

*Scowcroft  
file*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

President Nixon  
Golda Meir, Prime Minister of Israel  
Yitzhak Rabin, Ambassador of Israel  
Simcha Dinitz, Director General, Prime Minister's Office  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
M. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:

Thursday, March 1, 1973  
11:03 - 11:25 a.m.

PLACE:

The White House  
The Oval Office

[The press was admitted.]

President: You can imagine the problems we had on the dinner. We made 100 friends and 1000 enemies. Everyone wanted to come.

Ambassador Rabin, I want to congratulate you--I know you're 51 today. We first met after the '67 war. He's been a great Ambassador. I will miss him.

I want to welcome Mr. Dinitz. We first met in the Mayflower here in '68. My '67 trip was non-political.

Mrs. Holton said how kind you were to her son who visited Israel.

Meir: We are very happy to have visitors.

President: It takes time. That is the problem. There's only so much time in a day, so correspondence must be done at night.

[The President met the Israeli press. The press departed at 11:10 a.m.]



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/90, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY *dd* NARA, DATE *3/20/04* State Review *3/8/04*

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5, B, 1, 3  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON 1/1/01

Meir: I want to give you congratulations from the depth of my heart on your revolutionizing the world and creating for the first time hope in the hearts of people that we are approaching the end of wars. That people with different ideas and beliefs can live in peace. This is a great contribution.

President: As you are aware, there are what we call hopeless idealists. They see us trusting Mao, trusting Brezhnev, and they think as a result the world has changed--that the Communists have changed, that we have, and that the world is safe. This may be partly true. As Ambassador Rabin said, we have changed the world because of this dialogue and these agreements. There are improved chances that confrontation will not explode into war.

We are realistic about the dangers which still exist. Many here say that since the world is at peace, we can reduce arms to spend on ghettos. But there will be more until our adversaries really change. So publicly we say that it is good to say that these moves have happened -- we wouldn't have had a Vietnam settlement without our moves toward China and the Soviet Union, we wouldn't have these moves with the Soviet Union without the Chinese initiative -- but we will not change our ground.

Meir: I told Willy Brandt -- at the Socialist International -- don't become dewy eyed or drop your guard.

President: One thing you can do with your fellow Socialists. They are naive and think we can all drop our defenses. It doesn't mean we're still in the Cold War, but we must be realistic.

They talk about the golden rule. My rule in international affairs is: do unto others as they would do unto you.

Kissinger: Plus 10 percent.

Meir: We must be realistic. There may be a possibility of coexistence.

President: We mean live separately.

Meir: In the meeting of the Socialist leaders....



Kissinger: [Explained the meeting.]

Meir: I said I knew all about cease fires and peacekeeping. Palme said he knew the next most. Kreisky is good.

President: It's too bad Austria is so small.

Meir: Brandt didn't come. The Belgian is good, and the British shadow cabinet.

President: Woodrow Wilson was the biggest idealist in this office. When he went to Versailles, the pragmatists gobbled him up.

Except for Versailles, there never would have been a Hitler. What do you think, Henry?

Kissinger: Versailles was either too soft or too tough.

President: It was too tough.

Kissinger: It humiliated Germany without weakening it. It put all the weight on France, and Russia fell out. A disaster.


President: I'm glad you had a talk with Henry.

Get this out of the way because they will ask. On the plane accident. It was unfortunate. When you have this situation, things like this can happen.

Mrs. Meir wouldn't have wanted this to happen and if they did they would have been too smart to do it this way.

On ICAO, it never came to me. We would have pushed for an investigation first. It was a misunderstanding.

Meir: It was a misunderstanding. I want you to know that at the UN in January we got warnings from friends that the Black September Organization was planning a plane full of explosives to crash into an Israeli city. At Lod we had Japanese kamikazes. So we had to consider it a serious matter.



I want you to know that if we had any doubt that there were passengers we never would have done it. No body is no more sorrowful than me.

President: We understand. The main thing is that we don't want the Israeli position in the world to suffer. Your statement was good -- to help the innocent victims.

In Vietnam, when we hit the hospital -- our bombing was accurate because we could have wiped out Hanoi in three days. We want your position to be one which can be supported throughout the world.

Meir: In the Lebanon strike, the easiest way would have been air strikes. But they were next to a refugee camp, so we walked in for hours. We injured no refugees. I worried until they got back, but we did it to save lives.

President: Two major issues we always seem to discuss: arms and economic issues. On the negotiations. Do you have any others?

Let me begin. While you have been concerned at times over the past four years about us standing by you, I have kept our commitment to you and not squeezed you. That will continue.

Now we think it is important to move together to get off dead center in the negotiations. You can't link giving arms to negotiations. We give aid because it is in our interest that Israel be able to defend itself. But we also are interested, and you, in negotiating.

Meir: First, every commitment of yours has been meticulously kept. We never had it so good. There is mutual confidence. If you had doubts about our use of arms, we wouldn't get them. The arms we get are for self-defense and have also prevented war. Otherwise, there would have been shooting over the Canal.

Your policy has been correct. It has not only given us defense but prevented violence. We have been asked -- now that Vietnam is over -- don't you fear the US will be more active in the Middle East? The answer is we don't oppose it. On the contrary. The question is how to go about it.

Our stand is we will negotiate any time, anywhere.



We got a note last May that the Romanian Deputy Foreign Minister wanted to come in. Romania is the only Communist Government with diplomatic relations with us. He came in and told me that President Sadat wanted to see you. Can you come to Bucharest? I went and I was told Sadat wanted peace and Sadat thinks a meeting with Mrs. Meir is essential. I said tell him we sincerely want peace and would be glad to meet. He said good, you will hear within two weeks. Since then nothing. I am sure Ceausescu delivered the message, but nothing.

So we are prepared for direct negotiations, proximity talks which you suggested. All Israel is ready -- with any Middle East country.

Kissinger: Hussein sent a special message the day before yesterday before he left.

President: [Reads the note.]

Let me suggest a possible way to proceed. There are two tracks. The public track -- the difficulty is once you launch it, it has to work or one or obht sides must react. However, public discussions must go forth.

But just between us, we have found that because of my relations with Kissinger and the way we work together, by the time we go to the summit in Moscow and Peking we know what will and won't happen. So they were a success. We haven't done this in your area. You haven't wanted it.

Here is the proposal. You must have confidence in me. We know your elections are coming, and so on. The energy crisis is putting public pressure on doing something in the Middle East.

You are in a strong position -- you can take care of yourself, except for the Soviet Union.

You are so strong that Egypt is coming to us. We think the Soviet Union wants to get Egypt off their back -- we don't really know.

I would like Henry to explore privately with Egypt what might be possible -- not negotiate for Israel, but he should know what your positions are. The same with the Soviet Union. Brezhnev will



come, probably in June, and this will be an opportunity to do the same with them. Henry has told you of our dialogue with them. I can give assurance that Henry will conduct this absolutely off-the-record. If it is okay, let us see if there is a settlement possibility. You know Egypt wants to see an overall solution. You want security; they want sovereignty.

Now this is most sensitive. It must be fuzzy. Henry is a master of fuzzy language. The reason Sadat doesn't want to talk with you, Mrs. Meir, is he is afraid you would gobble him up.

Tell the Chou story, Henry.

Kissinger: Chou said "We don't have a chance. Kissinger is the only man who can talk for 1-1/2 hours without saying anything."

President: Maybe it won't work, but I think we should try, both tracks. We won't broker for you but we should know the outline of what you want.

Meir: We are strong, thanks to you, but we want a situation of peace in the Middle East.

We know you are talking to Egypt and the Soviet Union. Egypt wants you to deliver Israel to them. First they asked the Soviet Union, now you. We know better.

What we want is that you not come to a separate position that we would not know about. We want security; we are not concerned with sovereignty. What does Egypt really want? They tell their friends that Israel must go back to the '67 borders and deal with the Palestinians.

We agree with a Suez interim step. The line of withdrawal would be clearly temporary and subject to final negotiations. This means a lot to us. We would be leaving our natural defenses and the strongest point we have against Egypt; it shows we are prepared to take a risk for peace. We want the Suez Canal cleared and operating, in the hope that the sides, if separated from each other, won't shoot. We want people moving to their cities along the Canal, because that enhances the chance of no fighting.



We will even let some police on East Bank. We wouldn't implement a right to use the Suez Canal. We would insist on the right but not use it. That would save face for Sadat.

So here is something that can be done if they really want.

Kissinger: These proposals have never been formally put.

President: You mean publicly?

Kissinger: I have a number of points. It can be done in one of two ways. Let State start an interim settlement procedure, and get proximity talks going.

President: Don't tell State the Israeli position. Just that Israel will be reasonable.

State has to be doing something. Have State move, but don't give them the whole position. Let Henry sell this.

Meir: We won't say publicly, but we are willing to withdraw to the passes. But I won't tell State.

President: Yes, we can't have it leak.

Kissinger: There will be a couple of months of just getting things going in the public channel.

Meir: The trouble with Egypt is they want to end before they begin. Our stand is that the practical possibility is this interim agreement.

President: I have talked to Hafez Ismail. They are hard, but I think there is a window, don't you think?

Kissinger: There is no flexibility in their position, but there is in their attitude. Now we know something of your position.

President: I told Ismail that the two are far apart and we must have something in between, and what is their view? That is where we are.

What is the Soviet position?



Kissinger: Now that Egyptian talks are going, the Soviet Union will want a position paper on it. We can say that now that we are talking with Egypt, Egypt says they don't want a specific scheme from the Soviet Union. Dobrynin will probably bring back a specific scheme from Moscow.

President: If we, as the middle man, are talking to both sides, you are in a good position, because we tilt to you.

Meir: The Soviet Union told Ismail don't give in to the U.S. They didn't say go to war -- they were cautious there -- but said they would get the MIG-23 and send pilots to the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: We always get the transcript of these exchanges.

Meir: We share them with you.

They want Egypt to be inflexible. They want a repeat of the '57 performance. So they say "Don't compromise."

Kissinger: They don't like Sadat. They keep him inflexible so as to undermine him.

President: The Soviet Union is playing to the radicals in the area. We can't let them play the middle man.

Meir: Yes, they are playing with Syria. Qaddafi is the first madman in the area, Syria is the second.

President: Shall we do this then? Kissinger and Dinitz.

Kissinger: And on your side, keep it in the Prime Minister's office?

Meir: Yes. And now to hardware.

Production. The Pentagon said they would help with the prototype. It was successful. Now we want production. We want the Pentagon to say the prototype is successful, now go ahead.

As I said, we never had it so good. The planes are coming in and we are okay through '73. But we need to know for 74-75. No publicity -- only if the deliveries are not made. If you decide 36-30,

for 74-75, there will be absolutely no publicity.

President: Nothing should be said. As I understand on the numbers, it is better to indicate agreement in principle, with the details to be worked out. Is that okay, Henry?

Kissinger: Yes, we look sympathetically in both places, but let the numbers be agreed on by the experts.

The difficulty we have is the bureaucracy recommended a very small number. The President can't just overrule.

President: The recommendation is for a small number. We know you feel strongly. We will look sympathetically on the number you suggested. We will not take the recommendation of State and DOD, but with your number, we will look on the basis of no linkage.

I don't want to be in a position of overruling the bureaucracy. We will treat you right.

Rabin: Distinguish between public and private. In public, Mrs. Meir will say we don't discuss our military relationship in public and the U.S. will say that it will do whatever is needed for the balance of power. Privately, let's agree here we will get planes, both kinds, and you look sympathetically on the numbers.

President: How does that sound?

Meir: I always give in. [Laughter] Now on production.

President: You want 200, we will give you 100.

Rabin: At least 100.

President: Yes. Okay, Henry?

Kissinger: Yes.

Rabin: The problem is knowhow. We need decisions to give us knowhow. We can't go into production for only 100. Let's agree for not, at least 100, okay?

Kissinger: I'll check with DOD. As I see it, it makes no difference to us. We are not committed; we just left it open.



Meir and Rabin: What we want is that there is not now a decision of only 100, and nothing more.

President: Okay?

Kissinger: Make it clear to DOD. We are not committed to more than 100.

Meir: I don't want to go into details. My Finance Minister has talked....

President: We have budget problems we understand.

[The President left at 12:21 and returned at 12:22]

Meir: Henry said we must break at 12:30.

One other point. We have people coming in, but the Soviet Union is bad. They have people in prison just because they want to go to Israel. This ransom is terrible. If they would only let them leave. Anyone who applies for emigration loses his job, and usually goes to prison.

President: I know about anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union.

Meir: Now it is official.

President: Yes. Now what do we do? We have talked to them, Henry and I, and we will continue -- but privately. We could do it publicly -- like the Congress -- but what good would that do? They would slow down. It is unfortunate that Senators are tying MFN to exit fees. But that would be too popular for me.

I am willing to play a hard line -- my Vietnam bombing decision indicates my toughness -- if it will work. But if we do this publicly -- tie them together -- they can't back down. My view is we can accomplish more -- our conversations with the Russians are tough, frankly; that is why we get along -- by doing it privately. Publicly, they would slam the door.

Kissinger: I agree.

President: We will put it to the Soviet Union, you can be sure. We have experience with these people, and taking a public position would hurt. Privately, yes, but publicly we will deny we are linking.



I am afraid if this continues to escalate, it will not help the Jewish Community. They are even worse than you say.

Meir: There is one with terminal TB.

I don't ask you to do it publicly. I don't expect the Soviet Union to publicly say "no more fees."

President: But Congressmen say the linking has the support of Israel.

Kissinger: The important thing is for you not to influence the Congressmen.

Meir: I can't talk to American Jews about Russian Jews. Not all Jews will go to Israel. The Soviets are fools. They could get all the good will in the world.

Kissinger: The problem is not that you should say anything, but if you could restrain friendly Senators not to push the Jackson Amendment.

President: For us to make progress here is in your hands. We can't face down the Soviet Union any more -- it would mean mutual suicide. We have a dialogue. You can lick anybody except the Soviet Union. We have to keep them out. Let us develop a Soviet policy so we can influence them. Brezhnev is a tough cookie.

[Everyone got up.]

You will be asked about planes by the press. Just stick to what we agreed.



✓ Meir Memora 1 Ma

The Press/PMA  
Shuro. 1 Mar 73  
11:00 AM

1103P- Parks on chairman. We made 100 friends & 1000 enemies.

Everyone wanted to come

Orlando & Eugene - 5/1 today. That after '67 was in uniform

Great workable - will miss - welcome Dinity

First met in Mayflower house in G.S. May 67

trip was non political

Wm. Hutton said how kind you were to open your arms  
who wanted.

M We are very happy to have visitors.

P Take time. That is problem. Why so much time in day  
So exercises must be done at night

Pres left 11:10 (Pres sent Israeli press)

M - Impact from depth of heart against world's  
creating for first time hope in  
hearts of people that we are approaching end  
of war. That people of different itros etc can  
live in peace

P - Any one aware, there are what we call big  
egotists. They see us treating Israel, Bay, etc  
& they think as result world has changed. That  
trust has changed, we have, & world is safe  
(may be partly true). As Robert said, we have  
changed & world because of this dialogue  
& agreements. Improved chances that confrontation  
will not spiral into war.


Let me reiterate about dangers which  
still exist. In my heart & my throat & mind  
is peace, reduction of nuclear ghettos.  
There will be more until our enemies  
really change.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State Review 1/8/04

B7: JAG, NARA DATE 3/30/04





Thomas Wright as F, & K... fell out, &  
a... ..

P Glad you had talk with K  
Get this out of my case they will ask. Plans  
emailed... Unfortunate. We know you  
have this... things like the...  
Was in... ..  
they did they would have been... ..

On ICAO it never came to rule. We would  
have pushed for investigation... ..  
misconducting

In It was... ..  
that at UK in Jan we got... ..  
family that BSO was planning a plane full  
of explosives to crash into an Israeli city. at  
hand we had... ..  
had to consider it serious.

What you to know if we had any doubt  
that there were... ..  
As truly no more successful than me.

P We understood. Main thing is we don't want  
Israeli... ..  
your statement good - help innocent victims  
In UK, when we hit hospital - having... ..  
cause we could have... ..  
We want your... ..  
be supported... ..

In In... ..  
... ..  
to... ..  
... ..  
... ..





Sadaf / Amir meeting essential. I said we  
don't want to meet. He said good agreement will be  
w/ in 2 weeks. Since then nothing.  
I was some Cessation achieved way, but  
nothing.

So we are prepared for direct negot. proximity  
talks which you suggested. All of which is  
only - with any ME country.

R A man sent special way day before  
yesterday before he left.

P Reels Reels

P Let me suggest possible way to proceed. 2 tracks  
Public track - definitely is one you launch,  
it has to work on one or both sides must start  
to work, public discussions must go forth.

But just between us, we have found that because  
of my relation w/ K & - way we work together,  
by a kind of get to a summit in Moscow  
Picking what will & what happen. So success  
We haven't done this in your area, you haven't  
wanted it.

Here is proposal - you must have expertise in  
the. We know your expertise working, etc.  
Energy crisis putting pressure on do something  
in ME

You in <sup>stand</sup> ~~stand~~ position - take care of yourself  
except for SO.

You are <sup>to</sup> ~~stand~~ strong that E is causing to  
us. We think SO wants to get E off their  
back - we don't really know.

as would like K to explore privately w/ E what



would be possible. Not negotiable for Israeli  
but should know what your position  
are. Some of SO, Benz will come part in  
front of this opportunity to do some w/ them.  
I have told you from dealing w/ them  
I give assurance Henry will conduct  
this absolutely of record, but we see if  
there is a settlement possibility. You know E  
wants to see over all end. You want security  
they want security.

How most sensitive. Must be fuzzy  
Henry is a master of fuzzy language  
Kozan Seibel doesn't want talk w/ you. He is  
afraid you would pick him up.  
Tell them they K

K - Sharon said don't have a chance. K only man  
who can talk 1/2 hour w/ saying anything.

Maybe it wasn't work, don't I think we should  
try try, both tracks. Let's want broken for  
you but should know another part but you want  
as a one story, thanks to you, but we want  
retention of peace in ME

As I know you talking to E & SO. E wants  
you to deliver Israel to them - First they want  
SO, now you. As I know better.

What we want is that you not come to  
separate position that we would not know about.

We want security, not concerned w/ security  
collected E. sensible, what? They talk friends  
I must go back to 6) or 49 borders +  
deal w/ Palestinians

As I agree w/ Suez interim step - time of



W/demand is temporary + subject to a  
final agreement. This means a lot to us.  
So we would be leaving our national  
defenses + strongest point not back against E,  
it shows we are prepared to take risk for peace.  
We want Suez closed + operating, in hope  
sides separated won't shoot. We don't push back  
about Canal, could that enhance chance of our  
fighting.

Will men let some police on east bank.

We wouldn't implement a right to use  
Suez - insist on right but not use it. That  
would save face for S.

So here is something can be done if they really want

K These proposals have never been formally put

P you mean publicly?

K A number of points. One of 2 ways but state  
start within settlement procedure, get  
proximity talks going.

P Don't tell state post position. Just that I  
to responsible.

State has to be doing something. Have state  
work, but don't put them at state front  
but K sell this

M - Won't say publicly, but are willing to withdraw  
to a peace. But I won't tell state.

P - yes, can't have leak.

R There will be couple of messages just  
getting things going in public channel

M - I would like to see them start and before they  
begin.



One stand is that the potential possibility  
is this intrinsic agreement

P I have talked to General. They are hard, but  
I think there is a window, don't you think?

K No flexibility in position, but there is in attitude  
What are you hearing something of your <sup>position</sup> position?

P Still I would think 2 for agent & me would  
have something in between & what is this  
view? That is where we are  
What is SO position?

K Now that E talks going. SO will want a joint  
paper on a. We can say that we  
are talking w/F ~~we can say~~ E say they  
don't want specific scheme from ~~the~~ SO.  
D will not bring back spec scheme from  
Moscow

P If we, as middle man, talking to both sides  
you in general position, can we talk to you.

M SO told General don't give in to US. Don't  
say get worse - customer there - but said would  
get MIG-27 & to send pilots to SO

K - We always get transcripts of these exchanges

M - We share with you

They want E in flight

want report of '57 performance. So they say  
don't compromise

K They don't like the Soviet. Keep him in flight  
so to undermine him.

P SO playing to a ~~rehab~~ rehab in order  
we can't let them play midline

M - Yes they are playing w/ Syria. I had for  
1st midline in order, Syria #2



Priority  
Area 3

P Shall w/ do this then? K + ~~Constance~~  
K - And on your side, Key in PM office?  
P Yes. And insert brochure.

Production. Pentagon said they would help  
w/ prototype. Successful. Now we want  
production. Went Pentagon to my prototype  
successful, now go ahead.

Q I said, not sure had so good. Plans are  
coming in a lot of them 73. Need to know  
for 74-75. No publicity - only if deliveries  
not made. If you exceed 36-30,  
for 74-75, absolutely no publicity

P Nothing should be said. Q I understand on  
#1's, better to indicate agreement in principle,  
w/ details to work out, ok K?

K Yes, we look sympathetic on both plans,  
but let #1's be agreed by experts.  
Difficulty we have is because many recommended  
very small #. Pico can't just overrule.

P Recommendation is for small #. We know  
you feel strongly. We look to you on # you  
suggested. Not take recommendation of  
S. T. & S. D., but w/ your #, will look  
on basis of no language

Don't want to be in position of overruling  
Congress, we will treat you right

Rab - Distinguish bet public private. In public  
in <sup>US</sup> would say don't discuss in public & US  
very clear distinction would offer B of funds.  
Priority, let's agree here and we will  
get planes, both kinds, & you back

W. ~~to say anything on #1's~~  
I always see in. Now on production



P You want 200, and give 100

R at least 100

P Yes, OK K.

K yes

R Problem is knowledge, we would discuss  
to find our knowledge, all cost go into  
production for only 100. Let's agree for now,  
at least 100 OK

R I'll check w/ DOD. As I see, no difference to  
us. We not committed, just info per

WKR what we want is that not more a  
decision of only 100. Nothing more

P OK

K Make clear to DOD. Not committed & more  
than 100

~~P~~

W Don't want to go into details. My Fin Man  
has talked

W We have budget problems, but we will do  
what we can

W Budget problems are understood

P left - around 12:20 - 12:22

W - K said met back at 12:30

W One other point, we have problem in, but  
C & B is bad. They have problem just  
because they want to go to I read. This reason  
is terrible. If they would only let them know.  
Anyone who says <sup>love</sup> his job, & usually  
go to prison

P I know about anti-discrimination in SC

W know it is official

P Yes. Now what do we do. We have talked  
to them, K & we & will continue - but provide



Publicly  
Creating papers

Q - would do it publicly - like Congress - but  
what good that do? They would show love.  
Compassionate sometimes trying MEN to exact fees.  
That he payed for me.  
I'm willing to play hard some - by UN having  
decide in private say tough see if it will  
work. But if we do this publicly (two together)  
they can't be a charm. In, since is an  
enoughish man - an ~~unpleasant~~ or/panic  
are tough, frequently that is why we get along -  
by doing it privately. Publicly, they would  
show a char.

K Dayna

P We will put it to SO, you <sup>can</sup> be sure. We  
have experience w/ those people, & public  
partic would hurt. Privately, yes, but publicly,  
we will deny anything.

I afraid if this continues to escalate, it  
will not help Jewish community. They are even  
worse than you say.

M - One w/ ~~low~~ terminal TB

I don't ask you to do it publicly. I don't expect  
SO to publicly say we were wrong fees.

P But Congressmen say the public looking down  
support of Israel.

K Important thing is for you not to influence  
Congressmen.

M I can't talk to all Jews about Russian Jews  
but all Jews will get to S & one food. They  
could get all your will in world.



P Problem is not that you should say anything, but  
if you could restrain yourself, sometimes  
not to push Jackson around

P For us to make progress here is in your  
hands. We can't face down a SC on the  
national scene. We have changed your  
tick on both, except SC. We have to keep them  
out, but we don't let SC play the  
influence on <sup>Beckham</sup> ~~the~~ White, Clay and  
(all got up)

P You will be absolutely pleased by a pass. Just  
say stick to what we agreed.  
End at 1125

