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THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

HOTEL OKURA

5:25 P.M. (JAPAN TIME)

MR. NESSEN: Ladies and gentlemen, as we promised for the report on today's meeting with the Prime Minister and the President and on the final communique which has been issued, we have Dr. Kissinger. And there is a dinner tonight at the Akasaka Palace which Dr. Kissinger has to go and prepare for, so he would like to stay with you about a maximum of 30 minutes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen, let me sum up the communique, the meeting of the President with the Prime Minister this morning, and the meeting between the Foreign Minister and myself this afternoon because they all cover similar topics.

First of all, let me take this occasion on behalf of everybody on the American delegation to thank the Japanese Government for the excellence of the arrangements, cordiality, the hospitality with which we have been received, and for the meticulousness of the planning.

Secondly, before I get into any of the specifics, I would like to say that perhaps the most important result of the visit--beyond any of the specifics that were discussed--has been the frankness, cordiality and completeness of our exchanges. And the reference in the communique to the fact that this first visit by the incumbent President will add a new page to the history of amity between the two countries was put into practice in the discussions.

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(OVER)

The discussions today concentrated primarily in the morning on an elaboration of the review of the international situation that was begun yesterday which is based on the premise that Japan and the United States must understand each other's purposes and harmonize them in the common interest of the two countries and of world peace.

There was a review of Chinese relationships, Soviet relationships, and indeed a review of the whole world situation. There were discussions of the Middle East. Foreign Minister Kimura told us about his meetings with the Egyptian leaders on his recent trip and we exchanged views as to the prospects of peace in the Middle East. And we believe that there are possibilities for hopeful negotiations.

But there was a general understanding that security in the present age cannot be confined to military matters, but that the cooperation between Japan and the United States in the field of energy, in the field of food, represent a new and positive dimension of the security which must be added to this already established military security--traditional security -- relationship.

There was, as I have pointed out, an exchange of views in which the Japanese told us about developments in the latest exchanges in September on the occasion of the United Nations General Assembly and Japanese and Chinese relationships, and we did the same with respect to U.S.-Chinese relationships.

Of course, as you know, at the request of the President, I am returning here after the trip to Vladivostok and after my visit to Peking to brief the Japanese leaders about those developments.

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We consider the exchanges here to have been of an extraordinarily useful and important character and they lay the basis for a new era of partnership between Japan and the United States.

Now, I will be glad to answer your questions.

Q Mr. Secretary, are you saying that the results of the visit exceeded the expectations of the President, and if so, in what specific ways?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would say that the results of the visit achieved perhaps the optimum of what one had hoped for. We have always attached the greatest importance to the friendship between Japan and the United States.

One can never, in advance of any visit or any exchange of views, predict how intense and how far-ranging the exchange will actually be. But I would say this exchange has been as candid, as frank and as constructive as any I have attended since I have been in Washington and has had the most positive results.

Q Are there any specific results you can cite?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think that the approach that was taken to the question of energy, the question of food, to the realization of the interdependence of the present world economy and world political structure was of very considerable scope.

Q Mr. Secretary, were your meetings with officials other than the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister -- specifically the International Trade Minister and Mr. Ohira -- designed to determine in any way whether Japanese policy would continue as it is regardless of what happened?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The meeting with Finance Minister Ohira and Minister Nakasone were at the request of those two Ministers and they were not initiated by us. They were, however, natural requests. The Finance Minister, as you know, was Foreign Minister until August, and I worked closely with him until that time.

We established a very close working relationship and, of course, the problem of energy and food has implications also for finance.

Minister Nakasone was a student of mine at Harvard and I have never been in Japan without having seen him and it would have been unnatural for me to refuse to see him when he suggested a meeting.

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In other words, the meetings were in no way designed to deal with the Japanese domestic situation or to gain any particular reassurances. We believe the Japanese policy is likely to remain stable.

Peter?

Q Was the Japanese Foreign Minister sanguine about the prospects of a peaceful negotiation in the Middle East?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think the Japanese Foreign Minister ought to speak for himself and he, of course, visited in the Middle East only Cairo.

As far as I am concerned, I don't know if sanguine is exactly the right word. I have indicated that I believe there are possibilities for a step-by-step approach. I recognize that the situation in the Middle East is extremely complicated and that there are many issues involved.

I do believe, however, that with the determination and the good will, there are possibilities for progress in the Middle East and I think the Japanese Foreign Minister should speak for himself, though I did not have the impression that he disagreed with my views.

Q Mr. Secretary, did you seek a specific commitment from the Japanese Government to participate in the financial safety net and, if so, what was the Government's reaction?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We did not go into the detail of every individual measure that I have proposed. We discussed, in general terms, the importance of consumer cooperation along the lines of my speech and of a dialogue that would grow out of this with the producers.

We will have further discussions on the individual measures and on the implementation of the program, but I had the impression that there was a general sympathy to the approach.

Q Mr. Secretary, was there anything in Section 3 of the Communique dealing with nuclear weapons control that should be interpreted as referring to the question of transit of nuclear weapons in Japan?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I discussed that subject yesterday.

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Q I understand, but the Communique did not refer to that.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Not beyond anything I have said since yesterday.

Q As specifically as you can, were any assurances given Japan about pooling of energy resources by the United States should there be another oil squeeze?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I must say, beginning a question as specifically as you have wounds me deeply. It is also against my professorial training.

Q As generally as you would like.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The sharing of oil supplies is part of the emergency program that was ratified last week and that will be formally adopted this week. There were no additional commitments made.

However, the United States has made it clear that it believes that consumer solidarity is an important element in overcoming the difficulties produced by the energy crisis and that it will work closely with the Japanese Government and other interested governments in dealing with this issue on the basis of consumer solidarity and I repeat, I believe we had very fruitful and constructive exchanges on that range of issues.

Q Were there any additional agreements?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There was no discussion on going beyond the emergency program that has just been adopted three or four days ago, so there was no reason to reach any additional agreements.

Q You said the United States is prepared to maintain a stable food supply to Japan. Do you contemplate being able to increase the level of supply to meet the increasing demand in Japan?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let me explain the United States basic approach to the food problem which we reviewed again today in some detail in my meeting with the Foreign Minister, and on which I believe there is a general agreement.

And it is an approach that got overshadowed by the debate on food aid. The United States believes that the basic problem of world food supply requires some structural adjustment. There is now in the underdeveloped countries a food shortage of about 25 million tons which will increase, may increase, to as much as 85 million tons over a decade.

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We, therefore, believe that it is important to increase agricultural production in the underdeveloped countries and to provide food reserves to cushion against emergencies.

In both of these efforts, we believe that the Japanese Government will cooperate with us, especially with respect to the underdeveloped countries which is a problem of technology. And we will have some exchanges on that subjects

To the degree that food production rises in those countries, more food supplies will also become available in the United States. To answer your question specifically, we will give special attention to the needs of Japan. We will, in planning our own export, also try to do this on a more long-term basis than has been the case in the past and we will have intense consultations with Japan on what can be done to assure their needs.

Q Mr. Secretary, Japanese officials were basically sympathetic to your oil proposal. What have they learned since last Friday when they were basically unsympathetic?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I was not here last Friday so I don't know what they said last Friday. I can only say what they said this week.

Q Mr. Secretary, have you had any requests for a meeting by either Mr. Fukuda or Mr. Miki, and in particular, Mr. Shina? If so, have you met them, or have you talked with them any other way?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have not had a request for a meeting. I have run into Mr. Fukuda at social functions as I have also with Mr. Miki, but just to exchange a few words and neither of them requested a meeting.

Q Were there any discussions on Korea?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There was just a very brief discussion about the relationship between Korean security and the security of Japan, but there was no detailed, further discussions.

Helen?

Q Do you have any plans to see Le Duc Tho in Peking?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No.

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Q When you are traveling there?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No.

Q In Moscow?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have no plans to see Le Duc Tho anywhere.

Q Never?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Never is a very long time, but I have no plans to see Le Duc Tho on his current trip, which I understand is to last two weeks. I read that in the newspapers. But I have no plans to meet Le Duc Tho.

Q Mr. Secretary, the President seems to spend a lot of his time in ceremonial activities here. Wasn't it an unusual sort of program?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think the President spent a considerable amount of time on the bilateral talks. In addition, he spent some time on ceremonial activities which, as I explained before we came here, constitute an important element in the symbolism of the relationship and in the mood which is such an important attribute in which decisions tend to be made in this country.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you tell us why Mr. Rumsfeld is accompanying you to China?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: When we were flying across the Pacific, Mr. Rumsfeld suggested that maybe on my next trip to China I would take him along. I then said, "Well, as long as you are here this time, why don't we see whether we can still arrange it?"

I asked the President what he thought about it and the President thought it would be a good idea if his Chief of Staff had some exposure to China. The explanation is as simple as this: It was an off-the-cuff idea that occurred to us as we were crossing the Pacific. I believe it will be helpful to have the President's Chief of Staff have some exposure to China but it has no profound significance beyond this.

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Q On the nuclear issue, what kind of further understandings came out between you and the President and the Japanese leaders?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I mentioned yesterday the discussions and, of course, there are always discussions within the framework -- the mutual security treaty that permits issues to be raised -- and, as I have said, we will take into account the very special sensitivities of the Japanese people with respect to nuclear weapons.

Q Mr. Secretary, did you talk about U.S. and Japan's general approach to Siberian development planning?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Japanese side explained to us the general approach to Siberian development planning. We are in no position to make any judgments until the trade bill and the export-import bank bill have been passed by our Congress. And therefore we will have to defer any decision and consideration of these issues until that time.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in your discussions with Japanese officials and former officials, have you made any inquiries into the state of Japanese domestic politics?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I haven't made any inquiries into the state of Japanese domestic politics. It is impossible to have lunch with press people without being told certain things, but you must be as familiar with those as I am.

Q Mr. Secretary, the answer that the President gave in Phoenix on the subject of the PLO was a bit confusing. At one point he referred to the desirability of Israel negotiating with the parties, and another time he was saying negotiations among nations. Could you say whether the United States favors negotiations with Israel and the PLO?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think I went into that issue in detail at my press conference on Friday before we left Washington. I made clear then that the United States is not urging anybody to negotiate with anybody else, and any negotiation is, of course, up to the parties concerned. And it is our understanding that Israel has refused to negotiate with the PLO.

Q What was meant when the President said today at the Press Club, "We will not compete with our friends for their markets or for their resources." Is there a carving up of sections of the world into Japanese markets and into American markets?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think what the President had in mind is we do not look at our relationship with Japan in terms of competition but that the relationship between the industrial nations and especially between Japan and the United States in the Pacific area should be on the basis of cooperation, and that in an expanding world economy, there is sufficient place for both of us.

There is no carving up of markets that was discussed or is contemplated.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you think the next time an American President visits Japan, visits Tokyo, he could do it without having 25,000 police mobilized for his visit?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, the security arrangements for the visit of any President are, of course, up to the host government, and it is natural that they would tend to over-insure his safety.

Q Dr. Kissinger, I would like to say further, your statement yesterday about the United States position on industrial oil consumers and their cooperation seems milder than the tone of your speech in Chicago just before you left.

Is that a correct interpretation, and if so, has the position softened as a result of talks with the Japanese?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Our position is unchanged. Our position is that the industrial oil consumers have to cooperate and establish some basic principles before there can be a productive dialogue with the producers. This position has not softened. It is not a position of confrontation either, because we believe that the ultimate solution must be found on a cooperative basis.

In developing cooperation among the consumers, obviously consideration has to be given to the special circumstances of individual countries in applying these various measures that were proposed. This is what I intended to point out yesterday. But the position remains as I outlined it on Thursday.

Q Mr. Secretary, there has been renewed speculation -- I know you answered this last Friday -- but there has been renewed speculation that the fact that you and the President are meeting Mr. Brezhnev in Vladivostok has been a source of irritation in Peking. Is there any substance to that?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have had no indication whatever from Peking directly or indirectly through any sources that have reached us that it is a source of irritation to Peking. I repeat, we have had opportunity to obtain Peking's views.

Q Mr. Secretary, on your Chicago speech, you said you had the impression the Japanese Government was sympathetic to the approach spelled out in that speech. When do you anticipate seeing some concrete evidence of that?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe that over the next month concrete exchanges will begin on the implementation of these ideas with various consuming countries and I think that my statement will then be proved correct.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in view of the Japanese expression yesterday of their difficulty with reducing their energy consumption by the standards you outlined in Chicago, did you give them any refinement, especially for Japan to think about over the next month or so?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think it is very important to separate two things -- the basic approach and individual technical applications of it on a Presidential trip with the relatively limited amount of time that is available.

The conversations have to concentrate on the basic approach. They cannot go into the details of all the technical matters.

Secondly, as I pointed out yesterday, we did not say consumption had to be reduced by 10 percent in every country. We said that over a period of ten years, imports should be kept level by the whole group on the basis of consumption restraints and the development of new sources of energy.

The precise apportionment within the group of either consumption restraints or the bringing into being of new sources of energy has to be discussed.

I would like to remind you the same problems existed when the emergency sharing program was first proposed last February and it took about three or four months to work out all the details. This is a technically highly complex issue, but we are on the whole encouraged by the talks that took place here.

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Q Mr. Secretary, how does the President feel about his first big foreign trip?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think he feels extremely good about it.

Q Did he talk to you about it and say why?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: He talked to me about it in the two minutes from the South Wing of the Okura to the main building and, therefore, I don't think he could give me all the refinements of his judgement in that period.

Q Mr. Secretary, now that we are going to leave Japan and go to Korea, can you tell us whether the President is going to express any degree of dissatisfaction with the degree of political oppression in South Korea?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have stated the importance that we attach to the security of South Korea. We have also, I believe, made clear our general view with respect to the form of domestic conduct we prefer but I do not want to predict now what the President will discuss in his private talks with President Park.

Q Mr. Secretary, there has been considerable talk in the Defense Department over the last few years about reducing the size of U.S. troops in South Korea. Are we about to do that now, has the decision been made to do that? Is that why you are going to Korea?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are not going to South Korea in order to discuss--much less to announce any reduction of forces. We are going to South Korea for the reason that I indicated before. It is an ally. It is a country whose security is important not only to the United States but also to Japan and it would have created all the wrong impressions for the President to be in Japan and not pay the visit over such a short distance to Korea.

Q Mr. Secretary, did the President and Tanaka discuss the implications of the India nuclear explosion?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Not in my presence, and I was present at all the meetings.

Q Dr. Kissinger, I believe you did not answer the last question, which was: Are we going to reduce the troops in South Korea?

Your answer was, "We are not going to discuss, much less announce it."

But are we going to reduce?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: I know of no plans. There are no plans to reduce troops in Korea.

I will take two more questions.

Q Mr. Secretary, is it your understanding that Israel is refusing to negotiate with PLO, Palestinians in general, or only those Palestinians who want a separate Palestinian state?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I haven't had an opportunity to learn all the refinements of the Israeli position on that point. My understanding is that they will not negotiate with the PLO and I am not familiar with any other group that labels itself Palestinian that has come forward as a candidate for negotiations.

Last question.

Q Have you received any explanation why the Japanese Parliament hasn't yet been presented with a bill to ratify the nuclear non-proliferation treat and are you satisfied with the explanations?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Since we have not received such an explanation on this trip, I can't, obviously, express any satisfaction or dissatisfaction with it. The United States favors the ratification of the non-proliferation treat.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END (AT 5:08 P.M. Japan Time)