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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9/20

1: P. M.

Mike,

This Statement, completed
this morning by the Republican
Policy Committee, documents
the Costs of Carter's Programs.

They would reach \$ 706.1 Billion
in 4 years of additional
Federal spending - a 50% increase.

The Rep. Policy Committee is
planning a Press Conference
tomorrow A.M. to release
this. - Stet Halper





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EMPTY PROMISES OR EMPTY POCKETS?

Jimmy Carter is playing the old shell game with the American people this year. His Platform is a cynical and deceptive array of peanut shells, and the voters are supposed to guess which ones contain real pledges and which ones merely cover empty promises,

The Carter campaign has denied Republican charges that just 5 of Carter's programs would add \$100 billion and all of them over \$200 billion to the annual cost of the federal government. They challenged Republicans to prove their charges.

The Republican Policy Committee analysis (see attached chart) shows that the total would, in fact, be far higher -- over \$217.2 billion a year in additional federal spending by 1980 and over \$706.1 billion for four years -- a 50 percent increase in federal spending.

Many of Carter's pledges are vague, unspecific or confusing. Why? Because if Carter dared to spell out precisely what he meant, he would have to admit either that his were hollow promises or that his program would cost almost a trillion dollars for four years...and that's not peanuts!

Republicans know, the American people know and Carter himself knows that this kind of spending is wildly impossible and irresponsible. Personal and corporate income taxes this year will run about \$203 billion -- Carter's programs would mean almost doubling taxes. Everyone would have to pay a lot more, not just those with incomes above \$14,700 as Carter recently suggested. If he did not raise taxes to pay for these programs, the alternative would be unprecedented and staggering inflation, the least equitable tax of all.

That is why we don't think the pledges and promises made by Candidate Carter and his platform would be kept by President Carter. This calculated deceit of the Carter Platform arouses false hopes from individuals and groups duped into believing they would benefit from new or expanded programs. We saw in the 1960's how destructive and demoralizing it is to raise people's expectations and then not deliver. Carter's Platform promises to repeat this sad cycle.

If Carter disagrees with our analysis, we ask him to explain to the voters exactly what he does mean. Shell games are for carnivals, not for the 1976 presidential election. The American people deserve a straight answer on this important question.

President Ford and Senator Dole stand on the Republican Platform -- does Carter support his? The Republican Policy Committee hopes this analysis will prompt an honest and candid response from Carter -- not more evasion, deceit or empty rhetoric.

The Carter campaign has denied Republican charges that just 5 of Carter's programs would add \$100 billion and all of them over \$200 billion to the annual cost of the federal government. They challenged Republicans to prove their charges. The Republican Policy Committee's analysis (see attached chart) shows that the total would, in fact, be far higher -- over \$217.2 billion a year in additional federal spending by 1980 and over \$200.1 billion for four years -- a 50 percent increase in federal spending. Many of Carter's pledges are vague, unspecified or overstating. Why? Because if Carter dared to spell out precisely what he meant, he would have to admit either that his were hollow promises or that his programs would cost almost a trillion dollars for four years... and that's

not possible. Republicans know the American people know and Carter himself knows that this kind of spending is wildly impossible and irresponsible. Personal and corporate income taxes this year will run about \$203 billion -- Carter's programs would mean almost doubling taxes. Everyone would have to pay a lot more, not just those with incomes above \$16,700 as Carter recently suggested. If he did not raise taxes to pay for these programs, the alternative would be unprecedented and staggering inflation, the least equitable tax of all. That is why we don't think the pledges and promises made by Candidate Carter and his platform would be kept by President Carter. This calculated deceit of the Carter Platform arouses false hopes from individuals and groups duped into believing they would benefit from new or expanded programs. We saw in the 1960's how destructive and demoralizing it is to raise people's expectations and then not deliver. Carter's Platform promises to repeat this sad cycle. If Carter disagrees with our analysis, we ask him to explain to the voters exactly what he does mean. Shell games are for carnivals, not for the 1976 presidential election. The American people deserve a straight answer on this important question.

Additional Federal Costs of Democratic/Carter Platform

Proposal	1980 one-year estimate			1977-80 four-year estimate		
	LOW	MID	HIGH	LOW	MID	HIGH
	(billions)			(billions)		
1. HUMPHREY-HAWKINS:	\$12.1	\$21.8	\$31.5	\$29.9	\$56.5	\$83.2
2. COUNTERCYCLICAL AID:	0.5	1.0	1.5	2.0	4.0	6.0
3. PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT:	1.0	2.5	3.6	11.0	13.7	18.9
4. PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS:	1.5	1.5	1.5	6.2	6.2	6.2
5. DIRECT STIMULUS TO PRIVATE SECTOR:	1.65	1.65	1.65	6.6	6.6	6.6
6. NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE:	88.7	101.6	114.6	314.1	342.5	370.9
7. WELFARE REFORM:	12.3	18.9	25.6	44.4	70.8	97.3
8. FEDERAL TAKEOVER OF STATE LOCAL WELFARE COSTS:	4.1	5.2	6.4	14.68	18.71	22.94
9. TITLE I, ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT full funding:	.25	1.175	2.1	1.0	4.7	8.4
10. CHILD DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS:	7.1	14.2	25.10	13.4	26.6	47.0
11. EDUCATIONAL FINANCE EQUALIZATION:	11.0	22.0	27.88	38.35	76.7	85.28
12. TAX BENEFIT FOR THE EDUCATION OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY PUPILS:	.6	.9	1.2	2.4	3.6	4.8
13. EXPANDED VOCATIONAL EDUCATION:	.7	.8	.9	1.7	2.0	2.4
14. COST OF EDUCATION PAYMENTS TO HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS:	.75	1.0	1.25	3.0	4.0	5.0
15. VOTER REGISTRATION:	.05	.225	.500	.2	.9	2.0
16. INCREASING SOCIAL SERVICES TO KEEP PACE WITH INFLATION:	1.4	1.5	1.7	4.1	4.5	4.9
17. LIBERALIZATION OF ALLOWABLE EARNINGS LIMITATION UNDER SOCIAL SECURITY:	1.8	4.6	5.8	7.2	18.4	23.2
18. VA EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE - 2 years	0	0	0	.9	.9	.9
19. INDEX REVENUE SHARING TO INFLATION:	1.4	1.7	2.0	3.4	4.2	5.0
20. CHANGE REVENUE SHARING FORMULA	6.7	.9	1.25	2.7	3.6	4.5
21. SUBSIDIES OF LOANS FOR LOW & MODERATE INCOME HOUSING CONSTRUCTION:	1.5	5.5	3.0	6.0	10.9	12.0
22. EXPAND HOUSING SUBSIDIES FOR THE ELDERLY:	.1	.2	.3	.4	.8	1.2

Proposal	1980 one-year estimate			1977-80 four-year estimate		
	LOW	MID (billions)	HIGH	LOW	MID (billions)	HIGH
23. STEADY FLOW OF HOUSING CREDIT:	.06	.13	.19	.3	.5	.8
24. UPGRADING SECONDARY ROADS & BRIDGES:	.8	1.6	2.4	1.6	3.3	4.9
25. FULL FUNDING OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT ACT:	.4	.6	.8	1.5	2.1	2.9
26. INCREASED FEDERAL FUNDING FOR ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT:	.6	1.3	1.6	.8	1.6	2.3
27. FARM PRICE SUPPORT PROGRAMS:	4.4	4.9	6.2	16.4	17.8	20.6
29.- 74.	?	?	?	?	?	?
TOTAL:	\$161.5+	\$217.2+	\$270.5+	\$534.2+	\$706.1+	\$850.1+

1. HUMPHREY-HAWKINS BILL

The Congressional Budget Office prepared an economic analysis of the Humphrey-Hawkins bill, H.R. 50, "The Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1976." (May 21, 1976.) Using a variety of economic and policy assumptions, this analysis indicated that although the initial net cost (allowing for reduced unemployment compensation payments and increased tax revenues) would run between \$12.1 and \$31.5 billion, the net cost of the program after 12 months of operation would taper off to between \$7 and \$19.9 billion and after 24 months to between \$5.4 and \$15.9 billion. Estimating the four year cost can be done two ways. Using the initial cost figure (\$12.1 to \$31.5 billion) to represent achievement of 3 percent unemployment by 1980, assume a linear progression toward that goal at a 25% rate annually, i.e. one-fourth the full program in the first year (\$3 to \$7.8 billion), one-half the second year and three-fourths the third year. The total four year net cost under this method of estimating would range between \$30 and \$78.5 billion. An alternative would be to compute the initial cost, the 12-month figure, the 24-month figure and assume that the fourth year would approximate the 24-month figure as well. This yields a range of net cost between \$29.9 and \$83.2 billion. As CBO further indicates, "inflation that occurs between 1976 and 1980 could increase these costs." These estimates are based on 1976 dollars.

The range of estimates for each period depends on displacement and inclusion or exclusion of teenagers over age 18 in the program. Public employment programs often displace some workers who had previously been employed, perhaps in lower-paying private-sector jobs, or by simply rehiring with federal funds persons who had been previously paid with state or local funds. CBO low-end cost estimates were based on an assumption of zero displacement, while high-end estimates assumed a 40 percent displacement rate. Higher displacement would mean even higher costs.

2. COUNTERCYCLICAL AID TO CITIES

Many ambitious countercyclical aid proposals were circulated in Congress in the wake of the New York City fiscal crisis. The concept -- giving no-strings-attached federal grants to states and cities -- found its way into a job creation bill, S. 3201 (now P.L. 94-369) as Title II. Congress overrode the veto of this legislation and, pending appropriations, distribution of countercyclical funds is scheduled to begin in the fall of 1976.

Originally proposed as an annual \$2 billion program, the enacted version was pegged at \$1.25 for the first five quarters. However, the first (July, 1976) quarter payment will total somewhat over \$300 million.

Although the Democratic Platform endorses the countercyclical aid concept without specifying a funding level, Jimmy Carter in his presentation to the Democratic Platform Committee stated that "\$2 billion of countercyclical assistance...is essential and affordable."

Estimating added countercyclical aid costs depends on future rates of unemployment. Assuming the present program at \$1 billion annually, Carter's \$2 billion proposal means an added \$1 billion per year. Higher or lower unemployment rates affecting the current program would raise or lower this one-year estimate. The four-year estimate would similarly be affected by the extent and duration of 6% or higher unemployment rates.

3. PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT

The Democratic Platform states that "consistent and coherent economic policy requires federal anti-recession grant programs...accompanied by public employment.... In each case, the programs should be phased in automatically when unemployment rises and phased out as it declines." In Carter's presentation to the Democratic Platform Committee he was more specific:

"we should provide 800,000 summer youth jobs and double the CETA program from 300,000 to 600,000 jobs."

In February, 1976, the House of Representatives, under Democratic leadership, passed the "Emergency Employment Projects Amendments of 1976," H.R. 11453. This legislation would have increased Title II and VI CETA public employment jobs from 320,000 to 600,000. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that additional costs, over existing programs, would run about \$4.373 billion for Fiscal 1977, assuming an average annual cost of \$7289 per job created. The Education and Labor Committee disagreed with this estimate and predicted that the average man-year cost of a public service job under the bill would be \$8500, or an overall cost of \$5.1 billion.

This legislation was side-tracked in the Senate, however, and H.R. 12987, a stop-gap measure continuing the CETA public employment programs due to run out during the Fiscal 1976-77 transition quarter, was enacted instead. The net cost of the Senate version of H.R. 12987 was estimated by the Congressional Budget Office to be \$1.543 billion in Fiscal 1977. The final conference version of the legislation will be an estimated \$2.5 billion.

President Ford, by contrast, had requested a \$1.5 billion measure that provided for phasing out Title VI of this program in Fiscal 1977.



Since the Carter and Democratic Platform proposals range from the program favored by the House Democratic leadership to the final version of H.R. 12987, an estimate range is derived by assuming that President Ford would provide \$1.5 billion in Fiscal 1977 for Title VI during its phase-out period and nothing thereafter while assuming that a Carter administration would go for the \$5.1 billion program, the \$2.5 billion program or a figure inbetween, probably depending on prevailing unemployment rates. This computation yields a Fiscal 1977 net estimate of between \$1 billion for the added cost of H.R. 12987 over the President's request to \$3.6 billion for the added cost of H.R. 11453 over the President's request. Assuming that inflation increases would cancel out any savings from lower program levels due to reduced unemployment, a four-year range falls between \$11 billion and \$18.9 billion.

All the above estimates allow for the potential savings to be realized from unemployment compensation reductions and increased tax revenues. Regarding summer jobs, it should be noted that since 880,000 summer jobs were funded this year, 80,000 more than Carter recommended, a small savings would be obtained.

4. PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS

The Democratic Platform calls for "public works projects" as a part of a "consistent and coherent economic policy." Carter, in his testimony before the Democratic Platform Committee elaborated:

"creation of meaningful and productive public needs jobs as a supplement to the private sector, including jobs for unmet needs in areas such as housing rehabilitation and repairing our railroad railbeds."

A major public works-jobs initiative by the Congressional Democratic Leadership, H.R. 5247, the "Public Works Employment Act" was enacted in January 1976. When it was vetoed by President Ford, Congress responded with a second similar but scaled down bill, S. 3201, which became law despite a second veto. Were it not for having a Republican President in the White House, the first measure would now stand as public law, and with a Democratic President, the total cost might have been even higher than H.R. 5247.

H.R. 5247 carried a \$6.2 billion authorization which would have resulted in a Fiscal 1977 spending increase of about \$2.5 billion, over \$1 billion in Fiscal 1978 and another \$1.5 billion in Fiscal 1979 and beyond.

5. DIRECT STIMULUS TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR

The Democratic Congress enacted the "Emergency Employment Appropriations Act, 1976," H.R. 4481, in an ill-advised effort to stimulate the economy through increased deficit spending. Typical of "direct stimulus" proposals, this measure weighed in at some \$3.3 billion over the amount requested by President Ford, and would have required expenditures of about half this amount in Fiscal 1976 and the remainder in Fiscal 1977 and subsequent years, despite the fact that unemployment percentages were already trending downward. Several items in the bill were for increased spending levels for existing programs; their effect would be to lock in higher costs for these programs in future years. Assuming that a Democratic Congress unimpeded by a Republican President would enact a program of at least this magnitude, a \$1.65 billion annual figure stands as a reasonable estimate.

6. NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE

Both the Democratic Platform and Jimmy Carter's presentation to the Democratic Platform Committee call for a comprehensive national health insurance system with "universal and mandatory" coverage, financed by a combination of employer-employee shared payroll taxes and general tax revenues.

The most serious legislative proposal to provide this form of health insurance is H.R. 21, the Kennedy-Corman bill. Federal spending for the first year of this program has been estimated at \$70 billion by the Rand Corporation (May, 1976). However, this cost will be offset by a savings of \$4 billion through elimination of present tax expenditure items. The net cost during the first year of the program's operation is therefore estimated at about \$66 billion. This approximates the estimates made by the Congressional Budget Office.

Projecting the cost of national health insurance, the Congressional Budget Office in its March 15, 1976, Budget Options for Fiscal Year 1977 report discussed the impact of various options. For a tax-financed comprehensive national health plan, it calculated the following range of estimates (which vary depending on assumptions regarding the effectiveness of cost controls):

FY		billions
1977	-----	\$114.0 - \$116.5
1978	-----	\$125.4 - \$135.4
1979	-----	\$138.3 - \$156.7
1980	-----	\$151.4 - \$177.3
1981	-----	\$164.7 - \$200.1

CBO estimated continuation of programs which health insurance would replace during the same period to cost:

FY	billions
1977 -----	\$45.0
1978 -----	\$50.8
1979 -----	\$56.5
1980 -----	\$62.7
1981 -----	\$69.3

By contrast, President Ford's budget proposed curtailing growth in federal health expenditures by program consolidation and limiting reimbursable physician and hospital costs, while adding protection against catastrophic health costs and placing a ceiling on beneficiary cost-sharing for medicare services. The Ford proposal would have saved \$3.3 billion in Fiscal 1977, reducing the total to \$41.7 billion. Figures are not available for anticipated savings through Fiscal 1981 but they would yield a program somewhat less costly than the present one.

By subtracting the projected cost of present programs from the anticipated costs of a tax-financed comprehensive national health insurance program, it is possible to get an idea of the added costs of Carter's platform proposal:

FY	billions
1977 -----	\$69.9 - \$71.5
1978 -----	\$74.6 - \$84.6
1979 -----	\$81.8 - \$100.2
1980 -----	\$88.7 - \$114.6
1981 -----	\$95.4 - \$130.8

Total added cost over the 1977-1980 four-year period would be between \$314.1 and \$370.9 billion.

7. WELFARE REFORM

According to the Democratic Platform, "Fundamental welfare reform is necessary. ...We should move toward replacement of our existing...system with a simplified system of income maintenance, substantially financed by the federal government." Both the Platform and Carter's testimony to the Platform committee emphasize the need for a work requirement.

The proposal developed by former Congresswoman Griffiths (D-Mich.) stands as the most seriously considered welfare reform proposal of the type Carter describes. The Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress estimates that the Griffiths bill will cost, in addition to the \$11.2 billion currently being spent on welfare programs (1976 figure), an additional \$1.5 billion in outlays and \$8.4 billion in lost tax revenues, for a total cost of \$9.9 billion over present welfare costs.

The Congressional Budget Office in their March 15, 1976 report on Budget Options, estimated that,

"If the (Griffiths) system were initiated in 1978 and cash allowances were raised to keep pace with inflation, the first year cash allowance outlays would be \$2.3 billion less than levels needed to maintain current policy in the programs which the cash allowance would replace -- AFDC and food stamps. However, the tax credit would reduce 1978 revenues and generate outlays estimated at \$25.4 billion. Estimated costs do not assume an extension of the present earned income tax credit. The net effect...would be to raise federal outlays for income assistance for the lower-income population by \$23.1 billion in 1977 and \$26.4 billion by 1981."

In contrast, President Ford has proposed several cost-saving measures for welfare programs which would reduce program costs below the current policy level by \$4.9 billion in fiscal year 1977. Computing the cost of the Griffiths proposal over present policy, however, yields the following estimates if the Library of Congress estimate is used as the low figure, the CBO estimate as the high figure, and the average of the two as the middle figure:

FY	Low	Medium (billions)	High
1977	\$ 9.9	\$16.5	\$23.1
1978	10.7	17.3	23.9
1979	11.5	18.1	24.7
1980	12.3	18.9	25.6
Total	\$44.4	\$70.8	\$97.3

8. REDUCING STATE AND LOCAL SHARE OF WELFARE COSTS

Carter, testifying before the Platform Committee, stated that, "The welfare burden should be removed from cities, with all welfare costs being paid by the federal and state governments."

The Democratic Platform elaborated, "...Local governments should no longer be required to bear the burden of welfare costs...there should be a phased reduction in the states' share of welfare costs.

Using HEW's most recent (1975) figures, a 75 percent federal government assumption of state and local contributions for AFDC, SSI and Social Services would amount to \$4.38 billion, in addition to the \$10.7 billion in federal funds already being spent. A 75 percent takeover of just AFDC contributions would run some \$2.8 billion over the present federal share of \$4.5 billion.

Four-year estimates were not available. However, it is clear that inflation, increased welfare rolls and whatever higher welfare costs are involved in a welfare reform program would push the estimates up significantly. If more than 75 percent federal takeover were contemplated, this too would increase federal costs.

CMB calculates that under current policy, AFDC costs would increase during the next five years at about seven percent annually while SSI would go up annually at a rate between eight and eleven percent. Ignoring the increases that would be attributable to a costly welfare reform program, figuring an annual growth rate of eight percent and working from the 1975 figures, the following estimates are derived:

FY	low ¹	medium (billions)	high ²
1977	\$ 3.26	\$ 4.18	\$ 5.10
1978	3.52	4.51	5.50
1979	3.80	4.87	5.94
1980	4.10	5.25	6.40
Total	\$14.68	\$18.71	\$22.94

¹AFDC only
²AFDC, SSI and Social Services

9. TITLE I, ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT

The Democratic Platform states that,

"We should strengthen federal support of existing programs that stress improvement of reading and math skills. Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act must reach those it is intended to benefit to effectively increase these primary skills. 'Break-throughs' in compensatory education require a concentration of resources..."

Democrats in Congress have repeatedly sought full funding of Title I, ESEA, i.e. appropriating fully as much as the Act authorizes. Since the FY 1977 authorization is \$4.39 billion and the appropriations will be \$2.28, full funding would require an additional \$2.1 billion in Fiscal 1977 (high estimate). The Congressional Budget Office's July 15, 1976 report on Budget Options indicates that "increasing the share of federal resources devoted to services for inadequately served populations could add \$250 million to Title I" (low estimate). Choosing a course of increased funding mid-way between full funding, the goal of the education lobby, and the CBO's budget option yields a figure of \$1.175 billion. Assuming that inflationary pressure will push up present expenditure rates as well as Carter increases between 1977 and 1980, the four-year estimate is simply a multiplication of the 1977 one-year estimate.

10. DEVELOPMENTAL AND EDUCATIONAL CHILD CARE PROGRAMS

The Democratic Platform calls for, "federally financed, family centered developmental and educational child care programs -- operated by the public schools or other local organizations, including both private and community -- and that they be available to all who need and desire them."

Carter's presentation to the Platform similarly called for "adequate child care for all

parents who desire to use it," and for "high quality, accessible child care facilities so that mothers who wish to work can do so."

The leading proposal to develop the kind of program described by the Democratic Platform is the one developed by Senator Mondale, the Vice-Presidential nominee, and Rep. Brademas, S.626/H.R. 2966, "The Child and Family Services Act." This would create a new federal program.

This legislation contains a deceptively low initial authorization level sufficient only to allow for an initial planning phase and a gradual start-up of this massive new program -- just \$1.85 billion for a three-year period. However, the program structured under this Act, if fully implemented, would be vastly more costly after the initial start-up period. Most of those who have sponsored the bill and have testified before House and Senate Subcommittees on it have emphasized its child care or child development aspects, and it is fair to say that they hope the program would make available reasonably high quality child care services to those who want or need them.

The Executive Director of the Child Welfare League testified, for example, that, "appropriations needed to provide decent child care for the segments of the child population most at risk is...\$14.243 billion per year. Costs for purely custodial care,...would be about half that amount."

His estimates were based on the following assumptions:

	Amount
"latchkey" children needing care:	
10,000 under age six.....\$26,000,000 (\$2,600 per child per year)	
842,000 school age.....\$1.094 billion (\$1300 per child per year)	\$1.120 billion
<u>184,000</u> children looked after by caretaker while at work:	
65,000 preschool.....	\$169 million
119,000 school age.....	\$154 million.....\$1.323 billion
<u>4,925,000</u> preschool children requiring care whose parents are in work force.....	\$12.8 billion
TOTAL	\$14.243 billion

(Joint Hearings of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, U.S. Senate and the Subcommittee on Select Education and Labor, U.S. House of Representatives, on S. 626 and H.R. 2966, on February 21, 1975, page 210.)

The Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress attempted to cost out a fully-implemented Brademas-Mondale child development/child care program and arrived at a \$25.1 billion figure, making the following assumptions:

- Children Under 1 Year -- 3,081,000; assume a 5 percent participation rate and a cost per child of \$3,000.
Cost = \$462,150,000.
- Age 1 -- 2,999,000; assume a 10 percent participation rate and a cost per child of \$3,000.
Cost = \$899,700,000.
- Age 2 -- 3,014,000; assume a 20 percent participation rate and a cost per child of \$2,700.
Cost = \$1,657,700,000.
- Age 3 -- 3,225,000; assume a 50 percent participation rate and a cost per child of \$2,500.
Cost = \$4,031,250,000.
- Age 4 -- 3,577,000; assume a 50 percent participation rate and a cost per child of \$2,500.
Cost = \$4,471,250,000.
- Age 5 -- 3,493,000; assume a 50 percent participation rate and a cost per child of \$1,700.
Cost = \$2,969,050,000.



continued on next page

Ages 6 through 12 -- 25,824,000; assume a 50 percent participation rate and a cost per child of \$900.
Cost = \$11,620,800,000.

Ages 13 and 14 -- 8,434,000; assume a 30 percent participation rate and a cost per child of \$800.
Cost = \$2,024,160,000.

High though this estimate may seem, the Library points out that the bill does not limit eligibility for services and that the costs per child were mid-range estimates based on amounts currently deemed necessary by experts for "adequate" or "good" child care.

Assuming that Carter would fully implement the program described in the platform, estimates are made based on the Library of Congress figure for the high-range, the Child Welfare League figure for the mid-range, and half the Child Welfare League figure for the low-range. It is also assumed that the program will begin at a very modest level and then double each year to reach full program levels by 1980.

FY	low	medium (billions)	high
1977	\$.9	\$ 1.75	\$ 3.13
1978	1.8	3.55	6.27
1979	3.6	7.10	12.55
1980	7.1	14.20	25.10
Total	\$13.4	\$26.60	\$47.05

11. EDUCATIONAL FINANCE EQUALIZATION

The Democrats indicate that they want to,

"guarantee that jurisdictions of differing financial capacity can spend equal amounts on education....With increased federal funds, it is possible to enhance educational opportunity by eliminating spending disparities within state borders."

In Congress, several bills have been proposed by Democratic leaders to achieve this "equalization" of educational finances via infusions of federal funds.

H.R. 16 was introduced by Rep. Perkins, Democratic Chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee. Under this proposal, Title I Basic Grants to States would be between \$4.1 and \$4.5 billion based on a 41.1 million school enrollment figure for the 1978-79 school year base figure. Title II Equalization Grants would run between \$21.1 and \$23.3 billion. The range in both cases depends on whether or not private school enrollment were compensated. The grand total for this bill, therefore, would be between \$26.2 and \$27.8 billion by 1980.

H.R. 16 - Educational Finance Equalization (billions)

	Title I - basic grants	Title II equalization Grants	Total	
1977	public only	\$4.33	\$8.83	\$13.16
	public & private	4.77	9.74	\$14.51
1978	public only	\$4.30	\$13.16	\$17.46
	public & private	4.74	14.49	\$19.23
1979	public only	\$4.23	\$17.27	\$21.50
	public & private	4.66	19.00	\$23.66
1980	public only	\$4.16	\$21.19	\$25.35
	public & private	4.57	23.31	\$27.88
TOTAL	public only	\$17.02	\$60.45	\$77.47
	public & private	18.74	66.54	\$85.28

This proposal presses the limits of what an unrestrained Democratic Congress prodded by a Democratic President might seek for an educational finance program and therefore constitutes a

high-range estimate.

For a mid-range estimate, H.R. 10145, another Perkins bill, was used. This measure provides for a federal grant to all States for each fiscal year equal to one-third of the aggregate current expenditures in all States for the second fiscal year preceding such fiscal year which were derived from State or local sources. The costs of this program will be approximately \$16.6 billion for Fiscal 1977, \$18.1 billion for 1978, \$20 billion for FY 1979 and \$22 billion for FY 1980.

For a low-range estimate, assume that a program is enacted amounting to only one-sixth the aggregate current expenditures, i.e. one-half the amounts specified in H.R. 10145.

12. TAX AID FOR THE EDUCATION OF ALL PUPILS

The Democratic Platform supports "a constitutionally acceptable method of providing tax aid for the education of all pupils in non-segregated schools in order to insure parental freedom in choosing the best education for their children."

Dozens of bills have been introduced in Congress on this subject. Assuming eligible private school enrollment of between five and six million and an average tax benefit of \$150 per year -- a threshold amount necessary to have any meaningful impact on parents' ability to afford private education -- the revenue cost would be \$900,000,000. A \$200 tax benefit would mean a revenue cost of \$1.2 billion annually (high estimate) while a \$100 tax benefit would reduce revenues by \$.6 billion (low estimate). For four-year estimates, it is assumed that enrollments will hold steady, although were such a tax benefit to be enacted it might well have the effect of stimulating increased private school enrollments.

13. EXPANDED VOCATIONAL EDUCATION

The Democratic Platform favors expanding federal support in various areas of educational need, including vocational education. It also commits itself to support of adult education and training which will provide skills.

Jimmy Carter, testifying before the Democratic Platform Committee, elaborated by stating that these programs should address the 2.5 million students leaving the educational system without adequate vocational training and the 750,000 untrained youth entering the unemployment pool annually. He recommended that community colleges and other existing programs be strengthened and extended.

One reasonable estimate of what expanded federal support in these areas might entail would be to look at the House and Senate-passed versions of new vocational education legislation.

The Senate version, S. 2657, authorized for Title II vocational education and Title V career education programs of \$1.091 billion for Fiscal 1978, \$1.310 billion for FY 1979, and \$1.525 billion for FY 1980.

The House version, H.R. 12835 authorized for vocational education \$.780 billion for FY 1977, \$.973 billion for FY 1978, \$1.134 billion for FY 1979, and \$1.314 billion for FY 1980.

Current spending levels for Occupational, Vocational and Adult education are running somewhat over \$600 million annually.

Using the House bill as the low estimate, the Senate bill as the high estimate and the average of the two as the mid-range estimate yields the following:

FY	low	medium (billions)	high
1977	\$.1	\$.2	\$.3
1978	.4	.45	.5
1979	.5	.6	.7
1980	.7	.8	.9
Total	\$1.7	\$2.05	\$2.4

14. COST OF EDUCATION PAYMENTS TO HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS

The Democratic Platform calls for the federal government to "directly provide cost of education payment to all higher education institutions...to help cover per-student costs which far exceed those covered by tuition and fees."

Such a program is presently authorized at \$1 billion annually under the Higher Education Act, Title IV - A - 5, Sec. 419 (including general assistance to graduate schools). Funds for this

program have never been appropriated, so any money for it would be in addition to present spending levels.

Using this already-enacted \$1 billion program as a mid-range estimate, a low estimate might be derived by calculating 75% funding while a high estimate might mean a 25% increase in the program.

15. VOTER REGISTRATION BY MAIL

Both the Democratic Platform and Jimmy Carter, in testimony before the Platform Committee, called for:

"passage of legislation providing for registration by mail in federal elections to erase existing barriers to voter participation."

Democratic Members of the House of Representatives, responding to pressure from candidate Carter, pushed through a watered down version of the "Voter Registration Act," H.R. 11552. The Senate, favoring a more ambitious proposal, has not acted. Carter, in the meanwhile, subsequently advocated "universal registration," a still more costly option.

Estimates for implementing a registration by mail program have been variously estimated at \$50 million to \$500 million. Usually excluded from these estimates are the hidden expenses the Postal Service will be forced to absorb for distribution of the registration forms to every address in the United States.

Although federal elections are held every two years, the cost estimates for the registration legislation are computed on an annualized basis. Using \$50 million for a low estimate, \$500 million for a high estimate and the mid-point of \$225 million as a mid-range estimate and assuming that increasing experience and efficiency in operating the program will cancel out inflation increases during the first four years yields four-year estimates of \$.2 billion, \$.9 billion, \$2 billion.

16. INCREASING THE SOCIAL SERVICES PROGRAM TO KEEP PACE WITH INFLATION

The Democratic Platform states:

"In 1972, the ceiling for federal social service grants was frozen at \$2.5 billion, and subsequent inflation of 28 percent has reduced the effective federal aid to existing programs. While there must certainly be a ceiling on such grants, it should be raised to compensate for inflation and to encourage states and localities to expand social services to low- and moderate-income families."

Compensating for the 28 percent inflation since 1972 will cost \$700 billion annually, giving a new social services base of \$3.2 billion. Estimating FY 1977-80 costs depends on what inflation rate is assumed. Using a 5 percent rate for a low estimate, a six percent rate for the middle estimate, and a 7 percent rate for a high estimate yields the following additional costs over the present ceiling (\$2.74 billion in FY 1977, \$2.5 billion thereafter):

FY	low	medium (billions)	high
1977	\$.5	\$.6	\$.6
1978	1.0	1.1	1.2
1979	1.2	1.3	1.4
1980	1.4	1.5	1.7
Total	\$4.1	\$4.5	\$4.9

Extending eligibility for social services to low- and moderate-income families would involve an astronomically expensive restructuring of this welfare-oriented program, the cost of which is impossible to calculate without further details.

17. LIBERALIZATION OF THE ALLOWABLE EARNING LIMITATION UNDER SOCIAL SECURITY

There is currently a limit of \$2760 on the amount one may earn and still draw full social security benefits. The Democratic Platform advocates "a liberalization of the allowable earnings limitation under Social Security for older Americans who wish to continue working and living as productive citizens."

Raising the present limit to \$5000 would cost \$1.8 billion in additional Social Security benefit payouts. A \$10,000 limit would add \$4.6 billion; a \$15,000 limit would add \$5.8 billion and any limit higher than \$20,000 would cost from \$6 to \$7 billion.

Using \$5000 as a low estimate, \$10,000 as a mid-range estimate and \$15,000 as a high estimate and holding these figures constant (even though income security benefits for the aged increased by 28.5 percent between 1975 and 1977 and can be expected to continue climbing sharply during the next four years) yields four-year estimates of \$7.2 billion, \$18.4 billion and \$23.2 billion respectively.

18. EXTEND VA EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE TWO YEARS

In previous wars, veterans received eight years of educational benefits. Thus far, Vietnam veterans have received 10 years of benefits, and Carter proposes to extend educational assistance two years for those veterans already enrolled and drawing benefits in VA-approved educational and training programs.

According to the Veterans Administration, provision of a two-year extension to veterans who were enrolled in education programs under the G.I. bill during the Spring semester of 1976 and whose educational benefits expired on May 31, 1976 would cost \$610 million in FY 1977 and \$356.5 million in FY 1978.

19. INCREASE REVENUE SHARING TO COMPENSATE FOR INFLATION

An increase in the annual funding of the general revenue sharing program to compensate for the erosion of inflation is called for by the Democratic Platform.

Using a five percent rate for a low estimate, a six percent rate for a middle estimate and a seven percent rate for a high estimate gives the following increases in the present \$6.65 billion revenue sharing program:

FY	low	medium (billions)	high
1977	\$.3	\$.4	\$.5
1978	.7	.8	1.0
1979	1.0	1.3	1.5
1980	1.4	1.7	2.0
Total	\$3.4	\$4.2	\$5.0

20. CHANGE REVENUE SHARING FORMULA

Without greater specificity, it is impossible to cost out the impact of a broadly-based community needs formula which conceivably could include poverty, condition of housing stock, percentage of dependent population or other variables. However, H.R. 10319, a measure introduced by Rep. Fascell and proposed as an amendment during the 1976 revenue sharing debate, provided a needs-based formula using only poverty level data. A computer simulation of the impact of this formula showed that the additional cost could be \$630 million annually, or a four-year total of \$2.52 billion.

Adjusting the formula to measure tax effort could be done in a variety of ways. Assuming that the principal concern is to expand the definition of tax effort to include other non-tax sources of revenue such as water, sewage and sanitation charges, however, yields an annual \$270 million figure for a four-year total of \$1.08 billion.

Using these estimates as a mid-range figure, 75% of that amount as the low estimate and 125% as the high estimate yields the following:

FY	low	medium (billions)	high
1977	\$.675	\$.9	\$1.125
1978	.675	.9	1.125
1979	.675	.9	1.125
1980	.675	.9	1.125
Total	\$2.7	\$3.6	\$4.5

21. SUBSIDIES AND LOANS FOR LOW AND MODERATE INCOME HOUSING CONSTRUCTION

The Democratic Platform takes the Republicans to task for losing the "vision of the House Act of 1968 the result of three decades of enlightened Democratic housing policy...reasserts these goals and pledges to achieve them." This Act, typical of the extravagant promises and false expectations of the 1960's, promised 2.6 million units a year. Achieving this would involve subsidizing probably 1 million units substantially or even building them directly. Assuming \$25,000 per unit, the cost would be \$25 billion annually for direct construction. Reinstating the original Section 235 and 236 programs with a 1 percent interest rate for 40 years would involve obligations of \$72 billion.

Such goals are obviously impossibly high, and the Democratic Platform and Carter's testimony to the Platform Committee pledge support for direct federal subsidies and low interest loans to encourage the construction of low- and moderate-income housing.

Fiscal Year 1977 outlays for housing subsidies to stimulate low- and moderate-income housing under Section 8, interest subsidies, Section 235 and 236 amount to \$3 billion.

Assuming the Democrats mean to double this figure, an assumption well in keeping with legislative proposals by Democratic Congressional leaders, would mean another \$3 billion annually for a four-year total of \$12 billion.

The Congressional Budget Office March 15, 1976 report on Budget Options indicates that expanding production of subsidized housing for lower-income households through emphasis on Section 8 and assisting roughly 5.2 million households would require additional outlays of \$1.7 billion in Fiscal 1977, \$1.2 billion in Fiscal 1978, \$2.5 billion in Fiscal 1979 and \$5.5 billion in Fiscal 1980, for a four-year total additional outlays of \$10.9 billion.

Using a 50% increase in existing outlays as a low estimate, the CBO option as a middle estimate and a doubling of existing outlays as a high option yields the following:

FY	low	medium (billions)	high
1977	\$1.5	\$1.7	\$3.0
1978	1.5	1.2	3.0
1979	1.5	2.5	3.0
1980	1.5	5.5	3.0
Total	\$6.0	\$10.9	\$12.0

22. HOUSING SUBSIDIES FOR THE ELDERLY

Both Carter and the Democratic Platform call for expansion of the highly successful programs of direct federal subsidies to provide housing for the elderly. Fiscal year 1977 outlays for this program are approximately \$200 million. "Expansion" is assumed to mean a 50 percent increase, a doubling or a 150 percent increase for purposes of arriving at low, medium and high estimates. This would require \$.1, \$.2 or \$.3 billion respectively for one-year and \$.4, \$.8 or \$1.2 billion for four-years.

23. STEADY FLOW OF HOUSING CREDIT

Carter's testimony before the Democratic Platform Committee called for "providing a steady source of credit at low interest rates to stabilize the housing industry." This proposal was included in the Democratic Platform.

The major program that Democrats in Congress have pushed in the past and are likely to press in the future in the mortgage credit area is GMA. An additional \$5 billion has been authorized in the Emergency Housing Act of 1976. \$2 billion of this \$5 billion has been appropriated for use by HUD during Fiscal 1977. Assuming all \$5 billion would be appropriated and utilized during a Carter Administration, and assuming further an outlay level equal to 10 percent of total obli-

gational authority results in an estimate of \$.125 billion per year or \$.5 billion over four years. Spending only half this amount could be assumed for a low estimate, while additional legislation to spend 50% more would yield a high estimate.

24. UPGRADING SECONDARY ROADS AND BRIDGES

The Transportation plank of the Democratic Platform offers commitment to dealing with transportation needs of rural America by upgrading secondary roads and bridges and by completion of the original plan of 1956 for the interstate highway system where it benefits rural Americans.

The most recent (1972) National Highway Needs Study estimates that some \$36.8 billion of backlog and new needs would accrue by 1980, and \$38.4 billion by 1990, in terms of 1969 dollars, or \$51.7 and \$53.9 billion in terms of current dollars. Undertaking this upgrading in a four-year program is not feasible because state and local matching funds would not be available, federal regulations preclude expeditious programming of capital improvements, the construction industry could not respond to this magnitude of demand so quickly nor could state and local highway agencies. Therefore, apportioning the upgrading goal out through 1990, assuming that no increase at all could occur in 1977, a realistic attempt to upgrade secondary roads and bridges would involve at a low range \$1 billion annually between FY 1978-80 for a FY 1980 expenditure increase of \$.8 billion and a cumulative FY 1978-80 expenditure increase of \$1.630 billion. At a mid-range of \$2 billion annually from FY 1978-80, the FY 1980 expenditure increase would be \$1.614 billion for a cumulative impact of \$3.26 billion. At a high-range \$3 billion FY 1978-80 level, the FY 1980 expenditure increase would be \$2.42 billion and the cumulative impact would be \$4.9 billion.

25. FULL FUNDING OF THE RURAL DEVELOPMENT ACT

The Democratic Platform "pledges to strengthen the economy and thereby create jobs in our agricultural and rural areas by the full implementation and funding of the Rural Development Act of 1972."

Under existing policy, Federal expenditures for the Act are expected to be \$.29 billion in FY 1977, \$.34 billion in FY 1978, \$.48 billion in FY 1979 and \$.67 billion in FY 1980.

The Library of Congress examined the 14 programs contained in the Rural Development Act and estimated that probable maximum levels of program participation and demand would increase costs between \$.64 billion and \$.82 billion during those years. Using this as a high estimate, 75% of this figure for a mid-range estimate and half the maximum for a low-range estimate yields the following additional expenditures:

FY	low	medium (billions)	high
1977	\$.32	\$.48	\$.64
1978	.35	.53	.70
1979	.38	.56	.76
1980	.41	.61	.82
Total	\$1.46	\$2.18	\$2.92

26. INCREASED FEDERAL FUNDING FOR ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

The Democratic Platform recommends "that the federal government promptly expand whatever funds are required to develop a new system of energy...support an active federal role in research and development of clean burning and commercially competitive coal burning systems and technologies, ... (and undertake) major federal initiatives, including major governmental participation in early high-risk development projects...to harness renewable resources like solar, wind, geothermal, the oceans, and other new technologies such as fusion, fuel cell and the conservation of solid waste and starches into energy."

The Congressional Budget Office, in its July 15, 1976 Background paper No. 10 on Energy Research: Alternative Strategies indicates that a full funding strategy would add to the President's base program completion strategy all of the demonstration projects identified in ERDA's national plan in all program areas. This would be a high option estimate for the ambitious energy research and development program described in the Democratic Platform.

A mid-range option would be a strategy downplaying the fission programs but emphasizing all other long-term technologies. A low-range option would be a strategy emphasizing near- and mid-term technologies and deferring all major long-term technology demonstration projects not already underway.

In terms of budget outlays, the costs of these options over the program completion costs of \$2.7 billion in FY 1977, \$3.2 billion in FY 1978, \$3.6 billion in FY 1979 and \$3.8 billion in FY 1980 would be:

FY	low	medium (billions)	high
1977	--	--	--
1978	\$.1	\$.1	\$.1
1979	.15	.2	.6
1980	.6	1.3	1.6
Total	\$.85	\$1.6	\$2.3

27. FARM PRICE SUPPORT AND PARITY PROGRAM

The Democratic Platform states that,

"Without parity income assurance to farmers, full production cannot be achieved in an uncertain economy. We must assure parity returns to farmers based on costs of production plus a reasonable profit."

Carter expressed the same concern in his testimony to the Democratic Platform Committee.

This language would seem to support the view that a Carter Administration would reinstitute the farm price support policies and acre limitations of the 1950's and 1960's. These old farm policies were largely abolished by the 1973 Agricultural and Consumer Protection Act. A return to these discarded policies would cost the U.S. more than \$4 billion a year by 1980 according to estimates of agricultural economists at the Brookings Institution and the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

Allowing for inflation, storage costs and crop size, estimates for additional costs of a price support program are:

FY	low	medium (billions)	high
1977	\$ 3.8	\$ 4.0	\$ 4.2
1978	4.0	4.3	4.8
1979	4.2	4.6	5.4
1980	4.4	4.9	6.2
Total	\$16.4	\$17.8	\$20.6

28. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT BANK

29. YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS

30. ESTABLISH SPECIAL MEANS FOR TRAINING AND LOCATING JOBS FOR DIFFICULT TO EMPLOY PEOPLE IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND TO EXTENT NECESSARY IN PUBLIC SECTOR

31. ADEQUATE FUNDING FOR A GREATLY IMPROVED GOVERNMENT-WIDE SYSTEM FOR DELIVERY OF EQUAL JOB & PROMOTION OPPORTUNITIES

32. DIRECT GOVERNMENT LOANS FOR SMALL BUSINESS, ESPECIALLY MINORITY OWNED

33. INDEXATION OF MINIMUM WAGE (would affect some government employees).

34. RAISE PAY STANDARDS FOR OVERTIME (would affect some government employees)

35. EXTEND UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE TO COVER ALL WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS

36. FULL ENFORCEMENT OF OSHA, COMPREHENSIVE MINE SAFETY ACT AND BLACK LUNG COMPENSATION

37. INDEPENDENT CONSUMER AGENCY

38. INCENTIVES TO REWARD EFFICIENCY & INNOVATION, ASSURE NONDISCRIMINATION AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN CIVIL SERVICE

39. PARTIAL PUBLIC FINANCING FOR CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES ON MATCHING BASIS

40. OFFICE OF CITIZEN ADVOCACY IN EXECUTIVE BRANCH

41. FULL FUNDING FOR NEIGHBORHOOD LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR

42. GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED SYSTEMS FOR DEVELOPING OBJECTIVE PRODUCT PERFORMANCE STANDARDS

43. INCREASED FEDERAL AID TO GOVERNMENT LABORATORIES AND PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS TO SEEK THE CURE TO HEART DISEASE, CANCER, SICKLE CELL ANEMIA, PARALYSIS FROM SPINAL CORD INJURY, DRUG ADDICTION AND OTHER INFLICTIONS (sic)
44. INCREASING THE NUMBER OF DOCTORS AND PARAMEDICAL PERSONNEL IN THE PRIMARY HEALTH FIELD
45. VIGOROUS FEDERAL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES OF COMPENSATORY OPPORTUNITY AND FULL FUNDING OF CIVIL RIGHTS PROGRAMS
46. EXPAND FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR BILINGUAL EDUCATION
47. FEDERAL AID TO IMPLEMENT DESEGREGATION THROUGH MATCHING FUNDS, INCENTIVE GRANTS AND OTHER MECHANISMS
48. INCREASED FEDERAL INVESTMENT IN GRADUATE EDUCATION
49. FULL FUNDING OF LIBRARY PROGRAMS
50. ADEQUATE FUNDING AND IMPROVED MANAGEMENT AND HEALTH CARE IN VA HEALTH CARE PROGRAM
51. REDUCING HEALTH COSTS PAID BY SENIOR CITIZENS UNDER THE PRESENT SYSTEM
52. EXTEND MEDICARE TO AMERICANS ABROAD WHO ARE ELIGIBLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY
53. FUNDING FOR THE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS AND HUMANITIES
54. SPECIAL ANTI-RECESSION EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS FOR ARTISTS
55. INCREASED EMPHASIS ON REHABILITATION OF EXISTING HOUSING TO REBUILD OUR NEIGHBORHOODS
56. INCREASE LOANS AND SUBSIDIES FOR HOUSING AND REHABILITATION ESPECIALLY IN POVERTY-STRICKEN AREAS
57. MASSIVE EFFORT TO HELP MAJOR OLDER CITIES IN THEIR UNPRECEDENTED FISCAL CRISES
58. FUNDING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELIQUENCY PREVENTION ACT OF 1974
59. EXTEND FEDERAL DEATH BENEFITS TO POLICE KILLED IN THE LINE OF DUTY
60. INCREASED FEDERAL OPERATING SUBSIDIES FOR MASS TRANSIT IN URBAN AND RURAL AREAS
61. PROGRAM OF NATIONAL RAIL AND ROAD REHABILITATION AND IMPROVED MASS TRANSIT TO PUT THOUSANDS OF UNEMPLOYED CONSTRUCTION WORKERS BACK TO WORK
62. DEVELOP PROGRAMS TO MAKE THE FAMILY FARM ECONOMICALLY HEALTHY AGAIN
63. INSURE AND GUARANTEE LOANS FOR ELECTRIFICATION AND TELEPHONE FACILITIES FOR RURAL AMERICANS
64. INSURE THE EXISTENCE OF ADEQUATE FACILITIES, COMMUNITY FACILITIES SUCH AS WATER SUPPLY AND SEWAGE DISPOSAL SYSTEMS, DECENT HOUSING AND NEEDED TRANSPORT
65. NEW FEDERAL INCENTIVES FOR AIDING INDIVIDUAL HOME OWNERS IN UNDERTAKING ENERGY CONSERVATION INVESTMENTS
66. STRIP MINING REGULATION
67. REVITALIZE BASIC CREDIT PROGRAMS FOR FARMERS
68. PROVIDE ADEQUATE CREDIT TAILORED TO THE NEEDS OF YOUNG FARMERS
69. REINSTATE SOIL CONSERVATION PROGRAMS
70. FEDERAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS TO FARM WORKERS FOR HOUSING, EMPLOYMENT, HEALTH CARE, SOCIAL SERVICES, AND EDUCATION
71. SUBSTANTIAL INCREASES IN FUNDING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
72. FEDERAL ASSISTANCE IN PROMOTING GREATER DEVELOPING COUNTRY CAPITAL MARKETS
73. SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MULTI-NATIONAL WORLD FOOD RESERVE SYSTEM
74. INCREASE BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA