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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL  
DATE:  
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger  
VIA: Warren S. Rustand

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ XGDS(3)

MEETING: Courtesy call on the President by Republic of China Ambassador James C. H. Shen

DATE: Any time at your convenience.

PURPOSE: To reaffirm our defense commitment to the Republic of China.

FORMAT: -Oval Office  
-Ambassador Shen, Secretary Kissinger  
-15 minutes

SPEECH MATERIAL: Talking points would be provided.

PRESS COVERAGE: To be announced. Photo session desirable.

STAFF: Secretary Kissinger

RECOMMEND: Secretary Kissinger

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: You met Ambassador Shen recently at your reception for the diplomatic corps on October 5.

BACKGROUND: Ambassador Shen last week requested a call on you to present a letter to you from Premier Chiang Ching-kuo. Instead, Deputy Secretary Ingersoll received the letter. Ambassador Shen, who wanted to use this opportunity to establish something of a personal relationship with you, has asked that he still be allowed to make this courtesy call on you.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ XGDS(3)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/90, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY 10, NARA, DATE 4/20/01



## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ XGDS(3)ACTION

October 10, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: W. R. SMYER *WRS/jrk*

SUBJECT: Proposed Courtesy Call on the President  
by Republic of China Ambassador James  
C. H. Shen

At Tab A is a draft schedule proposal from you to the President recommending that he agree to receive Republic of China Ambassador James C. H. Shen for a courtesy call at any time convenient to the President. As you will recall, Shen last week asked for a call on the President to deliver a letter to the President from Premier Chiang Ching-kuo. You decided that instead Shen should deliver the letter to Deputy Secretary Ingersoll. Shen has indicated that he would still like to pay a courtesy call on the President.

I recommend that we advise Shen that the President's schedule will not permit a courtesy call in the near future. For Shen to call on the President any time before your Peking trip would seem awkward. In addition, we have no substantive issues in our relations that would make the President's seeing Shen advisable at this time. In any case, Shen met the President at the President's reception for the diplomatic corps last week.

Alternatively, if you believe the President should grant Shen's request to make a courtesy call on him, a draft schedule proposal from you to the President is attached at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize me to inform the Republic of China Embassy that the President's schedule will not permit a courtesy call on him by Ambassador Shen in the near future.


APPROVE *[Signature]*

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ XGDS(3)

DECLASSIFIED


E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/88, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY 67, NARA, DATE 4/20/01

Your receiving Shen for a brief call would give you the opportunity to reaffirm our defense commitment to the Republic of China, and to comment on the substance of Premier Chiang's letter -- which I am forwarding to you under a separate memorandum along with a suggested reply. (The thrust of Chiang's letter is to reaffirm his government's adherence to our alliance relationship, and to express appreciation for your assurance that your administration will stand behind our treaty commitments.)

An adverse consequence of your receiving Shen would be to stimulate PRC concerns, particularly in light of my upcoming trip to Peking. I do not think PRC concerns would be excessive, however.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		G NBR		INITIAL ACTION	
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	10/10 10/11 15 7404738		10

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION	TO: PRES _____	FROM: <i>Smyser</i> <u>KISSINGER, H</u> _____	S/S _____	REFERENCE: _____	CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE
	KISSINGER <i>X</i> _____	COLBY, W _____	OTHER _____	UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT	
	SCOWCROFT _____	SCHLESINGER, J _____		LOU NO FORN NODIS	
	DAVIS _____	ST EX SEC _____		C EYES ONLY EXDIS	
SUBJECT: <i>Request for appt w/ Pres for Rep of China</i> <i>amb Shen</i>					

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT	INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED	
	ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT	ACTION	INFO		MEMO FOR HAK	_____
	STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES	_____
	FAR EAST <i>Smyser</i>				REPLY FOR	_____
	SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION	_____
	MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO _____ TO _____	_____
	EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS	_____
	LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO	_____
	UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____	_____
	ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY?	_____
	SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE	_____
	PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE:	
	NSC PLANNING				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)	
	CONGRESSIONAL					
	OCEANS POLICY					
INTELLIGENCE						

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS	DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
	10/11		HAK	X	Decision (10/22)	
	10/14			X	Scowcroft approved request	
	10/14	<i>Smyser</i>	<i>Smyser</i>	S	Further action 10/17 (Done)	
	10/17	HAK	NSC/S		Conveyed request to Dr. Chen tai-chun on 10/17/74.	
	10/17			C	Action Complete	

NSC/S DISP INSTR	DISPATCH _____	Gerald R. Ford Library	MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:	
	CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____		M/F'D _____ BY <i>pa/b</i>	
	NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____			
	SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____			
	CROSS REF W/ _____			
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: <i>✓</i> FOLDER: _____			CRT <i>3/19/74</i>	SA SF
			OPEN	HP NS
			CLOSE	WH EP
				PA DY

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


October 18, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Transfer of Major Items of U.S. Military Equipment  
to the Republic of China

I informed General Fish this date that there was no objection to the proposed sale of one U-6A aircraft to the Republic of China as requested in his memorandum to me of 11 October 1974. Mr. Smyser had earlier given his concurrence.

No further action is required on this matter.

  
Richard T. Kennedy~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/99, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY GB, NARA, DATE 4/20/01



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20



DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY  
AND  
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY (SECURITY ASSISTANCE), OASD/ISA  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

11 OCT 1974

In reply refer to:  
I-9122/74

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD KENNEDY, NSC STAFF

SUBJECT: Transfer of Major Items of U.S. Military Equipment  
to the Republic of China (C)

(C) Reference is made to the NSC memorandum of 21 October 1971, same subject.

(C) The CMAAG Taiwan has requested the preparation of a formal Letter of Offer (DD Form 1513) for one (1) U-6A aircraft. The aircraft is excess to the requirements of the U.S. and will be offered on an "as is - where is" basis at a unit price of \$4,470.

(C) The ROC has a JSOP requirement for eighteen (18) U-6A aircraft and has purchased eighteen (18) under Foreign Military Sales. The additional aircraft the ROC desires to purchase is for attrition.

(U) Recommend approval of the transaction. The Department of State concurs.

*H. M. Fish*

H. M. FISH  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Director,  
Defense Security Assistance Agency



Director, Sales Negotiations, DSAA  
Classified by-----  
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADE  
AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 3/10/01  
1980

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

66 4/20/01

## NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
MO DA	MO DA HR	7404930	
10 18	10 18 18		

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

*Kennedy*  
TO: PRES \_\_\_\_\_  
KISSINGER \_\_\_\_\_  
SCOWCROFT \_\_\_\_\_  
DAVIS \_\_\_\_\_

*FISH, H*  
FROM: KISSINGER, H \_\_\_\_\_  
COLBY, W \_\_\_\_\_  
SCHLESINGER, J \_\_\_\_\_  
ST EX SEC \_\_\_\_\_

REFERENCE:

S/S \_\_\_\_\_

OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE

UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT

LOU NO FORN NODIS

C EYES ONLY EXDIS

S CODEWORD

TS SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: *Transfer of one V-6A aircraft to Rep of China*

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

## INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

ACTION INFO

REC  
CY  
FOR

## ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK \_\_\_\_\_

MEMO FOR PRES \_\_\_\_\_

REPLY FOR \_\_\_\_\_

APPROPRIATE ACTION \_\_\_\_\_

MEMO \_\_\_\_\_ TO \_\_\_\_\_

RECOMMENDATIONS \_\_\_\_\_

JOINT MEMO \_\_\_\_\_

REFER TO \_\_\_\_\_ FOR: \_\_\_\_\_

ANY ACTION NECESSARY? \_\_\_\_\_

CONCURRENCE. \_\_\_\_\_

DUE DATE:

COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
10/18			C	<i>Kennedy handled by phone</i>	

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: \_\_\_\_\_

NOTIFY *H. FISH* & DATE *10/18/74* BY *Kennedy*

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: \_\_\_\_\_

CROSS REF W/ \_\_\_\_\_

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: *X* FOLDER: \_\_\_\_\_

MICROFILM &amp; FILE RQMTS:

M/F'D \_\_\_\_\_

CRT ID: \_\_\_\_\_

OPEN \_\_\_\_\_

CLOSE \_\_\_\_\_

SA SF

HP NS

WH EP

PA DY(NBC-74-21)  
533-147



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

5616-X

*Cable sent  
w/ RTK's changes  
187000 14  
pm* 3

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

November 18, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KENNEDY  
FROM: JOHN A. FROEBE, JR. *OK*  
SUBJECT: Proposed U.S. Force Reductions  
on Taiwan

At Tab I is a draft cable from you to Secretary Kissinger providing the information which he requested on:

- Present actual U.S. force strengths on Taiwan.
- What the DOD-proposed 50% reduction would mean for the number of personnel allocated to the particular U.S. functions on Taiwan.
- What the proposed 50% reduction would mean for the military missions performed in these various functional fields.


Recommendation:

That you send the draft cable to Secretary Kissinger at Tab I.


Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/08, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY 61, NARA, DATE 4/20/01



I





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

4  
XR 7424967  
S/S7425012 6272

CONFIDENTIAL

December 21, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THE WHITE HOUSE


Subject: Sale of F-104D and T-33  
Aircraft to the ROC

In view of his specific request that he be informed of any significant move concerning the ROC, I would appreciate your obtaining the approval of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for the sale of six F-104D and twenty-five T-33 aircraft to the ROC. The F-104D is a trainer already in the ROC inventory and the sale would be designed to replace aircraft lost through attrition. The T-33 is also a trainer which the ROC wishes to use to replace its older T-28 trainers which are increasingly difficult to maintain. All concerned in State and Defense recommend approval of the sale which would be in keeping with virtually all the options discussed in the recently produced NSSM.

*for Rick Sherman*  
George S. Springsteen  
Executive Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL  
GDS

GA 4/20/01



## VSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		G NBR		INITIAL ACTION O
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR		
12	24	12	23	12	740627	Frache

TO: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ FROM: KISSINGER, H \_\_\_\_\_ S/S 7425012 REFERENCE: \_\_\_\_\_ CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE  
KISSINGER \_\_\_\_\_ COLBY, W \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT  
SCOWCROFT X SCHLESINGER, J \_\_\_\_\_ LOU \_\_\_\_\_ NO FORN NODIS  
DAVIS \_\_\_\_\_ ST EX SEC X \_\_\_\_\_ S \_\_\_\_\_ EYES ONLY EXDIS  
TS \_\_\_\_\_ SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: Sale of F-104D & T-33 Aircraft  
to Republic of China

## INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT			
STAFF SECRETARY			
FAR EAST <u>FRACHE</u>	<u>X</u>		
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA			
EUROPE / CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
NSC PLANNING		<u>X</u>	
CONGRESSIONAL			
OCEANS POLICY			
INTELLIGENCE			
<u>7405809</u>		<u>X</u>	


## ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ..... ( )  
MEMO FOR PRES ..... ( )  
REPLY FOR ..... ( )  
APPROPRIATE ACTION ..... ( )  
MEMO Scout Sp. g. steen X ..... ( )  
RECOMMENDATIONS ..... ( )  
JOINT MEMO ..... ( )  
REFER TO ..... FOR: ..... ( )  
ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ..... ( )  
CONCURRENCE ..... ( )  
DUE DATE: 01/09

COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
<u>12/24</u>			<u>C</u>	<u>See 7405809 for ATF</u>	

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_  
CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: \_\_\_\_\_  
NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ & DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY \_\_\_\_\_  
SPECIAL DISPOSITION: \_\_\_\_\_  
CROSS REF W/ 7405809  
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: X FOLDER: \_\_\_\_\_



## MICROFILM &amp; FILE RQMTS:

M/F 30 BY \_\_\_\_\_  
CRT ID: ADC SA SF  
OPEN AD HP NS  
CLOSE AD EP  
PA DY

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 4, 1974

Send to Smyser/Solomon for staffing.


Bud

5  
78  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ACTION MEMORANDUM

S/S

  
~~CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS~~  
BAN COPY

To: The Secretary

From: EA - Philip C. Habib 


Replacement of ROC Ambassador Shen  
by Chow Shu-Kai

Premier Chiang Ching-Kuo has told Ambassador Unger that the ROC wishes to replace Ambassador James Shen with Chow Shu-kai. Shen has been in Washington for about four years.

We doubt CCK's primary motive is to put us to some sort of test, and we are fairly sure his major purpose in wishing to replace Shen with Chow is to put us in touch with a man in whom he has greater confidence and who is more effective with Americans. There is no doubt that Chow would be a vast improvement over Shen. Chow knows the United States well, having been Ambassador here for five years in the Sixties and subsequently serving as Foreign Minister and Minister without Portfolio in Taipei. He is not of a philosophical bent but he is bright and far more flexible and pleasant than Shen. His close relations with CCK would be a useful asset as we move into the most tricky phase of our relations with the ROC.

Although CCK would be jolted by a refusal, our acquiescence in a change of ROC Ambassadors would unquestionably make the PRC unhappy. To what extent it would interfere with the process of normalization is uncertain, but it would be viewed as inconsistent with your presentation in Peking and might conceivably be caught up in PRC internal

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY  NARA, DATE 4/20/01





policy debates. The PRC would view the matter so soon after your 1974 visit in much the manner as the Unger appointment following your 1973 visit. Whatever the reality of Peking's reaction, we could certainly expect further public speculation about a cooling of U.S.-PRC relations. The result could benefit the Soviets in their dealings with us.

If we were to block CCK's plan, we believe he would interpret our action--however euphemistically phrased-- as an unmistakable signal that de-recognition of the ROC was impending. He would be unlikely to publicize our action though he might let certain friendly Americans know privately about it. Although a clear message must be delivered to CCK at some point, there is a question as to whether we should provide such an unambiguous signal to the ROC in this way and so far in advance of our next steps vis-a-vis the PRC. The timing is particularly unfortunate, because Peking discussions have not progressed to the point where we could afford to make more than the most minimally reassuring statements to CCK to help offset his overriding concern about Taiwan's future.

In sum thwarting CCK's move would accommodate a very legitimate concern of the PRC, but it would do so at a time when Peking is not being very helpful in the normalization process and before the ground in Taipei is well prepared.

OPTIONS:

1. Wait until a request for an agreement is received and then approve it promptly. Explain to the PRC in matter of fact terms in advance of the public announcement that our action has no political significance and is an unavoidable consequence of our current relationship with Taipei.
2. Have Unger go back to CCK, stating that we would not be able to grant an agreement to a new ROC Ambassador.

CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS



3. Have Unger go back to CCK and state that he, Unger, believes a switch in Ambassadors at present might pose difficult problems for Washington because of public speculation about a cooling in U.S.-PRC relations. Therefore, he would advise CCK not to pursue the matter at this time.

RECOMMENDATION:

We believe this is an extremely tricky matter which requires your prompt consideration. On balance our recommendation is to follow Option 3 without delay.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Concurrence: WL  
S/P - WLord

EA:WGleysteen:mfg Jf  
1/4/75: Ext. 23586

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/NODIS





# NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		LOG NBR		INITIAL ACTION	
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR			
4	16	14	75	00078	Hakke		

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES +  
 KISSINGER +  
 SCOWCROFT \_\_\_\_\_  
 DAVIS \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Hakke KISSINGER, H \_\_\_\_\_  
 COLBY, W \_\_\_\_\_  
 SCHLESINGER, J \_\_\_\_\_  
 ST EX SEC \_\_\_\_\_

REFERENCE:

CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE

S/S \_\_\_\_\_  
 OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT \_\_\_\_\_  
 LOU NO FORN NODIS  
 EYES ONLY EXDIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 CODEWORD \_\_\_\_\_  
 S \_\_\_\_\_  
 TS \_\_\_\_\_  
 SENSITIVE \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: Republic of China wishes to replace Gen. Sheng w/ Chow Shu-Kai as their New Gen to the US

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR
	ACTION	INFO	
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT			
STAFF SECRETARY <u>Tamm</u>		<u>X</u>	
FAR EAST <u>Froche</u>	<u>+</u>		
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA			
EUROPE / CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
NSC PLANNING			
CONGRESSIONAL			
OCEANS POLICY			
INTELLIGENCE			
<u>Super</u>		<u>X</u>	


## ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ..... + )  
 MEMO FOR PRES ..... ( )  
 REPLY FOR ..... ( )  
 APPROPRIATE ACTION ..... ( )  
 MEMO \_\_\_\_\_ TO \_\_\_\_\_ ( )  
 RECOMMENDATIONS ..... ( )  
 JOINT MEMO ..... ( )  
 REFER TO \_\_\_\_\_ FOR: \_\_\_\_\_ ( )  
 ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ..... ( )  
 CONCURRENCE. .... ( )  
 DUE DATE: 1-13

COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
<u>1/7/75</u>	<u>hak</u>	<u>NSC/S</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>No further action necessary per Froche</u>	



NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_  
 CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: \_\_\_\_\_  
 NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ & DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY \_\_\_\_\_  
 SPECIAL DISPOSITION: \_\_\_\_\_  
 CROSS REF W/ \_\_\_\_\_  
 SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: 7 FOLDER: \_\_\_\_\_

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:	
M/F'D _____	BY _____
CRT ID:	SA SF
OPEN <u>12</u>	HP NS
CLOSE _____	WH EP
	PA <u>DY</u>

66

INTERNAL NSC ROUTING

CLIFT \_\_\_\_\_  
DAVIS \_\_\_\_\_  
ELLIOTT \_\_\_\_\_  
FROEBE \_\_\_\_\_  
HORAN \_\_\_\_\_  
HORMATS \_\_\_\_\_  
KENNEDY \_\_\_\_\_  
LODAL \_\_\_\_\_  
LOW \_\_\_\_\_  
OAKLEY \_\_\_\_\_  
OBER \_\_\_\_\_  
SMYSER \_\_\_\_\_  
SOLOMON \_\_\_\_\_  
STEARMAN \_\_\_\_\_  
JANKA \_\_\_\_\_  
  
OTHER \_\_\_\_\_  
ADMIN \_\_\_\_\_



(TURN THIS TAB UP TO MOVE  
BACK TO THE SECRETARIAT)

*books*  
*Date &*  
*despatch*  
*Tab A*  
*JMM*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ GDS


January 14, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Transfer of Major Military Items to the  
Republic of China: F-104 and T-33 Aircraft

The Department of State memorandum of November 27, 1974, (S/S 7423058) requested approval of the sale of six F-104D aircraft and 25 T-33 aircraft to the Republic of China for replacement purposes. There is no objection to the transfer, and the request is hereby approved.

  
Henry A. Kissinger

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ GDS

66 4/20/01



Dispatched 1/15/75 - Outside Rcpt. (rb)

MEMORANDUM

5809

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~ACTION~~

December 19, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

JOHN A. FROEBE, JR. *JA*

SUBJECT:

Transfer of Major Military Items to the  
Republic of China: F-104 and T-33 Aircraft

At Tab B is a State memorandum, concurred in by Defense, requesting approval for the sale of six F-104D fighter aircraft and 25 T-33 jet trainers to the Republic of China. Both types of aircraft are already in the Republic of China Air Force inventory, and these aircraft would be transferred only for replacement purposes.

I believe we can proceed with this transfer before we get a final decision on the NSSM study of future military assistance to the ROC (NSSM 212). (We are waiting for DOD's clearance on the NSSM response and for departmental recommendations on the options in the study.) Only the extreme low option in the NSSM -- completely cut off ROC access to U.S. military equipment, either immediately or gradually in the next 3-5 years -- would preclude this transfer.

At Tab A is a draft memorandum from you to the Deputy Secretary of State approving the transfer of these aircraft to the Republic of China.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the draft memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of State at Tab A.

Concurrence:

Mr. Kennedy *W.D.*

Mr. Smyser *S*

Mr. Solomon (in substance) *AMS/jml*



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.8

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY *GA*, NARA, DATE *4/20/01*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/S 7423058

62

5809

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 27, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Transfer of Major Items of U.S. Military  
Equipment to the Republic of China

In accordance with General Haig's memorandum of October 21, 1971, approval is requested for the sale of six F-104D aircraft and twenty-five T-33 aircraft to the Republic of China (ROC). Both the F-104D and T-33 aircraft are needed by the ROC Air Force (ROCAF) for pilot training purposes. Due to attrition, the current low inventory of two-seat F-104s has seriously reduced the ROCAF's ability to provide adequate proficiency training to F-104 aircrews. The T-33 aircraft are planned for replacement of aging T-28 aircraft presently used for ROCAF undergraduate pilot training.

The Departments of State and Defense and the Country Team support the request.


*Paul Barbain*  
for George S. Springsteen  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

General Haig's Memorandum  
of October 21, 1971.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
GDS

GA 4/20/01



B

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 21, 1971

COPIES TO:  
PM (action)  
S/PC  
S/S  
S/S-S  
S/S-O  
INR  
EA  
L  
RF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

THEODORE L. ELIOT, JR.  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT E. PURSLEY  
MILITARY ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY  
OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Transfer of Major Items of U. S.  
Military Equipment to the Republic  
of China

In the future, White House approval should be obtained for any transfers of major items of U. S. military equipment to the Republic of China (such as F-5Es or M-48 tanks), whether through grant MAP, FMS credit or cash sales, commercial sales, as Excess Defense Articles, or through any other means. A memorandum giving a full description of the proposal should be submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs in each case.

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY 62, NARA, DATE 4/20/01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



## NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		JG NBR		INITIAL ACTION O
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR		
11	27	11	28	11	7405809	FroeBE

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ FROM: KISSINGER, H \_\_\_\_\_ S/S 7423058 CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE  
KISSINGER \_\_\_\_\_ COLBY, W \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT  
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DAVIS \_\_\_\_\_ ST EX SEC X S EYES ONLY EXDIS  
TS CODEWORD  
SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: Transfer of F-1040 & T-33 aircraft military equipment to Rep of China

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK ..... ( <u>X</u> )
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES ..... ( )
FAR EAST <u>Froebe</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>	REPLY FOR ..... ( )
<del>██████████</del> <u>Smyser</u>			<u>X</u>	APPROPRIATE ACTION ..... ( )
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO..... TO..... ( )
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS ..... ( )
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO..... ( )
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO..... FOR:..... ( )
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY?..... ( )
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE..... ( )
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE: <u>12/10</u>
NSC PLANNING				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				
INTELLIGENCE				

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS


DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
<u>12/19</u>		<u>HAK</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>Spu memo to Ingersoll (12/25)</u>	
<u>1/14/75</u>		<u>NBC/IS</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>HAK exp memo to Dep. Sec of State</u>	
<del>1/14/75</del>		<del>██████████</del>	<del>SS</del>	<del>██████████</del>	

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH <u>done</u>	MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS: M/F'D _____ BY _____ FACIT CRT ID: _____ SA SF OPEN <u>CRD</u> HP NS CLOSE <u>AA</u> WH EP PA DY
CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____	
NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____	
SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____	
CROSS REF W/ _____	
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: <u>✓</u> FOLDER: _____	

(NSC-74-21)  
533-147

7a  
get Simpson  
& Solomon  
one to. Note  
to file





NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012636

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction  
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Memorandum  
CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . R. H. Solomon, W. R. Smyser  
RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Secretary Kissinger  
TITLE . . . . . Calls by ROC Ambassador Shen  
CREATION DATE . . . . . 01/15/1975  
VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages  
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400113  
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL  
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE  
PACIFIC  
BOX NUMBER . . . . . 4  
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . China, Republic of (1)  
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 04/24/2001  
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

~~SENSITIVE~~ 4/30/03

MEMORANDUM

297-X

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

ACTION

January 15, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

R. H. SOLOMON

W. R. SMYSER

SUBJECT:

Calls by ROC Ambassador Shen

We have received reports that ROC Ambassador Shen is demoralized over our turndown of a successor. In this context, we also need to decide about Shen's expressed desire to pay calls on Vice President Rockefeller and General Scowcroft.

[redacted] that it is becoming known to embassy employees that Ambassador James Shen is demoralized about the State Department's turndown of his recent proposal that he be replaced by a new man. [redacted] was aware of the details of Shen's demarche to Deputy Secretary Ingersoll and its outcome. He also seemed aware that Chow Shu-kai was the man likely to be Shen's replacement. [redacted] commented [redacted] that Shen now believes President Ford's trip to Peking later this year will result in some major development unfavorable to ROC interests.

[redacted] news of the Department's turndown of a replacement for Shen is beginning to circulate rather widely. It seems likely that before long this development will become public, or at least will come to Peking's awareness through private contacts.

ROC reaction to the turndown also indicates that substantial demoralization is taking place within the Nationalist bureaucracy. [redacted]

[redacted] noted in late December that you had not been willing to receive Ambassador Shen after your November trip to Peking -- as you had after previous trips to the PRC -- and that you had not made a public reaffirmation of the U.S.-ROC defense relationship. The Nationalist official indicated that he thought this was an indicator of a major shift in our relations away from Taipei toward Peking.

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY - XGDS

DECLASSIFIED • E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6  
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (C)

ME01-163,29; CIA R 6/7/02, OF 22, 2/24/03

By dle NARA Date 6/30/03



In this context, we need to consider how we should deal with Ambassador Shen's request to meet with Vice President Rockefeller and with a dormant but standing commitment for Brent Scowcroft to meet with Shen.

Shen's request to see the Vice President was included in his congratulatory letter (Tab A) to Mr. Rockefeller. We recommend that the Vice President decline because such a meeting could create needless problems with the PRC and could give Shen a false impression of our intent on access. The Vice President could reply that he does not meet with Ambassadors.

Our commitment to have Brent Scowcroft meet with Shen arose when we declined Shen's request to meet with the President before the President's trip to the Far East. Jack Froebe told Shen at that time, under instructions, that the President could not meet with him but that Brent Scowcroft would be pleased to do so after the President's return. It was not made clear whether we were to call Shen or he was to call us, but we are on the record as suggesting a Scowcroft/Shen meeting. Such a meeting, in the present context, might represent a convenient way to boost ROC morale slightly after the several blows Shen has received recently. It would also enable Brent to reinforce the message that the President gave Premier Chiang Ching-kuo in his recent letter.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. That we inform Vice President Rockefeller's office that we recommend against a meeting with Shen.

Approve HK Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

- b. That General Scowcroft invite Shen in for a brief call, citing our earlier statement that we would do so after the President's trip.

Approve HK Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_



MEMORANDUM

297-X

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLYACTION

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY - XGDS

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

2

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Approve HK Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY - XGDS

7c

TAB A





Embassy of the Republic of China  
Washington, D. C. 20008

December 20, 1974

Dear Mr. Vice President:

On your assumption of office as the 41st Vice President of the United States, I want to join many others in offering you my hearty felicitations and best wishes. The overwhelming vote by both the Senate and the House to confirm your nomination indicates the trust and confidence which the American people place in you. There is no doubt that your long distinguished career in public service will ensure greater achievements in the future not only for this great country but also for the free world as a whole.

Our government leaders and compatriots on Taiwan will greet this auspicious event with great rejoicing since they have always held you in high esteem as a friend of the Republic of China.

I recall meeting you when you visited with President Chiang Kai-shek in Taipei many years ago. I was then the President's interpreter-secretary. It will be a pleasure as well as a privilege for me to call on you to pay my respects at an early opportunity.

With the Season's greetings,

Sincerely yours,

James C. H. Shen  
Ambassador of the  
Republic of China

The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller  
Vice President of the United States  
Washington, D. C.





7d

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012637

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Memorandum

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . R. H. Solomon, W. R. Smyser

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Secretary Kissinger

TITLE . . . . . Calls by ROC Ambassador Shen

CREATION DATE . . . . . 01/15/1975

VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400113

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL  
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE  
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 4

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . China, Republic of (1)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 04/24/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

~~SANITIZED~~ 6/30/03



MEMORANDUM

297-X

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

ACTION

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FROM:

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W. R. SMYER

SUBJECT:

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SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY - XGDS

DECLASSIFIED • E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.0  
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (C)

ME01-16329; CIA 4/7/02, 02-02, 2/24/03

By del NARA Date 6/30/03



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
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- b. That General Scowcroft invite Shen in for a brief call, citing our earlier statement that we would do so after the President's trip.

Approve HK Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_





Embassy of the Republic of China  
Washington, D.C. 20008

December 20, 1974

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With the Season's greetings,

Sincerely yours,

*James C. H. Shen*

James C. H. Shen  
Ambassador of the  
Republic of China

The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller  
Vice President of the United States  
Washington, D.C.



## NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		LOG NBR		INITIAL ACTION O	
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	7500297		

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES

KISSINGER X

SCOWCROFT

DAVIS

FROM: Solomon/SM4SER KISSINGER, H

COLBY, W

SCHLESINGER, J

ST EX SEC

REFERENCE:

CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE

UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT

LOU NO FORN NODIS

C EYES ONLY EXDIS

CODEWORD

TS SENSITIVE

SUBJECT:

Calc On ROC Ambassador SHEN

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

## INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

ACTION

INFO

REC  
CY  
FOR

## ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK . . . . . ( )

MEMO FOR PRES . . . . . ( )

REPLY FOR . . . . . ( )

APPROPRIATE ACTION . . . . . ( )

MEMO . . . . . TO . . . . . ( )

RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . ( )

JOINT MEMO . . . . . ( )

REFER TO . . . . . FOR: . . . . . ( )

ANY ACTION NECESSARY? . . . . . ( )

CONCURRENCE . . . . . ( )

DUE DATE:

COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE

FROM

TO

S

SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):

CY TO

01/15 Solomon/SM4SER HAK X Approve NCOM 6/00  
2/01 C final action / org unknown

ORIGINAL NOTES RETAINED BY  
WHITE HOUSE. CLOSE FILE.

init. &amp; date 4/27



NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:

NOTIFY . . . . . &amp; DATE . . . . . BY . . . . .

SPECIAL DISPOSITION:

CROSS REF W/

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:

FOLDER:

MICROFILM &amp; FILE RQMTS:

M/F'D . . . . . BY . . . . .

CRT ID:

OPEN

CLOSE

SA SF

HP NS

WH EP

PA DY