

The original documents are located in Box 13, folder “Campaign Strategy - Suggestions (3)” of the Michael Raoul-Duval Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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July 30, 1976

*File
Campaign
Strategy
GWC*

MEMORANDUM FOR: MIKE DUVAL
FROM: GEORGE VAN CLEVE
SUBJECT: TIMMONS CAMPAIGN PROPOSAL

The parameters for Presidential activity under the Timmons proposal as you gave them to me were as follows:

1. Begin campaigning in mid-September, and campaign three days a week through the election;
2. Make three campaign stops a day.

You asked me to assess the impact of such a proposal.

Conversations with the scheduling people indicate that:

1. The President cannot reasonably be scheduled for more than an average of 2 1/2 stops a day because of the physical strain of such an effort.
2. A "fixed form" event, which is a "no frills" setpiece event consisting of a straight speech after a motorcade entry, generally ends up costing us about \$10,000.
A "special event" where we go to extra lengths to do special advance, promotion, staging and so on runs anywhere from \$15,000 to \$30,000.

Thus a reasonable estimate of the cost to the PFC for othe proposed Presidential campaign schedule is \$1 million, a cost which could easily go higher, for about 50 campaign stops. The bottom line question is, what do we get for this \$1 million?

What We Gain

1. Action

Proponents of this plan will argue that people expect the Presidential candidates to campaign, to be active in meeting the people. They might



well argue that people would be upset by the change in style. Finally, they might argue that we would be hurt by the contrast between our "inactivity" and Carter's broad-based activity.

2. Media Access

The top 13 TV media markets in the US contain 38% of the US viewing population (see Appendix I for ranking). The next 17 major markets contain an additional 17% of the viewing population, so the top 30 markets contain 55% of the population. Going into those 30 markets could give us the equivalent of a 3-5 minute action spot in local TV news time which would reach more than half the American population.

Then, too, given an active strategy proponents will argue that we could hope for 30-60 minutes of national TV news "action" coverage during this period.

In addition, of course, we would hope to receive favorable newspaper coverage of the events which would reach many millions of newspaper readers.

An argument could also be made that the local news coverage of our events would be more favorable in some instances than the national coverage we might otherwise receive.

3. Image That we are "Fighting Hard to Win"

It can be argued that positively associated with the "action" dimension discussed above is an "underdog" image such as that Truman had when he campaigned in 1948. In addition, we would look more like the tough, combative Nixon of 1968 than the "isolated" Nixon of 1972.

4. Greater party enthusiasm for the cause

It is possible that personal appearances by the President, which are surrounded by a pomp which is impressive to the layman or the party official, could move party members to greater exertions in performing the essential drudge work for the campaign effort.



What We Lose

1. The "Presidential" (as opposed to partisan) image

We are selling the President, not the Republican party. To the extent that it seems we are selling the party our cause will be damaged because we cannot confine our base to the party and its allies and conceivably hope to win. Our information strongly suggests that when this President campaigns, he is viewed as a Republican partisan, precisely the image we wish to avoid.

2. Ability to control events on a national level for 20 out of 73 days between the convention and the election

Crucial to the Presidential strategy outlined above is our ability to "make the Presidency happen." Even if we were logistically capable of maintain the "home base" advantage while we were on the road, the partisan atmosphere of the campaign trail would inevitably cut into our ability to perform this major task.

3. Ability to "localize" our media message and to control its substantive content

One of the major differences between the 1948 situation and the situation today is that when Harry Truman went out on a train and talked to Kansans, he could talk to them about problems of concern to Kansans in a language with which they were at home, while today we run the risk of losing national media coverage (or of having comparisons made between a Kansas speech and a New England speech) if we use such an approach.

In addition, we do not have a great many friends in the national press corps or among the national network broadcasters. We can expect them to do as little for us as is humanly possible, and we certainly have little control over what they do to us.

4. Ability to avoid certain types of intraparty disputes

IF we go out in the field to campaign we are likely to have to make some very hard choices about whose requests for appearances we will honor. Someone has got to end up being unhappy -- perhaps it's better that everyone is equally unhappy.



5. Ability to respond with style to Carter or Congressional "surprises"

If the President is out in the field campaigning when the Carter people or some Congressional committee drops a bombshell on us, we may not be able to respond effectively. On the other hand, our chances of doing this are increased if we are here and have more time and are more relaxed.



APPENDIX I -- TOP 13 MEDIA MARKETS IN US

<u>MARKET</u>	<u>Per centage of National Audience</u>
New York	9
LA/SF	7.5
Phila/Pitts	4.8
Chicago	3.9
Dallas/Houston	2.8
Cincinnati/Cleveland	2.8
Boston	2.5
Detroit	2.25
D. C.	1.9

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 28, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: DICK CHENEY
FROM: MIKE DUVAL *Mike*
SUBJECT: CAMPAIGN STRATEGY

Dick, two very quick points:

oh 1. Meeting with the President on Strategy. I had a good meeting with Stu Spencer and he is reviewing our draft strategy book. Stu would like to meet with you, myself (Jerry & Foster?) tomorrow. We both have the feeling that the two strategy books will fold together very neatly. *not tomorrow*

After the meeting with you, we recommend that the strategy book go to the President late Thursday afternoon.

This would permit a meeting with the President and you, Stu (Morton? Duval?) on Friday morning before the Mississippi trip.

Depending on the outcome of that meeting, I could staff the book while you're in Mississippi (limited sections and no distributed copies) to Timmons, Harlow, etc.

Both Stu and I feel it's important to move this on a fast track and get some reaction from the President because there are simply too many things happening which must be linked to strategy (Convention planning, advertising, and the like).

*Wait ↓
let's see
what they
produce*
2. The Cannon Group. I talked to Bob Teeter who told me he had an excellent meeting last night with Cannon, Seidman, O'Neill, etc. They apparently are working very energetically to develop some issues which can be plugged into our strategy. *Dick*

It seems to me that it would be worthwhile to ensure that that effort is compatible with our strategy. As you know, the timing of presenting issues, and how they're packaged, becomes very critical.

Cannon has a group on a very fast track, and they intend to have some suggestions pulled together by tomorrow.

I recommend that you talk to Jim and suggest that they plug me into their group. I think I can work very closely with Jim and be helpful in keeping their work product linked to our tentative ideas concerning the strategy.



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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 30, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: DICK CHENEY
FROM: MIKE DUVAL *Mike*
SUBJECT: CAMPAIGN

Dick, here are two quick points by way of follow-up to the past week's activities:

1. Reference to Polling Information.

As you know, one of the basic elements of our strategy will be to portray Carter as a politician who develops his substantive positions on the basis of polling information, as distinct from developing positions on the issues on the basis of principle, experience, etc. This is a piece of the argument which is designed to establish Carter as a man of expediency and the President as a man of principle.

Unfortunately, for the past week many of us have been strongly emphasizing the President's reliance on polls as he has developed his basic campaign strategy. The President himself referred to the Teeter data when he announced his five issues in Vail. Your response to Jim Cannon's question at the Senior Staff meeting this morning also linked the Teeter information with the five issues.

Although the press has not really picked up on this yet, I think it is only a matter of time before they clobber us with our reliance on polling information to develop policy.

Accordingly, I think we should conscientiously attempt to back off emphasizing our polling efforts. I think we should do this in public, and here at the White House, because of our problem with leaks.



I understand that Alan Greenspan spoke briefly to the President about this last night in the airplane, but I think it's worth reinforcing this point.

2. Implementing Campaign Strategy.

A key element of our strategy memorandum was the establishment of a "Review Group". (See attached memorandum which I sent you on August 1.)

I don't believe that the "Executive Committee" announced in Vail can undertake the functions which we have identified for the Review Group.

I suggest that establishing such a group to keep all White House and PFC actions on strategy should be given the highest priority.

Some of our actions over the past week deviated from the strategy (e.g., the leaks concerning writing off the "cotton South"). We should expect a much rougher period in the upcoming weeks as Carter reacts to our Convention and his erosion in the polls. I think we're in for a very rough period, and we need the internal discipline which can perhaps best be achieved by strict adherence to agreed strategy.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 1, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: DICK CHENEY
FROM: MIKE DUVAL
SUBJECT: CAMPAIGN GROUPS

I recommend that the following be considered to staff these campaign groups:

Review Group - Personal staff for the President. Reports to Dick Cheney everyday, to the President twice a week. Responsible for (1) providing a "net assessment" of every proposed Presidential activity/decision in terms of its impact on The Campaign Strategy; (2) continually assess the effectiveness of The Strategy; and, (3) synchronize advertising, media and Presidential activity and Issue Cycle Plan.

Staff: Duval
Teeter
Spencer (if available)
Jones (if other duties permit)
Chanock

Issues Groups

PFC Director of Issues - Marty Anderson

1) Issues Steering Group

Cannon
Duval
Greenspan
Marsh
Spencer
Teeter
Anderson



2) Domestic Issues Group

Cannon, Chairman
Lynn
Cavanaugh
O'Neill

3) Economic Issues Group

Greenspan, Chairman
Simon
Seidman

4) Foreign/Defense Issues Group

Marsh, Chairman
Scowcroft
Hyland
Ellsworth (?)
Eagleburger (?)



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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


September 3, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: DICK CHENEY
FROM: MIKE DUVAL *Mike*
SUBJECT: CAMPAIGN

As indicated in the Strategy Book, one of the key factors which will affect the outcome of the November election will be our ability to react quickly to opportunities. I think the President's statement on the debate negotiations Wednesday evening is a good example of where we moved very quickly (although the execution was poor). As a result of making a quick decision and moving out on it, the President made all three networks while Carter only made ABC on the East Coast news edition.

Although I haven't been completely plugged in, I still sense we're shakey in two key areas:

- Full implementation of the Strategy Memo, including establishment of the Review Group, and
- Our ability to execute quickly, decisively and correctly.



OPERATION "OVER THE TOP"

In the final three days there can be no news as persuasive or as contagious as news of a last minute shift to Ford - a closing ground swell that will take him over the top.

However, the actual existence of such a trend is not enough. The important thing is for the public (as well as our workers) to know that it exists. It is only then that the contagion sets in.

If President Ford or his spokesmen merely say it exists that will be perceived as oratory and will not be treated as news. But if President Ford and the PFC take action because the ground swell exists the action will be hard news and the existence of the ground swell be assumed.

Recommendation: At the President's request the PFC could take the extraordinary step of purchasing radio time for a nationwide "rally" of Ford supporters in which the President and key campaign personalities will report the exciting details of the sudden turn of the tide. The President will then call on every worker for extra effort in the final three days. We have suddenly reached the one yard line - now let's go over the top.

The content of the program is only relatively important, the real importance is the fact that the program is suddenly being put on the air as a result of the sudden shift towards Ford.

The program is a cinch to produce. There can be phone calls from state or local chairmen reporting on local newspaper polls or any other



evidence of recent momentum. There can be pep talks from people like John Connolly, the closing segment could be a brief pep talk from the President himself.

I suggest the program originate from Texas at 8 or 9 a. m. Saturday morning. On Friday telegrams can be sent to all state and local chairmen advising them to alert their workers to tune in Saturday morning, "for exciting information about the shift to Ford, etc." Ads can be placed in local papers (there is still time) and radio spots can be bought to promote the program. The program will be aimed at Ford workers, but the general public, of course, will be listening in. Thus the public will hear about the ground swell right from the horse's mouth.

They will also learn that the "Truman finish" is really working and that in these closing days the voters are moving away from the unknown Carter and shifting to the known and trusted Jerry Ford. In the final three days, there can be no better basis for a bandwagon.

RAM

October 28, 1976



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