

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.0

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MR 05-21 #1; State Dec 8/4/05

BY dal NARA DATE 7/28/06

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:

Tuesday, September 10, 1974
9:00 a.m.

PLACE:

The Oval Office
The White House

Kissinger: For you to go to Korea from Japan and back would be a slap at the Koreans and present protocol problems with using Japan as a base. We should go to Korea and leave it up to the Soviet Union about getting on to Vladivostok.

President: I agree. Let's do it that way.

Kissinger: How is the foreign aid memo dealing with all aid? I would deal with the leadership on Indochina and the restrictions.

I told Dinitz to get Rosenthal off our back. He will -- he already has on poppies. Dinitz understands the danger of the Turks going radical.

On Vietnam, they will have to cut sorties, ammunition use, and the North Vietnamese will get more aggressive. They are spoiled on ammunition use. We are getting in a position where we are not getting enough but still getting Congressional scrutiny. The worst case is to operate 2-300 dollars below what is required. The restrictions will eliminate your flexibility.

President: Can we paint an accurate and dire picture that if Vietnam goes down, the whole policy in Southeast Asia is in jeopardy?

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CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
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Kissinger: It will happen more insidiously. It will be used as vindication by the McGovern group that they were right all along. In foreign policy it will happen insidiously -- others will see what happens to people who rely on the United States. First we make an undesirable settlement, but with the promise of unlimited aid -- and then aid is cut off within two years. The impact over three to five years is bad.

President: I would be prepared to veto. We can't have just a one-area policy -- we can have it one way in Asia and another in the Middle East.

Kissinger: You do have an option as a new President. You could let it go -- and not be blamed, at least through '76. I must say I think it is wrong. The liberals who would applaud it would fail you when the going was tough. The liberals always move just out of reach.

President: The Post is okay now.

Kissinger: Yes. They are just right. We have done enough to get involved but not enough to win.

President: I want to give some specific categories of examples. If they are going to give us inadequate funds for Southeast Asia and load up the Middle East, I would have no hesitancy to veto.


Kissinger: No decision is required now on food aid. The crop report is due next week. Butz supports it, Ash is against and Simon is torn between.

President: He is torn between what is right and trying to save \$10 billion. Did you see the McGovern report on food aid in the paper this morning? They are supportive.

Kissinger: The opposition will be on financial, not political grounds. Why don't you look at this and make a decision next week?

President: Get me the McGovern report.

Kissinger: I can't now find a counter candidate to Meany's ILO candidate.



President: Would there be any Congressional objection ?

Kissinger: I'll have to run it down. Meany said....

President: Let's go ahead with Lippe. Get credit with Meany.

Kissinger: I'll tell George you ordered it.

I told Javits his needs were fulfilled but as a favor he would like her through December 31.

President: I will give it to him as a favor.

Kissinger: Reciprocal dinners. It sets a precedent. Nixon never did it.

President: I usually like to read at night.

Kissinger: I advise against it unless you like it.

President: Let's not.

Kissinger: Now Heath. He is able, strong, courageous. He is odd, though. He is doctrinaire, while most British politicians are pragmatic. He is the only Prime Minister who would favor Europe over the United States, and since he might become Prime Minister, if you could in an easy way say we couldn't stand Europe organizing itself on an anti-American basis. If that happened, there is no reason for us to keep troops there -- we couldn't anyway.


President: Should I be that tough?

Kissinger: Say you want to keep the contact to Europe but can't if there develops an anti-American basis for Europe.

Another thing on Heath is his sensitivity. He sulks and it is hard to know why; communication just stops.

On the other hand, he is a strong, decent man and you should establish a relationship.

President: What do I call him?



Kissinger: Mr. Heath. His fate depends on the elections. If he loses, he is through, except perhaps as Foreign Minister.

It is in the European blood to reduce the power of powerful friends. For 300 years they have followed internecine wars for no real objective.

President: What does Heath think on detente?

Kissinger: He is tougher, but what the Europeans really want is to have it for themselves, but they don't have the power. When we were tough on the Soviet Union, they pandered to their left as holding back a wild US, and they kept running to the Soviet Union. We are best off keeping the Europeans to the right of us.

President: How about MBFR?

Kissinger: He is opposed to it. The Europeans want a free ride. Take CSCI -- we opposed it, now they are being miserable about the meaningless Basket III.

We have to be careful on detente though -- if we go too far, they will go wild. On credit too, anything we don't give the Soviets on credits, they will get from the Europeans. I bet the Europeans will meet with Brezhnev before they do you. The tendencies are for them to kick us around a bit.

President: And Rabin?


Kissinger: We would like to extend the welcome remarks. You should say, (1) you are committed to the survival and security of Israel, and (2) you would like to reaffirm our commitment to a Middle East settlement.

Then you meet for a half hour. Tell him this is not a confrontation but a meeting among friends to devise a strategy. Mention the Turks to give Dinitz some credit.

President: I'll say you have heard through the Ambassador.

Kissinger: Yes. Mention Dinitz in the toast.

Then outline the agenda and get his concurrence.



President: Can I start with the idea that we are dedicated to their survival and want to insure it but we have to have progress in the negotiation coming up? We have things to consider -- we don't want a war, or an oil embargo. He must realize we have problems on Congressional backing, inflation and the budget; we can't strip our forces to oversupply them. Is that okay?

Kissinger: It will frighten him but it doesn't hurt. Nixon gave him a letter on long-term supply. I told them it had no specific meaning.

They say they need hardware to be flexible. I don't believe it. A big authorization now would rip it with the Saudis. Maybe next year, after a major disengagement.

President: Let's discuss it frankly.

Kissinger: I don't think you can go beyond the first two packages and we will discuss the rest now.

President: We are committed to the long-term, but we can't put a dollar figure now.

Kissinger: They are saying if they don't get something they will go into a confrontation. He needs something.

There is a need for progress toward peace -- that is compatible with Israeli security. You can say the spirit of the last negotiations will be continued.



P/K 10 Sept 74 ✓

K. For you to go to Korea from Japan + back would be stop at Kalamo + potential problems of using Japan as base. We could should go to Korea + have it say to SC about getting on to Vlad.

P. Dayer. Lets do it that way.

K. There is foreign and various dealing of oil. Demand deal off leadership on Indochina + Cambodia. I told Derry to get Roosevelt off our back. He will - about, too on poppies. Derry understands danger of Trucks going ahead.

On VAI, they will have a lot of arms, ammo, and a NVA will get more aggressive. They are a spill over ammo use. We can a position where we are not getting enough but still getting a very a working. Worst case is to operate 2-300 & know what is required. Restrictions will eliminate your flexibility

P. Can we point a camera + live picture back if VAI goes down, what looking in SE Asia is in progress

K. Will happen over in Indochina. Will be used as ammunition by McCann group that they were right all along. In FP it will happen in Indochina - others will see what happens to people who rely on US. First an undesirable settlement, but a promise of unilateral aid - then aid is cut w/in 2 yrs. The next over 3-5 years bad

P. I would be prepared to veto. We can't have just a one ~~area~~ policy - we can't have it one way in Asia + another in XE

K. You do have an option as a new P. You could let it go - not be blamed, at least then 76. I must say I think it wrong. But a liberal who would expect it would be paid you when the going was tough. The liberal change were just

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AUTHORITY per MR 05-21, #1

BY Wa NARA, DATE 5/17/09



* 1. GSA < 2 Post editorial to K.

2. Get copy of McCann subcommittee report for P.

3. Woodhull lunch OK
and of note.

P The Post is okay now.

K Yes. They are just right. We have done enough to get involved but not enough to win.

P I want to give some specific categorical examples. If they going to give no independent funds for S&H & lead up to E I would have no hesitation to veto.

K No tension required now on Ford side. Copy report next week. Butz supports, Ash against, Simon Tom between.

P The tone between what is right & trying to run is bad. Did you see the McCann report on Ford side in paper this morning. They supportive

K The opposition will be on financial, not political grounds. Why don't you look at this & make decision next week.

P Get me McCann report

K I can't now find a center candidate to Waring IHO candidate

P Any Cong. objection?

K I'll have to run it down. Many said

P Let's go ahead w/ Kipp. Get credit w/ Waring

K I'll tell George you agreed it.

I told Francis his needs were fulfilled but as far as he would like how then Dec 31

P I will give it to him as far as

K Reorganized dinners - Site president. Waring rewarded.

P I usually like to read at night.

K I believe against it unless you like it

P hats out

K Now Henth. He is able, strong, courageous. He is odd tho. He is dogmatic, which most politicians are pragmatic - He is



only PM who would pass Euro over US. Since
he might become PM, & you could in an
easy way say we couldn't stand Euro on an
anti-US basis. If that happened, we've reason
for not to keep troops there - we couldn't anyway.

P. Should I be that tough.

K. Say you want to keep a contact to Euro but
not on anti-US basis for Euro.

Another thing on Heath is his sensitivity - he
switches & it is hard to know why - even in the
first steps.

On other hand he is a strong, decent man &
you should establish a relationship.

P. What do I call him

K. Mr. Heath. His fate depends on election. If loses
he is then, I forget perhaps as FM

It is in Euro's blood to remove a power of powerful
friends - for 3000 yrs they have followed intervention
was for no real objective.

P. What Heath think on détente

K. He's tougher, but what Euro really want is to
have it for themselves, but they don't have a power.
When we were tough on S.C. they pointed to their
left as holding back the wild US, & they kept running
to S.C. We best off keeping Euro to report of ours

P. How about N.B.F.R.

K. He's opposed. Euro want free ride. Take C.S.C.E. -
we opposed it, now they being unworkable about
unconquered Basket III

We have to be careful on détente tho - if we
go too far, they will go wild. On credit too,
anything we don't give ~~up~~ on credits, they
will get from the Euro. I bet Euro will
will w/ Bug before they do you. The
tendencies are for them to kick around a bit.



Does P know agenda? See Tasker?

P And Rubin

K We would like to understand better remarks.

1. related to survival & security pt

2. hope to reaffirm our interest in N-E settlement.

Then you meet for 1/2 hr. Tell him this not confrontation but a meeting among friends to discuss a strategy. Mention - Thanks to your dignity some credit.

P I'll say you have heard them out.

K Yes. Mention dignity then in Tasker.

Then ~~no~~ outline agenda & get his concurrence.

P Can I start with idea dedicated to their survival & want to insure it but we have to have prog in negot coming up. We have things to mention: don't want war, oil embargo. He must realize we have probs on Cong backing, inflation & budget, can't stay our focus to oversupply them. Is that ok?

K It will frighten him but doesn't hurt. Wish you give him a letter on long term supply. I told him it had no specific meaning.

They say they need hardware to be flexible. I don't believe it. A big accident, the war would rip it all. Maybe next year after a major disorg.

P Let's discuss it frankly

K I don't think you can go beyond 1st 2 paragraphs & we will discuss next week.

P We are entitled to long term, but we can't put a dollar figure now

K They say if they don't get something they will go into confrontation. He needs something

Need for prog toward peace - except that w/ security.



generally
The spirit of last night's session will be
continued.

