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MEMORANDUM

Scowcroft file

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
Major General John Wickham, Jr., Military
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, January 22, 1975
7:45 a.m. (Breakfast)

PLACE: The Pentagon

Secretary Kissinger: We should have a program in Portugal. There is a 50 percent chance of losing it.

Secretary Schlesinger: We have a contingency plan to take over the Azores -- that would be stimulating Azores independence. We're in good shape on Libya. Our flying close brought a protest but they have been making good noises since.

We have been over some of these selective nuclear options -- the Iranian one has gone down hill. I talked to the Joint Chiefs of Staff though and I think we are on the right track now.

Secretary Kissinger: I didn't think much of it before.

Secretary Schlesinger: I think we either have to use Poseidon or have forces in the country.

Secretary Kissinger: It was too slow moving -- it took days to get the F-4's in.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS



Secretary Schlesinger: I think we may have to take the Middle East away from EUCOM. There is something bad about SACEUR running a Middle East war.

Secretary Kissinger: I couldn't agree more. It doesn't make sense.

Secretary Schlesinger: I was thinking about giving it to REDCOM.

[General Scowcroft discussed why it was currently in EUCOM.]

Secretary Schlesinger: Our big problem is Cambodia.

Secretary Kissinger: There is a leadership meeting next week. Let's get the LIG going again.

Secretary Schlesinger: These new Congressmen are not bad. They seem more reasonable than some of the older ones.

Secretary Kissinger: I am really worried about the CIA thing.

Secretary Schlesinger: I agree. I talked to the Rockefeller Committee. I see from the French traffic we are making some progress.

Secretary Kissinger: That is all screwed up. It was proposed to us by the French that we would buy Sihanouk if he would include members of the Lon Nol Government. We said okay but it wouldn't work. Now they can't get a visa for this guy. Our best negotiating chance was in the summer of 1973.

We plan an NSC meeting on both MBFR and SALT. It'll be mostly informational. I don't think there are any real differences.

Secretary Schlesinger: I don't think so.

Dean wants to use U.S. planes to resupply. I think this is too early. The President should make that decision.

Secretary Kissinger: The SFRC said we were using spotter aircraft in Cambodia.

General Wickham: No.



General Scowcroft: Is it spotter or is it just passing data from the reconnaissance?

Secretary Kissinger: I'm not sure. Is that bad?

Secretary Schlesinger: We may give them some plots. But they explicitly accepted reconnaissance.

Ash crapped on me. He has cut us \$1.6 billion on pay and I told him that Congress would restore it but take it out of our hide.

Secretary Kissinger: We have got to have a better way to do it. If we could have an earlier review of the strategic concepts, we would be better off and the President would be able to make decisions on other than administrative grounds.

On the French, the President agreed in principle to help them with nuclear cooperation. They may send someone with a shopping list and then you and I must talk.

Secretary Schlesinger: I think the only thing we can't do is a statement of [REDACTED]

Secretary Kissinger: We don't want to do something which requires a legal change. What they want is negative guidance.

Secretary Schlesinger: The British have been shits on leaking the Masirah thing.

The F-15 letter of offer . . .

Secretary Kissinger: On LGB, can we give them something?

Secretary Schlesinger: How about five?

General Scowcroft: Maybe five now and more as they become more cooperative.

Secretary Kissinger: MATMON-B: Can you string it out?

Secretary Schlesinger: It will be strung out. LANCE? We are set now for 1 July.



Secretary Kissinger: Let's wait to see how the Sinai talks go. I am not sure whether Israel will go along or if they just want to set me up.

General Scowcroft: We have to sort out the F-15.

Secretary Schlesinger: I will take care of it. I didn't know there was a letter of offer. I have told them that it wouldn't affect the delivery dates.

[There was a discussion of Soviet intervention in the Middle East.]

Secretary Schlesinger: But however small the chances of Soviet intervention, what would we do?

Secretary Kissinger: That is my problem -- I don't know. But I feel they would put troops in before the Syrians were defeated.

Secretary Schlesinger: What would we do if they sent troops in now?

Secretary Kissinger: I would be tempted to let Israel preempt. What I fear is a Soviet move accompanied by a declaration for Israel on the '67 borders, and then they invite Europe and Japanese support.

Secretary Schlesinger: How about Clements going to Saudi Arabia?

Secretary Kissinger: I would agree in sending him as a counter-Soviet move, but my worry is that Clements might play it as a counter-Iranian move.



Moving into Portugal - From what we know, how much
wheel is it going

K/Schles 22 Jan 75

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

- K We should have pay in Portugal
There 50% chance of being it.
- S We have contingency plan to take over
C Azores - stimulating Azores impulse
We're just trying to help a. One
flying idea brought what but they
have making good ideas since.
I have been over review of these cases
relative more options - the exam are
has gone down hill. I talked to JES
this + I think we are on a right track
now.
- K I didn't think much of it before.
- S I think we either have to use Procedure
or have force in emergency.
- K It was to slow moving on talk day to
get F-4's in
- S I think we may have to take ME
away from Europe. Something bad
about Sachsen seeing a ME was
- K I could hit cycle moment about
what time.
- S I'm thinking about giving it to Rud can
S.C. (but why it is away it is)

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BY dal NARA, DATE 11/7/11

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- S I am big prob is Constructive
- K I am being very next work. Let's get
CIG going again.
- S These new impulses not bad.
They seem more reasonable than
some of the older ones.
- K I really worried about CIA.
- S I agree. I talked to Rush. Center
I see one from the troops and
are making some progress
- K That all reserved up - proposal
to us by F-4 that we would buy
Six months if he would include
numbers of how well best. We said
OK but it wouldn't work. What they
can't get a visa for their gear.
Our best best chance was
in summer of 73
- S We plan NSC as with MBFR +
SAT. Mostly explorational. I don't
think there are any real differences.
- S I don't think so.
Dean wants to use US plans to



* 2. World with articles on Chines
Race

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

- reception I think this is the way.
- P should make that decision.
- K SFRc ~~can~~ would use more using
spotter craft in Cambodia
- W no.
- Sc Is it spotters are passing data
from them
- K I don't see. Is that bad?
- S We may find them some spotters.
But they explicitly accepted
them.
- (Some chat re parkway)
- S Oak dropped on me. He has
not no 1.6 on pay & I told him that
Congress would restore it but take it
out of our budget.
- K We got to have a better way to do it.
If we could have an entire revision
of strategic concepts, we would
be better off & Congress would be able
to make decisions on other than
admin grounds.

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(Talk on Golly)

- K Don - French, Page in private
to help them w/ some crop. They
may send someone w/ shipping
list & that ^{you + 2} must talk
- S I think the only thing we can't
do w/o statute ~~_____~~
- K We don't want to do something
which requires legal changes.
What they want is ~~the~~ legislative
guidance.
- S Butts have been shitting Zone looking
in Thousand thing.
F-15 better of offer.
- K Frost, Matthew Q.
Bank & R, even we give them
something.
- S How about S?
- Sc Maybe S view & more as
they become more available
- K Matthew Q. Can you string
it out?



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

S It will be strong out
Lance? we can set now
for July

K Let's want to see how serious
talk go. I want some indication
~~strong~~ ^I will go along as if they
will let me go.

S. We have to restart F-15

S I will take care of it. I don't
know there was a letter of offer.
I have told them that it would not
affect a delivery dates.

(Discussion of Low intervention
in ME)

S But how can we handle a change
of Low intervention, what would we
do?

K That is my problem - I don't know
But I feel they would put troops
~~in before~~ ^{in before} a logistician were deployed.

S What would we do if they sent troops

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WASHINGTON

in now?

R I be tempted to let I preempt.
what I fear is they want a
decline for 67 weeks & invite Envo
& Jop support.

S How about E. Amato going to LA.

K I would agree as a counter move,
but E. Amato might
play it as a counter - Iran

