

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

President Ford
 House International Relations Committee:
 Representative Thomas "Doc" Morgan
 Representative Bill Broomfield
 Representative Charlie Wilson (Texas)
 Representative Paul Findley
 Representative Bob Lagomarsino
 Representative Larry Winn
 Representative L. H. Fountain
 Lewis Gulick (Committee Staff)
 Steve Ward (Committee Staff)
 Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to
 the President for National Security Affairs
 Mr. Eugene Krizek (State Department)
 Mr. Max Friedersdorf, Assistant to the
 President

DATE AND TIME:

Thursday, January 22, 1976
12:00 - 12:30 p.m.

PLACE:

Cabinet Room

President: It is very nice to see you and get a report on your trip to a very vital area. Doc --

Morgan: Thank you, Mr. President. I will have Fountain brief you on the part of the trip that I missed.

We were met by the heads of state from every country except Yugoslavia, and Tito was sick. We tried to portray our visit as a friendly one; it was not for arm twisting. We pointed out the problems and how we thought they could help.

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
 NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
 BY MA . NARA, DATE 6/7/04
 State Int. Sec. 0.1.1.04



~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

CLASSIFIED BY BRENT SCOWCROFT
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Broomfield: Sadat seemed pleased with the state of progress in the Middle East. The most interesting thing was he reported to us that he needed defensive weapons. He is out in the cold with the Soviet Union. He wants to concentrate on economic development, but he does need some weapons.

Fountain: Sadat clearly wants to focus on economic development. I even detected a changed attitude toward Rabin. I saw it on Rabin's part also. The chief problem seems to be Syria. We told him there was not much chance now to get weapons. He said he understood that 1976 was an election year and he didn't expect much from us.

He was concerned about the PLO. He said Arafat was the most moderate of them and if there was no movement, the radicals would take over.

President: Sadat has usually been very impressive. He gave us much help at the OAU Conference on Angola.

Findley: The major impression I had from everywhere was a yearning to see American leadership. And if we didn't provide it, there would be none. All of them but Rabin thought we had to start a dialogue with the PLO. I feel more strongly now that we must move for a comprehensive settlement and we must deal the PLO.

President: The situation in Lebanon is very serious. They have had 23 cease-fires and are working on another.

Findley: I think that adds urgency to the move for a comprehensive and broad settlement.

Despite what other members of the Committee may say, I hope you will consider seriously the sale of defensive arms to Egypt. Everyone else is getting them and Egypt is being left out.

President: Is there unanimity about opening an unofficial dialogue with the PLO?

Morgan: No, there is not. Some of us feel that with the PLO activity in Lebanon, now is not the time.

Wilson: I'm in favor of it.



Lagomarsino: I do not.

Winn: I do.

Findley: I do.

Winn: Sadat said Syria is auctioneering. He is concerned about Syria, but he wants us to keep working with them.

President: We do have the Syrians in the assistance package both for '76 and '77.

Winn: Sadat was very complimentary to the United States.

President: He is a very courageous man.

Findley: All the heads of government of the countries we visited urged us to help him all we can.

Fountain: Rabin indicated they were willing to give up territory under appropriate circumstances. He thought he could work with Hussein if Syria didn't push him to the wall.

I got the feeling that Hussein had his feelings hurt at the early stages, that he had not been called in to help.

Findley: Rabin places far too much hope on being able to work with Hussein to settle the West Bank. The Shah, though, thinks that if Hussein tried he would be overthrown.

Winn: I don't think Rabin changed his tune, really. But Peres is now leading Rabin in the polls by about 8%.

Morgan: Israel wants to negotiate the West Bank with Jordan, not the PLO. They feel that an independent Palestinian state would be a Marxist sword pointed at them, and they are prepared to give Syria some ground in a settlement.

Winn: General Gur said they are willing to give ground in the Golan, but he is talking in terms of feet and yards.

Morgan: The Shah said he needs arms and if he can't get them from us he'll get them elsewhere. We should keep friendship with both Greece and Turkey.



Findley: He expressed concern that we might be becoming isolationists. He said we are the leaders. If we didn't exercise leadership, the Soviets will.

Winn: On the nuclear issue, he mentioned India's increasing lean towards the Soviet Union.

Morgan: I rejoined the group in Turkey. We visited with all sides. We tried to impress on them the need for movement on Cyprus in view of the bills pending in the Congress. I was surprised by their indications of sincerity about the Cyprus negotiations. I was concerned about Makarios playing the spoiler role. They said they were non-expansionists and they wanted to negotiate with Greece. There is an age-old animosity, but I think they will make steps if they can sit down and discuss the issues.

We are in a time bind. We are trying to work out some compromise language because we are in mark-up now.

In Greece, I was impressed with the Prime Minister. He is a tough customer and I didn't see much give. I thought the Turks really wanted to settle.

President: How about Ecevit? Is he cooperative?

Morgan: He says he is, but he is ready to play it politically.

Lagomarsino: He can have it either way. He is not making an issue now, but if they move and the coalition collapses, Ecevit will take over.

Wilson: I stayed in Turkey after the group. I told them we had an irresponsible Congress and if they could play ball with us and be patient, we would be more responsive after November. The intellectuals seemed to buy it.

President: Clerides withdrew his resignation, but Makarios is the potential spoiler. I am glad you laid it on the line. I know what you face when the bill comes up. We got to have some indication of progress.

Findley: That is the line we tried to stress. We tried to be diplomats but we said we needed their help to get the necessary votes. You have to make another report on February 5.



Morgan: We pointed out to the Turks there was no way we could make a long term agreement on the bases. I think they got the message it would have to be on an annual basis.

Lagomarsino: For some reason they didn't want to talk about the troop withdrawals from Cyprus, but there have been some.

Findley: The differences between Greece and Turkey on Cyprus are fairly narrow. The problem is the difficulty of either one appearing to give in. I think the United States needs to be the catalyst. I think if we used someone like Lemnitzer to propose a settlement which they both could buy....

Wilson: Demirel said they would invade Greece if the embargo was re-imposed and if they perceived the military balance shifting.

Broomfield: We perceived that Yugoslav-American relations were good. There were no problems.

We asked why they voted the way they did on the Zionism resolution and they said it was a bad vote by them.

Winn: They would like the trade spread out. They do three times the trade with the Soviet Union as with us and they want to balance it.


Findley: All the capitals we visited expressed uneasiness about detente and SALT and I urge you to put it off until 1977.

President: We are negotiating now. I am concerned that if there is no agreement, we will have to start some new programs and that will cost money. No one will be able to sit in this chair without an agreement and not ask for more money for defense. What concerns me is what the Congress will do. If Congress turns me down, will we be in a better position to negotiate in 1977?

Findley: I am worried about Backfire and the cruise missiles. In fact, the cruise missiles are a greater problem to us than the Soviet Union and Backfire is an aircraft of tremendous range.

President: It is very complicated. I would reiterate that we are not necessarily better off in 1977.

[Congressman Findley handed the President a report of his views, which is attached.]



Fordley

1b

I returned from my trip to Europe and the Middle East with a number of impressions regarding past policy failures and possible policy initiatives.

U.S. Leadership Required - At every stop the same urgent theme emerged: There is a strong need for continued leadership by the United States to affect the shape and nature of international security system.

There is continued trust in our capacity for leadership and a growing fear of the consequences of a failure to exercise such leadership.

There is only one other power center capable of influencing events, the Soviet Union.

Uneasiness Over the Intentions and Power of the Soviet Union - Linked to the desire for U.S. leadership was, we found, a concomitant sense of concern over the continued and substantial growth of the Soviet Union's capacity to project military power and its willingness to do so. The Soviets have learned incompletely--to the extent they have learned at all--the rule of behavior a state must follow under any reasonable policy of detente.



Resolution of Turkish-Cyprus Problem - Our policy failures in the southern flank of NATO only increase the possibilities for irresponsible Soviet behavior.

The smoldering and still tormented situation on Cyprus affects adversely the interests of both countries involved, as well as the integrity and resilience of the NATO alliance.

The leadership of both Greece and Turkey labors under incredibly tenuous political circumstances. Domestic support can be found only under the umbrella of policies which are extremely intransigent in character. Neither side can afford to be perceived as surrendering to the demands of the other. The irony of the situation is that the substantive differences separating the two sides are really quite small. All of this leads me to suggest a change in our approach to this problem. We should attempt to structure the negotiations so as to permit the Greeks and Turks to make compromises on behalf of European security. I would suggest, therefore, the option of deputizing a former prestigious SACEUR such as General Lyman Lemnitzer to serve as an intermediary in follow-on negotiations on this problem.



Need for a Comprehensive Middle East Peace Initiative -

We have been successful today in effectively forestalling any new outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East. We have done this, though, at a very high price in terms of the military and economic resources we have provided. My concern is that such aid may provide the opportunity for greater delay, that it may dull the impulse for diplomatic initiative on the part of the state of Israel. This would be very bad for Israel's long-range security. We learned that the track record for Israeli-initiated peace ventures is not very substantial. This suggests that greater pressure will have to be applied. My impressions in this regard were strengthened dramatically in my talks with Prime Minister Rabin. I have suggested previously a comprehensive formula (see attachment) that would end the stalemate in the Middle East and thereby allow Israel to regain some diplomatic advantage. In light of the trend of events in the United Nations and elsewhere, this is a consideration of growing importance. No diplomatic initiative in the Middle East can succeed, however, unless we begin more actively to incorporate responsible Palestinians into the peace-making process.



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HON. PAUL FINDLEY

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

CONGRESS CAN END MIDEAST LOGJAM

American foreign policy has been riveted upon the Middle East while the delicate structure of world peace has begun to crack and tumble down.

It is high time for the Congress to lay down some fundamental principles which should govern any peace settlement which might yet be arranged.

Congress should put all the parties in the Middle East on notice that the American people support the peace initiatives which this administration has undertaken. Although that expression of support may be late in coming, it will nonetheless be important in whatever forum the peace talks are resumed.

Congress should recognize the fundamental importance of sustained progress on the issues which divide the two sides. For it is progress, more than any other factor, which weaves the fabric of peace.

Congress should now set forth a set of principles to serve as a guideline for peace, and thus provide impetus to renewed negotiations and progress toward peace.

The seven principles which I believe are fundamental to peace in the Middle East are embodied in a resolution I am introducing today. Those principles are:

First. Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict;

Second. Termination of all claims of states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats of acts of force;

Third. Recognition of the right of Pal-

estinians living on the West Bank of the Jordan River, in Gaza, and those wishing to return to these locations, to determine their own future, within the framework of the principle of Israel's sovereignty within defined borders and in accordance with U.N. Resolutions 194 and 242;

Fourth. Establishment and control by the United Nations Security Council of a zone of proportionate width on each side of the borders between the State of Israel and its contiguous neighbors, the security and inviolability of which to be maintained by United Nations forces subject only to the authority of the United Nations Security Council and removable only by its affirmative vote; said zone to be free of nationally controlled military forces;

Fifth. Guarantee to all parties of freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal and all international waterways of the area; and

Sixth. Guarantee to persons of all religious faiths of equal access to the city of Jerusalem.

The seventh principle, and the one which brings credibility to the preceding six, is that the United States should pledge that it will enter into an arrangement or agreement with such other powers as wish to join to guarantee a final settlement based upon the principles just stated.

This resolution is a careful mix of existing policy previously agreed to by all parties in the Middle East and some reasonable advances.

The most important part of my resolution is section 2, the glue which binds the agreement together. This key section states that:

The United States should pledge that it

will enter into an agreement to guarantee the final settlement based on the principles stated above in concert with such other powers as wish to join.

This section states a fundamental commitment on the part of the people of the United States. It is qualified. The commitment will occur only if the settlement contains the principles set forth earlier in the resolution.

That is an important qualification. The implementation of the commitment is subject, of course, to regular constitutional processes. This section would not in itself authorize the President to send U.S. military forces to attempt to enforce a settlement. Such action would require the separate specific approval of the Congress.

For all practical purposes, a U.S. congressional commitment to defend the integrity of the State of Israel already exists and has been restated and reinforced on many occasions.

Unfortunately this commitment is vague. It is imprecise. It does not state the principles which lead to the commitment. Because of its imprecision, it has on occasion placed the United States in an awkward position.

Although some Americans might fear that such an agreement could involve the United States in a war in the Middle East, that possibility already exists. In fact, I believe the passage of this resolution would reduce very substantially the risk of war. The United States has never been willing to permit Israel's neighbors to invade and destroy that nation. The threat of U.S. intervention has always

been a fundamental part of U.S. policy, and the Arab States know it. In addition, Secretary Kissinger has recently expanded the U.S. commitment in the Middle East to include the prevention of some undefined "strangulation" of the Western World.

It would be far wiser for the United States to enter into a formal agreement to guarantee a peaceful settlement in the Middle East based on fair and balanced principles, rather than the erratic shifting and unpredictable factors now in prospect.

I put this resolution before the House because it is clear that today, more than ever before, the United States must speak clearly and with one voice on the Middle East question.

In addition, this is an opportune time for the Congress to recognize its constitutional responsibility to participate in the formulation of fundamental U.S. foreign policy.

Moreover, it is an opportunity for Congress to be positive in the formulation of foreign policy, not always negative as in the debate over Cyprus. If we fail to accept that responsibility, fail to state clearly our support for a just and reasonable peace in the Middle East, the consequences of our inaction could be disastrous. The possibility of renewed war, another oil boycott, worldwide inflation and depression, all hinge upon fair resolution of the issues which separate Arabs and Israelis.

No single initiative which this Congress might undertake could be more worthy of its immediate attention. No other issue holds so much promise for the peace and well-being of mankind.

H. CON. RES. 192

Whereas peace in the Middle East is essential to world peace and to the peace and well-being of the people of the United States; Now therefore be it;

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled, That it is the sense of the Congress that the President should seek agreement by all parties to a peace settlement in the Middle East based upon the following principles:

1. Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict;

2. Termination of all claims of states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

3. Recognition of the right of Palestinians living on the West Bank of the Jordan River, in Gaza, and those wishing to return to these locations, to determine their own future, within the framework of the principle of Israel's sovereignty within defined borders

and in accordance with U.N. Resolutions 194 and 242.

4. Establishment and control by the United Nations Security Council of a zone of proportionate width on each side of the borders between the State of Israel and its contiguous neighbors, the security and inviolability of which to be maintained by United Nations forces subject only to the authority of the United Nations Security Council and removable only by its affirmative vote, said zone to be free of nationally controlled military forces;

5. Guarantee to all parties of freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal and all international waterways of the area;

6. Guarantee to persons of all religious faiths of equal access to the city of Jerusalem.

SEC. 2. It is the further sense of the Congress that the United States should pledge that it will enter into an agreement to guarantee the final settlement based on the principles stated above in concert with such other powers as wish to join.



Brief Points on Salt II

Election years are not appropriate times in which to negotiate sensitive and complex limitations on our strategic forces. We should not conclude an agreement with the Soviet Union on this subject unless we can have a very high degree of confidence in it. This is important both for reasons of international security (the perceptions other countries have of the military balance between the U.S. and S.U.) and domestic support. Recent revelations about Soviet compliance and action under existing agreements argue even more forcefully in favor of greater skepticism and safeguards.

Two issues concern me greatly: our position on the Soviet Backfire bomber and proposed restrictions on cruise missiles. My amendment to the House Resolution on the Vladivostok Understanding called for careful attention to be given to the Backfire problem, verification, and the imbalance in missile throw-weight. I believe the American people are also most concerned about these questions.

Backfire - We must not compromise our stance on the Backfire bomber. This is a highly advanced strategic aircraft capable of performing intercontinental missions. Various realistic flight profiles enable it to hit all meaningful targets in the United States. It should be treated as a "heavy" bomber and therefore counted within the 2400 aggregate for strategic delivery vehicles. Counting only those bombers which are deployed at Arctic staging bases does not make sense, since bombers can be re-deployed quickly in time of crisis.



page 2 (SALT)

Cruise Missiles - Restrictions on American cruise missiles would also not promote a high confidence arms control agreement. These are not "ballistic" missiles and should not be included within the comprehensive totals for strategic delivery vehicles. Range constraints on the cruise missile simply cannot be meaningfully verified. Range depends upon fuel load, which in turn depends upon the weight of the warhead. The warhead can be easily and quickly altered. We can only know the range within, roughly, an order of magnitude, i.e., perhaps one can fly 700 miles, perhaps 7,000.

Aside from this, cruise missiles enable us to redress to some extent the large and growing superiority in throw-weight that has been accorded the Soviet Union. Missile size and payload capacity determine the number of re-entry vehicles that can be fitted on an individual missile. The Soviet Union could translate their payload advantage into roughly 10 times the number of warheads possessed by the United States. While this imbalance is somewhat technical, it is nonetheless coming to be understood by the American people.



page 3

Cruise missiles have other desirable properties as well. They are extremely accurate; this means they are a very cost-effective system. Beyond this, however, it means they can be used against legitimate military targets without adverse spill-over effects on civilian areas.

Finally, placing (unverifiable) constraints on the cruise missile's range, say by limiting both sides to a range no greater than 600 kilometers, is not to the advantage of the United States. Most lucrative targets in the U.S. are located within coastal areas, which can be reached by Soviet short-range cruise missiles. Important Soviet targets, on the other hand, can only be hit by missiles of much greater range.



✓ P/HIRC Trip Group. [See list in
22 Jan 76 attached folder]

P. Very nice to see you & get a report on your
trip to a very vital area. Doc -
M. I will have Fumitara brief you on the
part of a trip I missed.

We were met by a bunch of stupid young
country except Yugo & Tito was rich!
~~The~~ We tried to portray our visit as a
friendly one, not for arm training. We
pointed out a parade & how we thought
they could help.

B. Sadat seemed pleased w/ a state of prog in
ME. The most interesting report was his
need for diplomatic reform. He is out in
a cold w/c S.C. He wants to concentrate
on a con deployment, but he does need some
reform.

F. Sadat clearly wants to focus on con deployment.
I understood a change attitude toward
Rabin - I saw it on Rabin's part also. The
trip prob seems to be Syria. We told
him not much chance ever to get reform.
He understood 76 was an election year &
didn't expect us to be from us.
He was concerned about PLO. He
said Shafiq was a most moderate &
if there was no movement a radicals
would take over.

P. Sadat has really been very impressive.
He gave us much help at the OAV
conf. on Angola.

Finally The major impression I had from everywhere
was a yearning for US leadership & if
we didn't provide it, there would be none.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, StateWiwew3/11/04

BY DA NARA DATE 6/7/06



All but Rabin that that we had to start a dialogue w/c PLO. I felt ^{more} strongly now that we must move for a ceasefire settlement + must deal w/c PLO.

P The sit in behavior is very serious. They have had 23 EF's + are working on another

Finally

I think that adds ~~urgency~~ to a move for a ~~ceasefire~~ + final settlement.

Despite what others are a little way, I do hope you will consider seriously risk of dy. arms to E. ~~For~~ Everyone else is getting them + E being left out.

P Is there uncertainty about joining ^{unofficially} ~~officially~~ w/PLO

M

No there is not. Some feel that w/c PLO activity is behavior now is not total (Wilson favored ^{lagomades} ~~left~~ didn't, ^{basically} ~~left~~ ^{Wheeler} ~~left~~, ^{Frankly} ~~did~~)

Winn ~~2nd~~ ~~left~~

Sadat said Syria is confronting. He is concerned about Syria but he wants not keep working w/ them.

P

We do have a Syrian sec a assistance package but to be 76 + 77.

Winn ~~2nd~~ ~~left~~

Sadat was very comprehending to US

P

He is very encouraging call myself to help him all we can.

Finally

F

Rabin indicated they were willing to give up territory under approp circumstances. He thought he could work w/ Hussein if Syria didn't push him to a wall.

I got a feeling that Hussein had his feeling about it a early stage that he had not been called in to help.



Frankly

Robin plans for too much ~~to~~ hope
on trying out to work w/ H. Nassir to
settle w. Bank. Shah, tho, thinks
if H. Nassir tried he would be overthrown.
I don't think Robin changed his basic line
nally. But P. is now leading Robin
in a pole by about 8%.

Winn
~~Winn~~

M

I want to report W. Bank w/ Jordan, not
Ph.D. They feel ~~in-gold~~ ^{held} ~~status~~ would
be a Marxist swind at them, & they
may want to give Syria swind period in
a settlement

Harry

Gene said they willing to give ground in
Golan, but he talking in terms of
feet & yards.

~~P. D. ...~~

M

Shah said he needs arms & if he can't
get them from us he'll get them elsewhere.
We should keep furnishing w/ both Geneva
& Turkey.

F

He expressed concern that we might be
becoming isolationist. If we are
leaders. If we don't placate it, CSU
will.

Winn
~~Winn~~

M

On the arms issue, he mentioned
Arch's increasing lean towards S. U.
Suzanne & group in Turkey. We must
w/ all sides. We tried to express our
need for movement on Cyprus in
view of a bill pending in C. Cong.
I was surprised by incentives of security
about help express request. Concerned about
breakdown playing spoils role. They



said they were non-business & wanted to meet w/ Assad. There is age old animosity, but I think they will make steps if they can set down + discuss cases.

Was one in a three kind. Was trying to work out some compromise language case in morning hour.

In hour, I expressed w/ C.P.M. Had a tough customer & I didn't see much going.

& that a Turkish ally wanted to settle.

P. How about E. coast. Is he cooperation

M. At 2 + says he is, but he is unable to play it politically

hagomarcini
(left)

He can have it either way. He not making an issue now, but if they move + a coalition emerges, E. coast will take over.

Wilson

I stayed in Turkey after a group. I told them we had an irresponsible lang & if they could play ball w/ us + be patient, we would be more coop. oriented. The intellectuals seemed to buy it.

P. Besides w/ show his resign, but Makarios is a potential spoiler. I glad you laid it on a table. I know what you face when you will come up. We got to have some substance of prog, prog.

F. That is a line we tried to stress. We tried to be diplomats but no avail we needed their help to get a necessary votes. You had to make another report on Feb 5.

M. We pointed out to a Turk that there was no way we could make a long term agreement on a



hagomans
(Sept)

bases. I think they get a message it would have to be on annual basis. For some reason they didn't want to withdraw a treaty of channel from byzans, but there have been.

Friday

The day last Oct on byzans are fairly serious. The prob is a difficulty of return appearing to give in. I think US wants to be a catalyst. I think if we had serious like harmless to propose a settlement which they could buy. Demirel said they would invade Greece if a embargo was imposed & they perceived a vital balance shifting.

Friday
(Sept)

B We perceived US - Yugo relations were good - no probs.

We asked why their 2 most votes & they said it a bad vote by them.

Friday


They will take trade good out. Turkey do 3x a trade w/ SU as w/ US & they want to handle it.

Friday

All capitals expressed serious about detente - Salt & I urge you put it off till ??

P

We've got now. I concerned that if no agreement, we will have to start some new probs & that will have cost money. We can't set in this chair w/o an agreement & not ask for more. What concerns me is what they will do. If they turn one down, will we then a better partner to negotiate in ??



Finally I worried about Backfire & ex. I fear
ex are greater prob to us than I & C +
Backfire is on a lot of tremendous range.
It is very encompassed. I would retreat too,
that was not exclusively written off in 2?

