


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

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ORGANIZATIONAL
CHART


THE PRESIDENT FORD COMMITTEE
 GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN
 ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE



THE PRESIDENT FORD COMMITTEE
GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN
ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE




THE PRESIDENT FORD COMMITTEE
GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN
ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE



CAMPAIGN PLAN

D R A F T O U T L I N E

PRESIDENT FORD COMMITTEE CAMPAIGN PLAN



PRINCIPAL FUNCTIONS

The major functions of the President Ford Committee are as follows:

- To support the President and his Administration in this campaign through organization, manpower, media, survey research, finance and record keeping;
- To provide total support to the Vice Presidential nominee who will bear the major portion of the actual public campaign both as the chief advocate of the President's record and as the chief critic of Jimmy Carter. Specific areas of support for the V.P nominee will include advance and scheduling, press, speechwriting, research and materials support.
- To work with the Republican Party and Special Groups to identify Ford supporters, mobilize them and get them to the polls on election day.
- To administer all campaign expenditures and to make certain that all aspects of the campaign adhere to and remain completely within both the letter and the spirit of the federal election laws.

CAMPAIGN THEME

President Ford's campaign theme must reflect a tone and approach radically different from that employed by recent presidential campaigns. Politically 1976 has not been a traditional year and a winning campaign theme will be one that recognizes that fact and reflects the mood of the electorate.

Surveys show that honesty and decency continue to be President Ford's greatest strengths, and they must serve as the basis of our theme.



Being honest means levelling with the American people. It means focusing on reality. It means admitting that things are not as good in this country as they could or should be. It means expressing frustration with the system and admitting that new approaches are necessary to turn the country around. Above all, it means not getting backed into defending the status quo or our own programs as being totally adequate. It means calling for unity, sacrifice and an end to partisanship in order to bring about a better life for all Americans. It also means standing for some positive programs at home. More than just vetoes and State of the Union.

Jimmy Carter did not storm through the Democratic primaries by appearing to be presidential in the traditional sense. He did it by appearing to level with the people, by admitting some mistakes by having the courage to say there is something wrong with our system of government and by saying that he would make the change. He did not say he would provide more government or less government. He said he would change the whole system Period. It was not a question or minor adjustments. A major overhaul was needed.



Traditional presidential activities -- meetings, trips, proposals, vetoes, etc. -- will be important this year but not as significant as in previous campaigns and not sufficient to win. The campaign must recognize that, short of war or a 50% reduction in unemployment, no single event or series of events in the next 90 days will cast President Ford in a traditional light comparable to that of past Presidents. By its reaction to the Puerto Rican "Summit" the press has already indicated that it intends to attribute most presidential activity from here on in as campaign-related.

In fact, in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate, it may be fair to say that the mystique of the presidency in the traditional sense is gone and may not return for some time -- if ever. The President is only an incumbent in the sense that he has done a good job.

President Ford, then, is presidential by demonstrating moral leadership. Not through demagogery or playing to the fears of the people but through quiet, calm, strong and resolute tones. Not by addressing Americans as masses but as individuals. We must emphasize the real versus the theoretical.

Good

The vehicle for this approach would be addresses to key forums around the country. Each speech would be a major address/white paper on a vital issue. Radio and maybe TV.

The President would spend much of the summer and fall campaign working on these programs. He would restrict his campaigning to focus on developing new approaches to insure a better future for all Americans. There is little to be gained from trying to out-campaign Jimmy Carter.

The white papers would offer specific programs and recommendations

The contrast to Jimmy Carter's generalities and ambiguities would again be apparent. And being honest, these programs would not be billed as the final answers but as guides, as first steps. The President would welcome discussion but say that it is time for a new beginning. Number of issues should be limited to 5 or 6 and really brought into focus.



Development of these white papers will involve major input from Cabinet Officers, the Domestic Council and many other sources across the country. It should be helpful in up-grading the quality of the President's speeches. ✓

It will also require long hours of personal involvement by the President. He must personally shape these programs, be completely familiar with them and comfortable with their presentation. Anything short of total preparation and commitment on the part of the President will significantly diminish the effectiveness of this approach. It must come across clearly that these are his programs, that he is his own man, free of commitments to previous administrations and policies.

There will, of course, be personal campaigning in addition to the major addresses. However, this must be limited and held until late in campaign. The V.P. nominee will do most of the campaigning and partisan attacks. The American people do not want to see their President out campaigning three or four days a week and when he is campaigning, it must take on a more serious sense of purpose. These are serious times, important times and the message must reflect this.

The Vice Presidential nominee must be someone of such stature that he will be creditable as a spokesman for the Party and the President

for the critical post-Labor Day campaigning. A heavy advocacy schedule would be developed utilizing a private plane, the best political talent available and the best scheduling personnel available to support sixty days just in front or behind Jimmy Carter, telling our story and keeping the Democrats honest.

CHAIRMAN'S OFFICE AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The Chairman will be the official spokesman for the PFC and a leading advocate for the President and against Carter.

Spokesman
As such he will be the most visible member of the Committee and will maintain a heavy public schedule throughout the Fall. The Chairman will be supported by a small but adequate staff that will include an executive assistant, press assistant and secretarial support. It will also include 6-8 special assistants responsible for maintaining liaison with Party officials, elected officials, VIP's, etc.

The Chairman will serve as an ombudsman with the Committee, the RNC and the White House. He will be responsible for seeing that the major pieces fall into place at the Committee, the RNC and the White House. He will attend cabinet meetings and major Administration meetings that affect the campaign.

He will have ultimate responsibility for program implementation including scheduling, media, voter contact activities, special groups and administration.

POLITICAL SECTION

The Political Division will be directed by the Deputy Chairman, who will have overall responsibility for program development and imple-



mentation.

A major function of the Deputy Chairman will be strategy formulation for the non-administrative part of the campaign. This will include campaign themes, Vice Presidential activities, media approach and voter contact programs. The Deputy Chairman will also work directly with the White House in issue development, Presidential scheduling and other campaign matters involving the President. Much of the Deputy Chairman's time during the campaign will be spent on the road with the Vice Presidential nominee.

11 ?

The Deputy Chairman will be assisted by a Field Director. The Field Director will have the major responsibility for implementation of the political/people programs. Although the Deputy Chairman will determine the overall programs, goals and budgeting limitations, the Field Director will have broad powers on day-to-day program implementation insofar as personnel activities, expenditures up to a specified level and other decision areas required to achieve campaign goals within resources available/allocated.

The Field Director will supervise the activities of a field force consisting of 10-12 primary fieldmen and support personnel. Fieldmen will be assigned individual states and regions on a priority basis. They will have secretarial support as well as special on-site assistants in certain priority states.

Fieldmen will be responsible for overseeing/monitoring the progress of the voter contact, turnout and other manpower mobilization programs. They also will assist in advancing presidential travel, lining up local endorsements, and coordinating PFC programs with party

organizations and individual candidates.

They will be responsible for identifying weaknesses or potential trouble spots and reporting them along with recommendations to fix them immediately to the Field Director.

Accountability will be essential. Regular reports should be sent to national headquarters outlining progress, priorities, needs and recommendations. Regional desks should be set up at national headquarters to serve as liaison and support for field personnel.

The spending ceiling will necessitate restricting the number of Ford headquarters around the country and wherever possible the campaign will share space with State Republican Committees and individual candidates.

Nevertheless, provisions must be made for independent headquarters in key states and areas where shared space is not available or adequate.

Each state will be assigned a budgeted amount for headquarters operations. With the exception perhaps of a manager and the field force, most of these headquarters will have to be staffed by volunteers.

A procedures manual listing operational procedures, reporting regulations and other campaign and legal guidelines should be prepared for each headquarters.

MEDIA

The campaign media program's objectives will be to communicate the major campaign themes as powerfully and effectively as possible.

During the primary campaign the incumbency was miscalculated. In essence, there is and was no incumbency. Nobody had voted for President Ford in the past. Nobody had a major investment in his being president. It just happened because of a series of events. Only attribute of incumbency is that the President has done a good job.

It is also apparent that we have no really good advocates or surrogates. Mainly because they come out of the same establishment that the public is presently fed up with. (In athletic terms, we have no bench.)


We must seriously consider advertising taking over the advocate role. This can be done with good creative work and planning.

The media effort will be directed by an advertising executive with political experience. This individual must be creative, imaginative and possess good public relations and political judgement.

The Communications Director will work closely with the Chairman, and the Deputy Chairman for Political, the Press Secretary, appropriate White House representatives and other designated individuals to develop the overall communications package.

The Communications Advisory Board should also be expended so as to benefit from the best expertise available

In view of the fact that campaign themes must be developed and translated into story boards and preliminary copy prior to the Convention, the hiring of a Communications Director and the expansion of the Advisory Board should be given top immediate priority. An initial meeting of the Board and key campaign representatives should be convened



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Handwritten notes:
Strategy -
Went
but
PTC must
be removed
Controlled
no
Community



no later than July 17th.

The number of paid staff in the Communications Group will be limited to 6-8.

One key appointment will be that of Production Manager. Since all production will be subcontracted, it will be the Production Manager's responsibility to assemble television crews, locate radio talents and work with printers and other suppliers to insure that the campaign's electronic and print media are produced and distributed as effectively, efficiently and economically as possible.

Other key staff would include an in-house artist to handle some mechanical and conceptual work as well as one or two writers to develop brochures, newspaper copy and special publications.

Another major area that needs consideration is the independent expenditures potential to augment those areas of the campaign media program we're not able to fund adequately. These areas would include newspaper advertising and local handout materials.

PRESS

The PFC Press Department will be responsible for all non-presidential press activities and be headed by a Communications Director. It will work closely with the White House Press Office to coordinate and support presidential activities.

In addition, it will provide total press support for the V.P. nominee. In view of the major advocate's role to be assumed by the V.P. nominee, the PFC Press Secretary will travel with him during most of the campaign. Support desks will be set up in Washington to back up this



operation.

The Press Department will provide press support for the Chairman and all Deputy Chairmen including releases, briefings, press conference interviews, in-house newspaper; develop briefs, releases, speech material and other support for the Advocates Program and work with the Special Groups Program on releases, radio actualities and other public relations activities. Utilize RNC facilities where possible - radio and mailing lists.

LEGAL OFFICE

The Legal Office will develop all background and instructional materials needed by any division to operate within both the spirit and the letter of all federal election laws.

The office will be particularly involved in assisting the Administration Division in developing and instituting campaign monitoring and reporting procedures.


ADMINISTRATION

The primary function of the Administration Division is to monitor and control all expenditures.

The Deputy Chairman for Administration reports directly to the Chairman. On a day-to-day basis, he works closely with the Deputy Chairman for Political and the Field Director. His authorization is required on any undiscussed or undudgeted items.

The PFC accounting system must be upgraded and organized so as to be able to provide an accurate reading on cash flow, expenditures, bills outstanding and current balance at virtually any moment.

Forms, reporting procedures and computer software must be developed to insure efficient operation.



Instructional materials must be developed for headquarters and field personnel. All PFC staff must be familiar with the reporting procedures for their program and must understand the importance of observing these procedures to the letter.

The Deputy Chairman for Administration should work closely with the Legal Department in the development and implementation of this system.

RESEARCH

Sound survey, issue and opposition research will be essential to the campaign. The major functions of the PFC Research Department will be survey research and coordination of issue and opposition research materials.

The survey research effort will consist of individual priority states surveys.

In addition, there will be an ongoing tracking program consisting of 5,000 interviews per week starting in mid-September and continuing through late October.

The Research Director will work with Market Opinion Research in questionnaire design as well as with analysis and interpretation.

All issue and opposition research must largely be conducted by the Republican National Committee. This includes development of some issue papers plus all opponent tracking and attack material. The

RNC will also provide an Answer Desk program for the Party and campaign in general. If necessary, the RNC Answer Desk will be a 24-hour-per-day program.

The PFC Research Division will serve as a clearing house for priority requests from the White House, the Vice Presidential nominee's staff and major advocates. At least one, and perhaps more, researchers should be on the V.P nominee's plane at all times. This individual(s) must be well-versed in the Carter record as well as that of President Ford.

The PFC Research Coordinator must work closely with his RNC counterpart. A meeting should be held soon to discuss PFC research needs and agree upon production deadlines and communications channels. Setup anti-Carter issues calculated to fracture his shaky coalition. These issues should be offensive for us and calculated to keep him off-balance.

SCHEDULING

The scheduling office will have primary responsibility for making arrangements for scheduling the Vice Presidential nominee, the Chairman, the Ford Family and Cabinet members, but not the President.

The RNC will be responsible for scheduling other advocates and handling speakers for normal GOP functions.

A close liaison and good communications should exist between the RNC, PFC and White House scheduling operations so as to avoid overscheduling or duplication of efforts in any area.



Scheduling must also work closely with the Administration office to make certain that the program operates within its budget, that all expenses are promptly reported and that all additional expenses are properly authorized and reported.



RNC LIAISON

The Republican National Committee represents a major resource both in terms of the \$3.2 million that it can direct into the campaign and the manpower and other resources that can both directly and indirectly benefit the campaign.

Close liaison with the RNC will be essential to insure that all possible resources are utilized to maximum advantage.

Specific areas of support that the RNC can provide include:

- Scheduling -- identifying key forums and opportunities for the President, V.P nominee and other advocates
- Voter Contact -- voter registration, identification, turnout and ballot security.
- Research -- issue development, opposition, vote history and demographics
- Press -- mailing lists, coordinate radio actuality - they have the equipment.
- Accounting -- report filing and bookkeeping assistance

Voter turnout

BUDGETING

Estimated cost figures are currently being collected as well as recommendations for percentage ranges and overall dollar commitments to each program area from a variety of sources.

Once this information has been compiled, Deputy Chairman of Administration will meet with each Division head, the Deputy Chairmen for Political and Administration and other appropriate people to discuss the budget for each program area.

Each Director should then be asked to develop an interim budget including cash flow requirements based on the agreed upon dollar amount.

Areas which will require thorough budgeting analysis include such areas as the following:

Headquarters Operation

Salaries
Payroll Taxes
Office Supplies
Telephone/Telegraph
Postage
Printing/Reproduction
Delivery Service
Rent/Utilities
Furniture/Equipment
Maintenance
RNC Liaison
Contingency Fund

Chairman's Office

Salaries
Travel
Entertainment
Contingency Fund



Administration

Accounting System

Program Development

Political Division

Salaries -- Field Force

Travel Expenses

Voter Contact Program

State Headquarters operations

Contingency Fund

Communications

Salaries

Graphics

Television

Production

Time

Radio

Production

Time

Direct Mail

Materials and Materials Distribution

Special Voter Groups

Salaries

Travel

Direct Mail

Paid Media

Individual Groups (by name)



Research

Salaries

Surveys

Special Projects

Contingency Fund



CONSTITUENCY
ANALYSTS



CONSTITUENCY ANALYSIS

First, let me make a few general points about constituency groups. The first thing to keep in mind about constituency groups is that they do not exist. Voters exist--constituency groups are generalizing labels that help us think about how and why voters behave, but the groups have no objective reality of their own. All so-called blocs have many divisions within themselves. Most differ only in emphasis from the general populations. It is worth recalling that 41 percent of Catholics favor the Supreme Court ruling on abortion, and a narrow majority of blacks oppose busing -- or at least did until the controversy heated up. (Such gross figures do not of course measure the intensity which either side brings to their feelings on the subject -- an issue that strongly motivates a relatively small group, such as opposition to gun control or aid to parochial schools, may be politically more important than an issue which attracts moderate or passive support from the great majority.)

Most people belong to a number of constituency groups, and the most that can be said is that their voting is to some extent influenced through their identification with some of these. There is no "Catholic vote". There are Catholic voters who are to varying degrees influenced by identification with the values and attitudes of their church. This should always be kept in mind when we speak of the Catholic votes, etc. as a shorthand.

Constituency identification is generally most influential when



members of a group feel that a candidate is hostile to their group's interests. Few Jewish voters, for instance, would be likely to vote for a candidate perceived as anti-Israel. Labor unions have been able to exert considerable control over their members in state elections where right-to-work was a burning issue. But if all candidates are perceived as more or less friendly to Israel, or if right-to-work is not a clear and present issue, voters identifying with the groups aroused by these issues make their choices on other grounds.

The closest thing we now have to constituency groups that are actual electoral forces, rather than helpful generalizations, are voting blocs that are simply voted by their leaders. But these are now few and far between, particularly in general elections. Remember, Charles Percy came close to carrying Chicago four years ago against a loyal adherent of the Daley machine. And even blacks -- the most cohesive voting bloc -- are increasingly selective about which candidates they will support.

The second thing to remember is that President Ford's greatest single advantage is his appeal to the American people as a whole. The most important thing that the President has going for him is that he has been a good President -- his foreign policies have improved chances for peace, his economic policies have worked, he has acted -- and promises to continue to act -- in the best interest of all the people. If he should be perceived as deviating from this course to favor a particular group or groups, his chances for election would be greatly reduced. Our most important political, as well as governmental, objective, therefore, is that the President should continue to be regarded as the representative

of the national interest, in contrast to our opposition's tendency to speak for particular, special interests.

We particularly should avoid the temptation to cast ourselves in the role of spokesmen for special interests that appear to be antagonistic to special interests that are pushed by the Democrats. If the Democrats, that is, claim to be the Party of the blacks, we should not counter by trying to become the Party of the whites; if the Democrats claim to promote women's rights, we should not aim a contrasting appeal to male chauvinists; if the Democrats claim to represent labor, we should not agree to become the Party of business. The President, again and again, should stress that he acts for the good of all.



This being said, it must be conceded that the President's overall record, plus the solid Republican vote, brings us up to only about 40 percent. The extra 10 percent -- or 10.1 percent -- must be won by motivating people to vote for Ford because they believe that he will advance concerns that are of special interest to them. The most important group to which we have to appeal is of course the loose group that is concerned by the effect of Democratic liberalism. (This is not the same as hard core conservatives -- a group that comprises no more than 30 percent of all voters.) Polls consistently show inflation to be the number one concern of the nation's voters. Taxes are a somewhat less urgent concern just now, but there is no doubt that many middle-class and working-class voters are strongly resistant toward any further rise in taxes. The implications of the liberal Democratic program are not lost on most voters. To take only three major items, the

combined costs of Humphrey-Hawkins, Kennedy-Corman health insurance, and federalization of welfare would be astronomical. (We should have -- if we do not have -- exact figures.) These costs can be paid only through inflation or higher taxes or both. If Humphrey or one of the liberals had been the Democratic candidate, I think the President could have won on voter rejection of the liberal program almost alone. With Carter, the problem is more difficult. Carter has edged toward the left, but he is still perceived as significantly more moderate than Humphrey, Kennedy, and friends. We should hang the liberal program on him to the extent that we can. We should nail him with Humphrey-Hawkins, which he privately opposes but publicly endorsed after "ethnic purity". Humphrey-Hawkins, as the Democrats have begun to realize, is a political loser -- I understand they are now afraid to bring it to a vote on the House floor. Carter has publicly stopped short of endorsing Kennedy-Corman, but Leonard Woodcock is circulating a letter to liberals saying that the Democratic platform, which Carter accepts, endorses it.

Carter is also ambiguous on welfare, but the Democratic platform promises that welfare will be "substantially financed" by the Federal government. We should tie all of this to Carter, and ask how he plans to pay for it. (I think the attack role, at least in the early stages of the campaign, should be carried out by somebody other than the President.) The fact is, however, that Carter is more moderate than Humphrey, et al. We should not lose credibility by becoming too strident in attempting to portray him as an extreme liberal.



Against Carter, we will have to present positive reasons why it would be a good thing to have Gerald Ford President for another four years. Again, the chief answer to this need is that the President's policies are good for the entire country. But to win, we will also need some additional specialized appeals. This is where the constituency groups come in.

There are several ways to divide the country into constituencies: states, income groups, age groups, religious groups, ethnic groups, sexes, issue groups, etc. Let's begin within the states, as these are the actual counters in Presidential electoral politics.


STATES



The New Majority strategy was to build a coalition based on the so-called Sun Belt, stretching from Florida to California, adding the basic Republican strength in the Mountain States and the Plains States and Upper New England, picking up most of the Border States, and counting on the conservative, mainly Catholic blue-collar vote to tip a few of the industrial states such as Illinois and Ohio Republican. This is still Reagan's strategy today. Against Carter, it will not work. I think Carter is almost assured of carrying the Deep South -- Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and South Carolina, and probably North Carolina as well. We must fight for Texas, Florida, Virginia, and the Border States -- but all will be tough. Carter appears weak in California, but the state is bound to be a battleground.

Ford will have a better than usual chance, for a Republican, of carrying Lower New England against Carter (Reagan would have no chance), but realistically it will be a long-shot proposition, except perhaps Connecticut. This means that the key to the election will lie in the belt of industrial states that stretches from New Jersey to Minnesota.


If either candidate carries most of these states, he will win the election. Logic therefore suggests that these industrial states, plus California, should be primary targets. Texas, Florida, the Border States, and the Northwest should be secondary targets. Upper New England, Lower New England, the Mountain States, the Plains States, and the Deep South, for various reasons, should be tertiary targets. New York City, whether or not the state is winnable, will be important to the campaign as the media capital of the nation.



Concentrating then, for the moment, on the industrial states -- how can they be won? Consider the kind of Republicans who in recent years have won elections in these states: Ogilvie, Percy, Bill Scott, Milliken, Romney, Griffin, Knowles, Taft, Scranton, Shafer, Scott, Schweiker, Case, Cahill. These individuals differ in many ways (some, of course, eventually lost), but they share in common the quality of projecting an essentially progressive image -- not of runaway spending, or of extending government controls, but of holding out a positive vision for their constituencies' future. The New Majority strategy has almost never worked in these states. Jim Buckley doesn't count, since he represents New York -- a state with characteristics and problems that set it off from the rest

of the industrial states of the East and Middlewest. (Anyhow, Buckley won with less than a majority in a three-way race.) Jim Rhodes is perhaps an exception, but his particular formula is too highly individualistic to have general application. Nixon's victory in 1972 is the only real exception -- but the nation's rejection of McGovern was too universal to tell us much about any particular region; anyhow, Carter does not arouse the kind of fears that McGovern caused.

The answer then seems to be that the best way for the President to carry the industrial states to to hold out a progressive image of the nation's future. This does not mean contradicting the basic conservatism of his economic approach, but showing ways in which this approach can lead to economic and social progress in the future. The primaries show that this goal can be achieved. These are all states (except Indiana, the least typical among them) in which the President ran well -- and progressive and moderate Republicans were the mainstays of his support in each of these states. Characteristics that most of these states have in common are: above average proportions of Catholics, Jews, blacks from the north, second generation Americans, persons over 65, and political independents. It should be noted, however, that the largest single ethnic or religious group in all of these states, except New Jersey, is composed of white Protestants. Special thought, therefore, should be given to the interests of these constituency groups. Obviously, there is something to be gained through attention to the direct economic interests of these states, wherever this can be done consistent with the




genuine priorities of the government and the overall national interest. More fundamentally, however, the Ford effort in these states can be aided by programs and appeals shaped to attract their internal constituency groups.

ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS

Ethnic and religious groups are among the most important constituency groups in the U. S. Their internal structures and attitudes are, however, much more complex and subtle than is sometimes imagined. The groups split on economic and social issues on the basis of income, education, and age, though often in different proportions from group to group. Among politically independent Catholics, for instance, 39 percent of non-college graduates over 35 regard themselves as conservatives on economic issues, compared to 27 percent economic conservatives among non-college graduates under 35. (Among Northern white Protestant non-college graduates, the figures in these two categories are 51 percent economic conservatives over 35 and 30 percent economic conservatives under 35.) Prominent "leaders" of ethnic and religious groups are often quite unpopular with large parts of the groups they are supposed to represent.

This being said, the following generalizations may be applied:

WHITE PROTESTANTS remain, of course, not only the largest single ethnic-religious group in the United States, but also a majority of the total -- roughly 55 percent. They are the largest group



in most of the key industrial states. They are also the most diverse, dividing not only on lines of economic interest and age but also of denomination. Roughly the denominations divide among the doctrinally more conservative, though politically more liberal, so-called "main line" groups, such as Episcopalians and Presbyterians; and the more evangelical fundamentalists, such as Baptists; with Methodists and Lutherans, two very important groups falling somewhere in between. The main-line groups are more common in metropolitan areas and small cities, while the fundamentalists are more common in rural areas and small towns; but both are found in both geographic areas.


Republicans, to win, must carry the Protestant vote by very large majorities -- Nixon received 70 percent in 1972. What polling evidence we have shows Ford and Carter now running about even among Protestants. Some of this is due to Carter's disproportionate strength among Southern Protestants, but we must substantially improve Ford's standing with Northern Protestants. Carter appears relatively weak among suburban, main-line type Protestants, who recently have shown the greater tendency to swing Democratic. But he has special appeal, because of his Baptist religion, for the rural fundamentalists, who have generally been the most staunchly Republican. In the primaries, he swept the rural counties and small towns - without this vote he would have been soundly beaten in Michigan and Wisconsin. This vote must be denied him in the general election -- without large majorities in the "upstate" counties, Republicans have no chance of carrying Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, or Wisconsin.



Protestants have a tendency to be moralistic in their political attitudes -- they like to believe that they support a cause because it is "right." This is particularly true of rural fundamentalists, but also of Methodists and Presbyterians. It will be well for the President to stress the moral objectives of his politics -- not only that they enhance the individual voters self-interest, but also that they will help to make a better world. This should not be leaned on to the point of becoming sanctimonious, obviously.

Rural and smalltown Protestants, in particular, feel that they are being shut out by the current trend of national politics. Remember, this group virtually dominated the first 150 years of our national history. It was not until the twentieth century that the Episcopalian Roosevelts and the Catholic Kennedys were able to break their near monopoly on political power. Recently, they have felt that Republicans in particular, in their efforts to reach out to other groups, are passing them by. This is particularly true in the northern industrial states which are among our primary targets. The President can achieve much with this group simply by showing that he values their support -- that his origins are close to theirs, and that his attitudes are shaped by the same basic beliefs that they hold.


This group can also be reached through an economic appeal. Though population is now moving as a result of natural forces back to small cities and small towns, many of these areas still



have serious economic problems. Helpful farm policies have political importance here, but a declining proportion of the rural and smalltown populations are tied to the farm economy. Most of these areas are now seeking other forms of economic development. A Ford "rural development" program would be most helpful. But most of all, the President should show, without slighting the cities, that he regards the small cities and small towns as the areas where much of the nation's future growth lies. (Remember, polls show that a majority of city-dwellers and suburbanites would prefer to live in small towns.)

CATHOLICS, while still leaning Democratic, have been increasingly open to Republican appeals. Nixon carried 52 percent in 1972 -- the first time in this century that a Republican candidate for President had a majority of Catholics. Polling evidence now shows Carter about ten percentage points ahead of Ford. Catholics, generally, did not vote for Carter in the primaries, but they do not seem to view him with the same hostility as they regarded McGovern four years ago. They are a key element in most of the industrial states, and we must cut substantially into Carter's current margin.

Any attempt to appeal to supposed anti-Baptist feelings among Catholics would of course be most ill-advised. Religious differences among Catholics and Protestants have not disappeared, but they are now much less pronounced than they were even ten years ago. Catholics who are not particularly religious probably have little feeling about Baptists one way or another. Religious




Catholics, like religious Protestants -- and to some extent religious Jews -- are tending to draw together in a common "religious front," to combat what is viewed as an increasingly secular society. Carter's religion is a plus with most religious Catholics. We should aim to make the President's basically religious outlook a plus for us as well.

Catholics have some special concerns -- particularly abortion and parochial schools. (Abortion, incidentally, is not exclusively a Catholic issue. Many Protestants, particularly of the older generation, view abortion with horror -- though not in so uncompromising a way as the official Catholic position. On the other hand, it is a mistake to think that Republicans have nothing to lose by taking a strong stand against abortion. Many middle-class Republicans and independents, particularly among women, are strong pro-abortionists, and some will vote on this issue alone.)

The President's position on abortion does not satisfy the extremes on either side, but I think it seems basically right to most people who take some kind of religious view of the subject. He can go a long way toward satisfying Catholic opinion by indicating that he believes the unborn baby -- I would not say fetus -- has some kind of "rights."


Aid to parochial schools, to the extent that Supreme Court rulings leave it still an issue, is a difficult subject. It still arouses strong opposition among many Protestants, Jew and public school teachers of all denominations. On balance,



I think there is more politically to be gained than lost through favoring some kind of aid, if a constitutional means can be found.

Catholics are located predominantly in metropolitan areas -- though there are many rural Catholics in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan -- and are therefore particularly concerned about city issues. We should push the crime package much more strongly than we have so far done. More fundamentally, some kind of coordinated program to "save our cities" is most desirable, politically as well as governmentally. Our approach is that this must be done basically at the state and local levels, but we should set forth a program on how it is to be done -- telling how much of the cost can be borne by the federal government, how much locally. We should claim more credit for this year's housing initiative. The busing issue is important to many Catholics, though some are insulated against it by the parochial schools. My feeling is that the President's position on the busing issue is essentially right, is shared by the great majority of Americans -- but we should not proceed as though we viewed it as the major domestic issue in the campaign. It should be one element in an overall array of Ford legislative initiatives.

Most of all, Catholics -- as well as Protestants and Jews -- can be reached through appeals to family values. Much of this is a matter of setting limits beyond which government should not intrude, but also government should contribute to a moral atmosphere in which cohesive families can flourish. Bill Baroody has written with great insight on this subject.



Some comments on particular predominately Catholic ethnic groups:

IRISH, despite their long ties to the Democratic Party, are now most tending toward the Republican Party. The Irish are basically conservative, very patriotic -- concerned about maintaining a strong defense; angry over pornography, other manifestations of "permissive" society. We can appeal to them on some of these issues. For foreign policy reasons, if for no other, the less said about Northern Ireland, the better.

ITALIANS have always been more politically independent than the Irish, are now more upwardly mobile. Many respond to economic conservatism, are concerned about erosion of family values. I would handle saving Italy from the Communists with care -- again primarily on foreign policy grounds, of course; but many Italians in this country as well as in Italy regard the Christian Democrats as incompetent crooks. But prominent Italian-Americans should of course be brought in on any projected aid program.

POLES are a tough nut for Republicans to crack, except in some areas where the Democratic Party has been dominated by the Irish. Best way to appeal is through arguments for economic, social conservatism -- joined to generally progressive vision of the future.

GREEK ORTHODOX, who are not of course Roman Catholics, are deeply concerned over the Cyprus issue -- which is tough to deal with on foreign policy grounds. I suggest that the President might



give the Medal of Freedom for religion to Archbishop Iakobos. It would save us the problem of choosing among the three major faiths, and would be much appreciated among Greeks.

Needless to say, appearances at ethnic festivals, conventions, etc. -- any form of recognition -- will be most helpful.

JEWs edged toward Nixon last time, and are now disturbed over Carter -- but polls show them going for Carter over Ford by about three-to-one. Though relatively few in number, they are articulate and strategically located in such target states as California, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Illinois. We should definitely aim to build Ford strength in the Jewish community. Jews are basically concerned about recognition (like all other groups, but particularly those that have traditionally felt insecure), Israel (toward which we should stress our friendship, within limits set by national policy), and a progressive attitude toward government. Jews tend to be liberals. They will not agree with us on many issues, but I think against Carter we can win a significant number of them to our side.

Let me here express some thoughts about liberals in general. I think we can -- and must -- win a portion of the liberal vote against Carter. To win, a Republican must obviously capture a large share of the independents and also win over a sizable number of Democrats. In the primaries, the Democrats divided, roughly, into a Carter vote, a Jackson-Wallace vote, and a Udall-Brown vote. (I am not sure where Church fits in.) I would argue



that the Jackson-Wallace vote is the least budgeable Democratic vote in November. The moderate-to-conservative Democrats most available to a Republican appeal -- those who voted for Nixon in 1972 -- voted predominantly for Carter. We would have had them again against Humphrey. Against Carter, whom some of them supported in the primaries (many did not vote), this group will be hard to crack. We must and will win back some of them; as we point out Carter's leaning toward liberal measures, but Carter will probably keep many of them. We need to get Democrats from one or both of the other two blocs. The Jackson-Wallace vote, outside the South, are the hard core Democrats, who vote Democratic in November, regardless of who the Democrats put up -- a liberal, a conservative, whatever. The South Boston Irish who voted for Wallace in this year's primary voted for even McGovern four years ago. Carter goes down comparatively easy with them. The Democratic liberals, the Udall-Brown voters, on the other hand, are deeply disturbed about Carter. We should aim to get some of them -- not so much on the issues, as on the ground that if Carter wins, they are likely to be frozen out of control of the Democratic Party for eight years. Similar considerations have led liberals in Texas to vote for John Tower in several elections. Our part should be mainly to keep in mind that part of this vote is now available, and not campaign in such a way that Democratic liberals would feel it impossible to cast a vote for Ford. (They would certainly never vote for Reagan.) Getting even a small share of this vote in the industrial states could be critical.

BLACKS are very difficult for any Republican, and appear to have a special affinity for Carter, with whom many of them share a common Baptist background. It is noteworthy, however, that polls show Ford doing a bit better among blacks -- about five percentage points -- against Carter than Nixon did four years ago. Some of the black leadership is suspicious of Carter, and some -- in Philadelphia and Cleveland -- were able to turn substantial blocs of black voters away from him in the primaries. We should do what we can here, again through recognition, and by stressing opportunity for black businessmen. Pushing aid for Africa also probably helps some. The "Clean Up America" proposal would help with the problem of unemployed black teenagers. To hold on to even that five percent gain among blacks would be extremely valuable in almost all the industrial states.

AGE GROUPS

Poll evidence shows the President doing best against Carter among the middle-aged, ages 36-55. The advantage that he enjoyed among young voters against Humphrey disappears against Carter. Ford also does not do well among older age groups.

To recapture support of youth, Ford needs to stress the underlying idealism of his program -- also how his economic policies will lead to a more prosperous future. The peace issue is also important among young people.



Among older voters, we must overcome the impression that Ford has slighted the elderly. We can appeal to underlying social conservatism, but we should also push much harder on catastrophic health insurance. The President should make this one of his top priority legislative items, and hold the Democrats' feet to the fire if they fail to pass it. We also should stress the President's proposals to assure the fiscal soundness of the Social Security system.

SEXES

The President receives about the same poll ratings from men and women -- but Carter's rating is almost ten points lower among women than among men! I have noticed among my own acquaintances that many women seem to distrust Carter -- the smile turns them off. Obviously, we will just have to hope that this chemistry continues to work.

Mrs. Ford is very helpful to the President with women -- also the Ford family. The President clearly should not take extreme feminist positions. His support for ERA is well known. I think we should make more of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. The strong presence of women in the Ford Administration should be publicized. Beyond that, the President should stress his support for family values -- still the most important consideration with a majority of women.




SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS

BUSINESS in general supports the President -- or Reagan -- but businessmen are not particularly frightened of Carter, as they were of McGovern. We must hammer home the remarkable job the President has done for the economy. Committees of business groups should be organized in all industries and all over the country, if this is not already under way. The President should always stress that his economic policies are designed to benefit the entire country -- not business alone. But our economic approach, unlike that of the Democrats, rests on encouragement of growth and investment in the private sector.

ORGANIZED LABOR, by the large, will be for Carter -- though in some sectors with considerable suspicion and without marked enthusiasm. Fooling around with the kind of insurgent labor leaders who for their own purposes can sometimes be persuaded to support Republicans has never seemed to me to be very productive. Our main objective should be to appeal to the rank-and-file on the basis of the President's general program, and keep the established union leadership from building too much of a head of steam for Carter. Above all, we should not embark on a "crusade" against "union bosses."

SCHOOL TEACHERS are a key group moving closer to the unions and the Democrats, but with strong ties still at the member level to the Republicans. At least half of the nation's school teachers



are Republicans or lean Republican in state and local elections. Endorsement of Carter by the NEA would be a very serious blow, which we should seek strongly to head off. Obviously, the President is not going to meet the NEA's demand that the federal government pay one-third the cost of education - but neither is Carter. The Supreme Court, fortunately, has taken federal regulation of state and local employee relations off our backs ~~the~~. President should say as little as possible about strikes by public employees; it is now mainly a state and local issue.


Since the President favors the teachers' position on portability of pensions, we should turn out a proposal on that subject -- unless the Supreme Court ruling prohibits that, too. I think we should consider proposing a separate Department of Education -- I realize it goes against the Administration's position, but I think the need to appeal to teachers, at least symbolically, is exceptionally important.

NURSES are another middle-class group, leaning Republican in the past, now growing increasingly militant, increasingly Democratic. I don't know specifically what they want from the federal government, but we should try to meet their reasonable aims.

FARMERS obviously must be kept heavily Republican to hold the Plains and Mountains States, and also are important in most of the key heavy population states from New Jersey to Minnesota. The politics of agriculture are beyond me -- although some of the farmers in the Middlewest are said to be mad at us.



ENVIRONMENTALISTS are down on the Ford Administration. Some of them need to be won back. There are many middle-class conservationists and working-class sportsmen who lean toward the Republicans on other issues. We must at least avoid allowing the environmental issue to become so aggravated that environmentalists will vote against Ford on that issue alone. A part of this is going strongly on record in support of a clean environment with a minimum of modifying conditions. We should make the point that our economic policies provide for the kind of investment that will be needed to pay for environmental protection, accompanying growth. We should make more of the ongoing environmental activity being carried on by the Administration. I am told that the environmentalists' current top priorities are: amendments to the Clean Air Act; the toxic substances control bill; and strip mine regulation. I am not familiar with the policy issues involved, but wherever we can responsibly lean toward them, it would be politically helpful. The "Clean Up America" proposal should also be favorably received by environmentalists.



POLITICAL PLAN

POLITICAL FIELD OPERATIONS



FIELD DIRECTOR

The Field Director will have the major responsibility for implementation of the political/people programs of the campaign. While the Deputy Chairman will determine the overall programs, goals and budgeting limitations, the Field Director will have broad powers on day-to-day program implementation insofar as personnel activities, expenditures up to a specified level and other decision areas required to achieve campaign goals within resources available/allocated.

REGIONAL COORDINATORS

The Field Director will supervise the activities of a field force consisting of 10-12 Regional Coordinators and support staff. Each Coordinator will be assigned one major state and from two seven smaller states. He will have secretarial support as well as special on-site assistants in certain priority states.

The Coordinators will be responsible for overseeing/monitoring the progress of the voter contact, turnout and other manpower mobilization programs. They also will assist in

advancing presidential travel, lining up local endorsements, and coordinating PFC programs with party organizations and individual candidates.

They will be responsible for identifying weaknesses or potential trouble spots and reporting them along with recommendations to fix them immediately to the Field Director.

Accountability will be essential. Regular reports should be sent to national headquarters outlining progress, priorities, needs and recommendations. Regional desks should be set up at national headquarters to serve as liaison and support for field personnel.

STATE CHAIRMEN

State Chairmen for each state should be selected by Labor Day. In some cases it will be necessary to wait until after the Convention because we will have to deal with Reagan people.

STATE ORGANIZATIONS

A minimum staff of at least an Executive Director and a secretary will be assigned to each state. In high priority states the staff may reach as high as fifteen.



Executive Director will be responsible to all Deputy Chairmen and will oversee and assist in developing and carrying out the plans of all areas of the campaign. It will be his responsibility to see that the campaign plans in his state are carried out properly and on time.

The spending ceiling will necessitate restricting the number of Ford headquarters around the country and wherever possible the campaign will share space with State Republican Committees and individual candidates. The Executive Director will maintain close liaison with the state party, state and local candidates and local organizations.

In key states and in areas where shared space is not available or inadequate, provisions must be made for independent headquarters.

With the exception of the Executive Director and secretary, most state headquarters will be staffed by volunteers. It will be the duty of the Executive Director to recruit and organize these key volunteers which will include a volunteers chairman, telephone chairman, headquarters chairman, mail supervisor and press assistant.

In states where some or all of the positions will be filled by paid personnel, the Executive Director will work with the Regional Coordinator for his state and the Field Director in locating these people



REGIONAL DESKS

Since the Regional Coordinators will be spending most of their time on the road, Regional Desks will be established at National Headquarters. These desks will be staffed by monitors who will be responsible for being completely aware and current on all campaign activities including voter contact, scheduling, special groups, advocates and media within their assigned states.

The Desk Monitors will serve as liaison with the Regional Coordinators and will report directly to the Field Director. Regional Coordinators will be responsible to the Field Director. However, weekly reports and standard requests for assistance will be channelled through the Desk Monitors.

The Desk Monitors will also be responsible for collecting and synthesizing all reports from the Regional Coordinators and individual State Executive Directors, for making certain that all Coordinators' reports are submitted on time, that overall and special objectives/goals/priorities are achieved or that proper remedial actions are taken.

CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON

There will be a full-time representative of the PFC to coordinate campaign activities with all incumbent Republican Congressmen and Senators, and to work with both campaign committees in their target districts or states. This person must work closely with White House Congressional Liaison.



PERSONNEL SELECTION AND TRAINING

All key staff people must be located and trained well before the Convention, if possible, and certainly no later than Labor Day.

Decision-making on Regional Coordinators and Desk Monitors should be well underway by August 1 and most selections should be finalized by August 15.

An evaluation should be made of all PFC State Executive Directors and necessary changes made.

Immediately following the Convention, a meeting of all Regional Coordinators and key State Executive Directors should be held to discuss game plan, strategy, budgets, timetables, etc. for the Fall campaign.

Prior to this meeting, each Regional Coordinator should be asked to be prepared and thoroughly capable of discussing his assigned states in terms of budget, media, manpower requirements/availability, scheduling opportunities, political environment, state party, other campaigns, etc.

VOTER CONTACT

Most of the voter contact work in terms of telephone and door-to-door activities will be handled/coordinated by the Republican National Committee.

The RNC is preparing detailed state-by-state outline of this program. The plan includes budget figures, proposed locations,



manpower requirements, telephone list availability/capability
and calling goals.

Suggested budgets for the state campaigns follow.



STATE BUDGETS

STATES PLAN

BUDGET

In considering budgets for the individual state campaigns the states were divided into four groups -- states with 4 or less Congressional Districts, states with 5-9 Congressional Districts, states with 10-19 Congressional Districts and states with 20 or more Congressional Districts.

Budgets for each group of states includes a range of high and low budgets and an average budget for each state in that group. Individual group budgets are attached.

Following the individual group budgets is a budget for the entire States program and sample budgets for individual states.

It is critically important that the state field staffs understand that this money, in most cases, is not assigned for their discretionary expenditure. They will follow the campaign plan, hire the people to carry out that plan, acquire the lists, send the mailings and make the phone calls into regions as instructed by the National Campaign.



STATES BUDGET

GROUP I

States with 1-4 Congressional Districts -- Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, North Dakota, Vermont, Wyoming, D. C., Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Nebraska, Arizona, Arkansas, Oregon and West Virginia.

	<u>Range</u>	<u>Average</u>
Salaries*	\$2,500-4,100	\$3,800
Travel	2,000-4,000	3,000
Telephones	2,000-4,000	3,500
Mailings	1,000-4,000	3,000
Overhead	1,500-2,500	2,000
TOTAL	\$9,000-18,600	\$15,300

\$15,300
 x 21 states

GROUP I TOTAL \$321,300



*Group I states will have two staff members each

STATES BUDGET

GROUP II

States with 5-9 Congressional Districts -- Colorado, Kansas, Mississippi, Connecticut, Iowa, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Alabama, Kentucky, Washington, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Tennessee and Wisconsin.

	<u>Range</u>	<u>Average</u>
Salaries*	\$3,700-10,200	\$ 6,600
Travel	3,000-6,500	5,000
Telephone	4,000-8,000	6,000
Mailings	4,000-8,000	5,000
Overhead	2,000-4,500	3,400
TOTAL	\$16,700-37,200	\$26,000

\$26,000
15 states

GROUP II TOTAL \$390,000



*Group II states will have 2-4 staff members -- a Senior

STATES BUDGET

GROUP III

States with 10-19 Congressional Districts -- Georgia, Missouri, Virginia, Indiana, North Carolina, Massachusetts, Florida, New Jersey and Michigan.

	<u>Range</u>	<u>Average</u>
Salaries*	\$4,750-34,600	\$14,000
Travel	4,500-20,000	10,500
Telephones	4,000-20,000	10,200
Mailings	4,500-20,000	10,500
Overhead	3,000-13,000	7,000
TOTAL	\$20,750-107,600	\$52,200

	\$52,200
	<u>9 states</u>
	\$469,800
Phone Banks	<u>94,500</u>
GROUP III TOTAL	\$564,300



*Group III states will have 2-10 staff members

STATES BUDGET

GROUP IV

States with 20 or more Congressional Districts -- Ohio, Illinois, Texas, Pennsylvania, New York and California.

	<u>Range</u>	<u>Average</u>
Salaries*	\$26,800-65,000	\$43,300
Travel	30,000-40,000	33,000
Telephones	20,000-40,000	30,000
Mailings	30,000-50,000	40,000
Overhead	20,000-30,000	25,000
TOTAL	\$126,800-225,000	\$171,300

\$171,300
 6 states

\$1,027,800

Phone Banks 198,000

GROUP IV TOTAL \$1,225,800



*Group IV states will have 10-15 staff members

STATES BUDGET

	I	II	III	IV	TOTAL
Salaries	\$ 79,800	\$ 99,000	\$126,000	\$ 259,800	\$ 564,600
Travel	63,000	75,000	94,500	198,000	430,500
Telephones	73,500	90,000	91,800	180,000	435,300
Mailings	63,000	75,000	94,500	240,000	472,500
Overhead	42,000	51,000	63,000	150,000	306,000
Phone Banks	--	--	94,500	198,000	292,500
 TOTAL	 \$321,300	 \$390,000	 \$564,300	 \$1,225,800	 \$2,501,400



	CONG. DIST.	# STAFF	SALARIES	TRAVEL	TELEPHONE	MAILINGS	OVERHEAD	TOTAL
ALASKA	1	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
DELAWARE	1	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
NEVADA	1	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
NORTH DAKOTA	1	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
VERMONT	1	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
WYOMING	1	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
DIST. OF COLUMBIA	1	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
HAWAII	2	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
IDAHO	2	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
MAINE	2	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
MONTANA	2	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
NEW HAMPSHIRE	2	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
NEW MEXICO	2	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
RHODE ISLAND	2	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
SOUTH DAKOTA	2	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
UTAH	2	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
NEBRASKA	3	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
ARIZONA	4	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
ARKANSAS	4	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
OREGON	4	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
WEST VIRGINIA	4	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
COLORADO	5	3	6500	4900	6000	4900	3300	25,600
KANSAS	5	3	6500	4900	6000	4900	3300	25,600
MISSISSIPPI	5	2	6500	4900	6000	4900	3300	25,600
CONNECTICUT	6	3	6500	4900	6000	4900	3300	25,600
MASSACHUSETTS	6	3	6500	4900	6000	4900	3300	25,600
OKLAHOMA	6	3	6500	4900	6000	4900	3300	25,600
SOUTH CAROLINA	6	2	4400	3300	4000	3300	2200	17,200

	CONG. DIST.	# STAFF	SALARIES	TRAVEL	TELEPHONE'S	MAILINGS	EVERHEAD	TOTAL
ALABAMA	7	2	4400	3300	4000	3300	2200	17,200
ALABAMA	7	3	6500	4900	6000	4900	3300	25,600
WASHINGTON	7	3	6500	4900	6000	4900	3300	25,600
LOUISIANA	8	2	4400	3300	4000	3300	2200	17,200
MARYLAND	8	4	8500	6400	8000	6400	4300	33,600
MINNESOTA	8	4	8500	6400	8000	6400	4300	33,600
KENTUCKY	8	4	8500	6400	8000	6400	4300	33,600
WISCONSIN	9	4	8500	6400	8000	6400	4300	33,600
GEORGIA	10	2	6100	4600	4000	4600	3100	22,400
MISSOURI	10	4	11500	8700	8000	8700	5800	42,700
VIRGINIA	10	4	11500	8700	8000	8700	5800	42,700
INDIANA	11	4	11500	8700	8000	8700	5800	42,700
NORTH CAROLINA	11	4	11500	8700	8000	8700	5800	42,700
MASSACHUSETTS	12	2	6100	4600	4000	4600	3100	22,400
FLORIDA	15	8	20500	15400	16000	15400	10000	77,300
NEW JERSEY	15	8	20500	15400	16000	15400	10000	77,300
MICHIGAN	19	10	26000	19500	20000	19500	13000	98,000
OHIO	23	10	39500	30000	20000	30000	20000	139,500
ILLINOIS	24	10	39500	30000	20000	30000	20000	139,500
TEXAS	24	10	39500	30000	20000	30000	20000	139,500
PENNSYLVANIA	25	10	39500	30000	20000	30000	20000	139,500
NEW YORK	39	15	50800	39000	30000	39000	26000	184,800
CALIFORNIA	43	15	50800	39000	30000	39000	26000	184,800



STATES PLAN

PROPORTIONAL BUDGET BREAKDOWN

\$200,000 PLAN

Salaries	20%	\$40,000
Telephones	15	30,000
Overhead	10	20,000
Mailings	30	60,000
Travel	20	40,000
Miscellaneous	5	<u>10,000</u>
		\$200,000

\$50,000 PLAN

Salaries	30	\$15,000
Telephones	10	5,000
Overhead	10	5,000
Mailings	20	10,000
Travel	15	7,500
Miscellaneous	5	<u>2,500</u>
		\$50,000



NOTE: Campaign materials provided by the National PFC

Targeted States: West - Southwest - Border - Midwest

California
Washington
Oregon
Texas
New Mexico
Colorado
Kansas
Missouri
Nebraska
Iowa
Illinois
Indiana
Ohio
Kentucky
Tennessee
Virginia
Florida
Maryland
Michigan
Wisconsin

Targeted States: West - Border - Midwest - Northeast

California
Oregon
Washington
Ohio
Indiana
Illinois
Michigan
Wisconsin
Iowa
Nebraska
Kansas
Missouri
Minnesota
Maryland
Florida
Massachusetts
New Jersey
Connecticut
Pennsylvania
New York



NATIONAL CAMPAIGN PROJECTIONS

Media (Including Campaign '76)	\$10,000,000
Presidential Travel	500,000
Vice Presidential Travel	1,450,000
Advocates Travel	500,000
Polls	800,000
National Headquarters (Including Special Groups)	3,000,000
Closing Costs	250,000
Reserve	2,800,000
States	<u>2,500,000</u>
TOTAL	\$21,800,000

6/28/76



NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS

Payroll/Consultants - 190 (including taxes)		\$1,150,000
Staff Travel*		200,000
Chairman (20 trips)	\$10,000	
Political (150 trips)	75,000	
Press (50 trips)	25,000	
Other (150 trips)	75,000	
Misc.	15,000	
Newsletters/Mailings		200,000
Special Groups Programs		900,000
Overhead		550,000
Rent	\$ 60,000	
Telephones	180,000	
Postage	40,000	
Telegrams	15,000	
Supplies	50,000	
Equipment	40,000	
Insurance	75,000	
Furniture	60,000	
Misc.	30,000	
TOTAL		\$3,000,000



*Average Trip: Economy class round trip to Dallas(\$240.00),
three days @ \$75/day = \$465.

HEADQUARTERS PAYROLL PROJECTIONS

<u>Staff</u>	<u>Now</u>	<u>Gen.</u>	<u>Est. Payroll</u>
Chairman	7	8	\$ 24,000
Hughes	1	2	5,000
Treasure	12	16	32,000
Treas.-Reg.	-	30	48,000
Gen. Counsel	4	6	12,000
• Press	5	10	24,000
Special Groups	8	30	60,000
Administration	12	37	40,000
Scheduling	4	10	18,000
Research	3	6	10,000
Volunteers	2	5	5,000
Political	14	28	87,000
Consultants	4	4	18,000
Total		192	\$383,000/month
Three-month Total			\$1,149,000

Campaign '76 -- unknown staff size/location



SPACE

Suite 250 - 6,000 sq. ft. \rangle \$10,000/month
Suite 1002 - 5,000 sq. ft. \rangle

8,000 sq. ft. addition space

\$20,000/month for three months -- \$60,000

TELEPHONE

Out WATS - \$1675 x 25	\$41,875
In WATS - \$1700 x 5	8,500
Long Distance	14,000
Basic bills	7,500

TOTAL \$71,875/mo.

CAMPAIGN TOTAL \$179,700



PRESIDENTIAL TRAVEL

Definition of an average trip: Total of 8 hours flying time on Air Force One, helicopter from White House to Andrews AFB and return, 10 political people accompanying and six events/locations scheduled.

Average Expenses:

• AF-1 and Helicopter	\$ 4,300
White House Advance (12)	9,000
Press Advance (4)	3,000
Advance Staff Office	3,000
Events/Locations @ \$4,000 ea.	24,000
Overnight	<u>1,500</u>
TOTAL	\$44,800

President can make ten average trips for less than \$500,000.



VICE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE'S STAFF AND TRAVEL

Staff -- 8 full time

Advance -- 6 full time and 10 expenses only

One Advance (including press function) per event

Three events/day at \$1,500 per event

Per-month costs:

Aircraft	\$250,000
Salaries	
Staff (8)	24,000
Advance (6)	12,000
Event expense (90 events)	135,000
Per diem (@ \$75/day max.)	
Staff	18,060
Advance (16)	36,000
Air fare (16 @ \$500/wk.)	34,400
Misc.	25,000
V.P. Salary/Expenses	<u>7,500</u>
Total	\$541,960/month
Campaign Total	\$1,083,920



ADVOCATE TRAVEL

These expense estimates are based on first-class air fare (for one person) and per diem expenses (one person, one overnight).

Average Air Fare	\$350.00
Average Per Diem	<u>100.00</u>
Total/Trip	\$450.00

Cost for 1,000 trips (for one person) \$450,000

This includes advocacy-type appearances by PFC leadership.



SPECIAL GROUPS

SPECIAL GROUPS

People involvement -- workers, advocates and supporters -- will be an important aspect of this campaign. Special Group programs should tie into and emphasize the constituency priorities of the campaign.

The Special Groups program offers the PFC an opportunity to involve, communicate with and influence millions of potential supporters. This program will cover both demographic (ethnic, seniors, youth, blacks, etc.) and non-demographic (business, professional, etc.) groups.

One of the really important characteristics of these special voter blocs for this election is the fact that many have their own infrastructure/organization and established channels of communication that offer an opportunity to greatly stretch campaign dollars while still achieving tremendous impact.

BUDGETING

As in virtually all areas of the campaign, the amount of dollars ultimately allocated to Special Groups will determine the scope and activities of this year. In the budget that accompanies this report, \$900,000 is allocated for Special Groups. This figure should be considered sufficient for a moderate, but by no means large scale program. An



example of the type of program that could be carried out within a given group is the outline of the Youth program that appears at the end of this report. As can be seen from the outline, the degree of impact varies significantly.

TARGET GROUPS

One critical step in arriving at a total budget amount for Special Groups is to determine for which groups there will be organized programs.

Presently, there are two programs -- Women and Youth -- under development at PFC and a Senior Citizens Task Force has been created.

Other possible target groups include:

Ethnic Cultural -- Black, Eastern European, Western European, Hispanic, Oriental, etc.

Social-Economic -- Professional, white collar, educators, labor, etc.

Religious -- Catholic, Jewish, Mormon, Seventh Day Adventist.

PRIORITIZATION

Within the groups selected, priorities and corresponding budget ranges should be assigned. General guidelines should



be established for personnel, travel, reporting, accountability and goals.

Each group coordinator should then be assigned to develop several program options, using these guidelines, similar to those in the attached Youth program.

ORGANIZATION

The Special Groups Program will be headed by a Deputy Chairman who will report directly to the Chairman and will work closely with the Deputy Chairman for Political, the Field Director, the Press Secretary and other campaign officials.

Although most individuals involved in the Special Groups Program will be volunteers, there is a need for a small staff of paid professionals to coordinate and oversee the activity.

Commitments must be made to individual group coordinators as early as possible and in many cases before the Convention. Here again, consideration must be given in some cases to the Vice Presidential possibilities. However, key national group coordinators should be selected prior to the Convention due to the lead time required for program development.



PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

The first major assignment to each national group coordinator should be to develop various program options within predetermined guidelines and budget ranges.

These program options should be detailed and cover areas such as personnel, program objectives/goals, media, voter and contact options as well as total estimated costs and a detailed program timetable.

In some cases it may be necessary to assign this program development activity to individuals prior to bringing them on board.

Once again, the importance of lead time and early organization must be stressed.

COMMUNICATIONS

In addition to sound organization, good, effective communications -- both internal and external -- will be essential to the success of this program.

INTERNAL -- Strict accountability and reporting are critical in this area. Traditionally, Special Groups have been among the most loose, least structured parts of national campaigns. Under the new election law, this situation cannot exist.



In addition, careful planning will be required to insure that good communication exist between PFC Special Groups coordinators and those in similar positions in the White House, RNC, state parties and GOP candidate organizations.

Although national and state level Special Groups coordinators work directly for the Deputy Chairman, they must also work closely and coordinate their activities with the State PFC Executive Director, PFC field personnel and other appropriate individuals and organizations.

As in other programs, a key consideration in selecting individuals for Special Groups coordinators will be their ability to cooperate and work effectively with groups at all levels.

MASS COMMUNICATIONS -- The major vehicles used to reach and influence special voters will include personal advocates, direct mail, print media, some electronic media and, of course, adequate field personnel.

Advocates -- A primary criteria for selecting Special Group Chairmen should be speaking ability as they will be required to maintain a heavy public schedule. (NOTE: In some cases, there may be a Special Group Chairman who is a volunteer and a front man who is on board on an expenses-only basis while there is also a paid



executive director or coordinator who handles day-to-day planning and logistics.)

Special Groups advocates must be recruited early and their scheduling must be coordinated with other PFC advocates.

Direct Mail -- Due to its high degree of targetability, direct mail will be a key element in the communications program of most special groups. Mail will be sent to established group lists as well as into geographic areas with high concentrations of certain groups -- young people, senior citizens, blue collar, high income people, etc.

Mail would be used to promote the President's record on certain issues and to recruit volunteers. It also would be particularly useful for generating publicity and crowd building for rallies and advocate appearances. For example, in the case of a tour by Jack Ford or a leading senior citizen advocate, letters might be sent into the neighborhoods surrounding the site of an event. The letter would promote the President's record on youth or senior citizens issues and invite local citizens to attend the rally.



The mail effort might also be supplemented by a telephone program. Telephone manuscripts containing the names and telephone numbers of those receiving the mail could be generated and phonebanks set up to further encourage turnout and promote the President's record.

The overall effect of this approach would be to generate tremendous enthusiasm for the campaign in a very low profile manner thus enhancing the spontaneous nature and bandwagon effect for the overall campaign.

Print Media -- Paid advertisements in demographic and ethnic publications also will be utilized although the extent will be more limited than in previous campaigns due to budget restriction. More emphasis must be placed on editorial and leadership endorsements that will be carried as straight news and thus be free advertising.

Decisions also must be made as to the quantities/dollars allocated for Special Group literature. Here again, the quantities and variety will necessarily have to be more limited than in past elections. Literature and materials distribution must also be carefully regulated.



Electronic Media -- Paid radio advertising geared to youth, seniors and ethnics will be limited and concentrated in priority states.



The following are examples of the type of planning and questions that have to be answered for all our special groups.



The following sample budgets are examples of how few dollars we have when proportioned by states.

They do not include:

1. Advertising
2. Presidential Travel
3. Vice Presidential or Advocate Travel
4. Phone Banks
5. Collateral Material

All of the above will come out of the National Budget.



AN ETHNIC PLAN

MEXICAN-AMERICAN/SPANISH AMERICA

Mexican Americans hold the balance of power in four (4) states -- California, Texas, Illinois and New Mexico. They could have an impact in Colorado and perhaps the numbers generally are "not sufficient to influence the outcome of any Presidential election in Arizona." However, I would point out that old voting habits may change in 1976 and the Colorado and Arizona population could make the difference.

This analysis is directed at the Spanish/Mexican-American and does not refer to the Hispanic potential in New York (Puerto Ricans) or Florida (Cubans) etc.

Let me emphasize that a strategy should not be based on the assumption that the group is monolithic. For example, the Hispanic population in New Mexico is different in southern New Mexico where the heritage is Mexican in origin compared with Northern New Mexico where the ancestry is of Spain.

A profile of the Spanish/Mexican origin population reveals:

1. They are younger. U.S. Department of Commerce, May 10, 1974, press release reveals that they are "about 8 years younger than the rest of the population. The Spanish origin median age was 20.1 years in March of 1973 compared with 28.4 years for persons not of Spanish origin. Persons of Mexican and Puerto Rican origin were even younger, each group having a median age of 18.8 years" Interestingly, Cubans are mostly of adult age, 35.3 years.
2. They are more likely to work in blue collar and



service occupations. Over 2/3rd of Spanish origin Americans fit this category.

3. The median family income is lower than the 1972 U.S. figure of \$11,120.00

Spanish-Americans	\$8,180.00
Mexican-Americans	7,910.00
Puerto Rican	7,160.00


4. Over 80% of the families live in metropolitan areas.
5. They are almost all Catholic with larger families
6. Education levels are lower, but rising dramatically.
7. There has been a "tremendous decrease of the number of persons of Central or South American origin"
8. They are more likely to be unemployed than white workers. But more likely than blacks to work or look for work (press release from U.S. Department of Labor Bureau Statistics, April 1974).
9. "Adult Spanish women participate in the labor force to a lesser extent than both white and black women" -- a reflection probably of the strong family responsibilities they feel.
10. They are mostly Democrat.



PROBLEMS:

As we develop a strategy to deal with this extremely important voter, we should keep in mind some of the following:

1. Jimmy Carter allegedly speaks Spanish and has already plowed some important turf in the Spanish-origin strategy by meeting with 40 representatives of various Hispanic groups in Houston -- promising them he would be totally accessible to them. In fact, they would have his private White House phone number -- the one besides his bed. I'm told he has travelled extensively in Mexico.
2. President Ford may not be sufficiently informed on Spanish-Mexican culture --e.g. the tamale incident in Texas.
3. Spanish surrogate capacity for the Administration is limited. We have Phil Sancher, Congressman Manuel Lujan, Al Zapanta, Alex Armanderiz and the White House Spanish-American Advisor. The Democrats have two Governors, neither of whom is up for re-election; Castro of Arizona and Apodaca of New Mexico. They have several Congressmen. Senator Montoya (in a tough re-election effort) and a score of locally elected public officials.
4. They are largely opposed to abortion contrasted with Mrs. Ford's position.
5. They are Catholic and our ticket will probably be Protestant
6. They tend to vote Democrat because of their registration and socio-economic status.
7. Virtually impossible to get non-Republican Spanish origin Ford supporters to work with the Republican Party at the local levels.




8. Heavy emphasis from organized labor in the Southwest to register minority voters- e.g. Southwest Voter Education Project.

A Suggested Ford Strategy For the Spanish-Mexican Origin Voter:

A. Pre-Republican Convention

- * 1. Research on Presidential accomplishments in this area:
 - (a) Hispanics (include Puerto Ricans & Cubans, etc.) appointed to Administration positions and Advisory Boards.
 - (b) Legislation that has affected them as an ethnic group or a socio-economic voter, e.g. Signing of legislation to guarantee Spanish Heritage Americans are not under-counted in future Census Counts. Important data used from Census data can affect federally funded projects.
 - (c) U.S. foreign policy initiatives that impact on the voter's heritage.
2. Pressure of Republican National Committee for high visibility at the Convention for Spanish Americans.
3. Consideration of possible platform convention initiatives that can impact on this voter group.
4. Courting of Spanish Representatives from the media (radio/T.V./newspapers) for their potential coverage of the Convention, and then assuring there is some Hispanic color.
5. You may want to consider invitations issued to various Hispanic American groups' leaders to be the President's special guests (at their own expense) at the Convention. e.g. Mannie Fierro with El Congreso; President of LULAC, et
6. Research compiled on Hispanic voter media outlets. Which newspaper/radio/ and T.V. stations have Spanish



formats. Program times? Audiences? Spanish? Cuban? English? What is the language. Who controls them? Is the Editor a possible friend?

7. Research compiled on the demographics on the Hispanic voter in each metropolitan area.
8. Survey Research (preferably in the field) to determine Hispanic Voter attitudes. This may be a post-convention rather than pre-convention activity.

B. Convention Strategy:

Some things that might be considered here are:

1. One of President Ford's nominating speeches by a Spanish American. Congressman Lujan did one for Nixon in 1972.
2. Use of Ford Spanish-American delegates in various ways- an example might be a caucus of such delegates approving a caucus resolution of support because of the President's record in this area.
3. Convention Resolution addressing the Hispanic-Catholic?
4. A meaningful plant in the Platform.

C. Campaign Strategy for Hispanic Voters:


1. Hispanic input immediately after the Convention- if not sooner -...a brainstorming session of Hispanics should rendezvous to discuss a game-plan, not formalize ...
I personally feel this is critical as too often strategy is formulated at a level highly removed from the group to be impacted.
2. It's important to remember that Spanish Americans who are Republicans are very often out of the main stream of thought of the typical Hispanic voter. Usually they



are better educated and higher on the socio-economic scale.

The discussion group should cover a wide range of the social scale . . Perhaps it should include:

1. Al Zapanta - who understands the potential of the office of the Presidency/Administration potential and campaign capacity.
2. Young, La Raza , activist
3. Someone active in Spanish organizations -like Joe Benites who was head of LULAC
4. Hispanic, non-working mother
5. Spanish-American active in a Veterans group. Hispanics dominate many of the American Legion Posts, DAV's, etc.
6. Traditional/Hispanic- active Catholic - Priest?
7. Spanish-American active in a poverty program
8. Spanish American businessman
9. Maybe there are others that should also be included.



The analysis should cover President Ford's strengths and weaknesses with the Spanish community --- possible voter issues -- presidential strategy -- Administration response possibilities.

3. Staffing:

The allocation of your resources will have to depend on where this voter group fits on the campaign priority scale. I would have to have more input from someone who has worked on the ethnic program for a National campaign, but sure as hell most of the staff's time is spent stroking the egos of your ethnic state leaders.

At a very minimum -- put someone at a high campaign policy level who is Hispanic and give him (or her) a top notice Spanish secretary.

4. Budget

Depends on Hispanic brain-storming and your voter priority, but it seems that the largest bulk ought to be to the Hispanic media outlets if the survey data supports that it has the impact.

Since the group is not monolithic -- different messages will be needed for different markets.

5. The Volunteers

The Ford Committee's Grass Roots Hispanic Program:

FORD CAMPAIGN STATE ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE:

1. A Spanish-American to be appointed to serve as State Chairman of (Hispanic) Affairs for President Ford.

Interchange Spanish/Mexican/Cuban etc. as appropriate.

a. Functions and Responsibilities of State Chairman:

1. Seek local Spanish-American to assume the campaign activities on a local/target area district within a County.
2. Provide local contact with an outline of responsibilities - goals to achieve/ game plan for creating a Ford movement within the local area.
3. Develop a voter registration plan for each local chairman to implement. Emphasis on G.O.P. registrants.
4. Develop a system for distribution of literature/ issue papers, etc. for local use and input.
5. Make press contacts within local communities of Spanish-American media outlets.
6. Develop a plan to identify and follow-up with Republicans Spanish-surnames to get them to the polls.



7. Working with local contact in the area --an attempt should be made to work with Senior Citizens/Youth/ Church auxiliaries/ veteran groups to develop a volunteer group of activists in each special interest group.
- b. State Chairman to appoint an Advisory Committee to be representative of all classes of Spanish-Americans citizens within State ...This Advisory Committee should promote activity within their State organizations such as LULAC- American Legion--G.I. Forum--Cambio--SER --
- c. A direct mail program to be developed to special interest groups that are predominately Spanish-oriented with specific issues (expressed in layman's language) that would appeal to the particular special interest group (e.g. -- day care centers for working mothers to residents residing in low-income housing developments). Letter to be signed by a woman that would be known in the neighborhood to her neighbors. Another example would be an ex-president of the GI Forum writing to all members in his chapter on the issue of veterans' benefits.

I think it is important to remember the local area you are attempting to organize--- and recruit a local contact for the area that best represents the overall resident. For instance, in low income/ blue collar "across the tracks" Spanish communities, you cannot establish rapport or build a working unit, if you use the Spanish American building contractor that has moved up and maybe sits on the City Commission ..he will be resented ..It's best to go to one of their own .. for instance the local barber has a lot better relationship with the residents.



Besides the regular sources of Spanish-American community leaders and average neighbor-to-neighbor type, the Chicano Affairs Programs at the different Universities should be contacted. These offices could also be a source for volunteers and the development of a Youth Hispanic Program.

6. Talk about the Republican Record and the Spanish American, Emphasize the past eight years of Hispanic influence in Government, if the record supports it. The appointments made compared with the LBJ and Kennedy Administration.

The Presidential Strategy for the Hispanic Voter:

1. What can the President/Vice President/Vice President candidate/ Secretary of State do with other countries to impact on America's Hispanic voters?
 - a. Mexico - What can we do with this country's leaders, economy, people to show our concern? One of the staff members reminded me that in 1972, Nixon brought the President of Mexico to the United States on a "Mission of State" and toured him through Chicago, Texas and Los Angeles.
 - b. Spain - Any possible Presidential follow-ups on King Carlos' visit to America?
 - c. Puerto Rico? Cuba? South America?
2. What can Vice-President Rockefeller do? He speaks Spanish-- travelled extensively in South America - owns a ranch in Venezuela. Knows the Hispanic culture. What kind of ideas does he have for Hispanic strategy?
3. Possible Presidential appointments for high level Hispanic jobs? The White House six months ago was collecting resumes of Spanish Americans. Are they trying to match up ethnics





with all jobs that are supposed to be available?

4. As Commander-in-Chief, what can the President do?
Hispanics have a great deal of pride in this country and greater percentages than Anglos served in the World Wars, the Korean and Vietnam Wars.
Has there ever been a Hispanic Admiral? General?
Is there a World War 1 Spanish American Veteran whose veteran's rights have been screwed up by the V.A.?
5. How about a Spanish American Cabinet Member? Has there ever been one? Is anyone leaving the Cabinet? Federal Judge vacancies?
6. Does any of the Ford family speak Spanish? Maybe Jack or Susan should learn. Does the Mexican Ambassador to the United States have a daughter that Jack can date?
7. Should the Administration set out a bold, new, Mexico-South-American thrust. The Alliance for Progress was a political hook for the Kennedy Administration.
8. Is there a political hook on international athletics to appeal to Hispanics? Olympics? Will there be an American Hispanic gold medalist? Has there ever been one? Other ethnics?
9. Cultural exchanges with Mexico? Spain? South America? O.A.S.?
10. Set up an early brainstorming session of politically astute guys who really know the nuances of Presidential power, prerogatives and protocol who can kick around what a President can do to impact on Hispanic and other ethnics.
11. Think about Gerry Ford, the guy and Gerald Ford, the President, and what he or the Administration can do vis a vis the Catholic Church. Relations with the Pope?

The Vatican? American Cardinals? Archbishop Robert Robert Sanchez of Santa Fe -- the first Spanish American Archbishop in the United States?

What issues can the President address that concern Catholics? Abortion? Aid to Private or Catholic Schools?

12. Presidential activity re-enforcing the strong family unit as he did with the H.E.W. insanity on Father-sons/ mom-daughter banquets. Spanish -Americans have extra strong family loyalties.
13. Presidential activity that appeals to "social conservatism" of the ethnic and blue collar worker.

Some Miscellaneous Thoughts

Young Spanish-Americans are much more active now. Basically liberal with lots of ethnic pride, but much more practical. There is a glimmer of awareness in New Mexico, for example, that the Democratic Party has used the Spanish American and the Democrats have taken them for granted for too long. There is a feeling that the two-party system offers them something -- political leverage on the parties for Spanish support.

The President's support from Spanish-Americans is hindered by the perception of ethnic and blue collar workers of Republicans in general. Republicans, they believe are insensitive to the wage earner and minority citizen. Republicans are the Party of big business and the rich.



YOUTH PROGRAM

POST-CONVENTION YOUTH PROGRAM



PLAN I

A basic youth program with a budget of \$100,000 and a staff of 25, would consist of a youth volunteer recruitment effort in each state following the Convention. With youth chairmen in each state and high school and college coordinators on as many campuses as possible, the Youth Department would undertake to recruit volunteers to assist at local Ford headquarters throughout the country. Although limited in scope, an effort on college campuses to register Ford supporters to vote would also be made.

PLAN II

If an additional \$100,000 were available to the Youth Department, a more visible program in key states would be undertaken. This program would consist of an organizational effort in 20 key states during the month of September to plan a series of tours throughout the 20 states by Jack Ford and other members of the First Family. These tours, which would take place throughout the month of October, would be designed to capture media attention, create excitement and build a bandwagon psychology in our most important states (lists of possible key states are attached).

A very important element of this program is control by the Youth Department. In order to maximize the effect of this effort, all elements of the program must be under the control and coordination of the Youth Department.

PLAN III

With the addition of another \$550,000, a concerted effort would be made to reach and impact a large segment of the under-thirty population in the 20 key states. Under-thirty communities would be located by census tracts and, using the student organizations developed under Plan I, canvassed by telephone and door-to-door to identify and register Ford supporters and turn them out on Election Day. In addition, special youth mailings designed to encourage voter registration would be sent via bulk mail into these communities in early September and leaflet drops announcing advocate appearances, rallies, etc. would be made in October. In addition to identifying and shoring up support, this program would also include volunteer recruitment in these communities. Budgets for each of these programs are attached.



PLAN I

Salaries

Director and three deputies	\$14,000
Regional coordinators (10)	\$21,000
Field people (5)	\$ 9,450
Clerical (5)	\$ 9,450
Travel cost and staff expenses	\$25,000
Materials and supplies	\$25,000

Total	\$103,900

PLAN II

Salaries

Advance people (4)	\$12,500
Press people (4)	\$12,500

	\$25,000
Travel and expenses	\$30,000
Materials and supplies	\$30,000
Advertising, media	\$15,000

Total	\$100,000




PLAN III

Salaries

Field staff	\$25,000
Travel and Expenses	\$25,000
Materials and Supplies	
(brochures, flyers, forms)	\$200,000
Advertising, media	\$100,000
Telephone	\$50,000
Postage	\$150,000

Total \$550,000



WOMEN'S DIVISION

WOMEN'S DIVISION



Women represent a tremendous resource for the President's campaign. Polls indicate that women are very supportive of President and Mrs. Ford, especially as compared to Jimmy Carter.

PHASE I

One of the most visible ways to reach out to women and demonstrating their support is by staging a "Women for Ford Day" after Labor. This special day would be observed with rallies and seminars in cities in all fifty states. Local events would range in size from 100-2,000 participants. In as many cities as possible a well-known woman will be in attendance. These women will include Mrs. Ford, Cabinet wives, high-ranking administration spokeswomen, elected officials, etc.

In order to accomplish these events a ten-women field force would be hired on August 20th along with a support staff. As often as possible these field people would be identified and volunteering prior to the 20th.

Each field worker would be responsible for one major state and from two to seven smaller states. She would work to coalesce not only the local and state Republican women's organizations but also non-political women's activist groups. She would work in her states to see that arrangements are made and that all advance work is done in preparation for the Women's day.

By tapping this reservoir of support, we can provide the campaign with thousands of visible supporters and volunteers who can staff

telephone banks, canvass door-to-door, distribute literature, staff headquarters and provide business and professional endorsements.



It is critically important that we demonstrate early the broad base of support the President has among women. They will provide not only the bullwark of our volunteer program but also a visible and potent example of the President's appeal.

PHASE II

Following the "Women for Ford Day" a second phase in the Women's program would begin. This phase would include a series of brunches lunches, etc. with important women at the state level. State women's leaders would be invited to Washington to meet with top women in the Ford Administration. The field people would work at the local level in their states to provide workers for phone centers, canvassing, etc. and help in the planning of mailings and rallies.

During the last ten days of the campaign PR would be shut off and a last minute push would be made in absentee ballot programs (set up in advance), telephone programs, etc.

All of this activity would be augmented with a constant barrage of local publicity in the weeklies and small radio stations -- announcements of appointments to the Ford Committee, women of that community attending meetings, people getting special pictures, etc. from the President, appearance on talk shows by local PFC members, local people speaking at clubs, coffees, etc.

Budgets for the two phases of the Women's program are attached.

WOMEN'S DIVISION BUDGETS

PHASE I -- "Women for Ford Day" -- August 20-September 20

Salaries	\$ 23,800
10 field people @ \$1,500/mo.	
10 support staff @ \$700/mo.	
Travel	20,000
Materials	10,000
Speakers' Travel	32,500
100 speakers -- average trip-	
\$250 + \$75/day for one day	

PHASE I TOTAL \$ 86,300

PHASE II -- Continuing program throughout campaign --
September 20-November 2

Salaries	\$ 35,700
Maintain field and support staff above	
Travel	20,000
Speakers' Travel	32,500
100 additional appearances	
Materials	25,000

PHASE II TOTAL \$113,200

PHASE I AND II TOTAL \$199,500

