULATES, SAYING THAT WHILE THE ROMANIANS HAVE MOLDAVIA IN THEIR DISTRICT, MOST OF THE OTHERS DO NOT; I FACT, OF COURSE, THE SITUATION IS PRECISELY THE OPPOSITE.) WHEN I ASKED HIM WHETHER HIS COMMENTS REGARDING THE PROBLEMS IN DEALING WITH OFFICIALS

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OF A SECOND REPUBLIC IMPLIED THAT CONSULAR DISTRICTS MUST NECESSARILY BE CONFINED TO ONE REPUBLIC; HE BACKED OFF AND SAID THAT HE WAS NOT NECESSARILY POSTULATING THIS AS A GENERAL RULE.

F. SAN FRANCISCO. KORNIYENKO AND KOMPLEKTUV BOTH RAISED WITH US THE ISSUE OF THE SAN FRANCISCO "QUOTA". THEY STATED THAT SOVIETS HAD NEVER AGREED TO QUOTA ARRANGEMENT, AND THAT ADDITIONAL STAFF IS NOW NECESSARY IN SAN FRANCISCO. THEY WERE TOLD THAT IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT POSITION

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
CONVEYED IN DEPARTMENT'S NOTE ON THIS MATTER IS FIRM US POLICY. DURING PRIVATE EXCHANGE WITH DCM, KOMPLEKTOV IMPLIED THAT SOVIETS MIGHT WITHDRAW SOME OF LOCAL STAFF FROM Leningrad IF FORMULA NOT ABANDONED. HE SPECULATED THAT THIS WOULD FORCE US TO SEND MORE AMERICANS TO Leningrad AND THUS WOULD INCREASE BASE FOR SOVIET PERSONNEL IN SAN FRANCISCO. DCM REMINDED HIM THAT DEPARTMENT'S NOTE PROVIDED EXTRA 50 PERCENT OF SOVIET CONGEN ON EXPLICIT CONDITION THAT LOCAL STAFF BE PROVIDED FOR Leningrad, AND WE PLACE NO RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIETS HIRING LOCAL STAFF IN US. DCM ALSO COMMENTED THAT IT WOULD BE HIGHLY IN ADVISABLE FOR SOVIETS TO TAKE COURSE KOMPLEKTOV INDICATED, SINCE IT WOULD NOT RESULT IN ADDITIONAL US PERSONNEL IN Leningrad BUT MIGHT CALL INTO QUESTION CONTINUATION OF FORMULA ALLOWING SOVIETS FIFTY PERCENT MORE PEOPLE THAN WE HAVE IN Leningrad.

G. PNE'S -- BOTH KORNIYENKO AND KOMPLEKTOV SHOWED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. I GAVE THEM A QUITE POSITIVE EVALUATION OF WHAT WE HAVE ACHIEVED.

H. VE DAY -- KORNIYENKO RAISED THE SUBJECT OF VE DAY. HE SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN DISCUSSIONS ON THE ISSUE IN WASHINGTON, AND THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A CABLE THAT MORNING FROM VORONTSOV NOTIFYING HIM THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD AGREED TO SEND A DELEGATION TO THE USSR, PERHAPS TO BE HEADED BY HARRIMAN. KORNIYENKO ASKED IF OUR DAD HAD RECEIVED ANY PROPOSALS FROM THE DEFENSE MINISTRY ON EXCHANGES OF AIR CREWS, VETERANS OR SHIPS. I INDICATED

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
THAT WE HAD NOT. HE ENDED THE DISCUSSION BY SAYING THAT HE WOULD BE GLAD TO HEAR ANY PROPOSALS WE MIGHT MAKE IN LINE WITH THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT IN GENEVA.

I. NATIONAL WAS COLLEGE VISIT -- KORNIYENKO CLAIMED TO HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF OUR PROPOSAL THAT THIS VISIT TAKE PLACE IN APRIL. HE SHOWED ACTIVE INTEREST AND ASKED SEVERAL QUESTIONS. HE SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO THE MATTER.
STOESSEL

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NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PINS, UR, US
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY ROBINSON'S VISIT

FOR SONNENFELDT

REF: STATE 060851

1. WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING FROM SOVIETS HERE ABOUT SCHEDULE FOR ROBINSON'S VISIT, EXCEPT CONFIRMATION THAT THEY ARE AWARE OF HIS ARRIVAL MARCH 26.


2. DO YOU KNOW IF ANYTHING IN THE WAY OF APPOINTMENTS OR SOCIAL EVENTS HAVE BEEN SET UP FOR ROBINSON THROUGH SOVIET EMBASSY WASHINGTON? WE WILL BE GLAD TO TRY TO ARRANGE APPOINTMENTS, BUT HESITATE TO DO SO WITHOUT YOUR OK.

3. I PLAN MEET ROBINSON MARCH 26 AND WE WILL LOOK FORWARD TO HAVING HIM AND SHINN FOR FAMILY DINNER THAT EVENING.

STOESSEL

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NODIS

EYES ONLY HARTMAN FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PO, UR

SUBJ: CONSULTATIONS ON PORTUGAL

UNDERSTAND FROM ALLIED DIPLOMATS HERE THAT CONSULTATIONS
WITH SELECTED ALLIES ARE IN PROGRESS REGARDING POSSIBLE
APPROACH TO SOVIETS REGARDING PORTUGAL. APPRECIATE FILL
IN IF POSSIBLE.
STOESSEL

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RECD: MARCH 26, 1975

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NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFUR, UR, PO
SUBJECT: THE USSR AND PORTUGAL

1. SUMMARY: THE EVENTS OF THE LAST TWO WEEKS IN PORTUGAL ARE A SPECTACULAR WINDFALL FOR THE SOVIET UNION, ALTHOUGH MOSCOW UNDOUBTEDLY HOPES TO EXPLOIT THEM IN A WAY WHICH DOES NOT TURN THE WEST OFF DETENTE. WE DOUBT THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD DO ANYTHING TO SLOW THE LEFTWARD PACE IN PORTUGAL, BUT WE WOULD GUESS THAT THEY CONTINUE TO SEE ADVANTAGES IN NOT PURSUING TOO COMRADELY A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE POST-MARCH 11 REGIME. THE DANGER IS THAT MOSCOW MAY BE TEMPTED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF A DETERIORATING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PORTUGAL AND NATO TO ESTABLISH SOME FORM OF MILITARY OR QUASI-MILITARY TIES WITH THE LISBON GOVERNMENT. I THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE SECRETARY TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT -- PERHAPS IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION AT A PRESS CONFERENCE -- TO THE EFFECT THAT ANY EFFORT TO EXPLOIT PORTUGAL'S DIFFICULTIES FOR UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE WOULD INEVITABLY HAVE A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON DETENTE. END SUMMARY.

2. FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW, THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN PORTUGAL IS ALMOST TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE. THE ABORTED COUP OF MARCH 11 HAS PERMITTED MOSCOW'S CLIENTS -- CUNHAL AND HIS COMMUNIST PARTY -- TO DON THE MANTLE OF ORDER, MODERATION, AND DEVOTION TO DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES, WHILE THE ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT (AFM) IS NOW ABLE TO PURGE ITS RANKS OF CONSERVATIVE

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ELEMENTS. FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD, BUT NOW IN SIGHT, MOSCOW PROBABLY ENVISAGES AN INDIGENOUS PORTUGUESE MOVE TO DUST THE U.S. FROM A MAJOR ATLANTIC BASE AND TO SEVER LISBON'S TIES WITH NATO. MOREOVER, IF THE SOVIET LUCK HOLDS, ALL THIS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE AFM AND NOT DIRECTLY BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY, WITHOUT THE SOVIETS HAVING TO DO -- OR TO BE SEEN TO DO -- MUCH TO ABET THE PROCESS.

3. NEVERTHELESS, THIS POSES OBVIOUS PROBLEMS FOR BREZHNEV'S DETENTE POLICY. THE KREMLIN IS CERTAINLY CONCERNED THAT TOO CLOSE AN IDENTIFICATION BETWEEN THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNISTS AND THE LEFTWARD SWING IN THE COUNTRY MAY RAISE SUSPICIONS ABOUT MOSCOW'S OWN ROLE IN THE TURN OF EVENTS. LAST FALL, WHEN PORTUGAL'S GOVERNMENT WAS MORE PLURALIST, THE SOVIETS DID NOT MIND BUILDING UP CUNHAL BY GIVING HIM A VISIT TO THE USSR AND MAKING HIM THE BENEFICIARY OF A FEW BILATERAL AGREEMENTS. NOW THAT HE HAS EMERGED AS PORTUGAL'S LEADING CIVILIAN POLITICIAN -- AND GIVEN HIS LONG HISTORY OF DOCILITY TO MOSCOW'S WILL -- THEY MAY WISH THEY HAD BEEN SLIGHTLY MORE CIRCUMSPECT.

4. IN ADDITION, WE SUSPECT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE STILL WORRIED ABOUT A POSSIBLE SWING BACK TO THE RIGHT IN PORTUGAL. THEY WOULD NOT WASTE MUCH CONCERN OVER THE "PORTUGUESE LIBERATION ARMY," ABOUT WHICH PRAVDA MARCH 25 RAN A HIGHLY PROPAGANDISTIC SCARE STORY; BUT THEY MAY FEEL UNSURE ABOUT THE POLITICAL PERSUASION OF THE SHADOWNY FIGURES WHO MAKE UP THE MAJORITY OF THE AFM. WE WOULD GUESS THAT THE MAIN SOVIET INTEREST IN THE CURRENT MOSCOW VISIT OF THE LABOR MINISTER, MAJOR COSTA MARTINS, IS TO GET A BETTER LINE ON THE AFM'S POLITICAL ORIENTATION. THE CHILEAN EXPERIENCE HAS SEARED DEEPLY INTO THE SOVIET CONSCIOUSNESS AND, THOUGH THEY KNOW THAT THE AFM AND THE CHILEAN MILITARY ARE POLES APART IDEOLOGICALLY, THEY STILL FEEL UNCOMFORTABLE WITH MILITARY REGIMES.

5. THE SOVIETS MAY ALSO BE WORRIED THAT A SWIFT SLIDE TOWARD A COMMUNIST-MILITARY DICTATORSHIP IN PORTUGAL COULD GIVE COMMUNISM A BAD NAME IN COUNTRIES (E.G., FRANCE AND ITALY) WHERE LOCAL COMMUNIST PARTIES HAVE IMPROVED THEIR POLITICAL PROSPECTS BY WORKING THROUGH THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM. A RELATED

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
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SOVIET CONCERN MAY BE THAT A COMMUNIST-DOMINATED OUTCOME IN PORTUGAL COULD DAMAGE THE POSSIBILITY OF A LEFT-WING TAKEOVER IN POST-FRANCO SPAIN, A COUNTRY OF GREATER IMPORTANCE TO MOSCOW FOR BOTH EMOTIONAL AND GEOPOLITICAL REASONS. (WE VENTURE THIS LAST JUDGMENT SOMEWHAT HESITANTLY, SINCE IT COULD ALSO BE ARGUED THAT THE SOVIETS SEE A LEFTWARD SLIDE IN PORTUGAL AS UNDERMINING CONSERVATISM IN SPAIN.)

6. MOST IMPORTANT, OF COURSE, THE SOVIETS ARE UNDOUBTEDLY CONCERNED THAT EVENTS IN PORTUGAL COULD IMPERIL THE CONTINUED SUCCESS OF THEIR POLICY OF DETENTE WITH THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE. HERE THEIR FEARS ARE PROBABLY TWO-PRONGED: THAT THE WESTERN ALLIES COULD LOSE INTEREST IN A CLOSE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR IF IT SEEMS TO HAVE A HAND IN THE DISRUPTION OF THEIR ALLIANCE AND THAT THE "LOSS" OF PORTUGAL TO NATO COULD ACTUALLY STRENGTHEN RIGHT-WING FORCES IN THE WEST (E.G., STRAUSS IN THE FRG).

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8571

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7. ASSUMING THAT SOVIET POLICY-MAKERS ARE WEIGHING SOME OR ALL OF THE ABOVE FACTORS, WE WOULD EXPECT TO SEE THE SOVIETS TRY TO STRADDLE TWO POLICIES: DISCREET SUPPORT FOR THE CURRENT DIRECTION IN PORTUGAL AND CONTINUED ALLEGIANCE TO DETENTE WITH THE WEST.

8. IN THE INTERESTS OF DETENTE, WE EXPECT THE SOVIET TO KEEP A LOW PUBLIC PROFILE IN PORTUGAL AND TO MAKE THEIR OWN ROLE SEEM AS MINIMAL AS POSSIBLE. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD INVOLVE PUBLIC PROFESSIONS OF FIDELITY TO DETENTE (E.G., BREZHNEV'S SPEECH IN BUDAPEST MARCH 18, WHICH DID NOT EVEN MENTION PORTUGAL), PROPAGANDA EMPHASIS ON THE GUIDING RULE OF THE AFM RATHER THAN OF THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST PARTY, THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF MODERATION IN CUNHAL'S STATEMENTS (E.G., HIS RECENT REITERATION THAT THE TIME IS NOT RIPE FOR PORTUGAL'S WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO), CARE NOT TO ASSOCIATE THE U.S. AND OTHER MAJOR WESTERN COUNTRIES TOO DIRECTLY WITH REACTIONARY FORCES IN PORTUGAL, AND -- PERHAPS -- A TENDENCY NOT TO GLOAT TOO OPENLY ABOUT THE EXTENT TO WHICH DETENTE HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE SITUATION IN PORTUGAL.

9. GIVEN THE OBVIOUS ADVANTAGES TO MOSCOW OF THE CURRENT MOMENTUM OF EVENTS IN PORTUGAL, HOWEVER, IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD DO ANYTHING TO RESTRAIN THE LEFTWARD PACE THERE. IF EVENTS MOVE TOWARD ELIMINATION OF THE U.S. BASE IN THE AZORES AND TOWARD PORTUGUESE WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO, WE CANNOT EXPECT MOSCOW TO ACT AGAINST SUCH A PROCESS OR EVEN TO TRY TO SLOW IT DOWN.

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10. PROBABLY THE BEST WE CAN HOPE FOR IS A RELATIVELY PASSIVE SOVIET ROLE IN PORTUGAL -- LETTING EVENTS TAKE THEIR COURSE. SUCH AN APPROACH OUGHT TO COMMEND ITSELF TO THE SOVIETS, SINCE IT COULD HELP PROTECT THEIR DETENTE IMAGE WHILE THINGS SEEM TO BE MOVING THEIR WAY ANYWAY FOR INTERNAL PORTUGUESE REASONS. HOWEVER, IT IS STILL NOT CLEAR THAT MOSCOW SEES IT THAT WAY. WE DOUBT THAT THE SOVIETS PICTURE PORTUGAL AS A POTENTIAL CUBA. IN OUR VIEW, THEY LACK BOTH THE CONFIDENCE IN THE LEFT'S STABILITY AND THE WILLINGNESS TO BANKROLL AN ECONOMIC BAIL-OUT. BUT THERE IS A DANGER THAT THAT MOSCOW MAY BE TEMPTED TO SEEK SOME KIND OF MILITARY OR QUASI-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH PORTUGAL AS LISBON'S TIES WITH NATO DETERIORATE. THE SOVIET REQUEST FOR FUELING FACILITIES IN MADEIRA IS NOT ALARMING IN ITSELF, PARTICULARLY SINCE IT WAS APPARENTLY MADE LAST YEAR, AT A TIME WHEN THE PORTUGUESE MODERATES WERE IN A MUCH STRONGER POSITION. BUT WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE FOREWARNED THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO USE THE PORTUGUESE SITUATION FOR MILITARY ADVANTAGE COULD NOT HELP BUT AFFECT DETENTE NEGATIVELY.

11. I AM AFRAID THAT A PRIVATE APPROACH OF THIS SORT TO THE SOVIETS WOULD BE UNPRODUCTIVE AND MIGHT BACKFIRE, SINCE THEY MIGHT WELL LEAK IT TO THE AFM, ALLEGING THAT WASHINGTON STILL CONSIDERS PORTUGAL A CLIENT STATE. IN MY VIEW A PUBLIC STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY -- PERHAPS IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION AT TODAY'S PRESS CONFERENCE -- WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE. THE STATEMENT WOULD HAVE TO AVOID ANY IMPLICATION THAT PORTUGAL COMES UNDER ANY U.S. "BREZHNEV DOCTRINE." IT COULD FOCUS ON THE NEED FOR ALL COUNTRIES TO LET PORTUGAL WORK OUT ITS PROBLEMS FOR ITSELF, ON THE HOPE THAT THE ELECTIONS WILL TAKE PLACE ON SCHEDULE AND WILL REFLECT THE WILL OF THE PORTUGUESE PEOPLE, AND ON THE FACT THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO REAP UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FROM PORTUGAL'S DIFFICULTIES COULD NOT HELP BUT AFFECT THE OVERALL CONTEXT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. ONCE A PUBLIC STATEMENT IS ON THE RECORD, A PRIVATE FOLLOW-UP TO THE SOVIETS MAY CONCEIVABLY BE USEFUL. I WOULD STRESS, HOWEVER, THAT IF THERE IS ANY FOLLOW-UP, IT SHOULD -- TO BE MOST EFFECTIVE -- BE PRIVATE, INFORMAL (I.E., NOT A "DEMARCHÉ"), UNILATERAL AND NOT REPEAT NOT IN THE NATO CONTEXT.

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
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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (ROBINSON)
SUBJ: BRIEF MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN

WHILE TRANSITING FRANKFURT ROBINSON HAD BRIEF CHAT WITH DOBYNIN, WHO WAS ON HIS WAY TO WASHINGTON. DOBYNIN WAS IN EXTREMELY JOVIAL FRAME OF MIND AND LOOKED WELL RESTED. ONLY MATTER OF SUBSTANCE WHICH AROSE WAS DOBYNIN'S REMARK THAT HE FELT IT WAS GOOD THING THAT BOTH SIDES HAD BECOME MORE REALISTIC ON PROSPECTS FOR TRADE RELATIONS. EXCESSIVE EXPECTATIONS OF MASSIVE CREDITS AND BILLIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS HAD BEEN DAMPENED, BUT MORE LIMITED PERSPECTIVE WOULD BE BETTER STARTING POINT FOR DEVELOPING COMMERCIAL TIES. HIS ADVICE THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD BE MORE RELAXED ABOUT THE WHOLE ISSUE ACCORDED WELL WITH HIS GENERAL MOOD.
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NODIS

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: OVIP (ROBINSON, CHARLES W.)

SUBJECT: ROBINSON'S TALKS WITH SOVIET ECONOMIC OFFICIALS

1. SUMMARY: ROBINSON CONCLUDED HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL TALKS WITH SAME TEAM OF SOVIET OFFICIALS AS YESTERDAY. MOST TIME WAS SPENT ON ENERGY. DURING FORMAL MEETING SOVIETS HINTED BROADLY THEY WOULD LIKE TO PARTICIPATE IN PRODUCER-CONSUMER CONFERENCE, BUT AT LUNCH FIRST DEPT. MINSITER OF FOREIGN TRADE KUZ-IMIN SAID ONLY THAT INVITATION WOULD BE GIVEN CONSIDERATION IF RECEIVED. ROBINSON TOOK POSITION THAT WHILE IDEA OF SOVIET PARTICIPATION WAS OF INTEREST, DECISION ON POSSIBLE PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE MADE AT PREPCON. SOVIETS REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED DESIRE TO COOPERATE IN STABILIZING ENERGY SITUATION SO DETENTE WOULD NOT BE JEOPARDIZED. THEY SHOWED SPECIAL INTEREST IN OIL PRICE, WHICH THEY REGARDED AS MAIN ISSUE IN CONSUMER-PRODUCER DIALOGUE. ONLY BILATERAL ISSUES TO ARISE WERE YAKUTSK AND NORTH STAR GAS PROJECTS. ON YAKUTSK, ROBINSON CITED HIS LONG-STANDING PERSONAL INTEREST, AND VOICED HOPE IT WOULD MOVE FORWARD ON NON-GOVERNMENTAL, COMMERCIAL BASIS. ALKHIMOV SEEMED ESPECIALLY CONCERNED OVER NORTH STAR PROJECT, NOTING TALKS HAD BEEN GOING ON FOR THREE YEARS AND THAT KOSYGIN HAD RECEIVED COMPANY REPS. ALKHIMOV REGRETTED THAT PROJECT WAS USED BY SOME TO DETRIMENT OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS. IN REPLY, ROBINSON ALLUDED TO CONGRESSIONAL PROBLEM AND SAID WE HOPED FOR PROGRESS. NO OTHER BILATERAL ISSUES WERE RAISED. IN PARTICULAR, SOVIETS MADE NO MENTION OF TRADE ACT OF EMIGRATION QUESTION. ON FOOD, SOVIET SIDE SHOWED NO INTEREST IN MULTILATERAL TALKS ON GRAIN RESERVES, BUT WAS POSITIVE ON BILATERAL DISCUSSION ALONG LINES OF

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PAPER GIVEN SOVIET EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON ON MARCH 15. SOVIETS SUGGESTED SHORT PRESS RELEASE, TO WHICH UNDERSECRETARY AGREED, NOTING ONLY THAT TALKS HAD BEEN HELD AND THAT THEY HAD COVERED "MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST TO THE PARTIES." OVERALL, SOVIETS WERE CORDIAL AND SEEMED IMPRESSED WITH OPEN MANNER OF UNDERSECRETARY'S PRESENTATIONS, TAKING VOLUMINUS NOTES AND ASKING PENETRATING AND INTELLIGENT QUESTIONS. END SUMMARY

2. UNDERSECRETARY'S SECOND SESSION WITH SOVIETS HELD TODAY IN OPEN, FRANK, AND CORDIAL ATMOSPHERE. SOVIET TEAM WAS SAME AS FIELDED YESTERDAY, I.E., GOSPLAN DEPUTY CHAIRMAN INOZEMTSEV DID NOT APPEAR AS PROMISED AND WAS REPRESENTED BY MOROZOV.

3. MOST OF DISCUSSION AGAIN CENTERED ON ENERGY-RELATED ISSUES, LARGELY INTERMINGLED WITH COMMENTS (IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET QUESTIONS) REGARDING US RELATIONS WITH LDC. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY SHORT EXPOSITIONS FROM BOTH SIDES ON WORLD FOOD SHORTAGE PROBLEMS, ENDING UP WITH ANOTHER QUESTION PERIOD. UNDERSECRETARY'S PRESENTATION TODAY ON ENERGY CENTERED ON PREPARATORY CONFERENCE COMMENCING APRIL 7 IN PARIS AND US VIEWS OF ISSUES LIKELY TO COME UP THERE. UNDERSECRETARY STRESSED THAT WHILE CONFERENCE SHOULD FOCUS ON ARRANGMENTS FOR FULL PRODUCER-CONSUMER CONFERENCE, US RECOGNIZES THERE WILL BE PRESSURES FOR DISCUSSION OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. FROM CONSUMER SIDE, MAIN ISSUES AT STAKE IN CONFERENCE CONCERNED CONSTRUCTIVE USE OF OPEC SURPLUS FUNDS; PROBLEM OF COOPERATION OF PROVIDING TECHNOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT EXPERTISE TO PRODUCER NATIONS FOR ASSISTING IN THEIR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; AND PRODUCER-CONSUMER COOPERATION IN REDUCING STRESS CAUSED BY OIL PRICE HIKES.

4. SOVIETS SEIZED ON THIS DISCUSSION TO BORE IN ON SUBJECT CLEARLY CLOSE TO THEIR HEARTS: LEVEL AT WHICH OIL PRICES MAY FINALLY SETTLE. LONG GIVE-AND-TAKE ENSUED, WITH SOVIETS TAKING POSITION THAT PRICE MUST FINALLY BE SET AT RELATIVELY HIGH LEVEL, OSTENSIBLY (FROM THEIR VIEWPOINT) TO STIMULATE DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATE ENERGY SOURCES. SOVIETS ALSO REITERATED THEIR VIEW THAT OIL PRICES CANNOT BE SET IN ISOLATION FROM GENERAL PRICE AGREEMENTS FOR WHOLE RANGE OF RAW MATERIALS, JUSTIFYING THIS WITH CLAIM THAT IT WAS ONLY WAY FOR LDCS TO ACHIEVE FAIR SHARE WITHIN PRODUCER-CONSUMER POWER STRUGGLE.

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
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5. VARIOUS MEMBERS OF SOVIET TEAM, NOTABLY KUZ'MIN AND OSIPOV, REPEATEDLY STRESSED URGENT "POLITICAL" NEED TO REACH AN EQUITABLE AGREEMENT BETWEEN PRODUCERS AND CONSUMERS TO STABILIZE ENERGY SITUATION, SO AS TO AVOID POSSIBILITY OF "CONFRONTATION" WHICH THEY VIEWED AS POSSIBLE JEOPARDIZING ENTIRE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL DETENTE. SOVIETS ALSO HINTED BROADLY THAT AS MAJOR PRODUCING NATION THEY MIGHT WISH TO PARTICIPATE IN WIDER PRODUCER-CONSUMER CONFERENCE SLATED FOR LATER IN YEAR. UNDERSECRETARY REPLIED THAT OBVIOUSLY ENERGY PROBLEM WAS GLOBAL IN NATURE AND THAT GLOBAL SOLUTION ATTAINABLE ONLY WITH ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF ALL INTERESTED PARTIES. HE AGREED TO PASS ON THIS POSSIBLE SOVIET INTEREST IN PARTICIPATION, BUT REMINDED SOVIET SIDE THAT DECISIONS AS TO WHO WILL PARTICIPATE IN PRODUCER-CONSUMER CONFERENCE COULD BE MADE ONLY AT THE PREPCON.

6. OSIPOV REPLIED FOR SOVIETS TO UNDERSECRETARY'S ENERGY PRESENTATION, GIVING ISSUE BROAD-BRUSH APPROACH WHICH NEVERTHELESS CONTAINED NINE GENERAL AREAS OF POSSIBLE COOPERATION SOVIET WOULD BE WILLING TO CARRY OUT ON EITHER BI-OR MULTI-LATERAL LEVEL FOR IMPROVING ENERGY SITUATION. IN ENSUING DISCUSSION, SOVIETS BROUGHT UP TWO BILATERAL ISSUES: YAKUTSK JOINT JAPANESE/AMERICAN GAS EXPLORATION PROJECT AND NORTH STAR PROJECT. ON YAKUTSK SOVIETS MENTIONED LAST WEEK'S MEETING IN US OF PARTICIPATING AMERICAN AND JAPANESE FIRMS TO SEEK WAYS AND MEANS OF FINANCING PROJECT THROUGH COMMERCIAL CREDITS. ALKHIMOV MENTIONED THAT OCCIDENTAL AND EL PASO HAD PROPOSED HELPING SOVIETS OBTAIN DOLS 100 MILLION COMMERCIALY TO CARRY FORWARD EXPLORATION PROJECT. SOVIETS HAD NOTET REPLIED TO THIS, ALKHIMOV INDICATED, BUT HE STATED PROPOSAL IS UNDERER ACTIVE E CONSIDERATION IN SOVIET GOVERNMENT CIRC

(COMMENT: OCCIDENTAL'S BOARD CHAIRMAN ARMAND HAMMER ARRIVING MOSCOW THIS SUNDAY; AT SPASO LUNCHEON TODAY FOLLOWING MEETINGS SVIETS INDICATED THEY MAY REPLY TO OXY PROPOSAL DURING HIS STAY. END COMMENT) SOVIETS IN THIS CONTEXT ALSO RAISED POSSIBILITY OF DOLS 500 MILLION BANK OF AMERICA-SYNDICATED CREDIT RAISED BY BOFA PRESIDENT CLAUSEN AT RECENT US-USSR TRADE AND ECONOMIC COUNCIL EXECUTIVE SESSION. UNDERSECRETARY NOTED SOVIET CONCERNS AND STATED HIS HOPE THAT IT COULD MOVE FORWARD TO FRUITION ON NON-GOVERNMENT BASIS.

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7. REGARDING NORTH STAR, SOVIETS DWELT AT LENGTH DURING MEETING, AND AGAIN AT LUNCH, THAT PROJECT WAS BEING USED BY "CERTAIN CIRCLES" IN US TO DETRIMENT OF US-USSR ECONOMIC/TRADE RELATIONS AND THAT SOVIET SIDE BECOMING INCREASINGLY IMPATIENT AT WAY TALKS ON PROJECT DRAGGING ALONG SEEMINGLY WITHOUT PROGRESS. THEY NOTED THAT PERHAPS IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO ANNOUNCE THAT IT NO LONGER INTERESTED IN COOPERATION WITH US COMPANIES. AT LEAST, SOVIETS INTIMATED, SOVIET GOVERNMENT MAY WISH TO SET TIME LIMIT--SAY SIX MONTHS--FOR DEFINITE PROGRESS TO BE ACHIEVED TOWARD REACHING AGREEMENT WITH TENNECOT/TEXAS EASTERN/ BROWN AND ROOT GROUP, AFTER EMPUJATION OF WHICH SOVIETS WOULD DISENGAGE THEMSELVES FROM DEALING WITH US FIRMS ON PROJECT.

8. IN DISCUSSION OF FOOD PROBLEM, SOVIETS EXPRESSED THEIR DISINTEREST IN MULTILATERAL TALKS ON GRAIN RESERVES. INSTEAD, THEY REACTED POSITIVELY TO PROSPECTS OF BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS OF THIS ISSUE ALONG LINES OF PAPER PRESENTED TO SOVIET EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON ON MARCH 15.

9. KUZ'MIN SUGGESTED ISSUING A SHORT PRESS RELEASE REGARDING UNDERSECRETARY'S TALKS IN MOSCOW. UNDERSECRETARY SAID THAT TRIP WAS NOT SECRET AND HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO PRESS RELEASE IF SOVIETS FELT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO THEM. ACCORDINGLY, A SHORT STATEMENT WAS DRAWN UP NOTING THAT SECRETARY HAD COME TO MOSCOW FOR TALKS WITH SOVIET GROUP LED BY KUZ'MIN AND THAT TALKS HAD REVOLVED AROUND "MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST TO THE PARTIES." PRESUMABLY THIS WILL BE PUBLISHED IN TOMORROW'S PRAVDA.

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10. SOVIET ATTITUDE THROUGHOUT TALKS GENERALLY WAS ONE OF CORDIALITY AND GOOD WILL, AS EVIDENCED AT LEAST IN PART BY TOTAL ABSENCE OF REFERENCE TO TRADE ACT OR EMIGRATION QUESTION. THEY WERE CLEARLY HIGHLY IMPRESSED BY UNDERSECRETARY'S OPENNESS IN HIS EXPOSITION OF US POSITIONS ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES UNDER DISCUSSION, AND THEY REACTED BY TAKING VOLUMINOUS NOTES AND BY ASKING INTELLIGENT, IF POINTED QUESTIONS.
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FOR THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, US, UR, VN
SUBJ: THE SOVIETS AND VIETNAM

REF: A. MOSCOW 1128; B. MOSCOW 4207; C. MOSCOW 4241;
D. MOSCOW 1117

1. IN REF A WE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT FLAGRANTLY AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS BY HANOI ARE SURE TO HAVE A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE DEGREE OF COMMITMENT THAT THE U.S. IS ABLE TO BRING TO BEAR ON ITS POLICY OF IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE USSR.

2. ALTHOUGH SITUATION HAS DETERIORATED DRASTICALLY SINCE WE SENT MESSAGE IN JANUARY, I BELIEVE POINT IS STILL VALID AND THAT IT SHOULD BE MADE TO SOVIETS. IF IT IS SOMETHING YOU HAVE ALREADY TAKEN UP WITH DOBRYNIN OR PLAN TO RAISE, I WOULD BE GLAD TO SUPPORT WITH REPRESENTATIONS HERE IF YOU FELT THAT ADVISABLE.
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NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (ROBINSON, CHARLES W.)

SUBJ: UNDERSECRETARY'S INITIAL MEETING WITH SOVIETS

1. SUMMARY: UNDERSECRETARY BEGAN CONSULTATIONS TODAY WITH SOVIET TEAM HEADED BY FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN TRADE MINISTER KUZ'MIN. SOVIET GROUP WAS LARGE AND FAIRLY HIGH LEVEL, INCLUDING -- BESIDES KUZ'MIN -- TWO DEPUTY MINISTERS AND ONE FIRST DEPUTY STATE COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN. TALKS GOT OFF TO POSITIVE START, WITH ENTIRE FIRST SESSION DEVOTED TO IEA AND DOMESTIC US ENERGY POLICY. SOVIETS LISTENED ATTENTIVELY AND ASKED NUMEROUS QUESTIONS, NONE OF WHICH, HOWEVER, TOUCHED ON ANY US-USSR BILATERAL ISSUES.
END SUMMARY.

2. UNDERSECRETARY ROBINSON BEGAN MEETINGS THIS MORNING WITH SOVIET TEAM LED BY FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN TRADE MINISTER M.K. KUZ'MIN. OTHERS COMPRISING GROUP OF SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS INCLUDED:

- N.G. MOROZOV, FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, STATE COMMITTEE FOR FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
- N.G. OSIPOV, DEPUTY FOREIGN TRADE MINISTER
- V.A. ALKHIMOV, DEPUTY FOREIGN TRADE MINISTER
- N.V. ORLOV, HEAD OF FOREIGN TRADE MINISTRY MARKET RESEARCH INSTITUTE
- V. N. POLEZHYEV, CHIEF, FOREIGN TRADE MINISTRY ADMINISTRATION FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS
- V.V. MOROVINOV, CHIEF OF GOSPLAN SECTION FOR

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ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

-- A. MEL'NIKOV, DEPUTY CHIEF OF FOREIGN TRADE MINISTRY
ADMINISTRATION FOR TRADE WITH COUNTRIES OF AMERICAS
-- D.A. LYAMIN, INTERPRETER

MORDVINOV SAT IN FOR GOSPLAN DEPUTY CHAIRMAN (FOR FOREIGN
ECONOMIC RELATIONS) N.N. INOZEMTSEV, WHO WAS REPORTEDLY
TIED UP WITH "GOVERNMENT BUSINESS." HE WILL TAKE PART IN
TOMORROW'S TALKS.

3. KUZ'MIN, IN WELCOMING UNDERSECRETARY, SEVERAL TIMES
ALLUDED TO "U.S. SIDE REQUEST" FOR THESE CONSULTATIONS
AND THAT SOVIETS WERE HAPPY TO RECEIVE WHATEVER INFORMATION
HE HAD TO PROVIDE. UNDERSECRETARY SET RECORD STRAIGHT BY
NOTING THAT VISIT WAS IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET REQUEST. HE
STRESSED THAT PURPOSE OF HIS MEETINGS WAS TO RESPOND TO
SOVIET INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
FRANK AND FORTHCOMING MANNER.

4. UNDERSECRETARY OUTLINED TOPICS HE WAS PREPARED TO
DISCUSS WITH SOVIETS DURING THIS VISIT: INTERNATIONAL
ENERGY SITUATION; WORLD-WIDE FOOD PROBLEM; AND US RELATIONS
WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY REGARDING SUPPLY
BY THEM OF RAW MATERIALS TO US. ENTIRE FIRST SESSION
WAS DEVOTED TO EXPOSITION BY UNDERSECRETARY OF US GOELS
VIS-A-VIS INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, COUPLED WITH
PRACTICAL STEPS BEING TAKEN DOMESTICALLY TO ALLEVIATE
EFFECTS OF 1973 OIL EMBARGO AND SUBSEQUENT PETROLEUM
PRICE HIKES. UNDERSECRETARY RAN DOWN LIST OF FOUR MAIN
OBJECTIVES OF IEA, STRESSING HOPE AND BELIEF THAT EMERGENCY
OIL-SHARING ARRANGEMENT TO COUNTER EFFECT OF EMBARGO
AGAINST UNEUR MORE IEA MEMBERS WOULD NEVER HAVE TO BE
TESTED. HE FURTHER EMPHASIZED BENEFICIAL RESULTS TO DATE
IN MULTILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITHIN IEA ON PROPOSALS FOR
ASSURING FINANCIAL SOLIDARITY, PROMOTING CONSERVATION
CONSCIOUSNESS, AND DEVELOPING ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF
ENERGY. AGREEMENTS IN PRINCIPLE ON ALL THESE ISSUES AMONG
IEA MEMBERS HAS ALLOWED IEA TO PROCEED WITH PLANS FOR
PREPARATORY CONFERENCE BEGINNING IN PARIS APRIL 7 WHICH
WOULD ULTIMATELY RESULT IN CONSUMERS-PRODUCERS CONFERENCE
LATER IN YEAR. UNDERSECRETARY ALSO DWELT AT LENGTH ON

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UNILATERAL EFFORTS BEING UNDERTAKEN IN US TO CONTRIBUTE TO LESSENING OF WORLDWIDE ENERGY CRUCH.

5. SOVIETS LISTENED ATTENTIVELY AND INTERRUPTED FREQUENTLY WITH QUESTIONS, ESSENCE OF WHICH SEEMED TO BE ATTEMPT TO ASCERTAIN "REAL" EFFECT OF ENERGY CRISIS ON US ECONOMY. THEY WERE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN US CLAIMS THAT ITS OIL CONSUMPTION TO BE REDUCED BY ONE MILLION BARRELS PER DAY BY END OF YEAR AND TWICE THAT BY END OF 1977 -- WHETHER THIS ON RELATIVE OR ACTUAL BASIS. THEY FURTHER REQUESTED GUESSTIMATE AS TO LEVEL AT WHICH WORLD OIL PRICES MAY EVENTUALLY SETTLE. IN GENERAL, SOVIET QUESTIONS -- WHILE PROBING -- WERE NON-POLEMIC AND OCCASIONALLY EVEN SCHOLARLY. THROUGHTOUT DISCUSSION NO BILATERAL ISSUES OF ANY KIND WERE RAISED BY SOVIET TEAM, WHICH INSTEAD SEEMED GRATEFUL FOR STRAIGHTFORWARD AND INFORMATIVE APPROACH TAKEN BY UNDER-SECRETARY TO IEA QUESTION.

6. FULL DAY OF TALKS SLATED FOR TOMORROW, AT WHICH TIME DISCUSSION EXPECTED TO FOCUS ON FOOD PROBLEM ISSUE AS WELL AS US RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
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
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E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS: CVP, (ROBINSON, CHARLES W.)
SUBJECT: ROBINSON MEETING WITH PATOLICHEV

1. LATE AFTERNOON MARCH 25 PATOLICHEV SUDDENLY REQUESTED MEETING WITH ROBINSON, WHICH SEEMED TO UNDERLINE SOVIET SATISFACTION WITH TALKS AND DESIRE FOR FURTHER COOPERATION IN MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC FIELD. PATOLICHEV SAID HE HAD RECEIVED FULL REPORT OF ROBINSON'S SESSIONS WITH SOVIETS DELEGATION AND EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH RESULTS AND APPRECIATION TO ROBINSON. HE SAID HE HOPED THIS WOULD BE FIRST OF MANY MEETINGS WITH UNDERSECRETARY.
 2. FOLLOWING UP MORNING'S DISCUSSION, PATOLICHEV REITERATED CONCERN OVER NORTH STAR AND YAKUTSK GAS PROJECTS. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT ROBINSON'S EXPERIENCE IN NATURAL RESOURCES WOULD ENABLE HIM TO HELP. H. ROBINSON SAID HE WOULD DO WHAT HE COULD, BUT NOTED PROBLEMS ESPECIALLY WITH CONGRESS.
 3. PATOLICHEV REITERATED SOVIET CONCERN LEST ENERGY CRISIS CAUSES WEAKENING OF DETENTE. HE WAS EFFUSIVE IN HIS EXPRESSED TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH THE US.
- SYCESSEL

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