

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 11, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

PARTICIPANTS:

President Ford
Vice President Rockefeller
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Bipartisan Congressional Leadership (list
attached)
Leslie A. Janka (note taker)

DATE AND TIME:

Friday, June 6, 1975
8:10 - 9:30 a.m.

PLACE:

The Cabinet Room
The White House

SUBJECT:

Report on President's Trip to Europe

The President: Thank you all for coming this morning. The Speaker, Tip O'Neill, and Phil Burton are coming but they will be a little late.

I wanted to give you this morning a quick overall summary of what happened on my trip to Europe. Before the trip there was an under-current of feeling in Europe that the United States, because of Vietnam and Cambodia, did not have the will to stand firm in Europe where our basic foreign policy interests are really concentrated. When British Prime Minister Wilson proposed a NATO Summit, I thought this was a good idea and readily agreed.

The overall results of this meeting were excellent. In my talks with the NATO leaders, I stressed that the United States does have the strength and the will to maintain our commitments to the Alliance, but I want to say that the most persuasive and convincing reassurance we could give them was not what I could say but it was the votes the Congress has given me on the Defense Bill. I used a statement by Tip O'Neill and comments like yours, Mike [Mansfield]. These

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CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

actions by the Congress were extremely important in the eyes of the Europeans. These statements and actions plus what I said left NATO feeling very reassured about the United States.

But let's not fool ourselves; there are serious problems to be addressed. I met with Demirel and Karamanlis, the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey. They both have very difficult problems, but the net result of our meetings and because the atmosphere in Brussels was so good, Demirel and Karamanlis met themselves on the Saturday after we left.

The action, Mike [Mansfield], taken in the Senate with regard to the Turkish aid cutoff was very helpful. There are indications they could reach a settlement if the United States did not hold a club over the head of the Turks while they were trying to reach a Cyprus solution. I told Demirel and Karamanlis that I would work with the House in attempting to achieve a lifting of the restriction.

(Representative Burton entered the meeting at this time.)

I am convinced that if we can knock out the embargo soon, we can get significant movement on Cyprus. All of the issues to be settled are well defined, the positions of both sides are not that far apart, and the problems are manageable; but Turkey cannot settle as long as it appears that there is a United States club over its head. At the same time, Greece cannot appear to be too forthcoming on this issue.

There was also the problem of Portugal. In my discussions with the other allied leaders and with Prime Minister Goncalves of Portugal, I repeatedly expressed my deep concern about the developments in Portugal and the continuing evidence of Communist control in the government there. I must say it was one of the greatest discussions I ever had with anybody when I talked with Goncalves. I spoke to him along the following lines. I asked him if there was a Communist influence in the Portuguese Government. He denied it. I told him it was hard to understand how a NATO government could have Communists in it when NATO was set up for the purpose of resisting communism. The Portuguese attempted to describe their governmental structure to me. They see the armed forces as the only organization in the country that represents all of the people. They say that political parties are not democratic because they represent only portions of the people, and therefore the political parties would not be allowed a role in the government. It was a most fascinating explanation; Henry (Kissinger) said that that would write a new chapter in any political science textbook.

I believe that in our discussions with other leaders there was a strong feeling that the other diplomatic forces in Portugal must be strengthened. [Socialist leader] Soares will try to fight for a greater role and to keep the socialist newspaper alive. I have the impression that everyone in NATO wants to help the people of Portugal, but how you do it in a government infiltrated with Communists is difficult. I see it as a real touch-and-go-situation and remain rather pessimistic about the future there.

We went on to Spain. The situation there is rather obvious. Franco is still in control and while he appeared to be in better health than when I saw him some 15 months ago, he is 82 years old and his strength is clearly declining. There are forces in Spain working for political progress and they are forming what are called "political associations" but they are not called parties. If there is some development there, things could get very serious. I met with Juan Carlos and had a good talk with him. He very much wants to play a stronger role in the politics there, but everything in Spain is just hanging in the balance.

I made clear to the Spanish leaders that our bilateral military agreement plays a significant role in the defense of Western Europe. All the other NATO governments made clear that they wanted nothing to do with Spain before a change in government, though they all recognize the defense contribution Spain makes. I think Spain will be welcome after the government changes there. In my talks with the allied leaders, I made the point that it was hard for me to understand the double standard, whereby they could live with the dictatorship in Portugal while excluding Spain, where democracy could make some progress.

We next went to Salzburg. I had a little trouble arriving there. I was coming down the steps of the airplane; it was raining like mad. I had Betty on one hand and was holding the umbrella with the other. Betty tripped me. I went flat on my face in the rain and she walked off with the umbrella. (laughter)

In Salzburg I had an excellent meeting with Chancellor Kreisky, who is a very able fellow, very suave, intelligent and knowledgeable. But the primary purpose of Salzburg was my two long meetings and other discussions with President Sadat.

Sadat is a very, very impressive person. I am convinced that he really wants a Middle East settlement but this is where we really face a very difficult situation. As you know, we are now taking a long, careful look at how we might move to get some progress toward a permanent settlement in the Middle East. We tried last fall and last winter to work

closely with Egypt and Israel on an interim settlement, but in the March negotiations it tragically failed and the talks were suspended.

We now see three alternatives in our reassessment:

-- First, we could try to revive the step-by-step negotiations. There are some rumblings that this may be possible; however, I am pessimistic about the resumption of such talks because I know how very difficult they were during last March.

-- Second, we could come up with a broad, comprehensive settlement in which the United States could put on the table all of its answers to all of the issues which have festered in the Middle East for 25 years. This would include our ideas for the permanent borders for Israel. This would be a comprehensive plan laid on the table at Geneva. This may, in fact, be the best way to launch the talks. Many who criticized at first have now suggested this route despite all the problems inherent going to Geneva, having to deal with the PLO for example. I believe this will not be an easy thing to do, but it may turn out to be the best and the only thing we can do, but I'm not predicting this is what we will do.

-- The third option would be to go to Geneva, lay out all the problems on the table--the PLO, the Arab Pact, the Golan Heights, even Jerusalem, and then try to expand that with some bilateral agreements under the umbrella of Geneva.

I will be meeting with Prime Minister Rabin next week. This will be the same kind of in-depth discussion I had with President Sadat. After that meeting, we will make the final decisions in our reassessment. We will tell the Congress our ideas and our decisions. Let me say that in the meantime I will be happy to get any ideas or suggestions from the Congress.

After Salzburg we went on to Rome, where I had some very fruitful discussions with President Leone and Prime Minister Moro. Even more important was the meeting I had with the Pope, who is a very impressive and interesting man. He is desperately concerned to see the United States keep up its humanitarian activities in the world. I found the Pope to be very well informed on world affairs, and although he is reported not to be very well, I certainly found him to appear very vigorous. Henry [Kissinger], do you have anything to add along these lines?

Secretary Kissinger: No, Mr. President, you outlined very well the results of the trip. I have attended a number of NATO meetings and I do want to say that this is the most positive NATO meeting I have ever attended.

Events of recent months have brought home to our allies how important the United States is to the stability of the alliance. They were worried that after Vietnam and Cambodia, the United States might try to withdraw from our role in the world. In his talks with the allied leaders, the President did not so much reassure them with his words, but by focusing on the new agenda ahead of us and outlining the approaches and solutions the United States has in mind, he clearly convinced them that we were there to stay.

The meeting with Demirel and Karamanlis was a very important event. Let me just say a little about the Turkish domestic situation. Ecevit, who was Prime Minister when Turkey moved onto Cyprus, is now in the opposition, where he can accuse the current Prime Minister Demirel of giving away what Turkey acquired under Ecevit. Demirel, therefore, needs a lifting of the arms cutoff restrictions to strengthen his position in order to move in a conciliatory way. The President's meeting with Demirel was very good and very useful.

The overall success of the NATO meeting was best indicated by the proposal of the Canadian Prime Minister, who has never been very enthusiastic about NATO affairs, for annual NATO meetings. The French blamed us for putting Trudeau up to his statement, but we had no talks with Canada on the matter; we were as surprised as everyone else.

With regard to Spain, the President's conversation with Juan Carlos was very helpful chance to meet with Franco's successor. There is an evolutionary process going on in Spain and our embassy is trying to keep contact with the important opposition groups. Our difficulty will be to steer between Franco and the development of the situation like that in Portugal.

With regard to the meeting with Sadat, he is really very ready to move toward a settlement. He will consider any of the three options we have put forth. We also find the Israelis making helpful sounds at this time too. We have great hopes that Salzburg may represent a great turning point. After Rabin's talks next week we hope to be in a position to decide which of the three options will be the best to pursue.

Secretary Schlesinger: Despite some reports of dissension within the Defense Planning Group, the fact was that in the end the ministerial guidance was passed unanimously. It contained the right mix of nuclear and conventional force planning. The harmony in NATO is the result of the hard work by the U. S. to improve its force posture, and this provides

important evidence that the U. S. is serious about the defense of Europe. I think our own efforts under the Nunn Amendment to increase our fighting strength in place of logistic forces has given a great impetus to our efforts to get the other countries to do their best. Spain is a problem for the Alliance, but all the Ministers recognize the importance of the Spanish contribution to the Western Alliance.

Senator Mansfield: I'm very pleased, Mr. President, with the report on your trip. I am wondering, however, what effect the letter signed by the 76 Senators had on your discussions with President Sadat. It appears to me that despite encouraging signs, you may be forced to go to Geneva and this would certainly weaken the position of Israel.

The President: I will be very frank upon this. Sadat and all the Arabs were very upset at the letter. I made it clear that the letter did not represent an official position of the United States; that it represented only the views of 76 Senators, some of whom later stated objections or clarifications of their views. It was a very disturbing influence on the talks. As much as I am confident about the situation, we cannot have a stalemate. If we don't get some movement, Geneva is where we are going and Geneva is not the best forum. It will be an awful situation where everything will be fought over, but I want to be categorical about this, without any movement, this is where we are going.

Representative McFall: Does this represent a threat to Israel?

The President: I am not threatening anyone. I am just offering my objective, realistic appraisal. Last March there were some Israelis who were opposed to the step-by-step process and wanted to go to Geneva. Now that a real prospect for it has opened up, these same people are losing their enthusiasm.

Representative McFall: How about the Russians?

Secretary Kissinger: They want to go to Geneva now. It is only our diplomacy which is keeping the other two options open. We will have to go to Geneva eventually. It all depends on when we have to go. If we could get some movement in advance, the Geneva process would then be manageable, but if we have to go in a crisis atmosphere and the talks then break down, then real trouble would come about.

Senator Mansfield: I see Geneva as weakening Israel. Everyone, the Arabs, the Soviet Union, will all be against Israel and all the issues would come up at once.

Secretary Kissinger: You're exactly right. Everything will have to be discussed and in terms of opposition to Israel. Now we can deal with different issues one at a time and not all at once as in Geneva.

Representative Burton: The letter of the 76 Senators also reflects the sentiment in the House. How do you see the impact on Sadat of the Israeli move to thin out their forces along the Canal? I would also like to hear your views about Cyprus and the discussions Demirel faces in Turkey. Do the Turks really want an agreement?

The President: We got the news of the Israeli pull-back just before my lunch with Sadat. Our initial feeling was that this was a helpful move by Israel. It is not a militarily significant movement, but I am not trying to downgrade it. It seemed to be an effort to create a better atmosphere and my attitude was to give everybody the benefit of the doubt.

Secretary Kissinger: The President pointed out to Sadat that whatever its military significance, it was a positive signal. After the meeting Sadat went out and gave very positive remarks to NBC about it.

The President: With regard to Turkey we have to remember the Greek junta started things on Cyprus and Ecevit moved in the Turkish troops. Then there was a caretaker government in Turkey for several months, a situation where neither Ecevit nor Demirel could get a coalition government together. Unfortunately Demirel's coalition now puts him in a very difficult position. Only Ecevit wants elections. Everyone feels that if an election is held now, Ecevit will win because he is the man who took Cyprus. I think Demirel wants an agreement, but he is fearful that if he cuts back on the Turkish territory on Cyprus from the 40 percent now held, he will be seen as giving away too much and his government will fall. This would bring Ecevit in again.

Secretary Kissinger: As the President points out Ecevit would win an election but the Parliament doesn't want elections, and elections cannot be held unless the Parliament approves it. Ecevit would make a good settlement, but the extreme right wing parties for his coalition have left him because he was too flexible and too conciliatory with regards to Cyprus and he also screwed up Turk relations with the U. S. Ecevit sees his coalition blowing up if he tries to get a settlement. I have talked to all the Turkish leaders on three occasions. No Turk can make a concession while the U. S. arms embargo is still on. We have absolutely no leverage on Turkey today. Removal of the arms cut-off is absolutely essential if we are to make any progress on Cyprus.

Despite all the fierce talk of both Karamanlis and Demirel in terms of the real issues, the two parties are really closer to each other than it

would appear. But no one wants to make the first move. If we can ever get some momentum going and get the embargo lifted, we are optimistic that we can get an agreement in three to four months.

Representative McFall: Can't Karamanlis signal the U. S. Greek community that he is willing to let the United States restore arms to Turkey?

Secretary Kissinger: He can't because if the word got out, he would be in deep trouble in Athens. Our feeling is that the Greek community here is activated not from Athens but from Nicosia.

The President: There are two other things that are very disturbing. There is the long-standing dispute about the Aegian Islands which are 600 miles from Greece and only 40 miles from Turkey. They were given to Greece by the 1920 treaties and the dispute has been rekindled by the Cyprus matter.

Secretary Kissinger: Under these two treaties, the islands are to be demilitarized, but the Greeks have put troops on them. With a 12-mile limit around these islands, there is no exit from Turkey to the sea. After his meeting with Karamanlis and Demirel, the President asked me to say at my press conference that we would strongly oppose any resort to force over the islands. After the Karamanlis-Demirel meeting, they announced that they had agreed to take the issue to the world court.

The President: A further complication is the possibility of oil in the area. We should not minimize the prospects of confrontation over this issue which could bring about a head-to-head confrontation quite aside from the Cyprus dispute.

A second issue I raised was that of the NATO bases in Turkey. Turkey has the third strongest NATO forces. We also have some highly significant U. S. bases in Turkey. They are as highly classified bases as anywhere in the world. We urged the Turks to keep down the criticism of the U. S. presence there and to refrain from threats to close them down. Demirel is a moderate and wants to cooperate and keep things under control in Turkey, but with the threat in the Aegean and if the embargo leads to anti-Americanism, he may not be able to turn off the momentum against the United States. I would like to talk with the House leadership next week to see how we can move on this matter. I believe my AHEPA friends are misguided. I think if we can get some action on the embargo, we can get the Cyprus thing solved. I cannot stress how impressive the Senate vote was to our allies.

Senator Case: I want to mention again the letter of the 76 Senators. The letter is not a political device. It was a considered action. We shouldn't appear to be putting pressure on Israel. The letter was representative of the true feelings of the Senate not the pressure of Jewish groups. We must insist on a reasonable settlement. We do not want to see pressure put on Israel to withdraw to borders that are not defensible. All of the other issues are tough, but I don't think any one issue is decisive. The Arabs do not want the PLO in Geneva or the Russians in the Middle East. I don't think we should be in a position where Israeli recalcitrance is something to be beaten down at all costs. After our last meeting there was no one who spoke up for Israel. I don't want this letter to be seen in the context of domestic politics. It was not an irresponsible action by the Senators. It does represent the true feeling of Senators concerned with Israel.

The President: I tried to put the letter in context in my meeting with Sadat. I do want to ensure the survival of Israel. I was just trying to put that letter in the proper context. We cannot have any misunderstanding to upset the real chances of forward movement. I can assure you that as I meet with Rabin next week, nothing will be higher in my mind than ensuring the survival of Israel, and no one hopes more than I that progress will be forthcoming. I just want to see some progress.

Representative Rhodes: As the House takes up the Turkey problem, the House will want to see what the prospects are for a settlement. I think there has to be some understanding as to what will happen on Cyprus before we have any hope of getting a positive vote. We do not need the detailed content of your talks but just some indication of what progress we can expect. We have a chicken and egg situation here. We need some signal from both Turkey and from Greek Americans that we won't be taking a vote on faith.

Representative McFall: The Greek-Americans are not reassured that there has been enough progress. Somehow they must be satisfied that the prospects for progress are real.

The President: Our problem is that if the broad outlines of a settlement were made public before a House vote, there would be, like all compromises, some disappointment on all sides. All elements of the compromise might not satisfy the Greek-American community. Both sides are jockeying for position now anyway, and the Greek-American community should not be a controlling factor on the Greek Government.

Representative Rhodes: Makarios and the Greek Archbishop Iakonos are very dominant in all of this. If Makarios could make some kind of settlement it would be helpful.

Secretary Kissinger: Makarios is part of the problem, not the solution. Makarios is not willing to accept the solutions worked out by Denktash and Clerides.

Representation Rhodes: Karamanlis is no help at all. We must have some help from somewhere.

The President: Yes, but Karamanlis is so much better than what we had before in Greece. We are lucky to have him there.

Secretary Kissinger: Karamanlis is trying to keep Makarios from teaming up with Papandreaux.

Representative Broomfield: I suggest that you meet with Brademas, Sarbanes, and Hayes to work up some sort of package deal. Maybe you should propose a 90-day lifting of the restrictions. You can't get the Senate bill passed in the House, but you might get a lifting for 90 days. What I hear in our committee is that we want to see some genuine sign of progress over there.

Senator Byrd: I was very proud of the Senate taking the action it did. Before the vote the letters were 100 to 1 against lifting the restrictions. Since the vote, though, I have had virtually no reaction from my Greek-American community regarding my changing my vote. I had anticipated a very violent outburst.

Secondly, Mr. President, I was very encouraged by your trip. You spoke my sentiments exactly when you came down hard on the Portuguese issue and in trying to get Spain recognized as a vital component of Western defenses. I share your concern about Portugal. I just hope the other allies are as serious about NATO as we are. I also hope that the other countries are not thinking about a protracted conventional war, especially in the face of the strong Soviet strength in Eastern Europe. We would lose in a long protracted war with the Soviets. I think a war would be quick and decisive and I hope we are prepared for that kind of conflict.

The President: Bob, we are pressing for standardization of weapons. We are wasting too much money in NATO in differing weapons systems. I think there is now a move in Europe to standardize and modernize.

I think there is now a new recognition and a new resolution in NATO to do so. I think they recognize they can't face the Soviets with outdated and obsolescent equipment.

Secretary Schlesinger: I am quite confident we will see some movement in this direction. The other countries are serious and are making improvements to keep current their defense posture. With regard to the issue of a protracted war, we are planning the kind of force structure that would deter such a war, not fight it.

Representative Wilson: AHEPA visited me last week. They expressed great concern for the 200,000 refugees on Cyprus. If we could do something very feasible for the refugees, it would be very helpful. Perhaps we could do something as part of a package on the Turkey arms restrictions.

Secretary Kissinger: We could do that. We could also put together a package of economic and military aid for Greece, although it would be hard to do so long as the arms cut-off to Turkey exists. I would also point out that the provisions of the Cyprus settlement would permit the Greeks to go back to the land the Turks would give up.

Representative Wilson: We need to dramatize the refugee situation.

The President: I am very fond of AHEPA. They are fine people who have been my friends, but let me tell you what Demirel told me. "The Turks fought with the United States in Korea and we have a cemetery there. There are items we have paid for which are now embargoed and are in storage in the United States, and the U. S. is now charging us for storage on the things we own. We don't understand why the United States doesn't understand Turkey." How the hell do you answer a question like that? This arms embargo just makes no sense at all.

Thank you for coming down here today.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President

SENATE

Mike Mansfield
Hugh Scott
Bob Byrd
Bob Griffin
Frank Moss
Carl Curtis
Cliff Case
John Stennis
Strom Thurmond

HOUSE

Carl Albert
"Tip" O'Neill
John Rhodes
John McFall
Bob Michel
Phil Burton
"Doc" Morgan
Bill Broomfield
Bob Wilson

STAFF

Secretary of State Kissinger
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger
Don Rumsfeld
Bob Hartmann
Jack Marsh
Max Friedersdorf
Phil Buchen
Bill Seidman
Alan Greenspan
Ron Nessen
Jim Cannon
Jim Lynn
Frank Zarb
Dick Cheney
Vern Loen
Bill Kendall
Brent Scowcroft
Leslie A. Janka (Note Taker)

REGRETS

Sen. Sparkman
Rep. Anderson
Rep. Price

MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ATTACHMENT

June 12, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: LES JANKA *for*
SUBJECT: Bipartisan Congressional Leadership
Meeting, Friday, June 6, 1975

Attached for your review is a Memorandum for the Record drawn from your notes and mine of the President's meeting with the Bipartisan Congressional Leadership last Friday, June 6, 1975.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review and approve the Memo for the Record at Tab A.

 Approve

 Disapprove

Byrtham Leadership Inty
6 June 75

Th. to for coming. Waiting for Phil, Spencer & Trip but they are now on way. Say we couldn't meet other day.

Just to give you an overall summary of what happened on a trip. There was independent of belief that because of Jordanian US didn't have will to stand firm on our extract when it was basic. This wasn't excellent. ~~From~~ I stated we firmly intend & had will to make it work. But - most evening support I could give was on very active on def bill & Mike & Trip remarks - these very active were extremely negative. Together of what I said, it left our allies feeling very reassured.

There are jobs - I met w/ Kara & Dennis. Not result is also not just because I talked to them - they got together & good stories provided. Smooth action was very helpful - indication they could settle it w/ Club over head of T. Dennis would work w/ House. I convinced if we can knock out a embargo soon there can be sig movement as by pass. The issues are well defined, a jobs are unmanageable, don't want more while embargo on. Dennis work w/ House leaders.

I had talk w/ Goncalves - one of most interesting I ever had. Red Admiral of him. He denied Court influence in a Govt. I said it had to understand Govt of Court influence in a Govt designed to fight Court aggression. His description of Fed Congress was fascinating. Only AFM represent all people - parties are not laws because they up only portion of a people. Our allies feel demo force in past have to be strengthened. Sooner fighting for greater roles to help a one page open. It is tough set. Everyone wants to help set people - how you do it in Govt involvement w/ Court influence is key set.



We want to Spain. Franco still control. looked in
better health than 15 mos ago. There are fears in
Spain. Pol assass have now been allowed. If
there isn't some delay there, when Harry comes it
could be very serious. But Juan Carlos. Everything
now hanging in balance. I need just an
altered relations make contribution to Euro def.
Our allies will have nothing to do w/ Spain before
change of govt - other way contrib. Spain makes
w/ a change, I think Spain will be welcomed into
community. I question Euro double standard
on Port vs Spain.

Went to Salzburg (John about tripping). He'd speak
with w/ Keesing. Very able - smart, knowledgeable,
very helpful. Primary purpose there, was to see. He
was impressive - wants a settlement. He is where
we get to a tough job. As you know we have strategy
how to not prog toward a settlement. Ted wants
us worked closely w/ E + I to make on interim step.
Ultimately it failed ~~to~~ & there wasn't response.
There are 3 options: pick up stb. Remember that
would be possible but I personally ~~do~~ prefer last
month. 2nd would be UK broad concept. settlement
including all a fostering prob of 25 yrs. Part
part forward at Geneva to lay it all out. Maybe
best way to lay a card on table. bit of anger, but
many who critical of stb have original part. At
Geneva there will be all a govt, big tip, but
maybe at best - I not predicting now. ~~get way~~
could be to lay out all prob overall. Third way
would be to combine that w/ interim steps. I will
meet w/ Robin like w/ Sukut & then make decision.
I will meet w/ leadership when decision made, but
I be happy to get any suggestion
Then meet w/ here & here. Part must sig



oppor was to meet w/c. Very - Disappointed concerned
w/ humanitarian issues. Very impressive person. I heard
not well but looked vigorous to me. Very positive &
impressive person. K?

K In P. you have covered all highlights. I
have attended many Nato mtgs. Recent wants small
con alt to realize how essential US is to stability
of alliance. ~~So~~ ~~dated~~ Fear of consequences of
isolating. P didn't spend time discussing but
disting w/c p/b. T but gave allies ~~some~~
sense of reassurance.

Plates w/ G & T - made tremendous dip. If I could
describe T just a bit. Cyprus occupation
done under E control. Giving very territory by Revised
very dip ~~of~~ politically w/o compromising lifting
feudalisms. Success there indicated by T. ~~amban~~
- ent under threat Nato - who proposed annual
mtgs. French accused us of putting them in a
- mt time. (Phrasing about heads of govt)

In Spain - P communitarian w/ Juan Carlos was
very helpful course on succession. E and trying
to things contact w/ broad groups.

We have great hopes that Solzberg made
turning point in that way at a after next week
we hope we be in position to check which option
best to pursue

SW/MS

In DPC a Spanish issue gave sense of disharmony.
In fact, a defense guideline went there unanimously.
Gives no good strategy for defense coalition thus
a conventional faces. I think our own efforts under
New arrangements to add fighting strength in
place of legs strength has given great evidence
from data to leave best.

Wesfield

I wonder about effect of 76 letters. Despite your
optimism, I fear Geneva w/all tried by against.



✓ I will be frank. Said E very upset at a letter. I made clear it wasn't official but mins of 76 - even some of those marginalized their mins. It was a very obstructing response. Geneva is not the forum - but if we don't get movement, Geneva is where we are going. All the bad things will be fought over - but that is where we have to go

In Fall do that a threat to I

P Wrote to anyone. It is an objective expressed

K I after March welcomed Geneva. Now prospect has opened up, this order has called

re Russians?

K Every agent Geneva now. Only one diplomat has washed it off. Have to go monthly, but it depends on others when we go. After a deal, or at all a transition mechanism

Unofficial My fear is all - E, m, Arabs, SU will be against I + all issues right at once.

K Exactly right. E everything will have to be discussed + in terms of opposition to I.


Burton 76 letter reflects House sentiment also. What impact of I thinking out. And how about a Cyprus

elbyants. Do not really want an agreement

P Once initial feeling this was a helpful move by I. It was a military sig movement. Not trying to lower grade it but it's not hard mil. sig. It seemed to be effort to create better relations.

K We get - trips while Sadat/P having drinks. I pointed out its symbolic sig + Sadat went on NBC was open + made a positive statement about it.

P The Greek fronts started things + E sent several in trips. Then there was a meeting part in I for months. Then a ~~to~~ Demirel solution - w/ 1 member being removed in tough spot. Only E sent out's solution. I think Demirel wants an agreement, but not



if he gets Truman out in - process. It is a very difficult
part.

K As P puts out, E must win an election, but
"inherent doesn't want election. There might very
possibly left E must because he has flex on Cyprus.

W I will make concession while embargo. Demird has
added need to show some things to use against
E must & buy his coalition. I want them all the issues
w/ both. W/ all a fierce talk by both - they are a
bit closer to each other than it would indicate - W wants
to make a 1st move. If we could actually get
it moving, we optimistic about prog in 2-3 mos.

Use: E must Kara signed back early

K If Assad got out, he would be in trouble. Some feeling
is G unity here is a threat by Cyprus not others.

P 2 Estuary trip: long standing dispute about Aegean
Islands - 600 miles from G & 40 mi from T. Given
to G in (1920 & 47). (I missed some)

K These Islands should be demilitarized, but G has put
troops on them. W/ 12 mile limit around them, there
is no exit from T. Pushed me to say at press conf that
we would strongly oppose want to force.

P Further negotiation is possible w/ funds. We
should not minimize pot. of cooperation over this, points
aside from Cyprus.

I made 10th point. We have NATO bases there. That's
2nd strongest NATO force. We also have some big big
US bases in T. As highly classified bases than anywhere
in world. We asked T to refrain from threats to use
them down. Demird wants to cooperate, but I fear if
we prog, threat in Aegean, embargo's continuation,
that movement may get started & will be hard
to turn around. I would like to talk w/ you next
week to see what can be done we can move.



My Akhpa friends are misguided. I think if we can get some action we can get this thing solved.

Case The 76 letter is not a pol device. It was a considered piece. We shouldn't appear to be further pressured on I. I think the letter contains elements of justice to I which have to be supported. We must insist on a reasonable settlement - a Arabs don't want an unperturbed PLO state. I don't think we should be in a position that I realisation is something to be beaten down. After last vote, press said we were open up for I. I don't want this letter put in context of domestic politics.

P I clearly said to I. I can assure you, we are happy more than I that unity of Robin will be forthcoming. I just want prog.

Rhodes I think there has to be understanding what will happen on Cyprus before we have hope of getting a vote. Not a detailed contract, but some indication. It is unclear & said that Gov't to have some feeling from T & from G-Arms that we want to take on out.

Doc G-Arms not reassured there has been enough prog. Somehow they must be reassured.

P If conditions of a settlement were given to give a vote, then the it fails G & T, it might not satisfy G-Arms country. Both sides are pushing for partition now anyway & I can understand giving you partition.

Rhodes Makarios & Takas are key. If we could make a statement.

K. Makarios is part of the prob, not a solution. He is a leader who will say a settlement is viable.

Rhodes Kana is no help at all. We must have some help.

P But what are advantages Kana is as regarded to West eyes.

Brownfield Maybe if you got B, S, Hayes, its done but maybe.



propose a 90 day trying - Can't get a Senate bill, but
in the 90 days.

Byrd

I was proud of a Senate vote - even tho letters were
100-1 against. Since - vote, tho, I have had no
reaction, tho I anticipated a violent one.
Secondly, I was encouraged by your trip. You gave
my sentiments when you came down here on last
visit & trying to get Spain away as vital component
of def of west. I have grave concern about that, tho I
don't want forgetting Trojan Horse. I get big concern
allison as serious about that as we are. I also
hope they not planning a ~~prop~~ protracted war
in E. I think a war would be quick business
& I hope we prepared for that.

P but one comment. We been pushing for standardization
there to be fortified, I think there is more in E in the
standardize & modernize. We may have good news in
a few days. I think they may not be a threat
w/out dated & outdated equip.

Schub There is effort toward standardization, tho differences
there are well entrenched & protected. Many of the countries
are very serious, others not so ~~so~~ firm. On def.
we hope our posture will help a war from happening.

Weldon Very insistent, and worried about refugees. If we could
show some concern there - tho we have for
VN refugees, it would help.

R We could do that, together w/ a package of aid to G & T.
Refugees ^{sit} would be admitted w/ any settlement - into Thailand
& trying to be given back.

Weldon - We need to characterize it.

P I very fond of Abeja. They have always helped us.
But let me tell you what Demird said. They fought
w/ us in Korea & we have a cemetery there. Now there
are arms they paid for they can't get in storage & we
being changed storage. They just don't understand.

