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OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

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THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE  
OF  
HENRY A. KISSINGER  
SECRETARY OF STATE

450 EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING

3:38 P.M. EST

Q Dr. Kissinger, who was your recommendation for the Supreme Court?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I wanted to say my recommendation was that it should be somebody who had a mind uncluttered by legal knowledge -- political scientist with a foreign perspective. (Laughter)

Q Have you volunteered?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That was one of the obstacles I had. (Laughter)

Q Can you give us your expectation and not your hope of the chances for an extension of the UN towards a mandate on the Golan Heights issue?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Security Council is meeting today. I don't know whether it has formally met yet but there are intensive consultations. The Secretary General has reported about his trip to the Middle East and I want to take this occasion to pay tribute to his untiring efforts and to his effective role. I think progress is being made and the chances are much better than they looked earlier this week.

There are still one or two problems that have to be ironed out, but I am more optimistic than I was earlier this week.

Q Mr. Kissinger, the President said at his press conference that he hoped the Soviet Union would get the message from this country on the intervention in Angola, a sentiment that you indicated you shared when you were in Detroit. Do you have any sign that they have gotten the message? Have you had any response from them?

MORE

Q Question?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The question is whether the Soviet Union has gotten the message about Angola.

We have not yet had a conclusive reply. We have had a preliminary exchange.

Q Mr. Secretary, I was going to ask you if you feel thoroughly comfortable now with Mr. Moynihan?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have always felt thoroughly comfortable with Mr. Moynihan. I don't know how often I can repeat it. Mr. Moynihan has been a good friend of mine whom I recommended for every diplomatic position he has held in this and in the previous Administration. Give or take an adjective, I have agreed with what he has done and said in New York. It is my responsibility, as Secretary of State, to relate what happens in New York to other aspects of our foreign policy so I inevitably have to think of the broader canvas.

On Ambassador Moynihan's role in New York, I was comfortable with him before, I am comfortable with him now; he was a good friend of mine before, he is a good friend of mine now; he had my full support and he continues to have my full support.

Q Mr. Secretary, in the confirmation hearings you testified the United States played only a minor part in the 1970 election in Chile. Since then we have had the Senate report where Director Helms testified about the September 15, 1970, meeting which you attended where President Nixon ordered the CIA to help stage a military coup to block Allende from taking power.

Now do you think those two statements that the U.S. played a minor role in the events listed in the Senate report can be reconciled?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The essential elements of the report, when all the mass of detail is stripped away from it, are that the President asked that they look into the possibility of a coup and that this was turned off on October 15 and that the group which did it was not the group with which they looked into it. Those are the essential elements, and this is in the report.

If you strip away all the phrases and all this massive documentation, those are the key facts and those are absolutely consistent with what was said.

Q May I follow that up? The CIA was not turned off. Why weren't you supervising the CIA so it did get turned off?

MORE

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I stick by what I have said. What was done on October 22 was not what was done by the CIA.

Q What about all the CIA activities after October 15 when you said they were turned off?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have made the essential point that can be reconciled that is in the report, and beyond that I do not want to go now.

Q Mr. Secretary, back to Angola for a moment. Can you foresee any set of circumstances under which the United States might intervene militarily in Angola?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The United States has no plans to intervene militarily in Angola.

Q That is either by direct or sending military arms there by MAP?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I said the United States cannot be indifferent to what is going on but the United States will not intervene militarily in Angola.

Q Mr. Secretary, on that, some of us at the President's news conference the other night sensed a certain hardening of the U.S. position towards the Soviet Union from this reaction to the question on Angola and also his reaction on a possible Ford-Brezhnev meeting, saying there will be no meeting until progress is made. Is the United States more unhappy now with the Soviet Union because of the Angola situation and has there been a hardening of the U.S. attitude toward Moscow?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have never liked characterizing foreign policy in terms of soft or hard. The United States objects to what the Soviet Union is doing in Angola. The United States believes that the relaxed policy of relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union is essential for our two countries and for the peace of the world. We have seen no viable alternative that anybody has put up to the policy of relaxation of tensions except rhetoric. We will, therefore, pursue it.

We believe that the limitation of strategic arms is essential. We are prepared to modify our position if the Soviet Union is prepared to modify its own and we will make a serious effort to bring about a limitation of strategic arms.

The relationship between us and the Soviet Union must clearly be based on reciprocity. It cannot be done by one country alone. When we take the effort seriously, we will resist unilateral efforts and unilateral measures by the Soviets and we will not make the unilateral concessions in SALT but the basis for a relaxation of tensions exists and we will pursue it with great seriousness of purpose.

MORE

Q Mr. Secretary, what is your view on the alleged help given by South Africa to one of the factions in Angola? Do you see that as seriously as you do the Soviet alleged intervention in Angola?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: To the best of my knowledge, the South Africans are not engaged officially; that is, they are not engaged with their own military forces, but we would prefer all outside forces, all outside intervention to cease.

Q Is each side seemingly ready to change its proposal on SALT, and are you going to Moscow?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are discussing the possibility of a trip to Moscow, and if I go, you can assume that it is on the basis that both sides will modify their position. It does not mean that the modified position necessarily will lead to an agreement but at least we will not be talking on either side on the basis of the old proposals.

Q Mr. Secretary, may I ask one more question on Chile? Were you saying that the CIA was out of control when they shipped three submachine guns by diplomatic pouch?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have said the essence of this, I have said what is in the report. I do not think it is appropriate for me to get into any further questions and I have stated the essence of the issue in relation to your first question.

Q Mr. Secretary, what are the chances of your going to Moscow to discuss SALT in the near future?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The possibility exists.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

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(AT 3:47 P.M. EST)