

The original documents are located in Box 15, folder “People's Republic of China - State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE - NODIS (4)” of the Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

Copyright Notice

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.



Department of State

~~SECRET~~

NOD291

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 PEKING 02214 030742Z

00
ACTION NODS-00

INFO DLT-01 1801.4

Copy 10 of 10 copies

R 030720Z DEC 74
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2911

059381
Control: 350Q
Recd: Dec 3, 1974
2:31 AM

~~SECRET~~ PEKING 2214

WODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR US IN
SUBJECT: FURTHER MOVEMENT ON U.S.-PRC CLAIMS AND
ASSETS ISSUE

1. WE IN USLO BELIEVE THERE IS ROOM FOR SPECIAL CONCERN IN THE FACT THAT DURING THE RECENT COUNTER-PART TALKS IN PEKING ON CLAIMS AND ASSETS, BOTH LIN PING AND PRCLO COUNSELOR TSIEN TA-YUNG TOOK AN ACCUSATORY AND SUSPICIOUS LINE REGARDING THE U.S. POSITION ON THIS ISSUE. WE ARE BY NOW QUITE FAMILIAR WITH LIN PING'S RIGID AND DOCTRINAIRE ATTITUDE, BUT THE FACT THAT HE WAS JOINED BY TSIEN TA-YUNG IN QUESTIONING U.S. MOTIVES AND SINCERITY SUGGESTS THAT THIS DOGMATIC POINT OF VIEW MAY BE QUITE WIDELY HELD ON THE PRC FOREIGN MINISTRY. IN ADDITION, IT SEEMS LIKELY TO US THAT TSIEN WAS REFLECTING THE THOUGHTS OF OTHERS IN PRCLO, POSSIBLY INCLUDING HUANG CHEN HIMSELF.

2. GIVEN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE BELIEVE IT ALL THE MORE DESIRABLE TO MOVE FORWARD PROMPTLY IN DEVELOPING A NEGOTIATING POSITION CAPABLE OF EASING CHINESE SUSPICIONS OVER CLAIMS AND ASSETS. THE CHINESE THEMSELVES ARE OF COURSE IN LARGE PART RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INORDINATE DELAYS IN THIS MATTER, BUT FORWARD MOTION ON THE U.S. PART AT THIS STAGE IN THE DISCUSSIONS COULD IN OUR OPINION HELP

~~SECRET~~

HA 5114/01





Department of State

~~SECRET~~

TELEGRAM

PAGE 02 PEKING 02214 030742Z

TO ESTABLISH A MORE FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE EVEN IF --
AS IS PROBABLY LIKELY--THE CHINESE WILL AT FIRST
GLANCE NOT FIND ANY NEW U.S. POSITION WHOLLY ACCEPTABLE,
WE ARE AWARE THAT THE DEPARTMENT'S LEGAL
ADVISERS WILL BE ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM SHORTLY, BUT
WOULD HOPE THAT THEIR DELIBERATIONS CAN BE CONCLUDED
AT AN EARLY DATE SO THAT NEW LANGUAGE CAN BE CONVEYED
TO THE CHINESE.
BUSH

~~SECRET~~





Department of State
~~SECRET~~ NOD429

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 PEKING 02258 061024Z

00
ACTION NODS-00

COPY 5 OF 15 COPIES

INFO OCT-01 /001 W

104128

R 060930
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2945

CONTROL: 12730
RECD: DEC 06, 1974
0540AM

~~SECRET~~ PEKING 2258

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, ECON, CH, US
SUBJECT: ALLEGED FAVORABLE COMMENTS BY BANK OF CHINA OFFICIALS
ON STATUS OF US-PRC CLAIMS AND ASSETS NEGOTIATIONS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO CINCPAC POLAD FOR AMBASSADOR BUSH

1. AT FINNISH NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION DECEMBER 6, BELGIAN
AMBASSADOR GROOHTHAERT TOLD HOLDRIDGE THAT DURING DISCUSSIONS WITH
BANK OF CHINA OFFICIALS EARLIER ON SAME DAY THEY HAD EXPRESSED
SATISFACTION WITH STATUS OF US-PRC NEGOTIATIONS ON CLAIMS AND ASSETS
ISSUE AND HAD ALSO SPOKEN OPTIMISTICALLY ABOUT BEING ABLE TO RESOLVE
THE ISSUE FAIRLY SOON. SUBJECT HAD COME UP AS RESULT OF POLITE
REMARKS BY GROOHTHAERT TO CHINESE TO EFFECT HE ASSUMED THEY HAD
BEEN BUSY LATELY WITH MATTERS SUCH AS THIS. HE HAD BEEN SEEKING
APPOINTMENT WITH BANK OF CHINA FOR SOME TIME IN ORDER TO
DISCUSS WINDING UP ACTIVITIES OF BANQUE BELGE IN SHANGHAI-- DISCUSSIO
NS
WHICH GROOHTHAERT SAYS WERE SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED AT THIS MEETING AND
HAD ONLY JUST BEEN GRANTED AN APPOINTMENT.

2. COMMENT: WE FIND IT RATHER PUZZLING THAT BANK OF CHINA
OFFICIALS SHOULD COMMENT ON CLAIMS AND ASSETS ISSUE AT ALL,
MUCH LESS IN SUCH OPTIMISTIC TERMS, IN VIEW OF FACT THAT AS FAR
AS WE HAVE BEEN AWARE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS BEEN SOLELY RESPONSIBLE
FOR HANDLING THIS ISSUE. IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT
PRC GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR AGENCIES CONCERNED WITH FINANCIAL MATTERS
WOULD HAVE BEEN KEP INFORMED. IF OS, NEGOTIATING TACTICS USED BY

~~SECRET~~

HR 5114/01





Department of State

~~SECRET~~

TELEGRAM

PAGE 02 PEKING 02258 061024Z

THE CHINESE ~~MAY~~ BE MORE DEVIIOUS THAN WE HAVE SURMISED.
HOLDRIDGE

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CINCPAC BY OC/T

~~SECRET~~





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

NDD428

PAGE 01 PEKING 02257 061000Z

00
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 /001 W

Copy 10 of 10 copies

103912

Control: 1270Q

R 060900Z DEC 74
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2944

~~SECRET~~ PEKING 2257

NODIS/CHEROKEE
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, CB, US, FR
SUBJECT: CAMBODIA

1. PEKING DIPLOMATIC CORPS HAS RECENTLY BEEN SPECULATING ABOUT QUICK FIVE-DAY TRIP TO PARIS WHICH FRENCH AMBASSADOR MANAC'H MADE RECENTLY, WITH MOST SPECULATION FOCUSING ON POSSIBILITY THAT CAMBODIA WAS SUBJECT OF TRIP DUE TO FACT THAT MANAC'H

HAD LUNCH WITH SIHANOUK ON DAY BEFORE DEPARTURE. AT FINNISH NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION DECEMBER 6, MANAC'H CONFIRMED TO HOLDRIDGE THUS HIS PURPOSE IN RETURNING TO PARIS HAD, IN FACT, BEEN TO

DISCUSS CAMBODIAN SITUATION, AND THAT AS A RESULT OF THIS VISIT FRENCH PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING HAS SENT OR WILL BE SENDING LETTER TO PRESIDENT FORD PROPOSING THAT THIS QUESTION BE A SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE TWO AT UPCOMING MARTINIQUE MEETING. MANAC'H INDICATED THAT FRENCH ARE QUITE DISTURBED OVER TREND OF DEVEL-

OPMENTS IN CAMBODIA AND ARE ANXIOUS TO DO WHAT THEY CAN TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD DENY CAMBODIA TO THE COMMUNISTS.

2. DEPARTMENT IS UNDOUBTEDLY FAMILIAR WITH MANAC'H'S VIEWS ON CAMBODIA AND HIS CLOSENESS TO SIHANOUK. MANAC'H WILL BE RETURNING TO FRANCE ON RETIREMENT IN EARLY JANUARY, AND HE MAY REGARD HIS ROLE IN HELPING TO BRING ABOUT A CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT AS FINAL CULMINATION OF HIS DIPLOMATIC CAREER.



~~SECRET~~

NR 5114101



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

~~PAGE 02 PEKING 02257 061000Z~~

3. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO INFORM AMBASSADOR BUSH AT CHIEFS OF
MISSION MEETING IN HONOLULU.
HOLDRIDGE

~~SECRET~~



ACTION COPY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ NOD012

PAGE 01 PEKING 02302 01 OF 02 170721Z

00
ACTION NODS-00

Copy 1 of 10 copies

INFO OCT-01 /001 W

083400

Control: 3883Q

R 170630Z DEC 74
FM USLOC PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2984

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 PEKING 2302

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT PFOR CH UR US
SUBJECT: DISCUSSION BETWEEN SENATOR MANSFIELD AND
CHIAO KUAN-HUA ON CURRENT WORLD ISSUES

SUMMARY. AT A DINNER DISCUSSION DEC 10, SENATOR MANSFIELD AND CHIAO KUAN-HUA DISCUSSED WEST EUROPEAN MILITARY STRENGTH, THE RESULTS OF THE VLADIVOSYOK MEETING, CHINESE NUCLEAR POSTURE AND VIEWS ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, CONTINUITY IN CHINESE POLICY, THE FORTHCOMING NPC, KOREAN AND SINO-US RELATIONS. CHIAO WAS CLEARLY INTERESTED IN CLARIFYING SENATOR MANSFIELD'S POSITION ON US TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM WEST EUROPE AND LAID CONSIDERABLE EMPHASIS ON THE NECESSITY FOR PREPAREDNESS AGAINST CONVENTIONAL MILITARY ATTACK. CHIAO INDICATED THAT THE POLICIES SET BY CHAIRMAN MAO WOULD BE CONTINUED BY OTHERS AFTER HE HAD PASSED FROM THE SCENE. SPEAKING OF THE NPC, CHIAO SURPRISINGLY STATED THAT THIS CONGRESS WOULD "ELECT A NEW PRESIDENT". CHIAO'S COMMENTS ON SINO-US RELATIONS WERE ALONG STANDARD LINES, EMPHASIZING THAT FURTHER MOVES IN NORMALIZATION IN RELATIONS WERE UP TO THE US, BUT THAT CHINA WAS PATIENT AND WILLING TO WAIT. END SUMMARY.

1. ON DEC 10, 1974, FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA HOSTED A DINNER FOR SENATOR AND MRS. MIKE MANSFIELD. ALSO PRESENT ON THE CHINESE SIDE WERE AMBASSADOR HUANG CHEN, CPIFA DEPUTY DIRECTOR CHOU CHIU-YEH, AND





Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 PEKING 02302 01 OF 02 170721Z

CPIFA DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL KANG TAI-SHA, DEPUTY CHIEF HOLDRIDGE WAS PRESENT FOR USLO. FOLLOWING TOPICS OF INTEREST TO DEPARTMENT WERE DISCUSSED:

2. US FORCES IN EUROPE. CHIAO BEGAN BY DECLARING THAT THE PRC BELIEVED IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT ONLY TO MAINTAIN THE DEFENSIVE STRENGTH OF WESTERN EUROPE, BUT ALSO TO INCREASE THIS STRENGTH. HE ASKED FOR THE SENATOR'S VIEWS.

SENATOR MANSFIELD SAID HE THOROUGHLY AGREED, AND STATED THAT HE REGARDED THE NATO TREATY AS THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE US FOREIGN POLICY. HE HAD FELT THIS WAY FOR YEARS, AND WAS AN ADVOCATE OF THE WE COUNTRIES' CONTRIBUTING MORE TO NATO.

CHIAO REFERRED TO SENATOR MANSFIELD'S PROPOSAL FOR A REDUCTION IN US TROOP STRENGTH IN EUROPE AND ASKED IF THE SENATOR STILL SUPPORTED SUCH A REDUCTION.

SENATOR MANSFIELD CONFIRMED THAT HIS POSITION ON REDUCTIONS WAS UNCHANGED. HOWEVER, WHAT WAS NOT GENERALLY UNDERSTOOD WAS THAT THIS PROPOSAL WOULD ACTUALLY MEAN AN INCREASE IN US MILITARY STRENGTH IN EUROPE. BY REDUCING BY HALF THE PRESENT US FORCE LEVEL IN WE OVER A PERIOD OF TIME AND BY CUTTING OUT THE 225,000 DEPENDENTS OF US MILITARY PERSONNEL IN EUROPE, THE US FORCES WOULD BE MADE LEANER, TOUGHER, LESS EXPENSIVE, AND MORE EFFECTIVE; THIS WOULD ADD UP TO AN ACTUAL INCREASE IN MILITARY STRENGTH.

SENATOR MANSFIELD REFERRED TO THE ROMAN TROOPS STATIONED ALONG THE RHINE, NOTING THAT IT WAS ONLY AFTER THESE TROOPS WERE ALLOWED TO HAVE DEPENDENTS THAT THEIR EFFECTIVENESS HAD DIMINISHED. IN HIS PLAN, ALL DEPENDENTS WOULD BE SENT HOME, AND THE US FORCES WOULD SERVE 12-MONTHS TOURS OF DUTY. THROUGH THE "REFORGER" PROGRAM, SOMETHING LIKE THIS WAS ALREADY BEING DONE, ALTHOUGH IT WAS RATHER EXPENSIVE.

3. SENATOR MANSFIELD EMPHASIZED AT SEVERAL POINTS IN



Department of State TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 PEKING 02302 01 OF 02 170721Z

THE CONVERSATION THAT HE WAS NOT CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE HALVING OF US TROOP STRENGTH IN WE, BUT RATHER A PHASED REDUCTION OVER A PERIOD OF TIME. MEANWHILE, HE HOPED TO SEE A GREATER CONTRIBUTION ON THE PART OF THE OTHER NATO MEMBERS TOWARD THE COMMON DEFENSE. CHIAO COMMENTED IN RESPONSE THAT IT WAS NOT FOR THE PRC TO JUDGE HOW THE MATTER OF ESTABLISHING FORCE LEVELS IN WE WAS HANDLED--IT COULD BE DONE WITH US PARTICIPATION OR ON AN ENTIRELY EUROPEAN BASIS. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS, AS HE HAD ALREADY SAID, NOT JUST TO MAINTAIN WE'S DEFENSIVE MILITARY STRENGTH, BUT TO INCREASE IT.

4. VLADIVOSTOK. CHIAO BROUGHT UP THE SUBJECT OF THE AGREEMENT REACHED AT VLADIVOSTOK ON ESTABLISHING CEILINGS ON US AND USSR NUCLEAR WEAPONS, REMARKING THAT SEVERAL SENATORS HAD EXPRESSED CRITICISM OF THIS AGREEMENT. WHAT WAS SENATOR MANSFIELD'S OPINION?

SENATOR MANSFIELD SAID THAT PRESIDENT FORD FELT THE AGREEMENT WAS A GOOD ONE AND SECRETARY KISSINGER FELT THE SAME. PRESIDENT FORD HAD PROVIDED THE DETAILS OF THE AGREEMENT AND HIS INTERPRETATION OF IT IN A BRIEFING FOR THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP. IN ADDITION TO THE PRESIDENT'S AND SECRETARY KISSINGER'S VIEWS, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SCHLESINGER AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WERE ALSO IN ACCORD. SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD SAID THAT HE HAD HOPED FOR A LOWER CEILING, BUT THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO GET THE SOVIETS TO GO ALONG. CHIAO WONDERED WHETHER SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD WITHHELD ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT FROM THE PRC WHEN IN PEKING. SENATOR MANSFIELD SAID HE FELT CONFIDENT THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER WAS BRIEFING THE PRC FULLY, AND THAT THIS WAS A MATTER OF POLICY, BOTH THIS TIME AND OTHER TIMES.

5. CHINESE NUCLEAR STRATEGY. CHIAO AND SENATOR MANSFIELD ENGAGED IN A DISCUSSION OF THE CURRENT STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL SITUATION, WITH THE SENATOR OBSERVING THAT THE US AND THE USSR ALREADY POSSESSED ENOUGH NUCLEAR STRENGTH TO DESTROY EACH OTHER MANY



~~SECRET~~



Department of State TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04 PEKING 02302 01 OF 02 170721Z

TIMES OVER. HE EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THE PRC SHOULD DEVELOP ITS OWN NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. CHIAO SAID THAT, UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, WHAT GOOD WOULD IT DO FOR CHINA TO HAVE LARGE NUMBERS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS? SENATOR MANSFIELD MENTIONED THAT CHINA POSSESSED MRBM'S, IRBM'S, AND SOME ICBM'S, TO WHICH CHIAO RESPONDED BY SAYING THE SENATOR WAS NOT ENTIRELY CORRECT--CHINA HAD NOT YET TESTED ANY ICBM'S. CHIAO ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT CHINA HAD "A FEW" MISSILES WHICH THE PRC WOULD USE TO SHOOT AT THE SOVIET UNION "IF THEY SHOT SOME AT US." (MRS. MANSFIELD NOTED AT THIS POINT THAT CHINA HAD A DETERRENT.)

BUSH



~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ N00016

PAGE 01 PEKING 02302 02 OF 02 170821Z

00
ACTION NODS-00

INFO . OCT-01 /001 W

Copy 1 of 10 copies

R 170630Z DEC 74
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2985

----- 083818
Control: 3893Q

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 PEKING 2302

NODIS/CHEROKEE

6. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. SENATOR MANSFIELD SAID THAT THE CHINESE NOW APPEARED TO BELIEVE THAT THE MAIN SOVIET THREAT WAS NO LONGER AGAINST CHINA BUT AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE. CHIAO AGREED THAT IT WAS. HE WANTED TO POINT OUT, THOUGH, THAT CONTRARY TO SOME ALLEGATIONS IN THE PRESS, CHINA WAS NOT HOPING FOR A SOVIET ATTACK AGAINST ME. THE FORCES IN EUROPE WERE ON THE DEFENSIVE, BUT SO WERE THE CHINESE FORCES; OTHERWISE WHY WOULD THE CHINESE BE DIGGING AIR RAID SHELTERS? CHIAO OBSERVED THAT IF THE SOVIETS WERE TO ATTACK CHINA WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE CHINESE WOULD WAIT NOT JUST A BRIEF WHILE BUT A LONG TIME BEFORE RESPONDING. THIS WOULD BE FOR THE PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE WORLD TO SEE CLEARLY WHO WAS THE AGRESSOR.

7. CONVENTIONAL WAR PREPAREDNESS. CHIAO ASKED SENATOR MANSFIELD'S OPINION ABOUT WHO WOULD BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE EVENT OF A WAR INVOLVING THE US AND THE USSR. SENATOR MANSFIELD ASSERTED THAT THE US WOULD NOT BE THE FIRST. CHIAO THEN SAID THAT THIS WAS PRECISELY HIS POINT--IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE A WAR WITHOUT THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ESPECIALLY IN THE LIGHT OF THE DAMAGE EACH SIDE COULD INFLICT ON THE OTHER. THIS WAS WHY THE CHINESE STRESSED THE NEED FOR INCREASING THE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY STRENGTH OF THE WE NATIONS. HE REITERATED THE POINT MADE SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING AND FURTHER



~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 PEKING 02302 02 OF 02 170821Z

BUILDING UP DEFENSIVE STRENGTH IN WE. HE ALSO TOUCHED AGAIN ON THE MATTER OF IT NOT BEING FOR CHINA TO SAY TO THE US HOW THIS PROCESS SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT.

8. CONTINUITY OF PRC POLICY. SENATOR MANSFIELD RECALLED THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN CHIAO AND HIMSELF THAT AFTERNOON ON PRC POLICY VIS-A-VIS THE US, AND RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT THERE WOULD BE CONTINUITY IN THIS POLICY WHEN LEADERS LIKE MAO TSE-TUNG AND CHOU EN-LAI, WHO WERE IDENTIFIED WITH IT, WERE SUCCEEDED. CHIAO PONDERED A MOMENT, AND THEN REFERRED TO THE FACT THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY HAD A LONG HISTORY BEGINNING IN 1921 AND THAT MAO TSE-TUNG HAD BEEN CHAIRMAN SINCE THE TSUNYI CONFERENCE OF 1935 AND HAD INITIATED CCP POLICIES. HISTORY HAD SHOWN THAT THESE POLICIES ADOPTED BY THE CCP UNDER THE INITIATIVE AND LEADERSHIP OF CHAIRMAN MAO WERE IN ACCORDANCE BOTH WITH THE NEEDS AND THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE. MOREOVER, PRACTICAL EVENTS HAD SHOWN THAT THESE POLICIES WERE CORRECT. THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE IN THIS SITUATION OVER THE ENSUING YEARS--THE POLICIES SET BY MAO WOULD BE CARRIED OUT BY OTHERS.

9. NPC. CHIAO AND SENATOR MANSFIELD SPOKE BRIEFLY ABOUT A PORTION OF THE AFTERNOON CONVERSATION DEALING WITH THE CONVENING OF THE PRC NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS. CHIAO NOTED THAT THIS CONGRESS WOULD "ELECT A NEW PRESIDENT." THERE WAS ALSO A JOINT REFERENCE TO THE NEW SITUATION IN THE US CONGRESS, IN WHICH SENATOR MANSFIELD DECLARED THAT US POLICY TOWARD CHINA WOULD REMAIN BIPARTISAN IN SUPPORT OF THE PRESENT LINE.

10. KOREA. CHIAO SAID HE WANTED TO TALK ABOUT KOREA. IT SEEMED TO HIM THE US WAS OPERATING UNDER THE FALSE ASSUMPTION IN STATIONING TROOPS THERE THAT CHINA WAS GOING TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK. THE SAME THING WAS TRUE ABOUT INDOCHINA. SENATOR MANSFIELD STATED IN RESPONSE THAT THERE ONCE HAD BEEN SUCH AN





Department of State TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 PEKING 02302 02 OF 02 170021Z

ASSUMPTION, BUT THIS WAS NO LONGER THE CASE.

11. US - PRC RELATIONS. CHIAO TURNED TO THE QUESTION OF NORMALIZING US-PRC RELATIONS. IF THE US WANTED TO MOVE THIS PROCESS FORWARD MORE QUICKLY, THE CHINESE PEOPLE WOULD APPROVE; ON THE OTHER HAND, HOWEVER, THEY WERE "NOT IN A HURRY" (CHIAO REPEATED THIS LATTER COMMENT SEVERAL TIMES). IT WAS UP TO THE US TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS. CHIAO SAID HE WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH THE LOGIC OF EVENTS WHICH WERE REQUIRED BY THE US SYSTEM, BUT IF THE US WANTED TO WAIT, THAT WAS ALL RIGHT. THE CHINESE PEOPLE WERE ALSO WILLING TO WAIT. THEY HAD WAITED 25 YEARS FOR THE PRESENT US-PRC RELATIONSHIP TO DEVELOP (HE MENTIONED THIS SEVERAL TIMES), AND COULD WAIT ANOTHER 25 YEARS. IT WAS ALL UP TO THE US. OF COURSE, CHIAO ADDED, AS SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD SAID, IN POLITICS, AS WELL AS IN DIPLOMACY, ONE SHOULD HAVE A POSITIVE APPROACH. AFTER NORMALIZATION, THERE COULD BE MORE COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND THE US. CHIAO COMMENTED THAT US TRADE WITH TAIWAN WAS GREATER THAN US TRADE WITH THE PRC. THE CHINESE HAD NOTICED THIS FACT, BUT DIDN'T MIND.

12. IN CONCLUSION, CHIAO DECLARED THAT WHAT HE HAD JUST STATED WOULD BE SAID ONLY IN PRIVATE AND NOT IN PUBLIC.

BUSH

~~SECRET~~





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

NO0056

PAGE 01 PEKING 02308 01 OF 03 102405Z

00
ACTION NO03-00

ACTION COPY

INFO OCT-01 /001 W

095233

R 170900Z DEC 74
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2990

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 3 PEKING 02308

NODIS
CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR PINT UR CH US
SUBJECT: SENATOR MANSFIELD'S DISCUSSION OF WORLD
ISSUES WITH VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING

SUMMARY. ON DEC 12, VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING HOSTED A LUNCHEON IN HONOR OF SENATOR AND MRS. MANSFIELD AT THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE. DURING THE LUNCHEON, SENATOR MANSFIELD AND THE VICE PREMIER DISCUSSED ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, SOUTHEAST ASIA AND ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT REACHED AT VLADIVOSTOK. THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS AND US PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WERE ALSO TOUCHED UPON. TENG DISPLAYED GREAT CAUTION CONCERNING CHINA'S ROLE AS A LEADER OF THE THIRD WORLD AND POTENTIAL AID DONOR, WAS DISAPPROVING BUT NOT CONTENTIOUS ABOUT THE US ROLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND MANIFESTED TYPICAL CHINESE SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE RESULTS OF THE VLADIVOSTOK MEETING. END SUMMARY.

1. VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING, ACCOMPANIED BY VICE FOREIGN MINISTER WANG HAI-JUNG, CPIFA VICE DIRECTOR CHOU CHIU-YEH, MFA AMERICAN AND OCEANIAN DEPARTMENT DEPUTY DIRECTOR TANG WEN-SHENG, CPIFA DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL KANG TAI-SHA, AND CPIFA STAFF MEMBER CHENG WAN-CHEN, HOSTED A LUNCHEON FOR SENATOR AND MRS. MANSFIELD ON DEC 12, 1974, AT THE GREAT

~~SECRET~~

HR 51401





Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 PEKING 02308 01 OF 03 180405Z

HALL OF THE PEOPLE. IN ADDITION TO THE SENATOR AND MRS. MANSFIELD, MRS. JANE B. ENGELHARD AND DC AND MRS. HOLDRIDGE WERE PRESENT ON THE AMERICAN SIDE.

2. ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. AFTER THE OPENING PLEASANTRIES, SENATOR MANSFIELD RAISED THE QUESTION OF OIL. WITH THE FOUR-FOLD INCREASE IN THE PRICE OF OIL, SOME OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE THIRD WORLD WERE ABLE NEITHER TO BUY THE OIL THEY NEEDED NOR TO BUILD REFINERIES AND WERE IN VERY DIFFIULT CIRCUMSTANCES. GENG HSIAO-PING AGREED ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES CAUSED BY THE OIL SITUATION, AND SAID THAT "SOME WORK HAD TO BE DONE." SENATOR MANSFIELD THEN DECLARED THAT CHINA, AS THE LEADER OF THE THIRD WORLD, COULD ASSUME SOME RESPONSIBILITY. TENG DISCLAIMED ANY ROLE FOR CHINA AS LEADER OF THE THIRD WORLD, SAYING THAT, WHILE CHINA WAS A MEMBER OF THE THIRD WORLD AND SUPPORTED ITS POSITION, IT WAS NOT THE LEADER. SENATOR MANSFIELD NOTED THAT SINCE CHINA WAS THE BIGGEST THIRD WORLD COUNTRY AND HISTORICALLY HAD MADE SPEECHES SUPPORTING IT, CHINA HAD TO BE CONSIDEREN THE LEADER OF THE THIRD WORLD. AS IN THE CASE OF THE US, WHICH NEITHER WANTED NOR PARTICULARLY APPRECIATED THE APPELLATION OF "SUPER-POWER" BUT ACCEPTED THIS STATUS FOR WHAT IT WAS, CHINA ALSO HAD TO ACCEPT ITS STATUS AS LEADER OF THE THIRD WORLD. "IF THE SHOE FITS, WEAR IT," HE STATED. TENG REPEATED THAT CHINA WAS NOT TO BE REGARDED AS THE LEADER, EMPHASIZING THAT, "WE WOULDN'T DATE TO CLAIM SUCH A POSITION."

3. THE MATTER CAME UP OF ASSISTANCE TO THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES HIT BY THE OIL SITUATION, WITH SENATOR MANSFIELD REMARKING THAT THE US COULD HELP TO SOME EXTENT BUT COULD NOT ASSUME THE FULL BURDEN. TENG RECALLED THAT THE US HAD GIVEN ASSISTANCE TO MANY THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES, TO WHICH SENATOR MANSFIELD RESPONDED BY AGREEING THAT THE US HAD INDEED GIVEN PL 480 AND OTHER FORMS OF AID; HOWEVER, THIS HAD USED UP AMERICAN RESOURCES AND LEFT THE COUNTRY IN STRAITENED ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES. TENG COMMENTED THAT THE CHINESE HAD LEARNED FROM THE US ABOUT THE EXPENSE OF ECONOMIC

~~SECRET~~





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 PEKING 02308 01 OF 03 180405Z

ASSISTANCE. "DON'T CALL ON US," HE SAID.

4. SOUTHEAST ASIA. SENATOR MANSFIELD ASKED WHAT TENG THOUGHT ABOUT AMERICAN TROOPS IN THAILAND. TENG REPLIED THAT US TROOPS WERE SPREAD OUT TOO THINLY OVER TOO GREAT AN AREA, AND WERE NOT STRONG ENOUGH IN ANY ONE PLACE. "IF YOU TRY TO USE YOUR TEN FINGERS TO CATCH TEN FLEAS," HE SAID, "YOU WILL NEVER SUCCEED." THE US HAD BEGUN TO DISENGAGE AFTER THE VIETNAM WAR, BUT THIS DISENGAGEMENT HAD NOT BEEN CARRIED OUT CLEANLY ENOUGH--THE US STILL HAD TROOPS IN MANY PLACES ABROAD. IN FACT, US FORCES WERE STRUNG OUT ON A LONG LINE ALL THE WAY FROM KOREA AND JAPAN THROUGH THE INDIAN OCEAN AND MEDITERRANEAN SEA TO EUROPE. SENATOR MANSFIELD ASKED IF TENG MEANT TO INCLUDE THAILAND IN THIS DESCRIPTION, AND TENG ANSWERED AFFIRMATIVELY. SENATOR MANSFIELD ASKED IF BY REFERRING TO THE US BEING SPREAD TOO THINLY AND NOT DISENGAGING CLEANLY ENOUGH, TENG MEANT THAT US FORCES SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM EUROPE. "THIS IS A MATTER FOR DISCUSSION WITH YOUR ALLIES," TENG REPLIED.

5. SENATOR MANSFIELD QUESTIONED TENG ABOUT CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE COALITION IN LAOS. "WE ARE IN FAVOR OF IT," TENG SAID. HOWEVER, WHILE THE BASIC AGREEMENT IN LAOS WAS SATISFACTORY, IT WAS NOT PERFECT AND SOME PROBLEMS STILL REMAINED. "WHAT ABOUT CAMBODIA?" SENATOR MANSFIELD ASKED. TENG REPLIED THAT HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE US HAD SUPPORTED A PERSON SUCH AS LON NOL FOR SO LONG. "I CAN'T DISAGREE WITH YOU ON THAT," SENATOR MANSFIELD OBSERVED. TENG WENT ON TO SAY THAT BECAUSE LON NOL WAS NOT A GOOD MAN AND DID NOT ENJOY THE SUPPORT OF THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE, THE LATTER WOULD CONTINUE TO FIGHT HIM. THIS WAS A CASE WHERE A PREVIOUSLY PEACEFUL PEOPLE HAD BEEN TURNED INTO THE OPPOSITE BY OPPRESSION. SENATOR MANSFIELD DISPUTED TENG'S REMARK, DECLARING THAT IN HIS OPINION THE LAOTIAN AND CAMBODIAN PEOPLES WERE THE MOST PEACE-LOVING IN THE WORLD.

~~SECRET~~





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04 PEKING 02308 01 OF 03 180405Z

6. TENG SAID IN RESPONSE THAT THERE WERE OTHER INSTANCES IN HISTORY IN WHICH NON-WARLIKE PEOPLE HAD BEEN TURNED INTO GOOD FIGHTERS AS A RESULT OF OPPRESSION. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WAS A SAYING IN CHINA THAT THE PEOPLE OF KIANGSI COULD NOT BE RELIED UPON TO FIGHT, AND FACT THE WARLORDS HAD AVOIDED USING KIANGSI MEN IN THE ARMIES. HOWEVER, WHEN CHAIRMAN MAO ESTABLISHED THE CHINGKANGSHAN REVOLUTIONARY BASE IN KIANGSI, MOST OF THE REVOLUTIONARY SOLDIERS WERE RECRUITED FROM THAT PROVINCE AND THEY FOUGHT VERY WELL. AS OF THE PRESENT TIME A MAJORITY OF THE TOP LEADERS OF THE PLA WERE FROM KIANGSI.
BUSH

~~SECRET~~





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

NOD051

PAGE 01 PEKING 02308 02 OF 03 180158Z.

00

ACTION NOOS-00

INFO OCT-01 /001 W

094374

R 170900Z DEC 74

FM USLO PEKING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2991

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 3 PEKING 2308~~NOFORN~~

7. TENG ALSO MENTIONED AS A CASE IN POINT THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM, WHERE THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE HAD NOT BEEN KNOWN HISTORICALLY AS FIGHTERS, BUT HAD NOW BEEN CARRYING ON A WAR FOR ALMOST 30 YEARS. THE CHINESE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE, IN CONTRAST, HAD ONLY LASTED FOR 22 YEARS. SENATOR MANSFIELD EXPRESSED SOME DOUBTS ABOUT THE ALLEGED VIETNAMESE LACK OF MARTIAL QUALITIES, NOTING THAT THE CHINESE THEMSELVES HAD UNDERGONE SOME EXPERIENCES OF FIGHTING WITH THE VIETNAMESE. THAT HAD BEEN A FIGHT BY MEMBERS OF A FAMILY, TENG SAID, TO WHICH SENATOR MANSFIELD RESPONDED BY REMARKING THAT FAMILY FIGHTS SOMETIMES WERE VERY GOOD ONES. A BRIEF DISCUSSION THEN ENSUED ABOUT THE "CHENG SISTER GENERALS"-- THE TWO VIETNAMESE SISTERS HAD HAD LED THE VIETNAMESE ARMIES AGAINST THE CHINESE.

8. WHILE DESCRIBING THE FIGHTING IN CAMBODIA, TENG DENIED REPORTS IN THE FOREIGN PRESS TO THE EFFECT THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS WERE INVOLVED. "THERE IS NOT ONE NORTH VIETNAMESE SOLDIER FIGHTING IN CAMBODIA," HE INSISTED. SENATOR MANSFIELD THEN ASKED TENG IF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS WERE IN CAMBODIA. TENG THOUGHT THIS QUESTION OVER FOR A MOMENT, AND THEN RESPONDED WITH THE REMARK THAT "CAMBODIA AND VIETNAM SHARE A COMMON FRONTIER."

9. VLADIVOSTOK AND DISARMAMENT. TENG THEN BROUGHT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 PEKING 02308 02 OF 03 180158Z

UP REPORTS IN THE US PRESS INDICATING THAT AMERICAN OPINION WAS DIVIDED ON THE OUTCOME OF THE VLADIVOSTOK SUMMIT. WHAT WAS SENATOR MANSFIELD'S OPINION OF THIS AGREEMENT?

10. SENATOR MANSFIELD INDICATED THAT HE IN GENERAL WAS IN FAVOR OF THE AGREEMENT FROM WHAT HE KNEW ABOUT IT BECAUSE IT PUT A LIMIT ON EACH SIDE'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ORIGINALLY IT HAD BEEN AN ORAL AGREEMENT, BUT A WEEK LATER WHEN IT WAS FOLLOWED UP IN WRITING, PRESIDENT FORD HAD BRIEFED THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP AND HAD ALSO PRESENTED IT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN A PRESS CONFERENCE. LIKE SENATOR JACKSON, HE, SENATOR MANSFIELD, WOULD HAVE PREFERRED A LOWER LIMIT, BUT AT LEAST THERE WAS NOW THE POSSIBILITY OF WORKING FOR LOWER LIMITS LATER ON. SENATOR MANSFIELD ASKED TENG WHAT HE PERSONALLY THOUGHT ABOUT THE AGREEMENT. TENG REPLIED THAT IT DIDN'T HAVE ANY RELEVANCE TO CHINA, TO WHICH SENATOR MANSFIELD OBSERVED THAT SUCH WASN'T NECESSARILY THE CASE. TENG WENT ON TO SAY THAT, IN ANY EVENT, WHILE OPINION IN THE US WAS DIVIDED ABOUT IT, THE REACTION IN THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN ENTIRELY ONE OF JUBILATION. TENG RECALLED THE SIGNING OF THE PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY IN MOSCOW IN 1963, WHEN HE HIMSELF HAD ALSO BEEN IN MOSCOW, FOLLOWING WHICH THERE HAD BEEN A BIG EXPANSION IN THE USSR'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM. THE SAME THING HAD OCCURRED FOLLOWING THE MAY 1972 AGREEMENTS.

11. SENATOR MANSFIELD AGREED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS ENGAGED IN A GAME OF "CATCH-UP" WITH THE US, AND THAT THERE WERE AREAS IN THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT SUCH AS THE COMPARATIVE THROW-WEIGHT OF US AND SOVIET MISSILES, WHICH MIGHT CAUSE CONCERN. BUT ALL OF THIS WAS MEANINGLESS WHEN EACH SIDE POSSESSED THE CAPABILITY OF DESTROYING HANKING 15 TIMES OVER, AND WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT THE SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY HAVE GONE WELL BEYOND THE LIMITS WHICH HAD BEEN AGREED UPON IN VLADIVOSTOK. AND, AS HE HAD MENTIONED EARLIER, THERE NOW WAS A CHANCE TO WORK FOR LOWER

~~SECRET~~





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 PEKING 02300 02 05 03 180150Z

LIMITS LATER ON.

12. IN THE COURSE OF THIS PORTION OF THE CONVERSATION, SENATOR MANSFIELD SEVERAL TIMES STRESSED THAT HE WAS SURE SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD BRIEFED THE CHINESE FULLY ON THE VLATCHINSKIY AGREEMENT, AND THAT THE STAFF OF THE PRC LIAISON OFFICE IN WASHINGTON HAD BEEN SIMILARLY INFORMED. HE ALSO STRESSED THAT IF THE AGREEMENT WAS SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE IN THE FORM OF A TREATY FOR RATIFICATION--AND HE ASSUMED IT WOULD BE AS PART OF OUR DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES--IT WOULD BE SUBJECTED TO THE CLOSEST SCRUTINY AND WOULD NOT GO INTO EFFECT UNLESS PASSED BY A TWO-THIRDS VOTE.

13. TENG MENTIONED THAT CHINA DID NOT BELIEVE THAT IF A WAR WERE TO BREAK OUT, IT WOULD NECESSARILY BE FOUGHT WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY IT WOULD BE FOUGHT ENTIRELY WITH CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. SENATOR MANSFIELD REPLIED THAT HE AGREED, AND SAID THAT THE WORLD REMAINED IN A DANGEROUS STATE. THIS WAS ONE OF THE REASONS WHY HE WAS A SUPPORTER OF WOMEN'S LIB--THE MEN HAD DONE SUCH A BAD JOB OF RUNNING AFFAIRS THAT IT WAS TIME TO LET THE WOMEN HAVE A TRY. THEY CERTAINLY COULDN'T DO ANY WORSE, AND THEY MIGHT DO A GOOD BIT BETTER. HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE WOMEN RUNNING THE WHITE HOUSE, THE GOVERNMENT AND THE CONGRESS. "BUT WHAT ABOUT MADAME GHANDI?" TENG ASKED. SHE HAD NOT DONE SUCH A GOOD JOB IN GOVERNING INDIA, HE CONTINUED, AND MOST RECENTLY SHE HAD INITIATED ACTIONS WHICH HAD PUT SIKKIM IN INDIA'S POCKET. TENG AND SENATOR MANSFIELD AGREED THAT INDIA'S MOVE TO TAKE OVER SIKKIM (WHICH, IN THE SENATOR'S WORDS, HAD LEFT INDIAN OFFICIALS RUNNING THE COUNTRY) WERE UNWARRANTED; THE FACT THAT INDIA ALREADY HAD 25,000 TROOPS IN SIKKIM MADE THE TAKE-OVER UNNECESSARY.

BUSH

~~SECRET~~





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

NOD053

PAGE 01 PEKING 02308 03 OF 03 180202Z

00

ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 /001 W

094427

R 170900Z DEC 74
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2992

SECRET SECTION 3 OF 3 PEKING 2300

NODIS/CHEROKEE

14. INDIAN OCEAN. SENATOR MANSFIELD ASKED TENG WHAT HE THOUGHT ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF US NAVAL FORCES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. TENG PASSED A MOMENT, AND THEN CITED CHINA'S POLICY TOWARD INDIA: SINCE THE SOVIET UNION WAS ALREADY IN INDIA, IT WOULD BE BETTER TO HAVE THE US PRESENT THAN TO HAVE THE SOVIET UNION THERE ALONE. SENATOR MANSFIELD'S RESPONSE WAS "THANKS."

15. NPC. SENATOR MANSFIELD REFERRED TO PRESS REPORTS THAT THE CHINESE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS WOULD BE HELD SOON. COULD TENG SAY ANYTHING ABOUT THE DATE WHEN THIS CONGRESS WOULD BE HELD? TENG AFFIRMED THAT THE 4TH NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS WAS BEING ORGANIZED. AS TO THE DATE, THIS WOULD DEPEND ON THE STATE OF THE PREPARATIONS.

16. SENATOR MANSFIELD RECALLED THAT THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE BIRTH OF SUN YAT-SEN HAD TAKEN PLACE THE PRECEDING MONTH, AND THEN ASKED ABOUT THE HEALTH OF MADAME SUN YAT-SEN. TENG REPLIED THAT MADAME SUN WAS NOW IN HER 80'S AND RATHER WEAK, AND SO DIDN'T GO OUT MUCH. HOWEVER, SHE WAS IN QUITE GOOD HEALTH FOR A PERSON OF HER AGE.

17. FOLLOWING THE FORMAL TOASTS, THE CONVERSATION CLOSED WITH INFORMAL REMARKS BY SENATOR MANSFIELD THANKING TENG FOR THE TIME HE HAD GIVEN THE SENATOR AND HIS PARTY AND FOR TENG'S FRANK EXPRESSION OF VIEWS. EVEN IF THE US AND CHINESE POSITIONS WERE DIFFERENT, IT WAS USEFUL TO LEARN OF THE NATURE OF THE

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 PEKING 02308 03 OF 03 180202Z

DIFFERENCES, THIS WOULD HELP THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF US-PRC RELATIONS. MRS. ENGELHARD ALSO SPOKE, SAYING THAT AS THE ONLY AMERICAN PRESENT WHO HAD BEEN BORN IN CHINA, SHE COULD TESTIFY THAT CHINA WAS ON THE RIGHT COURSE. THE CONTINUATION OF CHINA'S DEVELOPMENT WOULD BENEFIT THE CAUSE OF IMPROVING SINO-US RELATIONS, SHE DECLARED. TENG THANKED SENATOR MANSFIELD AND MRS. ENGELHARD FOR THEIR WORDS, AND SAID THAT HE, TOO, HAD LEARNED FROM SENATOR MANSFIELD.

BUSH

~~SECRET~~





COPY 1 OF 15 COPIES

Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

N00156

~~PAGE 01 PEKING 02326 200753Z~~

ACTION COPY

00
ACTION N05-00

INFO 01-01 /001 W

121389

R 20075Z DEC 74
FM USU PEKING
TO SESTATE WASHDC 3006

~~SECRET~~ PEKING 2326

CONTROL: 4643Q
RECD: DEC 20.1974

N003

E. 11652: GDS
TAS: CH US PFOR PROPS
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE PRC STIMULATION OF THE PRESS

EF: STATE 277439

1. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT PRC OFFICIALS ARE USING THE PRESS TO CONVEY DISSATISFACTION CONCERNING PACE OF NORMALIZATION OF US-PRC RELATIONS. MOST SIGNIFICANT OF THOSE CASES MENTIONED REFTEL IS JAFFE INTERVIEW WITH YU CHAN REPORTED PEKING 2305. AS WE NOTED JAFFE WAS TOLD IN ADVANCE THAT THIS WOULD BE A VERY IMPORTANT INTERVIEW, AND MFA INFORMATION DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS WENT OVER JAFFE'S TEXT WITH A FINE TOOTH COMB, THE FINAL SESSION LASTING UNTIL 2:30 A.M. TEXT WAS THEN SENT TO HIGHER AUTHORITIES FOR FINAL APPROVAL, POSSIBLY BY YU CHAN OR EVEN CHIAO KUAN-HUA. WE ASSUME JAFFE ARTICLE HAS NOW BEEN PUBLISHED AND DEPARTMENT HAS OBTAINED TEXT.

2. IF, AS SEEMS LIKELY, CHINESE ASSUMED THAT JAFFE WOULD DISCLOSE SOURCE AND CIRCUMSTANCES TO USG, THEN THIS OBVIOUSLY IS A CAREFULLY PREPARED MESSAGE. CHINESE ARE SAYING THAT WHILE BASIS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP REMAINS SOUND AND, ON THE WHOLE, RELATIONS HAVE DEVELOPED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, THEY EXPECTED MORE FROM U.S. AS A RESULT OF THE U.S. DECLARATION ON TAIWAN CONTAINED IN THE COMMUNIQUE. SLIGHT TOUGHENING IN YU CHAN'S TERMS

~~SECRET~~

HR 5114101



NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 PEKING 02326 200753Z

FOR FULL NORMALIZATION MAY ALSO BE PEKING'S WAY OF INDICATING ITS UNWILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE ON FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, AND CAN BE READ AS A MOVE TO STAKE OUT ITS BARGAINING POSITION.

3. CHINESE STATEMENTS APPEAR TO BE TAKING ON ASPECT OF ORCHESTRATED CAMPAIGN. WE NOTE HONG KONG'S 13708 REPORTING LOCAL LEFTIST NEWSMEN ARE NOW SPREADING THE LINE THAT PRC IS DISSATISFIED WITH PACE OF NORMALIZATION. JAFFE TOLD US HERE THAT AT DINNER PARTY PRIOR TO HIS LEAVING FOR PEKING PRCLO DEPUTY CHIEF HAN HSU HAD POUNDED THE TABLE WHEN DISCUSSING OPENING OF TWO ROC CONSULATES OF U.S. WE EXPECT THAT WE WILL SEE SIMILAR STORIES APPEARING ELSEWHERE. DEPARTMENT WILL RECALL SPATE OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS EARLIER THIS YEAR DESCRIBING PRC OFFICIALS AS CONCERNED ABOUT PRESSURE BEING BROUGHT ON CHOU EN-LAI BY CHIANG CHING OVER US-PRC RELATIONSHIP. USLO SPECULATED AT THE TIME THAT THESE REPORTS MIGHT BE PART OF A COORDINATED EFFORT, PERHAPS BY CHOU HIMSELF, TO APPLY PRESSURE ON US. WHAT WE ARE SEEING NOW IS SIMILAR, ALTHOUGH LESS SUBTLE CAMPAIGN, AND IT SEEMS TYPICALLY CHINESE--CONVEYING DISPLEASURE INDIRECTLY WHILE EXPRESSING PATIENCE AND SEEMING UNCONCERN IN FACE TO FACE DISCUSSIONS WIT AMERICAN OFFICIALS.
BUSH

~~SECRET~~





Department of State

~~SECRET~~

ACTION COPY TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 6031Q

RECD: 27 DEC 74

10:52PM

R 280315Z DEC 74
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3025
BT
~~SECRET~~ PEKING 2352

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, UR, CH, US
SUBJECT: SENATOR MANSFIELD'S CONVERSATIONS

REF: STATE 277531

1. CHIAO KUAN-HUA'S QUESTION AS TO WHETHER ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT HAD BEEN WITHHELD FROM THE CHINESE OCCURRED DURING COURSE OF INFORMAL GIVE-AND-TAKE BETWEEN CHIAO AND SENATOR MANSFIELD. CHIAO RAISED THE POINT MORE IN PASSING THAN MAKING A MAJOR ISSUE OUT OF IT. POSSIBLE THAT HE HAS TRYING TO SOW DOUBTS ABOUT THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT IN SENATOR MANSFIELD'S MIND, PERHAPS IN HOPES OF AFFECTING CONGRESSIONAL ACTION. IN THIS RESPECT, IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT CHIAO ASKED MANSFIELD FOR LATTER'S OWN VIEW OF AGREEMENT, AND AT THIS PARTICULAR SESSION THE SENATOR WAS NOT AS POSITIVE IN HIS SUPPORT AS HE WAS DURING LATER CONVERSATION WITH TENG HSIAO-PING.
2. REGARDING MANSFIELD-TENG CONVERSATION, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE SENATOR THOUGHT IT DESIRABLE TO CLEAR UP ANY MISCONCEPTIONS WHICH MIGHT HAVE ARISEN IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH CHIAO OVER VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT. HE WAS FIRM IN ENDORSING IT, AND ALSO WAS QUITE EMPHATIC IN EXPRESSING CONFIDENCE TO CHINESE THAT THEY HAD BEEN FULLY BRIEFED ON AGREEMENT BOTH BY THE SECRETARY IN PEKING AND AT APPROPRIATE LEVELS IN WASHINGTON. TENG HSIAO-PING DID NOT RPT NOT EXPRESS SAME DOUBTS WHICH WERE RAISED BY CHIAO CONCERNING FULLNESS OF SECRETARY'S BRIEFING, ALTHOUGH TENG CERTAINLY PRESSED CHINESE POINT OF VIEW THAT SOVIETS BENEFITTED MORE FROM THE AGREEMENT THAN DID THE US.

BUSH

~~SECRET~~

HR 5114101





Department of State

COPY 1 OF 13 COPIES

TELEGRAM ACTION COPY

~~SECRET~~

NODG45

PAGE 01 PEKING 0055

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

MR # 10-042-427

State Dept letter 5/6/10

By dal NARA, Date 6/24/10

ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 /001 R

037499

R 130700Z JAN 75
FM USLU PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 307

CONTROL: 2095Q
RECD : JAN 13, 1
3:06 A.M.

~~SECRET~~ PEKING 0055

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CH, US, UR, NL, XF

SUBJECT: COMMENTS BY DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER ON US-PRC
RELATIONS AND OTHER CURRENT ISSUES

REF: PEKING 0020

1. AFTER READING HARSH WORDS ON BOTH US AND SOVIETS IN CHIAO KUAN-HUA'S TOAST DURING BANQUET FOR VISITING DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER VANDERSTOEL (REFTEL), ON JAN 7 I CONTACTED DUTCH AMBASSADOR VIXSEBOXSE TO ASK DUTCH IMPRESSION OF CHIAO'S REMARKS AND TO SEE IF THEY FELT THERE WERE ANY INDICATIONS OF PROBLEMS IN US-PRC RELATIONSHIP. VIXSEBOXSE REPLIED IMMEDIATELY THAT NONE OF DUTCH G

HAD ATTACHED PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE TO THESE WORDS NOR DID THEY BELIEVE ANY SPECIAL PROBLEMS HAD ARISEN IN US-PRC RELATIONS FROM WHAT THEY HAD HEARD FROM CHINESE SO FAR. HOWEVER, VIXSEBOXSE SAID HE WOULD GET BACK TO ME AGAIN AFTER HE RETURNED TO PEKING FROM ESCORTING VANDERSTOEL TO OTHER PARTS OF CHINA.

2. VIXSEBOXSE CALLED ON ME JANUARY 10 TO FILL ME IN ON WHAT CHINESE HAD SAID ABOUT RELATIONS WITH THE US. HE CONFIRMED WHAT HE HAD ALREADY TOLD ME; NAMELY, THAT NEITHER VANDERSTOEL NOR HEAD OF ASIAN DIVISION IN FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD ATTACHED ANY SPECI

IGN- NIFICANCE TO CHIAO'S BANQUET TOAST. ALL THOUGHT THIS WAS JUST ROUTINE. WHILE IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH THE DUTCH TENG HSIAU-PING AND CHIAO KUAN-HUA (PARTICULARLY THE FORMER) HAD

~~SECRET~~





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 PEKING 055

TAKEN A FAIRLY HARD LINE AGAINST THE SUPERPOWERS, IT WAS EVIDENT THAT THE CHINESE CRITICISMS WERE DIRECTED PRIMARILY AGAINST THE USSR.

3. VIXSEBOXSE WENT ON TO SAY THAT AT MEETING WITH CHIAO KUAN-KYUA WHICH OCCURRED AFTERNOON OF JAN. 7, CHIAO HAD IN FACT SPOKEN DIRECTLY ON SUBJECT OF US-PRC RELATIONS. ACCORDING TO CHIAO, THERE HAD BEEN SOME REPORTS RECENTLY TO EFFECT THAT THESE RELATIONS HAD DETERIORATED, BUT THIS WAS "SIMPLY NOT TRUE." CHIAO DESCRIBED US-PRC RELATIONS AS "NORMAL" AND GENERALLY GOOD.

4. VIXSEBOXSE NOTED THAT TENG HSIAO-PING HAD MADE IT VERY PLAIN IN TALK WITH VANDERSTOEL THAT THE CHINESE LOOKED UPON THE SOVIETS AS CHINA'S MAIN ENEMY. TENG SPOKE IN FAMILIAR TERMS ON SOVIET FORCE OF ONE MILLION MEN BEING CONCENTRATED ALONG CHINESE BORDERS WITH USSR, ADVING, THOUGH, THAT THESE FORCES WERE NOT SO WELL ARMED AND THAT MANY MORE TROOPS WITH THE MOST MODERN EQUIPMENT WERE CONCENTRATED AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE. HE SPOKE OF NECESSITY FOR WE UNITY AND INCREASE IN MILITARY STRENGTH. REGARDING THE US, TENG SAID THE AMERICANS HAD "TOO MUCH FLESH" (I.E., WERE TOO FAT; A LINE HE HAD TAKEN WITH US UNIVERSITY PRESIDENTS) AND AS A RESULT WERE ON THE DEFENSIVE AGAINST THE "LEANER" SOVIETS. CHIAO, FOR HIS PART, HAD CRITICIZED US FOR ATTEMPTING TO USE ITS MILITARY POWER IN ASIA FOR A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD AFTER WORLD WAR II TO PREVENT A VACUUM FROM FORMING, BUT CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT US HAD FINALLY "SEEN THE LIGHT."

5. IN RESPONSE TO TENG'S REMARKS ON NEED FOR WE UNITY AND STRENGTH, VANERSTOEL TOOK SAME POSITION AS THAT OF DANISH PRIME MINISTER HARTLING DURING RECENT TALKS WITH TENG: HIGH PRICE OF OIL ERODED ECONOMIC STRENGTH OF WE NATIONS AND, HENCE, UNDERCUT THEIR MILITARY STRENGTH.

6. FURTHER ON SUBJECT OF OIL PRICES, VIXSEBOXSE COMMENTED THAT CHIAO KUAN-HUA HAD RAISED SUBJECT IN JAN 7. SESSION WITH VANDERSTOEL. CHIAO HAD VIEWED CONSULTATIONS AMONG CONSUMING NATIONS ON OIL PRICES AS CONTRARY TO PRINCIPLE OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN PRODUCERS AND CONSUMERS AND AMOUNTING ALMOST TO CONFRONTATION. VANDERSTOEL HAD DEMURRED, SAYING THAT SINCE CONSUMING NATIONS DID NOT

~~SECRET~~



NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 PEKING 0055

REGARD CONSULTATIONS AMONG PRODUCING NATIONS AS CONFRONTATION, THE PRODUCERS SHOULD TREAT CONSULTATIONS AMONG CONSUMERS IN THE SAME LIGHT. CHIAO HAD AGREED THAT EC NATIONS WERE FOLLOWING A PROPER COURSE IN WORKING OUT A COMMON POSITION ON OIL PRICES, BUT SAID THAT IN WHATEVER THEY DID THEY SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO CREATE A DIVERGENCE WITH THE US. WITH RESPECT TO THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION IN GENERAL, VIXSEBOXSE SAID SUBJECT WAS NOT DEALT WITH DIRECTLY EXCEPT IN CONTEXT OF OIL PRICES.

7. VIXSEBOXSE REMARKED BRIEFLY ON VIEWS EXPRESSED BY CHINESE REGARDING SOVIET-INDIAN RELATIONS: SITUATION WAS ONE IN WHICH ONE SUPERPOWER WAS SUPPORTING A LESSER POWER IN THE SUBCONTINENT WHICH HAD AMBITIONS TO BECOME A GREATER ONE.

8. DURING VANDERSTOEL CALL ON PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI, CHOU REFERRED TO SECRETARY KISSINGER'S BUSINESS WEEK INTERVIEW AND SAID JOKINGLY THAT ON QUESTION OF USING FORCE, SECRETARY HAD "OVERSHOT THE MARK." CHIAO KUAN-HUA HAD ALSO COMMENTED ON THIS PARTICULAR ASPECT OF SECRETARY'S INTERVIEW, NOTING THAT HE ASSUMED SECRETARY KISSINGER HIMSELF WISHED HE HAD NOT SAID WHAT HE HAD SAID. NEITHER CHOU NOR CHIAO HAD EXPRESSED ANY FEARS OVER POSSIBLE USE OF FORCE BY US, HOWEVER.

9. APROPOS OF CHOU EN-LAI, HIS APPEARANCE IMPRESSED DUTCH VISITORS AS BEING ABOUT SAME AS USUAL ALTHOUGH HE WAS PERHAPS SOMEWHAT THINNER. CHOU TOLD DUTCH THAT FOR LAST TWO YEARS HE HAD BEEN SUFFERING AILMENT WHICH COULD NOT BE COMPLETELY CURED EVEN THOUGH HIS OUTWARD APPEARANCE WAS NOT BAD. HIS MENTAL VIGOR WAS UNIMPAIRED AND HE WAS FULLY ON TOP OF ALL SUBJECTS WHICH HIS ASSOCIATES HAD DISCUSSED WITH VANDERSTOEL.

10. IN MAKING FOREGOING INFORMATION AVAILBLE TO US, VIXSEBOXSE SAID HE WAS UNDER SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FROM VANDERSTOEL AND HEAD OF ASIAN DEPARTMENT TO KEEP US INFORMED NOT ONLY ON MATTERS INVOLVING US-PRC RELATIONS, BUT ALSO ON MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN EC AS WELL.

11. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO REPEAT TO OTHER INTERESTED PART IES.
BUSH

~~SECRET~~



NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

ACTION COPY

COPY 1 OF 13 COPIES



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

NO0373

PAGE 01 PEKING 00064 160520Z

CONTROL: 2980Q
RECD: 15 JAN 75
11:36PM

00
ACTION NOUS-20

INFO OCT-01 1001 W

047578

R 140905Z JAN 75
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3087

~~SECRET~~ PEKING 0064

NOVIS CHEROKEE.

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFUR CH US IN UR
SUBJECT: PAT MOYNIHAN'S CALL ON PRC FOREIGN MINISTER
CHIAO KUAN-HUA

1. ON JANUARY 13 I TOOK PAT MOYNIHAN TO CALL ON PRC FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, CHIAO HAVING SET UP THIS APPOINTMENT IN LIEU OF ACCEPTING A LUNCHEON INVITATION WHICH I HAD EXTENDED TO HIM OR ARRANGING A MEETING WITH A LESSOR OFFICIAL IF HE WAS BUSY. JOHN HOLDRIDGE ACCOMPANIED US. IN ADDITION TO CHIAO, ON THE CHINESE SIDE WERE CHAO CHI-HUA AND TWO OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S CORPS OF LADIES, ONE WHO INTERPRETED AND ONE WHO WAS INTRODUCED AS THE INDIA DESK OFFICER. (IT IS UNUSUAL FOR CHIAO TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY SUCH A LOW-LEVEL GROUP, AND WE SUSPECT THAT MORE EXALTED PERSONALITIES SUCH AS CHIAO'S WIFE CHANG HAN-CHIH AND NANCY TANG MAY BE INVOLVED IN PREPARATIONS FOR A NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS.) CHIAO WAS HIS USUAL AFFABLE AND ARTICULATE SELF, AND THE ATMOSPHERICS OF THE MEETING WERE VERY GOOD.

2. A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE MEETING CONSISTED OF PLEASANTRIES-- PAT'S VISIT TO CHINA, THE COURSES PAT WILL TEACH AT HARVARD, HIS IMPRESSIONS OF HARVARD COLLEAGUES SUCH AS JOHN FAIRBANK; HOWEVER, WE GOT DOWN TO BRASS TACKS ON TWO BASIC TOPICS: INDIAN RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND THE US, AND SINO-US RELATIONS.

3. ON THE QUESTION OF INDIA, PAT SAID HE HAD HEARD FROM SECRETARY KISSINGER SINCE THE SECRETARY'S LAST VISIT TO CHINA TO

~~SECRET~~

HR 511401





Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

~~PAGE 02 REXING 00064 150500Z~~

THE EFFECT HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE CHINESE WOULD LIKE CLOSER RELATIONS WITH INDIA. IN FACT, THE SECRETARY HAD SENT A CABLE TO PAT IN NEW DELHI SAYING HE BELIEVED IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IF PAT WERE TO PASS ON THIS THOUGHT TO PRIME MINISTER GHANDI, AND HE HAD DONE SO. CHIAO REMARKED IN RESPONSE THAT SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS HAD BEEN QUITE GOOD IN THE PAST BUT HAD SUFFERED SOME TWISTS AND TURNS; HOWEVER, RELATIONS WOULD CERTAINLY GET BETTER IN THE FUTURE BECAUSE THINGS COULDN'T GO ON THE WAY THEY WERE AT PRESENT.

4. PAT OBSERVED THAT THE SAME THING COULD BE SAID ABOUT US-INDIAN RELATIONS, WHICH ARE NOW MUCH BETTER THAN BEFORE. PAT SAID HE BELIEVED THE INDIANS WERE CONCERNED NOT TO BE JUST IN THE SOVIET CAMP EVEN THOUGH THEY HAD A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIETS, BUT WANTED BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE US. INDEED, THEY HAD ALREADY MADE THIS CLEAR. CHIAO AGREED THAT THE INDIANS DIDN'T WANT TO BE COMPLETELY UNDER SOVIET CONTROL, AND THAT THEY WANTED TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE US. HE THOUGHT SUCH AN IMPROVEMENT WOULD BE HELPFUL. CHIAO RECALLED THAT HE HAD EXPRESSED THE SAME ATTITUDE DURING THE SECRETARY'S LAST VISIT TO CHINA, AND HAD CALLED THE SECRETARY'S EARLIER VISIT TO INDIA A GOOD THING.

5. CHIAO DECLARED THAT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA AFFECTING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WERE NOT SO MUCH CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD INDIA ITSELF, BUT RATHER TOWARD INDIA'S POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. CHINA DID NOT AGREE WITH THESE POLICIES, FOR EXAMPLE, WITH RESPECT TO SIKKIM. NOR DID CHINA AGREE WITH INDIA'S POLICY TOWARD NEPAL.

6. WHEN CHIAO MENTIONED NEXT THAT THE US AND CHINESE ATTITUDES MIGHT DIFFER, PAT OFFERED TO EXPLAIN THE US VIEW ON SIKKIM. HE SAID THAT WHILE WE TOOK NO PLEASURE IN WHAT HAD HAPPENED, IN DECIDING WHAT POSITION WE OURSELVES SHOULD TAKE WE FELT WE HAD TO BE CONTROLLED BY WHAT WE REGARDED AS THE LEGAL SITUATION RESPECTING SIKKIM. THIS WAS THAT SIKKIM HAD BEEN A PART OF BRITISH INDIA AND, HENCE DIDN'T REALLY HAVE A SEPARATE STATUS. ALTHOUGH THE CHINESE MIGHT NOT AGREE WITH US, WE TOOK THIS LEGAL POSITION AS CONTROLLING. HE NOTED THAT WITH RESPECT TO NEPAL, WE KNEW WHEREOF CHIAO SPOKE, AND ADDED THAT THE INDIANS WERE NOW CLEARLY MAKING THINGS DIFFICULT FOR THE NEPALESE.

~~SECRET~~





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 05 PEKING 00064 160320Z

7. CHIAO COMMENTED THAT THE CHINESE HOPED INDIA WOULD TAKE "A RATHER REASONABLE ATTITUDE" TOWARD ITS NEIGHBORS IN THIS CONNECTION. HE REFERRED TO NEWS REPORTS ALLEGING THAT CHINA'S REACTION TO THE SIKKIM EPISODE HAD BEEN A REACTION TO FEARS THAT INDIA'S ANNEXATION OF SIKKIM WOULD HAVE SOME MILITARY EFFECT ON CHINA. CHIAO DENIED THAT CHINA HAD ANYTHING TO FEAR FROM INDIA, SIKKIM WAS A SMALL PLACE, COULD EXERT NO EFFECT ON CHINA, AND THE CHINESE OPPOSED INDIA ON THE SIKKIM ISSUE "AS A MATTER OF JUSTICE."

8. TURNING TO SINO-US RELATIONS, PAT REMARKED THAT HE WOULD BE RETURNING TO THE US AND SEEING THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY KISSINGER, AND, THEREFORE, WOULD LIKE CHIAO'S IMPRESSIONS REGARDING SINO-US RELATIONS. FROM NEWSPAPER REPORTS SUCH AS THOSE APPEARING IN THE HONG KONG PRESS, WE HAD HEARD THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE US WERE NOT AS FLOURISHING AS WE HAD HOPED THEY WOULD BE.

9. CHIAO SAID THAT HE HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED THE SAME QUESTION WITH ME (NO DOUBT REFERRING TO MY CONVERSATION WITH HIM ON DEC 27). REGARDING THE PRESS REPORTS PAT HAD CITED, ESPECIALLY THOSE IN HONG KONG AND SOUTHEAST ASIAN PAPERS, THERE HAD BEEN MANY OF THESE ALLEGING THAT US-PRC RELATIONS WERE DOWN "BUT THESE DON'T CONFORM WITH THE FACTS." DURING THE SECRETARY'S LAST VISIT, CHIAO AND THE SECRETARY HAD SAID IN THEIR SPEECHES THAT RELATIONS WERE DEVELOPING ALONG THE LINES ENVISAGED IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. "GENERALLY SPEAKING," CHIAO SAID, "RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE MOVED FORWARD." THERE WERE CERTAIN CORRESPONDENTS WHO HAD IGNORED WHAT CHIAO AND THE SECRETARY SAID IN THOSE PARTS OF THEIR SPEECHES DEALING WITH US-PRC RELATIONS, AND HAD TRIED TO CREATE TROUBLE. NEVERTHELESS, WHAT BOTH THE SECRETARY AND CHIAO SAID WAS NOT THE LANGUAGE OF DIPLOMACY BUT WAS "IN THE OPEN." "BUT, OF COURSE," HE CONTINUED, "AS MR. BUSH AND MR. HOLDRIDGE KNOW, THE TIME FOR ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS HAS NOT YET COME."

10. THE CONVERSATION THEN SLIPPED OFF INTO PLEASANTRIES FOR AWHILE, IN THE COURSE OF WHICH CHIAO MENTIONED THAT HE WELCOMED PAT'S VISIT TO CHINA, AND HOPED PAT WOULD LOOK AROUND AND SEE MORE OF THE COUNTRY. ONLY BY MAKING COMPARISONS COULD ONE ARRIVE AT OBJECTIVE CONCLUSIONS. IN EFFECT, PAT WOULD BE WELCOME TO COME

~~SECRET~~





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04 PEKING 00064 160520Z

BACK AGAIN. PAT SAID THAT IT WAS KIND OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO SAY SO. WHILE HE HAD ALREADY SEEN MANY THING SUCH AS HOUSING DURING HIS PRESENT TRIP, HE WOULD LIKE TO COME BACK TO SEE SHANGHAI, NANKING AND CANTON. HE THANKED CHIAO FOR THE INVITATION TO RETURN.

11. AS WE WERE GOING OUT THE DOOR, I ASKED PAT WHETHER OR NOT THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN UPSET OVER THE INDIAN NUCLEAR TEST. PAT DECLARED THAT THEY HAD BEEN VERY UPSET; IN FACT, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN NEW DELHI HAD BEEN RECALLED TO MOSCOW JUST AFTER THE TEST AND REPRIMANDED FOR NOT HAVING KNOWN ABOUT IT IN ADVANCE. CHIAO SEEMED INTERESTED IN THIS INFORMATION.

12. SINCE THE SECRETARY IS A FORMER COLLEAGUE OF JOHN FAIRBANK, CHIAO'S COMMENTS ON FAIRBANK MAY BE OF INTEREST. AFTER ELICITING FROM PAT THE FACT THAT HE WAS A MEMBER OF THE GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF HARVARD, CHIAO HIMSELF ASKED PAT WHAT FAIRBANK'S PARTICULAR POSITION WAS. (IN OTHER WORDS, CHIAO RAISED THE SUBJECT HIMSELF.) PAT EMPHASIZED THAT JOHN FAIRBANK IN ACTUAL TERMS CONSTITUTED A WHOLE HARVARD DEPARTMENT ON HIS OWN, EVEN THOUGH HE WAS TECHNICALLY RETIRED. WHEN PAT ASKED CHIAO IF HE COULD TELL FAIRBANK OF CHIAO'S HAVING ASKED ABOUT HIM, CHIAO SAID "SEND HIM MY REGARDS." HE POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT THE TWO OF THEM HAD MANY DIFFERENCES, AND HAD "MANY WORDS" TO SAY TO ONE ANOTHER WHEN THEY MET.

BUSH

~~SECRET~~





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

NOD854

PAGE 01 PEKING 00182 030430Z

CONTROL: 1920

RECD : FEB 2, 1975
10:36 P.M.

00
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 (NODS) W

001835

O 030322Z FEB 75
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3177

~~SECRET~~ PEKING 0182

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS CH TW
SUBJECT: SCHEDULE OF US/ROC JOINT EXERCISES

REF: STATE 023853, STATE 022571

1. WE IN PEKING ARE, OF COURSE, UNAWARE OF ALL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED UN SCHEDULING OF US/ROC MILITARY EXERCISTS IN VICINITY OF TAIWAN, ESPECIALLY THOSE SUCH AS SHARK HUNT INCLUDING SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT OF BOTH SIDES, AND IN ANY EVENT IT IS PROBABLY TOO LATE TO CANCEL SHARK HUNT NOW. HOWEVER, FROM STANDPOINT OF US-PRC RELATIONS, WE WISH EXERCISTS SUCH AS THESE COULD BE AVOIDED. NOT ONLY WILL PRC HAVE GROUNDS FOR QUESTIONING WHETHER US IS CARRYING OUT TERMS OF SHANGHAI JOINT COMMUNIQUE "IN EARNEST," BUT INCREASED CHANCES OF FURTHER US INCURSIONS INTO PRC AIR SPACE OR TERRITORIAL WATERS CERZAINLY EXIST. NEITHER DEVELOPMENT DOES US-PRC RELATIONS ANY GOOD, AND THOSE INSIDE PRC LEADERSHIP WHO ARE CRITICAL OF IMPROVED US-PRC TIES MAY HAVE THEIR HANDS STRENGTHENED AS A RESULT.

2. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE INCURSIONS, WE NOTE THAT LATEST INCIDENT OCCURRED AS RECENTLY AS JANUARY 28 DURING JOING US/ROC EXERCISES. AS REFTEL B NOTES, THIS ASPECT OF INCURSION WAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO PRC WHEN PRCLD DEPUTY CHIEF HAN HSU PRESENTED PRC PROTEST TO HABIB.

~~SECRET~~

HR 5/14/01





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 PEKING 00182 030430Z

3. IT SEEMS TO US IN PEKING THAT LONG, HARD LOOK AT WHOLE PATTERN OF US/ROC MILITARY RELATIONSHIP IS DESIRABLE. IF US POLICY REMAINS THAT OF WORKING TOWARD NORMALIZATION OF US-PRC RELATIONS, CONTINUATION OF HIGH-PROFILE US/ROC MILITARY EXERCISES ALONG LINES CHARACTERISTIC OF PRE-SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE PERIOD HARDLY LOOKS TO BE IN CONSONANCE WITH SITUATION AS ITS EXISTS TODAY. THIS WE BELIEVE IS ESPECIALLY THE CASE IN LIGHT OF PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO PRC LATER IN 1975.

4. FOR DEPARTMENT: PLEASE PASS AMEMBASSY TAIPEI, AMCONSUL HONG KONG AND CINCPAC FOR POLAD.
HOLDRIDGE

~~SECRET~~

