

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. Han Hsu, Deputy Chief, PRC Liaison Office
Mr. Chi [Interpreter]

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, July 11, 1973
4:30 p. m.

PLACE: The Map Room
The White House

General Scowcroft said that he was instructed to convey the following, with regard to the specific date of the visit and the specific time of announcing of the date. He read the attached note. [Tab A]

Han Hsu listened, and said he would report to his government. He said the Chinese side was well aware of Dr. Kissinger's contribution to the Sino-American rapprochement. The Prime Minister has given high appraisal of Dr. Kissinger's work.

The Chinese position on Cambodia had been stated many times by the Prime Minister. A solution was a matter for discussions among Cambodians and Sihanouk.

General Scowcroft acknowledged this, but said that friends of the various Cambodian parties should use their influence for a solution, as Dr. Kissinger had described, in the interests of all parties.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, *State Review 3/9/04*

hkt *2/3/04*



CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1, 3)
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~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

I first would like to say something on a personal basis, as a good friend. I know that Dr. Kissinger was surprised at your message, that there would be a delay in responding to our proposals relating to the dates of his upcoming visit. He had been under the clear impression that your side wished him to come in early August at a date which would be left up to him, but definitely before the visit of Senator Mansfield. Dr. Kissinger is puzzled by the fact that we have now been told that a decision must wait until Ambassador Huang has been consulted, when earlier we were given an invitation to come at any time and to stay for any length of time. It will not now be possible to announce the visit on July 16. The U.S. side would recommend that the announcement be made on July 19 or July 23, although the longer the delay, the more speculation will develop.

That was a personal note. Now, I would like to make some observations on a semi-official basis. As you well know, Dr. Kissinger is the principal, and practically the sole, architect of Chinese/American rapprochement. He is inseparably identified with that policy -- and its success, on the U.S. side, has been almost exclusively due to his tremendous efforts on its behalf. For



some time into the future that will continue to be the case, at least until this policy becomes fairly institutionalized throughout the American Government. At the present time, that is far from the case. In particular, even those now supporting the policy of normalization do it principally on the basis of sentiment. Moving beyond this sentimental plane to the practical concepts of active support of China in the event of a military contingency remains with Dr. Kissinger alone.

I point this out as background. As you undoubtedly know, expectations have been raised about Dr. Kissinger's visit, especially with respect to Cambodia. Under these circumstances, should Dr. Kissinger come back from his visit to Peking empty-handed, that result would seriously undermine his authority in the eyes of the U.S. Government and people and could thus substantially jeopardize the policy of Chinese/American reconciliation with which he is so closely identified. We would therefore appreciate some idea from the Chinese side of what he may be able to bring back regarding the Cambodian situation.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET~~ / SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

July 11, 1973

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: USA - L. S. Eagleburger

PRC - Mr. Chi
Mr. Tien Ta Yung

DATE, TIME, July 11, 1973 -- 9:45 a.m.
PLACE Room 372-A, Old EOB

Mr. Chi and Mr. Tien Ta Yung called at their request to convey the following message:

"With regard to the matter of the date of Dr. Kissinger's visit to Peking and the date of the announcement of that visit, it will be necessary for the Chinese side to delay its reply until after it has been possible to consult with Ambassador Huang Chen following his arrival in Peking."

I thanked Mr. Chi for the above message, and asked when he expected the Ambassador to arrive in Peking. He replied that Ambassador Huang would reach Peking on July 13. Thus, we would probably have a firm reply to Dr. Kissinger's proposal for a visit sometime prior to July 15.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/14/88, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State Review 3/3/04
BY DM NARA DATE 8/3/04

~~TOP SECRET~~ / SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

~~fact & timing~~ Inty Secs / How to see / Chi
11 July
~~10¹ to [unclear] + [unclear] were to get out [unclear] [unclear]~~

Instructed to ensure that w.r. regard to a specific date and the specific time of discussing of the matter of the date.

② Report to Govt. would ^{aware} ~~approve~~ of R contributions to representative P.M. has given high approval of Dr. K work Position on Cambodia has been stated many times by P.M.

Solution a matter for ^{discussions among} ~~discussions among~~ and Schwank. ^{has attached in intro of all} ~~has attached in intro of all~~ people outcomes Repeated part 2 "Estimate of ~~work~~ on Cambodia" - I called Schwank - They said they had heard sound, but not from authorized source.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Rev. as 3/8/04
v. [unclear] NARA DATE 8/3/04