


**The original documents are located in Box 8, folder “Japan - State Department Telegrams: From SECSTATE - EXDIS” of the National Security Adviser Files: Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.**

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66 8/30/01





# Department of State TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 253697

FUTURE NEGOTIATION EFFORTS. IN ADDITION, SLOWING DOWN THE MOMENTUM HAD RAISED SERIOUSLY THE DANGER OF RENEWED WAR. KING BELIEVES SADAT IS NOT IN POSITION TO JOIN SYRIA IF WAR BREAKS OUT AGAIN BECAUSE HE DOES NOT HAVE THE EQUIPMENT AND SPARE PARTS TO DO SO AND HAS ALREADY MADE IT CLEAR TO OTHER ARAB LEADERS THAT HE WOULD NOT JOIN IN A WAR, IN SPITE OF GENERALLY MORE FUZZY EGYPTIAN PUBLIC STATEMENTS. KING SAID SADAT NOW HAS, IN EVENTUALITY OF WAR, ONLY THREE ALTERNATIVES: (A) TO GO BACK TO THE SOVIETS AND SEEK MASSIVE MILITARY SUPPLIES AND THEREBY RISK THE REACQUISITION OF SOVIET DOMINANCE IN EGYPTIAN POLICY; (B) TO INCUR THE IRE OF THE OTHER ARAB STATES BY DRAGGING HIS FEET AND REMAINING OUT OF THE CONFLICT; AND (C) TO RISK AN OVERTHROW BECAUSE OF DOMESTIC INTERNAL INSTABILITY AND ARMY PRESSURE BY DECLARING HIMSELF OUT AT THE BEGINNING. IN EACH CASE SADAT AND EGYPT WOULD LOSE. IT WAS KING'S JUDGEMENT THAT SADAT WAS IN A WEAKENED INTERNAL POSITION AND THEREFORE WAS NOT IN GOOD SHAPE TO FACE ANY OF THE FUTURE ALTERNATIVES. HE CAPPED HIS REMARKS BY STATING THAT HE THOUGHT THE US HAD TOO OFTEN OPERATED AS IF EGYPT WAS THE MOST INFLUENTIAL -- INDEED THE SOLE -- LEADER OF THE ARAB WORLD. HE THOUGHT EGYPT WAS A COUNTRY ON WHICH THE US HAD DEPENDDED TOO HEAVILY. THERE WERE OTHER SIGNIFICANT ARAB STATES AND THE US SHOULD BE CAREFUL ABOUT GOING OVERBOARD WITH THE EGYPTIANS.

3. ON WAR: KING SAID HE THOUGHT SITUATION AT PRESENT WAS VERY DANGEROUS. ARAB AMBASSADORS HAD BEEN CALLED IN IN DAMASCUS YESTERDAY AND TOLD THAT ISRAELIS WERE ABOUT TO STRIKE. SYRIANS SAID THEY COULD NOT FACE THE ISRAELIS ALONE, WITHOUT EGYPT AND JORDAN, FOR THEY WERE SURE TO LOSE. KING CONTRASTED THIS POINT WITH FACT THAT SYRIANS HAD ALSO SAID CLEARLY THEY WOULD NOT RENEW THE UNDOF MANDATE WHICH SEEMED TO MAKE WAR INEVITABLE. WHEN PRESSED AS TO WHETHER SYRIA WOULD CHANGE ITS VIEW ON UNDOF, KING SAID THEY TEND TO BE STUBBORN, BUT THEY MIGHT BE SHIFTED. HE WENT ON TO INDICATE THAT HE BELIEVED ASAD WAS UNDER VERY CONSIDERABLE DOMESTIC PRESSURE ON THIS QUESTION.

4. ON THE PLO: THE SENATOR ASKED HIM DIRECTLY WHETHER



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# Department of State TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 STATE 253897

HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR US TO BEGIN A  
DIALOGUE OR TALKS WITH THE PLO. THE KING SAID HE WOULD  
PREFER NOT TO COMMENT ON THAT POINT AS HE DIDN'T REALLY  
FEEL QUALIFIED. IMPLICATION WAS CLEARLY HE DID NOT  
WANT TO MAKE DIRECT RECOMMENDATION ON US POLICIES.  
HOWEVER, WHEN PRESSED BY THE SENATOR FOR AN ANSWER,  
HE SAID INTER ALIA THAT HE THOUGHT PLO SHOULD BE GIVEN  
SOME TIME TO SEE WHAT THEY CAN DO WITH THE PROBLEM ON  
THEIR OWN. WE AND SENATOR KENNEDY BOTH INTERPRET THIS ANSWER  
(NOT SURPRISINGLY) AS BEING CLEARLY A HOPE THAT WE WILL NOT  
INTERVENE IN ANY WAY THAT CAN BE PERCEIVED BY PLO AS  
ASSISTING THEIR CAUSE, AT LEAST UNTIL IT CAN BE SEEN  
WHETHER PLO CAN MOVE TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS ON ITS OWN.  
PICKERING UNQUOTE INGERSOLL



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~~SECRET~~





Department of State

W H 2  
TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 1398

PAGE 01 STATE 254631

44

ORIGIN SS=25

INFO OCT=01 ISO=00 SSO=00 NSCE=00 CCO=00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY ARA:BR:RWZIMMERMANN:LK  
APPROVED BY S:ADAMS  
ARA:WGBOWDLER  
S/S: JMEALUM

028851

O 191457Z NOV 74 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 254631

EXDIS TOSEC 64

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, BR  
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA TO THE SECRETARY  
SANTIAGO: FOR LEWIS (S/P)

1. THE BRAZILIAN AMBASSADOR DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO THE SECRETARY FROM FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA AFTERNOON NOVEMBER 18.

BEGIN TEXT: MY DEAR HENRY, I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM QUITO, FROM THE CONSULTATIVE MEETING OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS, WHERE THE MOST IMPORTANT RESULT ACHIEVED WAS, IN MY OPINION, THAT OF PROVIDING A REALISTIC PICTURE OF THE POSITIONS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. BESIDES THIS, I THINK THAT A CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT PREVAILED THROUGHOUT THE MEETING, AS INDICATED ABOVE ALL BY THE CONCERN SHOWN BY ALL THE PARTICIPANTS TOWARDS STRENGTHENING THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM AND THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY FOR MUTUAL ASSISTANCE. THIS, UNFORTUNATELY, WAS NOT REFLECTED IN THE PRESS NOTICES.



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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 STATE 254631

THIS ATMOSPHERE OF MUTUAL RESPECT AND UNDERSTANDING AROSE, AS I UNDERSTAND, FROM THE FACT THAT NO ONE DECEIVED OR TRIED TO DECEIVE ANYONE ELSE, SO THAT THE POSITIONS WERE MADE PERFECTLY CLEAR AT ALL THE MEETINGS, WHETHER FORMAL OR INFORMAL. THE OUTSPOKEN FRANKNESS WHICH CHARACTERIZED

THE INFORMAL MEETINGS MADE THEM AS IMPORTANT OR MORE SO THAN THE OFFICIAL ONES.

ON RETURNING TO BRASILIA, I FOUND THAT THE AGENDA FOR THE WORK OF THE PLANNING GROUPS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE ITAMARATY, ON THE 21ST AND 22ND, HAD BEEN PRACTICALLY ESTABLISHED. I SEE THAT THE PREDOMINATING INTENTION ON THE UNITED STATES SIDE IS THAT OF MAKING A KIND OF "TOUR D'HORIZON" OF THE CURRENT PROBLEMS OF GLOBAL POLICY. I FIND THIS EXCHANGE OF VIEWPOINTS TO BE OF THE HIGHEST UTILITY. IT IS MY IMPRESSION, HOWEVER, THAT WE SHOULD NOT FAIL TO DEVOTE SOME TIME, POSSIBLY TOWARDS THE END OF THE CONVERSATIONS, TO AN EVALUATION OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THE AMERICAN AND BRAZILIAN REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD EXAMINE, WITH THE MOST ABSOLUTE FRANKNESS, THE PRESENT STATE, THE PROSPECTS AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF THAT RELATIONSHIP. I THINK IT IS OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE THAT THERE SHOULD PREVAIL THE UTMOST FRANKNESS IN THIS DIALOGUE, EACH PARTY BEING AWARE THAT THE POSSIBILITIES OF COOPERATIONS AND CONVERGENCE WILL BE ALL THE MORE REALISTIC WHEN RESULTING FROM WELL-UNDERSTOOD NATIONAL INTERESTS AND NOT FROM AUTOMATIC ALIGNMENTS THAT SHOULD NOT PREVAIL BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

I UNDERSTAND THAT THESE CONVERSATIONS WILL BE ONLY A PRELUDE TO YOUR VISIT TO BRAZIL EARLY NEXT YEAR. AT THAT TIME WE SHALL DEAL, ON A POLITICAL LEVEL, WITH THE QUESTIONS THAT OUR POLICY PLANNERS WILL APPROACH THIS WEEK ON A SPECULATIVE AND TECHNICAL LEVEL. WITH WARMEST REGARDS FROM ANTONIO. END TEXT.

2. PROPOSED REPLY IS IN PREPARATION AND WILL BE SENT TO YOU SHORTLY. INGERZOLL



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013775

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Telegram

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . SECSTATE WASHDC

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TITLE . . . . . IDF Mobilization

CREATION DATE . . . . . 11/19/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400275

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL  
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE  
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 8

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Japan - State Department Telegrams:  
From SECSTATE - EXDIS

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/05/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG



## 4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BY HR, NARA, DATE 1/27/03  
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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 STATE 263002

DEFICIT FINANCING THROUGH THE IMF. WEBER SAID THAT THE CHANCELLOR'S INITIAL REACTION TO THE US PROPOSALS HAD BEEN QUITE RESERVED, BUT THAT HE, WEBER, HAD NOT AS YET HAD A REPORT ON STATE SECRETARY POEHL'S LATEST DISCUSSION OF THE US PROPOSALS WITH THE CHANCELLOR.

2. WEBER MENTIONED THE FOLLOWING FACTORS (IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE) AS HAVING LED TO HIS MINISTRY'S NEGATIVE RECOMMENDATION ON THE US PROPOSALS:

(A) WITH EVERY PRESENTATION THE US PROPOSALS SEEMED TO TIE AID OUT OF THE \$25 BILLION SOLIDARITY FUND MORE AND MORE EXCLUSIVELY TO COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR IN ENERGY CONSERVATION AND LESS AND LESS TO STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF GENERAL SOUND ANTI-INFLATIONARY ECONOMIC PROGRAMS OF THE RECIPIENT COUNTRIES. BUT IN THE GERMAN VIEW INSISTENCE ON OVERALL STABILITY PROGRAMS WAS OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE IN THE CASE OF SUCH LIKELY BENEFICIARIES OF RECYCLING AID AS ITALY.

(B) THE MAGNITUDE OF THE US PROPOSAL SCARED THE GERMANS. IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY DIFFICULT FOR THEM IN VIEW OF THE HUGE INCREASE IN GOVERNMENT DEBT ALREADY SLATED FOR NEXT YEAR AND WOULD GIVE SOME OF THE WEAKER COUNTRIES SUCH A SENSE OF SAFETY AS TO MAKE NECESSARY STABILIZATION POLICIES BY THEM THAT MUCH MORE UNLIKELY. THE GERMANS ASSUMED THAT IF OUR PROPOSAL WAS ADOPTED THERE WOULD IN ADDITION ALSO BE SOME WITTEVEN II/HEALY TYPE OF FINANCING AND A GENERAL QUOTA INCREASE IN THE IMF. THUS THERE WAS LIKELY TO BE TOO MUCH INSTEAD OF TOO LITTLE INTERNATIONAL LIQUIDITY.

(C) A WITTEVEN II/HEALY TYPE PLAN THROUGH THE IMF DID NOT NEED A GERMAN BUDGET ENTRY OR PARLIAMENTARY AUTHORIZATION. A KISSINGER/SIMON PLAN DID. RAISING MONEY UNDER THE US PROPOSALS ALSO WOULD BE MORE EXPENSIVE FOR THE FRG, BUT WEBER ADMITTED THAT THIS WAS A MORE TECHNICAL, RELATIVELY MINOR CONSIDERATION.

3. THE FINANCIAL ATTACHE STRESSED THAT THE US PLAN AS SET FORTH IN THE KISSINGER/SIMON SPEECHES DID IN FACT ENVISAGE CONDITIONS FOR SOUND STABILITY POLICIES IN RECIPIENT COUNTRIES AND INDICATED THAT UNDER SECRETARY BENNETT HAD SPECIFICALLY RECONFIRMED THIS. THE FINANCIAL



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EXDIS  
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EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 33 STATE 263002

ATTACHE GENERALLY REPEATED THE ARGUMENTATION PUT FORTH DURING THE RECENT BENNETT/ENDERS DISCUSSIONS IN GERMANY AND SAID THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT WAS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION THAT A WITTEVEN II/HEALY TYPE PLAN WOULD BE ADOPTED IN ADDITION TO THE US PROPOSAL. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT ACTUAL FINANCING OUT OF THE \$25 BILLION FUND WOULD AT MAXIMUM COME TO ONLY HALF THAT AMOUNT. WEBER SAID THAT HE WOULD FURTHER DISCUSS THE US PROPOSAL AND THE POINTS STRESSED BY THE FINANCIAL ATTACHE WITH STATE SECRETARY POEHL WHO WILL BE ACCOMPANYING THE CHANCELLOR TO WASHINGTON. CASH UNQUOTE, INGERSOLL

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5

# Department of State TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 358

PAGE 01 STATE 263806

60  
ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 RSC-01 SSO-00 ISO-00 EA-06 NSC-05  
NSCE-00 /028 R

DRAFTED BY S/S-0: R. ELTZ:WES  
APPROVED BY S/S-0: R. ELTZ

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O 300333Z NOV 74 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 263806

TOTEC 654

E.O. 11652: N/A  
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER HENRY A)  
SUBJECT: US PRC COMMUNIQUE

REFTEL PEKING 2201

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE.

2. QUOTE DR HENRY A. KISSINGER U S SECRETARY OF STATE AND ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, VISITED THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FROM NOVEMBER 25 THROUGH NOVEMBER 29, 1974. THE US AND CHINESE SIDES HELD FRANK, WIDE RANGING AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL TALKS. THE REAFFIRMED THEIR UNCHANGED COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AGREED THAT PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD WOULD VISIT THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN 1975. ENQ QUOTE. INGERSOLL



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Department of State

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WH  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

6908

PAGE 01 STATE 040465

63

ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 7026 R

DRAFTED BY EA/J:WCSHERMAN:RD

APPROVED BY EA - MR. HABIB

P - MR. RAPHEL

S/S - WHLUERS

NSC - MR. SMYSER

005701

P 220033Z FEB 75

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ STATE 040465

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: JA, OVIP (HIROHITO, EMPEROR)

SUBJECT: STATE VISIT OF EMPEROR HIROHITO

FOR AMBASSADOR

1. AT PRESENT, IT APPEARS THAT PERIOD LATE SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER WOULD BE MOST CONVENIENT TIME FOR THE PRESIDENT TO RECEIVE A STATE VISIT BY EMPEROR HIROHITO. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED PROPOSE THIS GENERAL TIME FRAME TO FOREIGN OFFICE AND ASCERTAIN WHETHER THEY HAVE SPECIFIC DATES TO SUGGEST.

2. GIVEN INTENSE JAPANESE PRESS INTEREST IN THIS MATTER WE SEE LITTLE CHANCE OF AVOIDING LEAKS. THEREFORE, ONCE AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON DATES WE WOULD HOPE FOR EARLIEST POSSIBLE JOINT RELEASE.

KISSINGER



~~SECRET~~  
b6 8/30/01



Department of State

7  
WH  
TELEGRAM

SECRET 6729

PAGE 01 STATE 043734

73  
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY EA/J:WCSHERMAN:RD  
APPROVED BY EA - MR. ZURHELLEN  
NSC - MR. SMYSER  
S/S - JPMOFFAT

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO NIACT IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 043734

EXDIS


E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: JA, OVIP (HIROHITO, EMPEROR)

SUBJECT: IMPERIAL VISIT  
REF: TOKYO 2511

RE QUERIES PARA 6 REFTEL: A) WE ARE AGREEABLE TO  
SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE OF ANNOUNCEMENT WITHOUT ADVANCE  
EMBARGOED RELEASE. WHITE HOUSE PRESS OFFICE IS CLOSED AT  
2030 HOURS AND WE WOULD MAKE NO SPECIAL EFFORT CALL PRESS  
IN, HOWEVER, WE COULD CONFIRM AND GIVE TEXT ANNOUNCEMENT IF  
ASKED. NESSEN WOULD MENTION ANNOUNCEMENT IN COURSE REGULAR  
BRIEFING FOLLOWING DAY; B) TEXT OF PROPOSED JAPANESE  
ANNOUNCEMENT IS ACCEPTABLE TO US; C) PRECISE WORDING US  
ANNOUNCEMENT IS IN CLEARANCE PROCESS, BUT IT WILL PROBABLY  
NOT DIFFER SUBSTANTIALLY FROM LANGUAGE PROPOSED BY  
YAMAZAKI. WE WILL INFORM YOU OF PRECISE WORDING PRIOR  
RELEASE.

KISSINGER



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SECRET

6/18/30/01 4



8

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013777

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Telegram

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . SECSTATE WASHDC

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TITLE . . . . . Nuclear Problems

CREATION DATE . . . . . 03/25/1975

VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400275

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL  
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE  
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 8

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Japan - State Department Telegrams:  
From SECSTATE - EXDIS

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/05/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

**EXEMPTED**

8/13/07





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 2974

PAGE 01 STATE 067853

63  
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY EA/J:DGBROWN:BB  
APPROVED BY EA: MR. HABIB  
S/S - MR. GAMMON

----- 097886

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 067853

EXDIS

E.O. 11652GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, JA, VN  
SUBJECT: JAPAN - DRV RELATIONS

REF: TOKYO 3772

IN MEETING WITH ARITA, CHARGE SHOULD EXPRESS APPRECIATION FOR FRANKNESS OF HANABUSA'S COMMENTS ON VIETNAM SITUATION. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT CONCLUSION OF AID AGREEMENT WITH DRV IN MIDST OF CURRENT OFFENSIVE WOULD BE, AS HANABUSA ADMITTED, MISUNDERSTOOD, AND HOPE, AS EMBASSY COMMENTED, THAT CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS IN TOKYO WILL NOT RESULT IN AGREEMENT. WE ALSO CONTINUE TO HOPE THAT GOJ WILL FIND REASONS TO DELAY OPENING ITS EMBASSY IN HANOI BEYOND APRIL 1, BUT DO NOT WISH TO PRESS GOJ HARD ON THIS POINT, RECOGNIZING HANABUSA'S POINT CONCERNING OUR RECENT REQUESTS TO GOJ. KISSINGER



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TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 4124

PAGE 01 STATE 086491

60  
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY EA/J:DGBROWN:BB  
APPROVED BY EA/J:MR. SHERMAN  
S/CPR: M.L. SHIELDS (SUBST)  
S/S-O: PSHANKLE

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027062

O 160208Z APR 75  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 086491

EXDIS


E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: JA, OVIP (EMPEROR HIROHITO)  
SUBJECT: IMPERIAL VISIT

REF: TOKYO 4914 (NOTAL)

TAIPEI FOR ROGER WALLACE

1. S/CPR OFFICER, ROGER WALLACE, IS TRAVELING WITH VICE PRESIDENTIAL PARTY. DEPT IS CERTAIN HE WOULD BE WILLING TO MEET WITH FONOFF PROTOCOL OFFICERS TO DISCUSS IMPERIAL VISIT AT HANEDA DURING ONE-HOUR STOPOVER APRIL 17.

2. FOR TAIPEI: PLEASE CONTACT WALLACE AND CABLE CONFORMATION OF ABOVE TO TOKYO. KISSINGER



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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 5600

PAGE 01 STATE 086528

43

ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY EA/J:CGDUNKERLEY:BB  
APPROVED BY EA/J: MR. SHERMAN  
D - MR. DUEMLING  
S/S - MR. ORTI,

P 161305Z APR 75  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY

036283

~~SECRET~~ STATE 086528

EXDIS

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: JA, PFOR

SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER MIYAZAWA'S MEETING WITH THE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY - APRIL 10

1. FOREIGN MINISTER MIYAZAWA MET WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY AND SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICERS ON APRIL 10 FOR GENERAL TOUR D'HORIZON. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL ISSUES DISCUSSED:

2. VIETNAM: FOLLOWING CANDID REVIEW BY US SIDE OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATIONS IN VIETNAM, MIYAZAWA OUTLINED JAPAN'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH HANOI WHICH WERE VIRTUALLY COMPLETED LAST FEBRUARY AFTER SEVERAL YEARS. HE NOTED THAT GOJ HAD AGREED TO PAY REPARATIONS EUPHEMISTICALLY DESCRIBED AS ECONOMIC COOPERATION; PAYMENT WOULD BE IN KIND AND IN TWO CUTS - AMOUNTING TO \$17 MILLION AND \$30 MILLION. GOJ HAD ALSO AGREED TO RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE OF EMBASSIES 91"H HANOI. ON REPRESENTATIONS FROM US, GOJ HAD DEFERRED SIGNING OF AGREEMENTS AND DRV REPRESENTATIVES HAD RETURNED TO HANOI, BUT MIYAZAWA DID NOT BELIEVE HE COULD DEFER SIGNING MUCH LONGER. HE ARGUED JAPAN WOULD NOT INCLUDE WAR



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 / State Dept Review  
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES TD 9/23/02  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 1/27/03

# TELEGRAM



PAGE 02 STATE 086528

7. NPT: MIYAZAWA REAFFIRMED GOJ INTENTION TO PRESENT TREATY TO DIET FOR RATIFICATION. HE EXPRESSED HOPE TO OBTAIN REAFFIRMATION OF US COMMITMENT UNDER SECURITY TREATY IN THIS REGARD. HE ALSO STATED JAPAN WOULD WISH TO SUBMIT RESOLUTION AT FORTHCOMING REVIEW CONFERENCE REEMPHASIZING RESPONSIBILITIES OF NUCLEAR POWERS TOWARD

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OVERSIGHT





*Department of State*

**TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 STATE 086528

NONNUCLEAR STATES. US SIDE INDICATED RESOLUTION RE-AFFIRMING RESOLUTION 225 WOULD NOT CAUSE PROBLEMS, BUT THAT US WOULD OPPOSE ONE WHICH WENT FURTHER OR ATTEMPTED TO ADD PROTOCOL TO TREATY. MIYAZAWA SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND US POINTS.

8. VISITS MIYAZAWA NOTED HIS DESIRE TO FIRM UP DATES FOR PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT DURING HIS STAY. HE ALSO CONVEYED FORMALLY THE INVITATION OF THE GOJ DEFENSE MINISTER THAT SECRETARY SCHLESINGER VISIT JAPAN AFTER THE IMPERIAL VISIT. KISSINGER







# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 5919

PAGE 01 STATE 144761

62  
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY EA/J:DFSMITH:BCL  
APPROVED BY P - MR SISCO  
E - MR. POATS(DRAFT)  
NEA/EGY - MR. BROWN  
EA - MR. EDMOND  
S/S - RKUCHEL  
EL

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R 192313Z JUN 75  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 144761

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS:EAID, EG, JA  
SUBJT: JAPANESE PARTICIPATION IN FINANCIAL AID TO EGYPT  
REF: A STATE 133619 B, TOKYO 7545

1. SUMMARY: UNDER SECRETARIES SISCO AND ROBINSON CLARIFIED FOR JAPANESE AMBASSADOR US THINKING REGARDING AMOUNTS AND CONDITIONS FOR AID PACKAGE FOR EGYPT, STRESSING THAT \$100 MILLION WAS FIGURE US BELIEVED APPROPRIATE FOR JAPAN FOR REMAINDER OF 1975. SPEAKING PERSONALLY AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THAT IF WORLD BANK WERE TO PLAY CENTRAL ROLE IN ORGANIZING INTERNATIONAL AID TO EGYPT, GOJ DECISION MIGHT BE EXPEDITED. ROBINSON CLARIFIED IBRD'S ADVISORY ROLE IN EGYPT AND EGYPTIAN ATTITUDES REGARDING BANK ROLE AND URGED YASUKAWA TO CONTACT IBRD VICE PRESIDENT FOR CORROBORATION REGARDING EGYPT'S NEEDS. END SUMMARY.

2. AMB. YASUKAWA SOUGHT FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF EGYPTIAN AID PACKAGE IN SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH UNDER SECRETARIES SISCO AND ROBINSON JUNE 16. POATS PARTICIPATED IN LATTER



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MEETING. YASUKAWA STATED THAT GOJ HAD AID TO EGYPT UNDER STUDY, BUT THAT CONFLICTING REPORTS OF EGYPTIAN NEEDS AND PORTION DESIRED FROM JAPAN MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR GOJ TO PROCEED. ORIGINAL FIGURE CITED BY USG HAD BEEN OVERALL PACKAGE OF \$1 BILLION OF CURRENT IMPORT FINANCING WITH \$100 MILLION JAPANESE PORTION. SUBSEQUENTLY EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER FAHMY IN CONVERSATION REPORTED REF B, HAD SPOKEN OF \$3 BILLION WITH \$200 MILLION COMING FROM JAPAN. AMB. TOLD ROBINSON EMBASSY HAD JUST RECEIVED COPY OF CABLE REPORTING AMB. EILTS EXPLANATION TO JAPANESE AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO THAT GOE'S \$3 BILLION INCLUDED \$1.5 BILLION TO REFINANCE EGYPT'S SHORT TERM DEBT. IN BOTH CONVERSATIONS YASUKAWA OFFERED AS PERSONAL RATHER THAN OFFICIAL VIEW SUGGESTION THAT WORLD BANK PLAY ROLE IN CLARIFYING EXACT NATURE OF EGYPT'S NEEDS AND GUIDELINES UNDER WHICH AID SHOULD BE PROVIDED. HE NOTED THAT IBRD PRESIDENT MCNAMARA HAD INFORMED HIM THAT USG HAD REQUESTED HIS ASSISTANCE AND THAT BANK STOOD READY TO HELP, IF GOE WERE TO MAKE REQUEST. YASUKAWA TOLD ROBINSON HE BELIEVED GOJ DECISION MIGHT BE ACCELERATED IF IBRD WERE TO COME UP WITH OVERALL PLAN.

3. SISCO STATED THAT US HAD DISCUSSED \$1.5 BILLION AID TOTAL WITH GOE WITH \$100 MILLION MENTIONED AS APPROPRIATE CONTRIBUTION FROM JAPAN. NATURALLY EGYPT WOULD LIKE TO OBTAIN \$200 MILLION FROM JAPAN, BUT USG HAD NOT TALKED ABOUT THIS AMOUNT. SISCO SAID USG CONSIDERED WORLD BANK INVOLVEMENT ESSENTIAL TO MONITOR EGYPT'S USE OF AID. HE EMPHASIZED THAT JAPAN AND US HAVE PARALLEL POLITICAL INTEREST IN HELPING EGYPT DEAL WITH HER PRESENT ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES.

4. ROBINSON EXPLAINED THAT US HAD AGREED TO ASSIST GOE IN SOLICITING FINANCIAL SUPPORT. US ROLE WAS CONDITIONED ON GOE AGREEMENT THAT (A) IT WOULD NOT MAKE NET REPAYMENTS ON DEBTS TO MAJOR FOREIGN OFFICIAL CREDITORS AND (B) GOE WOULD CONSULT IBRD IN DEVELOPING MORE RATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF ITS FOREIGN EXCHANGE. IN ADDITION EGYPT WAS URGED TO CLARIFY RULES APPLYING TO FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT, INCLUDING APPLICABLE TAX AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES.

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5. ROBINSON SAID \$3 BILLION FIGURE USED BY EGYPT INCLUDED AT LEAST \$1.5 BILLION IN REFINANCING OF SHORT-TERM COMMERCIAL BANK DEBT (FOR WHICH IT IS SEEKING ARAB CASH LOANS) AND SOME FUNDS FOR EARLY 1976. USG BELIEVED THAT EGYPT SHOULD EXERCISE GREATER SELF-DISCIPLINE AND THAT \$1 BILLION WAS ADEQUATE FOR BALANCE OF 1975, INCLUDING \$250 MILLION FROM US, MATCHED BY \$100 MILLION EACH FROM JAPAN AND FRG AND \$50 MILLION FROM FRANCE. GOE, HE SAID, COULD ACHIEVE SAVINGS BY SLOWING DOWN CAPITAL INVESTMENTS FOR WHICH PROJECT FUNDS ARE NOT CURRENTLY AVAILABLE, BY RESCHEDULING EXISTING BILATERAL DEBT TO EASTERN EUROPE/ USSR AND BY ECONOMIZING ON IMPORTS OF CONSUMER GOODS.

6. ROBINSON SAID ROLE OF IBRD WAS TO PROVIDE ADVICE TO GOE ON MANAGING ITS FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND IN ESTABLISHING ITS ECONOMIC PRIORITIES. POATS DESCRIBED INDEPENDENT WORK OF IBRD TEAM NOW IN EGYPT AND NOTED THAT IBRD VICE PRESIDENT FOR MIDDLE EAST WAS PREPARED TO RECOMMEND THAT BANK CONTINUE ITS LENDING PROGRAM AT PRESENT \$200 MILLION LEVEL. HOWEVER, IBRD HAD NEITHER BEEN ASKED NOR VOLUNTEERED TO BE CENTER OF CONSORTIUM FOR EGYPT. SUCH A ROLE WAS NOT DESIRED BY EGYPT, WHICH COUNTS OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES AS ITS LARGEST DONORS AND FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS DOES NOT WANT AT THIS TIME TO GO THROUGH A BELT-TIGHTENING REGIME UNDER IBRD TUTELAGE. A CENTRAL COORDINATION ROLE FOR THE BANK IS ALSO NOT DESIRED BY THE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES, ALTHOUGH SAUDI ARABIA, ALONG WITH IRAN, WISHES BANK TO CONTINUE TO ASSIST EGYPT IN MANAGEMENT OF ITS ECONOMY. YASUKAWA ASKED IF, INSTEAD OF HEADING CONSORTIUM, IBRD MIGHT SIMPLY CALL A MEETING OF DONORS UNDER ITS AUSPICES. ROBINSON SAID HE WOULD NOT RULE OUT SUCH A MECHANISM AS MEANS OF EVALUATING AID PROGRAM FROM TIME TO TIME. POATS URGED YASUKAWA TO CONTACT IBRD VICE PRESIDENT BENJENK FOR CORROBORATION OF US VIEWS REGARDING GOE NEEDS, BUT SUGGESTED THAT FOR PUBLIC RELATIONS REASONS GOE WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO HAVE IBRD CALL DONOR MEETING ANY TIME SOON. KISSINGER



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DRAFTED BY NEA/EGY:GGBROWN:CEK  
APPROVED BY E - MR POATS  
S/S - MR. ORTIZ  
NEA:ALATHERTONJR

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
E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: EAID, JA, EG, US

SUBJECT: EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT

REFERENCE: TOKYO 10256; STATE 177515

1. REGRET CONTINUING CONFUSION ON SUBJECT EMERGENCY AID TO EGYPT. THE UNITED STATES' 250 MILLION DOLLAR CONTRIBUTION WILL BE COMPOSED OF THREE DIFFERENT ELEMENTS. SEVENTY MILLION DOLLAR LOAN FOR COMMODITY IMPORTS USING FY 75 AID FUNDS WAS SIGNED WITH GOE JUNE 29. EIGHTY MILLION DOLLARS WHEAT/WHEAT FLOUR UNDER THE FY 76 PL-480 PROGRAM PROBABLY WILL BE SIGNED WITH EGYPTIANS IN AUGUST. ONE HUNDRED MILLION DOLLARS FOR COMMODITY IMPORTS WILL PROBABLY BE SIGNED UNDER FY 76 AID PROGRAM IN LATE SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER. THIS LAST AMOUNT WILL NEED CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION. THE OVERALL FY 76 AID PROPOSED PROGRAM FOR MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES HAS NOT BEEN SENT TO CONGRESS YET BUT WILL BE SENT FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF OUR MIDDLE EAST POLICY REASSESSMENT. AT THAT TIME WE ENVISAGE BEING IN A POSITION



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TO FULLY BRIEF CONGRESS ON THE EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND SPECIFICALLY ON THE UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTION.

2. WE ENVISAGE A TOTAL OF AT LEAST 150 MILLION DOLLAR CONTRIBUTION FROM EC COUNTRIES. WE ARE NOT CERTAIN AT THIS

POINT IF THESE COUNTRIES WILL CHOOSE TO CONTRIBUTE THROUGH THE EC MECHANISM OR THROUGH BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE EGYPTIANS. WE ENVISAGE IN THIS CONTRIBUTION AT LEAST 100 MILLION DOLLARS FROM GERMANY AND 50 MILLION DOLLARS FROM FRANCE, WITH 15-20 MILLION DOLLARS FROM THE U.K., AND SOME SMALLER CONTRIBUTIONS BY OTHER EC COUNTRIES. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE STILL EXPECT A 100-MILLION-DOLLAR COMMITMENT FROM JAPAN. THE OVERALL TARGET REMAINS ONE BILLION DOLLARS.

3. FULL 100 MILLION DOLLARS IS NEEDED FROM JAPAN ALONG WITH MORE THAN 150 MILLION DOLLARS FROM EC COUNTRIES. DELAYS IN PROCESSING LOAN AGREEMENTS AND PROCUREMENT ACTIONS, AND LACK OF PERFECT FIT BETWEEN TIED AID AVAILABILITIES AND ACTUAL EGYPTIAN MARKET DEMAND, WILL REQUIRE AN INCREASED AMOUNT FOR THE EFFECTIVE IMPACT OF THIS AID ON CY 75 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. INGERSOLL



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DRAFTED BY E:RMPOATS  
APPROVED BY E:RMPOATS  
NEA/EGY:GGBROWN(SUBSTANCE)  
EA/J:DSMITH  
S/S -LCJOHNSTONE

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
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E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: EAID, USEGJC  
SUBJECT: EMERGENCY AID TO EGYPT

REF: (A) TOKYO 10476, (B) STATE 177515, (C) STATE 162867,  
(D) STATE 179564.

1. JAPANESE AMBASSADOR CALLING ON UNDER SECRETARY ROBINSON AT EMBASSY REQUEST THURSDAY MORNING. MEANWHILE EMBASSY SHOULD DEFER MAKING PRESENTATION TO FOREIGN OFFICE REQUESTED BY REF B. FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS, IF REQUIRED, WILL BE DISPATCHED FOLLOWING AMBASSADOR'S CALL.

2. AGREE THAT ISSUE OF ADDITIONALLITY OF NEW AID PACKAGE WAS NOT MADE CLEAR AT SUFFICIENTLY EARLY STAGE AND THAT GOJ CAN TAKE POSITION THAT ENTIRE \$75 MILLION OUTSTANDING COMMITMENT COULD BE ARGUED TO BE NEW AID INASMUCH AS LOAN AGREEMENT HAS NEVER BEEN SIGNED. DEPARTMENT'S CONCERN IS THAT EGYPTIANS WILL REGARD JAPANESE CONTRIBUTION OF \$100 MILLION CONSISTING OF \$25 MILLION IN NEW COMMITMENT AND BELATED LENDING OF \$75 MILLION FROM OLD COMMITMENT



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AS A SHELL-GAME. THIS REACTION WILL BE PARTICULARLY PREDICTABLE IF THERE IS ANY QUALIFICATION OR CONSIDERABLE DELAY ASSOCIATED WITH THE \$25 MILLION IN THIS PACKAGE. UNDER SECRETARY WILL DISCUSS THIS WITH AMBASSADOR BUT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT EMBASSY'S CONCERN THAT INSISTENCE ON A LARGER PROPORTION OF NEW AID WILL BE COUNTER PRODUCTIVE AT THIS STAGE.

3. EMBASSY'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON QUESTIONS POSED BY FOREIGN OFFICE WERE ANSWERED IN REF D WHICH CROSSED REF A IN TRANSMISSION. DEPARTMENT UNAWARE OF ANY OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTED BY GOJ.

4. AS TO EMBASSY'S VIEW THAT FOREIGN OFFICE HAS BEEN HANDICAPPED BY ABSENCE OF DONORS' MEETING, PURPOSE OF MEETING HELD AT IBRD JULY 10 (REF C) WAS TO MEET THIS JAPANESE NEED. SEE PARA 5 OF REF C. EMBASSY DOES NOT REFER THIS TELEGRAM, RAISING QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER IT WAS RECEIVED. HOWEVER, JAPANESE EMBASSY OFFICERS STATE TAT THEY REPORTED MEETING FULLY TO TOKYO. INGERSOLL



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DRAFTED BY: S/AJ:AMBASSADOR JOHNSON  
APPROVED BY: S/AJ:AMBAS ADOR JOHNSON  
S/S:MR BORG  
EA/J-MR SMITH (SUBS)

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E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PARM, JA  
SUBJECT: SALT BRIEFING

REF: TOKYO 13179

1. AMBASSADOR JOHNSON CONCURS WITH PROPOSED SCHEDULE FOR SEPTEMBER 22 SALT BRIEFING. DEPARTMENT IS NOT PLANNING ANY PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT OF VISIT, BUT WILL RESPOND AFFIRMATIVELY TO ANY INQUIRIES. NAC MAKES FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF CONSULTATIONS (TEXT OF LAST NAC PRESS STATEMENT BY SEPTTEL) AND THERE IS NO OBJECTION IF GOJ DESIRES TO DO SOMETHING SIMILAR TO SHOW THIS EFFORT BY USG TO TREAT GOJ ON SAME BASIS AS NAC. KISSINGER



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DRAFTED BY OES/NET/IM:DHOLE  
APPROVED BY OES/NET/IM:DHOLE  
NRC - B. HUBERMAN (SUBS)  
NEA/INS - J. NACH

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INFO AMCONSUL BOMBAY PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: TECH, IAEA

SUBJECT: TARAPUR FUEL LICENSE

REF: NEW DELHI 10883

PASS TO MR. KRATZER

1. REVIEW OF EXPORT LICENSE FOR TARAPUR ENRICHED URANIUM  
FUEL CONTINUES UNDER ACTIVE USG REVIEW.

2. FYI -- NRC STAFF ANTICIPATES THAT COMMISSION DECISION  
WILL BE MADE SOME TIME NEXT WEEK. COMMISSIONER KENNEDY  
WILL HAVE ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND FOR KRATZER WHEN FORMER  
ARRIVES VIENNA. END FYI. KISSINGER



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DRAFTED BY EA/J:WILLIAM C. SHERMAN  
APPROVED BY EA - ARTHUR W. HUMMEL  
S/S - MR. BRIDGES

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, MARR, JA

SUBJECT: MIG-25 ACCESS

ON INSTRUCTIONS, HUMMEL MADE FOLLOWING STATEMENT TO JAPANESE MINISTER NISHIDA AT 11:45 SEPT. 9 QTE: I HAVE BEEN DIRECTED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY TO EXPRESS MY GOVT'S CONCERN THAT US EXPERTS HAVE STILL NOT BEEN ALLOWED ACCESS TO THE MIG-25. WE FEEL THAT IT IS IN THE JOINT INTERESTS OF THE USG AND THE GOJ THAT A THOROUGH EXAMINATION SHOULD TAKE PLACE PROMPTLY. WE ARE PUZZLED THAT YOUR GOVT HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO ARRANGE FOR OUR ACCESS. AS YOU HAVE BEEN INFORMED ALREADY, THIS MATTER IS VIEWED WITH GREAT CONCERN BY THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE USG. I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU WOULD CONVEY THESE VIEWS TO YOUR GOVT BY EXPEDITIOUS MEANS. UNQTE. NISHIDA ASKED ONLY WHETHER REPRESENTATIONS HAD BEEN MADE IN TOKYO AND HUMMEL CONFIRMED THAT THEY HAD. KISSINGER



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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 / *State Dept Review*  
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES *TD 9/23/02*  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 1/27/03

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