

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald R. Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, June 11, 1975  
9:34 - 10:06 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office  
The White House


The President: The papers on Rabin and the arms requests are very well done. Really well done. It was an eye opener to me. With all they have gotten, they can never say we are not concerned with their security.

Kissinger: If we ever put these figures out, we could carry the country. If the Kennedy appraisal is correct -- and I think he is -- you are in good shape. He thinks you will be tough to beat -- because you have the center.

I told Rabin you leaned toward an overall agreement. On an interim deal, he is more flexible on giving access to the oil; he is willing to give up the warning station, but he is not ready to move out of the passes. This is a new argument -- he says the next line is near the '67 borders.

The President: If he is worried about security, won't those warning stations do it?

Kissinger: He has a point. Their infrastructure is right behind the passes, but why didn't he say that nine months ago? The other point is if he makes an interim deal, what understanding will there be about the next steps? He wants a promise there'll be no more moves. I didn't answer. But you can't commit yourself to anything more than to work in close consultation with them.



CLASSIFIED BY Brent Scowcroft  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
NSC MEMO, 11/20/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, STATE REV. 01/19/04  
BY AW, NARA, DATE 5/19/04

Scowcroft: We can't do it. You have consistently warned them that a Syrian move was essential.

Kissinger: He says he can move only a few hundred yards there. We would need at least three kilometers -- and that would hit the settlements. He says he can't do it, even for ten years of no movement -- only for peace. But if he talks peace with Syria, he can't avoid talking peace with Egypt, and then we would be talking borders.

The President: Will he push for free access to the Canal?

Kissinger: He didn't raise it -- nor aid, but he will. You might begin by raising the point about domestic interference here, and the leaks, and then let him go. It is hard work, but if it doesn't work, I think you should put out an overall plan.

The President: What are the elements of an overall proposal?

Kissinger: Borders, Arab peace commitments, the Palestinians, guarantees.

The President: I thought I would start with him saying how disappointed I was at the failure in March, and the problem of leaking my letter, their interference in our domestic affairs, why I announced the reassessment. I would say I was committed to peace which would guarantee Israel's survival, and I was leaning toward an overall settlement and ask him how he sees it.

Kissinger: I would be tough on leaking -- not just the letter, but the Schmidt leak also.

[Describes the Israeli leak to Schmidt about him setting up Israel-Soviet contacts.]

The President: If we talk about the leaking of the letter, that is a gross example.

Kissinger: Yes, but it is not the only thing; it is a pattern.



✓ P/K 11 June 75

9:34-10:06  
Wed

P The papers are very well done. Really well done. It was an eye opener to me. What they have gotten they can never say we not concerned w/ their security.

K If we ever put these figures out, we could cause a security. If Kennedy appraisal is correct - and I think she is - you are in good shape. He thinks you will be tough to beat - because you have a center.

I told Rubin your demand toward an overall agreement. On interim deal, he more flex on access to oil, is willing to give up a warning station, but not really to move out of the passes. This is a new argument - to force a next line is more a G7 broker.

P If he is worried about security, would those warning stations do it?

K He has a point. Their infrastructure is right behind the passes, but why didn't he say that 7 mos ago.

The other point is if he makes an interim deal what understanding will there be about next steps? He wants a promise of no more moves. I didn't answer. But you can't commit to anything more than ~~close~~ work in close consultations.

Sec Cant do it - you have consistently warned that a Syrian move was essential.

K He says he can move only a few hundred yards. We would need at least 2 km - and that would hit settlements. He says he can't do it, even for 10 yrs of no movement - only for peace. But if he talks peace w/ Syria he can't avoid it w/ E

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of them we would be talking borders.

P Will he push for full access to Canal

K Didn't raise it w/ aid, but he will. You might begin by raising domestic interference & take, & then let him go. It's hard work, but if it doesn't work I think you should put out an overall plan.

P What are elements of an overall program

K Borders, Arab peace contracts, Poles, guarantees.

P I think I would start w/ deops. at Munich factories & pub. of letter, a domestic interference, unassessment, contract to peace which would guarantee I survival and leaving toward overall settlement & ask him how he sees it

K It would be tough on leaking - not just a letter, but a Schmidt leak also. (Details a Schmidt leak about him setting up I-SJ contacts.)

P If we talk about leaking a letter - a good example

K Yes, but it's not the only thing - it is a pattern.

