

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 018652

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Memorandum of Conversation

TITLE Kissinger, Schlesinger, Moorer, and
Colby

CREATION DATE 01/22/1974

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COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 031400107

COLLECTION TITLE National Security Adviser. Memoranda of
Conversations

BOX NUMBER 3

FOLDER TITLE January 22, 1974 - Kissinger,
Schlesinger, Colby, Moorer

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/20/2004

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

redacted
11/30/07
6/23/10

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
William Colby, Director, Central Intelligence
Agency
Adm Thomas Moorer, Chairman, JCS
M. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME January 22, 1974 [Tuesday]
1:00 p.m. (lunch)

PLACE: The Map Room
The White House



Moorer: Diego Garcia. Mansfield was fairly receptive. He didn't say no.

Kissinger: They're all moving to the right -- and Fulbright wants hearings on detente. His constituents think he is soft on Communism.

Scowcroft: How about the Syrians? Pretty heady stuff.

Kissinger: The Syrians and Israelis together -- what a combination! Sadat is fairly wise.

[Discussed the limitation agreement]

We are committed to over-flights every 10 days to two weeks.

Colby: Can we go with the U-2?

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted

Kissinger: I told them SR-71.

AUTHORITY MR Appeal 02-02, #16, NARA 6/23/10

Colby: Can we transit on Cyprus?

BY del NARA, DATE 8/31/10

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

Kissinger: Let's do it before Friday.

Schlesinger: Ghorbal is hinting at the US becoming an Egyptian arms supplier.

Kissinger: Stay away from him. He is not in on anything. But it is true that we are working that way.

EO 12958
3.3 (b)(1)

[REDACTED]

Kissinger: I need an understanding man in Egypt to talk with Sadat. Sadat wants to show us Soviet equipment and exchange information. Also, we need an outstanding attache. Maybe Georges Guay. They want to get personal security people out there February 2.

Colby: [REDACTED]

Schlesinger: I will work with Bill.

EO 12958
3.3 (b)(1)

[REDACTED]

Kissinger: Sure.

On the embargo, Sadat said he would get it lifted by Monday. He is having trouble.

Colby: He is trying.

Kissinger: Sadat promised we would get full September production from Bahrein.

Schlesinger: We already get it.

Kissinger: The companies have screwed up the deliveries to the Fleet by going public and demanding their 200,000 barrels.

Moorer: It has not definitely fallen through, but it is not set up yet. The real problem is the cost of the fuel, not the quantity.

The Japanese are complaining they are not getting the amount they should -- that companies are diverting to us.



Kissinger: Is that true?

Schlesinger: Yes.

Kissinger: Do you think if they hadn't lifted the embargo by Friday we should have held up the Israeli withdrawal?

Schlesinger: I don't know a date, but I agree we must be firm.

Colby: Can we give him a face saver?

Kissinger: I don't want to give him anything. Do you have a contingency plan for the Middle East.

Schlesinger: A piss-poor one.

Moorer: We don't have any plan to pur forces.

Schlesinger: We have to build up Deigo and get the British off our back.

Kissinger: Haven't they agreed?

Schlesinger: Yes, but they are talking about conditions and negotiations.

Moorer: We must have access to bases there which gives us flexibility.

Kissinger: How about Ethiopia?

Schlesinger: [REDACTED]

Kissinger: Can't we give them something?

Schlesinger: It is a matter of money. We need to talk about MAP allocations.

Kissinger: MAP is an important tool of foreign policy. It is disgraceful that we have to scrounge and the Soviet Union gives new equipment.

Schlesinger: If the Norwegians and Belgians buy the Mirage, we should think about withdrawing troops.

Kissinger: The Europeans have to expand their thinking. They are narrow-minded about Spain and Portugal.



EO 12958
3.3 (b)(1)

Schlesinger: Macomber was told by a Turkish Colonel that the Army was thinking about giving an ultimatum to form a government. Macomber said we would withdraw aid.

EO 12958
3.3 (b)(1)

Kissinger: I don't give a damn [REDACTED]. I will straighten this out.

Schlesinger: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Macomber has screwed that one out.

Kissinger: What do you want?

Schlesinger: A DOD negotiating team.

Kissinger: It is done.

Schlesinger: SALT.

Kissinger: We will have a briefing session. Duckett will give a w0-minute briefing. Then I will sum up and show how we are harming equivalence by going to 2,000 equal aggregates and MIRV throw-weight limitations.

Schlesinger: The NSC staff wants Option A; we want Option B.

Kissinger: Brent make sure the options are in the paper for me.

Schlesinger: We need throwweight in an overall agreement -- not chopped out of equal aggregates. We can ask for reductions. If they say no, we have a white hat and then we can ask for a build-up.

Kissinger: We need a position we can intellectually justify to ourselves.

I have no problem with equal aggregates, but at 2,350 they have to reduce 150 and then reduce again.

Schlesinger: They only have about 2,100 now. We could propose this for public opinion.

Colby: Public opinion won't accept if we give them an acceptable proposal.



Kissinger: If we turn SALT into a cynical exercise of build-up...

But tomorrow, we just need to educate the President. Let's stick together tomorrow. If I steer it in any one direction, correct me. But let's not upset the President with a controversy now. We need to get him up to speed.

I will present the issues and the building blocks.

Colby: Should we give him two tracks -- detente and building strategic forces?

Kissinger: No. That will get him off on another track. Give him the Duckett briefing.

The meeting should just get him thinking. Then we can hold a VP meeting next week and then another NSC meeting.

Colby: Hersh has a story about the Soviet submarine. I would like to level with him and appeal to his patriotism.

Kissinger: No.

Moorer: Eagle pull.

Kissinger: [Asked everyone] Let's not do it.

TOW in Vietnam.

Schlesinger: We are doing it.

Colby: _____ on Thailand.



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DESCRIPTION Brent Scowcroft's handwritten notes of
Kissinger, Schlesinger, Moorer, and
Colby

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