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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 21, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MIKE DUVAL

FROM:

DAVE GERGEN *DS*

SUBJECT:


The Politics of  
Presidential Travel

George Van Cleve has been conducting a very interesting survey of the impact of Presidential travel upon the President's approval ratings. Here is a summary of what he has found so far (see attached for full report).

Conventional wisdom holds that Presidential summitry should be a significant plus for a President. In recent years, however, this assumption has been increasingly questioned. In the case of President Ford, George finds that summit trips have had only a minimal impact -- and in some instances, the impact has definitely been negative. For example, the President suffered a three-point drop in his Gallup approval ratings before and after Rambouillet -- a change that may have been tied to domestic events but one also suggesting that Rambouillet did not have a strong, positive influence.

Analysis has not been done on domestic travel, but evidence from the foreign trips suggests that domestic trips -- especially political ones where the President is primarily in the role of campaigner -- should have even less benefit and can easily be more negative in character.

Attachment



June 17, 1976



MEMORANDUM FOR: DAVE GERGEN

FROM: GEORGE VAN CLEVE

GWVC

SUBJECT: FACTORS INFLUENCING PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL  
RATINGS -- PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

This preliminary analysis of factors influencing Presidential approval ratings summarizes the work I've done on the problem to date and indicates areas in which I intend to do further work.

#### BACKGROUND

We have data concerning President Ford based on two different and presently noncomparable<sup>1</sup> questions:

1. Gallup: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Ford is handling his job?"
2. Sindlinger: "How would you rate the overall kind of job President Ford is doing as President -- Excellent -- Pretty Good -- Only Fair -- or Poor?"

Gallup has been asking Americans the same question since the time of the Roosevelt Administration. I don't know how far back the Sindlinger data goes. Table II presents detailed approval rating data for the Ford administration from the Gallup/Sindlinger polls.

Although approval rating questions have been asked of Americans for many years, a search through 30 years of back issues of Public Opinion Quarterly, a journal devoted entirely to survey methodology and analysis, failed to disclose a single article or note which discussed the factors influencing Presidential approval

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<sup>1</sup>

As you know, when Sindlinger asks the same question Gallup uses, the responses he gets are close to those Gallup gets.



ratings. Nor is there any discussion of the way in which approval ratings translate into voting intentions. I emphasize that the conclusions I draw below rest on a common sense testing scheme rather than on previous empirical work or a series of scientific experiments.

Note: Comparison of Average Presidential Ratings

Newspapers occasionally publish comparisons of approval ratings across administrations. The comparisons are presented as though they actually had predictive value. It is generally implied that President X had a better rating than President Y at a particular point in their respective administrations; yet President X was defeated; therefore President Y will also be defeated. This analysis is completely mistaken, for two reasons: first, no one knows how approval ratings translate into votes (Truman's last rating before the 1948 election was 39); secondly, the events of President X's administration which gave him a higher rating at a particular point may not be at all comparable to events in President Y's administration. Although such comparisons should be made with the utmost caution, I have assembled comparative data which gives the average annual approval ratings for several administrations for the purpose of allowing a response to this type of journalism. The data are presented in Table I.

FACTORS INFLUENCING APPROVAL RATINGS: THE EXAMPLE OF FOREIGN PRESIDENTIAL TRAVEL

We might wish to know how foreign travel and meetings with foreign leaders affect the President's approval ratings. The conventional wisdom has been that such travel generally improves Presidential approval ratings. A moment's thought will expose this as a facile conclusion. To be sure, the fact of travel itself may demonstrate to some people that the President is taking an active role in the conduct of foreign policy, something which people generally expect the President to do. But perhaps the same travel will mean to other people that the President is neglecting important domestic responsibilities. Perhaps the countries visited by the President, the leaders with whom he meets, and the results of the meeting will have independent effects. For example, a Ford-Arafat meeting would be likely to have very negative effects on the attitudes of certain parts of the population, even though it might favorably affect attitudes held by other groups. Most importantly,



however, how is one to separate the effects of domestic events occurring within the same time period from the effects of the foreign travel itself?

To this last question, at least, there is an answer of sorts. The Sindlinger data we have available represents a composite view of the President based on a combination of views of his domestic and of his international performance. Public opinion on Ford foreign affairs performance often moves independently of public opinion on Ford domestic performance -- see, for example, the shifts in ratings contained in Table III-C. This means that we can probably isolate the effects of foreign travel with a higher degree of certainty than we could obtain if we tried to sort out the effects of domestic travel. Of course, there will be situations in which, because of the greater connection perceived between a particular foreign policy move and its domestic policy effects, this will not be possible. One example would be the problem of foreign grain sales; another might be the problem of foreign arms sales. But generally, we can separate the effects of domestic and international events using the Sindlinger data. Comparison with the Gallup data will help to provide a cross-check on the conclusions we derive.

#### ANALYZING THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN PRESIDENTIAL TRAVEL: THE PROBLEM

During the first year and one-half of his Administration, the President spent about 25% of his time travelling (i. e., he was on the road one day out of every four). About one-half of this time was devoted to foreign travel. Theoretically, foreign Presidential travel could either help the President, hurt him, or have no effect. It is also possible that a particular trip might have one of these effects, while another trip might have a different effect. A discussion of the method used in analyzing the data for the foreign trips (Tables IIIA-F) can be found in Appendix I. This is what the evidence suggests:

#### VLADIVOSTOK AND JAPAN (TABLE III-A)

More than any other trip, this one was associated with a drop in the President's approval ratings: six points on the Gallup scale.



The trip to Russia and Japan occurred during a period in which there was (1) a large amount of adverse economic news and (2) Watergate-related news in which the White House and former President Nixon played a part. It seems safe to assume that at least part of the President's ratings slippage is to be attributed to the Watergate news and economic events. Did the President's trip forestall an even greater decline? The answer to this question seems to be no, because the Sindlinger data for the period immediately after the trip indicates that the President's international performance ratings slipped more sharply from the previous period than did his domestic ratings.\* Therefore either the President's trip had no effect or it had a slightly negative effect.

#### MARTINIQUE (TABLE III-B)


The Martinique trip came during a period of slippage on both domestic and international fronts; the trip itself appears not to have had any substantial positive effect on the President's ratings.

#### WESTERN EUROPE (TABLE III-C)

The President enjoyed a solid upturn during this period, almost all of which can be traced directly to one event: the seizure and recapture of the S.S. Mayaguez. The shift in the President's international rating was dramatic, and the Sindlinger domestic data indicates that the international shift accounts for all of the improvement in the Gallup ratings, since the President's domestic rating remained virtually unchanged throughout this period. Further, it can be concluded that the trip itself either had no effect or had a slightly negative effect since the Sindlinger international ratings obtained immediately after the trip show a slight decline from those obtained immediately before the trip.

\*

A different picture might emerge if we had a Sindlinger domestic/ international breakdown for November 7-10, but this seems unlikely.



EASTERN EUROPE (TABLE III-D)

The President suffered a decline in both his overall and his international ratings during the Helsinki period, and it appears that the trip plus the pact were at least partially responsible. The Eastern Europe trip occurred during a period of relatively favorable economic news. During this same period, however, the President vetoed health, education, and oil price control bills. These vetoes were likely to keep groups which were normally disapproving in the disapproval category even in the face of economic "good news." Thus it is probable that some of the decline in the Gallup ratings in this period (though the Sindlinger data suggests probably not very much) should be attributed to Administration domestic policy. Since the Eastern Europe trip and the Helsinki pact were the only major international events of this period, it seems probable that they were largely responsible for the rest of the decline.



PARIS ECONOMIC SUMMIT (TABLE III-E)

It appears that Rambouillet had little impact one way or the other on the President's approval ratings.

During this period, the best that can be said of the economic news was that it was mixed; it is probably fairer to describe it as not very good. There is, of course, no way to isolate the impact of the cabinet reorganization and of the continuing fight over aid to New York City, but it appears from the Sindlinger data that the cabinet reorganization had a strong negative impact while the tough stand on New York City had a positive impact.

I think it would be fair to describe the ratings over this period of time as stable. The Gallup shift downward is too small to be really significant, and the Sindlinger ratings change very little. The Sindlinger international ratings, when viewed in light of the fact that there does not appear to have been any other major international news during the period, seem to suggest that the Rambouillet trip had little or no effect on the President's approval rating.



CHINA TRIP (TABLE III-F)

It also appears that the China trip had little impact on the President's approval ratings.

The China trip took place in a period when nearly all of the economic news was good. This is a fact which seems to be reflected in the jump in domestic approval ratings shown by Sindlinger and it seems probable that it accounts for a substantial part of the Gallup shift upward. I would regard the Angola controversy as unlikely to have had a significant effect on Presidential approval ratings (see discussion of Method, Appendix I). The stability of the Sindlinger international ratings seems to suggest that the China trip had little or no effect on the President's overall ratings.




CONCLUSION: FOREIGN TRAVEL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS  
FOR DOMESTIC TRAVEL

I have indicated that foreign travel is generally thought to have a significant positive effect on Presidential approval ratings. This is a supposition which seems supported by common sense. Presidential foreign travel shows the President as an active participant in foreign policy-making in a "Presidential" rather than in a partisan role. Thus it should generally strengthen the President's position. But the data I have assembled and discussed suggests that President Ford's foreign travel has had either no effect or a very slight positive or negative impact on his approval ratings.

While this data tells us nothing about why the public has been generally unaffected by President Ford's foreign travel, the data does have some implications for domestic travel. When the President travels in the United States, the fact that he is playing at least a quasi-partisan role all the time is quite obvious to the public. This alone is likely to limit the favorable impact of the travel, since it is probable that it will simply reinforce partisan impressions of the President. Domestic Presidential travel contains little of the drama that surrounds foreign travel. Finally, it is probable that people are generally prepared to concede the necessity of foreign travel, though because HAK travels extensively and because modern communications make relatively effective interaction with foreign states possible for

the President, they are probably not as convinced of this as they used to be.\* This is probably not true of domestic travel. The President has a fairly effective national forum at the White House.

All of this suggests that domestic travel is likely to damage the President's ratings.





1

AVERAGE ANNUAL APPROVAL RATINGS FOR RECENT PRESIDENTS

FORD ..... 1974 - 51  
 1975 - 43  
 1976\* - 47

NIXON ..... 1969 - 62  
 1970 - 57  
 1971 - 50  
 1972 - 57

JOHNSON ..... 1964 - 75  
 1965 - 68  
 1966 - 56  
 1967 - 45  
 1968 - 46

KENNEDY ..... 1961 - 75  
 1962 - 71  
 1963 - 64


EISENHOWER .. 1953 - 69  
 1954 - 65  
 1955 - 73  
 1956 - 73  
 1957 - 65  
 1958 - 55  
 1959 - 61  
 1960 - 62

TRUMAN ..... 1946 - 46  
 1947 - 50  
 1948 - 39  
 1949 - 59  
 1950 - 40  
 1951 - 26

\*through 4/12/76

Comment: The Ford ratings compare favorably with the Truman ratings, and with the rougher periods in the Johnson and first Nixon Administrations. Generally, the Ford ratings appear to have remained more stable over time (i.e., a smaller range from high to low) than has been true of ratings of most other Presidents.

<sup>1</sup> All data is Gallup poll data.



SINDLINGER DATAFORD OVERALL RATING

<u>DATE</u>	<u>POSITIVE</u>	<u>NEGATIVE</u>
9/01 - 9/04/74	53	17
9/05 - 9/07/74	51	27
9/10 - 9/15/74	44	40
10/08 - 10/13/74	46	47
11/07 - 11/10/74	38	59
11/25 - 12/01/74	30	65
12/19 - 12/25/74	17	61
1/02 - 1/08/75	9	45
1/09 - 1/15/75	33	43
2/09 - 2/19/75	51	42
3/06 - 3/19/75	49	43
4/10 - 4/23/75	43	51
4/24 - 5/07/75	40	55
5/08 - 5/14/75	38	55
5/15 - 5/18/75	48	44
6/06 - 6/12/75	45	50
6/19 - 7/02/75	57	32
7/03 - 7/08/75	46	47
7/09 - 7/16/75	59	38
7/17 - 7/30/75	57	33
7/31 - 8/13/75	51	44
8/14 - 8/27/75	39	57
8/28 - 9/04/75	46	45
9/05 - 9/17/75	55	38
9/18 - 10/01/75	55	37
10/02 - 10/15/75	46	46
10/16 - 10/22/75	38	54
10/23 - 10/28/75	35	57
10/29 - 10/30/75	59	32
10/31 - 11/03/75	56	34
11/04 - 11/12/75	37	53
11/13 - 11/26/75	37	50
11/27 - 12/03/75	34	54
12/04 - 12/10/75	42	48
12/11 - 12/17/75	44	48
12/18 - 12/24/75	47	46
12/25 - 12/31/75	48	45



1/01 - 1/07/76	49	44
1/08 - 1/19/76	49	43
1/19 - 1/26/76	54	40
1/28 - 2/04/76	61	33
2/05 - 2/11/76	45	50
2/12 - 2/21/76	40	53
2/22 - 2/27/76	38	52
2/28 - 3/01/76	48	45
3/02 - 3/05/76	54	39
3/06 - 3/12/76	57	36
3/13 - 3/24/76	57	36
3/25 - 3/31/76	49	41
4/01 - 4/07/76	47	43
4/08 - 4/14/76	45	44
4/15 - 4/22/76	43	47
4/21 - 4/28/76	40	50
4/29 - 5/05/76	39	53



TABLE 11

GALLUP POLL

TREND OF FORD APPROVAL RATING

<u>Field Date</u>	<u>Approve</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
4/09 - 4/12/76	48	41	11
3/19 - 3/21/76	50	36	14
2/27 - 3/01/76	48	38	14
1/30 - 2/02/76	46	40	14
1/23 - 1/26/76	45	45	10
1/02 - 1/05/76	46	42	12
11/21 - 11/24/75	41	46	13
10/31 - 11/03/75	44	44	12
10/17 - 10/20/75	47	40	13
10/03 - 10/06/75	47	37	16
9/05 - 9/08/75	47	36	17
9/12 - 9/15/75	47	36	17
8/15 - 8/18/75	46	37	17
8/01 - 8/04/75	45	37	18
6/27 - 6/30/75	52	33	15
5/30 - 6/02/75	51	33	16
5/02 - 5/05/75	40	43	17
4/18 - 4/21/75	39	47	15
4/04 - 4/07/75	44	37	19
3/28 - 3/31/75	37	43	20
3/07 - 3/10/75	38	45	17
2/28 - 3/03/75	39	45	16
1/31 - 2/03/75	39	43	18
1/10 - 1/13/75	37	39	24
12/06 - 12/09/74	42	41	17
11/15 - 11/18/74	48	32	20
11/08 - 11/11/74	47	33	20
10/18 - 10/21/74	55	28	17
10/11 - 10/14/74	52	29	19
9/27 - 9/30/74	50	28	22
9/06 - 9/09/74	66	13	21



FOREIGN PRESIDENTIAL TRAVEL  
AND  
PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL RATINGS

Table IIIA	.....	Russia and Japan November 17 - November 24, 1974
Table IIIB	.....	Martinique December 14 - 16, 1974
Table IIIB	.....	Western Europe May 28 - June 4, 1975
Table IIID	.....	Eastern Europe July 26 - August 4, 1975
Table IIIE	.....	Paris Economic Summit November 15 - 18, 1975
Table IIIF	.....	China November 29 - December 8, 1975





RUSSIA AND JAPAN (November 17 - 24, 1974)

<u>Gallup</u> - November 15 - 18:	Approve : 48
	Disapprove: 32
	Don't Know: 20
<u>Gallup</u> - December 6 - 9:	Approve : 42
	Disapprove: 41
	Don't Know: 17
<u>Sindlinger</u> , October 8 - 13:	Overall : 46-47
	Domestic : 34-58
	Internatnl: 60-20
<u>Sindlinger</u> , November 7 - 10:	Overall : 38-59
<u>Sindlinger</u> , November 25 - Dec 1:	Overall : 30-65
	Domestic : 29-65
	Internatnl: 38-51

POSSIBLY RELATED NEWS EVENTS:

- \*11/01 - Unemployment at 6%. Highest in three years.
- \*11/10 - National coal strike begins.
- \*11/11 - WH agrees Ruth to get Nixon records access
- \*11/15 - WH announces Ford will run. FRB reports
- \* industrial output declines.
- 11/18 - WH releases tape showing Nixon promised Hunt clemency. Arabs riot in Jerusalem.
- 11/19 - Nixon agrees to physical exam.
- 11/21 - UNESCO excludes Israel.
- 11/22 - Senate Rules unanimously reports Rocky nomination.
- 11/23 - Ford meets Brezhnev.
- 11/23 - Udall announces.
- \*11/24 - Ford-Brezhnev agreement.
- \*11/25 - Prosecution rests in Watergate trial.
- 11/29 - UN renews buffer zone force mandate.
- 12/02 - Ford veto of Veterans education benefits overridden.
- \*12/02 - Ford announces Ford-Brezhnev agreement.
- \*12/05 - UMW strike ends.
- \*12/06 - November unemployment at 6.5%.
- 12/09 - Ford will support \$2 billion for public service jobs.

\*Indicates an event which probably had a substantial effect on approval ratings.



MARTINIQUE

(December 14-16, 1974)

<u>Gallup</u> - December 6 - 9, 1974:	Approve	:	42
	Disapprove:		41
	Don't Know:		17
<u>Gallup</u> - January 10 - 13, 1975:	Approve	:	37
	Disapprove:		39
	Don't Know:		24
<u>Sindlinger</u> - November 25 - Dec 1:	Overall	:	30-65
	Domestic	:	29-65
	Internatnl:		38-51
<u>Sindlinger</u> - December 19 - 25:	Overall	:	17-61
	Domestic	:	15-62
	Internatnl:		19-67

POSSIBLY RELATED NEWS EVENTS:

- 12/10 - Rockefeller confirmed.
- 12/11 - Boston race riots
- \*12/12 - Carter announces; Public service jobs bill passes.
- 12/13 - Senate approves foreign aid bill which trades loosening of emigration restrictions for trade benefits to Soviet Union.
- 12/17 - US Steel announces 8-10% price rise; Ford orders investigation.
- \*12/21 - CIA domestic intelligence files existence disclosed.
- 12/23 - Colby to report to Ford on CIA; US Steel announces large price reductions due to 12/17 action.
- \*12/27 - Prosecution rests in Watergate trial; Boston School Board held in contempt by Garrity.
- 12/30 - Ford pocket vetoes two bills -- American ship quota and strip mining.
- \* 1/01 - Watergate defendants convicted.
- \* 1/02 - Kissinger announces US may use force in Mideast.
- \* 1/05 - Unemployment in December at 7.1% (13 year high).
- 1/07 - Chrysler offers rebates on new cars.
- \* 1/13 - President proposes \$16 billion tax cut; Ford Motor announces rebates.

\*Indicates an event which probably had a substantial effect on approval ratings.

\* WESTERN EUROPE (May 28 - June 4, 1975)

<u>Gallup</u> - May 2 - 5, 1975:	Approve : 40
	Disapprove: -43
	Don't Know: -17
<u>Gallup</u> - May 30 - June 2, 1975:	Approve : 51
	Disapprove: 33
	Don't Know: 16
<u>Gallup</u> - June 27 - 30, 1975:	Approve : 52
	Disapprove: 33
	Don't Know: 15
<u>Sindlinger</u> - May 8 - 14, 1975:	Overall : 39-55
	Domestic : 30-64
	Internatnl: 24-70
<u>Sindlinger</u> - May 15 - 18, 1975:	Overall : 48-45
	Domestic : 28-63
	Internatnl: 74-23
<u>Sindlinger</u> - June 6 - 12, 1975:	Overall : 45-50
	Domestic : 31-61
	Internatnl: 69-26

POSSIBLY RELATED NEWS EVENTS:

- \*5/12 - Mayaguez seized.
- \*5/14 - Mayaguez recaptured.
- 5/15 - Exxon/Gulf bribery disclosed
- 5/16 - \$400 million refugee aid voted
- \*5/23 - Laos evacuation
- 5/27 - Ford reimposes \$2 import fee on oil; attacks Congress.
- 5/28 - Ford reaffirms NATO commitment.
- 6/02 - Israel cuts forces.
- \*6/06 - 9.2% May unemployment announced.
- \*6/10 - MAC set up to aid NYC

\*Indicates an event which probably had a substantial effect on approval ratings.

EASTERN EUROPE (July 26 - August 4, 1975)

<u>Gallup</u> - June 27 - 30, 1975:	Approve : 52
	Disapprove: 33
	Don't Know: 15
<u>Gallup</u> - August 1 - 4, 1975:	Approve : 45
	Disapprove: 37
	Don't Know: 18
<u>Gallup</u> - August 15 - 18, 1975:	Approve : 46
	Disapprove: 37
	Don't Know: 17
<u>Sindlinger</u> - July 9 - 19, 1975:	Overall : 59-38
	Domestic : 38-57
	Internatnl: 71-27
<u>Sindlinger</u> - July 17 - 30, 1975:	Overall : 57-33
	Domestic : 34-60
	Internatnl: 67-28
<u>Sindlinger</u> - July 31 - August 13:	Overall : 51-44
	Domestic : 33-62
	Internatnl: 54-48

POSSIBLY RELATED NEWS EVENTS:

\*7/03 - Unemployment down to 8.6%  
 \*7/15 - Industrial production up .4%  
 \*7/18 - Ford vetoes petroleum price controls.  
 \*7/24 - Ford vetoes education appropriations bill.  
 7/26 - Ford vetoes health bill; leaves for Europe.  
 7/29 - Ford health bill veto overridden.  
 \*7/31 - New York austerity plan announced.  
 \*8/01 - Unemployment down to 8.4%.  
 \*8/01 - Helsinki agreement signed  
 8/18 - Maritime unions announce US grain shipment  
 boycott; Ford attacks union action.

\*Indicated an event which probably had a substantial effect on approval ratings.



PARIS ECONOMIC SUMMIT (Nov. 15 - 18, 1975)

<u>Gallup</u> - October 31 - November 3:	Approve	:	44
	Disapprove:		44
	Don't Know:		12
<u>Gallup</u> - November 21 - 24, 1975:	Approve	:	41
	Disapprove:		46
	Don't Know:		13
<u>Sindlinger</u> - November 4 - 12:	Overall	:	37-53
	Domestic	:	36-53
	Internatnl:		36-54
<u>Sindlinger</u> - November 13 - 26:	Overall	:	38-50
	Domestic	:	37-51
	Internatnl:		37-51

POSSIBLY RELATED NEWS EVENTS:

- \*10/29 - GNP grew at 11.2% annual rate.
- \*10/29 - Ford vetoes Federal help to NYC.
- \*11/01 - House gives NYC loan guarantees.
- \*11/02 - Ford fires Schlesinger/Colby favoring HAK
- 11/04 - Cabinet reorganization announced.
- 11/06 - Carey requests Federal Reserve help.
- \*11/07 - WPI up 1.8%.
- \*11/08 - Unemployment rate up .3%.
- 11/08 - Ford will run in three primaries.
- 11/09 - Ford explains Schlesinger firing and opposes NY aid.
- 11/12 - Rhodes/Burns soften on NY.
- \*11/13 - Wallace announces; Ford/Congress agree on oil pricing.
- \*11/14 - Detroit appears to be on upswing; Ford announces possibility of NY aid.
- \*11/15 - Oil accord attacked; .4% industrial output increase.
- 11/18 - Announcement of Rambouillet agreements.
- 11/19 - \$90.7 billion defense budget approved.
- \*11/20 - .7% CPI rise; Ford acts to protect Jews from Arab boycott.
- 11/21 - Reagan announces.

\*Indicates an event which probably had a substantial effect on approval ratings.



## TABLE IIIF

CHINA

(November 29 - Dec. 8, 1975)

Gallup - November 21 - 24, 1975:    Approve    : 41  
    Disapprove: 46  
    Don't Know: 13

Gallup - January 2 - 5, 1976:       Approve    : 46  
    Disapprove: 42  
    Don't Know: 12

Sindlinger - November 27 - Dec 3:   Overall    : 34-54  
    Domestic   : 32-57  
    Internatnl: 32-55

Sindlinger - December 4 - 10:       Overall    : 42-48  
    Domestic   : 43-48  
    Internatnl: 33-55

Sindlinger - December 11 - 17:      Overall    : 44-48  
    Domestic   : 45-47  
    Internatnl: 33-54

POSSIBLY RELATED NEWS EVENTS:

- \*11/27 - Ford requests \$2.3 billion in NY loans; Trade surplus for 8 months in a row; production reported up.
- \*11/29 - Prices to farmers down 4%; down for second month in row.
- \*12/03 - Israel attacks Lebanon; Ford meets Mao; announcement of Soviet harvest shortfall.
- \*12/04 - Russia announces low grain crop.
- \*12/05 - Tax cut to stay; wholesale prices steady.
- \*12/06 - Unemployment steady at 8.3 over 6 months.
- 12/08 - "Pacific doctrine" announced by Ford.
- 12/11 - Senate wants individual tax cut extension.
- 12/12 - Angola gets \$50 million US arms.
- 12/14 - Callaway attacks Reagan.
- \*12/16 - Tax cut approved.
- \*12/19 - Tax cut veto sustained; Filibuster for Angola; Soviets to pay higher rate on grain shipment.
- \*12/20 - Real wages increase; Senate funds cutoff on Angola.
- 12/21 - Ford claims win on tax cut.
- \*12/23 - Ford signs energy bill.
- \*12/25 - Announcement of record trade surplus.
- 12/26 - Protest on Ford grain policy.
- \* 1/01 - FPC oks natural gas price hike
- 1/03 - Ford vetoes common situs picketing bill.
- 1/04 - Soviet Union not allowing emigration.
- 1/05 - Concorde hearings.

\*Indicates an event which probably had a substantial effect on approval ratings.



## APPENDIX I --- RESEARCH METHOD

Table III presents the data which is used in the analysis. Each section presents before and after measurements of Ford popularity by Gallup and Sindlinger for each foreign Presidential trip during the first year and one-half of the Ford administration. Also presented are possibly related news events which occurred during the polling period. In terms of the method, the selection of news events made is the most questionable part of the procedure. I cannot defend the general selection on any scientific basis. Rather, all I can do is to explain the assumptions I made in making the selection. They were as follows:


- (1) Events can be classified into major and minor events on a common sense basis. For example, a bus crash in Toledo is an event which is much less likely to significantly affect the President's approval rating than is a .5% increase in unemployment;
- (2) The major news most likely to affect the President's ratings at any given point in time is news related to issues of high concern to the voting public. This would mean, for example, that because the "integrity in government" issue has been of substantial, though decreasing, significance to voters over the last several years, Watergate-related news would probably have a significant effect on the President's ratings because he is not completely able to escape association with this problem in the minds of many voters. This assumption has the consequences spelled out in (3) and (4), infra.
- (3) Changes in the major economic indicators are generally major events, and will usually affect only the President's domestic ratings. This assumption is supported by the fact that the economy is generally the major issue on people's minds at any given time, and that the President appears generally to be considered responsible for the performance of the economy.
- (4) Most foreign events are events of minor significance to the average citizen. There is some fairly solid empirical support for this view in the fact that citizens generally have only the vaguest notions about the actual course of foreign events and their perceptions of the proper course in foreign policy can shift radically in extraordinarily short periods of time.



Once these assumptions are made, the mode by which the analysis will proceed becomes clear. In each case, we will try to explain the shifts in Presidential ratings before and after a trip by asking whether the major news events we have isolated were likely to have a generally favorable or unfavorable impact. This gives us a basis for asking what effect the trip had.



## ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS ON FALL CAMPAIGN TRAVEL SCHEDULE



### I. Assumptions or Known Facts

#### A. The Democrats

##### 1. Carter

- An excellent communicator
- Communicates values, vision, personality and character well
- Presently vulnerable on issues -- lack of positions and dubious positions
- Will probably begin an intense campaign early (August)

##### 2. Other

- Dems will be unified
- Can expect Labor to provide strong grassroots organization support

#### B. The GOP

##### 1. The President

- A poor campaigner
- A poor communicator -- this goes beyond speeches -- he has little sense of crowds, language, timing, or how to frame an argument to make it memorable
- He seems reluctant to deal with philosophy, values, his vision of America's future

##### 2. Other

- The GOP will be divided -- conservative workers, who are our best, may sit on hands
- This year we do not have our traditional advantage of being able to outspend the Dems -- this is a serious handicap.

#### C. General Comments

1. We are in a confused time period when old conventional wisdom about politics doesn't seem to be working.
  - People don't seem to be interested in specific issues or in the President's record.
  - They seem to yearn for a change and to be attracted to personality, the promise of leadership, spirituality, a vision of the future.



2. We will be far behind Carter at the end of our convention -- by 20 or 30 points -- we will have only 73 days to catch him.

## II. Conclusions about the Givens

- A. We will lose if we continue our campaign travel as in the past. Carter is simply a better campaigner and this will become obvious to a majority of the people.
- B. This is a year for gambles -- if we don't try something unusual, we will lose.
- C. Our 2 advantages are:
  1. The incumbency
  2. Better positioning on the issues

We must use both to good effect.

- D. We cannot afford to let the campaign center on Carter's strengths -- vision, personality, spirituality.



## III. Campaign Travel Options

- A. Have 3 basic approaches:
  1. Saturation Campaign Travel in the states we must win (much as we did in the primaries).
  2. Symbolic Campaign Travel i. e. use travel to highlight a personal characteristic of the President, a key campaign issue, a key constituent group.
  3. No campaign travel at all (the Duval/Chanock option).
- B. Must begin evaluation with 2 questions:
  1. How do we want the public to perceive the President?
    - as a person
    - as a leader
    - on specific issues
  2. How best is this perception conveyed? Particularly given Carter's and the President's strengths and weaknesses.



### C. Conclusions on Options:

1. We recommend Option 2 -- Symbolic Travel only.
  - Carter will win perception battle if we continue saturation travel. The President comes off as a Hack in this mode.
  - The President is overexposed -- when he has something to say it is lost. Everything has become a campaign act and is discounted by the reporters and apparently by the public. Heavy travel will only make this problem worse.
  - Less is more. Fewer campaign events which are highly symbolic in nature will be more effective than many standard events which run together. Also symbolic events which by nature rely on the event rather than a Presidential speech to get across a message will help overcome the President's inability to communicate.
  - This type event, if there are not other activities to crowd it out, will force the Press to report the event and the issue which the event symbolizes.
  - Saturation campaigning is probably not technically possible.
    - Over last 5 months' or 150 days we have been out of town 40 days or parts of 50 days. Thus we have traveled about 1/3 of the time.
    - This travel has saturated only 12 states with stops in 6 other states.
    - After the convention we only have 73 days or 10 plus weeks to cover many more states.
    - We would be hard pressed to support a travel schedule of more than 3 days per week. This means travel of 30 days during the campaign.

- Thus our travel, even if we travel at the maximum rate, can only be symbolic given the number of states we must cover in a race against Carter.
- 2. The Option of no travel at all is a possibility, but probably not desirable.
  - Many symbolic activities can be done from the Oval Office. These can have great impact -- perhaps a greater impact than travel.
  - These should be done, however the people like a President who will mix with them and show his human side which is best done through travel.
  - Also campaign workers must be fired up -- something that is hard to do from Washington.

#### IV. Steps Required to Develop Symbolic Travel Plan

- A. Define personal qualities, issues and constituency groups we want to emphasize (Teeter, et. al.)
- B. Define how we want the President to be perceived on each of these.
- C. Define states we want to concentrate on (Teeter, et. al.)
- D. Assign the Domestic Council, NSC, EPB and our most creative people the task of coming up with highly creative activities which will demonstrate the President's position on a given issue in a highly creative and symbolic way.
- E. Assign the scheduling and advance offices the responsibility for finding the appropriate sites in the key states to stage the events.



## V. Summary

1. The President's weaknesses as a campaigner can be exploited by Carter's obvious ability as a campaigner unless we drastically change our campaign style.
2. We must go to fewer, highly symbolic events in our campaign travel. The events themselves should carry the message. We cannot rely on the President's ability to communicate. Less is more.
3. We must discipline ourselves to pick the key personal traits, issues and states we want to concentrate on and use our full efforts to project the President properly on these few areas.
4. We must organize ourselves to develop a number of symbolic events to communicate on these few areas.