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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

President Ford
Senator J. W. Fulbright
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:

Wednesday, July 2, 1975
11:04 - 11:35 a.m.

PLACE:

The Oval Office
The White House

Senator Fulbright: I appreciate your giving me the time. I wouldn't take it if I didn't think it was important.

The President: It was a very timely trip to the Middle East. I would appreciate hearing your views, from your vast experience.

Senator Fulbright: Let me leave you this, which is by Jim Symington.
[Tab A].

I visited seven countries. I was well received, but they think my views were a reflection of American foreign policy. I think it is imperative that you make a statement about our objectives before the election. The Arabs -- except Qaddafi -- are the most conciliatory they have ever been. They say that if Israel will go back to the '67 lines, they will recognize Israel. Iraq was not as forthcoming. They didn't indicate they would welcome a settlement, but they would not oppose it. But Iraq is just emerging from its isolation. That is breaking down now, with recent developments with Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Kurds.

In Syria, who I thought didn't like us, the Economic Minister is a graduate of New York University. He gave me two cordial hours.

The President: Henry really likes Asad. All the countries around Israel have a different attitude than they had before.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISCHER

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12815, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/88, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
State Review 3/10/04
NARA, DATE 5/20/04

By: Henry A. Kissinger



Senator Fulbright: I used the Percy statement. I tried to explain the 76 Senator's letter.

The President: Those fellows who signed the letter -- they may support Israel, but I bet not to the tune of \$2.5 billion.

Senator Fulbright: The key to my idea -- and I am a politician -- is the political angle. Not that you need this advice. I have talked to Laird, Kissinger and Ingersoll, etc. You are in a unique position, as a politician. You want to be reelected. Your political opponents are critical to Israel. The question is: can you win on it? I am convinced you need to make a positive statement. This is in Israel's own interest. They are so paranoid they don't know their interest. The Israeli Government is weak and can do it only if they can say that "the damned President forced us." This is the only way we can be free of the burden which has plagued your presidency.

The President: In the next months or year, we have to lay out a comprehensive plan. Now I think there is an advantage to an interim agreement. The chances are against it, and if there is no interim agreement, we have to go for a comprehensive plan. You know the Jews will attack me, but if we posture it right, we can say we tried an interim and we just couldn't get it. I will have \$208 million people with me against 6 million Jews.

You may disagree with what we are trying to do on an interim. But that will put it on the back burner for six months or perhaps through the election.

Senator Fulbright: I would just like to get this burden off you. Implementation could wait until the election. But the Arabs need to know your objective. Arafat, of course, is in a more delicate position. I think he will in fact accept the West Bank and Gaza as a place for the Palestinians to call their own. What they do with it is their problem. In five years, with a settlement, Israel would have recognized borders. We just have to get by this damned war. The Jews are propagandizing and using the underdog strategy. They are sending around brochures. I will send you one.

The President: We have been sending them arms. They are better off than they were before the October war.

Senator Fulbright: They would win a war but that wouldn't help -- it would be a disaster.

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The President: We have bent over backwards to help them. They do have a weak domestic situation.

Senator Fulbright: They Arabs will be terribly disappointed if nothing happens for 18 months. It doesn't have to be action, but at least not a stalemate. I think you are going to win in '76 and I think they will be reassured. The moderates have to be able to point to some progress -- if not, they will be pushed out by the radicals. We have to help the moderates. When we didn't help Khrushchev, he got thrown out. You remember we wouldn't let him visit Disneyland! The same will happen to Brezhnev.

The President: Does Arafat think he can control the PLO?

Senator Fulbright: If we can make some progress, so he can contain the radicals. Publicly Arafat is still for a "secular state," but privately he would settle for the West Bank and Gaza.

The President: Not just the West Bank?

Senator Fulbright: Gaza is just a symbol.

The President: What is your impression of Prince Fahd?

Senator Fulbright: He's a powerful fellow. Khalid is a softer fellow, but he is impressive.

The President: The story is that he is weak-minded.

Senator Fulbright: He is quiet, but not feeble-minded. But they have some good people in their 40's. We have a great position in Saudi Arabia. They want to develop with our cooperation -- it's the same in Abu Dhabi -- they are just dying to do something. The Sheikh is an interesting fellow. They have the highest per capita income in the world.

The President: What do they do with the money?

Senator Fulbright: They built roads; they have the two finest hotels I have ever seen; ports, and factories. I am trying to get him into solar energy.

The President: Did you go to Kuwait?



Senator Fulbright: No. I went there before. I visited Iraq for my first time. There is a big opportunity for American investment. They have the biggest oil reserves, next to Saudi Arabia. There are two big rivers.

The President: They are fighting with Syria over that.

Senator Fulbright: Yes, the Saudis are trying to settle that and I think they have. The key to this war.....everyone is apprehensive. If we could get the war settled we would have great business opportunities.

Suppose you made this statement, you could go to the Saudis and say "We stuck our necks out here, so now you help us on oil." Make a deal with them. You can't make a deal when you don't do what they are interested in.

The President: If we did lay out a comprehensive plan, is a guarantee essential?

Senator Fulbright: Israel says they want to rely on themselves, but I think it would help the Jews here. Israel was created by the UN. I think a resolution guaranteeing the borders, and the U.S. and the Soviet Union say "We agree with it and will support it." I would use the UN because they created it. I was surprised the Soviet Union said publicly they would go along. Why not?

I fear that a delay would result in Israel doing something reckless.

The President: They would be unwise to do it. The last war was bloodier than ever. I feel their support in the U.S. isn't as strong as it was before. That is why the letters.

Senator Fulbright: That is puffing, not substance.

I think it is a winning issue. The American people are tired of being whipsawed on this. The Arkansas Gazette blasted the 76 Senators' letter for preempting your reassessment.

The President: I appreciate your coming in and giving me this and this material.



We will do something within two or three weeks. And within the next year or so, we must come out with a comprehensive plan.

There is no question after the election. It's just a question of timing.

Senator Fulbright: I think the American people will support you. Only you can do it. Think what it would do in Europe and Japan. You would be acclaimed. Conversely, if there's another embargo and you would be blamed for being able to do something and that you didn't.

It is a great opportunity. I know it is a difficult political problem.

I appreciate the opportunity. I know I am no longer in politics, but I have been following this since the Aswan business.

[Senator Fulbright later sent the President a written report on his trip. Tab B.]

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James W. Symington

Toward an American Foreign Policy

In his farewell address George Washington cautioned his countrymen to beware of foreign entanglements. The Father of his Country had been a loyal British subject, having fought on the Indian frontier with General Braddock. His Americanization, like that of his associates, occurred by degrees as his mind and spirit became alienated by perceived injury and attracted by a corollary sense of patriotism to the emerging colonial cause. Were he to be allowed to visit with us today he would be hard put to fathom our network of alliances, trading arrangements, military aid programs and

Rep. Symington (D-Mo.) entered these remarks in the Congressional Record on Feb. 5.

the intricacies of detente. Observing our grants, sales and loans to nearly every participant in the Middle East struggle, he might conclude our foreign policy bordered on the occult.

If he were to offer advice after being afforded such an overview, it seems to me it would be simply to bear in mind America's national interest in the formulation of foreign policy, so that it might be an American foreign policy with no prefixes denoting an infusion of extra-national bias or sentiment. He would have agreed with Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Sr., who early in this century spoke of the need to cease being Anglo-Americans, German-Americans, Italian-Americans and Irish-Americans and become just Americans. This is harder than one might think. The melting pot melts slowly and Congress quite accurately reflects the condition of its content . . .

Reflecting overwhelming but imperfectly informed public sentiment, dominant voices in the House and Senate recently prevailed on the administration to insist on a more liberal Jewish emigration policy on the part of the Soviet Union as a condition for increased trade. I supported the effort as the only one offered to express our proper concern for another people. But I would have thought a more attainable and more valuable *quid pro quo* would have been a firm guarantee of Soviet cooperation in securing a stable peace for Israel and her neighbors. That would have been in the best in-

terest of Israel, the United States and, in fact, a whole world clinging precariously to the hem of peace. For the Soviets that would have been an external not an internal initiative, thus properly negotiable.

Diplomacy is akin to the work of a potter's kiln. Congress can break but not make its products. There were aspects of the trade arrangement which I believe were questionable. A \$10 billion investment in Soviet energy production capacity with the hope of getting a steady supply of it seemed to merit close scrutiny. But if its benefits could stand that test it should not have been sacrificed to any condition other than one of the first magnitude. Compared to a great-power cooperative peace effort, the emigration flow is of a lower order of magnitude.

The Cyprus question provides another example of how Congress would lay its heavy hand on the fragile pen of diplomacy . . . The delicate task of reconciling the two contending NATO nations chiefly interested by bonds of blood, affinity, history and geography is ours as the principal NATO partner. The administration approaches the thicket most cautiously. We enter as if the thorns will recede at the sight of us. The problem appears simple to Congress. It is merely one of first principles: The provisions of the law are broken when one NATO power uses U.S. arms, not defensively but offensively, against another or a neutral. A factor? Definitely.

The principal factor? Reverse the players and see. Let us assume the Turkish enclave produced a militant force which threatened the Greek sector, and Greek troops arrived first to defend, but then to attack and occupy the Turkish sector. Would the same impulse to curtail aid to Greece until the withdrawal of those troops be manifested with such firmness on the House floor, particularly if the President asked for time and patience? Can-do compels a negative response to the hypothetical. What is it then that impels the Congress to take over the negotiations on Cyprus in this instance? The law only? No, the law buttressed by sentiment which evokes a sympathetic response from every minority which looks upon its respective kindred people overseas as an endangered species.

American foreign policy is thus like Gulliver, bound and immobilized by myriad threads of prejudice, favoring

a chance assortment of nations and peoples whose own first concern is by no means for America. In the rush to resolve a delicate dispute on behalf of one favored contestant, the other's rightful claims to our gratitude or respect are muted and forgotten. Turkish excesses and the agonies of the Greek Cypriot community are well ventilated. But forgotten is the response of Turkey to our needs in Korea and the bravery of her soldiers there. Forgotten is the tangible bulwark Turkey poses by history and national character to Soviet expansion: forgotten, the strategic importance of her steadfastness; muted, the impact on her people of the mass execution of her civilian kinsmen on Cyprus. No, indeed, these concepts give way to the wry humor of what is fed in Greek restaurants to Congressmen who vote "wrong," reminiscent of the jokes that flourished in the wake of the six-day war in the Middle East and which bring no smiles now.

Similar impulses unite the Black Caucus on Rhodesia and South Africa, while Caesar Chavez suggests favored treatment to millions of illegal immigrants at the expense of his fellow citizens including 8 million unemployed. Are we so homesick for the problems of others that we care not for our own? There is irony in the fact that the technology of communication, normally a force for cohesion, has had a centrifugal effect on our attention span, leading us emotionally back to the entanglements Washington so feared. We live in a new and permanent era of interdependence. But the day-to-day reflection of our rightful concern for the rationality of our involvement is better left to the executive than the legislative branch. The Congress plays its proper foreign policy role when it uses its principal powers, those of oversight, investigation and the purse, to encourage or discourage long-term courses of action . . .

If the 535-member Congress thinks its collective wisdom is all that's necessary to break the Cyprus deadlock, it engages in a presumption commensurate with its size. In the further consideration of this and other matters that come before us, we would do well to remember not only our individual origins but the origins of the nation we serve. Its majesty and power were given us not to pursue old feuds but new understandings, not for vengeance but for vision.

MEMORANDUM

TO: President Ford DATE: June 27, 1975
FROM: J. W. Fulbright
SUBJECT: The Middle East - An American Policy

In his speech at Atlanta on June 24, Secretary Kissinger pointed to the range of vital American interests in the Middle East -- the security of Israel, access to Arab oil, the strain on the Western alliance posed by each successive crisis, the threat to the world economy of a new oil crisis, and the chronic danger of confrontation with the Soviet Union. The Secretary emphasized that the United States "must do its utmost to protect all its interests in the Middle East."

Having recently returned from an extended tour of the Middle East, I take the liberty of conveying to you my strong sense of both the import and urgency of the Secretary's observations. Time is working against us, and against our interests. The status quo is not benign. It is not allowing tensions to abate; on the contrary, it fosters a steady and accelerating slide toward war. The Secretary was, if anything, understating the matter when he said at Atlanta that "We are now at a point where there must be a turn either toward peace or toward new crises." Virtually every Arab leader I met on my trip expressed not just apprehension but certainty that if significant progress toward a settlement does not come soon, war will follow within a year or so, and with it a new oil embargo.

The principal Arab countries -- including Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia -- are all at present led by moderate and responsible men. These leaders are united in a consensus for making peace with Israel on the basis of the 1967 borders. All of them say so, explicitly and without qualification, and Mr. Arafat says so too, guardedly and by indirection, but to my ear, unmistakably. The emergence of this consensus for the acceptance of Israel is the most important and promising development in the Arab world since the 1967 war. It has created what Arab leaders describe as a "golden opportunity" for peace.

Emphatic as they are in pointing to this "golden opportunity," Arab leaders are no less emphatic that if not seized upon now, the opportunity will soon be lost, perhaps irretrievably. As in our own politics, no approach to a problem -- especially a risky and controversial one -- can be pressed indefinitely if it does not bring results. The continued occupation of Arab lands is a threat not only to moderation but to the moderate leaders themselves. Mr. Arafat hints that he could be more forthcoming if he had something to show for it, and also warns that if he does not succeed he will be replaced by extremists. One also hears -- with disturbing frequency -- warnings that President Sadat himself may be in trouble if he does not soon achieve some progress toward peace.

American interests. The Arab-Israel conflict and the oil problem are not only related but inseparable. Israel is largely a creation of the conscience of the West, particularly that of the United States; for that reason alone, her survival qualifies as an American national interest. At the same time we have a most vital interest in access to Arab oil -- all the more as the Gulf states account for a steadily rising portion of our imports and Congress shows little inclination to cooperate with you in meaningful energy-conservation. The problem of statecraft is to reconcile these interests, surely not to allow ourselves to drift, or be maneuvered, into a position in which one must be sacrificed to the other. The only way to reconcile these interests is by bringing the Arab states and Israel to a settlement.

The stakes are high, either for disaster, or as is not always sufficiently recognized, for great good. If there is another war, it may well bring a confrontation with the Soviet Union, and it will surely bring an embargo, which in turn could precipitate the disintegration of our alliances with Europe and Japan.

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has offered the United States a degree of cooperation and assured access to its oil which arouses the envy of all other industrialized countries. The Saudis do not propose, nor would we desire, privileged or discriminatory access to their oil, but they do offer us -- and it is entirely proper that we should accept --

a unique relationship based upon assured oil supply, large-scale investment of oil revenues in the United States, and primary reliance upon American technology for the development of Saudi Arabia. A Saudi-American association of this kind could also serve as an economic nucleus which would be highly beneficial to the rest of the world, including the developing countries. Also of great importance is the fact that almost all of Saudi Arabia's vast oil reserves are explored and extracted by a highly efficient American company with excellent relations with the Saudi Government. It is staffed primarily by Americans, is American in its orientation, and qualifies thereby as a solid asset to the national interest.

There are two basic problems with respect to our reliance on Arab oil: supply and price. The problems of supply -- which is to say, the threat of embargo -- is wholly a function of the Arab-Israel conflict. If that is resolved, there is no further threat of embargo. The problem of price is also related to the Arab-Israel conflict. A settlement could not be expected to result in an immediate, sizable price rollback, nor would it detach Saudi Arabia from OPEC. It would, however, eliminate the only outstanding issue between the United States and Saudi Arabia -- especially if provision were made for the restoration of East Jerusalem to one form or another of Arab sovereignty. Under these circumstances, Saudi Arabia would

almost certainly draw closer to the United States and become more amenable to our influence, making the problem of oil prices far more susceptible of reasonable accommodation.

The settlement. Except from Israel herself, there is a virtual world consensus as to the main outlines of a Middle East settlement: an Israeli withdrawal to the borders of 1967 with insubstantial variations; a Palestinian state comprising the West Bank and Gaza, either separate or in association with Jordan as the Palestinians may choose; the permanent or indefinite demilitarization of the Golan Heights, of much or all of Sinai including Sharm el-Sheikh, and of much or all of the West Bank; the stationing in the demilitarized zones of UN forces which could not be removed except with the consent of both sides; and great power guarantees of the settlement, preferably under the aegis of the United Nations Security Council, supplemented if necessary by a solid and explicit American guarantee of Israel.

A settlement along these lines has been endorsed by the principal Arab parties and also by the Soviet Union. The Arab consensus for the acceptance of Israel has been repeatedly signaled by the Arab leaders. King Khalid put it this way: "The Arabs have learned to be moderate, reasonable. Gone are the days of Nasser's period when the Arabs threatened to exterminate the Israelis." No less significant is the Soviet declaration of willingness to guarantee Israel. As Foreign Minister Gromyko

put it at a dinner in Moscow on April 23, 1975, for Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam: "Israel may get, if it so wishes, the strictest guarantees with the participation -- under an appropriate agreement -- of the Soviet Union." As noted, the Arab consensus will not survive indefinitely if it brings no rewards; nor can we count on the Soviets to renew their offer to cooperate if we do not hold them to it now.

The settlement would not need to be implemented at once. President Sadat and other Arab leaders indicate that they would be prepared to have it implemented over a period of years, step-by-step -- provided it were understood that such a settlement, and nothing less, were the agreed objective.

A settlement of the kind described would redeem and reconcile the American interests at stake, and, I feel certain, is in the best interests of Israel as well. Israel will be secure only when she gains acceptance as a normal state in the Middle East, in which event she would almost certainly become the scientific and technological leader of the region. The Arabs offer that -- or a start toward that -- now, but it is far from certain that they will continue to offer it as they gain in military and technological capacity and the balance of power swings in their favor. In that eventuality, Israel will become less secure despite the retention of "defensible borders," and will of course be thrown into steadily greater dependence upon the United States.

As matters now stand, our commitment to Israel is open-ended: we are providing the material means for an Israeli

policy which is beyond our control -- a policy which, by all indications, is carrying both Israel and the United States toward a major new crisis. An American guarantee of an agreed settlement, on the other hand, would clarify an ambiguous commitment, bringing it clearly within the scope of our national interest, and at the same time provide Israel with the greatest possible security under the circumstances which exist in the area. As one thoughtful observer remarked: "The only secure borders are those which are accepted by one's neighbors."



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 3, 1975

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: JAMES E. CONNOR 
SUBJECT: The Middle East - An American Policy

The attached memorandum was returned in the President's outbox with the following notation:

"I have read"

cc: Don Rumsfeld

Attachment:

Memorandum of June 27, 1975 to the President from
J. W. Fulbright on the above subject.

HOGAN & HARTSON

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J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT
OF COUNSEL

815 CONNECTICUT AVENUE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

TELEPHONE (202) 331-4500

CABLE "HOGANDER WASHINGTON"

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WRITER'S DIRECT DIAL NUMBER

July 2, 1975

Major General Brent Scowcroft
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear General:

In accordance with our conversation this morning, I am sending you under cover of this letter the material we discussed.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Bill
J. W. Fulbright

JWF:at



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✓ P/Fulbright
2 July 25

F Oppenheimer going over this. Would
tell it if doesn't think important

P Very truly try. Would appreciate your views
from your vast experience.

F Let me leave you this by Jim Syria -
I visited 7 countries - well recd, but they think
my views were based on Am. FA
I think it upsets your main statement
about our objectives before election. I have
Ans - expect Q ad off - are most unwilling
wth. They say if I go back to 67, they
will never frag out or forthcoming. Didn't
mention they would welcome a settlement, but
ext oppose it. But they just emerging from
its isolation. That breaking down now w/
Iran, Saudi, Kurds.

For Syria, who I don't like w/o, the main
man is part of NYU. He gave me 2 crucial
hours.

P Harry really likes Assad. All countries around
I have dig attitude than before

F Tensed & very statement. I tried to explain > b
letter.

P That follows on his signed a letter - they may
support F but 2 but not 23 but.

F The long to my side - 2e position - & it's
political angle. Not that you need it. I have
talked to Laird, K, Sagerall, etc. You in
middle position, as position. You want



In addition, your potential opponents are
located to I. Question is can you win
a it. I convinced you make a positive
statement - in I own interest - they're so
paranoid they don't know their interest.

^{I can't}
They ~~weak~~ & can do it only if they can
say that I'm dead & forever. This is
only way we can be free of the burden
which has plagued you people.

B. In next 12 or 18 months we have to lay out
envelope plan. Now I think advantage of an
internal agreement. Chances are against it
& if no, we have to go for single house.
You know Jews will attack me, but if
we postpone right - we tried internal + conflict.
I will have 208 mil w/me against 6 mil
Jews.

Given my disagreement/what we trying to
do an internal. But that put it in like
bunker ~~for~~ for a 6 mos or perhaps three
months

F. Should just let's get this broken off you
implementation will wait till Shabtin. But
Anobs need to know your Mgmt team.

Graft, of course is in much better
position. I think he will in fact except
W Bank & Gaza as ^{Palest} ~~group~~ call its own.
What they do w/ it is their job. So I yes
as excellent I would be expand bank.

We just have to get by this damned war.

The guys are preparing by the military strategy. Starting battles - It can't go on.

P We know nothing about them before it was

F They would win a war but that wouldn't help - be discreet.

P We have dealt with backward to half, then they do have weak democratic set.

F There will be trouble if nothing for 18 mos. Don't have to be action, but a statement. I think you going to win in 76 & I think they will be massacred. The moderates have to make a point to show they - if not, they will be pushed out by radicals. We have to help & moderate.

When we didn't help Khomeini. He got Clinton out (Disneyland). Same could happen to Bush.

P Does Arafat think he can control PLO

F If we can make some progress so to can contain radicals. For which Arafat still for secular state, but growth would settle for WB & Gaza

P What just WB?

F Gaza is a symbol

Y What your impression of Fakhreddine

F Powerful fellow. Khalil is a softer fellow but he impressive.

P Stay to the event record.

F. He points, but not forthwordly. And they have some good people in their 40's. WI has a great position in S.A. They want to keep w/ own Corp - some in Abu Dhabi - they just trying to do something. Shiekh is interesting fellow. Highest p.c.i. in world

P. What do they do w/ money

F. Roads, 2 first hotels I ever seen, ports, factories. & they trying to get him with take away.

P. Or F. Kuwait?

F. No. Went there before. Drove my first train. True a big opportunity for US investment. Big, just needs help & S.A. Two big rivers.

P. Fighting w/ Syria/with that

F. Saudis trying to settle that & think they have key to this war... everyone is aggressive. If we could get more settled we would have great business opportunities.

Suppose you make this statement. You could go to C. Saudi & say we strike our trucks out here, so now you help us on air - make a deal w/ them. You can't make a deal when you won't do what they want it in.

P. If you did ~~too~~ lay out a long plan, is as guarantee essential?

F. I say they want to rely on themselves but I think it would help a few here. I expect by UN. I think resolution guaranteeing

The Indians & c US & SU say we agree w/ it & will support it. I would use UK because they control N. I compromised SJ so I publicly they would be going, why not.

I fear they would result in I doing something unless

P They would be unable to last. The last man was Hooker, then we. I feel their support even US isn't strong or before. That's why the others.

F That is putting out substance.

I think it is a winning issue. The American people ~~but~~ tired of being being whipsawed on this. Ask Congress about 1. 76 letter for preventing your assessment

P I appreciate you coming in & giving me this & this material.

We do something w/in 2-3 weeks. And w/in next year so we must come out comprehensive plan.

There are question of the election. Not a question of time.

F I think our people will support you. Only you can do it. Think what it would do in Europe. You would be ridiculous. Conversely, another bombing & you would be blamed for being about do something & didn't.

It a great opportunity. I have a diff

political part.

I agree, especially I have & no longer
in politics but I been following this
since Alman