

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford  
Dean Rusk, former Secretary of State  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Friday, September 10, 1976  
5:40 - 6:15 p.m.

PLACE: The Cabinet Room



[This meeting was off the record].

Kissinger: [Discussed his meeting with Senator Allen and 40 other Senators.]

President: This is something I feel we must keep doing even during the campaign. With the unfortunate end to the Angola situation, there was an acceleration in Africa toward radicalism and violence. So I sent Henry there in April and thereafter to meet with Vorster to try to turn the situation away from violence. We got the British on board also. And then I made a basic decision that regardless of the political situation here -- and I wasn't even through Kansas City -- I believe that if it is good for the country, it is good politics.

Rusk: That man [pointing to the bust of Truman] said good policy makes good politics. I have long been concerned about the trend toward violence and the race war in Africa.

I am here in no other role than as a former Secretary of State. As such, I have a stake in every President. I am not a spokesman for Carter in any way. If you think it reaches a point where you need to bring Carter in, I think you should call him, explain it to him, and tell him you have been working with the Congress. Then I might be helpful.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Rev. on 3/13/04  
BY [signature], NARA, DATE 6/9/04

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Something like this frequently happens in campaigns -- I have been through seven of them.

I thought I would tell Carter this weekend that I was up here and it is important, so he won't make statements on the situation based on his "youthful advisers."

Kissinger: When you might want to see him is if I go to Vorster and get somewhere, then you might want to point out that he could be inheriting a policy and could we tell the Rhodesians he would generally follow through?

Rusk: I would suggest that Carter say, "There is only one President at a time, and if the President makes a decision in consultation with the Congress, I would take it very seriously if I became President." It would be important in stabilizing the situation here if a cross section of the black leaders support it.

President: That is an integral part of the plan.

Kissinger: And in that case we wouldn't need Carter's support. But if the blacks don't sign on, we might veto Namibia and then all hell might break loose. Then we might need Carter's support. But now the blacks all support us.

President: Well, we are going ahead with the plan.

Kissinger: The Senators asked what happens if we failed. I said the worst was what would inevitably happen if we did nothing. At least then we would be in a position of supporting a peace resolution and the blacks will be the ones insisting on violence.



→ Mary supply school at Athens • Securaphous  
P/Rusk/K 10 Sept 76 ✓

K (discussed his mtg w/ Sen Allen & his 58  
on Senators)

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NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES *stabilized* 03/03/04

BY *W* NARA DATE 4/4/04



on his "youthful advisers."

K When you might want to call him is if I go to Boston & get somewhere, then you might want to point out he could be indefinitely a policy & would see all the Rhodesians he would gently follow them.

R I would suggest that Carter say there is only one time & if a Pres makes a decision in concert w/c Cong, I would take it very seriously if I became Pres. It would be important in stabilizing it here if a cross section of the black leaders support it.

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K and in that case we wouldn't need Carter support. But if the blacks don't sign on, we might get to Harare & then all hell might break loose. Then we might need Carter support. But make be hold support.

P Well, we are going ahead w/c plan

K The Senators asked what if we failed. I said the worst way what would inevitably happen if we did nothing. At least then we would be in a position of supporting a revolution & the blacks would lose cross industry & income

