

The original documents are located in Box 13, folder “Campaign Plan - 7/31/76 Draft” of the Michael Raoul-Duval Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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I - BACKGROUND

~~56~~ ~~3, 4, 6, 7, 18, 21, 22~~
~~62~~ ~~29, 30, 51, 53, 58, 70, 90~~
~~65~~

OVERVIEW

This book presents an analysis of the problems ^{you} facing ^{you} in the ~~President~~ ^{your} in his efforts to win the 1976 election. It concludes that there is a "best chance" strategy to win.

The book consists of this ~~introductory~~ memorandum, followed by tabs broken into two parts. Part I contains some details on the strategy. Part II contains background materials, such as analysis of constituency groups and historical analysis.

This memorandum is broken into the following chapters:

I - BACKGROUND

- Overview (p)
- Major Constraints (p)
- Definition of Problem (p)
- Elements of Perception Problem (p)
- Targets of Opportunity (p)

II - CONCLUSIONS/GOALS

- Conclusions (p)
- Goals for Campaign (p)



III - DESCRIPTION OF STRATEGY

- The Strategy (P)
- Analysis of the Recommended Strategy (P)
and Alternatives (P)
- Themes (P)
- Synopsis of Implementation Plan (P)
- Pre-nomination Implementation Plan (P)
- Attack and Carter's Reaction (P)



As the following analysis shows, ^{you} the President faces a unique challenge. No President has overcome the obstacles to election which President Ford will face following our Convention this August. For example, President Truman trailed Dewey in August 1948 by 11 points, whereas we expect to be trailing Carter by about 17 points after our Convention.*

Of course, the Ford-Carter gap will begin to close (perhaps even before our Convention) on its own almost irrespective of what we do.** However, although the point

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
There really is very little similarity between the Truman situation in 1948 and President Ford today. Truman's challenge was markedly different and, accordingly, so were his strategy options. See Tab II- for an analysis of the Truman campaign and excerpts from Clark Clifford's 1947 election strategy memorandum.

**

There are three important caveats -- the gap could widen if (1) the President makes a highly visible mistake; (2) the Convention turns sour and the TV viewers see the President portrayed unfavorably; or (3) Carter is able to go back on offensive.

over time
spread may close/fairly easily down to a point where
Carter is 5 to 10 points ahead, the remaining distance
to victory will be very difficult.

Because ~~the~~^{you} President must come from behind, and is ~~is~~^{are}
subject to many constraints, no strategy can be developed
which allows for any substantial error.



We firmly believe that ~~President~~^{you} Ford can win in November.
During times when ~~the~~^{you} President and his ~~Administration~~^{your} pulled
together and projected a positive image of ~~of~~^{action and} accomplishments,
the ~~President's~~^{your} standing in the national polls rose accord-
ingly. Furthermore, ~~the~~^{your} President has solidified ~~some of~~^{your national support} ~~his~~^{some of} national support. ~~Although~~^{However} ~~the~~^{you} President, ~~by~~^{you have been able to} his actions,
~~can~~ positively influence the voters, efforts to do this in
the past have resulted in very limited and temporary increases.
Most importantly, the ~~President's~~^{your} national approval rating
declined during the periods when ~~he~~^{you were} was perceived as a
partisan, particularly when we campaigned. (See Chart 1.)

If we avoid past errors and improve upon our many strong points, the primary campaign will have made a very positive contribution to ~~the President's~~^{your} election chances.

It is possible that Jimmy Carter will go through much the same phenomenon as ~~the President~~^{you} did: his rapid rise in national popularity will be followed by a steady and pronounced decline. Notwithstanding Carter's enormous (media) popularity at the present, it must not be forgotten that he never got more than 54% of the vote in any of the contested primaries, and never won in a head-to-head race. Furthermore, Carter was beaten in eight out of the last eleven contested primary fights. There is ample historical precedent for the proposition that such a rapid rise in national popularity (one of the most rapid ascendancies according to Lou Harris) is generally followed by a decline. We believe that much of Carter's rise in the polls is due to

his "media" image as a winner. However, between now and the election, he will not be able to rely on these "victories".

There are ^{SIX} ~~five~~ points that we wish to emphasize at the beginning:

1. The Nation is at a crossroad. We are in the process of making a choice (consciously or not) between greater self-reliance to govern our lives, or even greater reliance on government. There can be little doubt about which road we will travel under the leadership of a Democratic President and Congress. For many Americans who believe that unconstrained government is a threat to individual freedom, your election in November is a national imperative. For them and for us, the campaign is not simply a fight ~~for~~ power. We are fighting for principle. Your supporters welcome whatever discipline and hard work is necessary to win because they believe in you and because you stand for the principles they think are important.
2. If past is indeed prologue, you will lose on November 2nd -- because to win you must do what has never been done: close a gap of about 20 points in 73 days from the base of a minority party while spending approximately the same amount of money as your opponent.



6A



3. You cannot overcome the Carter lead on your own no matter what you do. Of course, your "offensive" campaign is a crucial element, but to win, Carter's position must be changed by a strong attack launched by the V.P. nominee and others.

4. You are not now perceived by anywhere near a majority of the American people (as being a strong, decisive leader.) Our campaign must change this perception, but it cannot unless some current problems such as in-house staff fighting are corrected.

5. In preparing this memorandum, we have tried to be completely candid. We have viewed our strengths and weaknesses in the context of the election challenge. We recognize that a "weakness" in this context may be a "strength" in normal times. Thus, this paper is not intended as criticism of anyone, but rather we have tried to present a hard, realistic analysis of the obstacles to your victory and how they can be overcome. We firmly believe that you can win.

5. You cannot possibly win without a highly disciplined and directionalized campaign. The first step is to develop and adopt a basic strategy. Once adopted, your strategy must not be changed unless clearly justified by hard data. If the strategy is not followed, or if it ~~is~~ constantly ~~xxxxxxx~~ changes, your campaign will ~~be~~ ~~on~~ become chaotic.



MAJOR CONSTRAINTS

The purpose of this section is to outline the major constraints facing the President's campaign. We believe that the campaign strategy must accept these constraints as givens, and not attempt to attack them as solvable problems. With the very limited resources available to the President, it is crucial that all our efforts and funds be directed at achieving clearly defined objectives which can be accomplished and which are selected solely on the basis of their contribution to the election effort.

By way of providing perspective, President Ford faces almost the reverse situation that Richard Nixon confronted in '68 and '72. In both cases, Nixon had a substantial margin over his challenger (12% points in '68 and 25% in '72) going into the general election. Thus, the Nixon strategy of holding onto his lead or, more accurately, managing the inevitable erosion, simply is not applicable to today's problem.


The President's strategy must recognize and deal with the following constraints:

1. The Democratic Party enjoys a 43% to 20% ~~registra-~~
~~tion~~ advantage. A GOP candidate will always have difficulty closing a large gap on a Democratic opponent.
2. Campaign expenditures for both candidates will be the same. We no longer have the previous advantage of being able to outspend our opponent. This is a particular handicap when we are behind.

3. Given the dollar limitation, any dollar wasted cannot be recouped. Limited resources is a major restraint.
4. The GOP Convention is late; the Party will be divided after the nomination fight and will have little time to bind its wounds.
5. A campaign designed to woo various voter blocs through extensive government programs and patronage is not in the cards in 1976.
 - a. Budget dollars are not available to fund extensive new program initiatives.
 - b. The broken promises of 1972 have made the buyable voter blocs wary of promises.
 - c. The President's most basic philosophy has been to ask the people to sacrifice short-term benefits in return for long-term gains. Changing this philosophy now is too late:
 - to be credible to the recipients.
 - to escape a media storm.

~~6. The reporting press will probably be biased for Carter -- a Democrat and the new face.~~

Careful
~~_____~~
~~_____~~
No True



DEFINITION OF PROBLEM

As a basic approach, it is helpful to view our electorate in two parts:

1. The base of our support, which is made up of Republicans and Republican-type Independents.
2. The "swing vote" which can be attracted from a position of neutrality or pro-Carter into our column.

In the following section, we analyze the specific elements of the problem we face. Although we have organized this section by dividing the elements among the two general classes of voters identified above, it's important to remember that there are substantial interrelationships and trade-offs between the two groups.

Our election goal must be to win enough popular votes in enough States to get over 270 electoral votes. In broad terms, we have to close a nearly 3-to-2 gap in seventy-three days from the base of a minority Party.

On the other hand, Carter's popularity is based almost exclusively on his awareness factor. His support is very thin and clearly vulnerable to deterioration. See Tab II- for analysis of Carter's current popularity and weaknesses.

Accordingly, a major shift in the national polls is possible. In all likelihood, Carter has reached his peak of popularity and will now begin to show signs of erosion. If the Republican Convention is perceived by the television viewer as positive for the President (or at least

neutral), we should expect to see a closing of the gap, and thus the building up of momentum in favor of the President.

President Ford's perception must change and Carter's perception must change. In order to win, we must persuade over 15% (or about 10 million people) to change their opinions. This will require very aggressive -- media-oriented efforts. We must pull together and wage a very active and determined fight. If the President sits back as Richard Nixon did in '68 and '72, he will certainly lose. As demonstrated in the following pages, the President can run hard without relying on the traditional campaign "hoopla". Thus he can be an active candidate and yet be perceived as a working President.





ELEMENTS OF THE PERCEPTION PROBLEM

Any campaign strategy, to be successful, must deal with perceptions. Voters do not make up their minds on an understanding of the actual strengths and weaknesses of candidates; rather, their choice is made on the basis of their perception of the candidates.

Personal perception is several times more important to voting than the perceived position on issues. But, particularly for an incumbent, the determinants of perception are (1) the candidate's agenda of issues -- which issues he chooses to talk about, and (2) how he handles them. The selection of the issues may well be of greater importance than his position on the issues.

* * *

In the following "perception" analysis, we have tried to capture the current perception of the President and Carter, using descriptions commonly used by those polled or interviewed by the press. We have attempted to use descriptions which may best reflect the perception held by the voter who is not a hard partisan for the President or Carter. In short, we believe that these are the perceptions of the people in the "middle".

THESE PERCEPTIONS DO NOT
NECESSARILY REFLECT YOUR TRUE CHARACTER
OR STYLE AS PRESIDENT. THEY ARE AN
REFLECTION OF HOW THE TV VIEWER AND
NEWSPAPER READER "SEE" YOU. We have

presented this with the "bark" off because we must solve this perception problem in order to ^{successfully} communicate you.



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people in the "middle". These perceptions do not
leadership qualities. This obstacle must be
overcome or there is no chance for victory.

Copy of report



Perception of Carter


POSITIVE

- A winner who has "it". A man with real personal appeal; "I like him."
- A man with strong spiritual and moral values; an honest man of character.
- A family man.
- A man who cares about the common man and his problems.
- A new kind of politician who is against the corrupt Washington system and will not lie.
- A man concerned about government efficiency and dedicated to making the government work better.
- A man who seems to deal with and resolve issues in a non-controversial way.
- He is seen as an economic liberal and a social conservative.
- He is a man with quiet strength; he will not let the politicians run over him. He is in control and will run the country with authority.
- Seen as responsible Democrat -- not a maverick; not extreme.

NEGATIVE

- An arrogant man.
- A man who wears his religion on his sleeve; he is very self-righteous. Lacks humility.

- A man who tries to be all things to all men; we don't know where he stands on issues.
- A man about whom we don't know enough; we really don't know who he is as a person.
- A Southerner.
- May not be experienced enough to be President.



Causes for Perception of Carter

The principal reason Carter appears so favorably in the polls (39-point lead over the President) is because all others in the field are perceived so badly. It is Carter's "newness" and his image as a winner that has carried him to the heights he has reached thus far. Virtually all other national political figures -- including President Ford -- are not perceived positively by the voters, and this accounts for Carter's high rating. This is a very important point, because it suggests that there is nothing intrinsically strong about Carter -- either in terms of personality or substance -- but rather, he comes across favorably only relative to the alternatives.

- He is a winner; winners are admired and respected.
- He has a strategy and he lets it guide his campaign and uses it to help him achieve the correct public perception. He is consistent in his campaign and behavior; he consistently projects the same image.

- He has built up those characteristics that he thinks the public wants.
 - Acts Presidential; handles himself with coolness, with dignity.
 - Is confident and in charge -- can make things happen.
 - Makes few errors in public and (so far) his team is tight and doesn't leak damaging information.
 - Is perceived to be a moral man, will make government work better, has a vision of the future, and will be open with the people.
- In terms of the few negative indicators concerning Carter, these appear to be related to some extent to his "trust me" approach to issues. His unwillingness to be specific is a form of arrogance.
- His religiosity raises suspicions among Catholics* and Jews.



* Events at the Democratic Convention probably aggravated the anti-Carter potential among Catholics (e.g., the dispute with Cardinal Cooke, their abortion controversy and the rejection of Muskie for V.P.)

Perception of the President

POSITIVE

- I like him; he is a good man who tries hard. I hope he succeeds.
- He is safe and will do the right thing.
- He came in under horrible circumstances and the situation in the country has gotten better under him.
- An honest man who will try to do the right thing; he has restored honesty in government.
- He will keep the activists from taking over and springing another Great Society on us.

NEGATIVE

- Not decisive.
- Not really on top of the job.
- Doesn't seem to have a clear view of where he is going and why; doesn't seem to understand our problems or have solutions for them.
- Spends too much time on politics, too worried about election, doesn't seem to spend enough time on the people's business, too much of an old politician.
- Seen as part of the old-time, do-nothing Washington establishment.
- He is politically expedient; he seems inconsistent -- swings one way and then another.

- Not strong enough to lay Reagan away; does this reflect on his abilities?
- Not in control of government. HAK and others seem to be able to control him; he is their puppet. He doesn't seem to want to use his power and authority.
- Makes errors, may not be smart enough to do the job.
- Fights with Congress while problems remain unsolved.
- Boring; not exciting.
- Appointed by Nixon whom he pardoned.

Conclusions on Perception of the President

One positive thing is that we are not working against a hard, anti-President Ford feeling. Even the disapproval in the Gallup (although high) is not firm. There is not a hard, negative feeling. It is just that not enough voters have a strong, positive feeling about the Ford personality and character.

There is one disturbing factor beginning to show up in Bob Teeter's latest data. Some of those polled are beginning to raise the question of whether the President is considered smart enough for the job.

Also, he apparently has lost a great deal of his perception of being open. This has contributed to the President's

decline. This is linked to the President being perceived as becoming more political (especially when he goes on the attack in a partisan, strident manner). This is why the primary campaigns have really hurt the President's national standings.

Also, there is a clear public perception that no one is in control of this Administration -- no one at the White House, in the campaign, or anywhere. This is a major negative.

The following are some specific conclusions on the perception problem:

- Many do not see the President as a leader -- they perceive that he has:
 1. Limited vision
 2. No will to control his Administration
 3. No compassion
- He also looks like a loser to many:
 1. Can't lay Reagan away.
 2. Many errors by the campaign and White House staff.
 3. Seems befuddled in the face of campaign and Congressional challenges.
 4. Doesn't seem to be able to get anything done.
- After a promising start, he is coming to be seen as just another politician.



- To some,*
- He doesn't seem good enough to be President.
 1. Indecisive
 2. Reactive
 3. Not smart

Causes for Poor Perception

- The struggle with Reagan.
- Overexposure on political matters, transparent campaigning techniques.
- *Inability to communicate*
Lack of a vision of what life in America should be, and a well-articulated, logical program to get us there.
- Inability to articulate ~~his~~ goals and programs effectively.
- Serious White House, Administration and PFC organization and personnel problems.
 1. Not bringing strength of incumbency to battle.
 2. Press considers speeches too poor to report seriously.
 3. Error rate is high; poor execution by campaign and government officials.
 4. Lack of team play. No control over prima donnas. *In-house bickering among the staff receives*
 5. No strategy for running government and campaign.

extensive attention by the Press.

* * *

It is important to consider the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the candidates, along with their perceived reasons in the context of what is real. The following is an attempt to briefly identify the key actual strengths and weaknesses of ~~President Ford~~ and Jimmy Carter.

Carter's Actual Strengths and Weaknesses

STRENGTHS

- He is bright, intelligent and disciplined.
- His strategy is on target with the mood of the electorate, and he plays the strategy effectively (vision, character, morality, spirituality).
- A good political mind, good instincts. He's "new" -- not from Washington.
- A good, well-knit organization which executes effectively. So far, does not leak. Low error rate.
- A favorable public perception, on characteristics and issues important to the voters. By avoiding specifics, his actual positions appear to be conservative on social issues and liberal on economic issues.
- He has united the Democratic Party, which will work on his behalf.
- He promises change, that he has solutions to the problems.

- He is subtle; he can send political signals with a light touch. These signals don't seem political.
- His religious background.

WEAKNESSES

- Overly ambitious, which may make him devious.
- Personal makeup is not in tune with public perception. He appears to be vindictive, arrogant, egotistical, bull-headed.
- Position on issues is to the left of a rightward moving electorate -- Humphrey-Hawkins, and many others.
- He has the support of the Democratic Party which brought us our current problem of a big, unresponsive federal government; he will either have to defend the Congress, or Party, or reject it -- either of which will give him problems.
- He is inexperienced.
- He is a "winner" only because he has had weak opponents thus far.

President Ford's Actual Strengths and Weaknesses

~~STRENGTHS~~

- His decency and honesty.
- His record; the country is in good shape.
- His experience and understanding of the issues -- he has done the job and handled the Office.

- The power of the incumbency; he is the President. People will have to want to kick him out.
- People have empathy with him.
- His family.
- His personal makeup; he isn't vindictive, mean or an egomaniac. He can listen to others, take advice. In short, he is human.


~~WEAKNESSES~~
Weaknesses which are persistantly attributed to the President

- Does not think in terms of vision and quality of life, and articulate these.
- Seems unwilling to take charge and discipline his Administration and campaign, even when it is in his interest; is a poor organizer.
- Is a poor communicator. *especially via television*
- Decisions often lack political subtlety -- both sides are angered.
- Administration decision process is often incapable of bold, rapid action; in seeking the "safe" course, we often miss opportunities when timing is critical.



Currently, the President's positions on issues have not helped him in terms of electability. We believe this is a problem for two reasons:

First, voters are far more influenced by the perceived personal traits of the candidates than their substantive position on even that issue which a given voter considers most important. Thus, because the President's



perception as a leader is so poor, any potential benefit due to the objective "correctness" of his substantive position on an issue gets no recognition.

Second, in far too many cases we have communicated the President's position on issues with political incompetency. For example, many issues are presented as legislative proposals or in veto messages, in which case the substance is overshadowed by the strong perception of the President as a part of the old Washington establishment. Also, substantive positions are presented in speeches which are so poor the press simply does not report them. We have been unsuccessful in packaging the President's positive programs for campaign advertising. (The "slice of life" ads prepared for California are an example of extraordinarily bad advertising. For example, they stressed inflation which was not an issue in that primary, and they demeaned the Presidency -- by using ^across-commercial advertising techniques -- thus forfeiting the advantage of incumbency.)

Third, we have been communicating the wrong points. Often our communication capability works just fine, but we send the wrong message. For example, the Homemakers speech in North Carolina, ~~and the emphasis we have put~~



~~on the President's interests in sports may have contributed to the perception of some that he is not very smart.~~

However, this problem can be corrected.* Issues can be a potent weapon in this year's Presidential campaign. Indeed, a fundamental element of the recommended strategy will be to break with traditional campaign wisdom and attempt to rely heavily on the use of issues as a fundamental element in our attack.

We believe that President Ford is in a better position on the issues than Jimmy Carter, for the following reasons:

- The President's positions have far greater substantive integrity. On many issues Carter is either overly vague, or has taken positions based on a weak analytical base.
- For the most part, we have "discounted" the negative political response which necessarily results when the President takes a firm position on controversial issues.
- Although undercut somewhat by the anti-Washington mood of the country, the President nevertheless has a clear advantage in discussing issues by virtue of the Office he holds.

*

We must improve our communications effort by (1) choosing our message, simplifying it and repeating it; and, (2) improving the speeches and tying them to the overall strategy instead of continuing to develop speeches in an organizational vacuum.


We believe that the substance of President Ford's position on the issues is far closer to the political center of gravity of the Nation than are the positions taken by Jimmy Carter. This is particularly true if we are successful in tagging Carter with the record and Platform of the Democratic majority. Nevertheless, Carter is now perceived as slightly liberal by Democrats, moderate by ticket splitters, and slightly conservative by Republicans. Thus he is all things to all people.

For the most part, the President has already taken positions on the most controversial issues. Thus his national standing in the polls already reflects the displeasure of the various groups opposed to his positions. Therefore, to a large extent, he has already "discounted" the downside of being specific on the issues.


Carter has not done this. Even to the extent he has taken positions on the issues, he has done so with regional selectivity and in a manner that has not fully been communicated to those who disagree with his positions. Accordingly, we must develop a campaign strategy which includes as a major objective the dissemination of Carter's positions to the groups adversely affected and forcing him to be specific.

Of course, the President also brings to his substantive position on the issues the full force and power of the Presidency. Especially in the areas of foreign policy and national defense, there is generally a presumption that the President's position is at least correct factually. Although this "presumption of Presidential accuracy" is still a potent force, it has been substantially diminished as a result of Vietnam and Watergate.

Notwithstanding the apparent advantage the President has on the issues, it is obvious that this is not reflected in the national head-to-head Ford-Carter polls. We believe this is due largely to the fact that issues have not played a significant role to the President in the campaign thus



far (as a matter of fact, in the President Ford-Carter contest, they have played almost no role at all).



As a last element of our perception analysis, we will look at Presidential travel.

It is true that some of the President's primary campaigning did result in an increase in his local popularity in the area campaigned in (and this shows up on election day), but these examples would be very misleading if applied to the general election. There is no question that people who actually see the President are influenced by that event, and local press has its beneficial impact. However, for the general election, Presidential campaign events are not significant in terms of their impact on the people who attend. These people are ^{mainly} ~~only~~ important as backdrops for the television viewer. * During the general election, all Presidential travel must be planned for its impact on those who learn about it through the media. Thus it is important to keep in mind that while selected campaign stops by the President during the primaries helped him in those locations, cumulatively, they had a negative impact on his overall popularity rating throughout the country. (Refer to chart on Page 4 .)

* Besides the fact that ^{TV reports of the President,} ~~campaigning~~ ^{are the} ~~have~~ ^{negative} impact on the viewer negatively, there are the following additional reasons for not utilizing ~~broads~~ ^{broads} relying on traditional campaign stops:

- 1) At most, the President ^{could} ~~can~~ probably only sustain a schedule of 2 1/2 stops 3 days a week. If that ~~would~~ ^{would} ~~was~~ ^{be} done ~~from~~ ^{beginning} in mid-September, the cost would be well in excess of \$1 million.
- 2) Only about one million people would actually see the President (including hard-core Carter and Ford supporters.)



TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY

The objective of this section will be to present an analysis of the States and key constituencies within each State in the perspective of an electoral strategy for the President to win.

As a general proposition, there is a base vote for each candidate in a two-way Presidential election, consisting of:

- 35% for GOP
- 40% for Democrats

The election is thus decided by the 25% "swing vote" made up of Republican and Democratic defectors, the Independents, and ticket splitters.

Because of our electoral college system, "swing voters" in target States which we believe can be won, are the only "swing voters" we should focus on. It does no good to capture 100% of the "swing vote" in a State which goes to our opponent because of his overwhelming initial advantage.

The President must make two major decisions in the definition of his constituency in the general election. The first is the choice of target States in the electoral college. The second is the choice of a swing constituency in the selected States. These two decisions are interrelated and the selection of our Vice Presidential nominee will alter somewhat the State strategy.

The first decision is whether to concentrate total effort on the northern industrial States from New Jersey to Wisconsin, plus California, or to devote some effort to peripheral southern States, plus California.


The second decision is whether to develop a constituency of Republicans, Independents and ticket splitters, or go after the New Majority coalition of Republicans and disgruntled conservative Democrats.

We recommend concentration on the northern industrial States, but do not have sufficient data at this time to determine whether Pennsylvania is winnable. If it is not, we must make up for it in the peripheral South. Also, we need more data on Florida, Virginia, West Virginia and North Carolina. New York is also a State which we must analyze in greater detail. If the anti-Carter potential among Catholics and Jews develops fully, New York may be winnable (depending on our VP choice). Under all conceivable scenarios, California is essential.

Base

The base of support for the President's victory lies in the traditionally Republican areas outside of the South.

Carter's base is in the deep South and a few traditionally Democratic States.



Swing States

From the swing State list, victory can be achieved by either candidate winning 180 electoral votes. We must be able to sharpen our focus on the swing States to those which are not winable and which lead to victory in the electoral college. Thus, we will develop a key State list which will allow us to:

1. Allocate resources efficiently.
2. Select and manage issues pinpointed at winning constituency.
3. Develop electoral criteria for selection of a Vice President.
4. Schedule the President, Vice President and advocates.
5. Take advantage of media markets.

The swing States can be prioritized in three ways. First, they are listed in order of their historical Republican vote totals in the Presidential elections from 1952-1972. Second, they are ranked in order of their winnability this year. Third, the States' historical voting pattern, winnability and electoral contribution are combined in an electoral strategy list.

Building a Winning Coalition

On our base of 93, we must surely win all the States in the middle column on the preceeding page through California: Nevada, New Mexico, Montana, Alaska, Michigan, Delaware, Ohio, Oregon, Maryland, Illinois and California. This brings our total electoral strength to 233. The final 37 electoral votes must be won from the other swing States or the unknowns:

Tennessee	10	Florida	17
New Jersey	17	New York	41
Missouri	12	North Carolina	13
Wisconsin	11	* Texas	26
Connecticut	8	Virginia	12
Washington	9	W. Virginia	6
Kentucky	9		
Pennsylvania	27		



These States can be viewed in two types: peripheral South and traditionally swing States leaning Democratic:

<u>Peripheral South</u>		<u>Traditionally Swing</u>	
* Florida	17	Connecticut	8
Kentucky	9	New Jersey	17
Missouri	12	* New York	41
* No. Carolina	13	Pennsylvania	27
Tennessee	10	Washington	9
* Texas	26	Wisconsin	11
* Virginia	12		
W. Virginia	6		

* Unknowns

Swing Constituency in Key States

To build a winning coalition in the swing States, the President must build on his base of rural and small town majorities with suburban Independents and ticket splitters. All successful Republican candidates in these States have won with the same constituency with the exceptions of Texas and Florida. In very general terms, the target constituency in the suburbs for the President is the upper blue collar and white collar workers, often from a family which has risen in mobility in the last generation. These are independent minded voters, many of whom are Catholic. In addition, there is a weakness in Carter's support among Catholics and also among Jews. The upwardly mobile Catholics are a group becoming more independent and conservative, and they represent the key to victory in the northern industrial States where they are from 25-45% of the voters. (See Tab I- for analysis of Catholic strategy.) Jewish skepticism of Carter as a southern fundamentalist provides an opportunity to strip away part of the traditional Democratic coalition.

The following is a more detailed analysis.

In our swing States, there are essentially two groups of ticket splitters:

1. Original ticket splitters - They have traditionally split their ticket; they are upper middle-class suburban from middle-sized cities. They are people

who are a little more affluent, educated, little higher incomes than the average voter. Many of them came from the Republican side originally, and they are typically upper middle-class suburbanites. They are good government people who used to be strong on civil rights and fair housing, and are now anti-busing and strong against crime. They consider themselves moderate, and they consider themselves issue voters but, in fact, they are more candidate oriented than issue oriented. Style of a candidate is very important to them. Even though they wouldn't admit it, the Ford family would have an impact on them. These people were probably squeezed in the recession.

2. Recent ticket splitters - This group has split their ticket since '66 or '68. They are upper blue collar who have just moved to the suburbs and people from the northern States who have come from the Democratic side into the ticket splitter column. In the East they are largely Catholic, and many of them are ethnic. In the West it's the same basic social class, but they are no longer ethnic or Catholic. These are



people who have just barely made it out of the working class. Most of their wives work, and they are really threatened. They are afraid of social change, which is one reason why they moved to the suburbs. They are much closer to the New Majority people. As to those who are fairly hard Democratic, we probably won't do very well except to the extent we're able to cut the Catholics out.

These two groups have in common the fact that they are younger than the average voter (in their thirties and forties) and they are the people who are socially mobile. All of them have moved up either half or a full social class in their own time. These people are parents and therefore very concerned with anything that has to do with children, schools, and the like.

The New Majority group (second group above) tends to be socially very conservative, but still quite liberal economically.

Both groups of ticket splitters feel strongly about quality of life issues, and neither understand there is a tradeoff between environmental quality and the economy. The quality of life issue combines many separate issues such as consumerism, home ownership, leisure time, environment, etc.

Also, an important point is that these voters want their individual lives and the lives of their children to get better, e.g., more income, good health, trip to Hawaii.

Just because these voters want a smaller government and one not involved in everything, we cannot jump to the conclusion that they don't want government to do things. They see government as the legitimate instrument to solve problems.

On the other hand, the hard-core Republican really does want government out of everything, and the hard-core Democrat just isn't concerned about the too much government issue.

In addition to the problems already outlined concerning the perception of the President relative to Carter, it must be remembered that this swing vote is most heavily influenced by issues of all voting blocs. This swing constituency is concerned about the following specific issues:

1. National Defense - This group favors a strong national defense (which is seen as a traditional American value), but is very suspicious of making deals with our adversaries. They would like more visible cooperation with our allies and a little tougher approach to the Communists. The President is well positioned on these issues, but the articulation of his policies has been insufficient. By stressing defense (but not to the extent of committing troops, Ford will be perceived as being identified closer to "traditional American values".



2. Morality -- This constituency has a strong commitment to government working better and doing what's right. The President's policies are appealing to this group, but they need to be characterized as doing what's right and good for the country rather than what is politically expedient in an election year. This group also wants to feel that the country is moving again, after Vietnam, Watergate and the recession. They are cautious and will be suspicious of Carter's uncertain direction. But they need to feel that the President has character and is leading the country in the right direction.
3. Economy and Taxes - These issues are of major concern and the President's record is excellent. But public awareness of the President's policy on tax reduction and the effect on the taxpayer of the Democrat's economic policy need more effective communication. This group was strained by the recession and fears any possibility of slipping back. The vast majority are homeowners and will react negatively to Carter's proposal to eliminate mortgage interest as a tax deduction.
4. Crime - This is a major concern of these people and the President must come down hard on the issue. His

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programs will work and they make sense. (However, we must be very careful not to turn the gun lobby against us because they are very active -- and effective -- once stired up.)

5. Education - Many of these voters are upwardly mobile and owe some of their success to education. They fear that their children will not get the quality of education they deserve. The President must show awareness and concern on this issue above and beyond the busing question. Favoring more local control will be well received.
6. Quality of Life - The vast majority of the swing voters who live in the suburbs are conservationist and strongly supportive of a responsible environmental policy. In this issue area, the President is perceived by many as a pro-business, anti-environment candidate. To correct this situation, we must become actively involved in conservationist activities, especially in the energy and recreation areas. Above and beyond this, quality of life is a catch phrase which connotes a healthy community environment for individuals, housing, transportation, low crime rate, and quality education. There are sound Republican methods to achieve these goals and the President's blueprint for the future must clearly communicate a commitment to "quality of life" for the individual.

II - CONCLUSION/GOALS

CONCLUSIONS

3 lines

From the foregoing analysis of the problem of perception and the swing States and voters, we have reached the following conclusions:

Voter Perception

1. Although President Ford has demonstrated an ability to cause an increase in his approval rating by the national voters (based on Harris, Gallup and other polls), such a rise has always been relatively modest and temporary. ^{plus four} The President has not shown the capability of causing a sharp increase in his approval rating for a sustained period of time.

2. The President's strongest characteristic is his honesty. He is perceived to be open and direct (e.g., "I pardoned Nixon in the national interest and I would make the same decision today.") Carter is vulnerable because his character is unknown (^{i.e.} ~~e.g.~~, is he sincere or devious.)



3. By actively campaigning in the traditional sense (^{e.g.} ~~i.e.~~, rallies, stump speeches, ~~and the like~~) the President impacts his national standing negatively.*
4. In general, the voters do not have a firm perception of any specific positive trait of the President. There are, however, some general "feelings" which contribute to the President's approval rating:
- He is basically non-arrogant and honest.
 - He is safe -- will not make major errors as President.

However, many of our target voters have the following negative perceptions of the President:

- He is weak -- not decisive or in control.
- He is not thought of as being bright.
- He is somewhat identified with the status quo of big, unresponsive government.



* Besides the analysis presented previously on the President's traditional campaigning, the following reasons exist for sharply curtailing future campaign travel: (a) The President is perceived as unpresidential compared to Carter in the campaign mode; (b) when on the stump, the President is very susceptible to errors such as launching into a personal attack on his opponent; (c) for the general election, we can get far greater benefits by allocating our very scarce resources elsewhere, e.g., advertising and TV buys for major speeches; and, (d) we need a dramatic change (e.g., to issues, away from conventional campaigning) in order to capture the initiative and put Carter on the defensive.

5. In general, many voters have the following positive perceptions of Carter, based almost entirely on a very soft "awareness" factor:

- He is new -- represents a fresh approach and change.
- He is honest and religious.
- He is a conservative Democrat -- just to the right of center.

In general, the voters do not have a negative impression of Carter, but he has the following weaknesses which could result in a negative opinion by the voters:

- He is vague -- almost arrogant. This raises questions about his honesty and openness.
- He is almost mystical, evangelical.
- He may be joining the Democratic establishment.

6. The President's current White House and campaign organization is not likely to be capable of his ^{changing} negative perception among certain target voters and, in fact, continuation of the present staff operation will likely result in an increased negative perception of the President by the voters.

7. There does not appear to be any alternative way of substantially increasing the President's approval rating, other than by fundamentally

↳ Bickering within the Administration contributes to the perception that the President is not in control, thus not a leader.

changing the voters' perception of him. Until the voters perceive that President Ford has the personal characteristics ^{of a strong, decisive leader,} ~~that a President should have,~~ no strategy can be expected to close the Ford-Carter gap.*

*

President Ford has overcome one of the most serious challenges any 1976 Presidential candidate must deal with, which is, the perception of arrogance. We believe that many people equate the perceptual arrogance with ~~duplicity~~ (probably a "lesson" of Vietnam and Watergate). There is probably nothing President Ford can do between now and the election which would result in the voters perceiving him as arrogant. Of course, the difficulty is that, in striving to appear the opposite of arrogant, the President has also managed to appear undignified, uninspired and mediocre. This "price" which has been paid to avoid the "imperial Presidency" charge has been enormous and, tragically, probably totally unnecessary. There is no way that President Ford (especially in comparison with Nixon or, for that matter, Carter) will ever appear arrogant. Therefore, self-deprecating comments, such as "I am a Ford, not a Lincoln", rather than having any beneficial impact, have, in fact, resulted in a substantial negative result.

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2. The Targets

For the allocation of campaign resources, the States are divided into five categories of priority:

Priority I - Large Swing States - maximum resources

California	45
Illinois	26
Ohio	25
Michigan	21
New Jersey	17
* New York	41
* Texas	26
* Florida	17
Pennsylvania	27

Priority II - Swing States - heavy resources

Maryland	10
Tennessee	10
Missouri	12
Wisconsin	11
Washington	9
Kentucky	9
* North Carolina	13
* Virginia	12



* Unknowns

Priority III A - Republican States - need some attention


Indiana	13
Iowa	8
Oklahoma	8
Colorado	7
Maine	4
Montana	4
Alaska	3
Delaware	3

Priority III B - Democratic States - need some attention

Connecticut	8
Oregon	6
New Mexico	4
Nevada	3

Priority IV - Safe Republican States - minimal resources

Kansas	7
Arizona	6
Nebraska	5
Idaho	4
South Dakota	4
Utah	4
New Hampshire	4
Vermont	3
North Dakota	3
Wyoming	3



Priority V - Safe Democratic States - minimal resources

Massachusetts	14
Georgia	12
Minnesota	10
Louisiana	10
Alabama	9
South Carolina	8
Mississippi	7
Arkansas	6
* * West Virginia	6
Hawaii	4
Rhode Island	4
D.C.	3

* Unknowns

~~***~~ Our strategy in these States should be to force Carter to devote resources here to keep his base. We should have one PFC official devoted full time to creating "paper" organizations (Hollywood fronts) in these States. A chairman and press spokesman should pump out releases announcing a plethora of news groups (e.g., Georgians for Ford, Baptists for Ford) and examples of Carter weakness. We should devote very little resources to this effort.

* Unknowns

CAMPAIGN GOALS

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From the foregoing analysis, we have identified the following goals (objectives) for the President's campaign.

These goals are broken into three basic parts: first, those necessary to solidify and maintain the President's "base" of strength; second, those necessary to accomplish the incremental swing votes necessary to achieve 270 electoral votes; and, third, those necessary to change the perception our target voters have of Carter.

General Goals for Base of Support

1. Adopt a specific campaign strategy and create a control and management capability in the White House and PFC to conduct a highly disciplined, error-free campaign. Once we have the strategy, we must stick to it.
2. Establish the perception of the President as a leader:
 - honest
 - experienced
 - strong character
 - decisive
 - compassionate
 - perceptive/vision
 - man of action




3. Develop voter understanding of the President's position on the issues -- underscore Carter's vagueness on issues. Demonstrate that the President is substantively a pragmatic conservative whose programs are developed.
4. Unify the GOP after the nomination. Show the President as a winner and get the Party behind us.

Campaign Goals for Swing Vote (Independent and Ticket Splitters)

A. General Goals

1. Cause the swing voter to reevaluate the President. This will take an "attention getter" (such as a good acceptance speech) so that people will reevaluate their assumptions about the President's personal characteristics and once again begin to listen to what he has to say.
2. Develop a major and highly disciplined attack on the perception of Carter. We must close the gap between Carter's perception and his actual weaknesses. He must be seen as:
 - An unknown. A man whose thirst for power dominates. Who doesn't know why he wants the Presidency or what he will do with it.
 - Inexperienced
 - Arrogant -- ~~over-creative~~ (deceitful)
 - Devious and highly partisan (a function of uncontrolled ambition).



- As one who uses religion for political purposes; an evangelic.
 - As liberal, well to the left of center and a part of the old-line Democratic majority.
 - Carter's campaign must be linked (in the public's mind) to Nixon's '68 and '72 campaigns -- very slick, media-oriented.
- A candidate that takes positions based on polls -- not principles.

B. Independents (Suburban, White Collar, Upper Middle Class from Traditionally Republican Households)

1. Develop positions on specific issues designed to appeal to the voter bloc (such as "quality of life issue).
2. Target special advocates program to this group.
3. Establish personal recognition by the President of this group.

C. Ticket Splitters (Low Suburb, Upper Blue Collar, Upward Mobility, from Traditionally Democratic Households, Conservative on Social Issues, Liberal on Economic Issues)

1. Position the President as strongly concerned with religious and ethnic groups. Demonstrate his concern for the traditional values of family and moral values.
2. Demonstrate the President's concern for the fears of people who have recently helped themselves. Show a strong opposition to government programs which equalize people rather than let people help themselves.



3. Develop an active program of targeting specific issues and programs and attention on ethnic/religious groups (e.g., social issues like crime and education).
4. Portray the President as Presidential and not as a partisan Republican.

Campaign Goals for Changing Perception of Carter

1. Force him to take positions on issues (break up his coalition).
2. Characterize his campaign style as a 1976 version of the Nixon '68 campaign — a slick show done with mirrors. This is a campaign for power — not principle.
3. Raise doubts about a Carter Presidency. What are we getting? Why?
4. Show that his "flip flops" on issues ~~in~~ demonstrates insincerity, deviousness. He is not candid and honest.



III - DESCRIPTION OF STRATEGY



THE RECOMMENDED STRATEGY

1. Introduction

There are other campaign strategies, but we have not presented them as alternatives because, in our judgment, they will inevitably lead to the President's defeat in November.

The chapter following this one will show how the recommended strategy can result in achieving each identified goal.

2. The Targets ~~[to be supplied]~~

insert (A)

Insert (A)

~~Key States~~

the preceding

The state lists on pages 3-5 are our best estimate of the state breakdown at the present time. But there is a great deal of flexibility built into our key state decisions. First, the Vice Presidential nominees will impact on the state strategy, especially the unknowns. Second, five days after the convention we will poll in the following states: California, Illinois, Texas, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, Iowa, Colorado, Mississippi, Missouri, Tennessee, Washington, Maryland, Virginia, Florida, and New York. Thus, by the second week in September we will be able to make our operating decision on key states for travel and resource allocation.

(A) In the meantime, we will not rede target any major states or region until we have scientific evidence. We can use the five priority categories system ~~for~~ for our preliminary resource allocation since it is based on electoral strength and historical voting data.

Once the key state list is finalized it must not be changed unless justified by hard data such as polls. If "gut" opinions or "informal" samplings of advisers are allowed to change our ^{plan} ~~basic~~ the campaign will degenerate quickly and become chaotic.

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map



3. Strategy Basics (Cross-Cutting Concepts)

A. The President's campaign must be highly disciplined.

- The President must establish iron-clad control over Administration and campaign officials. For the period from the time of implementation of this plan until the election, every high visibility action of Administration and campaign officials must be cleared at the White House. Administration prima donnas must subvert their personal ambitions to the objective of getting the President elected.
- The President must take specific actions to demonstrate that he is a capable and competent leader.

B. The President's campaign must be television oriented. We must change the perception of literally millions* of voters, and this can only be done through the


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Although not statistically meaningful, the following will give some perspective to the magnitude of the challenge. If the President trails Carter by 20 points after our Convention, we will have to make about 10 million voters switch from Carter to the President. This is about 150,000 per day.

Bringing these figures into sharper focus, to pick up 10 million voters, the President will have to:

- "Win" over six Congressional Districts per day for 73 days (from being behind 60-40%);
- Operate in a media market of 1.5 million voters a day.

mass media with the principal emphasis on television.* This is true for coverage of the President and media advertising.



C. We must establish a major credibility to attack Carter.

D. We must carefully allocate our resources. See tab I for a proposed budget prepared by Stu Spencer.

4. Strategy Specifics (Actions Aimed at Specific Objectives)

~~A) See tab I for proposed campaign budget prepared by Stu Spencer~~

B. Establish leadership qualities

- Avoid self-deprecating remarks (Ford not a Lincoln) and acts (being photographed with a cowboy hat).

- Carefully plan, prepare and execute all on-camera appearances. The President should be seen on television as in control, decisive, open and candid. Prep time (15-30 minutes) should be built into the President's schedule immediately preceding on-camera events.

- Use ads and advocates to compare the President's personal characteristics and experience with

Carter's.
• (insert OVER)

B. ~~(Create the impression)~~ ^{Show} that the President has taken control of his Administration and campaign and is on the road to victory.

- Instill a new discipline in the President's White House and campaign staff.
- Control prima donnas in Administration.

For example, the President should rehearse his acceptance speech (before departing for Kansas City) using a teleprompter and video tape.

*For the reasons discussed infra, we discount the conclusion of Patterson and McClure that TV has no impact on the voters' choices. See their recent book analyzing the impact of TV on the 1972 election (The Unseeing Eye).



Strategy Specifics (Actions Aimed at Specific Objectives)

Establish leadership qualities

Avoid self-deprecating remarks (Ford not a

Lincoln) and acts (being photographed with

a cowboy hat).

Carefully plan, prepare and execute all on-

camera appearances. The President should

seen on television as in control, decisive,

open and candid. Prep time (15-30 minutes)

in a negative over reaction) because

the country does not want negative

strident, divisive tactics. The country

is coming together (as we saw over

the 4th of July weekend) and part of this

healing process is a rejection of

people who politicians who are

perceived to be aggressive attackers.

Instill a new discipline in the President's

White House and campaign staff.

Control prime time in Administration.

For the reasons discussed infra, we discount the conclusion

of Patterson and McClure that TV has no impact on the voters' choice.

See their recent book analyzing the impact of TV on the 1972 election (The Unseeing Eye).


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NOTE: We should plan for an ~~the~~ major Campaign swing for the last two weeks possibly including the use of a train.

- Announce that the President will not campaign by relying on hoopla for TV, but rather will use this Bicentennial election year to improve the Presidential electoral process by focusing on issues (See next chapter for specifics, and ~~Tab I - for draft announcement.~~)
- Develop and implement "issue cycle" plan. (See next chapter for specifics, and ~~Tab I - for detailed examples.~~)
- Hold open the option of challenging Carter to a series of debates. (See next chapter for specifics.)

C. Actions to hold base.

- In order to demonstrate that the President is the Party's leader, in control and the unifier,* he should consider addressing the Convention immediately after being nominated. Once the



* We cannot dwell on the unification problem nor spend resources working on Republicans. The fact is that if we're 15 or 20 points behind, Party unity will be a function of Ford's perceived winability. If Republicans think he's going to win, they'll pull behind him; if they think he's going to lose (as they perceived -- correctly -- Goldwater in 1964), the Party will remain divided no matter what we do.

In taking steps after we have the nomination to be perceived as moving towards the center, we must (1) avoid alienating our "base" to the point of reducing Republican turnout and volunteer efforts and (2) never be perceived as abandoning basic principles.


President goes over 1,130 votes, the following sequence could be considered:

- suspend the rules
- Reagan moves to make the nomination unanimous and introduces the President
- brief remarks by the President on the need for Party unity.

- In his remarks to the Convention, the President can stress party unity, but ask the Convention to face facts; we are a minority party, but we are the conscience of the Nation. Therefore, he can ask each and every Republican across the land to find one Independent and one Democrat, convince each of them to support the President, and make sure they go to the polls. This will put our 73-day task in perspective for the Convention and the Nation. It demonstrates that the President is a loyal GOP member, but reaching out to the entire Nation for support.

- Develop a half-hour paid television address by Reagan or Connally, aimed at conservatives, which would be used in our base States. This would be designed to underscore the President's conservative record on the issues and the need for Republican support because of the Carter threat.
- Develop and implement a special rural development/farm program, ~~(See Tab I- .)~~
- The President must continue to project an image of openness, inner tranquility and family-oriented. His campaign activities should not detract from this perception.

His campaign organization must be disciplined but open and honest. The voter should associate Carter with the Nixon image of arrogance and thirst for power. ~~(See pp .)~~





D. Actions to get target swing voters:

- Select Vice Presidential running mate with following characteristics:
 1. Able to carry a key State or region.
 2. Aggressive campaigner who can take the lead implementing the attack Carter plan.
 3. A man who is perceived as an Independent, or at least moderate Republican, without a strong Party identification. Must have a strong image of freshness and non-Washington establishment. Honest.
- Develop and implement a major "attack Carter" plan. (~~See Chapter _____ for discussion and Tab I- for further details.~~)
- In order to break the President out of the Washington establishment mold, he should launch an attack on the Democratic majority which has governed Washington for forty out of the past forty-four years. We should avoid symbolic acts such as bill signings, submitting legislation, vetoes, and the like, which simply reinforce the perception of the President as part of the Washington establishment. These events very rarely leave an impression on the substance of what was done. (~~See Tab I- for details of how this can be accomplished.~~)
- The President must refrain from appearing highly partisan. He must never personally attack his opponent.

4. A man who has good credibility with the press.



- The President must not campaign for GOP candidates. This will seriously erode his support among Independents and ticket splitters. The President should not attend any Party fund raisers. Any support given a GOP candidate must be done in a manner to avoid national media attention. For example, the President can make telephone calls, sign mailers, do video tape endorsements for fund raisers, etc.
- Develop a TV documentary targeted towards the Independents and "Group 2" of swing voters.
- Establish a program targeted specifically at Catholics. (See following chapter and Tab I for details.)
- Implement new campaign themes aimed at the Independent and ticket splitter. Strive to create the perception of the President as a conservative on social issues and moderate on economic issues. (See Chapter .)
- Implement a major First Family media blitz aimed particularly at the swing voter (Group 1). Orient along the lines of a loyal, supportive family. (~~See Chapter~~ and Tab I- for details.)

E.

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E. Actions to get target constituency groups:

- Our efforts in this area should be rifle-shots aimed at the specific group involved. These efforts should NOT have the objective of getting national press coverage (although we must keep in mind that this will happen if any mistakes are made.)
- The following are examples of key constituency groups:
 - Farmers
 - "Anti" groups such as anti gun control, abortion, (etc. anything)
 - Religious groups
 - Italians, and Irish and Mexican Americans
- See Tab I - for a constituency group plan ~~developed~~ and ~~it~~ a general Tab II - for ~~an~~ analysis of constituency groups.



5. Implementation Steps

A. As a critical part of creating voter perception, which is necessary to break the current mold which constrains and limits the perception voters have of the President, there will have to be some announcement, as indicated previously. This announcement, which probably should occur within a week after the Convention, perhaps in Grand Rapids (~~see Tab I-~~
~~for draft~~), should contain the following key elements:


- Presidential campaigning has become a circus which no longer fully serves the needs of the American people and the political process established by the Constitution. The President can appropriately use this Bicentennial year to demonstrate how the process can be improved. He can contribute by campaigning on the issues and thus assisting the people in making one of the most serious choices they must to preserve democracy and freedom.
- Candidly, a campaign which focuses on the issues helps the President get elected. His strength is in his proven ability to lead this Nation. Thus a campaign which results in the voters intelligently judging the candidates on the basis of their proven records, is a campaign that will favor the President.

- The President will announce certain ground rules for his campaign, including a schedule of press conferences, a timetable for his presenting the issues to the American people, and other specifics including the possibility of a debate. * There will be some crowd events

decide on route to substance; this meeting during the campaign should plan on a major campaign during weeks.

- NOTE: The President's announcement must convince the country that his "campaign" will be very aggressive. He must appear as the man fighting an uphill fight, but confident of ultimate victory. He must never appear defensive or defeated.

Our campaign strategy has been developed around the President's actual strengths and aimed at Carter's actual weaknesses. We are not trying to change the President (style ^{and} of substance); we are trying to change the voter's perception of the President and Carter.



B. To command and control ^{the} ~~his~~ campaign, the following key elements are necessary:

- At the White House:
 - 1) A Review Group - see infra.
 - 2) Absolute control over Presidential activities and Administration officials and actions.

* The "debate" challenge can be very flexible. ^{For example} the President could ~~be~~ ~~offer~~ state that he will appear before a panel of newsmen and experts five times on different subjects (e.g. foreign/defense, economy, domestic ~~of~~ affairs) and a sixth time for follow up questions. We could challenge Carter to do the same.

- At the President Ford Committee:
 - 1) Control over advertising, political press relations, campaign budget, RNC activities, etc.
 - 2) Control over advocates
 - 3) Execution of Carter attack plan (~~See pp.~~)
 - 4) Polling
 - 5) Campaign control over Vice President Rockefeller and the Vice Presidential nominee.

- At the RNC:
 - 1) Voter identification and turnout
 - 2) Carter attack capability (~~See pp.~~)

C. In order to ensure that every single action by the President between the time the strategy is adopted and the election is reviewed to determine its impact on the strategy, a Review Group should be established.

This group will have three functions:

First, to assess every proposed Presidential action (from scheduling to positions on issues) along with the actions of every key Administration and campaign official, to determine how that action impacts on the strategy objectives. Each target group will be indexed and given a specific weight so that all actions can be judged in terms of how they impact each target group/State and a "net assessment" can be rendered.

Second, the group should act as a political crisis management group which can meet on less than an hour's notice, at any time, to advise the President on how to react to opportunities or attacks as they develop.

Third, synchronize Presidential activity, campaign advertising, press plans, the Issue Cycle plan (discussed in the following pages) and the attack plan.



This group should be viewed as "personal to the President", that is, it should not appear in any organization chart, and it should receive no publicity. Its membership should be kept very small (five or six) and the campaign and Administration "superstars" should not be part of it on a permanent basis because of their lack of availability. Obviously, the President will often want to consult with one or more of his top officials, but he should also have the advice of the Review Group separately.

The Review Group should be one step removed from the pressures of running the day-to-day White House/campaign activities. This should enable them to maintain perspective, thus avoiding such errors as the "Schweiker Blunder".

2. Alternative Strategies

There are three basic campaign strategies available to the President:

- Continue the same type of campaign utilized in the primaries.
- Develop a more structured, yet conventional, campaign effort (similar to Truman in '48 or Nixon in '68).
- Adopt The Recommended Strategy, an unconventional strategy which is highly targeted on specific swing constituencies in swing States, and which is designed to improve the voters perceptions of Ford relative to Carter.

The following is an analysis of the alternatives:



Extend Current "Strategy"

Currently, the President's campaign can be characterized as utilizing traditional campaign tactics with directions and decisions coming in response to events. The strengths of the current "strategy" are:

- There are a variety of inputs from advisory groups, the PFC, Congressional leaders, Party officials, etc.

- The strategy entails a great deal of Presidential travel, thus beneficially impacting those who see the President, and local media markets.
- This strategy causes the least problems among Party officials, Congressional leaders, and the like.

However, this current method of operation is deficient in several respects.

- It's not likely to work.

The President was slightly behind Reagan in both the NBC poll (43-40) and MOR poll (48-45) among Republican primary voters last December. The net effect of the Presidential activities of January to February and the primary campaigns was to raise Republican support of the President to our present 60-30 margin over Reagan. But, this was accompanied by a drop in support by the rest of the electorate measured by the head-to-head races with Democrats and the approval rating.

In every primary State where we could afford to poll, we were leading before the campaign began (with the exception of California). Although Presidential

travel caused momentary increases in popular support, our lead was always eroded by the active campaign and media blitz of our opponent. This was, of course, due in part to the higher rate of turnout of Reagan's supporters. But to campaign more extensively in the general election is not an option because:

1. We are not protecting a lead but trying to cause millions of voters to change their minds and must do so through effective use of mass media.
 2. We cannot hope to cover the relevant States with Presidential travel. It took a large chunk of our resources just to cover twelve States in the three months of primaries. Further, this travel had a negative effect on the electorate at large. If we travel extensively, or all out, the President will be seen as another partisan politician and charged with neglecting the people's business.
- There's no "base line" against which we can measure options for changes as we go through the campaign. We do not have a clear understanding of campaign objectives, which are based on a careful analysis and a solid data base. Decision-making is haphazard with no clear lines of authority, and there does not exist a capability to produce really good campaign speeches, issue papers, etc.



- It has forced the President into a reactive mode -- defending his position on emotional but relatively insignificant issues.

Rather than correct the perception of deficiencies noted above, continuation of this strategy will, in all likelihood, lead to an increase in the negative gap between Carter and the President.

Structured, "Truman" Campaign

The principal advantage of a structured campaign would be better allocation of scarce resources. There could be a substantial improvement in the decision-making process, with deliberate attempt to coordinate the various spheres of influence, including the RNC, a President Ford committee, the White House, an independent "attack" group, etc. It is possible that a conventional campaign waged by a minority party could make up a 15-25 point gap in the seventy-three days available. However, it is not reasonable to assume that this can happen, given equality of financial resources. Not only will the Republicans not be able to outspend the Democrats, but in terms of non-financial resources (principally a unified majority party and union help), the Democrats will actually have far greater resources than we will. For example, in 1968 Humphrey trailed Nixon after the Convention by 12 points (43 to 31) with 19% of the vote going to Wallace and 7% undecided. By election day, Nixon still retained his 43%, but Humphrey had picked up slightly over 11 points.

It should be remembered that Nixon was able to hold his position in the polls, notwithstanding the fact that he faced a majority party. This is largely due, of course, to "external forces" such as LBJ's position on the Vietnam war.

Also, as we have shown previously, the President tends to lose national popularity as he campaigns. This was true in the past and is likely to be even a greater problem when running against Carter.

One important point must be kept in mind when considering a "Truman" campaign: if Truman had to implement his '48 campaign today, he would probably LOSE BECAUSE OF TV. Truman was not that good on the stump (his speeches were awful!) and, while his "Give them Hell, Harry" style was pleasing to relatively small crowds -- who would only see it once -- it probably would have quickly worn thin if seen nightly by millions in living color.

THEMES

Although we have developed several "themes" for use in speeches, etc., the President's campaign really must only have one theme. This theme must be repeated and repeated and repeated. We must drive it home incessantly. One possible campaign theme is: Trust and Accomplishment.

The theme should be developed by the President's and advocate's speeches, campaign ads and the attack plan.

* * *

In order to maintain our "base" constituency, we recommend the following themes:

1. Honesty - This theme will be designed to demonstrate that the President's speeches and actions are morally based. It will reflect principles in terms of the President's life style and the position he takes on issues. A key ingredient of this theme will be the role Mrs. Ford and the family plays in the election.
2. Intelligent and In Command - This theme will be used in an attempt to establish a perception of the President as intelligent and in control. The President should be portrayed as possessing knowledge and wisdom, tempered by over a quarter of a century of experience. As with the honesty theme, this will involve an intensive look at the President as a man and, accordingly, much of the burden of presenting this theme will have to be borne by advertising and advocates. We should seize every opportunity to

directly compare Ford and Carter in terms of experience, education and family characteristics. While the President's intelligence can be developed by emphasizing his past, it is clear that to demonstrate control, the voter must perceive that changes have occurred. Control will inevitably be measured in highly personal terms, such as the relationship between the President and Kissinger, Simon, et al.



3. Experienced at the Essentials of Governing - This theme will demonstrate that the President recognizes that there are certain essentials which government must provide its people, and in these areas, the President, by virtue of his experience, can best govern the Nation.
4. Opposed to Arrogance of Bigness - For the most part, opposition to bigness means opposition to bigness of institutions. At the head of the list, of course, is the federal government. Our opposition should be aimed at the Democratic ~~majority~~ in Congress and not Congress as an institution. We must build the case that the Democrats are a party which relies on the government to solve problems we face as a Nation. Jimmy Carter is a part of the Democratic establishment by virtue of his activities from the time he was assured of the nomination until the beginning of the campaign. He is linked with big labor and with the Democratic leadership of Congress. Carter in the White House and the Democrats in Congress will ensure a continuation of the ever-increasing power of government over the lives of individuals and the private economic sector.

begin here.

On the positive side, we must stress the fact the President has consistently (over a twenty-five year period) sought to reduce the power of the federal government and protect the rights of individuals and businesses to govern their own destiny. As a practice matter, the negative attack on Carter (linking him with the Democratic and a majority party that seeks to impose greater domination over this country) will be more effective than the positive thrust of stressing the President's record.



In addition to coming up with specific reforms which will be perceived as meaningful progress, the President must also come to grips with the big business problem. Politically, opposition to big business is the real litmus test for any Republican. Thus far, the President is perceived as clearly in bed with big business (particularly because of his position vis-a-vis the oil companies), and is opposed to stronger anti-trust laws.

5. Growing Prosperity - This theme should be developed by showing how the economy is improving -- and will continue to improve -- because of President Ford's steady-handed leadership.

Carter will be linked to traditional Democratic economics. A "Carter" budget will be presented.

We will make the point that by minimizing government management of the Nation's economy, the President has revitalized the private sector and America's can-do spirit.

This theme should also stress the importance of the Ford-Carter choice for the future of the country. At issue is who will control our lives -- ourselves or our government.

In order to attract the swing voters (which are primarily pragmatically -- as opposed to ideological -- conservatives who are upwardly mobile) we recommend the following additional themes:

6. Vision of a Better Life - This theme must demonstrate that the President is a man of change. It must establish the point that if he is elected President, the next four years will result in a better life for our target voters.

This theme should be developed around programs which demonstrate vision for the future based on caution and a healthy respect for the existing governmental system. It is the articulation of the President's willingness to incur near-term costs for long-term benefits, and his ability to avoid the "big play".



7. Stability of Opportunity - This theme must drive home the point that the President will not allow those who have moved upward during their life to slip backwards, either because of external pressures such as inflation and the like, or due to positive government action such as quotas.
8. Quality Government as a Means to Improve the Quality of Life - This theme will develop the President's basic approach to improving the quality of life of those who have been helping themselves. At the core of this theme will be the concept of increased knowledge.

Using the idea of self-betterment as a way to overcome obstacles and achieve a better life, this theme will deal with the following specific subjects:

- Education
- Housing
- Crime
- Environment
- Transportation
- Etc.

In terms of form, this should reflect social conservatism with moderate to slightly left of moderate positions on other issues.

One possible approach to the environmental (and big business issues would be to attack the "hidden subsidy" business has been getting by being allowed to dispose their waste in our air and water. The President could approach this as a moral issue -- do not give anyone free use of the national assets of air and water. Our program would be aimed at internalizing these costs -- not EPA regulations.

9. Americans Together - Counter the basic attack by Democrats (need for change because Americans are disillusioned) by stressing that Americans have come together after Watergate and Vietnam because of Ford's leadership. Cite the 4th of July phenomena.

* * *




Although we've been cautious about over-promising, we must drive home in our themes the idea that President Ford is going to improve people's lives. In some cases, we may have to go out on a limb in terms of a promise, but we've got to let people know that this President is going to make a change for the better in their lives. We've got to stop talking about such things as whether or not it's improvement to go from 7.3 to 6.9 unemployment, and talk about how we're going to end this problem and really help people.



SYNOPSIS OF IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

1. Command and Control

There must be a clear definition of responsibilities between the White House, PFC and RNC. Control of the campaign must be centralized. The following command and control mechanism is recommended:



Advisory Group: Made up of the President's Senior Campaign advisors/officials. Acts as "Board of Directors" of campaign. Small Executive Committee meets with the President twice a week.

Review Group: Its three functions (which were described on Page) are: (1) provide a "net assessment" of every proposed Presidential activity/decision in terms of its impact on The Campaign Strategy; (2) continually assess effectiveness of the strategy; and (3) synchronize advertising, media, Presidential activity and issue cycle plan.

This group should meet with Dick Cheney every day (just prior to Dick's evening meeting with the President. It should meet with the President twice a week just prior to his meeting with the Advisory Group.

The group should consist of the following:

*transfer
stop code*



- 2. Vice President
stop code ~~[to be supplied]~~
- 3. Budget

The budget should be developed by the PFC, reviewed by the Advisory Group and approved by the President.

The following relative priorities are suggested:

- 40% - Advertising
- 25% - Carter/Mondale attack
- 15% - Presidential events
- 15% - PFC activities
- 5% - Vice President

4. Presidential Activity

The President's campaign activity should be developed around the "Issue Cycle Plan".

We have discussed earlier the importance of trying to focus the Fall campaign on the issues. Again, people rarely vote because of the candidate's position on specific issues, but they use issues (particularly how the candidate prioritizes and presents the issues that are important to him) as a means to assess the character and personality of the candidate. Thus issues are important, not so much because of substance, but what they tell the voter about the candidate as a man.

One reason why Americans in general tend to become confused as to the candidate's position on issues (except a few controversial and key issues which receive a lot of press attention) is because of the haphazard way they tend to be presented during the course of a normal campaign. In general, issues are presented, not in any logical order based on substance, but rather in accordance with the candidate's schedule of events. Also, events external to the particular candidate's campaign, such as attacks by his opponents, etc., tend to become action-forcing in terms of the presentation of the candidate's view on specific issues.




As a result, the electorate is faced with a confusing presentation of a great deal of substance, often deliberately obscured by the candidates for political purposes, and then further confused by the press reports and his opponent's attack.

We have a plan which has as its objective the presentation of issues in a logical way, so that the presentation itself tends to drive home the President's substantive position in the voter's mind. Also -- and more importantly -- the method of presentation will show the President as a logical, ordered and experienced President who is in control.

Our recommendation is that issues be grouped under logical, generic headings such as:

- A prosperous and free domestic economy
- Improved quality of life for each American family
- A more peaceful world



Each major subject area would be presented over a given period of time (averaging about a week) in the following general manner:

Day 1 - Presentation by the President of his basic philosophical approach to this subject area. Statement of principles which guide his policy decisions. Basic statement of

accomplishments and "core" program and initiatives.

Day 2 - Presentation of specific "white papers",
& 3 fact sheets, legislative proposals, administrative actions, etc. Specific issues are presented with facts, backgrounders and enough detail to fully present the problem being addressed, how the President's action will solve the problem, what the cost will be and who will pay it, and other relevant information.

Day 4 - Presidential press conference with twenty minutes devoted to this subject area and the remaining ten minutes for general questioning. Selected specialty and regional press would be invited to augment the regular White House Press Corps.

Day 5 - Major speech by principal advocate (probably
& 6 buy television time) characterizing the President's position on this issue and attacking the opposition.

Our campaign advertising would be geared to sync with this schedule. In addition, all advocates and other spokesmen would do likewise.



In order to provide an increasing tempo for the campaign, this cycle would probably begin scheduled to cover a seven to eight-day period, which would then be slowly telescoped for succeeding subjects covered so that the final issues might be covered in a three to four-day cycle.



One obvious option would be to schedule in debates with Carter keyed to the issue cycle. If the President decides to challenge Carter to debate, we should try to get an agreement that there will be a series of four or five by subject area (which would coincide with our issue cycle plan).

The President could close the campaign with a major televised address (time purchased by the campaign) with the presentation organized in accordance with the issue cycle used in the campaign. An option to the President presenting this solo would be to have a presentation by someone like John Connally as narrator, presenting the issues by the use of film of the President in action, etc. This could be followed by a brief summation by the President himself.

Although this has the appearance of being overly structured when presented in writing, it will lose this characteristic when implemented. External events (Carter activities, government business, etc.) will inject randomness and spontaneity into the news flow.

The Issue Cycle Plan will nevertheless project an impression of orderliness and control.

Although applicable to our campaign as a whole, our Issue Cycle Plan must be developed for television. In the past, TV has not been a good medium for communicating the candidate's position on issues. For example, Patterson and McClure in their book, The Unseeing Eye, state that the networks nearly ignored the issues during the seven-week 1972 campaign (September 18 through November 6).

NETWORK EVENING NEWS

(Totals for entire seven-week campaign)

	<u>ABC</u>	<u>CBS</u>	<u>NBC</u>
Total coverage for all issues	35 min.	46 min.	26 min.
<hr/>			
Average news minutes for <u>each issue</u> (over 7 weeks)	80 sec.	105 sec.	60 sec.
<hr/>			
Total for cam- paign activities such as rallies and motorcades	141 min.	122 min.	130 min.

Probably the major reason for the networks dismissal of the issues is they lack film value.

We are developing a plan to deal with this problem.

Here are some of the elements:

- The networks tend to overreact to criticism, therefore we will seek to give attention to the Patterson-McClure book (even though we disagree with much of its analysis and conclusions). This should "encourage" the networks to pay more attention to issues.
- We must get our issue message across in our ads. * For example, film of a closed down college could be effective in making the point that inflation may deny higher education to many people.
- We should seek to present issues in terms of conflict situations that can be covered live - e.g., debates.
- Visuals should be used in Presidential speeches, meetings, etc.

*

In the 1972 election, many people learned a great deal more about the candidates positions on issues by watching political ads than the evening news. The key issues received almost five times the air time via advertising than they did on the evening newscasts.



PRE-CAMPAIGN PLAN

The following pre-campaign plan is intended as an integral part of this overall election strategy. It covers the period from now through the Convention.

1) Develop Perception of Strong Fall Campaign Capability

OBJECTIVE: Demonstrate that the President has firm control of his Fall campaign effort; that a strategy has been developed and adopted; and, that the best talent available has been lined up.

RECOMMENDED STEPS:

- The President should adopt a campaign strategy by July 31, after receiving the advice of his closest advisors. He should reveal the entire strategy only to a half-dozen or so very close -- and trusted -- advisors.

The press guidance (for White House and PFC) should be as follows:

- a) The President has developed a comprehensive campaign strategy, drawing on a broad range of advice and factual input.
- b) He will not reveal the strategy. Only very few senior advisors have been briefed by the President -- and they aren't talking. Others (who may talk) are just speculating or may only have a part of it.



c) The only characterization given by the President is that the strategy is national, comprehensive and completely realistic. The major variable concerns the identity of the President's running mate.

- Identify additional key campaign aides. Quietly plug in and let that become known -- especially among party leaders.

Make special effort to include Independent and anti-Carter Democrats. Signal should go out that Carter will be a target as well as an opponent. This is important because (a) it will stimulate critical press attention directed at Carter; (b) provide a stimulus for Independents and dissatisfied Democrats to join Ford (thereby demonstrating our strength vis-a-vis Reagan); and, (c) as a signal to the delegates that we will run a really tough and aggressive campaign.

2) Announce a Vice President Selection Process

OBJECTIVE: Show the President (not external forces generated by the Reagan challenge) as being firmly in control; head off press criticism and unfavorable comparison to Carter and Reagan.



RECOMMENDED STEPS:

- President adopts a strategy of revealing that he has a specific and disciplined process for selecting his running mate, but he will not reveal names.
- Advisors (Morton-Cheney) will let it be known that only the President knows who is on the list.
- The President could reveal the following about the list:
 - About a dozen names
 - He personally knows everyone
 - Women are included

No one can add to this because no one else knows.
- The President (or Cheney?) could reveal the following concerning the process:
 - The President alone is in control
 - He is spending a considerable amount of time on the selection.
 - He is meeting with some of the people under consideration; with others he is conversing on the telephone, and in several cases he knows the person so well there is no need for specific conversations on the Vice Presidency.

- The President will make his preference known to the Convention after his nomination.
- Views of political leaders are being submitted (but not solicited) to the President via Rog Morton -- views of all others are submitted through Dick Cheney.
- The President is reviewing specific background information concerning the people under consideration. This varies by individual, but generally covers moral, ethical, financial and legal matters. The President has not revealed any further details.
- The President has talked to the Attorney General personally to develop a process of using the FBI to investigate specific factual matters if necessary. No government agency -- including the FBI -- will be used without the individual's consent.



NOTE: See Tab II- for President's on-the-record remarks concerning the V.P. selection matter.

3) Presidential Actions Between Now and Convention

OBJECTIVE: Begin to change current negative perceptions of President by events/actions designed to demonstrate that he is:

-- in control

- experienced and intelligent
- determined to win

RECOMMENDED STEPS:

[to be supplied]

4) Initial Carter Attack

(See infra) *beginning at Pg. [scribble]*



69 showing the President as a strong leader in control

5) Convention (Impact on Fall Campaign)

OBJECTIVE: Minimize adverse impact on President's national perception; to extent possible, take advantage of positive TV exposure; get best V.P. nominee; minimize GOP split; and, draw distinction between ^{President} Ford/GOP and Carter/Democrats.

BACKGROUND: The major risk facing the President in Kansas City -- other than getting nominated -- is that events (as seen by the TV viewer) will reinforce the President's image as indecisive and out of control.



RECOMMENDED STEPS:

[Assumption - President has over 1,130 delegates which appear firm -- nomination appears certain.]

- Bring on board a very strong TV advisor.
- About a week before the Convention, move to establish tighter control over Convention program. Include Reagan people in this effort (particularly his TV advisor).
- During Platform hearings in Kansas City, establish firm control by Ford people.
 - President announces certain fundamental principles which should guide Platform drafters.
 - President's men in Kansas City demonstrate their control, preparation and discipline by activities during week of Platform deliberations.

This should be a demonstration of strength and competence -- not belligerence or arrogance. We should not pick fights.
- President remain in the White House until Wednesday or Thursday of Convention week.
 - Nothing will be more beneficial for the President's image than TV cut-aways from K.C. to the White House for reports on his activities.
 - The President's influence on the delegates can be more powerful if done from the White House (with careful planning) than in K.C.

[separate plan will be drafted.]

- When the President arrives in K.C. he must immediately -- with high visibility -- dominate the City, the Convention and, most importantly, TV programming.

This can be accomplished by:

- a) Massive arrival; with major downtown crowd-raising and very upbeat remarks in center of town.
- b) Summoning several key Convention leaders -- including Reagan people -- upon arrival. Set forth one or two specific (symbolic) changes in Convention designed to improve GOP image and not to secure any Ford advantage vis-a-vis Reagan.
- c) See separate Convention plan.



ATTACK AND CARTER'S REACTION1. Background

Carter's popularity is based primarily on his perceived credibility, but ^{it} is very soft. The voter's perception of Carter can be substantially changed.

Our basic objective should be to change the perception of Carter:

- move him to the left on social issues and away from traditional American values;
- identify him as a partisan Democrat; and
- show that he is devious and arrogant, driven by personal ambition in ruthless pursuit of power.

We cannot wait much longer before launching the Carter attack -- he is building a very substantial lead and is beginning to look like FDR in the polls.

Carter's success is largely attributable to three factors:

1. A thematic campaign of national renewal avoiding issues.
2. Relative to other candidates, he's terrific and he is perceived as a winner.
3. He is a superb politician and highly intelligent.

Since most people vote on personality, his avoidance of issue positions has not caused any major defection from the Democratic coalition. His theme of restoring honesty and morality to government has struck a responsive chord,

not unlike the President did in his first few weeks in Office. But in the course of the campaign, he will have to take positions which will cause some erosion of his support. Mondale and the Democratic Platform will cost him a great deal since both are far too liberal for his base, which is conservative and Southern.



In the recent national poll, people place Carter near themselves on the issues wherever they are. Because of his thematic, personal appeal, they want him to be close to them. But his regional and religious background have developed a conservative base of support while his running mate and platform are basically liberal. We must mount an attack on him on conservative issues, both economic and social. If we can succeed, we can keep him busy holding the South, which at present he takes for granted. By occupying him there, we free the President and his advocates to concentrate on the swing States. But the attack in the South must be on issues. We should not attack him personally there since this would cause a backlash of regional pride. It must be a respectful disagreement on a high plane.*

* An example of how not to attack Carter is Senator Dole's line on Face the Nation (7/18): "He is Southern-fried McGovern."



* * *

Carter's choice of Mondale can be viewed as a potentially serious mistake which opens his ticket to attack as being liberal, especially on social issues. There are two obvious possible motives for the choice of Mondale and both present interesting attack opportunities:

- 1) Carter could be going for the big mandate by trying to win as many States as possible; or
- 2) He could be very worried about the third party threat by McCarthy.

* * *

In challenging Carter on issues, we are faced with the need to make a threshold choice: do we want to stress that he "flip-flops", or do we want to force him to take specific positions that result in a loss of part of his "constituency"?

Our recommendation is to use this sequence:

- Force Carter to take positions (don't worry too much how he comes out on a particular issue).
- Give high visibility to his positions and target on the groups offended.
- Assume he will react to the inevitable erosion in the polls by "softening" his positions.

- Then begin to make the "flip-flop" case. Point out that he goes from a conservative-moderate position to liberal. Stress that this is a fundamental character flaw -- it's deceitful. (For example, we can compare Carter's acceptance speech with his remarks at the Businessmen's Lunch at 21 Club.)

* * *

Finally, we should try to characterize Carter's campaign as a mirrorimage of Nixon's '68 and '72 campaigns. The following similarities should be pointed out:

- A candidate who tries to be all things to all people.
- Avoids specifics on issues (RN - '68 campaign)
- Driven by personal ambition - harsh and manipulative.
- Secretive and surrounded by a protective and fiercely loyal staff. (One problem)


(Problem: Press likes his staff)

→ we still face is the fact that in general the press likes the Carter staff. This may well change as he adds people and resumes increase.)



2. Carter's Campaign Strategy

- Carter/Mondale key States analysis
 - +-- Assume solid South
 - +-- Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, Midwest will be important.
 - +-- Texas, California, Oregon, Florida will be swing States.
 - +-- Probably will not concentrate on Plains and Mountain States.
- Carter will project moderate position; Mondale will project liberal position.
- Mondale will lead the attack on the President and the Republicans.
- Attack line will be:
 - +-- President isn't capable.
 - . not smart
 - . not competent
 - . not in control of Administration
 - . has no vision
 - . can't solve problems
 - +-- President is Washington
 - . won't change major problems
 - . things won't get better
 - . is of party that gave us Watergate, recession
 - +-- Nixon pardon
 - +-- Time to change, get country moving again



• Carter's personal campaign will:

- +-- Emphasize mood
 - . morality
 - . time to change
 - . decency of people
 - . let's make government decent again
 - . government efficiency
 - . government can do good for people; need action now
 - . determination to be a leader
 - . determination to change
- +-- *Involve an extensive voter registration drive*
- +-- Project conservative tone on social issue
- +-- Project liberal tone on economic issue
- +-- Project populist tone on bigness issue
- +-- Avoid specifics on issues
- +-- Will have a lot of movement, color, no specifics
- +-- This strategy will be implemented by:
 - . extensive campaign travel (big crowd events)
 - . extensive media
 - . extensive voter turnout efforts
 - . extensive special group efforts targeted at his base and swing support
 - labor
 - Blacks
 - liberals
 - farmers

- Carter will mask his weaknesses, e.g., Plains activities fishing, softball, etc., to mask arrogance.



- Carter will try not to react to our strategy.

What does Carter do:

- +-- He must travel to show movement and to capitalize on mood themes.
- +-- This movement lets him dodge getting specific on issues.
- +-- Contact with people is a plus for him.

3. Carter-Mondale Weaknesses on Issues

Where to attack Carter -

- 1. Right to work
- 2. National health insurance (mandatory)
- 3. Humphrey-Hawkins
- 4. Gun control
- 5. Democratic Platform
- 6. Defense budget cuts
- 7. Capital punishment ?
- 8. Busing ?
- 9. Affirmative action and quotas
- 10. Scatter-site housing
- 11. End mortgage payments as tax deduction
- 12. Record of increasing size of Georgia government
- 13. Federal guarantee bonds of bankrupt cities
- 14. Decriminalization of marijuana

*- careful
be cautious
Can't + doctor
which doctor
we must use.*



4. Lines of Attack

The following are examples of potential attack lines:

- Ask voters what do you what --
 - Peace?
 - Prosperity?
 - A leader to trust?

President Ford has given us these.

- Why trade a known for an unknown? We don't know what Carter is because he won't tell us. But we do know what he is not.

1 dash {

- not experienced
- not candid
- not specific on issues
- not known by foreign leaders
- etc.



Therefore, why take a chance on a stranger?


- The press says the race will be between a liberal and a conservative. We must make it a race between a liberal (Carter/Mondale) and a moderate (the President).

~~• Campaign against the '60s.~~

- What will the "Carter Dollar" buy us? (Cost out Carter's program -- predict inflation...)

5. Our "Attack" Resources

The following should be considered as people who can effectively attack Carter/Mondale:

- Vice President Rockefeller
- Vice Presidential nominee
- Cabinet and Members of Congress
- Democrats for Ford (or against Carter)
- Independents for Ford (or against Carter)
- X Constituencies or groups for Ford (or against Carter)
- Georgians for Ford (or against Carter)
- Religious leaders (Catholics, Billy Graham, etc.)
- John Connally
- Ronald Reagan
- George Wallace 

6. Our "Attack" Organization

~~[to be supplied - PFC, RNC, Independents]~~

7. Attack Strategy Outline

A. Pre-Republican Convention

~~[to be supplied]~~

B. Convention to Labor Day

~~[to be supplied]~~

C. Labor Day to November

~~[to be supplied]~~

8. Carter/Mondale Response

~~[to be supplied]~~

★ ★ ★

To support our offensive and attack efforts, there must be an issues group set up. I suggest that ~~it~~ be headed at the PFC by Marty Anderson. The PFC ^{should} will provide all administrative support and political input (analysis of polls and the like) along with information on what Carter, Mondale, et al. are saying. (Perhaps Marty Anderson could be asked to do this.)

The White House will have the responsibility to provide substantive ^{input on the issues.} ~~people to support this effort.~~

One way this could work would be to have Marty Anderson (or whoever fills his role) meet here at the White House every evening from 6:00 to 7:00 p.m. ^{as indicated:} ~~with the following~~ people, ~~as indicated:~~

Monday and Friday - Issues Steering Group members:

Cannon, Duval, Greenspan, Marsh, Spencer, Peeter (these are examples of who might attend.)

Tuesday - Domestic Issues Group:

Cannon (Chairman)
Lynn, Cavanaugh, O'Neill, Butz



Wednesday - Economic Issues Group

Greenspan (Chairman)
Simon, Seidman, Connable, Richardson

Thursday - Foreign/Defense Issues Group

Marsh (Chairman)
Scowcroft, Hyland, Dick Allen, Eastabrook?, Ellsworth(?)

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FORD - CARTER PERCEPTIONS

Summary Chart

F O R D

C A R T E R

F O R D		C A R T E R	
Perception	Actual	Perception	Actual
Not intelligent	Intelligent	Intelligent	Very intelligent
Honest	Honest	Honest	Insincere
Incompetent	Competent	Competent	Competent
Somewhat experienced	Experienced	Somewhat inexperienced	Inexperienced
Not arrogant	Not arrogant	Not arrogant	Arrogant
Indecisive	Seeks compromise	Decisive	Decisive
Safe (not extreme)	Safe	Not extreme	Politically expedient
Religious	Religious	Deeply religious	Religious
Not ambitious	Not ambitious	Ambitious	Extremely ambitious
Not in control of own staff	Not in control	In control of own staff	In control
Open (personally)	Open	Open	Withdrawn
Insensitive	Compassionate	Compassionate	Probably not compassionate
Takes positions on issues	Takes positions on issues	Avoids positions on issues	Avoids positions on issues



F O R D

C A R T E R

F O R D		C A R T E R	
Perception	Actual	Perception	Actual
Family man	Family man	Family man	Family man
Inarticulate	Relatively inarticulate	Articulate	Relatively inarticulate
Bad speeches	Bad speeches	Good speeches	Fair speeches
Lost small town roots/ part of Washington establishment	Washington establishment	Has small town roots	Has small town roots
Moderate on social issues	Conservative	Conservative on social issues	Moderate
Conservative on economic issues	Very conservative	Moderate liberal on economic issues	Liberal

