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TELEGRAM

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WH-LOX

Control: 3794Q

Received: December 16, 1974 521PM

O 161955Z DEC 74
FM DR KISSINGER
TO RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE
BT

ACTION COPY

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

E O 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY TO JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER

ACTION: AMEMBASSY TOKYO - IMMEDIATE

INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC - IMMEDIATE

SECTO 22

PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER PROMPTLY:

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. FOREIGN MINISTER:

IN THE LIGHT OF THE RECENT DISCUSSION WHICH THE PRESIDENT AND I HAD WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT ON THE ENERGY PROBLEM I WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT I BELIEVE WE HAVE REACHED A SATISFACTORY UNDERSTANDING WITH THE FRENCH DURING OUR MARTINIQUE MEETINGS ON A SEQUENCE OF STEPS INVOLVING CONSUMER SOLIDARITY AND LEADING TO CAREFUL PREPARATION OF A CONSUMER/PRODUCER MEETING. WE ASSURED THE FRENCH THAT WE WILL DO OUR UTMOST TO ACHIEVE THE NECESSARY PROGRESS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE TASKS AND

D BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL LIKEWISE BE COOPERATIVE. AMONG THE CONSUMERS WE WILL WORK IN THE IEA AND THE G-10 TO DEVELOP COMMON PROGRAMS ON ENERGY CONSERVATION, ALTERNATIVE SOURCES AND FINANCIAL SOLIDARITY. SINCE THE FRENCH WILL EVIDENTLY NOT BE JOINING THE IEA (AND WE DID NOT PRESS THEM TO DO SO), WE WILL HAVE TO FIND MEANS TO ASSURE COORDINATION WITH THEIR PARELLEL ACTIVITIES. THEY ARE PREPARED TO DO THIS.

I KNOW THAT WE CAN COUNT ON YOUR SUPPORT IN THIS DIFFICULT PROCESS OF MOLDING CONSUMER SOLIDARITY WHICH IS THE ESSENTIAL PRECONDITION FOR A SUCCESSFUL PRODUCER/CONSUMER DIALOGUE.

BEST REGARDS,
HENRY A. KISSINGER

END TEXT

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#0306

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O 170920Z DEC 74

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6787

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Control: 3907Q

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 16405

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP JA PFOR (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJ: LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY TO JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER

REF: SECTO MSG 161955Z DEC 74

1. MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY KISSINGER TO FOREIGN MINISTER MIYAZAWA CONTAINED REPTL WAS DELIVERED BY POL COUNS TO FOREIGN OFFICE (DINGEN FOR AMERICAN AFFAIRS YAMAZAKI) EARLY AFTERNOON DECEMBER 17. YAMAZAKI ASSURED PROMPT CONVEYANCE TO FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO WAS ABSENT FROM MINISTRY IN DIET SESSION. WE ASKED THAT MESSAGE BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL PENDING DEPARTMENT'S INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING PUBLIC RELEASE. HE ASSURED US THIS WOULD BE DONE.

2. APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S GUIDANCE FOR FONOFF REGARDING PUBLIC RELEASE OF SUBSTANCE OF SECRETARY'S MESSAGE.
HODGSON

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66 8/31/01





Department of State

TELEGRAM

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O 190857Z DEC 74
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6844

CONTROL: 4 4 2 5 Q

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 TOKYO 16543

NODIS

DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO REPEAT TO EMBASSY PHNOM PENH

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, JA, CB, UN
SUBJECT: FONOFF VIEWS ON KHMER QUESTION

REF: A. STATE 276599 B. PHNOM PENH 16528

1. SUMMARY: DURING DISCUSSION WITH FONOFF OF KHMER ISSUES, FIRST SE ASIA DIV DIRECTOR HANABUSA EMPHASIZED THAT MOMENTUM ACHIEVED IN UNGA MUST BE MAINTAINED. TASKS AHEAD ARE PRESERVATION AND EXPANSION OF LIMITED "NON ALIGNED" SUPPORT FOR MODERATE POSITION ON KHMER AND SPELLING OUT OPTION TO GRUNK TO CONTINUING MILITARY STRUGGLE. WHILE LEAVING INTERNAL SETTLEMENT TO KHMER, PRIMARY TWO ELEMENTS OF OPTION ARE DEPARTURE OF LON NUL FROM GOVERNMENT AND US AGREEMENT TO TERMINATE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO OKR AS PART OF OVERALL SETTLEMENT OF KHMER ISSUE. UNDER MILITARY STALEMATE AND WITH DOOR TO POWER THROUGH UN STILL DENIED TO GRUNK, KHMER COMMUNISTS MIGHT CHOOSE OPTION TO NEGOTIATE SETTLEMENT. FONOFF ANXIOUS TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS ON KHMER WITH USG. END SUMMARY.

2. PRIOR TO RECEIVING REF A, FONOFF FIRST SE ASIA DIVISION DIRECTOR HANABUSA DISCUSSED KHMER QUESTION IN DEPTH WITH EMOFF. JUST RETURNED FROM VISIT TO MANILA, BANGKOK, AND PHNOM PENH (REF B), HANABUSA EXPRESSED STRONG PERSONAL BELIEF THAT MOMENTUM ON KHMER QUESTION MUST BE MAINTAINED TO DEMONSTRATE GOOD FAITH BEHIND SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS DURING 29TH

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TELEGRAM

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UNGA.

3. AS INITIAL STEP, HANABUSA INFORMALLY SOUNDED OUT FONOFFS DURING MANILA, BANGKOK AND PHNOM PENH VISITS, IN ADDITION TO DISCUSSION WITH INDOONESIAN EMBASSY MINISTER JENIE IN TOKYO, ON DESIRABILITY OF MAINTAINING CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM SIMILAR TO ASIAN WORKING GROUP AT UN. HANABUSA FOUND PHILS, THAIS AND INDOONESIANS INTERESTED AND TENTATIVE CONSENSUS AMONG THEM POINTS TO SECRET, AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL GROUP IN JAKARTA. GROUP WOULD INCLUDE ASEANS, NEW ZEALAND, AUSTRALIA, AND JAPAN (NO MENTION OF US). THAIS PREFER THAT ASEAN NOT BE OUT FRONT ON KHMER SINCE IT WOULD FURTHER INCUR CHINESE AND NORTH VIETNAMESE ENMITY TOWARDS ASEAN. HANABUSA SAID ALL PROBABLE PARTICIPANTS IN CONSULTATIVE GROUP PREFERRED SAFETY OF NUMBERS, AS "ASIAN BLOC". GOJ FONOFF IS STILL DISCUSSING IDEA AND MAY FORMALLY PROPOSE CONSULTATIVE GROUP TO ASEANS PRIOR TO ASEAN VICE MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR JANUARY. HANABUSA ENVISAGES GROUP WOULD BE FORUM FOR EXCHANGING IDEAS WITH, AT LEAST AT THIS STAGE, NO PRE-DETERMINED MISSIONS.

4. MOVING TO OVERALL KHMER QUESTION, HANABUSA DESCRIBED TWO REQUIREMENTS WHICH MUST BE ADDRESSED, BOTH OF WHICH HE REGARDS AS ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM OF US-JAPAN-ASEAN MODERATE APPROACH TO KHMER ISSUES: A) FIRST REQUIREMENT: PRESERVE GOOD FAITH WITH NON-ALIGNED WHO SUPPORTED ASEAN RESOLUTION IN 29TH UNGA AND WORK (ESPECIALLY "NON-ALIGNED INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA") TO WEAN OTHERS FROM RADICAL TOWARD MODERATE POSITION. PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE PAID TO SPRING NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE IN LIMA WHICH COULD SERVE AS WATERSHED BOTH ON KHMER ISSUE AND ON PHENOMENON OF UNCRITICAL ACCEPTANCE OF "THIRD WORLD" POSITIONS IN GENERAL BY "NON-ALIGNED." BACK OF LATTER PROBLEM MIGHT BE BROKEN PRECISELY THROUGH THE KHMER ISSUE, SINCE THROUGH 29TH UNGA ACTION MODERATE POSITION ON KHMER GAINED STRENGTH AND SOME RESPECTABILITY WITHIN NON-ALIGNED BLOC. B) SECOND REQUIREMENT TO BE ADDRESSED INVOLVES CLARIFYING TO GRUNK WHAT OPTIONS ARE AVAILABLE TO THEM. SIMPLE DECLARATIONS BY LON NOL THAT GKR IS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE WITHOUT CONDITIONS ARE NO LONGER ADEQUATE. KNOWING MORE CLEARLY OPTIONS AVAILABLE SHOULD CAUSE GRUNK TO RE-THINK SITUATION, AND MIGHT LEAD THEM TO NEGOTIATIONS. WHETHER NEGOTIATIONS RESULTED OR NOT,

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
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HOWEVER, MODERATE POSITION WOULD BE HIGHLY DEFENSIBLE AND SALABLE BOTH DOMESTICALLY (IN JAPAN AND ELSEWHERE) AND WITH NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES. HANABUSA SAID IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT POSSIBILITIES BE CLARIFIED TO GRUNK IN NEXT MONTH OR TWO.

5. HANABUSA DESCRIBED "TWO ESSENTIAL POINTS" TO BE CLARIFIED TO PROVIDE GRUNK CLEAR PICTURE OF OPTION TO CONTINUING MILITARY STRUGGLE: A) LON NOL MUST MAKE KNOWN HIS WILLINGNESS TO STEP DOWN AND MAKE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH HE WOULD STEP DOWN CLEAR. B) US SHOULD MAKE KNOWN TO GRUNK ITS WILLINGNESS TO TERMINATE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GKR AS WELL AS BROAD CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH IT IS WILLING TO DO SO. REGARDING (A), HANABUSA POSTULATED THAT LON NOL MIGHT INDICATE THAT HE WOULD REMOVE HIMSELF FROM GKR TO COINCIDE WITH START OF NEGOTIATIONS AMONG KHMER PARTIES. HANABUSA CLAIMED THAT HE DETECTED THAT BROAD CONSENSUS IN GKR AND KHMER PUBLIC AGREED THAT TIME HAD COME TO NEGOTIATE SETTLEMENT AND THAT LON NOL WOULD HAVE TO GO. OTHER ASIANS, (AND KHMER EXCEPT FOR ONE OR TWO LIKE SON SANN), COULD NOT TELL LON NOL HE MUST GO. ONLY USG COULD AND LON NOL WOULD ACQUIESCE. SOP TO APPEASE LON NOL MIGHT TAKE FORM OF MAINTAINING THE REPUBLIC AT LEAST FOR THE INTERIM. BOTH PRO-KINGDOM ORCES AND PRO-REPUBLIC FORCES COULD SAVE FACE BY AGREEING TO A SUBSEQUENT PLEBISCITE ON KINGDOM/REPUBLIC ISSUE AFTER BASIC MILITARY AND POLITICAL SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATED AND SITUATION IN KHMER SETTLED DOWN.

6. REGARDING (B), HANABUSA SAID AT SAME TIME USG DECLARED WILLINGNESS TO TERMINATE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GKR, US/GKR CONDITIONS FOR MILITARY AID TERMINATION COULD ALSO BE SPELLED OUT: (I.E. US MILITARY ASSISTANCE WOULD TERMINATE A) WHEN CEASEFIRE AGREED TO OR WHEN IT TOOK EFFECT; B) MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GRUNK FROM OTHER POWERS WOULD HAVE TO CEASE OR BE CURTAILED, ETC). IMPORTANT MATTER WAS TO PROVIDE GRUNK A CLEARER IDEA OF WHAT THEY MIGHT EXPECT FROM NEGOTIATIONS. ONE POSSIBLE OUTCOME IS THAT THIS MIGHT LEAD KHMER COMMUNISTS TO FACE CHOICE BETWEEN CONTINUING THE STRUGGLE WITH SIHANOUK OR NEGOTIATING INTO POWER WITH THE REPUBLICANS. HANABUSA THOUGHT IT WOULD BE UNADVISABLE TO TRY DIRECTLY TO CREATE SPLIT BETWEEN SIHANOUK AND KHMER COMMUNISTS,

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
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SINCE ATTEMPT COULD BACKFIRE. AT SAME TIME, IT MUST BE EVIDENT TO KHMER COMMUNISTS THAT SIHANOUK'S PRESTIGE WITH THIRD WORLD FAILED TO INSTALL GRUNK AT UN. IN FACT, ELEMENT OF DEFEAT WAS EFFECTIVENESS OF ARGUMENT THAT GRUNK HEAD OF STATE IS IN EXILE AND MANY NATIONS WERE RELUCTANT TO SUPPORT SUCH ACTION WITH DANGEROUS IMPLICATIONS FOR ALL GOVERNMENTS IN UN.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6845

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7. HANABUSA CAUTIONED THAT "OPTION" TO GRUNK (DESCRIBED ABOVE) SHOULD NOT DEAL WITH INTERNAL KHMER SETTLEMENT WHICH MUST BE NEGOTIATED BY KHMER THEMSELVES IF SETTLEMENT IS TO BE VIABLE. IN THIS CONNECTION, HANABUSA SAID HE FOUND GKR FIGURES, LIKE FINANCE MINISTER KHY DEANE LEM, CONFIDENT THAT THEY COULD COPE WITH KHMER COMMUNISTS IN COALITION GOVERNMENT. LEM TOLD HANABUSA COMMUNISTS LACK OF TRAINED BUREAUCRATS AND OTHER PROFESSIONALS WOULD PUT THEM AT SERIOUS DISADVANTAGE IN POLITICAL INFIGHTING IN COALITION GOVERNMENT. ON OTHER HAND, LEM SAID SIHANOUK, IN ANY GOVERNMENT, WOULD BE MUCH MORE HAZARDOUS AND HARDER TO CONTROL.

8. IN CONCLUSION, HANABUSA RECALLED THAT USG ARGUMENTATION ON KHMER ISSUES WITH ALLIES FOR PAST TWO YEARS HAS FOCUSED ON BLOCKING GRUNK ACCESS TO POWER EITHER THROUGH MILITARY SUCCESS OR, THROUGH THE BACK DOOR, AT THE UN. FROM SUCH STALEMATED CONDITIONS, USG HAS CLAIMED AND GOJ AGREED, NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT EMERGE. MILITARY STALEMATE IS APPARENT. SUCCESS OF MODERATES AT UN ON KHMER, IN SHARP CONTRAST TO OVERWHELMING MAJORITIES ON OTHER "NON-ALIGNED" ISSUES, LIKE PLO AND SOUTH AFRICA, MAY BE PERCEIVED BY GRUNK AS STALEMATE TO THEIR ASPIRATIONS FOR POWER THROUGH UN BACKDOOR. IF MOMENTUM ALONG MODERATE LINES COULD TURN TIDE AND PREVAIL AT LIMA, HANABUSA CONTENDED, GRUNK MIGHT FINALLY CONSENT TO NEGOTIATIONS FOR SETTLEMENT.

9. HANABUSA SAID THAT FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS IN JAPAN

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
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IT WAS MANDATORY TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM ON THE KHMER ISSUE. OTHERWISE, GOJ EFFORTS AT 29TH UNGA WOULD BE EXPOSED AS MERELY ANOTHER DELAYING PLOY. HE SAID GOJ WAS WILLING TO WORK HARD NEXT YEAR AND AT THE 30TH UNGA ON KHMER BUT THAT WOULD BE LAST TIME IF SETTLEMENT COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED IN YEAR AND HALF OR SO OR AT LEAST BEFORE 31ST UNGA. IF NO MOMENTUM IS MAINTAINED, GOJ WOULD HAVE TO RECONSIDER BOTH ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH GKR.

13. HANABUSA MENTIONED THAT AMBASSADOR YASUKAWA HAD MET ASST SECRETARY HABIB DEC 17, DESCRIBING EXCHANGE AS IN REF A. HE SAID GOJ EMBASSY WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH PROBLEM TO REPRESENT GOJ IN DISCUSSIONS OF KHMER QUESTION WITH USG, AND HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO TO WASHINGTON HIMSELF TO PARTICIPATE IN WHAT HE HOPED WOULD BE EARLY DISCUSSIONS. (NOTE: WE ASSUME HE DID NOT NECESSARILY MEAN HE WOULD LEAD DISCUSSIONS ALTHOUGH WE COULD COUNT ON HIS BEING A MAJOR PARTICIPANT.)

14. COMMENT: AS DEPARTMENT KNOWS, HANABUSA WAS PRIME MOVER IN DEVELOPING JAPANESE STRATEGY ON KHMER IN 29TH UNGA. DURING CONVERSATION REPORTED ABOVE, HE NOTED THAT HE WAS "THINK ALOUD" BUT THAT HE ANTICIPATED HIS SUPERIORS, FROM FONMIN MIYAZAWA ON DOWN, WOULD SUPPORT HIS ASSESSMENT. IF PAST ANY INDICATOR, EMBASSY BELIEVES HANABUSA'S IDEAS WILL BE TREATED SERIOUSLY AT TOP LEVEL OF FONOFF AND RECOMMENDS DEPARTMENT CONSIDER EARLY CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON WITH JAPANESE ON KHMER ISSUE. HODGSON

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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 2338

CONTROL: 5605Q

RECD: FEB 24, 1975

NO07S

E.O. 11652 XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM, JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN AND NPT

FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

1. DURING PRIVATE MEETING WITH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER TOGO ON FEBRUARY 22, HE RAISED WITH ME PROBLEM OF JAPAN'S RATIFICATION OF NPT. TOGO STATED THAT PRIME MINISTER MIKI STRONGLY WISHED TO HAVE NPT RATIFIED DURING CURRENT SESSION OF DIET BOTH BECAUSE OF HIS PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO THAT OBJECTIVE AND BECAUSE OF HIS RECOGNITION OF IMPORTANCE TO WORLD PEACE OF WIDEST POSSIBLE NPT RATIFICATION. PRIME MINISTER, HOWEVER, HAS ENCOUNTERED SMALL BUT DETERMINED OPPOSITION WITHIN OWN PARTY (AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED BY EMBASSY). ONE PARTICULAR CONCERN TO PRIME MINISTER IS FACT THAT IN ADDITION TO PUBLIC RATIONALE, SOME AMONG OPONENTS OF RATIFICATION ARE CONTENDING PRIVATELY THAT U.S. NOT SERIOUSLY CONCERNED FOR RATIFICATION BY JAPAN. (TOGO STATED THAT MOST IMPORTANT PERSONALITY AMONG THOSE WHO HOLD THIS VIEW IS HARASONE.) PRIME MINISTER FEELS, THEREFORE, THAT SOME STRONG INDICATION OF U.S. INTEREST ESSENTIAL TO ACHIEVE RATIFICATION DURING THIS SESSION AND HAS INSTRUCTED FOREIGN OFFICE TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES FOR OBTAINING SUCH EXPRESSION OF U.S. VIEWS. THIS OBVIOUSLY WAS TOGO'S PURPOSE IN RAISING MATTER WITH ME.

2. TOGO EXPLAINED THAT WHAT PRIME MINISTER HAS IN MIND IS

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.5 *State Dept Review*
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES *TD 9/23/02*
BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *1/28/03*



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TELEGRAM

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SOME PERSONAL MESSAGE EITHER FROM PRESIDENT FORD OR FROM YOU URGING JAPAN'S RATIFICATION. (TOGO AND O MENTIONED PRIME MINISTER'S DESIRE THAT SUCH MESSAGE SHOULD ALSO CONTAIN SOME SPECIFIC ASSURANCE THAT U.S. WOULD PROTECT JAPAN IN EVENT OF NUCLEAR ATTACK, BUT IN COURSE OF SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION TOGO SEEMED TO BACK AWAY FROM THIS NOTION SOMEWHAT SINCE HE UNDOUBTEDLY APPRECIATES DIFFICULTIES WHICH WOULD BE INVOLVED.) TOGO COMMENTED THAT THE MORE EXPLICIT SUCH MESSAGE WAS AS TO WHAT USG WISHES FROM JAPAN THE BETTER.

3. I COMMENTED THAT USG CLEARLY ON RECORD IN SUPPORT OF NPT RATIFICATION AND REFERRED TO EMPHASIS GIVEN LAST SEPTEMBER. I ALSO NOTED THAT SINCE U.S. SELF-INTEREST NOT INVOLVED EXCEPT IN RELATION TO BROAD SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE, IT SEEMED TO ME A RATHER DUBIOUS PROCEDURE FOR US TO SINGLE OUT JAPAN TO URGE RATIFICATION. TOGO REPLIED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THERES POINTS, BUT HE INSISTED THAT WITHOUT SOME SUCH MESSAGE FROM U.S. ALONG LINES HE HAD SUGGESTED, PRIME MINISTER WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO OBTAIN RATIFICATION DURING CURRENT SESSION; WITH SUCH MESSAGE, TOGO FELT CHANCES OF RATIFICATION ARE REASONABLY GOOD.

4. TOGO SAID THAT HE APPRECIATED DIFFICULTIES WHICH U.S. WOULD HAVE IN FURNULATING SUCH MESSAGE AND ADMITTED THAT HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO DEVISE A SUITABLE FORMULA. HE SUGGESTED, HOWEVER, THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO DRAW UPON JOHNSON-SATO COMMUNIQUE OF 1965 AND FORD-YANAKA COMMUNIQUE OF 1974. (PRESUMABLY TOGO HAD IN MIND REFERENCES IN BOTH DOCUMENTS TO ARMS LIMITATION; PARA 4 OF 1965 COMMUNIQUE AND PARA 3 OF 1974 COMMUNIQUE.)

5. COMMENT: I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO ASSESS TO ULTIMATE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO JAPAN'S RATIFICATION OF NPT. I REALIZE ALSO THAT IN TAKING ANY SUCH ACTION MIKI HOPES FOR WE RUN THE RISK OF APPEARING TO BE PRESSURING JAPAN ON A MATTER WHICH IT SHOULD BE ABLE TO DECIDE IN TERMS OF ITS OWN SELF-INTEREST, ALTHOUGH THAT RISK MIGHT BE MINIMIZED BY JUDICIOUS WORDING AND CAREFUL CHOICE OF THE MODE IN WHICH WE RESPOND. IT IS A FACT, HOWEVER, THAT AMONG SUCH STRONGLY CONSERVATIVE LDP ELEMENTS AS ARE OPPOSING RATIFICATION,

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Department of State

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PAGE 03 TOKYO 02330 240033Z

THERE ARE THOSE WHO ARGUE THAT U.S. IS NOT SERIOUSLY CONCERNED WHETHER JAPAN RATIFIES NPT AND MAY NOT EVEN CONSIDER SUCH ACTION TO BE IN JAPAN'S BEST INTERESTS. SUCH ARGUMENTS, MOREOVER, MAY CARRY GREATER WEIGHT VIS-A-VIS MIKI GIVEN HIS REPUTATION AMONG THESE SAME CIRCLES FOR QTE LIBERAL UNOTE EYEN QTE LEFTIS UNOTE VIES. I CONCLUDE THEREFOR, THAT SOME EXPLICIT AND HIGHT-LEVEL STATEMENT OF THE U.S. POSITION AND INTEREST AND HIGHT-LEVEL STATEMENT OF THE U.S. POSITION AND INTEREST IN JAPAN'S RATIFICATION PROBABLY WOULD STRENGTHEN MIKI'S HAND, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY GUARAANTEE A FAVORABLE OUTCOME. SHOULD IT BE IN OUR INTERESTS TO MAKEE SUCH A MOVE, I BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO HAVE OUR VIEWS CONVEYED BY ME ORALLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER OR THE FOREIGN MINISTER, EVEN THOUGH THIS PROBABLY WOULD FALL SHORT OF WHAT MIKI HOPES FOR.

HODGSON

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TELEGRAM

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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8205

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOKYO 2364

CONTROL: 5614Q

RECD: FEB 24, 1975

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ENRG

SUBJECT: IEA AGREEMENT ON ALTERNATIVE SOURCES


REF: STATE 040804

1. IN ABSENCE OF AMBASSADOR, WHO ON OFFICIAL TRIP TO HOKKAIDO, DCM MET WITH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER TOGO FEBRUARY 24 TO REQUEST DELIVERY SHONEST OF PRESIDENT FORD'S LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER MIKI. DCM ASKED THAT LETTER BE HELD IN CLOSE CONFIDENCE. PLR REFTEL PARA 3, DCM ALSO RAISED WITH TOGO POSSIBILITY OF VISIT TO TOKYO BY SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS FOR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS PRIOR TO NEXT MEETING OF IEA GOVERNING BOARD MEETING.

2. TOGO ASSURED DCM HE WOULD CONVEY PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER PROMPTLY AND WOULD BE BACK IN TOUCH ON POSSIBILITY OF BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS.
HUGHSON

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TELEGRAM

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NOD362

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ORIGIN NODS-00

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Control: 5898Q

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8244

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FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS


E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ENRG OVIP (ENDERS, THOMAS D.), JA
SUBJ: ENDERS VISIT

REF: STATE 040604 NODIS

1. MIYAZAKI (DG, ECONOMIC AFFAIRS BUREAU, PCONOFF) CALLED IN E/C MIN AFTERNOON FEB. 25 TO PROVIDE GOJ RESPONSE TO SUGGESTION TRANSMITTED BY DCM TO VICE MINISTER TOGO FEB. 24 (REFTEL), THAT ENDERS AND OTHER OFFICIALS VISIT JAPAN BEFORE NEXT GOVERNING BOARD MEETING TO DISCUSS USG PROPOSALS. MIYAZAKI STATED THAT AFTER CONSIDERATION OF SUGGESTION BY FOREIGN MINISTER, TOGO AND SENIOR OFFICIALS OF OTHER MINISTRIES GOJ HAD DECIDED IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE QTE FRUITFUL DISCUSSIONS UNOTE AT THIS TIME. TWO GROUNDS GIVEN FOR DECISION:
(A) LOWER HOUSE OF DIET PRESENTLY DEBATING JFY 1975 BUDGET. GOJ IS PRESSING FOR PASSAGE BY LOWER HOUSE BY END OF NEXT WEEK SO THAT BUDGET CAN BECOME LAW IN EARLY APRIL (I.E. AFTER MANDATORY THIRTY DAY PERIOD IN UPPER HOUSE). OPPOSITION IS USING ANY AVAILABLE ISSUE TO DELAY BUDGET PASSAGE, AND GOJ CONSIDERS THAT VISIT BY ENDERS AND OTHERS WOULD QUICKLY BE TAKEN UP BY OPPOSITION AS LEADING

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PAGE 02 STATE

TO MEASURES WHICH WOULD ALTER BUDGET AS PRESENTLY SUBMITTED TO DIET. MIYAZAKI ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO HIDE ENDERS VISIT FROM THE PRESS, EVEN IF GOJ WISHED TO DO SO.


(B) GOJ MINISTRIES PRESENTLY CONSIDERING VARIS OPTIONS ON ISSUES RAISED BY USG AND IT IS QUITE UNLIKELY THAT GOJ WOULD HAVE FIRM POSITION TO DISCUSS WITH ENDERS BEFORE GB MEETING.

2. MIYAZAKI MADE IT CLEAR HE PERSONALLY WOULD WELCOME VISIT BY ENDERS AND REGRETTED THAT DECISION HAD BEEN MADE AT POLITICAL LEVEL TO DECLINE OFFER OF VISIT. HE ALSO CONCEDED THAT LACK OF FIRM GOJ POSITION MADE ENDERS VISIT ALL THE MORE USEFUL. IN CONCLUSION, HE ADDED THAT HE DID NOT PRECLUDE POSSIBILITY THAT GOJ WOULD ASK FOR VISIT BY ENDERS AT LATER DATE.

3. AS OF GENERAL INFORMATION, MIYAZAKI NOTED THAT AMBASSADOR TO THE OECD YOSHINO WOULD RETURN TO TOKYO THIS EVENING, WOULD OFFICIALLY BE NAMED DEPUTY MINISTER (TO REPLACE TSUKUMI) IN NEXT FEW DAYS AND WOULD RETURN TO PARIS TO HEAD GOJ DELEGATION TO IEA/GB IN NEW CAPACITY.

4. WHILE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR FACE-TO-FACE MEETING WITH SENIOR LEVELS OF VARIOUS GOJ MINISTRIES, WE THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO PROVIDE GOJ (EITHER THROUGH EMBASSY HERE OR JAPANESE EMBASSY WASH) WITH AS MUCH SPECIFICITY AS POSSIBLE ON CONTENTS OF MARCH 6-7 IEA/GB OUTCOME WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO US.
HODGSON

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N00320

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 TOKYO 02384 250346Z Control: 5848Q

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ACTION N005-00

INFO OCT-01 /001 W

030174

O 250325Z FEB 75
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8218

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOKYO 2384

ACTION COPY

NODIS

STADIS

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: ENRG, JA

SUBJECT: IEA- JAPANESE APPROACH TO ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT

REF: (A) TOKYO 2370, (B) STATE 040604 NODIS

FOR ASST SEC ENDERS

1. NITI DRAFT IEA/GB DECISION REPORTED REPTEL A WAS GIVEN TO EMBASSY BEFORE NITI WAS INFORMED LATE FEB 24 BY FONOFF THAT PRESIDENT FORD HAD SENT LETTER TO PM ON ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT (REF B). HOPEFULLY REF B WILL INDUCE GOJ LEADERS TO JOIN IN MORE POSITIVE STEP FORWARD AT MARCH 6-7 GB MEETING THAN IS REFLECTED IN NITI DRAFT WHICH, IN EMBASSY OPINION, DOES NOT ADVANCE STATE OF UNDERSTANDING ON BASIC ELEMENTS AND PRINCIPLES OF OVERALL APPROACH TO ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT BEYOND THAT ALREADY AGREED AT FEB 3-7 CH MEETING (AS RECORDED DECU PARIS 3463) AND IN SOME RESPECTS IS STEP BACKWARD (E.G. INSISTENCE THAT FRANCE AND AUSTRALIA JOIN).

2. IF ENDERS DOES OR WISH COMMENT IN DETAIL ON NITI DRAFT, THERE IS RISK NITI DRAFT MAY BE PUSHED THROUGH OTHER GOJ MINISTRIES IN NEXT FEW DAYS AND BECOME GOJ POSITIONING FOR MARCH 6 GB MEETING. ON OTHER HAND, WE SEE

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66 8/31/01





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
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PAGE 02 TOKYU 02384 250346Z

DISADVANTAGE OF ATTEMPTING TO AMEND MITI TEXT SINCE
OPERATIVE (SIC) PORTIONS OFFER SO LITTLE TO WORK FROM.
(SAME MAY NOT BE TRUE OF PREAMBULAR SECTION.) POSSIBLE
WYA OUT OF THIS BOX MAY BE TO RESPOND TO MITI DRAFT WITH
A US COUNTER-DRAFT OF AT LEAST OPERATIVE PORTIONS. IF
RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH EUROPEANS OFFER BASIS FOR SAYING
SO (AND WE INTERPRET RECENT REPORTING FROM BRUSSELS
ESPECIALLY EC BRUSSELS 1526 AS INDICATING EUROPEANS ARE
CLOSER TO US VIEWS THAN ARE JAPANESE AT MOMENT), IT WOULD
BE DESIRABLE TO INDICATED US PERCEIVES BASIC
THRUST OF US DRAFT IS LIKELY TO BE (OR WILL BE)
ACCEPTABLE TO EUROPEANS.

3. SENIOR STAFF LEVELS OF KEY MINISTRIES ARE CURRENTLY
DISCUSSING RESPONSE TO YOUR OFFER TO COME TO TOKYO
BEFORE MARCH 6 MEETING AND WE WILL PROBABLY GET REPLY
LATER TODAY.
HODGON

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8

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013819

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram
CREATOR'S NAME AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RECEIVER'S NAME SECSTATE WASHDC
TITLE GOJ Statement on Nuclear Issue
CREATION DATE 02/28/1975
VOLUME 3 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400289
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER 8
FOLDER TITLE Japan - State Department Telegrams: To
SECSTATE - NODIS (4)
DATE WITHDRAWN 09/06/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

EXEMPTED

8/13/07

Exempted
9/21/10

9

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013820

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram

CREATOR'S NAME AMEMBASSY TOKYO

RECEIVER'S NAME SECSTATE WASHDC

TITLE Nuclear Issue

CREATION DATE 03/01/1975

VOLUME 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400289

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER 8

FOLDER TITLE Japan - State Department Telegrams: To
SECSTATE - NODIS (4)

DATE WITHDRAWN 09/06/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

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9/21/10



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TELEGRAM

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NOD251

PAGE 01 TOKYO 02706 030926Z

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INFO OCT-01 /001 W

O 030730Z MAR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8370

122410

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 2706


CONTROL: 238Q
RECD: MARCH 03, 1975

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ENRG
SUBJ: FRENCH INVITATION TO PRODUCER/CONSUMER PREPARATORY MEETING
REF: STATE 46725

1. AMB MET WITH VICE MINISTER TOGO AFTERNOON MARCH 3 CONCERNING FRENCH INVITATION. TOGO SAID FACT OF FRENCH INVITATION IS TO BE RELEASED PUBLICLY AT 8 P.M. TOKYO TIME TONIGHT BUT ACTUAL INVITATION NOT EXPECTED TO BE RECEIVED HERE UNTIL MARCH 6. TOGO THEREFORE BELIEVED GOJ COULD GET BY WITH A PUBLIC POSTURE OF "STUDYING" FRENCH INITIATIVE AT LEAST FOR SEVERAL DAYS. HE CAUTIONED HOWEVER THAT THIS MIGHT HAVE TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY SOME REFERENCE TO JAPAN'S LONG-STANDING INTEREST IN A PRODUCER-CONSUMER DIALOG AND NON-CONFRONTATIONAL POSTURE TOWARD PRODUCERS. TOGO ASSURED AMBASSADOR GOJ WOULD NOT GO OVERBOARD ON THIS AND WOULD CERTAINLY BEAR IN MIND AND GIVE CLOSE ATTENTION TO POINTS MADE BY PRESIDENT FORD IN HIS FEB 22 LETTER TO PM MIKI.

2. GOJ REP TO IEA/G8 (DEPUTY VICE MINISTER YOSHION) ALREADY EN ROUTE PARIS AND WILL BE AVAILABLE MEET WITH US REP MARCH 5.
HODGSUN



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64 3/31/01

11

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013821

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram

CREATOR'S NAME AMEMBASSY TOKYO

RECEIVER'S NAME SECSTATE WASHDC

TITLE Nuclear Weapons

CREATION DATE 03/07/1975

VOLUME 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400289

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER 8

FOLDER TITLE Japan - State Department Telegrams: To
SECSTATE - NODIS (4)

DATE WITHDRAWN 09/06/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

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9/21/10



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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 TOKYO 03243 000226Z

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ACTION NODS=00

INFO OCT-01 /001 W

061827

R 030226Z MAR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8538

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 3043

N0016

NOFORN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: MNUG, KS
SUBJECT: ROK PLANS TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MISSILES
REF: STATE 048673

WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING FOR INFORMATION
SECULIS 1239 AND 8023 AND STATE 271124, ALL
REFERENCED REFTEL, AND SUBSEQUENT TRAFFIC THIS
SUBJECT, IN LIGHT OF OBVIOUS SERIOUS POTENTIAL
IMPLICATIONS FOR JAPAN.
HODGSON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3

MR# 08-031: #1

state dept. ltr 7/18/11

By dl NARA, Date 9/8/11



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NOD352

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 TOKYO 03337 140513Z

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ACTION NODS-00

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INFO OCT-01 /001 W

O 140500Z MAR 75
FM ANEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8663

045012

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 3337

CONTROL: 4177Q

RECD: MARCH 1st 1975

NODIS


E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ENRG JA
SUBJ: PREPCOM INVITATIONS

REF: TOKYO 3315

MIYAZAKI, DG FONOPF ECON AFFAIRS, TOLD E/C MIN MARCH 14
GOJ WOULD NOT RPT NOT REPLY TO FRENCH INVITATION TO
PREPCOM UNTIL AFTER IEA/GB MEETING MARCH 19-20.
E/C MIN EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND OBSERVED THAT
DEFERRAL OF REPLY SEEMED IN LINE WITH IEA/GB DECISION
MARCH 6.
HODGSON

~~SECRET~~

44 8/31/01



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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013823

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram

CREATOR'S NAME AMEMBASSY TOKYO

RECEIVER'S NAME SECSTATE WASHDC

TITLE Nuclear Transit Issue

CREATION DATE 03/19/1975

VOLUME 6 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400289

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER 8

FOLDER TITLE Japan - State Department Telegrams: To
SECSTATE - NODIS (4)

DATE WITHDRAWN 09/06/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

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9/21/10

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013824

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram
CREATOR'S NAME AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RECEIVER'S NAME SECSTATE WASHDC
TITLE Japan-DRV Relations
CREATION DATE 03/24/1975
VOLUME 3 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400289
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER 8
FOLDER TITLE Japan - State Department Telegrams: To
SECSTATE - NODIS (4)
DATE WITHDRAWN 09/06/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG



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PAGE 01 TOKYO 03904 261047Z

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ACTION NODS-00

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INFO OCT-01 /001 W

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O 262945Z MAR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0923

CONTROL: 8050Q
RECD: MARCH 26,,975

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOKYO 3904

NOD19

E.O. 11652 XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, JA, VN
SUBJECT: JAPAN-DRV RELATIONU

REF: A. STATE 0678531 (B) TOKYO 3772

FOR ASST SECY HABIB

1. AS INDICATED IN REF (B), PARA 6, I RAISED WITH DEPUTY
FONMIN ARITA ON MARCH 26 OUR CONCERNS WITH RESPECT TO GOJ
CONCLUSION OF AID AGREEMENT WITH DRV AND OPENING OF EMBASSY
IN HANOI. I NOTED THAT EMBASSY HAD REPORTED IN DETAIL
HANABUSA'S REACTION TO OUR INITIAL APPROACH AND, PER REF
(A), STATED THAT WE HAD APPRECIATED FRANKNESS OF HANABUSA'S
COMMENTS. I REITERATED OUR HOPE THAT AID AGREEMENT WOULD NOT
BE CONCLUDED AT THIS TIME AND THAT GOJ COULD DELAY OPENING
ITS EMBASSY IN HANOI UNTIL SITUATION HAD CLARIFIED. ARITA
STATED THAT OUR CONCERNS ARE FLLY UNDERSTOOD AND THAT GOJ
WOULD TRY ACOMODATE TO THEM, ALTHOUGH HE AYIDED ANY
SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS.

2. ARITA CONTINUED, HOWEVER, THAT QUESTION OF AID TO DRV AND
OPENING OF EMBASSY IN HANOI SEEMED TO BE TO HIM RELATIVELY
LIMITED AND SHORT-TERM PROBLEMS. OF GREATER CONCERN, IN HIS
LVIEW, ARE LONGER TEM IMPLICATIONS OF RAPIDLY DETERIORATING
SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM. ALTHOUGH GVN DECISION TO WITH-
DRAW FROM CENTRAL HIGHLAND AND OTHER PROVINCES MAY HAVE BEEN
MILITARILY JUSTIFIABLE, AIRTA WAS CONCERNED THAT THESE ACTIONS

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12065, SEC. 3.6 State Dept Review
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES TD 9/23/02
BY HR, NARA, DATE 1/28/03



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PAGE 02 TOKYO 03904 261047Z

WOULD GIVE RISE TO SERIOUS DOUBTS TO OTHER COUNTRIES CONCERNING POLITICAL VIABILITY OF THIEU REGIME. (IN THIS CONNECTION, HE WONDERED WHETHER US HAD BEEN CONSULTED IN ADVANCE OF GVN WITHDRAWAL AND WHETHER WE HAD CONCURRED IN DECISION OF THIEU GOVERNMENT.) AIRTA FELT THAT THERE IS AN URGENT NEED FOR GOJ TO BE INFORMED OF U.S. ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT SITUATION, PROSPECTS OF THIEU GOVERNMENT, AND CONSEQUENCES OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS FOR OVERALL U.S. STRATEGY IN EAST ASIA.

3. ALMOST LESS EXPLICIT, ARITA SEEMED CONCERNED WHETHER U.S. HAD NOT IN FACT ANTICIPATED LIKELIHOOD THAT ONCE U.S. FORCES WITHDRAWN, NORTH VIETNAM WOULD INCREASE MILITARY PRESSURE ON SOUT IN DISREGARD OF PARIS AGREEMENTS, PRESSURE. GIVEN RELUCTANCE OF CONGRESS TO PROVIDE FURTHER AID TO SOUT VIETNAM, ARITA WONDERED WHAT IMPLICATIONS, IF ANY, THIS SEQUENCE OF EVENTS MIGHT HAVE FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD NORTHEAST ASIA AND, PARTICULARLY, KOREA.

4. I TOLD ARITA THAT I WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO APPRISE HIM OF OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION AND COMMENTED THAT EVENTS HAD MOVED WITH SUCH SURPRISING SWIFTNESS THAT SOME FURTHER TIME WOULD PROBABLY BE REQUIRED FOR US TO SORT OUT THEIR SIGNIFICANCE. I STRONGLY CAUTIONED HIM, HOWEVER, AGAINST GENERALIZING FROM THESE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ABOUT THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF U.S. POLICY AND SAID THAT I COULD SEE NO ANALOGY IN THESE TERMS BETWEEN THE SITUATION IN INDOCHINA AND THAT IN KOREA.

5. I ASKED ARITA WHAT SIGNIFICANCE HE SAW IN THESE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA FOR GOJ TOWARD THAT AREA. ARITA SAID THAT HE COULD NOT BE CERTAIN ON THIS POINT. IN HIS VIEW, HOWEVER, THE GOJ STILL HOPES THAT SOME POLITICAL SETTLEMENT MIGHT BE REACHED WHICH WOULD PUT AN END TO HOSTILITIES IN SOUT VIETNAM. (HE FELT THAT THE TIME HAD PASSED WHEN ONE COULD REALISTICALLY HOPE FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN CAMBODIA. THE MOST LIELY PROSPECT THERE IN HIS VIEW IS FOR LONG NOL AND OTHER LEADING MEMBERS OF HIS GOVERNMENT TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY, BEING REPLACED BY A CARETAKER REGIME WHICH WOULD NEGOTIATE THE TERMS OF A TAKEOVER BY THE INSURGENTS.) HE THOUGHT THAT THE GVN PROBABLY WOULD BE ABLE TO MOUNT AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSE OF SAIGON AND THE SURROUNDING PROVINCES

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03 TOKYO 03904 251047Z

AND THUS BRING THE FIGHTING TO AT LEAST A TEMPORARY
STALEMATE. SUCH A SITUATION IN ARITA'S VIEW WOULD OPEN THE
WAY FOR POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS.
SHOEMITH

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013826

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram
CREATOR'S NAME AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RECEIVER'S NAME SECSTATE WASHDC
TITLE Nuclear Problems
CREATION DATE 03/26/1975
VOLUME 2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400289
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER 8
FOLDER TITLE Japan - State Department Telegrams: To
SECSTATE - NODIS (4)
DATE WITHDRAWN 09/06/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

EXEMPTED

8/13/07

Exempted
9/21/10