

February 16, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Special Report on the Guatemalan Disaster

In seismic terms, the Guatemalan earthquakes were "major"; in human terms, this disaster must be ranked as a tragedy of great and terrible magnitude. Based on my visit to Guatemala on February 12 and 13, I will attempt first to give you a brief overview of the disaster and its setting.

General Situation

The major shock area is large - about 3,530 square miles, or equivalent to the Grand Rapids-Kalamazoo-Battle Creek area of Michigan. 1.03 million people populate the area and 80 - 90 percent are now homeless. In the entire affected area, 22,360 are dead, 74,000 were injured and over one million were left homeless. (The wife of President Laugerud, concentrating on assistance to children, estimates at least 5,000 children became orphaned.) Overall, 20 percent of the country's people are directly affected. I should mention that as harder information comes in, the numbers keep rising. In U.S. terms, comparable figures would mean 2,800,000 killed and injured and 38,000,000 homeless.

The greatest impact is upon the poor - and it is essentially a rural disaster. The rural poor cluster their small adobe homes in villages. Adobe brick walls, while they look substantial, are not strong. They collapsed allowing the heavy clay tile roofs to fall in on the sleeping victims. The urban poor live in make-shift shacks which simply fell apart.

It is relevant to make two interesting side comments to the above. First, the casualty toll was great and the count was difficult to make because so many victims were trapped, unable to get outside before their dwelling collapsed during the approximate thirty seconds of the main shock. Second, conventionally built homes, especially the newer, though damaged, were not destroyed, thus inflicting fewer and less serious casualties.

- 2 -

Compounding the dimensions of the disaster was that it took place at 3:02 a.m., the time when the greatest proportion of the population was inside, asleep and not alert to respond quickly. And adding at least to the confusion was the darkness. Where electricity existed, it was cut or turned off to reduce chances for fire and electrocution from exposed, high-tension lines.

Outside Guatemala City, the terrain, rugged, mountainous, probably of volcanic formation, makes communications of any kind (roads, phones, even radio) difficult even in normal circumstances. Thus, in the vast hard-hit rural area virtually all immediate relief assistance was limited to that available locally. The sudden, gigantic and urgent needs for emergency help, tools, medicines were largely unmet during the crucial early hours and first days until rescuers could make their way in by some means.

Before turning to the response stage, I would like to mention another facet, parenthetically. Your description to me of the unusual nature of an earthquake you had seen some years ago in Yugoslavia was confirmed. It is awesome. It is almost eerie. Unlike other types of disasters, there is no clear-cut point marking the end of exposure to further risk. More than 600 tremors have been felt since the first quake. They are still happening. Several of the many I felt were severe enough shocks to do additional damage and to be visible in the sense of seeing the movements of the building I was in.

This has resulted in a widely felt sense of insecurity. A view of Guatemala City from a helicopter reveals tents in gardens, parks and on the sidewalk or street in front of homes seemingly and reportedly not seriously damaged. Also, many people sleep in their cars, if they don't have tents or other shelter from the very cool nights.

My impression is that, in immediate response to the disaster, virtually everyone who wasn't a victim turned, unhesitatingly, to aid others. President Laugerud, for example, took direct personal command immediately and was even able to check on one hospital's response capability within 27 minutes after the quake.

This self-initiated individual type of response quickly became organized by entity, e.g., government ministry, church or civic group, and voluntary agency. Then with the formation of the National Emergency Committee by the President there came the means of beginning to coordinate activities for a national response, including the allocation of assistance resources to areas of priority need.

I. Assessment of Damage

A. Physical Damage

Damage is concentrated in the densely populated Indian-inhabited Eastern Highlands, portions of the capital city and wide areas to the west, roughly 20 percent of the area of the country. A number of important rural population centers in the affected area were nearly totally destroyed, including Mixco (population 10,900), San Pedro (4,800), Patzicia (7,100), Patzun (8,300), Joyabaj (2,400), Tecpan (5,900), San Juan Sacatepequez (6,700), and El Progreso (4,000).

1. Housing and Other Building Damage

By far the most devastating impact of the earthquake was on the housing of the poor. The great majority of Guatemala's population resides in small towns and rural areas in adobe houses. Over 150,000 of these are estimated by the Government of Guatemala to have collapsed. In Guatemala City, some 100,000 dwellings of the urban poor were destroyed. The value of these urban and rural dwellings has not been determined. In most cases, they were built by the families who occupied them. It is probable that they will be rebuilt in the same fashion. A rough estimate of the financial costs of replacement might range from \$150-\$250 million, depending on whether new construction will adopt earthquake resistant design improvements.

There was, of course, loss to commercial, church, and public buildings, essentially in the small rural towns. No estimates are available, as yet, on these losses.

Several major hospitals in the capital were damaged by the quake and their staffs have been operating in other available buildings on a make-shift basis, pending assessment, repair, or replacement of damaged hospitals. Hospitals in several other communities were also severely damaged, as were many health centers and health posts.

2. Infrastructure

(a) Transport and Communications

The Guatemala City-Puerto Barrios highway and railroad, the primary transportation links from the capital to the Caribbean coast, have been cut because of a three-span fallen bridge and numerous landslides. A U.S. military engineer survey team is now in the field assessing the extent of damage.

A much more circuitous road from the coast to the capital is still open, but cannot handle the entire heavy traffic load that normally passes between the capital and the coast. Preliminary estimates of the cost of restoration of the road from Guatemala to the Caribbean approach \$25 million. In many areas of the highlands, roads also have been blocked by numerous slides. An estimate of cost of restoring major and secondary roads throughout the damaged area is \$35 million, of which the major cost will probably be for the main highway artery to Puerto Barrios. The cost to repair the railroad is not yet known.

Telephone communications, never particularly good, have been severely damaged by the quake. Phone lines are down throughout the affected area. Restoration is under way. However, it will be some weeks before all major phone lines are repaired.

(b) Water and Electricity

The first earthquake left approximately 40 percent of the residents of the capital without water supplies, and the water supplied to other sections of the city was unprotected by chlorination. This situation has improved marginally since then, due to emergency repairs and to increased chlorination. In many smaller cities, the water supply and distribution systems were partially destroyed, although the main water sources and storage systems remain relatively intact. Restoration and improvement of all of these systems will require major effort.

Electricity in Guatemala City is back on. However, regional transmission as well as local distribution of power service to many localities in the interior has been and still is disrupted.

B. Economic Impact

1. Balance of Payments Effects

Fortunately, Guatemala enjoyed a relatively strong balance of payments position in 1975. Its net foreign exchange reserves increased from the end of 1973 to the end of 1975 from \$201 million to \$280 million, a level equal to approximately four months of imports. Still too early to project the effects of the earthquake on Guatemala's foreign exchange position, it is clear the tourism income, which reached \$70 million in foreign exchange earnings in 1975, will decline and probably sharply. While, in the overall, hotels are only slightly damaged, some suffered heavy damage. It will be some time before prospective visitors regain confidence and resume their travels to Guatemala.

More importantly, the earthquake is expected to cause a significant upsurge in imports, particularly of glass, construction materials, and equipment. Some stocks of manufactured goods will also have to be replaced. Guatemala's main foreign exchange earners other than tourism, i.e., coffee, sugar, cotton, bananas and meat, have not been affected, and almost all of its industrial production capacity remains intact.

As its foreign debt service burden has been below 5 percent, Guatemala therefore has the capacity to borrow substantially to help finance its reconstruction and investment programs. Heavy reliance on large commercial borrowings, however, would increase debt servicing costs rapidly.

2. Budgetary Effects

The government's budgetary position, traditionally strong, will certainly be adversely affected. Some reductions may be expected in corporate and personal income tax collections as affected businesses write off their losses. Most significant will be the effect of increased government expenditures for relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction. The government will be called upon to assist the rural and normally poor municipalities in restoring the water supply and other essential services and provide emergency assistance to the homeless and medical assistance to the injured. Moreover, credit for housing reconstruction will be needed for many of the homeless. Unfortunately, these expenditures, either for temporary or more permanent shelter, cannot be spread over a number of years but will have to be concentrated within a relatively short period.

3. Effect on Prices

Price stability has long been a characteristic of the Guatemalan economy, but that changed in 1973 and 1974 when, as did many countries, Guatemala, largely from external causes, experienced serious effects from inflation. However, by the end of 1975, price stability had significantly improved. Strong inflationary pressures are expected, as an aftermath of the disaster, in the area of construction and construction materials. Demand is expected to exceed substantially available productive capacity. Wages in the construction industry are expected to rise sharply. As an offset, the just completed harvests of corn, beans, and wheat were relatively bountiful and can be expected to hold down price increases in basic foodstuffs. However, large quantities of grains were stored in and around homes and were partially lost. This may cause some increases in food prices.

4. Employment Effects

A number of businesses, closed temporarily until power was restored and repairs were made, are now reopening. However, many neighborhood shops and small businesses have been completely destroyed. Tourism and arts and crafts, normally an important source of employment, may be depressed for at least some months. Moreover, with so many homes destroyed and material possessions lost, the arts and crafts industry, largely a home industry, may suffer dislocation.

These adverse employment effects are expected to be of a short-term nature. The intensive reconstruction effort will provide additional jobs in the construction and construction materials industries. The manufacturing industry, which accounts for roughly 6 percent of the GNP, has not been seriously affected, and most major commercial establishments either have resumed, or soon will resume, operations.

In sum, the impact of the disaster on the balance of payments budget, production, and employment is not expected to be unmanageable. In human terms, however, the disaster is truly a disaster. Hardest hit were the poor, those who can least afford to lose their employment, homes, and possessions.

II. Disaster Relief

A. Immediate Response

1. Government of Guatemala

A national emergency was declared immediately after the first earthquake. The military received and has exercised extraordinary powers to deal with the immediate relief problems. The government has invested, and is investing, massive effort in clearing roads of landslide debris, completing initial damage assessments and distributing government food stocks. Price controls are being enforced to prevent the exploitation of temporary shortages. Citizens generally are contributing time and financing to help to save lives and feed the most affected. Private sector resources, whether channeled through the Guatemalan Red Cross or other organizations or provided on an individual basis, have played a significant role in speeding relief to those affected by the earthquake. The mass of the population is "cooperating" by its patience, and an almost stoical capacity for suffering.

The Guatemalan Government has formed a National Emergency Committee to coordinate the government relief efforts and the generous assistance being provided by the U.S. and other donors. The coordination task is large, complex and continuing. The improving communications system and the growing experience of the government point toward the easing of the coordination problem.

There have been but few reports of looting, with the government moving quickly to deal with any reported problem. During our visit we heard no complaints about diversion of relief supplies.

2. United States Government

Within hours after the first quake, the U.S. country team in Guatemala and A.I.D.'s Foreign Disaster Relief Center were in operation on a 24-hour basis. Quickly, we began to move in supplies, equipment, and personnel. Among the first arrivals was a U.S. military Disaster Assistance Survey Team (DAST) from Panama. This was followed quickly by a fully-equipped and staffed 100-bed U.S. military field hospital that is in operation in the center of the hardest-hit area - Chimaltenango.

Subsequently, we provided a U.S. Engineering Survey Team to assess damage to roads, bridges, and railroads; 13 large helicopters; 8 two-man medical/communications teams to assess needs and provide medical assistance in isolated areas; and a considerable amount of tents, medical supplies, field kitchens, generators, etc., from A.I.D.'s disaster relief stockpile in Panama. Two medical officers from the Communicable Disease Center in Atlanta and two U.S. Public Health Service pharmacists are assisting the Guatemalans in establishing systems to survey disease outbreaks and in organizing the receipt, storage, and use of the large quantities of donated medical supplies. We are also funding the transportation costs for certain high-priority relief shipments by voluntary agencies. Most of our efforts are concentrated in the hardest-hit areas of the highlands around Chimaltenango, for the Guatemalan Government has asked us to concentrate our resources on this area, which was almost totally devastated.

As of February 14, we have allocated \$3.6 million to this effort. The cost of relief over a 30 to 60-day period may require up to \$20 million, depending on the timing for the phasing down of helicopter and field hospital use.

3. Other Donors

(a) Third Country and International Organizations Relief Assistance

Thus far, 24 nations other than the United States (and the list is growing) have contributed to the relief effort. Contributions are being made in cash, personnel, transport, food and other commodities. I am attaching hereto a listing of third-country assistance based on the information currently available to us (TAB A).

International organizations are also responding to the needs of the immediate relief phase. Their known contributions, which already amount to over \$3.6 million, are listed in attachment TAB B.

(b) Voluntary Agencies

Voluntary agencies, such as CARE, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Caritas, the Salvation Army, the Red Cross, Seventh Day Adventists, Partners of the Americas (Alabama), and a host of others, including from other countries, have provided and are providing generous and effective support as they put to quick use long and practical experience in dealing with disasters. There is no reliable estimate yet available of the financial value of their assistance. A listing, based on currently known information, is also attached (TAB C).

B. Post-Immediate Relief Phase

We are now at a time when immediate relief requirements are moving into manageable proportions. Medical emergency needs have been largely identified and satisfied, but certainly not entirely, particularly in the more remote rural areas. In-country stocks of medicines, bolstered by donations still arriving, should be adequate to satisfy requirements, although there may be specialized needs from time to time which generally can be handled by other donors and private voluntary organizations. The major hospitals in Guatemala City are functioning well and are meeting the immediate needs for medical and surgical care.

No signs of epidemics have appeared. The process of restoring water services in rural towns, as well as in parts of Guatemala City, is moving ahead rapidly with provision for proper treatment of water supplies receiving high priority. Apart from the need for a relatively minimal quantity of tools and supplies in addition to the water storage tanks already supplied by the U.S., completion of temporary repairs to

- 9 -

water systems in the affected area should be possible without significant further external relief requirements.

Water supply capacity in the capital is back to about 50 percent of pre-earthquake levels. Shortage of supply is of lesser concern than is quality. The municipal water plants are chlorinating the water being distributed, but damage to the city's parallel water and sewage pipe systems has rendered supply potentially unsafe. Attention is being given to this problem by the government with assistance by the U.S. and others. The monitoring by the health authorities of hospitals and clinics is continuing in order to detect as quickly as possible any emerging health problems.

The major continuing problem, for the short and long run, is the need to provide adequate shelter to the many homeless. Given the relatively modest aspirations of the rural population, provisional needs increasingly are being met by the government and several donors. However, additional new inputs for this purpose are being considered by others. Properly handled, temporary shelter solutions can form the basis for rapidly resolving permanent housing needs through self-help programs utilizing simple materials and tools.

Barring further major quakes, a reasonable degree of normal economic activity and public services should be restored and in place in all but the remote areas by the end of this month or early March. An important factor bearing on this process, however, will be the rapidity with which closed roads are opened to permit access for the movement of food and other commodities. While there is no possibility that the main highway to Puerto Barrios can be opened within this time frame, temporary bypass construction will be needed. In-country equipment capacity should be sufficient to handle general road clearing work, but preliminary surveys by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers of Atlantic highway damage indicate that reopening of the highway will require a major effort, especially if the work called for along the fifty miles primarily affected is to be completed by the advent of the rainy season in mid-May and which normally continues until November. Whether this operation, located in rugged, difficult terrain, is within the country's capability must await completion of the in-depth damage assessment by the Corps of Engineers and a review of construction capacity now being carried out by the Ministry of Public Works. Decisions are expected shortly. Opening the road is obviously one of the priority tasks. The government, with its own facilities, hopes to be able to restore the railroad link before the rainy season.

Food stocks, augmented through foreign donations, should be sufficient for the next few months. There will be continuing difficulties, however, in ensuring adequate supplies in all areas because of access problems.

III. Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

Even while the Guatemalans struggle to deal with the emergency needs facing them, attention must be given, and is being given, to the next phases, i.e., the shorter-run rehabilitation task and the longer-run reconstruction task. There is no clear line distinguishing between these phases, and they are not necessarily successive in time sequence, as some must proceed in planning and execution simultaneously. Essentially, what is involved are decisions on policies and actions for interim and long-term responses to the consequences of the disaster.

After a relatively long period of slow economic growth, Guatemala, in recent years, has begun to develop a national network of public services with increased capacity to attend to the development needs of the large mass of rural and urban poor. The interruption caused by the earthquake in this delayed process of spreading the benefits of development to perhaps 80 percent of Guatemala's people poses not only a humanitarian problem but a challenge of fundamental importance to the future course of that nation. In recognition of this fact, President Laugerud has announced that it will be the policy of his government to continue overall development efforts for the entire country, guided by the 1975-79 Development Plan. The necessary rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in the earthquake affected areas are obviously of high priority, but this priority should desirably not deter the government from its development efforts to improve the quality of life of the poor Guatemalans.

The National Economic Planning Council is about to complete an initial assessment of damage cost and economic impact projections which will form the basis for more precise estimates of external assistance needs and internal self-help capacity. Major capital inputs will obviously be required for housing, road repair, public infrastructure (schools, medical centers and hospitals, water supply systems, and public buildings), small business rehabilitation and communication facilities. Moreover, small farmer productivity must be assured through effective and timely provision of normal governmental and cooperative services (credit, technical assistance, distribution of improved seeds and fertilizers, etc.). The extent to which this institutional infrastructure has been disrupted in the

affected areas is not yet fully determined, but it is important that it be in place and functioning within the next 6-8 weeks in anticipation of the May planting season. Obviously, projections of future food import needs will be influenced by how well the planting goes in the affected area which, outside of Guatemala City, is largely populated by small, subsistence-level farmers.

IV. Resources for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

A. Guatemalan Self-Help Measures

The administration of President Laugerud has been distinguished by its dedication to accelerating programs with impact in the long-neglected social areas. A competent managerial team within his cabinet has pushed forward major development projects, ranging from improved water supply to greatly increased electric power that had begun, before the disaster, to move Guatemala into the forefront of the Central American countries in terms of growth. If, as we hope, major economic activity quickly will be restored to the pre-earthquake level and fiscal progress can be maintained and intensified to help carry the heavy burdens now placed upon the population, Guatemala should be in a position to help finance a major portion of the programs required to regain and surpass its pre-earthquake situation.

The Guatemalan authorities stress their recognition that the foundation of Guatemala's recovery cum development thrust will rest solidly on its own self-help measures. They further recognize that external assistance will depend heavily on demonstration of such self-help. It is too soon to judge whether it will be possible for the government to pursue fully recovery and development simultaneously. Fortunately, as noted, at the time of the disaster, Guatemala was in a relatively strong financial and economic situation which can bolster the self-reliance underpinning of their laudable approach. Some tradeoffs may be necessary, however.

A major question in the post-earthquake period situation is the administrative and managerial capacity of Guatemalan institutions to handle the increased burdens of a reconstruction program. This is understandable because of the burdens being placed on top of the normal ones already associated with implementing an active and expanding development program. Preliminary consideration is being given to creating a special reconstruction entity. Such an entity would have the responsibility and authority to plan and direct the utilization of all resources destined for reconstruction. An important benefit of this approach would be

that the entity would be in a position to hire or have assigned to it top-notch, qualified personnel, thereby avoiding the problem of overloading existing ministerial staffs. Presumably, the new entity would also be granted emergency powers, enabling it to bypass many of the Guatemalan Government's present internal administrative procedures, thus speeding up project implementation.

B. External Assistance

1. United States

Apart from immediate assistance provided to meet the initial emergency and which will be phased down with the decreasing need for such assistance, the question of further U.S. assistance can be approached from two levels. The first essentially involves reviewing existing loan and grant projects to determine whether restructuring would be feasible. This examination is underway. Fortuitously, A.I.D. recently (December 1975) had authorized a \$13 million loan for small farmer development which is directed at the Highland Indian farmer. The Minister of Finance has indicated that the Guatemalan Government wishes to sign the loan agreement immediately. Our preliminary assessment is that essentially no restructuring will be necessary to ensure concentration of resources where needed. Also, the Government of Guatemala and A.I.D. signed in November 1975 a \$7 million rural primary education loan which included approximately \$4.2 million for up-grading school buildings primarily in the Highland area. Some reorientation of priorities in this program will likely be required in terms of school site selection, but, essentially, this loan is available to assist in the rehabilitation and reconstruction effort. Also, additional U.S. Government support, through the U.S. International Disaster Assistance Authority, for the early rehabilitation effort is being considered, pending further assessment of identified needs. The assessment is already underway and will require continuing close coordination with the government, other donor nations, and international organizations. Only until we know more of the nature and substance of the international and Guatemalan Government's national response can we establish our own priorities and clarify possible additional funding requirements.

U.S. voluntary agencies possess large capabilities, unique to each voluntary agency, which can play an important role in the rehabilitation phase. They are on the ground with established delivery systems which can meet the needs of many disaster victims without further straining government capacity. We hope that this capacity will continue to be utilized in the post-relief phases.

Over the next months, we anticipate that the Guatemalan Government's planning process will identify specific, longer-run needs which could appropriately be met through A.I.D. development loans and grants and which would clearly be consistent with congressional mandate criteria for development assistance. We should seek to be responsive within the means that may be made available through the appropriation process.

2. External Assistance from Other Sources.

For the post-emergency relief phase, I believe that the major burden of external assistance can be carried by the multilateral agencies, particularly the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The major requirements for shelter and urban reconstruction, generally, as well as more permanent restoration of infrastructure (roads, bridges, railroads, and ports), may well find substantial financing through these multilateral channels to supplement Guatemalan resources. It is interesting to note that only last month the Inter-American Development Bank provided \$135 million in loans for Guatemala (more than that country has had in total during the previous fifteen years of the Bank's existence). Portions of these may be redirected as a result of the disaster. Both financial institutions are already planning their active involvement. An IDB team has already been to Guatemala and a World Bank team is being dispatched shortly.

3. Coordination

Leadership in the coordination of the rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts has to come from the Guatemalans. They know it. With the support of ourselves and the many others interested in helping Guatemala, they can well perform the task. We anticipate that a consultative arrangement among donors and lenders will develop to insure a maximum, coordinated effort.

V. Contingency Planning for Possible Future Disasters

Even now, the Government of Guatemala must significantly strengthen its contingency planning for future disasters. Regrettably, the possibility cannot be ruled out that Guatemala, much of which is located along the long east-west Motaqua Fault, may still face other quakes.

The U.S. Government can provide technical assistance to the Guatemalans for contingency planning. We plan to help Guatemala lay out the various options it may have for

responding to any future natural disasters. We feel that more can be done to help the Guatemalan Government not to be taken by total surprise in the event of another major disaster. For example, United States Geologic Survey Geologists are now monitoring the tensions of the fault line which runs near Guatemala City. The tension has not yet abated fully and, with sophisticated monitoring devices, we may be able to provide the Guatemalan Government with some forewarning of another major earthquake.

Because the terrain of this country has changed significantly in some areas, we are alerting the Guatemalan Government to the concern that flooding of abnormal proportions may occur this year. Members of the U.S. Army Engineering Survey Team are making assessments of some possible waterways that may cause flooding damage to the already-disrupted major highway to the sea.

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Mr. President, the government and the people of Guatemala have responded well to the aftermath of the disaster. Certainly, there were and, indeed are, problems of coordination and maximum effective use of domestic and foreign resources; but the consensus of experienced observers is that the Guatemalan effort, given the enormity of its tasks, has responded well. They merit the continuing help from the United States and others.

President Laugerud asked that I convey to you, on behalf of himself and his people, the deepest appreciation for your personal interest and support. He stressed that it was not only the important technical and material assistance being provided by the U.S. Government and people but also the moral encouragement and bolstering derived by his government and the Guatemalan people from the spirit and timeliness of that support. He emphasized, too, his recognition that Guatemala itself must bear the major burden of the present and continuing costs of the disaster and that the nature and extent of its self-help measures will help determine the nature and extent of external support.

I wish also to commend to you all elements of the U.S. country team. Under the active leadership of Ambassador Meloy, they continue to devote themselves on a round-the-clock basis. I believe all the people of the United States may be proud of the U.S. role in helping the Guatemalan people in the traumatic aftermath of a major disaster.

While many other nations and organizations responded quickly with supplies and personnel, the U.S. response, both public and private, was critical in averting a serious worsening of the crisis.

In making the trip to Guatemala, I was joined by two congressional staff members, Ms. Herschelle Challenor of the House International Relations Subcommittee on International Resources, Food and Energy, and Mr. Richard McCall legislative assistant to Senator Gale McGee, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs. I am grateful for their participation. Mr. Herman Kleine, my Assistant Administrator for Latin America, and Major Marshall N. Carter, USMC, a White House Fellow serving as my special assistant, also accompanied me. Their support is greatly appreciated.

Daniel Parker

Attachments:

- A - Third Country Donor Assistance
- B - International Organizations Assistance
- C - Voluntary Agency Assistance

THIRD COUNTRY DONOR ASSISTANCE as of February 15, 1976

The Office of Foreign Disaster Relief Coordination has reports of the following contributions in cash or kind from third country donors.

Argentina	field hospital w/medical team	
Belgium	30,000 lbs.	Red Cross supplies
Brazil	45,000 lbs.	food and medical supplies
Canada	24,000 lbs.	milk
	35,000 lbs.	food
	75,000 lbs.	milk (\$160,000)
		blankets (\$300,000)
	Cash, Embassy	(\$15,000)
	Cash, Red Cross	(\$100,000)
Colombia	23,800 lbs.	medical supplies
	18,600 lbs.	food
Costa Rica	8,000 lbs.	hospital supplies
		doctors, nurses
	4,740 lbs.	medical supplies, food
	4,000 lbs.	plaster
Dominican Republic		5 doctors
	22,000 lbs.	medicines and food
Ecuador	7,000 lbs.	medical supplies
	7,000 lbs.	food
France		cash (\$11,260)
Germany, FRG	80,000 lbs.	medical supplies
Haiti	7,230 lbs.	food
Honduras	9,000 lbs.	food
		tents
	26,000 lbs.	medical supplies
	19,000 lbs.	food and other supplies
Israel	4,000	blankets
	26,000 lbs.	food and medical supplies
Italy	Cash	(15 million lira) (US\$22,000)

Mexico	12,000 lbs.	medicines and food
	200 tons	5 doctors
	10,000 lbs.	food per day by truck
	17,240 lbs.	meat and medicines
	10,000 lbs.	food and medicines
	8,000 lbs.	milk powder
	10,300 lbs.	radio equipment, food & milk
	13,600 lbs.	medical supplies & food
	12,500 lbs.	food and medical supplies
	27,600 lbs.	food and medical supplies
	16,200 lbs.	mattresses, food, clothes
	10,000 lbs.	food
		medical supplies
New Zealand	CORSO donated \$2,500 to CRS	
NICARAGUA	field hospital completely staffed	
	28,600 lbs.	food
	13,500 lbs.	food
	22,500 lbs.	medical supplies
	6,000 lbs.	tents and rice
Norway	Cash to Red Cross (\$90,300)	
	Cash through VolAgs (\$57,800)	
Panama	18,000 lbs.	medicines
	medical team, plasma, medicines, food & blankets	
	16,000 lbs.	food, hospital supplies
	6,000 lbs.	food
	4,000 lbs.	medical supplies
Peru	medicine, food and blankets	
Spain	medicine & supplies (\$250,000)	
Sweden	Cash to Red Cross (\$22,727)	
	Cash to UNDRO (\$11,363)	
Switzerland	Cash for shelters (\$37,500)	
United Kingdom	250 tents, blankets, sanitation equipment	
Venezuela	Field hospital, medicines, blankets, food, milk, rescue team	
	44,000 lbs.	medicines and food
	20,000 lbs.	food and medicine
	30,000 lbs.	food and medicine
	35,000 lbs.	food and medicine

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ASSISTANCE - as of February 15, 1976

Relief assistance from International Organizations has been reported to date as follows:

<u>CASH CONTRIBUTIONS</u>		<u>US Dollars</u>
1. ORGANIZATIONS OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) Cash for the purchase of roofing materials, medical supplies and other commodities		\$700,000
2. LEAGUE OF RED CROSS SOCIETIES (LICROSS) Contributions of goods and cash from National Societies		1,500,000
3. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (EEC) Cash donation		250,000
4. PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION (PAHO) Cash donation		50,000
5. UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM		1,180,936
A. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO) Cash donation	100,000	
B. WORLD FOOD PROGRAM (WFP) Food for Work allocation	985,936	
C. UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL CHILDRENS FUND (UNICEF) Cash donation	75,000	
D. UNITED NATIONS DISASTER RELIEF ORGANIZATION (UNDRO) THROUGH UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP)	<u>20,000</u>	
TOTAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS		<u>\$ 3,680,936</u>

OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS

PAN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION 6 ea. packaged disaster hospitals

(Three states, Alabama (through the Alabama Partners - Partner of Guatemala), South Carolina and Oregon have contributed 2 hospitals each.)

VOLUNTARY AGENCY ASSISTANCE as of February 15, 1976

The following is a list of the Volunteer Agencies and information on their activities as currently known:

Baptist World Alliance	Cash	\$2,000
CARE	9 mil. lbs. 5000 95	Title II food blankets first aid kits miscellaneous medicines
Catholic Relief Services - United States Catholic Conference	Cash 16 ½ tons	\$10,000 shelter material, blankets, emergency kits, tools, clothing (additional 30 tons being shipped by air)
Church World Service	4 truck loads 10,000	relief supplies blankets
David Livingston Foundation	specifics unknown	
Food for the Hungry	specifics unknown	
Lutheran World Service	Cash 5,000	\$20,000 blankets
Medical Assistance Program	specifics unknown	
Support for Instituto Evangelico		medical supplies
Salvation Army	1,000 lbs. 1,000 lbs. On Order: 60,000 lbs. \$10,000	powdered milk miscellaneous medical supplies canned food medical supplies
Seventh Day Adventists World Service	40,000 lbs. 2,000 lbs. 3,000 lbs. 5,000 lbs. 200 (have medical team in Tecpan)	food medicine blankets clothing tents

Seventh Day Adventists
World Service (continued)

On Order:

50,000 lbs.	corn
50,000 lbs.	beans
50,000 lbs.	rice
16,000 lbs.	medicine
100 bed	hospital
5,000	blankets
1,000	tents

Working in: Guatemala City
and 4 outlying towns.

Southern Baptist Convention
Foreign Mission Board

cash	\$25,000
270	tents
250	sleeping bags

World Neighbors, Inc.

Support of 23 medical personnel from
U. of Miami in Cooperation with Save
the Children Foundation

World Relief Commission

cash	\$35,000
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World Vision International

cash	\$15,000
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American National Red Cross

cash	\$100,000
3,400	tents
5,000	blankets
1,000	cots
20,000 lbs.	medical supplies
60,000 lbs.	food

On Order:

3,000	tents
6	3/4 ton pickups
5	ambulances

Working in: Zones 3 and 6
Guatemala City and 6
outlying towns

Christian Aid

30,000 lbs.	food
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Help the Aged

10,000	blankets
5,000 lbs.	food

British
Red Cross

22 tons	medicine
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Mormon Mission

\$5,000	food
6,000 lbs.	blankets & tents
500 lbs.	clothing
500 lbs.	medical supplies