

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Saturday, July 5, 1975
(After the Suharto meeting)

SUBJECT: CSCE Schedule

Kissinger: The 28th [of July] is Monday. If that is the first day, it would end on the 31st. We would leave for Germany on the 23rd, and remain there until Friday. Then go on to Warsaw around 4 or 5 p.m. Go on to Gdansk Saturday in the afternoon, and to the Masurian Lakes for Sunday afternoon. The Germans won't like that much, as it used to belong to them.


Monday night you could give a dinner for the heads of all the Western countries.

I don't think you can leave Helsinki much before noon Friday, to let Ceausescu get back first. You could go to Belgrade Saturday afternoon.

If you wanted, you could then meet with Asad in Vienna.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY ll, NARA, DATE 5/21/04



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Saturday, July 5, 1975

PLACE: Camp David
Maryland

Kissinger: The major thing with the Indonesians is they always smile. But Suharto is a tough cookie. He is anti-Communist but he has doubts about our steadfastness. He likes the idea of special emissaries.

It might be awkward if I was in the first meeting. I would be as firm as possible about the American role in Asia. They are pathological about the Chinese, and worried about Vietnam and the Soviet Union.

The President: The Chinese Communists under Sukarno were most influential weren't they?

Kissinger: Yes, but they loath the Chinese racially. We have to be careful about Indonesia. We tend to take things for granted. Remember they used to get all their military equipment from the Soviet Union. Here is a list of the equipment we could give them.

Ask his views about how Southeast Asia is and how we can organize it. You could send a note for me after about 30 minutes. By then I could have the other group organized. Simon isn't here, so we can't have an OPEC lecture.

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5(b) (1, 3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/2400, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Review 3/10/04
BY Wls, NARA, DATE 5/21/04



The President: Did I read that some are moving away from the floor price?

Kissinger: Let me tell you about the Israeli thing. Dinitz asked me a series of questions: "Where did we want the line?" I don't think we should give them one because then we are stuck with it. They want American troops in this area -- there don't have to be too many. Sisco, Atherton and I are all against it. Once we have combat troops there . . . Geneva will stalemate and down the road Egypt may get restive. If we pull our troops out, we will be accused of starting a war. If we won't, we will be accused of protecting a part of the front. The Israelis think you are softening.

The President: On what grounds?

Kissinger: You had a meeting with some contributors and said to a Jew that you are anxious for a settlement and would delay your departure for Europe to get it.

The President: That is not so at all. I don't even remember his name, but I may have said to him I hope for an agreement. We never talked about the European trip.

Kissinger: This just shows you how the network works. Dinitz knows every conversation I have with a Jew. My concern is, if we go in, what will we say to the Syrians if they want us there? Or if they want Soviet troops? This arrangement would break the back of it, so it is a big decision.

The President: My reaction was it is hazardous and will give us a Congressional problem. Why can't we compromise on the warning stations?

Kissinger: That is my thinking. Perhaps we could increase the number of warning stations. Maybe up to five -- not more.

The President: I don't think we could go for a combat troop presence. It would cause much more of a problem than warning stations.

Kissinger: Should I tell Shalev that we can't agree but we can increase the number of warning stations?

The President: Yes. Could we have them manned by civilians or mostly civilians?

Scowcroft: Probably civilian technicians.

Kissinger: They asked for a line in the east, but I wouldn't give them one. In the south they would draw the line straight down, so it would be a bitter pill for Sadat to accept the Israeli line. The Egyptian line also cuts out the Israeli logistics base.

The President: I think Israel should keep that base.

Kissinger: I would like to call Shalev and tell him there can be no area presence, but there can be warning stations. You are absolutely firm that something has to happen?

The President: Absolutely.

Kissinger: On seeing Rabin, I am not anxious to. I would leave it up to them. We have nothing to say. They asked more questions. On Syria, I said the unilateral gesture might get us through 1976. On aid, I said we could go higher with an agreement than without one. I said I didn't think we could go as high as \$2 billion. He said they could go down to \$2.3 billion.

The President: That is almost as much as the entire foreign aid program.

Kissinger: They want reimbursement for losing the oil fields and a guarantee of oil supply in case of an embargo. We could use the Iranian oil.

We have a deal with Iran if you want it. I will show you it Monday morning. It is a five-year deal, either at or less than the OPEC price. It is payable in 5-year notes, non-negotiable and non-interest-bearing for the first year. Zarb and Greenspan are afraid that if DOD buys the oil, it would lead to a government purchasing agency. Greenspan is worried about whether you should give the Saudis the same deal. That is a nice kind of problem to have. I would give them the same deal for the same amount but ask for a better deal if they want more. I would wait to see if the Saudis came to us. This would end the charges of cuddling the Shah and the money would be spent only in the United States.



The President: On the Israeli thing -- I would tell them there can be no combat personnel, and only civilians in the warning stations. It has got to be way down on the eastern slopes. Israel keeps the logistics base, but they've got to widen the line in the south.

Kissinger: What I would like to do -- the best Jewish group is the Klutznick ones. It is the most responsible, but they are unpopular in Israel. Maybe I should bring them down and briefly have you see them.

Now on CSCE. The Poles want you to come badly. They promised you a warm reception -- as good as they gave for Giscard, which means better than for Nixon. [He talks about Nixon's crowd trip.] They give you three options: meet next spring, that is their first choice; before the CSCE, which is their second choice; and spend one day in Warsaw, one in Gdansk, and then to the Masurian Lakes. I am inclined to do it now.

The President: I agree. We will take some flak with the ethnics with CSCE and this would moderate it.

Kissinger: We should leave Wednesday, go Friday to Warsaw, Sunday morning to Gdansk, and Monday to Helsinki.

X
Angola ✓

P/R 5 July 75
(Capt. Suharto mtg)

K 28th is Monday. If that is day it would end
on 31st. We could leave for Germany on 23.
Spent there til Friday, Arr Warsaw @ 9.5 pm
On to Gdansk Saturday AM. Massives letters for
Sunday pm. Germans want like that much need
to belong to them.

Monday night you could give a dinner for all
the Western countries.

I don't think you can leave much before from
Friday to let Gennissen get back 1st, you
could go to Belgrade Saturday afternoon. If you
wanted, you could then then visit w/ Assad.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY DA NARA DATE 5/21/04



JPK 5 July 75

~~P. H. ...~~

K Major thing w/c Serbians - they always smile but Serb is a tough cookie. He is anti West but has doubts about our steadfastness. He likes a bit of special exercises. ~~It~~
It might be awkward if I was in a 1st org.
I would be as firm as possible about US role in Asia.
They are pathological about PRC, worried about VN and SJ.

P Chinese Coast under Serbians were not enforced, weren't they?

K Yes, but they loath Chinese racially.
We have to be careful about Jews. We tend to take things for granted. Remember they need to get all their mail, equip from SW. Here is a list of equip we could give them.
Ask his views about how SEA + how to organize you could send a note for work of the above 30 minutes. By then I could have other gear organized. Simon isn't here so we won't have our Olic lectures.

P Did I read them are moving away from floor mats.

K Let me tell you about a I thing. Dinty asked me a series of questions. Where did we want a base. I don't think we should give them a base. They are stuck w/ it. They want US troops in this area - don't have to be too many. Soviet, American & Jan all against it. But we have worked

K They asked for a line in a east but I wouldn't give them one. In a search they would draw the line through down, so it would be a better fit to accept a E line. The E line also cuts out the J logistics tree.

P I think I should keep that tree.

K I would like to call Shaker & tell him no area presence, but warning statistics. You are absolutely firm that something has to happen

P Absolutely.

K On selling Robin. I got out of it. I would leave it up to them. We have nothing to say. They asked some questions. On Syria, I said the immediate question might get no more than 26. On oil I said we could go higher w/ them w/o. I said I don't think we could go as high as 2 but. He said they could go lower to 2.3

P That almost as much as entire F. and prog.

K They want ~~no~~ reimbursement for oil losses & guarantee of supply. We could use a Russian oil. We have a deal w/ Iran if you want it. I will show you Monday morning. It is 5-yr deal either at or less than OPEC price. Payable in 5-yr notes non-vot + non-interest for 1st year. Early Greenpan from if O.D. buys it it would have Govt purchase option. Greenpan would whether you should give Saudis some deal. That a nice kind of fact to have. I would give them a some deal for some asset but ask for better deal if they want more. I would want to see if Saudis

*
*



came to us. This would need changes of scheduling -
Shah & it could be spent only in US.

P ^ in a I thing - I would tell them in contact
personnel, conditions in various stations, get to
do very down on a E plays, ~~as~~ I keep a log, had,
got to write a line ~~as~~ in a Smith.

K What I like to do - a last Jewish group in a Khatynka
area. It is a rich but unpopular in F. Maybe I
should bring them down & briefly have you see them.

On CSCE, Poles have want you to come badly -
promised a warm reception - as good as for Guscinski,
which means better ^{than} for M. (His crowd trip). They
give you 3 options: next spring, their 1st choice,
before CSCE 2nd, one day in Warsaw, one in Gdansk,
& then to Masurian lakes. I wanted to do it now.

P Lopez, We will take some flak w/c ethics w/
CSCE & this would moderate it.

K to leave Wed, go Fri to Warsaw, Sunday
evening to Gdansk, Monday to Helsinki.

