The original documents are located in Box 7, folder "Japan - MIG - Incident (1)" of Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013707

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL .		National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL		Intelligence Report
DESCRIPTION		Re Soviet combat readiness
CREATION DATE		09/1976
VOLUME		5 pages
BOX NUMBER		NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
DATE WITHDRAWN		
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST .		

Saintized 9/21/05

THORITY P. O. De See - 0/2/105

BY _____ NLF, DATE 5/11/07

COMBAT READINESS, STRENGTH, ORGANIZATION, AND EQUIPMENT OF THE

25**X**1

25X1

THIS REPORT WAS PREPARED BY THE U.S. AIR FORCE AND THE DEFENSE

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		25X1
2.	THE NORMAL TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND	
EQUIPMENT	(T/O AND E) FOR A PVO FIGHTER REGIMENT WAS 36 INTERCEPTOR	ls.
A REGIMEN	T CONSISTED OF THREE SQUADRONS OF TWELVE AIRCRAFT EACH.	
SQUADRONS	WERE FURTHER DIVIDED INTO FLIGHTS OF FOUR AIRCRAFT AND	•
FLIGHTS W	ERE DIVIDED INTO PAIRS OF AIRCRAFT.	
3.	IN ADDITION TO COMBAT AIRCRAFT, FIVE TO SIX NONCOMBAT	
CAPABLE	TRAINERS WERE INITIALLY ASSIGNED TO A REGIMENT WHEN IT	
WAS BEING	REEQUIPPED WITH NEW AIRCRAFT. THESE WERE RETAINED	
DURING TH	E PILOT FAMILIARIZATION PHASE OF TRAINING BUT ONLY TWO	
TO THREE	TRAINERS WERE RETAINED ONCE FULL COMBAT READINESS WAS	
REACHED.	SQUADRONS CONVERTED TO NEW AIRCRAFT ONE AT A TIME. AD-	
JACENT RE	GIMENTS, IF ANY, ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECTOR	
DURING IN	IITIAL TRAINING.	
4.	T/O AND E HAD ONLY A PAPER VALUE. REGIMENT WAS	25X1
EQUIPPED	ONLY WITH 25 INTERCEPTORS AND FOUR TRAINERS, ONE OF WHICH	
WAS ALREA	DY INOPERATIVE. FEW REPLACEMENT	25X1
AIRCRAFT	WERE AVAILABLE FOR THOSE DAMAGED OR LOST. WHEN AVAILABLE,	
THESE WER	RE LONG IN ARRIVING. WHEN ASKED ABOUT REPLACEMENTS FOR	4
AIRCRAFT	ROTATED FOR MAINTENANCE,	25X3

Approved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-PC_EA_P-7-2-1-5

SECRET (classification)

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<u>.1</u>	5.	REGIMENT WAS NOT EXPECTED TO	
	REACH FUL	L COMBAT CAPABILITY FOR TWO YEARS AFTER RECEIPT OF THEIR	
	FIRST SQUA	ADRON OF MIG-25'S IN AUGUST 1975. AT THAT POINT THEY	
	WOULD NOR	MALLY BEGIN PRIMARY EMPHASIS ON TRAINING NEWLY ASSIGNED	
	PILOTS FO	R TRANSFER TO REGIMENTS ELSEWHERE WHICH WERE SCHEDULED	
	TO BE REE	QUIPPED WITH MIG-25'S.	
1	6.	THESE PROCEDURES WERE (PVO?) FORCE	
	WIDE. ON	LY FOUR OF THE ORIGINAL MIG-17 PILOT COMPLEMENT AT SOK-	
	OLOVKA WE	RE RETRAINED TO FLY MIG-25'S AND ONE SUBSEQUENTLY CRASHED	
	DUE TO HI	S INABILITY TO RELY ON INSTRUMENTS.	
	A LOW OPI	NION OF BOTH THE MIG-17 AND ITS PILOTS.) PILOTS THAT	
	FLY THE M	IG-25 WERE NORMALLY DRAWN FROM ESTABLISHED COMBAT-READY	
	REGIMENTS	EQUIPPED WITH LATE MODEL SUPERSONIC AIRCRAFT SUCH AS THE	
3	SU-15 [FL	AGON]. MOST OF THE MIG-17 PILOTS	
	FROM HIS	REGIMENT WERE TRANSFERED TO THE FEW REMAINING MIG-17	
•	REGIMENTS	IN THE FORCE WHEN THE REGIMENT REEQUIPPED. IT WAS BECOMING	
	EVIDENT T	HAT THERE WERE FEWER AND FEWER SLOTS FOR THESE PILOTS.	
1	7.	THE SUBORDINATION, LOCATION, AND COMBAT	
5	READINESS	OF REGIMENTS IN THE 11TH AIR ARMY AS FOLLOWS:	5
4 3			4 3
2			2

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REGIMENTAL AIRFIELD	SUBORDINATION	AIRCRAFT	PILOT READINESS
UCHOVOYE	HQ 23RD CORPS	SU-9/MIG-23	NONE#
SPASSK DALNIY	23RD CORPS	YAK-28P	FULL
SOKOLOVKA	23RD CORPS	MIG-25	POOR#
ZOIGTAY TOLINA (UTASHI)	23RD CORPS	SU-15TM	FULL
VELIKAYA KEMA SQUADRON	23RD CORPS	16 TO 18 MIG-	17 FULL#
10TH DISTRICT			
(NEAR KHABAROVSK)	(POSS HQ)	SU-9/MIG-23	POOR##
PEREYASLAVKA	KHABAROVSK DIVISI	ON SU-15	FULL
SOVETSKAYA GAVAN	KHABAROVSK DIVISI	ION MIG-17	FULL##
SMIRNYKH	KHABAROVSK DIVISI	ON YAK-28P	FULL
YELIZOVO	KAMCHATKA DIVISI	ION SU-15TM	PARTIAL##
BUREVESTNIK	KURILES DIVISION	MIG-17	FULL
ANADYR	?	TWO SQUADE	RONS
		YAK-28P	
		ONE SQUADE	RON
		MIG-19	FULL

5X1

OVERALL COMBAT CAPABILITY OF THE 23RD CORPS IS QUITE LOW. TWO
OUT OF FOUR REGIMENTS ARE UNDERGOING TRAINING IN NEW AIRCRAFT.
THE MIG-17'S PERFORMANCE AS AN INTERCEPTOR IS VERY POOR.

REGIMENTS UNDERGOING TRAINING IN NEW AIRCRAFT (SUCH AS THE YELIZOVO UNIT WITCH REGAN IN EARLY 1975) OR THOSE EQUIPPED WITH OBSOLETE MIG-17'S.

8. AIRCRAFT FROM REGIMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN REEQUIPPED FELL INTO TWO CATAGORIES. MIG-17 S AND MIG-19 S WERE RETURNED TO AIRCRAFT FACTORIES FOR CONVERSION INTO TARGET DRONES, MIG-15 TRAINERS WERE MOTHBALLED. MORE MODERN AIRCRAFT SUCH AS THE SU-9, YAK-28, ETC., WERE REFURBISHED AND OFTEN USED TO REPLACE EVEN OLDER AIRCRAFT ELSEWHERE IN THE FORCE.



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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013708

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National	security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram	
DESCRIPTION Re MIG-2	5 incident
CREATION DATE	76
VOLUME 3 pages	
PACIFI	SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL RY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
BOX NUMBER	MIG-25 Incident (1)
DATE WITHDRAWN	01

Exempt 4/12/05 5/3///



Department of State TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 9896

PAGE 01

TOKYO 13490 0818197

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /026 W 028463

O 081805Z SEP 76
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2127

CONFIDENTIAL TOKYO 13490

EXPIS

E.O. GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, JA
SUBJECT: SOVIET DEFECTOR

REF: STATE 221875

1. GOJ CLEARLY PREFERS DEFECTOR TRAVEL TO US BY CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT. AS PLAN NOW SHAPING UP HE WILL DEPART HANEDA ON REGULARLY SCHEDULED AIRCRAFT BETWEEN 1800 AND 1900 SEPTEMBER 9. WE WILL PROVIDE PRECISE DETAILS WHEN FIXED.





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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHOC IMMEDIATE 2126

CONFIDENTIAL TOKYO 13489

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3 TAGS: PFOR, US, JA, SREF SUBJECT: MIG=25

REF: STATE 220959

☐ Retain Class'n ☐ Change	
☐ Declassify in part and ex	cise as shown
EO 12958, 25X()()()
Declassify After	
☐ With concurrence	(not)(obtained)
200 A 1	ate
U.S. FOREIGN STOLEN	ALIG 3 2000

1. PRIOR TO DINNER FOR GOVERNOR SCRANTON SEPT 9 I WAS ABLE TO RAISE DIRECTLY WITH FOREIGN MINISTER MIYAZAWA QUESTION OF TECHNICAL EXAMINATION OF MIG 25. I PUT TO HIM OUR HIGH LEVEL AND INTENSE INTEREST AS OUTLINED REFTEL, FOREIGN MINISTER RESPONDED THAT HE "FULLY SYMPATHETIC WITH OUR CONCERNS" AND STATED THAT HE COULD "ASSURE YOU THAT WE WOULD WANT TO DO ANYTHING WHICH IS FEASIBLE AND WHICH IS NOT VISIBLE TO THE MEDIA TO FACILITATE YOUR PARTICIPATION IN AN EXAMINATION OF THE AIRCRAFT. THE QUESTION IS HOW TO ACCOMPLISH THIS". AFTER A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF WAYS IN WHICH THE PARTICIPATION OF AMERICAN EXPERTS MIGHT BE ARRANGED, THE FOREIGN MINISTER CONCLUDED THE CONVERSATION BY GESERVING THAT THE PRIME MINISTER IS "LEANING AWAY FROM YOUR DESIRES ON THIS".

2. FOLLOWING DINNER, FOREIGN MINISTER INVITED ME AND EMBOFF PLATT TO REMAIN FOR A FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION, AND ASKED HIS TOP ADVISERS TO JOIN US. THESE INCLUDED VICE MINISTER SATO, DEPUTY MINISTER ARITA, DIRGENS YAMAZAKI, (AMERICAN AFFAIRS), NAKAJIMA (TREATIES BUREAU), AND TACHIBANA (EUROPEAN AFFAIRS-WHO WAS SUMMONED FROM FOREIGN MINISTRY FOR THIS MEETING). DURING 2 HOUR DISCUSSION FOLLOWING POINTS EMERGED:

A. JAPANESE FULLY AWARE OF HIGH U.S. INTEREST IN KNOWING AS MUCH

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12966, SEC. 3.5

STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES, STALV: 5.4 8/5/60

BY http://doi.org/10.1001/10.10

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02

TOKYO 13489 Ø81825Z

ABOUT AIRCRAFT AS POSSIBLE (MIYAZAWA DESCRIBED IT AS "JACKPOT").

B. MODALITIES OF HANDLING PROBLEM MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH ACTIONS OF RESPONSIBLE INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT AND NOT PROVOCATIVE TO SOVIET UNION.

C. AMERICAN PARTICIPATION MUST BE KEPT FROM PUBLIC VIEW.

D. AIRCRAFT MUST BE RETURNED TO SOVIETS, THOUGH THERE NO CONSENSUS ON TIMING.

3. MIYAZAWA KEPT RETURNING TO CONSIDERATION OF WAYS OF MOVING AIRCRAFT TO LOCATION WHICH WOULD PERMIT MAXIMUM DISCREET ACCESS BY AMERICAN EXPERTS. SINCE WE LACKED EXPERTISE TO MAKE JUDGMENT ON FEASIBILITY OF THIS APPROACH, I THEN FOCUSSED ON INTERIM MEASURES DESIGNED TO INITIATE AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN EXAMINATION OF PLANE, SPECIFICALLY TO ARRANGE FOR EARLIEST INCLUSION OF THREE NISEI DOD CIVILIANS ON JDA SURVEY TEAM. I INSISTED THAT GOJ SHOULD BE ABLE TO WORK OUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS MINIMUM FIRST STEP. WHEN QUESTION RAISED, I EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT OFFSITE CONSULTATION BETWEEN AMERICAN EXPERTS AND JDA TEAM WOULD MEET GUR NEEDS BUT AGREED TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITY WITH U.S. EXPERTS.

4. COMMENT: EXTRAORDINARY MEETING CONVENED BY FOREIGN MINISTER TO DISCUSS OUR NEEDS DEMONSTRATES THAT HE IS GENUINELY CONCERNED TO FIND MEANS OF INSURING MAXIMUM EXPLOITATION OF AIRCRAFT WITH OUR PARTICIPATION. HOWEVER HE EVIDENTLY IS UNWILLING TO IGNORE WHAT HE THINKS WILL BE ADVERSE REACTION ON PART OF JAPANESE PUBLIC AND SOVIETS TO KNOWLEDGE OF US PARTICIPATION IN SURVEY. THE FOREIGN MINISTER WILL BE RECEPTIVE TO ANY SUGGESTIONS AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT THAT WE MIGHT HAVE THAT FIT THE FRAMEWORK OF HIS CONCERNS. FOR THE MOMENT, HOWEVER, PROBABLY THE BEST WE CAN HOPE FOR IS TO OBTAIN DIRECT PARTICIPATION BY QUALIFIED NISEI PERSONNEL IN EXAMINATION OF AIRCRAFT AS PART OF JDA TEAM. I WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS THIS COURSE WHILE EXPLORING OTHER ALTERNATIVES.

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01

STATE 222493

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ORIGIN SS-25

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SECRET STATE 222493

EXDIS

E.O. 116528 GDS

TAGS: MARR JA

SUBJECT: ACCESS TO MIG=25 AIRCRAFT

STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW ☐ Retain Class'n ☐ Change to ___ ☐ Declassify in part and excise as shown EO 12958, 25X()()()-Declassify After_ (not)(obtained ☐ With concurrence ____ Date__ AUG. 3 2000 JOSEPH P. LEAH

U.S. FOREIGN SERVICE (1987.)

HABIB CALLED IN JAPANESE CHARGE NISHIDA TODAY TO EXPRESS IN CLEAR AND STRONG TERMS OUR CONCERN OVER CON-TINUING DELAY IN AFFORDING US ACCESS TO MIG-25.

STRESSING OUR CLOSE MUTUAL DEFENSE SECURITY RELATION-SHIP, HABIB SAID THAT USG AT HIGHEST LEVELS PUZZLED AND CONCERNED BY CONTINUED DELAY IN ALLOWING JOINT JDA/U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL ACCESS TO THE PLANE, HABIB POINTED OUT THE UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED BOTH GOJ AND USG BY POSSESSION OF MIG-25. INDICATING HE SPEAKING UNDER INSTRUCTION, HABIB STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF UTILIZING THIS OPPORTUNITY IN TERMS OF OUR SECURITY INTERESTS AND REQUESTED THAT NISHIDA CONVEY IMMEDIATELY TO TOKYO THE HIGH-LEVEL CONCERN HERE ABOUT NEED FOR EARLIEST ACCESS TO THE PLANE. IN THAT CONTEXT, HABIB POINTED OUT THAT WE UNDERSTOOD NEED FOR DISCREET JOINT ACTION BUT REITERATED

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES, STOREVISH 8/3/00

. NARA, DATE 8/30/01 NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02

STATE 222493

THAT WE MUST NOT LET THIS UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY PASS.

3. NISHIDA SAID HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD IMPORTANCE USG ATTACHES TO THIS MATTER AND PROMISED TO CONVEY OUR VIEWS IMMEDIATELY. KISSINGER



SECRET

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013709

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL .	 National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL	 Telegram
DESCRIPTION	 Re debriefing of MIG-25 pilot
CREATION DATE	 09/08/1976
VOLUME	 2 pages
BOX NUMBER	 NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
DATE WITHDRAWN WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST .	

Exempt 5/11/07

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013710

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction	
TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram	
CREATOR'S NAME AMEMBASSY TOKYO RECEIVER'S NAME SECSTATE WASHDC	
TITLE Access to MIG-25 Aircraft	
CREATION DATE	
VOLUME 3 pages	
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400268 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENT: COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC	
BOX NUMBER	
DATE WITHDRAWN	

E.O. 12988, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, QUIDELINES, State VISA SIMOS
BY 4h NARA, DATE 9/7/01

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PUEHKO #3578 2531485

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* AMEMBASSY TOTYO

D SECREATE MASHOC WINCT INMEDIATE 2136

WENGASAY MOSCOW INMEDIATE 3619

ECKET TOKYO 139/8

IMDIS
O. (1559: COS
AGS: PFOR, US, JA, SMEF, MARR
JRJECT: ACCESS TO MIG-25 AIRCRAFT
EF! A. STATE 228555 8. TORYO 13489

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

MR # 29-84: #4

Plate lev 2/3/10; C14 lev 2/3/10

By dat NARA, Date 41: (10)

IN COCCOTANTED SERIES OF REPRESENTATIONS SEPTEMBER O. SENIOR BRASSY OFFICERS AND COMUSIADAN CONTINUED TO PPESS AT TOP LEVELS P BBI AGENCIES INVOLVED HIGH LEVEL AND INTENSE USG CONCERN TO USURE MAXIMUM EXPLOITATION OF MIG-25 AND FOR THAT PURPOSE TO STATE BERET PARTICIPATION OF AMERICAN EXPERTS. MEETINGS PRANCED DURING MORNING BY DEFATT PRENER HINISTER BAKATA FOR PURPOSE OF DELIVERING PERSONAL ESSAGES FROM RESPECTIVE AGENCY HEADS! ALSO HET ITH WITE MINDER MARUTAMA AND ACTING NATIONAL POLICE DIRGEN! HEOPPE REMAINED IN CLOSE TOUCH THROUGHOUT DAY WITH PONMIN NERTHAM AND EUROPEAN AFFAIRS BUREAUS, AND I HAVE FOLLOWED E LAST WIGHT'S DISCUSSION (REF 8) WITH DIRGENS OTH BUREAUS, COMUSIAPAN HAS REVIEWED SITUATION HITH DIRECTOR DINT STAFF OFFICE. THROUGHOUT HE HAVE STRESSED UNGENCY OF PROining proper and expertive access by american expects pop SPPICIENT PERIOD OF TIME TO PERMIT FULL INVESTIGATION. WE MAVE LEO UNGED JOA CIVILIAN AND UNIFORMED OFFICIALS TO TAKE LEAD IN PROPERTY THE CHIPTETTY IN THIER INTERMINISTERIAL DISCUSSIONS AND IN EVISING WAYS IN WHICH US ACCESS WILL BE ASSURED WITHOUT EXPOSIVE T TO PUBLIC GLARE, HE ALSO HAVE INJECTED CAUTIONARY NOTE ON MEED S PROVIDE TIGHT BECURITY FOR AIRCRAFT.

DIM BASTS THESE CONTACTS AND REPRESENTATIONS, WE ARE SECUNDING BEE ADME SIGNS THAT THE BUREAUCHATIC MACHINERY MAY BE TURNING ROUND, WE MAVE SEEN TOLD THAT THIS HORRING AT SPECIAL CASING.

COM, HY.LL

SMIRALTAN PASE PI

TOR: 253/14:402 OTG: 013/57 SEP 70

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N. FOROLIS

errer at Cata

FFICE MEETING OF OPFICIALS OF AGENCIES CONCERNED, CHAIRED BY EPUTY CHIEF CARINET SECRETARY KATPU, IT WAS AGREED THAT CHIEF ELEMEN MAD DEPARTED, MATTER SHOULD NO LONGER HE MANDLED AS RIMINAL CASE UNDER JURISDICTION OF PROCURATORS BUT SHOULD BE URNED OVER TO NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORITIES -- I.E. JAPAN DEFENSE GENCY -- TO TAKE CUSTODY OF PLANE AND CONTINUE INVESTIGATION. MIS RECOMMENDATION WILL MAVE TO BE APPROVED BY CASINET OFFICERS, UT YAMAZAKI HAS TOLD ME THIS SMOULD BE AUTOMATIC. LEDAL ATIONALE WILL MAVE TO BE DEVISED FOR JOA CUSTODY AND CONTINUING NVESTIGATION, HOWEVER, AND IT NOT CLEAR MON SOON THIS SHIFT IN URISDICTION WILL TAKE PLACE. IT IS, NONETHELESS, A STEP IN RIGHT INECTION. VICE MINISTER MARBYAMA HAS TOLD US THAT ONCE THIS STEP TAKEM, JOA THEN WILL PRESS FOR DECISION TO PERMIT JOA TO CALL N. DTE MOST EXPERTS.

MOPA, JOA AND MATIONAL POLICE ARE OF ONE MINE THAT IT IS REPORTANT FOR U.S. TO GATH ACCESS AND THEY SEEM TO BE COOPERATING ONE CLOSELY TO BRING THIS ABOUT. CURRENT JOA TMINKING IS TO MOLD LANE FOR AT LEAST ALD DAYS FOR EXAMINATION. MARUYAMA SAID THIS IGHT BE EXTENDED IF MECERSARY, ALTHOUGH ME RECOGNIZED POLITICAL RESSURES MIGHT BUILD UP FOR RETURN. MARUYAMA, MOMEVER, DID NOT SEEM TO BE UNDER ANY IMMEDIATE SENSE OF TIME PRESSURE CONCERNING ETURN OF PLANE. GENERALLY SPEAKING, JOA SEEMS TO BE MOVING INTO DRE POSITIVE, LEADING POSITION IN SEEKING RESOLUTION OF THIS ATTER, AND MARUYAMA MAS TOLD US THAT LETTERS FROM SECOEF RUMSFELD NO CIA DIRECTOR BUSH HAVE BEEN GUITE HELPFUL TO ITS EFFORTS.

LIAISON BETWEEN US TECHNICAL EXPERTS NOW AT MISAWA AIR BASE NO JASOF INVESTIGATING TEAM AT HAKODATE (WHICH MAS BEEN OPER TING TO DATE UNDER AEGIS OF PROCURATORS) NOW HAS BEEN AGREED PON, LIMITED AMOUNT OF DATE HAS BEEN PASSED, PRIMARILY PHOTOMRAPHS. IN OUR CONTACTS TODAY, HOMEVER, HE HAVE EMPHASIZED THAT HIS ARRANGEMENT COULD ONLY BE CONSIDERED A TEMPURARY STOP-GAP BETTER THAN MOTHING) AND THAT DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN EXAMINATION Y US EXPERTS IS ESSENTIAL FOR EFFECTIVE AND FULL EXPLOITATION.

DECOUNSELOR THAT WHEN SOVIET AMBASSAGOR POLYANSKY CALLED ON EPUTY POREIGN MINISTER ARITA AT 1480 THIS AFTERNOON, HE DEMANDED ETURN OF PILOT AND PLANE BUT DID NOT REVERT TO LEGAL ARGUMENTA* ION USED IN EARLIER SOVIET EMBASSY PROTEST THAT AIRCRAPT HAS XTRATERRITORIAL CHARACTER. ME DID, MONEVER, STATE THAT THIRD OUNTRY INVOLVEMENT NOULD HAVE UNFAVORABLE REPERCUSSIONS FOR OVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS. ARITA COUNTERED WITH EXPRESSION OF URPRISE THAT SOVIETS MAY THUS FAR NOT EXPRESSED REGRET FOR MCIDENT WHICH COULD HAVE DONE GRAVE TO JAPAN'S SECURITY. HE NSISTED PILOT SOUGHT TO GO TO U.S. OF OWN FREE WILL, WHICH IT IS JAPAN'S POLICY TO RESPECT. ARITA SAID ONLY THAT HE NOTED


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Tames of Soviets Re Peturn of Aircraft and Would Convey to tome authorities, me we jected, homever, soviet reference to wird country pressures and said that as independent country apar not subject to such pressures. In commenting, said may me has seem arguing that it is in Japan's security interests o molo aircraft for investigation and that this smould have ven more neight than any legal argumentation which could be onstrued toward this end, he has pointed out that, assuming apan kept plane for three or four neeks, it would be in dog house ith soviets and would assume that americans had been given access. Herefore, Japan should provide access which us desires and not et in difficulties with both soviets and us, he cautioned, onever, that it might take a pen days for arrangements to fall no place, poloumbelor urged that delay could only compound hopeler and some and some petier,

COMMENTS I AM ENCOURAGED BY THE FACT THAT DESPITE SOME FORT. RABBING AT LONER LEVELS, TOP LEVELS OF FOREIGN MINISTRY AND JOA RIMISTER AND VICE MINISTER IN EGTH) AS WELL AS IN NATIONAL DLICE CLEARLY UNDERSTAND AND AGREE WITH DUR CONCERN FOR THORE UGH EXPLOITATION OF AIRCPAPT. I BELIEVE THEY ARE ON THE RIGHT RACK TO INSURE RETENTION OF PLANE FOR SUFFICIENT TIME TO PERMIT EASONABLY COMPLETE EXAMINATION WITH DIRECT PARTICIPATION OF DUR APERTS. I CANNOT JUDGE JUST HOW LONG IT WILL TARE TO WORK OUT ME NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS. BUT THESE TOP OFFICIALS SEEM TO BE OVING MITH A BENSE OF UNGENCY. IN MEANTIME, I OO NOT THINK WE EED PEAR THAT GOJ WILL VIELD TO SOVIET DEMANDS FOR PROMPT RETURN P PLANE, WE MUST KEEP ON THE PRESSURE, IF ONLY TO SUPPORT GOJ FFICIALS AND ARE ANXIOUS TO COOPERATE WITH US. MOST SERIOUS TICKING POINT, HOWEVER, EVIDENTLY IS PRIME MINISTER MIKI WHO PRARENTLY IS RELUCTANT TO ANTAGONIZE SOVIETS, I BELIEVE THAT DET EFFECTIVE MEANS OF MOVING MIKI IN DIRECTION PAVORABLE TO UN INTERESTS IS PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT. HOESHITH:

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FORD J. BANA Y.



Department of State

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PAGE U1

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ACTION SS-25

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CONFIDENTIAL TOKYO 13512

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: PFOR, JA, US, SREF SUBJECT: MIG DEFECTOR TRAVEL PLANS

REF: TOKYO 13490

1. BELENKO WILL DEPART TOKYO HANEDA AIRPORT ON NORTHWEST 22 AT 1845. WILL ARRIVE LOS ANGELES 1710 SEPTEMBER 9.

2. SCENARIO FOR FINAL HOUR OF BELENKO STAY IN JAPAN HAS BEEN WORKED OUT WITH GOJ AS FOLLOWS:

1620 MEETING WITH US REPRESENTATIVES AT SUIJO

PULICE STATION.

1645 MEETING WITH MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OFFICIALS

FOR FINAL IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES.

1755 MEETING WITH SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES.

1810 DEPART POLICE STATION FOR AIRPORT

1835 ARRIVE HANEDA AIRPORT

1845 DEPART JAPAN

3. FOREIGN OFFICE REPORTS THAT DEFECTOR'S RESOLVE REMAINS FIRM. HE HAS AGREED TO MEET WITH SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES BUT SAID HE WOULD MEET THEM FOR "ONE MINUTE ONLY." HE IS PREPARED FOR POSSIBILITY THAT SOVIETS MAY TRY TO HAND HIM LETTER FROM HIS WIFE.

4. DOCUMENTATION FOR TRAVEL TO UNITED STATES IS





Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE U2

TOKYO 13512 090400Z

COMPLETE.

5. EMBASSY WOULD APPRECIATE SOONEST GUIDANCE ON WHAT WE CAN SAY TO PRESS AFTER BELENKO HAS DEPARTED JAPAN. SHOESMITH



NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITH CONFIDENTIAL PRIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FORM DO SOF

OP IMMED TKI450 DE RUEHKO \$3577 2531008 0 090925Z SEP 76 PH AMENSASSY TOKYO

TO SEASTATE WASHIE IMMEDIATE 2155

INFO COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA JA IMMEDIATE STH AF YOKOTA JA IMMEDIATE CINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE AMENBASSY HOSCOW INHEDIATE 3618 USHISSION NATO IMMEDIATE 315

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TORYO 13577 E.O. 11652: N/A YAGS: MARR, JA SUBJECT: FURTHER REACTION TO MIG-25 INCIDENT SUMMARY: JAPANESE MEDIA CONTINUES TO HEADLINE MIG-25 INCIDENT WITH SOVIETS COMING IN FOR CRITICISM FOR NEAVYHANDEDNESS, WHILE SOJ OFFICIALS ARE WARY OF PREDICTING MON THE MATTER HILL BE SETTLED. END SUMMARY.

1. WHILE GOJ OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO REACT WITH DELICACY TO COMPLEX OF DIPLOMATIC PROBLEMS CREATED BY MIG-25 INCIDENT TOUGHER POSTURE TOWARDS SOVIETS NOTED BY MEDIA. HIGH FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS ARE HEADLINED IN SEPTEMBER 9 PAPERS CRITI-CIZING THE USSR FOR NOT HAVING EXPRESSED ITS REGRET AT HAVING VIOLATED JAPAN'S TTERRITORY AND FOR "LACK OF PROTOCOL" IN MAKING DEMANDS WITHOUT EXPRESSING ANY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INCIDENT, A HIGH FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIAL COMPARED THIS TO "BREAKING INTO THE YARD OF A NEIGHBOR AND SAYING NO WORD OF REGRET" AND SAID IT WAS NOT SEFITTING A "GENTLEMANLY COUNTRY". FOREIGN MINISTER MIYAZAWA TOLD THE PRESS ON THE MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 9 THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY PRIME MINISTER MIKI TO HANDLE THE AFFAIR "VERY CAREFULLY SO AS NOT TO LEAVE ANY DISPUTES IN THE FUTURE".

2. MOSY PAPERS SEE THE DEFECTOR LEAVING FOR THE US ON SEPTEMBER 9, AND ARE THRNING THEIR ATTENTION TO THE DISPOSITION OF THE MIG-25' DHE FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL IS QUOTED AS SAYING THIS INCIDENT IS UNPRECEDENTED FOR JAPAN, BUT EUROPEAN PRECEDENTS

* * * * * * * * * * WHSR COMMENT * *

SCOWERDFT, HYLAND, LL

RECALLED PAGE 81 PSM1043575

TOR: 253/10:29Z OTG: 098925Z SEP 76

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12956, SEC. 3.5 STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES _, NARA, DATE & 30/0/



ESTABLISH A KIND OF "INTERNATIONAL MARKET PRICE" FOR HANDLING THE PLANE WHICH INVOLVES A "QUITE THOROUGH INVESTIGATION WITHIN THE SCOPE NECESSARY FOR THE PURSUIT AND CLARIFICATION OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE INCIDENT OF TERRITORIAL VIOLATION."
THE ASAHI SUMMARIZES THAT "THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THINKS JAPAN CAN DETAIN THE PLANE AS MATERIAL EVIDENCE IN A CRIMINAL OFFENSE EVEN AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF BELENKO AND THERE IS NO NEED TO DELAY HIS DEPARTURE, THE GOJ INTENDS TO RETURN THE PLANE EVENTUALLY. BUT A FINAL DECISION ON ITS HANDLING SHOULD BE MADE ONLY AFTER NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS REACH AM AGREEMENT." ALSO ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS FOREIGN MINISTRY SOURCES DO NOT RECOGNIZE THE PLANE'S "RIGHT OF INVIOLABILITY" AS CALIMED BY THE SOVIET SIDE,

3. THE JDA HAS BESUN INTERGOVERNMENTAL TALKS TO CONDUCT A SEPARATE INSPECTION OF THE PLANE, UP TO NOW THE JDA IS SAID TO BE COOPERATING IN THE POLICE AND PROCURATOR'S INVESTIGATION WITH ITS OWN PERSONNEL, JDA DIRGEN SAKATA REPORTEDLY TOLD THE LOP SECURITY RESEARCH COUNCIL THAT JDA INVESTIGATION OF THE PLANE "IS A MATTER OF COURSE", FOREIGH MINISTRY SOURCES SAGGVUMTHE INVESTIGATION WILL PROBABLY NOT TAKE AS LONG AS TWO TO THREE SXAW

THS. THERE IS A LINE OF COMMON SENSE", A JOA SOURCE OFFICIAL OPINED THAT ABOUT ONE MONTH WILL BE REQUIRED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF COMMON SENSE, ACCORDING TO THE YORIURI.

4. SOVIET REACTION IS BEING WATCHED CAREFULLY, FONOFF OFFICIALS REVEALED THAT MOSCOW AMBASSADOR SMIGEMITSU WAS PRESENTED THE SAME DEMANDS HADE EARLIER IN TOKYO, AMBASSADOR POLANSKY IS SCHEDULED TO MEET VICE FOREIGN MINISTER ARITA THIS AFTERNOON (SEPTEMBER 9) IN WHAT THE PRESS EXPECTS WILL BE PRESENTATION OF THE MOST AUTHORITATIVE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DEMARCHE TO DATE, THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAS BECOME INVOLVED.

5. THERE IS LITTLE COMMENTARY ON IMPLICATIONS FOR US-JAPAN RELATIONS. ONE FOREIGN OFFICE SOURCE IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THE US TO DIRECTLY SEEK THE INVESTIGATION OF THE MIG-25, AND THAT THE US HAS ATTACHED NO CONDITION TO BELENRO'S ASYLUM OTHER THAN CONFIRMATION OF HIS INTENTIONS. SHOESHITH

RECALLED

PAGE 02 OF 02

TOR:253/10:297

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Outside System

SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS

ACTION September 9, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

Mr. Clift

SUBJECT:

Brezhnev Message on MIG-25 Pilot

Actuated

The message from Brezhnev to the President delivered by Voronstov on September 8 requires a businesslike reply from the President setting the record straight with regard to the MIG-25 pilot's request for asylum and advising that the President will look forward to meeting with Gromyko later this month. I recommend that you sign the memorandum to Larry Eagleburger for Hal Sonnenfeldt at Tab A requesting State to prepare a proposed reply for consideration by the President.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A, to be handcarried on this morning's 10:00 a.m. courier run to State.

(in envelope) Roberts
(in Envelope) Roberts
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A

FORD LIBRARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

September 9, 1976

MEMORANDUM TO:

LARRY EAGLEBURGER

FOR:

HAL SONNENFELDT

SUBJECT:

Message From Brezhnev

on MIG-25 Pilot

Last evening Voronstov delivered the attached message to the President from General Secretary Brezhnev expressing his bitterness over the U.S. role in the defection of the Soviet MIG-25 pilot, stating that this is an issue Gromyko will follow up on when in Washington this month, and advising that attempts by the United States to get access to the aircraft cannot but leave their mark on US-USSR relations.

Would you please prepare a proposed draft reply from the President to Brezhnev setting the record straight and advising that the President is looking forward to meeting with Gromyko when the Foreign Minister comes to Washington.

May we please have the draft by noon, Friday, September 10.

Brent Scowcroft

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12956, SEC. 2.5

MBC MEMO, 11/2406, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY http://doi.org/10.000/01/20.000

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS



Vocantar, 7:30 pm - 1/c

Dear Mr. President,

I have just learned of the statement of the White House that you have offered asylum to the Soviet pilot who is now in Japan. I must express my extreme surprise with regard to this step on your part.

So what is going on now?

The matter concerns the serviceman of the Soviet
Union who by a concurrence of circumstances was forced
to land on the territory of Japan. And the US Government
is eager immediately to lay a hand on this pilot and the
Soviet aircraft.

Even if what happened to the pilot were as some people try to present it, in that case too the step you have taken cannot be justified in any way. In fact you have urged the Soviet serviceman, opening the doors wide before him, to seek asylum in the United States in violation of his military oath of allegiance.

We are convinced that the situation is different at all and that we have here the use of violence and unlawful methods with respect to the Soviet pilot. Otherwise, why should the meeting of Soviet representatives with the pilot be denied?

In this connection I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the Japanese television showed how the Soviet pilot was taken from Hakodate airport to Tokyo. This program was watch d by millions of people. A sack was put on the man's head, he was dragged into a car by rude physical force. Can you really approve of all that?

I will tell you frankly, Mr. President, the position, expressed in the said statement of the White House does not conform at all to the assurances given by you on more than one occasion as to your desire to continue the course for better relations between our countries. Moreover, and I want to be frank on this point too, we feel also concerned about many other things that are being said and done in the United States in the course of recent months. I have already drawn your attention to a number of points in this connection.

These points as well as other questions of Soviet-US relations will, of course, be the subject of conversation when A.A. Gromykó visits Washington on your invitation later this month. As of now I would like to refer to only one above-mentioned fact and to your position in this connection. And I must say, I speak of it with the feeling of bitterness.

I would repeat in conslusion: any actions on the part of the United States with regard to the Soviet pilot, as mentioned in the statement of the White House, as well as the attempts of the US authorities to get access to the aircraft cannot but leave their mark on our relations.

L.I. ERECHTEV

September 8, 1976



DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Obol Object

Brent:

I thought you and Bill H. might be interested in the attached memo on the Defector.

GB 9-12



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013711

| REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL Natio | onal security restriction |
|-----------------------------|--|
| TYPE OF MATERIAL Memo: | randum |
| RECEIVER'S NAME Natio | onal Foreign Intelligence Board incipals |
| TITLE Proce | edures for Handling of Information rived from Defector |
| CREATION DATE | 0/1976 |
| VOLUME 1 page | ge |
| | |
| BOX NUMBER | |
| DATE WITHDRAWN | 4/2001 |

Exempt 4/12/05

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013712

| REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction |
|---|
| TYPE OF MATERIAL Memorandum |
| CREATOR'S NAME George Bush CREATOR'S TITLE Chairman, National Foreign Intelligence Board |
| RECEIVER'S NAME National Foreign Intelligence Board Principals |
| DESCRIPTION Re procedures for handling of information derived from defector |
| CREATION DATE |
| VOLUME 3 pages |
| COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400268 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC |
| BOX NUMBER |
| DATE WITHDRAWN |

Exempt 4/12/05 5/31/11

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Obal Obic

Brent:

I thought you and Bill H. might be interested in the attached memo on the Defector.

GB 9-12

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| TITLE |
| CREATION DATE |
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| COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400268 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC |
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WITHDRAWAL ID 013712

| REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL | National security restriction |
|--|---|
| TYPE OF MATERIAL | Memorandum |
| | Chairman, National Foreign intelligence Board |
| RECEIVER'S NAME | National Foreign Intelligence Board
Principals |
| DESCRIPTION | Re procedures for handling of information derived from defector |
| CREATION DATE | 09/10/1976 |
| VOLUME | 3 pages |
| COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . COLLECTION TITLE | 032400268 NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC |
| BOX NUMBER | Japan - MIG-25 Incident (1) |
| DATE WITHDRAWN | 09/04/2001
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| REASON FOR WITHDR | AWAL | | | National security restriction |
|---------------------------------------|------|--|--|---|
| TYPE OF MATERIAL | | | | Intelligence Report |
| DESCRIPTION | | | | Re MIG-25 |
| CREATION DATE . | | | | 09/14/1976 |
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| BOX NUMBER | | | | NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC |
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| REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL |
National security restriction |
|-----------------------|---|
| TYPE OF MATERIAL |
Intelligence Report |
| DESCRIPTION |
Re further reaction to MIG-25 pilot defection |
| CREATION DATE |
09/14/1976 |
| VOLUME |
1 page |
| |
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC |
| BOX NUMBER | Japan - MIG-25 Incident (1) |
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14 Sep 76

In diplomatic circles, the first instance of Soviet/
Warsaw Pact representatives discussing the defection occurred at a Bulgarian sponsored reception in Sofia. The Soviet ttache approached his US counterpat on several occasions and insisted on private discussions concerning the status of the defector. However, it appears his enthusiasm for extracting information exceeded his capacity for alcohol. He pursued the subject while initiating repeated toasts and consuming several "final" drinks. To the embarrassment of other Soviet dignitaries present, he departed the reception with a promise of further talks at upcoming social events.

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TO DIA WASH DC INFO FTD WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB OH COMNAUTHTOOM WASH DC 7602 AIRINTELGP FORT BELVOIR VA DA WASH DC FTD DET 3 LINDSEY AS GERMANY CINCPAC HONOLULU HI CINCPACAF HICKAM AS HI FTD DET 4 YOKOTA AB JA TAC LANGLEY AFB VA CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NE AFENC KELLY AFB TX FSTC CHARLOTTESVILLE VA CSAF WASH DC AFSC ANDREWS AFB MD MAC SCOTT AFB IL NISC HASH DC DIRNSA FORT GEORGE G MEADE MD NAVHPNSCEN CHINA LAKE CA DET 1 7602 AIRINTELOP YOKOTA AB JA 6921 SCTYN MISANA AB JA CORUSAMICOM REDSTONE ARSENAL AL COR US ARMY INTEL AGENCY FORT MEADE MO USDAO MOSCOM USSR USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY CINCUSAFE LINDSEY AS GERMANY CIA WASH DC SECSTATE WASHDC COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA SECDEF WASH DC 5 AF VOKOTA AB JA

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TOR: 258/04:59Z DTG: 140355Z SEP 76

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COMNAVINTCOM FOR NIC-23, 7602 FOR INUA, AND INCA, DA FOR DAMINDOM, ETD DET 3 FOR DA, CINCPAC FOR J253, PACAF FOR DOIT, FTD FOR XRGH AND FAM, TAC FOR INDA, CINCSAC FOR INY, AFENC FOR SURP, FST CH FOR DRXST-FA1, MICOM FOR DRSMI-YDL AND DRSMI-YDR, CSAF FOR INY, AFSC FOR INJ, 5 AF FOR INX, MAC FOR IN, DIRNSA FOR C+54 AND CSS, 6921 FOR COL CARNAHAN, USAINTA FOR MILA-INC, -M, USCINCEIR FOR ECJ2-R, USAFE FOR INCFR, CIA FOR DOD/INT/RO AND IDC, STATE FOR INR/DIL, COMUSJAPAN FOR J=2. THIS IS REPORT NUMBER 15. SUBJ: STABLEMATE (U).

(S/NOFORN) AIRA MET WITH JASDF CHIEF OF STAFF, GEN TSUMODA, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF LT GEN HIRANG AND DCS/DEFENSE, MGEN NAMATAME, LATE AFTERNOOM 13 SEP 76 TO EXPLAIN THE REDISIGNATION OF COMUSI AS OVERALL COORDINATING AUTHORITY FOR MIG-25 EXPLOITATION. POINTED DUT THAT DAD RELATIONS WITH JDA AND JASDE WOULD REMAIN SAME, ALL UNDERSTOOD, GEN HIRAND ASKED WHAT US SIDE'S OPINION OF BEST WAY TO EXPLOIT. AIRA EMPHASIZED THAT BEST WAY WOULD BE TO LET APPROX 14 US SPECIALISTS WORK WITH INTACT ACFT, 24 HRS A DAY FOR APPROX SEVEN DAYS, HIRAND ASKED WHETHER WORKING WITH INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS WOULD NOT BE ADEQUATE, AIRA EXPLAINED IMPORTANCE OF OPERATION AND ANALYSIS OF SYSTEMS IN THEIR TOTALLTY AND IN THEIR NORMAL ACFT ENVORONMENT IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN THEIR TRUE OPERATING CHARACTER-ISTICS. GEN TSUMODA EXPRESSED HIS UNDERSTANDING OF OUR DESIRES BUT CITED PROBLEM OF GETTING JDA INTERNAL BUREAU OFFICIALS APPROVAL.

2. (S/NOFORN) MORNING OF 14 SEP 76 JASDF OFFICIALS GAVE AIRA 380 COLOR AND 1485 BLACK AND WHITE PRINTS OF MIGH25, MSG IR BEING PREPARED BY DAD. PRINTS WILL BE TURNED OVER TO DET 4 FTD FOR DUPLICATION AND USE.

3. (S/NOFORN) IN BRIEFING WITH DEP MIN SAKATA 13 SEP, MGEN MITSUIT HAS ASKED ABOUT BEST WAY, FOR ACFT TO BE TAKEN OUT OF HAKODATE, HE REPLIED BY USAF C-5, SAKATA INDICATED TO HIM THAT THIS SOUNDED LIKE A GOOD IDEA. GDS - 31 DEC 1984. 日节

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PAGE 02 OF 02 TOR: 258/04:59Z DTG: 148355Z SEP 76

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FORD

K3 04U 17802) IZYRCZCUIV URGENT """ PILOT

SCOW, HY, MCF, LL

MOS COW, SEP 14, REUTER - THE SOVIET UNION TONIGHT
IMPLICITLY CHARGED THAT JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES HAD
ONNIVED AT COMPELLING A RUSSIAN AIR FORCE PILOT WHO LANDED A
TOP-SECRET JET IN JAPAN LAST WEEK TO SEEK ASYLUM IN THE WEST.
THE EFICIAL TASS NEWS AGENCY, IN THE FIRST SOVIET COMMENT
ON THE AFFAIR, SAID FIRST LIEUTENANT VIKTOR BELENKO HAD BEEN ON
A ROUTINE TRAINING FLIGHT WHEN HE LOST HIS BEARINGS, RAN OUT OF
FUEL, AND MADE AN EMERGENCY LANDING IN JAPAN.
MORE 1349

R3 ØGR 17811)2ZYRCZCCYN PILOT 2 MOSCOW

BELENKO IS NOW IN THE UNITED STATES WHERE HE WAS GRANTED POLITICAL ASYLUM ON THE INSTRUCTIONS OF PRESIDENT FORD.

INSTEAD OF CONTACTING SOVIET DIPLOMATS, THE AGENCY SAID, THE JAPANESE AUTHORITIES ""PUT THE SOVIET PILOT INTO STRICT ISOLATION WHICH GIVES GROUNDS FOR BELIEVING THAT VARIOUS METHODS WERE USED TO INFLUENCE HIM.""

TASS ALSO ACCUSED PRESIDENT FORD OF INCITING THE PILOT TO DEFECT BY ANNOUNCING THROUGH HIS WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN THAT BELENKO WOULD BE GIVEN ASYLUM BEFORE IT WAS KNOWN WHETHER HE HAD ASKED FOR IT.

MORE 1352

R307R I7850)LZYRCZCZSA

PILOT 3 MOSCOW

THE TASS ACCOUNT, WHICH FOLLOWED CLOSELY THE VERSION OF THE AFFAIR WHICH HAS BEEN DISSEMINATED BY THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN TOKYO, SAID THAT WHEN BELENKO WAS ALLOWED TO MEET A RUSSIAN DIPLOMAT HE SAT ""LIKE A DUMMY.""

THE MEETING, TASS ADDED, ""SHOWED THAT V.I. BELENKO WAS NOT IN A NORMAL STATE AND WAS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF NARCOTICS OR SOME OTHER DRUG.""

THE ALLEGATIONS CLOSELY PARALLELED SIMILAR CHARGES ISSUED IN MOSCOW AT THE WEEKEND WHEN A SOVIET NEWSPAPER SAID OLYMPIC DIVER SERGEI NEMTSANOV HAD BEEN DRUGGED IN CANADA IN AN APPARENT BID TO MAKE HIM STAY IN THE WEST.

REUTER 1354



RI

MIG REACTION
MOSCOW (AP) -- THE SOVIET UNION ACCUSED JAPAN TODAY OF "IGNORING THE

ELEMENTARY NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS' IN REFUSING TO RETURN A MIG25 JET FIGHTER AND ITS DEFECTING PILOT.

IN THE FIRST PUBLIC SOVIET COMMENT SINCE THE JET LANDED IN JAPAN SEPT.6 AND THE PILOT WAS GIVEN ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES, THE TASS NEWS AGENCY SAID THAT JAPANESE COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES IN THE MATTER HAS HARMED SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS.

TASS SAID THE AIRPLANE, WHICH IT DID NOT IDENTIFY AS THE MIG25, ONE OF THE MOST SOPHISTICATED IN THE WORLD, HAD LANDED IN JAPAN RECAUSE IT LOST ITS BEARINGS AND RAN OUT OF FUEL.

IT SAID JAPANESE AUTHORITIES HELD THE PILOT, LT. VIKTOR IVANOVICH BELENKO, AGAINST HIS WILL, AND THAT HE WAS SENT TO THE UNITED STATES AGAINST HIS WILL. IT DENIED HE HAD SOUGHT ASYLUM.

TASS REFERRED TO A SOVIET STATEMENT TO THE JAPANESE ON SEPT. 9 ''IN WHICH THE ACTS OF THE JAPANESE COVERNMENT WERE QUALIFIED AS OPENLY UNFRIENDLY TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION.''

IT SAID THE JAPANESE DID NOT REPLY.

FBIS 72''''

TASS COMMENTS ON BELENKO'S FLIGHT TO JAPAN

LD 14 1645 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1635 GMT 14 SEP 76 LD

("WHO NEEDS IT?"--TASS HEADLINE)

CAN ARISE, SOME TOTALLY UNFORESEEN, IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES, ESPECIALLY NEIGHBOUR STATES. IF THE STATES INVOLVED IN SUCH A ISSUE SET REAL STORE BY THEIR RELATIONS, THEY GO ABOUT SOLVING THE ISSUE IN A CALM MANNER TRYING NOT TO DAMAGE THE INTERESTS OF ANY OF THE SIDES, AN UNFORESEEN CONCATENATION OF EVENTS HAS BROUGHT ABOUT JUST THAT KIND OF ISSUE IN SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS A FEW DAYS AGO.

ON SEPTEMBER 6 ROUTINE TRAINING FLIGHTS WERE GOING ON AT A FAR EASTERN SOVIET AIRFIELD. A PLANE PILOTED BY AIRMAN V.I. BELENKO LOST ITS BEARINGS. IT FOUND ITSELF CLOSE TO JAPANESE TERRITORY, AND, WITH NOT ENOUGH FUEL FOR A RETURN FLIGHT, MADE AN EMERGENCY LANDING AT THE AIRPORT IN THE JAPANESE TOWN OF HAKODATE.

THE FIRST DUTY OF THE JAPANESE AUTHORITIES WOULD SEEM TO HAVE BEEN TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE SOVIET AIRMAN TO CONTACT SOVIET OFFICES IN JAPAN--THE USSR EMBASSY IN TOKYO AND THE USSR GENERAL CONSULATE IN SAPPORO JUST 150 KILOMETERS AWAY FROM HAKODATE.

THE JAPANESE AUTHORITIES ACTED OTHERWISE. THEY PUT THE SOVIET AIRMAN IN STRICT ISOLATION WHICH GIVES GROUNDS FOR BELIEVING THAT VARIOUS METHODS WERE USED TO INFLUENCE HIM. MILLIONS OF JAPANESE TV VIEWERS SAW THE AIRMAN, WITH SACK PULLED OVER HIS HEAD, BEING MOVED FROM HAKODATE TO TOKYO, DRAGGED BY POLICE, PUSHED BY THEM INTO A CAR AND HAVING HIS HEAD PRESSED AGAINST THE SEAT.

DESPITE PERSISTENT APPEALS OF THE SOVIET SIDE, THE JAPANESE AUTHORITIES REFUSED TO ALLOW THEM TO MEET BELENKO FOR ALMOST FOUR DAYS, THUS GROSSLY VIOLATING THE PROVISIONS OF THE SOVIET-JAPANESE CONSULAR CONVENTION, ARTICLES 31-32, WHICH ENVISAGE THAT A DETAINED CITIZETN OF ANOTHER STATE SHOULD HAVE AN IMMEDIATE MEETING ARRANGED WITH THAT STATE'S REPRESENTIVES.

IT IS NOTABLE THAT THIRD STATES HAVE INTERFERED IN THE AFFAIR WITH THE CONNIVANCE OF JAPANESE AUTHORITIES. ON THE DAY FOLLOWING THE LANDING OF THE SOVIET PLANE IN JAPAN, AN OFFICIAL WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT PRESIDENT FORD HAD DECIDED TO GRANT ASYLUM TO THE SOVIET AIRMAN. THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN HAD TO ADMIT THAT THE AMERICAN AUTHORITIES DID NOT EVEN KNOW WHETHER THE AIRMAN HAD ASKED FOR AN ASYLUM IN THE USA.

(MORE)

14 SEP 1815Z MJL/SAJ''''