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TELEGRAM

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NODIS
TOSEC 578

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS:PFOR, CY, GR, TU
SUBJECT: SUGGESTED TELEGRAM TO ATHENS WITH MESSAGE FOR
BITSIOS

REF: ATHENS 8448

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM STSC0
1. WE ARE NOT SURPRISED BY BITSIOS' NEGATIVE REACTION TO
THE TURKISH DRAFT PRINCIPLES. YOU WILL RECALL THAT HE
WAS GIVEN THE HARDER TURKISH TEXT SO AS TO BETTER APPRE-
CIATE OUR SUGGESTED MODIFICATIONS. NOW THAT BITSIOS HAS
LET OFF STEAM, BELIEVE KUBITSCH SHOULD ENGAGE HIM IN DIS-
CUSSION OF PRINCIPLES AND TRY TO OBTAIN AN OFFICIAL GREEK
POSITION WHICH WE COULD TRY TO RECONCILE WITH TURKISH
POSITION. IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF THIS COULD BE DONE BEFORE
MAKARIOS AND GREEKS HAVE ADOPTED FINAL NEGOTIATING POSITION
IN ATHENS. WE ARE SUBMITTING RE: ON FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION
AND APPROVAL SUGGESTED DRAFT TELEGRAM TO ATHENS (INFN
ANKARA AND NICOSIA) INSTRUCTING KUBITSCH TO APPROACH
BITSIOS WITH A SLIGHTLY REVISED FORMULATION ON PRINCIPLES.

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2. BEGIN TEXT OF TELEGRAM: FYI: YOU SHOULD AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY, PREFERABLY BEFORE MAKARIOS CONSULTATIONS IN ATHENS HAVE REACHED FINAL STAGE, RENEW DISCUSSION WITH BITSIGIS ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES. STATUS OF PRINCIPLES IS AS FOLLOWS.

SUGGESTED US TEXT WAS GIVEN TO MAVROS AND GUNES IN NEW YORK EARLY OCTOBER. MAVROS INDICATED GENERAL ACCEPTANCE BUT SAID HE WOULD REFER PRINCIPLES TO GREEK GOVERNMENT WHICH MADE NO FURTHER COMMENT ON PRINCIPLES SINCE THEY WERE AWAITING MAJOR TURKISH REVISIONS. ON OCTOBER 18, TURKS GAVE US THEIR MUCH REVISED SUGGESTED PRINCIPLES. THESE WERE IMPROVED SOMEWHAT IN ANOTHER TURKISH TEXT DELIVERED OCTOBER 23. WHEN THE SECRETARY SAW BITSIGIS IN ROME ON NOVEMBER 5, BITSIGIS WAS GIVEN OCTOBER 18 TEXT. (THIS WAS SO HE WOULD HAVE TOUGHTEST TURKISH DRAFT IN ORDER TO PERCEIVE ADVANTAGES OF OUR OWN DRAFT.) HE WAS ALSO SHOWN, BUT DID NOT RETAIN, A NEW US PROPOSAL ON PRINCIPLES WHICH HAD BEEN GIVEN TO TURKS NOVEMBER 4. THESE WERE OUR ORIGINAL PRINCIPLES WITH SOME MODIFICATIONS TO ACCOMMODATE TURKISH SUGGESTIONS. ON NOVEMBER 5 ECEVIT AND GUNES MADE SOME PRELIMINARY SUGGESTIONS FOR REVISIONS OF OUR NOVEMBER 4 PRINCIPLES, THE MOST SUBSTANTIVE OF WHICH INVOLVED A CHANGE IN PARAGRAPH 3 TO DETINENT WORDING TO PROVIDE FOR EITHER RETURN OR RESETTLING OF PERSONS ON THE ISLAND. THUS, PREVIOUS TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAD COME CLOSE TO ACCEPTING OUR NOVEMBER 4 PROPOSALS EXCEPT FOR PARAGRAPH 3.

3. IN ORAL MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO BITSIGIS BELOW, WE ARE PROPOSING GREEK CONSIDERATION OF A TEXT WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY OUR NOVEMBER 4 PROPOSALS WITH MINOR CHANGES IN PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5 (BUT NOT MAJOR ONE IN PARAGRAPH 3) TO ACCOMMODATE TURKISH POSITION OF NOVEMBER 5. WE ANTICIPATE THAT BITSIGIS WILL REJECT REFERENCE IN PARAGRAPH ONE TO FEDERAL SYSTEM ON A GEOGRAPHICAL BASIS, AND NEW TURKISH GOVERNMENT WILL PROBABLY WANT CHANGES IN THIS DRAFT, PARTICULARLY RE PARAGRAPH 3. AFTER WE HAVE OFFICIAL GREEK REACTION TO THIS TEXT AND LATER THE REACTION OF NEW TURKISH GOVERNMENT, WE WOULD HOPE TO BE ABLE TO SUGGEST SOME NEW FORMULATIONS THAT WOULD BRIDGE

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THE THEN EXISTING GAP. YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE TO BISSIORS THAT THIS TEXT DOES NOT REPRESENT FORMULATION PREFERRED BY USG BUT IS RATHER AN ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY THE DIFFERENCES OF THE TWO PARTIES SO AS TO FIND A FORMULATION ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH. END FYI.

4. BEGIN ORAL MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO BISSIORS: AMBASSADOR KURISCH HAS REPORTED TO ME ON HIS MEETING WITH YOU NOVEMBER 28 AND ON YOUR CONCERN, WHICH I SHARE, OVER THE FURTHER DELAY IN MY VISIT TO ANKARA TO OBTAIN MOVEMENT ON THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. UNFORTUNATELY, THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN ANKARA HAS NOT YET BECOME SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR TO PERMIT SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS WITH THE NEW TURKISH GOVERNMENT ALONG THE LINES THAT WE DISCUSSED

IN ROME. I INTEND NEVERTHELESS TO RENEW MY EFFORTS WITH THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND NOT LATER THAN DECEMBER 11 WHEN I EXPECT TO SEE THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER IN BRUSSELS.

5. THE COMMENTS YOU MADE TO AMBASSADOR KURISCH REGARDING THE TURKISH PROPOSALS ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF OCTOBER 18 WERE NOT SURPRISING SINCE WE DID NOT EXPECT THEM TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE GREEK GOVERNMENT IN THAT FORM. IN FACT ON THE EVE OF MY INTENDED VISIT TO ANKARA, NOVEMBER 4, WE PRESENTED TO THE THEN TURKISH GOVERNMENT SOME ADDITIONAL PROPOSALS WHICH WE HOPED WOULD HELP MEET SOME OF THE TURKISH CONSIDERATIONS WITHOUT PREJUDGING THE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS. BECAUSE OF THE GOVERNMENTAL CRISIS IN ANKARA AT THAT TIME WE DID NOT OBTAIN A FULL OFFICIAL TURKISH REACTION TO OUR PROPOSALS.

6. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING FROM OUR INITIAL CONTACTS WITH THE NEW TURKISH GOVERNMENT THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO GO FARTHER IN MAKING GESTURES ON CYPRUS IF, AS ENVISAGED, AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED ON A SET OF PRINCIPLES. I AM ASKING AMBASSADOR KURISCH TO GIVE YOU A COPY OF A PROPOSED SET OF PRINCIPLES WHICH I HOPE WILL HELP IDENTIFY THE REMAINING AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT. WE HOPE SOON TO BE ABLE TO DISCUSS THESE PROPOSALS WITH THE NEW TURKISH GOVERNMENT. MEANWHILE I WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING THE

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GREEK GOVERNMENT'S REACTION TO THIS TEXT:

7. IT IS MY HOPE THAT ON THE BASIS OF OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH BOTH GOVERNMENTS IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN AN AGREEMENT ON PRINCIPLES PRIOR TO DISCUSSIONS IN BRUSSELS ON DECEMBER 11. I WISH TO ASSURE YOU THAT I WILL DO EVERYTHING I CAN TO HELP IN THIS PROCESS AND IN OBTAINING FROM THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT MEANINGFUL GESTURES THAT WILL MOVE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD TOWARD A SETTLEMENT SATISFACTORY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF GREECE. END MESSAGE TO ATHENS.

8. THE PROPOSED TEXT ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES IS AS FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT: CLERIDES AND DENKTASH WOULD AGREE TO BEGIN DISCUSSION ON THE CYPRUS PROBLEM WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE FOLLOWING SET OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES:

1- THE PARTIES WILL AGREE TO NEGOTIATE CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FEDERAL SYSTEM ON A GEOGRAPHICAL BASIS TO BE DEFINED BY THE PARTIES AND ON THE BASIS OF A CENTRAL GOVERNMENT THAT WILL ENSURE THE INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS AND WILL PROVIDE THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE TWO COMMUNITIES CAN LIVE TOGETHER IN PEACE AND HARMONY.

2. THE PARTIES WILL DISCUSS TERRITORIAL ARRANGEMENTS ACCEPTABLE TO THE TWO COMMUNITIES.

3. THE PARTIES WILL DISCUSS THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH REFUGEES SHOULD RETURN TO THEIR HOMES IN SAFETY AND UNDER WHICH FREE CIRCULATION OF PERSONS ON THE ISLAND MAY BE ASSURED, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SYSTEM ENVISAGED IN PARAGRAPH 1.

4. THE PARTIES WILL AGREE THAT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF AN AGREED SETTLEMENT PROVIDING FOR PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE ISLAND, MEASURES WILL BE TAKEN FOR THE TIMELY PHASED REDUCTIONS, WITH THE AIM OF WITHDRAWAL, OF THE NUMBER OF

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ARMED FORCES, MILITARY PERSONNEL, AND AMOUNTS OF ARMAMENTS, MUNITIONS AND OTHER WAR MATERIEL IN THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS.

5. THE PARTIES WILL DISCUSS ARRANGEMENTS AIMED AT THE ESTABLISHMENT AND PRESERVATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE ISLAND AND WHICH WILL ENSURE THE INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS. SUCH ARRANGEMENTS MIGHT INCLUDE INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES. END TEXT. INGERSOLL

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E.O. 12858, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES SW 9/26/02
BY HR, NARA, DATE 2/4/03

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, XO, UK
SUBJECT: BRITISH POSITION ON ARMS LIMITATION INITIATIVES
IN INDIAN OCEAN

1. BRITISH HAVE NOW PROVIDED US WITH TEXT OF STATEMENT
ON INDIAN OCEAN THEY PROPOSE TO MAKE IN PARLIAMENT
DECEMBER 3 (WHICH YOU MAY HAVE RECEIVED THROUGH OTHER
CHANNEL). RELEVANT PASSAGE READS AS FOLLOWS:

"GIVEN THE EFFECTS OF THESE DECISIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
AREA AND THE SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE THERE, WE HAVE DECIDED
TO AGREE TO PROPOSALS FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
FOR A RELATIVELY MODEST EXPANSION OF THE FACILITIES ON
THE ISLAND OF DIEGO GARCIA WHICH THEY ENJOY, JOINTLY
WITH US, UNDER AN EXISTING AGREEMENT WITH HER MAJESTY'S
GOVERNMENT. THEIR USE OF THE FACILITIES OTHER THAN FOR
ROUTINE PURPOSES WILL HOWEVER BE A MATTER FOR JOINT
DECISION OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. WE AND THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT HAVE ALSO AGREED TO PURSUE CONSULTATIONS WITH





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THE AIM OF DEVELOPING REALISTIC PROGRESS TOWARDS ARMS
LIMITATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN."

2. THIS TEXT REPRESENTS A SUBSTANTIAL RETREAT FROM
THEIR EARLIER AVOWED INTENTION OF ENDORSING AUSTRALIAN
CALL FOR BILATERAL US-SOVIET RESTRAINTS IN INDIAN OCEAN
AREA. THE LAST SENTENCE, HOWEVER, GOES BEYOND
YOUR GUIDANCE. AUTHORIZING US TO ASK BRITISH TO
CONFINE THEMSELVES TO STATING SIMPLY THEY ARE IN CON-
SULTATION WITH USG AND TO AVOID ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT ON
JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF AN ARMS CONTROL APPROACH. THEREFORE,
WITH YOUR CONCURRENCE, WE WILL ASK BRITS TO MODIFY LAST
SENTENCE IN PROPOSED STATEMENT TO READ "WE ALSO INTEND
TO ENTER INTO CONSULTATIONS WITH THE USG TO EXPLORE
THE POSSIBILITIES FOR ARMS RESTRAINT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
AREA."

3. REQUEST YOUR GUIDANCE. INGERSOLL

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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS ON VLADIVOSTOK SUMMIT FOR YOUR
APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE AND HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEES
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SONNENFELDT

INTRODUCTION

—TURNING TO THE PRESIDENT'S MEETINGS WITH GENERAL SECRETARY
BREZHNEV IN VLADIVOSTOK, THEIR PRIMARY PURPOSE WAS TO
MAINTAIN THE CONSTRUCTIVE AND MUTUALLY-BENEFICIAL COURSE
IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS WHICH HAS EVOLVED DURING
THE PAST FEW YEARS.

—SHORTLY AFTER PRESIDENT FORD ENTERED INTO OFFICE, HE
ENTERED INTO CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE GENERAL SECRETARY TO

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CONFIRM OUR COUNTRY'S ADHERENCE TO THE COURSE OF POLICY ESTABLISHED IN THE RECENT PAST AND TO ELICIT A SIMILAR CONFIRMATION FROM THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP.

--AT THE LAST SUMMIT MEETING IN MOSCOW BETWEEN PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY, IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT SUMMIT MEETINGS NEED NOT BE CONFINED TO ANNUAL OFFICIAL VISITS, BUT COULD INCLUDE ADDITIONAL "WORKING" VISITS AS WELL. DURING CONVERSATIONS HERE IN WASHINGTON, IT WAS AGREED THAT SUCH AN EARLY WORKING MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV WOULD BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE. IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PLANNED TRIP TO THE FAR EAST WOULD PROVIDE SUCH AN OPPORTUNITY.

--THE FINAL ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE DURING MY TRIP TO MOSCOW IN OCTOBER.

SALT

--DURING MY VISIT TO MOSCOW, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE DEADLOCK THAT HAD EXISTED FOR SOME TIME CONCERNING A NEW AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION MIGHT BE BROKEN IN A FACE-TO-FACE MEETING AT THE SUMMIT. --WE HAD BEEN ATTEMPTING SINCE THE FIRST SALT AGREEMENTS

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IN 1972 -- FREEZING ABM DEPLOYMENTS AND LIMITING OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC WEAPONS FOR AN INTERIM PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS -- TO DEVELOP A SET OF LONGER TERM AND MORE COMPREHENSIVE LIMITATIONS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. BUT IT HAD BEEN DIFFICULT GOING.

--THE STRATEGIC FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES ARE COMPOSED OF DIFFERING WEAPONS SYSTEMS OF DIFFERING SIZES DUE TO THE NATIONAL DECISIONS OF THE TWO SIDES. TO LIMIT THEM SO THAT EACH SIDE WOULD HAVE ITS ESSENTIAL SECURITY INTERESTS PROTECTED AND A BASIC EQUALITY BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WOULD BE ASSURED PROVED A TASK OF ENORMOUS COMPLEXITY.

--IT WAS CLEAR TO PRESIDENT FORD WHEN HE ASSUMED OFFICE THAT IF WE FAILED TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT IN THIS CRUCIAL AREA IN THE FAIRLY NEAR FUTURE, MAJOR NEW DECISIONS CONCERNING OUR STRATEGIC FORCES WOULD BE REQUIRED. FOR IT WAS A FACT THAT SIGNIFICANT SOVIET PROGRAMS WERE IN PROGRESS, IN THE AREAS OF BOTH LAND-BASED AND SEA-BASED MISSILES.

WHILE IN SOME RESPECTS THESE PROGRAMS WERE DESIGNED TO GIVE THE USSR CAPABILITIES WHICH WE ALREADY POSSESSED, IN OTHER WAYS THEY APPEARED INTENDED TO PROVIDE THE USSR

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WITH SIGNIFICANT ADDITIONAL STRENGTH IN THE YEARS FOLLOWING THE EXPIRATION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IN 1977.

OBVIOUSLY, THE U.S. COULD NOT PERMIT THIS TO HAPPEN WITHOUT RESPONSE.

IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE COURSE OF DETENTE AND INTERNATIONAL RESTRAINT ON WHICH WE WERE ENHARKED WOULD BE PLACED UNDER ENORMOUS STRAIN IF THE GROWTH OF STRATEGIC FORCES COULD NOT BE BROUGHT UNDER FURTHER CONTROL.

THUS, IN THE MONTHS SINCE THE PRESIDENT ENTERED OFFICE WE HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN OUR GOVERNMENT IN THE MOST INTENSIVE EXAMINATION OF ALL POSSIBLE WAYS OF CURBING THE STRATEGIC ARMS COMPETITION IN A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE MANNER.

INTENSIVE EXPLORATIONS WERE SIMULTANEOUSLY GOING FORWARD WITH THE SOVIET UNION, BOTH IN THE REGULAR SALT NEGOTIATION FORUM IN GENEVA AND THROUGH THE PRESIDENT'S PRIVATE CHANNEL WITH MR. BREZHNEV.

MY TALKS IN MOSCOW LAST MONTH GAVE THIS PROCESS ADDED MOMENTUM.

THE ISSUES WERE SUFFICIENTLY NARROWED BY THE TIME

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THE PRESIDENT SET OUT FOR HIS TRIP SO THAT THERE WAS REASON TO HOPE THAT A BREAKTHROUGH MIGHT BE ACHIEVED IN VLADIVOSTOK.

--AS YOU ALREADY KNOW, THIS HOPE WAS JUSTIFIED.

--I OBVIOUSLY CANNOT SPECULATE IN DETAIL ABOUT THE JUDGMENTS AND MOTIVATIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP.

--BUT IT SEEMS REASONABLE TO SAY THAT IN MOSCOW, TOO, THERE WAS A GROWING REALIZATION THAT A NEW EQUITABLE AGREEMENT WAS NEEDED IF THE COMPETITION WAS NOT TO BE DRIVEN TO A NEW PEAK OF INTENSITY AND ECONOMIC COSTS; AND IF THAT WERE TO HAPPEN, THE COURSE OF RELATIONS ESTABLISHED IN RECENT YEARS WOULD BE IN SERIOUS JEOPARDY.

--THUS, IN VLADIVOSTOK IT WAS POSSIBLE TO AGREE ON THE BASIC LIMITATIONS THAT WILL GOVERN THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP UNTIL 1985.

--WE AGREED ON AN OVERALL EQUAL CEILING ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES AT A LEVEL OF BLANK STRATEGIC LAUNCHERS.

--WE AGREED ON A SEPARATE EQUAL CEILING OF BLANK FOR MISSILES THAT MAY BE EQUIPPED WITH MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE RE-ENTRY VEHICLES (MIRVs).

--THE SOVIETS HAVE DROPPED THEIR INSISTENCE THAT THEY

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RECEIVE COMPENSATION FOR U.S. FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS OR
THE NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES OF THIRD COUNTRIES.
-THESE ARE THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE TREATY WE NOW
EXPECT TO NEGOTIATE IN DETAIL OVER THE COMING MONTHS.
--I DO NOT MEAN TO MINIMIZE THE DIFFICULTIES THAT REMAIN.
-THE TECHNICAL ISSUES, ESPECIALLY THOSE RELATED TO
VERIFYING THE LIMITATIONS ON MIRVED MISSILES, ARE COMPLEX.
-BUT WE HAVE DONE A GREAT DEAL OF DETAILED WORK ON
THEM WITHIN OUR GOVERNMENT AND BELIEVE THEY ARE SOLVABLE
THROUGH THE SAME PROCESS OF GIVE-AND-TAKE NEGOTIATIONS
THAT BROUGHT US TO THE FUNDAMENTAL ACHIEVEMENT IN
VLADIVOSTOK.
OTHER ISSUES--THE MIDDLE EAST.
--WHILE THE PRESIDENT'S DISCUSSIONS CONCENTRATED ON SAULT,
THEY ALSO RANGED WIDELY OVER ALL THE MAJOR ISSUES THAT
ENGAGE THE INTERESTS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES. ARMS CONTROL
AGREEMENTS CAN BE OF LASTING BENEFIT ONLY IF CRITICAL
INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS ARE APPROACHED IN A SPIRIT OF
CONCILIATION, RESPECT FOR THE INTERESTS OF ALL CONCERNED
AND MUTUAL RESTRAINT.
--IT WAS ON THIS BASIS THAT WE DISCUSSED THE MIDDLE EAST

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PROBLEM. WHILE WE DID NOT AGREE IN ALL RESPECTS, WE HAD A FULL AND FRANK EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. BOTH SIDES RECOGNIZE THE DANGERS OF THE SITUATION AND AGREE THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO CONSULT AND WORK TOWARD A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE AREA. WE DO NOT OPPOSE THE GENEVA CONFERENCE AND HAVE ALWAYS AGREED THAT IT SHOULD BE RECONVENED AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME. AS REGARDS THE PALESTINIANS, THE ISSUE IS NOT WHETHER THEIR INTERESTS SHOULD BE WOVEN INTO THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS BUT HOW THIS CAN BE DONE EFFECTIVELY.

THE TRADE BILL

--THE SOVIETS, OF COURSE, REMAIN ANXIOUS TO RECEIVE WHAT THEY TERM "NON-DISCRIMINATORY" TREATMENT IN OUR TRADE RELATIONS. THE PRESIDENT CONFIRMED THE COMMITMENT OF THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION TO SEEK MFN TREATMENT FOR THE USSR AND TO SEEK PASSAGE OF THE TRADE BILL TO THIS END.

--ALTHOUGH BREZHNEV SHOWED CONSIDERABLE SENSITIVITY OVER TREATMENT OF THE EMIGRATION ISSUE, HE REPEATED SOVIET ASSURANCES THAT CITIZENS DESIRING TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION WILL BE ALLOWED TO DO SO.

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--CONCERNING THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE IN GENEVA, THE SOVIETS PRESSED FOR AN EARLY CONCLUSION TO THE CONFERENCE AND SUGGESTED INITIALLY JANUARY 1 OR JANUARY 15.

--WE REPLIED THAT JANUARY POTENTIALLY WAS INFEASIBLE, BUT WITH MAJOR EFFORT BY ALL AND A WILL TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING ISSUES, CONCLUSION IN SPRING MIGHT BE ENVISAGED.

--WE WILL BE CONSULTING CLOSELY WITH ALLIES FOLLOWING THE CURRENT ROUND OF EAST-WEST AND INTRA-WESTERN HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS TO CONSIDER HOW AND WHEN BEST TO BRING CONFERENCE TO A CONCLUSION. INGERSON

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: ODDS AND ENDS
FOR BREMER FROM EAGLEBURGER

1. RE YOUR SECTO 236, YOUR ASSUMPTION IS CORRECT. SCHMIDT AND GENSCHER WILL BOTH BE INCLUDED.
2. HARTMAN CAN'T MAKE THE PASENTI DINNER HERE. I WILL WORK OUT A REPRESENTATIVE -- PERHAPS SISCO.
3. RE YOUR SECTO 243, WE WILL BEGIN TOMORROW VIA BACKGROUND TO GET WORD OUT ON THE UNDOF RENEWAL.
4. ALSO RE SECTO 243, IF HAK HAS RAISED THE SLACK REQUEST, THAT'S ALL I'M WORRIED ABOUT.
5. AND FINALLY ALSO RE SECTO 243, ON THE CHILDREN'S TRAVEL, YOU WILL NOW HAVE SEEN MY REPORT ON WHAT TRANSPIRED. I INTEND IN THE NEXT FEW SENTENCES TO BE EVEN MORE BLUNT AND IF YOU WANT TO PASS IT TO THE SECRETARY YOU MAY DO SO. IF I HAVE ONE RESPONSIBILITY WHICH IS UNLIKE

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THAT OF OTHERS IN THIS DEPARTMENT, IT IS TO PROTECT HENRY KISSINGER FROM THE SLIGHTEST HINT OF WRONGDOING. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN THE AFTERMATH OF WATERGATE. WE HAVE CHECKED THE REGULATIONS THOROUGHLY AND IT IS ABSOLUTELY

CLEAR THAT WHILE THE AIR TRANSPORTATION FOR MRS. KISSINGER CAN BE BORNE BY THE GOVERNMENT, THAT OF THE CHILDREN CANNOT. THIS ISSUE CAME UP AT THE TIME OF THE TRIP TO MOSCOW AND THE SECRETARY WAS INFORMED OF THE FACT AT THAT TIME. IT WAS EQUALLY CLEAR TO ME AND TO THE PRESS PEOPLE YESTERDAY, GIVEN THE NUMBER OF QUESTIONS INDEPENDENTLY RAISED BY VARIOUS NEWSPAPERS, THAT THERE WAS AT LEAST A SUBSTANTIAL CHANCE THAT SOMEONE THROUGH VARIOUS SOURCES WAS ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH THAT THE SECRETARY WAS VIOLATING GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS BY TAKING HIS CHILDREN TO PEKING. THUS, TO ME AT LEAST, THE NECESSARY RESPONSE WAS CLEAR AND I TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR AUTHORIZING THE PRESS SPOKESMAN TO MAKE THE STATEMENT HE DID. I CONSIDER IT THE PROPER JUDGMENT, A JUDGMENT I WOULD MAKE AGAIN TOMORROW, AND ONE WHICH NOT ONLY NEED NOT HAVE BEEN REFERRED TO THE SECRETARY BUT WOULD HAVE BEEN EMBARRASSING TO HAVE REFERRED TO HIM. IT IS ONE CASE IN WHICH I RESENT SECOND GUESSING SINCE THE ENTIRE PURPOSE OF MY DECISION WAS TO AVOID EMBARRASSMENT TO THE SECRETARY AND CHARGES OF PECULATION AGAINST HIM. NOR DOES THE FACT THAT THE SECRETARY CLEARED WITH THE PRESIDENT TAKING HIS CHILDREN ON THIS TRIP IN ANY WAY CHANGE THE IMPACT OF THE REGULATIONS. THIS IS A PROBLEM THAT WAS RAISED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NIXON CHILDREN EARLIER; THE WHITE HOUSE AT THAT TIME MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT PRESIDENT NIXON HAD PAID FOR THE TRAVEL OF HIS CHILDREN OUT OF HIS PERSONAL FUNDS. NONE OF THIS IS INTENDED TO GO TO THE MERITS OF THE CASE, SINCE I CONSIDER THE REGULATION ABSURD. THE PLANE IS THERE, THE SEATS ARE THERE AND IN ANY RATIONAL WORLD THE CHILDREN SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO TRAVEL AT NO COST. THIS, HOWEVER, PARTICULARLY THESE DAYS, IS NOT A RATIONAL WORLD. INGERSOLL

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NODIS
 CHEROKEE TOSEC 603

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH DINITZ

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM EAGLEBURGER

1. SIMCHA HAS COME IN TO SEE ME TO BLFED PROFUSELY ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO RABIN. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE REACTIONS WERE HIS OWN AND THAT HE COULD NOT AT THIS POINT PREDUCT WHAT OFFICIAL REACTION THERE MIGHT BE.

2. BEFORE GIVING YOU A REPORT ON DINITZ' VIEWS ON THE LETTER, HOWEVER, I SHOULD TELL YOU THAT HE, AT THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION, TURNED TO THE QUESTION OF LASER GUIDED BOMBS. HE SAID THE ISRAELIS ARE STILL WAITING TO SEE HOW MANY THEY WILL RECEIVE, WHAT KIND THEY WILL GET, AND WHEN THEY WILL GET THEM. HE HAS, HE SAID, DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH SCHLESINGER, WHO TOLD HIM THAT HE "NEEDED GUIDANCE FROM THE WHITE HOUSE." OFF THE RECORD, DINITZ ALSO SAID THAT SCHLESINGER TOLD HIM THAT THERE WAS "NO AVAILABILITY PROBLEM" SO FAR AS THE PENTAGON WAS CONCERNED. THAT IS,

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THE LASER GUIDED BOMBS WERE AVAILABLE, TRANSFER TO ISRAEL WOULD CAUSE NO SHORTFALLS IN DOD'S INVENTORY, AND THE PENTAGON WAS READY TO MOVE THEM AS SOON AS THEY WERE TOLD TO DO SO. ALSO ACCORDING TO DINITZ SCHLESINGER SAID ALL HE

NEEDED NOW WAS A GREEN LIGHT FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT.

SCHLESINGER ALSO TOLD DINITZ, ACCORDING TO THE LATTER, THAT IF THE ISRAELIS COULD NOT GET AN OK FROM THE WHITE HOUSE, HE (DINITZ) OUGHT TO TALK TO STSC0 AND GET HIM TO CALL THE PENTAGON GIVING AN OK TO MOVE THE BOMBS. I HAVE DISCUSSED ALL THIS WITH BRENT.

3. NOW TO THE PRESIDENTIAL LETTER. FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE POINTS DINITZ MADE TO ME:

(A) THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT KNOW NOR UNDERSTAND ISRAELI AND ISRAELI PROBLEMS. THIS LETTER IS A CULMINATION OF A SERIES OF REMARKS AND ACTIONS THAT MAKE THAT CLEAR. (OTHER EXAMPLES: THE STATEMENT ON THE PLO; THE PRESIDENT'S INTERVIEW IN US NEWS IN WHICH HE SAID UNLESS THERE IS MOVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST THERE WOULD BE ANOTHER EMBARGO.)

(B) THE LETTER COULD NOT HAVE BEEN WRITTEN BY THE PRESIDENT ALONE; YOU MUST HAVE BEEN INVOLVED. IN ANY EVENT, SIMCHA SAID HE COULD NOT BELIEVE THAT THE LETTER WOULD HAVE BEEN SENT WITHOUT YOUR KNOWLEDGE.

(C) IN EVERY SENSE THIS LETTER WAS UNNECESSARY, BUT OF A PIECE WITH PREVIOUS TACTICS. THAT IS EVERY TIME YOU MADE A VISIT TO THE AREA OR A HIGH ISRAELI OFFICIAL CAME HERE SOME WAY WAS FOUND TO GIVE THE ISRAELIS A "REMINDER" THAT THEY MUST BEHAVE THEMSELVES.

(D) THE LETTER IS UNNECESSARY BECAUSE ISRAEL HAS ALWAYS DONE WHAT YOU HAVE ASKED. IN THE PARTICULAR CASE OF ALON'S UPCOMING VISIT HE (DINITZ) HAD BEEN VERY HOPEFUL THAT ALON WOULD BRING MEANINGFUL PROPOSALS WITH HIM. NOW, AS A RESULT OF THIS LETTER, DINITZ IS LESS CERTAIN OF WHAT ALON WILL SAY WHEN HE GETS HERE.

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(E) IF THE ISRAELIS HAVE LEARNED NOTHING ELSE FROM HENRY KISSINGER, THEY HAVE LEARNED THAT IT IS NOT WISE TO ACT UNDER PRESSURE. DINITZ' VIEW IS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER CAN BE SEEN AS NOTHING BUT A MESSAGE OF PRESSURE.

(F) THE CHARGES CONTAINED IN THE LETTER OF ISRAELI FAILURE TO ACT ON JORDAN ARE THE CONTINUATION OF A "MYTH." THE ISRAELIS HAD CARRIED ON SECRET NEGOTIATIONS WITH KING HUSSEIN. THEY WERE NOT, HOWEVER, PREPARED TO ACCEPT HUSSEIN'S UNREALISTIC DEMANDS.

(G) THE LETTER IS, UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, NOT THE WAY TO ADDRESS A FRIENDLY COUNTRY AND THE URGE THAT ALON COME PREPARED TO OFFER SOMETHING IS EXTREME. DINITZ TOOK PARTICULAR EXCEPTION TO THE SENTENCE "SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD TOLD YOU ENOUGH ABOUT PRESIDENT SADAT'S VIEWS THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR YOU NOW TO KNOW WHAT THE ISSUES WILL BE AND HOW THEY MIGHT BE DEALT WITH IN WAYS THAT WILL PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES." THAT SENTENCE, TO SIMCHA, WAS A STATEMENT THAT ISRAEL MUST ADAPT TO SADAT'S DEMANDS, AND MUST DO SO WITHOUT KNOWING WHAT SADAT IS PREPARED TO GIVE IN RETURN.

(G) ON THE ISSUE OF MOBILIZATION, DINITZ ARGUED THAT THE US GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN INFORMED ON THURSDAY EVENING AT THE TIME THE MOBILIZATION WAS TAKING PLACE AND THAT THE US WAS THE FIRST TO KNOW OF THIS ACTION. THE MOBILIZATION WAS NOT TAKEN WITH ANY POLITICAL MOTIVATION IN MIND BUT RATHER IN RESPONSE TO INDICATIONS OF A SYRIAN ALERT, SOVIET MOVES, ETC. ON THE QUESTION OF PRIOR CONSULTATION BEFORE ANY FURTHER MOBILIZATION, SIMCHA SAID THAT HE REALLY WONDERED WHETHER THAT WAS A WISE DEMAND ON OUR PART. SHOULD ISRAEL CONSULT WITH US AND WE DISAGREE WITH THE MOBILIZATION, WHICH IN TURN WAS FOLLOWED BY AN ARAB ATTACK OF THE VARIETY OF OCTOBER 1973, THE US WOULD BE IN AN EXTREMELY AWKWARD POSITION.

(I) FINALLY, DINITZ SAID THAT HE HAD GONE OUT OF HIS WAY AFTER HIS MEETING WITH YOU IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO YOUR DEPARTURE TO STATE PUBLICLY THAT YOU HAD RECEIVED ASSUR-

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ANCES THAT THERE WOULD BE NO ARAB ATTACK. HE HAD DONE THIS IN AN ATTEMPT TO HELP YOU COOL A DIFFICULT POLITICAL SITUATION IN WHICH THERE WAS A POTENTIAL FOR CHARGES THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD GONE ON HIS TRIP TO JAPAN IN THE FACE OF A TENSE AND UNSTABLE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT AS A RESULT OF HIS PUBLIC STATEMENT,

----- HE HAS BEEN HEAVILY CRITICIZED BOTH BY THE ISRAELI PRESS AND HIS OWN GOVERNMENT IN THE LATTER CASE. JERUSALEM HAS ASKED HIM WHY HE SHOULD BE REPEATING ARAB ASSURANCES TO YOU RATHER THAN YOU YOURSELF PUBLICIZING THOSE ASSURANCES.

4. I WILL NOT BORE YOU WITH THE DETAILS OF MY RESPONSE TO DINITZ EXCEPT ON TWO POINTS. WITH REGARD TO THE OBJECTION TO THE SENTENCE QUOTED ABOVE ABOUT THE ISRAELIS KNOWING SADAT'S VIEWS, I SAID I THOUGHT DINITZ' READING OF

THE SENTENCE WAS TOTALLY DISTORTED. CLEARLY THE PURPOSE OF THAT SENTENCE HAD BEEN NO MORE THAN TO POINT OUT TO THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY KNEW IN DETAIL WHAT THE EGYPTIANS

VIEWS WERE ON THE CRITICAL ISSUES AND WHERE THE DEBATE WAS LIKELY TO FOCUS. THE SENTENCE DID NOT ASK THAT ISRAEL ACCOMMODATE TO ALL EGYPTIAN DEMANDS; IT DOES ASK THAT THE ISRAELIS GIVE CONSIDERATION TO THE ISSUES THEY WILL INEVITABLY ARISE AND TO METHODS OF HANDLING THEM THAT WILL PROTECT BOTH ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN INTERESTS.

ON THE QUESTION OF MOBILIZATION, I SAID THAT SIMCHA HAD TOTALLY MISSED THE POINT. TO HAVE TOLD US AT THE TIME THE MOBILIZATION WAS TAKING PLACE THAT IT WAS IN FACT UNDERWAY WAS IN EFFECT TO GIVE US NO MORE WARNING THAN THEY WERE GIVING THE SYRIANS WHO INEVITABLY WOULD KNOW ABOUT THE MOBILIZATION AS SOON AS IT BEGAN. THE ISSUE IS -- AS THE LETTER MAKES CLEAR -- THAT PRIOR DISCUSSION WITH US MEANS PRECISELY WHAT IT SAYS: DISCUSSING THE SUBJECT WITH US BEFORE THE STEPS ARE IN FACT TAKEN.

5. COMMENT: IT HAS REACHED THE POINT NOW WHERE EVERY TIME THE ISRAELIS FEEL PUT UPON, DINITZ COMES TO CRY ON MY SHOULDER. IT MAY BE -- IN FACT I SUSPECT -- THAT HE

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FEELS HE CAN SAY THINGS TO ME, WHICH I WILL REPORT TO YOU, WHICH HE CANNOT SAY FACE TO FACE. SIMCHA EMPHASIZED THAT THESE COMMENTS WERE HIS OWN AND THAT HE WAS UNDER NO INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS OWN GOVERNMENT. NEVERTHELESS, WITH THE PENCHANT HIS BETTERS HAVE FOR TAKING UMBRAGE WHENEVER THEY THINK IT SUITS THEIR PURPOSES, I SUSPECT THAT WE CAN EXPECT A FAIRLY STIFF REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER. SIMCHA SWEARS TO ME THAT HE HAS SENT NONE OF THE COMMENTS HE MADE TO ME BACK TO JERUSALEM. I HAVE MY DOUBTS. INGERSOLL

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